

much I appreciate the very, very positive and constructive working relationship that I have had with my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES]. He was my chairman during the last Congress. His friendship is very important to me, and I must say that during this process of transition, working together has been extremely positive in spite of the fact that the shift in policy direction is not necessarily always to the agreement of the gentleman. He has been willing to communicate at every step of the way and has been very cooperative and helpful in the process, and I appreciate that.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. STOKES. I would like to say how much I appreciate the comments of the chairman of the subcommittee, and I would just like to say in return that working with the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS] has been one of the most enriching experiences of my career here in the Congress, and I think I said this on other occasions, but I reiterate it here again, that notwithstanding whatever philosophical changes or difference now exist as a result of the majority changing in this Congress, working with the gentleman from California has been an experience which has meant a great deal to me. I have enjoyed cooperating and working with him, and while we have changed chairmanships, from myself over to him, I do want him to know that I have enjoyed working very closely with him and look forward to a continued personal relationship of the kind that we have had.

Mr. LEWIS of California. I appreciate the comments of the gentleman very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, I have an amendment that is currently filed at the desk that would bar the Federal Government from making any per diem payments to a State veterans administration nursing home if that nursing home has undergone privatization which results in the diminution of services or care to the veterans, the quality of their health care, or quality of life. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that in your judgment the Secretary of Veterans Affairs currently has this authority and would indeed be required under current law to bar per diem payments to any State nursing home who sees a decline in the quality of care following a privatization of services.

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Since in your judgment, Mr. Chairman, this authority is already vested in the department, I assume it is your judgment that it would be unnecessary for the House to reaffirm this authority.

Because we share a concern with a possible privatization in the district of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mrs. ROUKEMA], but in the county which we jointly represent, I would like at this time, Mr. Chairman, to yield to Mrs. ROUKEMA.

Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, actually I wanted to hear from the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS], his observations regarding our understanding concerning the existing legislation that controls this issue.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TORRICELLI. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding the intent of the gentleman's amendment is already existent in current law, and the Department of Veterans Affairs has the legal authority to withhold these payments if the concerns that the gentleman has made come to fruition.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, if the privatization of a Federal-State nursing home were to happen, and the concerns I enumerated, such as a decrease in the number of nurses or other tangible signs of a decrease in the quality of care provided to the veterans would occur, the Federal Government has the legal authority to withhold per diem payments to that facility.

Mr. Chairman, the concurrence of the gentleman from California, Chairman LEWIS, with this judgment and his commitment to work with me and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mrs. ROUKEMA, to require that the VA take this action seriously, is extremely important. I take from the gentleman's comments, Mr. Chairman, that indeed is the belief and commitment of the gentleman of California [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, my colleagues on the committee have my commitment.

Mrs. ROUKEMA. If the gentleman would yield further, I certainly appreciate the assurance of the gentleman from California, Chairman LEWIS, and would like to make some important observations of my own.

Mr. Chairman, over the last few days I have conducted extensive research on Mr. TORRICELLI's amendment. We have confirmed several key points:

Whether our Paramus home is operated by State employees, private contractors or some combination of the two, one thing is clear: Responsibility for the quality of care at the home will not change.

It rests with the New Jersey Commissioner for Veterans Affairs as monitored by the New Jersey Department of Health and enforced by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA's quality assurance program, as outlined in subchapter 5 of chapter 17 of title 38 of the United States Code, includes precise standards on both the range and the quality of care and—this is critical—an enforcement regime.

Throughout the State's privatization study, I have expressed serious reserva-

tions. In fact, based on recent bids, I believe this proposal will not go forward.

Our State commissioner of veterans affairs, Gen. Paul Glazer sat in my office last Wednesday and pledged that the quality of care will not be diminished whether services are contracted out or not. I know that to be his commitment, the Governor's commitment and the New Jersey legislatures.

Mr. Chairman, when it comes to our veterans, we cannot ignore our sacred commitment to protect them in their time of need, just as they served us in our time of need. We must preserve, protect and enhance the quality of care at the veterans' health care facilities around the country, including our veterans' memorial home at Paramus.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEWIS of California. If the gentleman will yield further, I appreciate my colleagues bringing this matter to my attention. I assure both Members we will continue to work with them. If our good offices will help open the channels of communication with the Department of Veterans Affairs, we are happy to be of service.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the gentleman from California. The gentleman from New Jersey [Mrs. ROUKEMA] joined with me in this, and the bipartisan leadership of the New Jersey legislature, to assure that we will watch the Paramus Nursing Home, the quality of its care, the numbers of nurses, the quality of the food, to ensure that these people, who served our country so well, are not jeopardized.

Mr. Chairman, I will not ask for my amendment.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PORTER) having assumed the chair, Mr. COMBEST, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill, (H.R. 2099) making appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS

SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY: CONTINUE B-2 BOMBER PRODUCTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I took this special order today in order to again be able to present my very strong and deeply held concerns about the future

of the U.S. defense policy and defense posture. I have served on the defense committee on appropriations for the last 17 years, and I can remember very well, almost vividly, when President Carter and Secretary Harold Brown made the decision to start producing a stealthy long-range bomber known to the American people as the B-2 bomber.

We are now at the point in this program where we have committed ourselves to purchase 20 of these B-2 bombers. They are being delivered to Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. They have met, according to Secretary Darleen Druyun, all requirements under the block 10 configuration, and they will be steadily improved between now and the year 2000.

In the defense appropriations bill and in the defense authorization bill in the House, there has been authorization and a recommendation to the House to appropriate funds to do two additional planes, the long-lead for two additional planes, and I want to rise today in very strong support of that recommendation.

We have a very difficult problem as we look at our bomber force. Today America possesses over 90 B-52's, and over 90 B-1B's. They represent the bulk of our American bomber force. Unfortunately, neither one of these bombers are able to penetrate air space where we have Russian surface-to-air missiles. One of the problems we face today is that Russian surface-to-air missiles have proliferated around the world. In fact, just a month ago, when Capt. Scott O'Grady was shot down, he was shot down by an A-6, a Russian surface-to-air missile in Bosnia, and he was flying a nonstealthy airplane.

One of the lessons that we learned in the Gulf war in the first 10 days of that war is that the F-117's, the stealthy attack aircraft, were used for only a small number of sorties, about 2.5 percent of the sorties, but they were able to knock out 40 percent of the most difficult targets. The reason for that is when you put smart conventional weapons together with stealth, you are able to go in against the most heavily defended targets, knock them out, destroy those surface-to-air missiles, destroy those radars, and the pilots are able to then come out and survive.

This is a truly revolutionary capability. If you think back to World War II, if you think back to Vietnam and Korea, we lost a lot of our planes and a lot of our pilots because they were shot down. As I have mentioned, with the proliferation of Russian surface-to-air missiles in Korea, Iran, Iraq, Bosnia, all over the world, China, our planes, if they fly in over enemy airspace, are going to get shot down unless they are stealthy.

So the decision that we are about to make on whether we should continue to build the B-2 bomber is, in my judgment, one of the most important defense decisions that we will make in this decade.

I happen to believe that the B-2 bomber offers us a revolutionary new conventional capability. You have got long range. This plane can fly over 5,000 miles, and, with one aerial refueling, it can go one-third of the way around the Earth.

When you combine that with smart conventional munitions, JDAM's or GATS/GAM or the sensor-fused weapon, you give this airplane a tremendous conventional capability.

Rand did a study in 1991 that looked at what would have happened if we had had the B-2 operation and we had loaded it up with sensor-fused weapons against Saddam Hussein's invading division from Iraq into Kuwait. In that scenario, three B-2's, each B-2 would have had about 1400 of these little bomblets, and they would come down with little parachutes and hit the moving Iraqi vehicles, this division in column, and they were able in this scenario, in this simulation, to knock out 46 percent of those moving mechanized vehicles, and that includes tanks.

We have never had that kind of a conventional capability against a mobile division. That is why I think this is such an important decision. Rand, General Jasper Welch, and I even asked Colin Powell, I said what would be the ideal number of B-2's? And in each of these studies, the recommendation was somewhere between 40 and 60.

So I believe that the decision on the part of the House thus far to go forward with longlead for two additional planes is a very important decision.

The other point is that we have an industrial base out in California where we produce the B-2 at Palmdale, and the Northrop Co. receives parts from all over the country, but particularly parts from Texas and Washington and other States, Ohio, and they put that plane together there. That industrial base, in my judgment, is very important, for if we shut this line down and we have a bomber force today which is not adequate in my judgment to the future challenges, then it is going to take us a number of years to get that line reopened.

In fact, if we wait 5 years, I am told it will cost somewhere between \$6 and \$10 billion just to reopen the line. For that, we will get no additional airplanes. So if we keep the line open now and start moving toward buying the right number of B-2's, we can save the taxpayers a great deal of money.

Now, I also want to talk about the administration's very, I think, flawed study on the bomber force. That study I think was flawed in several respects. First of all, it said that we were going to have in the future 14 days of actionable warning time in order to move tactical aircraft like the F-16's, and F-15's, and F-18's out to wherever the problem would be in the world.

Well, we did not have 14 days of actionable warning time before Pearl Harbor, we did not have 14 days of actionable warning time before the Korean war.

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We only had about 3 days of actionable warning time before the Gulf war. And because the picture was clouded, as it always is in these situations, with the intelligence community saying, yes, we think Saddam Hussein is going to invade, and the leaders in that part of the world saying, no, he would never do that, then we took no steps whatsoever.

In fact, had it not been for the 5 months that Saddam Hussein gave us, he could have kept coming. He could have gone right into Saudi Arabia. And it took us 5 months to get all the equipment out there in order to be able to effectively deal with his invasion and to throw him out of Kuwait.

Now, what if we do not have 5 months to build up our forces? What if it is in a place in the world where there is not appropriate infrastructure, landing fields, and harbors and everything else that was necessary and fortunately was available to us in Saudi Arabia so that we could move our forces? What if that does not exist?

Then it is the condition of the bomber force that that force can react in a matter of hours. That is going to be crucial for the security interests of our country.

I am convinced that if Saddam Hussein had known that we had 60 B-2's, 20 in Guam, 20 in Diego Garcia, 20 at Whiteman Air Force Base, he might have thought long and hard. If they were married up with a sensor fused weapon, the smart conventional submunition that I described earlier, that if he had known that, he might have thought long and thought long and hard about whether he should invade because he would have known that his Republican Guard would have been destroyed before it got into Kuwait.

That is, in my judgment, my colleagues, a revolutionary conventional potential capability. So buying enough of this airplane I think makes a great deal of sense.

The other problem is in the weapons, in the administration's study on bombers. They say we should rely on stand-off capabilities. In other words, we should load up the B-52's and the B-1's that cannot penetrate with long-range cruise missiles. Well, there are a couple problems with that. The first problem is that the long-range cruise missiles cost \$1.2 million per missile. So, if you have 12 to 14, you can do the math, it is going to cost somewhere between \$15 and \$20 million for a load, for one plane load of those missiles.

The other problem is they can only go to a fixed target. They have no utility against a mobile target, a mobile division moving in the field. They also will not help us go after the launchers, the mobile launchers that the Scud missiles utilized. So they have very major deficiencies.

What are the costs of the weapons on the B-2 bomber? The JDAM's, the 2,000-pound bomb, the equivalent of what we

used on F-117 and the F-15 Eagles, they only cost \$20,000. The B-2 would handle 16 of them. So that is \$320,000. That is one-fourth the cost of one cruise missile. So the difference in weaponry is very, very important. And the administration has no plan to buy all these long-range cruise missiles, and it certainly is not part of their budget.

The other weapon that I mentioned, the sensor fused weapon, a load of those would cost about one-fourth the cost of a load of standoff cruise missiles.

So the difference in cost in weaponry is very, very significant, and as I mentioned before, the difference in cost, if you shut this line down and have to open it up and you will have to spend \$6 to \$10 billion, and you will not get a thing for that except to open the line up, and then it is going to take a number of years to start producing the planes again. To me that just does not make sense.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from California, the distinguished chairman of the HUD appropriations subcommittee and a very strong supporter of the B-2 and one of the most knowledgeable members of the defense appropriations subcommittee.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, let me say that it is truly a privilege for me to serve on the subcommittee of appropriations that deals with our national defense. There is little question that the gentleman from Washington is one of the House's experts in this entire field. He and I have had a chance to look at various elements of our defense system. That is what we are talking about, we are talking about peace in the world, creating a foundation for our own national defense and the defense of freedom that really stops the prospect of major confrontation in the world.

There is no question that America is on the edge of having the kind of force that will allow us to preserve the world from major conflict. One of the elements of that force that could bring us to peace in our time is the B-2. It is an incredible vehicle. We all know the role that stealth will play in our air future. The B-2 has a tremendous potential for America's future in terms of peace.

Nobody ever said that peace was inexpensive. But if there is a responsibility for the national government, if there is a reason for us to have a national Congress, the reason is to make sure that we have adequate national security.

Fundamental to that is to have this aircraft available in numbers that will allow us to make that difference in the world. And without the gentleman's leadership, I think this issue might well have been dead by now. That is, we would have gone in a different direction. If there is a phase in terms of defense spending this year, where we should be willing to make a sacrifice, it is to make sure that the B-2 is avail-

able and in a quantity that makes sense.

So I want the gentleman to know that I very much appreciate the work he has done here and look forward to continuing working with him in that regard.

Mr. DICKS. I think we ought to have a little colloquy here, a little dialog on this.

I appreciate that the gentleman has been on the floor and has been very much involved in other matters. He makes some very important points. The thing that I have always believed in and the great secret of our success in the cold war was that America stood for strength but it also stood for deterrence. We had a strong capable military so that we could deter the Soviet Union and its allies from ever attacking us in NATO.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Absolutely.

Mr. DICKS. It was our strength and our commitment. The fact is, in this dialog here today, that was bipartisan, Democrats and Republicans joining together to foster a defense policy for this country that I think is so important.

On this question, what we are really talking about is a revolutionary conventional capability. I think once we can demonstrate it and show the skeptics, including some in this administration and the previous administration, that in fact this capability can work and will work effectively, as Rand has said in its simulation that it will work by destroying 46 percent of Saddam's invading division, I mean, to me that will give us for the first time conventional deterrence. We have nuclear weapons, too many nuclear weapons. But we know we do not want to ever have to use those nuclear weapons.

A conventional deterrent, on the other hand, if deterrence fails and someone makes a move from North Korea or from Iran or Iraq, then we have got the capability to fly this plane a third of the way around the world with one aerial refueling and with these smart conventional weapons attack these mobile divisions. Frankly, we have never had a conventional capability to do that.

That is why this decision is so important.

The other point, of course, is that of maintaining the industrial base for bombers, and this is a revolutionary technology. We are talking about stealth, long range, and a tremendous conventional capability against mobile targets, against, as the gentleman and I both have been following in the analysis of the gulf war, one of the biggest problems we had was finding those Scud launchers. With the block 30 upgrade on the radar of the B-2, we will have an ability to fuse into that cockpit the kind of intelligence that we are now able to gather so that we can go after those mobile targets.

Remember, if those Scuds had been accurate, which they thank God were not in the gulf war, and the upgrades in

Scuds were going to be accurate, or if they had used chemical, biological or, God forbid, nuclear weapons, then we would have been in real trouble and our forces would be in real trouble. We had really no capability to go and find those mobile targets. The B-2 could be used in that respect.

Mr. LEWIS of California. In those circumstances, without that force available, if those Scuds had been accurate, potentially thousands of American lives could have been lost.

The gentleman has articulate very well in our committee the fact that just two B-2's can deliver a force half-way around the world with so few numbers of personnel involved. It takes a whole armada of aircraft to replace that force. That is a great value, not only in terms of preserving the peace but it is less expensive than continuing to build and maintain that armada, of aircraft.

Mr. DICKS. It is so true. The gentleman is exactly correct. When you have this standard package in our chart, the value of stealth, it was like I think 76 airplanes and 145 crewmen that went in, in the most heavily defended targets in Iraq, and they got turned back. They could not do the job. So they had to come back. We risked all those lives.

We did the same thing the next day with eight F-117's, which were equivalent to one B-2. So one B-2, with two pilots and the 18 on, the 16 2,000-pound bombs, each one of which is individually targetable, could have done the job. They would have gotten the job done that the eight F-117's were able to accomplish but the huge package of nonstealthy airplanes were not able to accomplish.

The other thing is, as the gentleman points out, because the weapons are less expensive, and because we do not want to lose any lives, I mean, stealth makes it possible for our kids to go in against the most heavily defended targets, take them out and come out alive. If we said, you have to throw the B-52 in there or the B-1B in there, they would be shot down by Russian surface-to-air missiles. I do not know how a commander would face his troops and say, go do that mission, especially if we have ability as a country and turned it down to put those young men in stealthy airplanes.

Think about Captain O'Grady. He is in that F-16, a great airplane, but it was not stealthy. It got shot down. In our overview of this, in the intelligence committee, I asked the admiral who briefed us, I said, would his chances of survival have been greater if he were in the F-117, another attack aircraft, but stealthy? He said, they would have been greater, Congressman. Probably he would have not been shot down.

One last point, we had to send in two big helicopters full of Marines to rescue the downed pilot. We put all those young men's lives at risk. They got him out, and it was a great mission, but they never, if it had been a

stealthy airplane, they would have never had to go in there and do it. So the value of stealth is not only that it saves us money, but most importantly, it saves us American lives.

Think about World War II, when we lost plane after plane over Nazi Germany, that were shot down by either fighters or knocked down by enemy aircraft. Now in this world we live in, we have this incredible Russian surface-to-air missiles that have proliferated in the world. So if we are going to send somebody in, we better have them in a stealthy airplane in order to win that air war quickly, gain superiority so that we can then use the stealthy assets after we have got total air superiority.

Mr. LEWIS of California. If I could make one more point, then we might get the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] involved, who is a member of the authorizing committee on national security.

There is a tendency for people to believe, my colleagues, in this day and age of supposed peace in the world, because there is not a major confrontation between the Soviet Union or Russia, that no longer is there a need for a national defense. Nothing could be further from the truth. We are living in a shrinking world with elements of potential danger that we have never really thought about in the past.

America needs to be strong to preserve the peace. One element of our strength that is critical is the expansion of Stealth. The B-2 bomber as a vehicle is going to make all the difference in terms of how many lives we would have to put at risk over the next several decades. It is a very, very important item. I want to congratulate my colleague for his continued work on behalf of this effort.

Mr. DICKS. I would like to also to yield to the chairman of the Procurement Subcommittee of the House Committee on National Security, another Californian, but also someone who has been at the forefront of ensuring that America has a strong national defense.

The chairman was able to put into his mark and defend on the floor the authorization for two additional B-2s. Now we are going to have the appropriations bill in the next day or two. I hope that the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS] and I are as successful as the gentleman from California was. I think it is important for the American people, for the press, for our colleagues to understand our intellectual rationale for this important defense system, one that I am proud to happen to start under a Democratic President but has been supported by Republicans and Democrats in the Congress for the last 15 years. I am honored to yield to our colleagues and chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

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Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I want to thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] for the work

that he has done on this system because he is one of the gentlemen who understands the importance of projecting American air power, and he has done a lot to make that power a reality. The gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS] also has been a very effective and articulate advocate for a strong air power.

Air power is now very, very important to us. Let us go over a couple of those things, because the gentleman talked about the history of stealth. Jimmy Carter did, in the Carter administration, initiate the original work on stealth. I know people like Dr. Johnny Foster, Bill Perry, Paul Kominski, all had a hand in that, and the reason we tried to build a radar or a plane that could evade radar is because of our Vietnam experience.

Mr. Speaker, in Vietnam we lost over 2,200 planes, and we all, all of a sudden, realized and recognized that Russia could market these SAM missiles, these surface-to-air missiles, to any Third World country around. With a few weeks of training, this Third World country, with its personnel, could put together teams to operate the SAM's and they could effectively shoot down high-performance American aircraft, and they did that by the thousands in Vietnam.

America has always been the land of creativity, the land of innovation, and especially in military areas we have always been ahead of the rest of the world. Our best people, having watched those 2,200 planes go down with American pilots in them or having to bail out of them, some of them POW's—

Mr. DICKS. Some Members of this very institution. Our colleagues have been POW's.

Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely. The POW community has had an effect on the United States Congress, House and Senate, because members of the Hanoi Hilton, being so respected and so focused upon by our colleagues and by our constituents, have come to this body and made a difference.

Mr. Speaker, our best scientists sat down and said radar was "probably the greatest military invention of this century. We may be able to create a system that can evade radar; that can be invisible to radar."

I have to say this as a Republican. We got after Jimmy Carter. We said that is so impossible, so incredible, such a tightly held secret, this was back in the 1970's, we said Jimmy Carter has done a disservice to national security to even mention that we could avoid radar. We got after him as if he had given away nuclear secrets, because that invention was such a fantastic thing.

Mr. Speaker, we built the stealth aircraft, and my colleague mentioned the gentleman that was shot down over Bosnia. I know the opponents to B-2 say that that has no relevance, let us not think about that. Of course, that guy going down in that F-16, that Scott O'Grady, was the reason we built

stealth, whether it was in a bomber or a fighter aircraft.

One reason we did it was because these SAM missiles are mobile. They are mobile missiles. They move around. Our intelligence thought there were not any missiles in that particular place in Bosnia. Lo and behold, a SAM site turned up and took down the best pilots and the best planes we have at 20,000 feet. That is the reason we did the stealth technology.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] has gotten up on this floor, when we put up this big package or packages of 38, 45 and 75 conventional aircraft that are required to do the job of one stealth aircraft. Let us remember the reason for that, and the gentleman from Washington has gone through that, is because to support just a couple of bomb-dropping aircraft, like one of our first Desert Storm packages had 38 planes in it, only eight of them actually dropped bombs. Those were British Tornados and American A-6 attack planes from our carriers. Only eight bomb droppers. The other 30 aircraft had to handle the SAM missile sites. They had to handle the air-to-air in case Iraq scrambled some airplanes to meet them. They had to handle the radar jamming. We had this big armada of support airplanes to support just eight bomb droppers in this one task force.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] said, "Yeah, maybe that is true, but we still have all those planes, so we can go in, instead of going with the one stealth bomber, we can go in with the 38 aircraft." He has not been watching the drawdown in the United States Air Force. At that time we had 24 air wing equivalents to project American air power. We now have cut down to almost half of that, to 13 air wing equivalents. We are down from 24 air wings to 13 air wings.

Mr. Speaker, a whole bunch of those support airplanes that worked out in the gulf are now at the bone yard in the desert of Arizona. Those are not operational aircraft. If the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. KASICH] wants to call them up, if we should have another Desert Storm, they are not around.

We get to the final point, which is the multiplier effect that stealth gives you. The one stealth bomber can hit the same 16 targets. If you want to give it redundant coverage, you can use two bombers as a package of 75 conventional aircraft.

Mr. Speaker, the last point the gentleman made before I came on the floor, and I was really taken with this, is he talked about people. He talked about the pilots. With that package of 75 conventional aircraft to do the same 16 targets as only one stealth bomber, you expose 134 crew members.

Mr. DICKS. That is right.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, those are the guys on the front of Time magazine when they get captured; those are the guys that get dragged through the streets by our adversaries; those are

the guys that are forced to write confessions under torture. One reason we built this stealth bomber and this stealth technology is so we would not have those guys being shot down and we would bring them home to their families.

Mr. Speaker, with the conventional mission that the opponents of B-2 would like to go with, on a conventional mission to hit 16 targets, you risk 134 crew members. If you send one B-2, you risk a total of two crew members. If you send two B-2's, you risk a total of four crew members.

I would say to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS], I would feel pretty bad about telling our Air Force personnel every time in the past, in this century, when we have had top technology, we field it. The best stuff we could get, we field it. Chuck Yeager shot down one of the first German aircraft, a jet aircraft, when he had a propeller driven plane. He was real happy to get into that X-1 that could go faster than the speed of sound in the late 1940's and drive American technology.

Mr. Speaker, we have always given our kids technology. This will be the first time we will tell our pilots, "You know, we spent \$30 billion developing a technology that makes your plane virtually invisible to radar, but we decided not to give it to you because we think it is too expensive."

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, the other point is the gentleman made a very major point here. We have spent all this money to get us where we are, and what are we talking about, by the Air Force's own numbers, \$15.3 billion, to build 20 more of these airplanes. That is a much lower price than we purchased the first 20. It is about a half to a third of the cost. The gentleman and I have been around quite a while, and at some point, they will say, "Oh my gosh, we made a terrible mistake, we should have built this." Then we will have to reopen the line.

The Air Force tells me it is \$6 billion to \$10 billion to get the line up if we wait 5 years. For that, we get nothing. It seems to me while the line is open out in California, we should continue at a low rate to purchase these bombers. It will keep the industrial base alive, keep it there in place, and it will allow us to have the most modern technology for our young men and women to fly and use if we have another major problem.

The world is not any safer. I think the world was safer during the cold war, if you want to know the truth. Now you have all kinds of problems around the world. It is a combination of saving money in the weapons that are used, the JDAM's weapon for \$20,000 apiece versus the standoff cruise missile for \$1.2 million apiece. They cannot have any capability against mobile targets.

That is the other problem, Mr. Speaker, with saying we will take the B-52's and the B-1's, and load them with standoff cruise missiles. Those

standoff cruise missiles only go to a fixed point and they cannot be effective against the mobile issues. We have not only the division coming in either in South Korea or in Iraq or Iran, but you have this problem with the scud launchers. That was a major problem in the gulf war. We could not find those scud launchers. Again, with better intelligence and with stealth, we can put the B-2 or the F-117's in against those mobile targets.

This is, in my judgment, a revolutionary capability. To not get enough of it while the line is open just defies common sense. When I look at the entire budget, and some people say look at our aircraft carriers, and I am as strong a supporter as the gentleman is of our aircraft carriers, unfortunately a decision was made to stop building the stealthy long-range attack aircraft coming off our aircraft carriers. The aircraft today coming off those carriers are not stealthy and have limited range, so we cannot rely on them either.

The B-1's cannot penetrate, the B-52's cannot penetrate, the planes coming off the carriers cannot penetrate. The only thing we have are the F-117's and the B-2's. In my mind, why would I not go out and reshuffle my defense dollars and buy the most incredible capability, the capability for the next 30 years, that can deal with the radars? To me, this does not make any sense. I am hard pressed to come up with a rationale, especially when the B-2 has this potential against mobile targets. That is what bothers me the most.

None of these other weapons, Mr. Speaker, have the capability to go against these mobile targets before we have complete air cover and air cap because of the surface-to-air missiles that go along with the division.

I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman mentioned our ability to project power off aircraft carriers. I was reminded again, as we all were who watched CNN and read the front page of the newspapers, of American, I believe it was A-7 aircraft that were shot down by Syrian gunners. I believe they were using the same Russian-made surface-to-air missiles that are proliferated throughout the world. That was the pilot that, I believe, Jesse Jackson went over and rescued amid enormous publicity and self-promotion by Syria.

The gentleman has made his point, but the point has really been validated every time we have had to send conventional aircraft into areas that maintain these surface-to-air missile sites. We have been shot down.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, they have proliferated all over the world. This is not something that is just in a few countries. We have them in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China. We have them in Bosnia, where Captain O'Grady was shot down.

Another thing here, for some of the crowd of American people saying, "Are

these two Congressmen just up here by themselves?" I feel very proud of the fact that without any request from me or anybody else who is a B-2 supporter, seven former Secretaries of Defense wrote the President of the United States, and this is unprecedented in the 17 years I have been on the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations, and said, "Mr. President, please keep this line open. This is the kind of weapon system that we are going to need in the future. Twenty of them simply is not enough."

One of those colleagues, Mr. Speaker, former Congressman Dick Cheney was the one who made the decision with Les Aspin, our former colleague, former Secretary of Defense, now deceased, to limit this to 20. There was absolutely no military rationale for that decision. It was strictly a decision made on what Congress would go along with. At that time there was some question about the plane, but now we have six of these at Whiteman Air Force Base, according to the pilots there. One just flew all the way to Europe, did a mock bombing run over the Netherlands, went to Paris, engines running, changed crews and flew back to Whiteman Air Force Base.

Mr. Speaker, this thing is going to work. It has a 95-percent mission reliability, and it is at the block 10 configuration. Over the next 4 years it will be upgraded to block 30, which will give us this revolutionary capability.

Mr. Speaker, to have seven former Secretaries of Defense write the President and say this would be a terrible mistake, is, I think, one of the most unprecedented things I have seen. In light of all that, I am amazed, frankly, and with the importance of power projection in this very dangerous world, and with the potential conventional utility of this system, why we are killing this at this point. I think it is the greatest mistake that I can think of since I have been in the Congress and involved in defense matters. This is a terrible, awful decision. We in the Congress, under the Constitution, as the gentleman well knows, serving as a senior member of the Committee on National Security, ultimately have the responsibility for raising navies and armies and, by inference, air forces. It is the constitutional responsibility of the Congress of the United States, and I am proud of the fact that we have stood up on this issue and are trying to correct a very serious mistake in judgment.

The gentleman from California has been willing to stand shoulder to shoulder to discuss this issue, to lay out our rationale with the American people, and I just am very pleased that he has been willing to continue to engage in this colloquy to explain to the American people why we feel so strongly about this and why we think those seven Secretaries of Defense were correct.

□ 1600

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding, because I think the fact that seven former Secretaries of Defense have endorsed the B-2 has some significance.

You ask yourself, "Why would they do that?" I think the answer is laid out in the history of the last 10 or 15 years.

We review the Libya raid. The Libya raid followed Mr. Qadhafi's killing, terrorist style, of American soldiers in Germany. We had the goods on him. We knew that he had ordered these assassinations, these murders. When he did that, Ronald Reagan decided to strike him. But we found out we had a problem. I was being interviewed by British television, I believe, shortly after the raid was made, and I cannot remember the name of the interviewer, but in Great Britain, Maggie Thatcher had allowed our F-111's, this medium bomber, to take off from Heathrow Airport in Great Britain. But there was great consternation in Britain because they were letting us do this, because the Libyans had great terrorist capability, there had been threats that if anybody helped the Americans at any time, they would be struck, they were very worried about it, and I was talking to the commentator, I was being interviewed, and I said, "Thank God for Maggie Thatcher. It's nice of her to let us at least use the facilities in Great Britain to strike this terrorist."

The commentator said, "Congressman, don't speak too soon. We've just taken a television poll." In Great Britain they apparently wire a sample number of television sets so when they ask a national question, would you vote so and so or would you do so and so, people can just punch the buzzer or the button on their set and that gives the BBC an instant poll.

He said, "We've just polled the British people and by a majority," they are against Maggie Thatcher having let our F-111's, which had already been done obviously, but having let the Americans use British air bases to launch this strike against Mr. Qadhafi.

Here we had the British people, we had a great British stateswoman, Maggie Thatcher, helping Ronald Reagan, helping America to launch that strike against Qadhafi. But a little farther away, in France, the French decided not even to let us fly over their airspace, and they forced our F-111 pilots to fly to their border and then we had to skirt around their perimeter at a great loss of time and fuel, and fatigue of our pilots, because we were not even being allowed to fly over France to strike a terrorists who had murdered American soldiers.

When we finally got to Libya, we made the surprise strike on Mr. Qaddafi. The U.S. Navy, in assisting with that strike, had moved about \$6 billion worth of carrier task force com-

ponents into the Gulf of Sidra, just outside of the Gulf of Sidra, and they launched naval aircraft from there.

The point is that when the going gets tough, you cannot count on having a batch of allies that are going to let you use their airspace, let you use their runways, have their cooperation.

The great thing about the B-2 bomber, and I think this is a reason the seven former Secretaries of Defense support the B-2 bomber, is that they believe in the ability to project American power early.

That means when an armor attack starts, you stop that attack before you have to send a bunch of Marines and U.S. infantry over there to stop it with soft bodies. You do things quick.

You can fly the B-2 out of the United States. You do not have to ask Maggie Thatcher, you do not have to ask the French, you do not have to ask somebody else, you can fly it out of the United States and you can make a strike in the Middle East. Now, you may have to recover in Diego Garcia, but we own the Diego Garcia base. We do not have to ask anybody's permission to land there, and you can project American power from our shores. That is what these gentlemen are concerned about. Every American father and mother who have children who may at one time be in the ground forces of the United States have a real interest in having powerful air forces.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman makes a very important point. I do not know if he was here on the floor, but I suggested that if we had had, say, 60 B-2's, 20 at Diego Garcia as the gentleman suggests, Guam and at Whiteman, Saddam might not have made the attack. If he did, we could have obliterated that division, we could have stopped the war.

Do you know what it cost us to move all the forces out to the gulf to fight the war, just in transportation? Ten billion dollars. The cost of the war to us and our allies was \$60 billion, for a total of \$70 billion. With an adequate bomber force that is stealthy, that has long range and can use smart conventional weapons against mobile targets like Saddam's republican guard, if we could just prevent one war out there in the future sometime somewhere, whether it is North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or wherever, that would save and pay for this more than once. There is nothing else that can do it.

That is why it blows my mind when people talk about priorities. Well, other things are more important. I say, I cannot think of one except the young men and women serving in our military today. They are more important, obviously. They are first in my mind. But in terms of other weapons systems, other things that we are doing, that have the capability to give us conventional deterrence and if deterrence fails, a way to knock out the enemy quickly and save American lives while we are doing it and not even risk them because of stealth, I cannot imagine

how this Congress in its wisdom can stop this system when every export has said that 20 of these is simply not enough, that you need somewhere between 40 and 60.

Colin Powell, as good a military mind as I know, he has recommended to Chaney 50. Sometimes you have got to make hard decisions. You have been on the Hill for a long time as I have. I asked the staff of the Committee on Appropriations, I said, "This is going to cost us about \$2 billion a year for about 7 or 8 years in order to get the additional 20 planes."

I said, "How much did we cut out of the defense budget, about \$250 billion, how much did we cut out just in a cut here, a cut there, through the thousands of line items that are in that budget?" The answer is in both this year and last year, \$3.5 billion in just low-priority items.

Right there is more than enough money to finance the B-2. I know the gentleman has been urging reform in the procurement areas where we have thousands and thousands of extra buyers or shoppers or whatever you call them. There is another way to save some money that we could use to finance the acquisition of these weapons systems. You are the procurement subcommittee chairman. You know as I do that procurement in the peak of the Reagan buildup was \$135 billion a year in today's dollars. Now that is down to about \$40 billion to \$45 billion, or it has been reduced about 70 percent.

We have got to continue to do some things that make sense. Here is a system that gives us a revolutionary conventional war-fighting capability, and I believe the potential for conventional deterrence. Not to get this and spend the money on a bunch of lower priority things that have no comparable worth or value to the American people and to our military, to me is just unbelievable.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield, you mentioned the defense overhead. We have about 250,000 professional shoppers in the Department of Defense. Those are the people that engage in the acquisition of military systems. Roughly you have two Marine Corps of shoppers. They cost us about \$30 billion a year. That means we have a procurement budget of about \$45 billion that as you have mentioned it is down 70 percent. But for every aircraft or tank or weapon that we buy, we pay almost as much as we paid for that system to the Department of Defense for the service of buying it.

That means if you buy an airplane for \$100 million, you pay about \$70 million on top of that to the shoppers in DOD for buying the components for that airplane. If we cut that bureaucracy down, the shopping component, if we cut it down in the same way we have cut the Army, we cut the Army from 18 divisions to 12 divisions, and it may go down to 10, and the news did not make Stamp Collectors Weekly, nobody knows about it, and we have

cut the U.S. Army strength almost 50 percent. We have cut the Air Force from 24 to 13 air wings and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] thinks they are still there. Nobody knows about these massive cuts we have taken in our force structure. If we took that same proportionate type of cut in the shopping corps, in the Department of Defense, the procurement corps, that means we would save about \$10 billion a year. If we took 100,000 people out of the shopping corps, we would save \$10 billion a year. That would buy 4 B-2 programs.

Mr. DICKS. I agree with the gentleman. There are ways to save money in a \$250 billion budget if you want to set priorities. When you look at all the things we are procuring, there is going to be a list of what is important, what is crucial, and what is kind of nice to have. I have got to tell you, when you have got something that has the potential capabilities that the B-2 has, you have got to make room for it. It does not make any sense to protect a lot of purchases of other things that cannot project power around the world like the B-2 can in our future.

I just hope that we can continue to make this battle on the floor with our colleagues here in the House. I happen to think that this is one of those watershed moments, one of those times when either the Congress is going to have truly profiles in courage, standing up to this administration and saying, "Wait a minute, this is a mistake." The same Congress, by the way, that supported the F-117, the stealth attack aircraft. In the first 10 days of the Gulf war, I think I have the numbers right, the stealth fighter flew 2.5 percent of the sorties but knocked out 32 percent of the hardest targets, because it was stealthy. What did that mean? That allowed us to win the air war more quickly and cap Iraq so they could not even get a plane up. That saved a lot of American lives. If we did not have that stealthy airplane to lead the attack and to knock out those surface-to-air missiles, knock out those radars, we would have lost a lot more of our pilots and they would have been there and Saddam would have had them to play politics with as the gentleman has suggested. But because we had stealth, we were able to win that war more rapidly. Then we could bring to bear the B-52's with their dumb bombs, not very accurate but they pounced away on the Republican Guards and allowed us to win the war quite easily. But stealth, the F-117, was at the forefront. Here you have got the B-2 which can carry 8 times what the F-117 can carry and it can carry it 6 times as far and with one refueling go a third of the way around the earth and be able to have it not only against fixed targets as we proved with the F-117 but by putting that sensor-fused weapon on there, those 1,400 little bomblets over that Iraqi division, 3 of them knocked out 46 percent of the mechanized vehicles as that division moves in the field, that is a revolution-

ary capability, and there is nothing in the Pentagon's budget that can do anything like that.

How can you say we are not going to fund this when it has that kind of capability and we are going to fund a lot of other things that have no comparable worth or value and just do it because, "Well, we just can't make any hard decisions. We can't make tradeoffs. We can't do roles and missions. We can't do the job we were sent over there to do." That is what it says to me.

It is never easy to have to make tradeoffs. But in this case, I think the potential is so great that without those tradeoffs, we are really doing a disservice to the American people. I hope that Congress stays with this, makes the point, so that we can show the American people why we feel so passionately about this subject.

Mr. HUNTER. I noticed a friend of ours, the gentleman from California [Mr. MCKEON], just arrived, another staunch supporter of B-2. But I think the gentleman has made an excellent point in that we have an article of leverage. We have a system that gives us enormous leverage. The last thing the American people want to do is have to send marines or infantry divisions to stop an armor attack. The way you stop an armor attack without using a lot of lives is with air power. The way you stop an armor attack with an absolute minimum of casualties is to use air power that has stealth.

I am thinking, if you went inside Saddam Hussein's war room or maybe, later in this decade, inside North Korea's war room and you saw them making a determination as to whether or not they should strike American positions, it would be awfully nice to have one colonel in that North Korean intelligence operation or in that Iraqi operation say, "How about the American invisible bombers? I'm kind of scared of them. How about the invisible bombers, that we can't take down with our SAM's, will they be here? Does anybody know where they are? Are they launched?" That uncertainty is deterrence. That means you do not start it.

The gentleman made one great point. The amount of money we spent on Desert Storm because we did not deter Saddam Hussein from striking, because he thought we were weak, was enough money to buy out the entire B-2 program of 80 airplanes and have a lot of money left over.

□ 1615

If you were strong up front, you would not have to pay later. That is the point of having strong American air power, and that is the point of stealth and that multiplier of precision-guided munitions.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's participation in this colloquy, and I also want to yield to my distinguished friend from California [Mr. MCKEON], who has been another leader and another worthy proponent of the B-2.

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Speaker, I just turned on the TV in my office and saw two of my friends talking about the B-2, one of my favorite subjects.

Mr. DICKS. We had a little break in the action, and so we jumped in and took our shot.

Mr. MCKEON. I really appreciate what you are doing. The B-2 is built in my district, and a lot of people say that is probably the reason that I am a strong supporter. That is one of the reasons.

Because it is in my district, I have had the opportunity of going down to the factory, going down on the floor, seeing the assembly lines and seeing what is being done. A lot of people do not understand that that plane is built differently than any other plane. It is built from the outside in. It has a wingspan of 170 feet, and from one end of that wingspan to the other end, it cannot be off one-thousandth of an inch.

We cannot afford to lose this technology. The people that have been trained, the tools that have been put together, all of that is already now starting to unwind. Originally, the assembly line was built for 20 planes; we are down to 6 planes. They have already closed up part of the assembly line.

We are losing the people that have been trained, that have put in the time and effort, have the skill to learn how to do this. We are losing that.

I think it is very important that we keep our economic base there, our industrial base to build the B-2, but the second and probably even more important reason to me is defense.

When you talk about Desert Storm, you could probably talk about other wars that we do not even know about that have never happened because we project power. But we are losing that projection. We are starting to talk now about moving the B-52, which is almost as old as I am, that is pretty old; and the B-1B's into London to use in Bosnia. I do not know how long we can expect our young people, our career people to get in those planes and fly them. B-1 is still relatively young, about 15 years old; the B-52's are 30, 40, 50 years old.

Mr. HUNTER. Compared to the B-52, the B-1 is a baby.

Mr. MCKEON. That is right. But even then, when all the B-52's are gone, we are down to 95 B-1's. The study that was given to us, that we should be able to fight in two places at one time, we need 174 long-range bombers, we would be down to 95, and then you add the 20 B-2's that we have now.

Mr. DICKS. But we do not have them yet. We have six of them now.

Mr. MCKEON. I am looking out 20 years. I think our responsibility should be to really look out 20 years, 30 years, 40 years.

I know one of my good friends on the other side of this issue has said there will be another bomber at some point. I think that is a total fallacy. It takes \$10 billion to \$15 billion now to get a

fighter up, ready to be built. Who around here is going to vote \$25 billion, \$30 billion or \$40 billion just to get another bomber developed? Why spend that kind of money when we have the great B-2?

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield, I told my friends in the Boeing Co. in the State of Washington that one of my colleagues has suggested a B-3; and they said, "Congressman, what we would do is, we would build a long-range, subsonic aircraft and it would look a heck of a lot like the B-2. It would be stealthy and we would have the ability to put precision-guided munitions on them."

We have got the line open and the costs are down where this thing is affordable in terms of the defense budget, and now, not to do enough of it just does not make sense. I always say to my Democratic friends, many of whom are not happy about some of the budget cuts that are being made, if we cut out the B-2, this money is not going to go to HUD or education or the environment; this money is going to go to something that is less important in the defense arena.

As I said, I look at the entire defense budget, and except for the men and women serving in the service, I cannot think of one weapons system that has anywhere near potential that this weapons system does.

The gentleman has made another important point that General Skantze, who was our former acquisitions person at the Air Force, has made as well, and that is that this plane is the most difficult plane to put together. So we finally figured it out.

Mr. Chairman, I think we should stay with it, and I appreciate my colleagues joining me here on the floor in an impromptu session to talk about one of the most important defense decisions this country will make during our time in Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

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DO NOT BE DETERRED: CONTINUE  
B-2 PRODUCTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ENSIGN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. MCKEON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Speaker I do not know exactly what you had talked about before I came in.

Mr. DICKS. Do not be deterred.

Mr. MCKEON. The B-2?

Mr. DICKS. The B-2.

Mr. MCKEON. What do you know? I think it is a very important vote, and it is a lot of money; I think that people need to understand.

I am a businessman. This is my second term in Congress. I came here to make cuts, but I also came here to carry out our constitutional responsibility which is to provide defense for this country. Defense is one of the most important things that we need to

do. It is our responsibility, as the Congress, to look out for that.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield on that point, I have served for 17 years on defense appropriations subcommittees since the winter of 1979. We build up until 1985, but since 1985, the defense budget has been reduced by \$100 billion a year. Today's defense budget would be 350; it is 250 now in fiscal year 1995, so we have made a big cut, 37 percent in real terms.

We have a smaller Army, a smaller Navy, a smaller Air Force. Yet, here is a technology, a revolutionary technology that would help us still have an enormously effective and capable military. But we have got to have enough of it so that it can have the sortie rates, in and out, in and out, to do the job. Every expert who has looked at this and said, 20 of these is not enough; we have got to have somewhere between 40 and 60.

It is value. Sometimes we forget when it is right in front of us that some things are more important than other things. Some things can do things that no other system can do. And that is why this is so important.

The B-2 offers us a revolutionary conventional capability that nobody else has in the world. Think about it. If somebody else had the B-2, we would be in deep trouble. We would be very, very concerned about it. We would be probably cheer if they made a decision to cut it off at 20 and only have a very limited capability. We would be saying, "Thank God they made that decision, because if they had 50 or 60 of these, and we did not have a way to counter it." Think if our adversary, Russia, had developed this stealth technology. We would be deeply concerned. I think sometimes we forget things that are so obvious. They are right in front of us and we still do not see it.

It reminds me of the battleship debate where they said that battleships are not vulnerable to air power. Finally, Billy Mitchell flew over one and dropped a bag of flour and everyone had to wake up and say, "Oh, my God. These things are vulnerable." And some day they are going to say the same things about the B-52's, the B-2's and the planes coming off the carriers. They are all vulnerable to these surface-to-air missiles.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would yield briefly, Billy Mitchell did sometimes. He showed that technology had moved on and we had entered the era of air power. But he did not drop a sack of flour; he dropped enough munitions to totally sink and destroy three major ships, including one captured German battleship. He carried out his task with a little more enthusiasm than the people who have invested all their political capital in battleships or warships cared for him to do.

In a way we are doing the same thing here. We are in an era in which we can avoid radar because of the great technology that freedom has brought us in this country and we are about to forgo

that technology for some pretty silly reasons. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MCKEON. Reclaiming my time, I think you make a good point on the technology. A lot of my friends here in the Congress have asked me, "Well, is there technology out there, or will there be in the next few years, to make it possible to see the B-2 to make it obsolete?"

I was talking to our ex-Secretary of the Air Force about a month ago, before we had the last vote, and he was going over that with us. He said that all during the development phase of the B-2, we had our best minds working to see if they could come up with a way to detect it. So that we, if the other side had it, so that we could defend against it. We have not been able to find that; it is not available.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman makes a point too. Remember one thing, a plane can be seen. That does not mean you can vector weapons against it. That is the thing that you have to remember about stealth.

People say, "Well, I can see it. It is there on the field." But when you have that thing up in the air at 45,000 feet, and it has got that incredible design which is very hard to see, even when you are just a few miles away from it. But it is the fact that the enemy cannot vector weapons with their radars and the systems that they have to have to take a weapon to the plane. That is why it is so revolutionary. So we do not want anybody to be misled, because you can see it.

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DO NOT BE DETERRED: CONTINUE  
THE B-2

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, it is that important fact, and the fact that we have not been able to figure out a way to counter it. This is a game that goes on and on. There is a struggle back and forth.

Again, I want to thank my colleagues for coming over here and joining me in an impromptu discussion of the B-2. We are going to be moving on to this issue as we get to the defense appropriations bill. As I have said, I think this is the most important defense issue that most of us will decide while we are in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad that I have good bipartisan support from my colleagues are we try to oppose those who I think in a very shortsighted way are trying to cut off this program and saying that they are going to save money.

I will tell my colleagues this: We are going to save lives and money if we build the B-2. We are going to save money if we do it at the time the line is open. We are going to preserve the