

be consumed tonight except for the time between 8:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m., and 90 minutes beginning at 12 noon, with all that time to be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that at 1:30 Senator DASCHLE be recognized to use his leadership time, followed by Senator DOLE to use his leadership time, and the Senate then proceed to vote on the Cohen second degree, to be followed immediately by a vote on the Nunn amendment, as amended, if amended, to be followed by a vote on the Dole substitute, as amended, if amended, to be followed immediately by a third reading and final passage of S. 21, as amended, if amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES—ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President pro tempore of the Senate be authorized to appoint a committee on the part of the Senate to join with a like committee on the part of the House of Representatives to escort His Excellency Kim Yong-sam, President of the Republic of Korea, into the House Chamber for the joint meeting tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1995

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in recess until the hour of 8:30 a.m. on Wednesday, July 26, 1995, that following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be deemed approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then immediately resume S. 21, and that Senator DODD be recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Senate will be in controlled debate between 8:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m. on the Bosnia legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that at 10:40 a.m., the Senate stand in recess until 12 noon in order to hear an address by President Kim of the Republic of Korea.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, under the previous order, the Senate will begin voting on amendments and final pas-

sage of S. 21 at approximately 1:45 p.m. Therefore, Senators should be on notice that at least two votes will occur at that time. Following those votes, it will be the intention of the majority leader to begin the State Department authorization bill, and if consent cannot be granted the leader will move to proceed to S. 908.

ORDER FOR RECESS

Mr. ROTH. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order following the conclusion of the remarks of Senator DASCHLE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Democratic leader.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me describe for our colleagues briefly what this unanimous-consent agreement entails so everyone has a clear understanding of what the situation is.

We will come in at 8:30 in the morning. At that time, we will have debate for 2 hours and 10 minutes, to be equally divided. We will then recess to attend the joint meeting to hear the speech from the President of South Korea, reconvene at noon, and have an additional 90 minutes of debate, again to be equally divided, followed then by recognition of the two leaders for one-half hour under which leadership time will be used, and with the completion of that time, an immediate vote first on the Cohen amendment, and then on the Nunn amendment, and then finally on final passage.

So there will be two blocks of time, an hour on either side approximately in the morning, 45 minutes on either side beginning at noon.

What that means is that there is very limited time, and I encourage my colleagues to keep their remarks brief. We have already had a number of requests for time tomorrow morning on this side. I urge my colleagues to be accommodating and to take into account the fact that a number of Senators will wish to be recognized and to be heard. It is not my intent to allocate any time beyond 10 minutes tomorrow morning to any Senator except Senator NUNN, who has an amendment pending or during that period beginning tomorrow noon.

So this accommodates a number of concerns raised and certainly allows us to reach a time for final passage sometime in early afternoon, and I appreciate the cooperation of the Senators on both sides.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me make a few comments tonight—I have waited to allow other Senators to be heard—and I intend again to speak briefly tomorrow prior to the vote, but I wish to take some time this evening to express my personal position with regard to this issue and explain why I will be voting as I will tomorrow afternoon.

We are again, as others have indicated, in a crisis in Bosnia. Just today, as was reported several hours ago, in open violation of the United Nations mandates, the Bosnian Serbs have seized another safe area, Zepa, under the protection of UNPROFOR, the United Nations protection forces.

This despicable act of aggression by the Bosnian Serbs is now being followed by a brutal wave of ethnic cleansing that is forcing thousands of Bosnian women and children and elderly to flee for their lives. United Nations peacekeepers now find themselves under attack in a land where there is little peace to keep.

This is not the first time the Senate has debated whether to terminate the arms embargo in Bosnia. In the 103d Congress, the Senate voted on the matter seven different times.

Less than a year ago, on August 11, 1994, the Senate adopted two competing amendments to the fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense appropriations bill. The first of those amendments was offered by Senators DOLE and LIEBERMAN. It set a deadline of November 15 of last year for the President to break with our NATO allies and unilaterally end the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. It passed by a vote of 58 to 42.

The second amendment, offered by Senators Mitchell and Nunn, proposed a different scenario for lifting the arms embargo. It said first that if the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept a peace plan developed by the five-member contact group by October 15, 1994, then the United States would introduce and support a resolution in the United Nations to end the embargo completely.

Second, the Nunn-Mitchell amendment said that if the United Nations failed to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia by November 15 of 1994, and if the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the peace plan developed by the contact group, then no Department of Defense funds could be used to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia. In addition, the President would be required to submit a plan to equip and train the Bosnian armed forces and consult with Congress regarding that specific plan.

The Nunn-Mitchell language was included in the 1995 defense appropriations bill and signed into law on October 5 of last year.

The administration has been unable, unfortunately, to convince the United Nations Security Council to lift the arms embargo multilaterally. But in keeping with the congressional mandate, the United States last November ceased participation in the enforcement of the arms embargo against the

Bosnian Government. The administration also prepared and briefed the Congress on a plan to equip and train Bosnian armed forces. That is the historical context for the debate we are now experiencing here on the Senate floor.

Today, as this Senate once again debates whether to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, the credibility of UNPROFOR as peacekeepers has seriously eroded. What has not eroded is the overwhelming desire by the American people to see the bloodshed in Bosnia ended without committing United States ground troops to the Bosnian conflict.

Yet, the Dole-Lieberman amendment would make this all the more likely by requiring the President to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. This amendment will place United States ground troops in peril by intensifying the conflict at the time when United States troops were assisting our NATO allies in the difficult and dangerous mission of withdrawing their scattered forces from Bosnia.

Mr. President, today I received a letter from the President explaining his reasons for strongly opposing S. 21, which he believes "could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict itself."

I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks and urge all of my colleagues to consider carefully the President's concerns as we debate this legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DASCHLE. In contrast to those concerns, some of the sponsors of this amendment believe that by lifting the arms embargo, we can avoid the awful possibility of sending United States ground forces to Bosnia or we will let the Bosnians fight their own war. But it is not that simple, and we know that. We have a responsibility in this Senate to speak honestly to the American people, to tell them the potential consequences of lifting the arms embargo at this time and in this manner.

The Dole-Lieberman amendment requires the amendment to lift the embargo upon completion of the withdrawal of the United Nations protection forces or 12 weeks after the Bosnian Government requests the withdrawal of U.N. troops.

While the President may extend the deadline for lifting the embargo for up to 30 days, if he determines and reports in advance that the safety, security and successful completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR requires more time, the fundamental problem remains the same. Under this resolution, America's military and diplomatic policy in the Balkans conflict will be determined not by the President and not by the Congress, but by the actions of the Bosnian Government. Let me restate that, Mr. President, because it is

so critical to an appreciation of what this vote is all about. America's military and diplomatic policy in the Balkans will be determined not by the President, not by the Congress, but by the actions of the Bosnian Government.

What is not addressed in the bill is what happens when the U.N. forces, including substantial forces of our NATO allies, begin to withdraw from Bosnia. What happens? As we all know, the President has promised our NATO allies that the United States will provide up to 25,000 ground combat and logistic troops to assist in the safe evacuation of the U.N. peacekeepers from Bosnia. It could very well mean that we will be forced to send U.S. troops into a situation of heightened conflict that would risk American lives.

There is no question that the long nightmare in Bosnia must end. There is no question that the United States must play a role in resolving the nightmare. But let us be fully cognizant of what is truly at stake. Let us not pretend that there is an easy way out, because there is not. There should be no confusion in the minds of any of my colleagues regarding what a vote for this bill actually means. What it means is that the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, will be required by law to act in response to actions taken by a foreign government, the Government of Bosnia.

It means, by design, by this legislation itself, not only are we responding for the first time to a foreign government, required to respond in a way that may not be in our best interest, but we will have to ignore our closest allies and unilaterally lift the embargo to do so. It means this Nation will very likely be forced to assume sole responsibility for arming and training the Bosnian army. That is what this means.

And it means almost certainly—it means almost certainly—that in all of this, U.S. troops will die. This is a very slippery and treacherous slope we would embark on with the passage of this bill. And I would remind my colleagues that, if we enact it, we have got to be prepared to face the almost certain consequence of U.S. involvement of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia sometime very soon.

No one can read the accounts of ethnic cleansing, no one can look at those images of terrified refugees trudging a trail of tears from one Bosnian city to another in search of safety and not be horrified. I understand the arguments of those who say we cannot stand by and allow genocide to occur unchecked and unchallenged. I understand those arguments and agree with the moral concerns of those who advance them. But let us be clear, forcing U.N. protection forces to withdraw from Bosnia, which is the most likely effect of the bill, can only increase, not decrease, the horrifying acts of genocide in Bosnia.

Mr. President, what happens then? What happens when the U.N. forces are gone? What happens when NATO forces are gone? What happens when we continue to see night after night on the televisions across this land that genocide, the horrific acts that we have seen so far, and there is no one there to protect them? What will we do? Do we continue to say it is unacceptable and we will keep sending arms? And then watch this spread to Kosovo and Macedonia and other parts of this region? Is that what we are allowed to do?

What happens? We are left with the untenable choice after all our allies have washed their hands of this situation to accept one of two things: either to accept the horrific acts that we will continue to see, Serbians rolling over the Bosnians, with or without additional arms; or some unilateral insertion of American troops to stop this from spreading and to stop the holocaust that we see already. That is the untenable choice we are going to be given if our allies leave.

The very best case scenario, Mr. President, assumes that it will take 2 to 3 months to arm and train the Bosnian army. That scenario also assumes the arms will actually reach the Bosnian army and that they will not be captured by Bosnian Serbs and that the Croatian Government will allow all of the arms to be transported through their ports and across their land. That is what we are assuming, that somehow the Croatian Government will say, "OK. We will subject ourselves to whatever may come, all of the repercussions that may come with opening our ports to the Bosnians so that the Bosnians can ship tanks and heavy weaponry through our ports, through our land, to fight the Serbs." How many people really believe that is what is going to happen?

Mr. President, to suggest that the Bosnian Serbs will simply wait patiently and peacefully to decide what the Croatian Government is going to do, to decide whether or not the Bosnian army is being armed, seems to me to be very naive. We are talking about a regime that shells unarmed women and children as they wait in line in safe areas to collect their daily ration of water, a regime that is committed to ethnic cleansing. Should we really believe that this regime will hold its fire while the U.S. troops are training the Bosnian army to defend its own people? Can we, without endangering U.S. or allied troops, counter their fire? We know the answers. I have grave doubts.

The likelihood is that the Bosnian Government will escalate its campaign of genocide, will overrun the remaining safe areas quickly while it still has the ability to do so with little resistance. And it is entirely possible that this escalation could occur while U.S. troops are on the ground in Bosnia.

Then what? Those who would vote for this bill must also be concerned about

the very real possibility that withdrawing U.N. troops from Bosnia now and unilateral lifting of the embargo will greatly increase the risk that the war in Bosnia will spread. While the United States may have no direct national security interest in Bosnia itself, we certainly would have security interests at risk in fighting that would go south to the region in Kosovo, in Macedonia, where 500 U.S. troops are now stationed and involve our NATO allies of Greece and Turkey.

I believe that every Member of this Senate is deeply concerned about the tragic events that are taking place in Bosnia. And I believe that every Member of this Senate would like to see an end to the fighting that has left thousands of innocent people dead, millions of people displaced, torn from their homes, torn from their families. And I do not believe there is any disagreement about the goal we all share: to end the aggression and the atrocities born in the Bosnian conflict. The only disagreement is over how we can best achieve that goal. And the question is again before the Senate, should the United States on our own, against the wishes of our allies, end the arms embargo, or should we continue to act in concert with our allies and the United Nations to end the arms embargo? Considering this question, let us remember that Bosnia is not the only Nation in which the United States is engaged in a multinational effort to impose sanctions or take other collective measures. There is a collective action to impose sanctions against Iraq, against Cuba, against Libya, and it may become necessary to impose sanctions against others to control the spread of nuclear weapons, or for other reasons. All of these collective efforts are of great importance to this country.

Mr. President, if we unilaterally terminate the arms embargo, then what is to prevent our allies from doing the same on collective actions with which they disagree? What do we tell them? What standing do we have to suggest to them that they must comply but we will not?

We cannot have it both ways. We cannot expect our allies to support us on collective actions that suit us if we refuse to support other collective actions that may make us uncomfortable.

Senator EXON and others have raised important questions about the consequences that lifting the arms embargo could have on NATO. Fifty years ago this summer, the NATO alliance freed Europe, freed the world actually, from the great evil of Nazism. And for nearly 50 years, until the start of the Serbian aggression 40 months ago, NATO has kept peace in all of Europe. The NATO alliance was essentially there to end the cold war, and now it is essential to the continued stability of both Europe, as well as the United States.

Our NATO allies are imploring us not to lift the arms embargo unilaterally

while they have troops in Bosnia. They are imploring us to stand with them as they continue to seek a negotiated settlement against the odds, recognizing the difficulty, knowing there are no easy answers, appealing to us to help them as they have helped us.

What will happen if NATO chooses at some point in the future to ignore us? What will happen to NATO if we ignore the urgent pleas of our allies now? Those are questions we must all ask ourselves, Mr. President, before we cast this crucial vote tomorrow.

The end of the cold war and the resurgence of ethnic conflict and nationalism have created flashpoints all over this world. As the only remaining superpower, the United States is going to be asked again and again to send troops to resolve conflicts. Maybe these conflicts will have long histories and maybe they will be intractable, but we will be asked and, in some cases, we will commit, and as we make those decisions, we, by ourselves, must recognize that we cannot solve every problem in the world. We are going to need the help of our allies in dealing with these problems, and the only way we can deal with them without resorting to unilateral action is in those difficult times, as we see right now, we recognize the implications of breaking out from multilateral efforts and taking upon ourselves the responsibilities that come with the actions that we are now contemplating.

I understand and, frankly, I empathize with the motivations of my colleagues who have introduced and supported this bill. The carnage in Bosnia cries out for decisive action to end the suffering of helpless men, women and children who daily are abused, killed by Bosnian Serb gunmen. But we must not, we must not allow our frustration over the failure to reach a settlement of the Bosnian crisis to force us into actions that will only worsen the situation. We must not lose sight of the fact that breaking with our allies carries with it the risk of long-term consequences, and we must not pretend we are decreasing the chances that U.S. ground troops will be sent to fight in Bosnia when, in fact, the very opposite is likely to happen.

So as we debate this proposal, let us consider carefully what is in our Nation's best interest, in the best interest of the Bosnian people now and in the future. Let us recognize that this is an issue beyond Bosnia, in spite of our outrage, in spite of our frustration, in spite of our desire to respond in some way. We must also recognize the commitments, the long-term ramifications and the extraordinary nature of the decision that we will be making tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. President, we will have more time to talk about this tomorrow. I certainly hope that we will not allow our decision to be made by emotion, rather by objective calculation of what is best for the effort, what is best for our long-term alliances, what is best

for this country, what is best for the men and women we will be called upon to send to Bosnia should this situation worsen and should the need for U.S. forces be more evident as the weeks and months unfold.

Mr. President, I now yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, July 25, 1995.

Hon. THOMAS A. DASCHLE,

Democratic Leader,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. LEADER: I am writing to express my strong opposition to S. 21, the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995". While I fully understand the frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached a crossroads. As you know, we are working intensively with our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it has—for all its deficiencies—over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these significant results.

Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. I am determined to make every effort to provide, with our allies, for more robust and meaningful UNPROFOR action. We are now working to implement the agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the Rapid Reaction Force. These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is

complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void—in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

I am prepared to veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S. 21.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO JOHN MORAVEK

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, with the recent passing of John Moravek, our nation's legal community lost an outstanding and respected member, and many Americans lost a good friend and trusted adviser.

John worked for Century 21 real estate for 20 years—the past 15 as general counsel at the corporate headquarters in Irvine, California.

John was recognized as one of America's preeminent experts in his field in the field of real estate and franchise law, and he was one of few attorneys who had the honor of appearing before the United States Supreme Court.

I was not privileged to know John as well as his countless friends and colleagues, which included my daughter, Robin. But I do remember John as a man of great integrity, intelligence, compassion and curiosity.

The title of the obituary that ran in his hometown newspaper, the Long Beach Press-Telegram, summed it up best—"John Moravek was a renaissance man." John's interests ranged from classical guitar, to sailing, to painting, to politics. And while John and I didn't share beliefs on every political issue, we shared a sense of determination and a sense of humor.

Without exception, those who knew John well speak of a remarkable man with a passion for life—a man who

loved the ocean, who loved his job, who loved his friends, and who, above all, loved his wife, Lisa.

Mr. President, I join in extending my sympathies to Lisa Moravek, and to all who were proud to call John Moravek their friend.

IS CONGRESS IRRESPONSIBLE? CONSIDER THE ARITHMETIC!

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the impression will not go away: The \$4.9 trillion Federal debt stands today as a sort of grotesque parallel to television's energizer bunny that appears and appears and appears in precisely the same way that the Federal debt keeps going up and up and up.

Politicians like to talk a good game—and "talk" is the operative word—about reducing the Federal deficit and bringing the Federal debt under control. But watch how they vote.

As of yesterday, Monday, July 24, at the close of business, the total Federal debt stood at exactly \$4,938,384,897,270.48 or \$18,746.19 per man, woman, child on a per capita basis. *Res ipsa loquitur*.

Some control.

MEDICARE'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues in celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Medicare program. In light of recent Republican attacks on the program, it is particularly important that we take the time to recognize the value of the Medicare program to so many of our Nation's senior citizens and their families.

For decades, Democratic leaders have supported and reinforced the generally accepted proposition that health care is a fundamental human need and that, in a just society, there ought to be a way to provide for it. Since it was signed into law by President Johnson in July 1965 the Medicare program has succeeded where many had thought it would fail. The world's largest health care program, Medicare currently provides quality health services for more than 37 million American senior and disabled citizens at an administrative cost of just two percent.

In my State of Maryland alone, more than 604,000 seniors receive vital medical services through the Medicare program. Just yesterday, I visited a number of these individuals at the Parkville Senior Center in Baltimore County. Like a vast majority of seniors across the country, they too are concerned about the future of Medicare and how decisions now being made in Congress will effect the quality and availability of health care services for their generation. Quite frankly, Mr. President, I share their concerns.

For these senior citizens and the more than 37 million elderly Americans nationwide, the Republican budget cuts will be devastating. The Republican Budget Resolution cuts Medicare

by \$270 billion over the next 7 years. I know it is asserted that the actual dollar amounts for Medicare will not drop, but rather will increase gradually over the next 7 years. However, if the proposed dollar increases are not proportional to increases in Medicare enrollments and increases in the costs of medical care, the end result is massive cost-shifting and cuts in services for beneficiaries.

Mr. President, in my view, it is essential that we recognize that Medicare is not a system unto itself. The Medicare program is instead a large component of our Nation's health care system and it is illogical to assume that isolated cuts in Medicare will not adversely effect all Americans.

The Health Care Finance Administration [HCFA] estimates that Medicare payments account for 45 percent of health care spending by our Nation's elderly. Under the Republican budget plan, out-of-pocket costs to seniors are expected to increase by an average of \$900 per person year by the year 2002. Over a 7-year period, the typical beneficiary would pay an estimated \$3,200 in additional out-of-pocket costs. While this might not sound like much to some, these numbers become more significant when you factor in statistics that indicate that 60 percent of program spending was incurred on behalf of those with incomes less than twice the poverty level, and 83 percent of program spending was on behalf of those with annual incomes of less than \$25,000.

Clearly, when we talk about Medicare recipients, we are not talking about our Nation's wealthiest citizens. Many seniors live on fixed incomes. In fact, a large number of Medicare recipients depend on Social Security benefits for much of their income. According to HCFA, about 60 percent of the elderly rely on Social Security benefits for 50 percent or more of their income and 32 percent of the elderly rely on Social Security for 80 percent or more of their income. It is also estimated that as many as 2 million seniors can expect to see the value of their Social Security COLA's decline as increased Medicare costs consume 40 to 50 percent of Social Security COLA's by 2002. Requiring these individuals to pay more for their health care will directly undercut their standard of living. In my view, it is simply unacceptable to create a situation in which more and more seniors will see their resources stretched to the extent that they will have to choose between food and health care.

Mr. President, what I find most troubling is that Congressional Republicans are seeking to enact draconian spending cuts, the burden of which will fall primarily on the shoulders of the most vulnerable of our society, in order to provide a significant tax cut for the very wealthy. The future health security of our Nation's seniors should not be jeopardized in order to create a pool of funds for a tax break which almost