in the 1960 constitution. United States Secretary of State George Ball visited Cyprus in February 1964 and concluded that Greek Cypriots ''just wanted to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots.'' Turkey waited for 11 years for help from the world community. None came. By 1974, Turkey could no longer stand by and watch innocent Turkish Cypriots be slaughtered by Greek Cypriots. So Turkey intervened militarily on the island which was completely legal under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed by the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, Britain, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots. It clearly stated that any of signatures had the right to intervene on Cyprus should the sovereignty of the island be threatened.

Let me emphasize that these troops pose no threat to the southern part of the island. Since the Turkish military intervention concluded in 1974, these troops have never attacked or threatened to attack the south. They are there simply to deter aggression against Turkish Cypriots. Let me also add that unlike Government officials from Greece, who have often made statements saying that Cyprus is rightfully part of Greece, no Turkish officials have ever suggested that Turkey should attempt to annex the whole of Cyprus.

Unfortunately, House Concurrent Resolution 42 completely dismisses the history of Cyprus.

For Turkish Cypriots, the memories of 1960–74 remain vivid. It is absurd to suggest that they should lay down their arms and suddenly trust their age-old nemesis, especially when Greek Cypriots are continuing to try to impoverish them through an economic embargo. I cannot think of another conflict in the world where this committee would put forth such a solution.

I call on my colleagues to reject House Concurrent Resolution 42. This resolution is biased against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. It makes no demands whatsoever of the Republic of Cyprus like lifting its economic embargo against the north, and it completely ignores the history of the island and who is to blame for its division.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CLINGER). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 42, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 83) relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogue with the Republic of Korea, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.J. RES. 83

Whereas the United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (''Agreed Framework''), entered into on October 21, 1994, between the United States and North Korea, requires North Korea to stop and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program and related facilities, and comply fully with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for alternative energy sources, including interim supplies of heavy fuel oil for electric generators and more proliferation-resistant light water reactor technology;

Whereas the Agreed Framework also commits North Korea to ''consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'' and ''engage in North-South'' dialogue with the Republic of Korea;

Whereas the Agreed Framework does not indicate specific criteria for full normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, and does not link the sequencing of actions in the Agreed Framework with any time-frame for carrying out the provisions of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and carrying out the dialogue between North Korea and the Republic of Korea;

Whereas the commitment by North Korea to carry out the letter and spirit of the Agreed Framework has been put into doubt by actions of North Korea since October 21, 1994, including the suspected diversion of United States heavy fuel oil in apparent contravention of the agreed purpose of the interim fuel deliveries, the resistance to accepting light water reactors from the Republic of Korea, the harsh denunciations of the Government of the Republic of Korea and other actions contrary to the commitment by North Korea to engage in a dialogue with such Government, and the continued conduct of provocative, offensive oriented military exercises; and

Whereas the nuclear threat posed by North Korea is just one of a number of security concerns of the United States arising out of the policies of North Korea: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS OF NORTH KOREA UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

It is the sense of the Congress that in discussions or negotiations with the Government of North Korea pursuant to the implementation of the United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (in this joint resolution referred to as the ''Agreed Framework'') entered into on October 21, 1994, the President should uphold the following minimum conditions relating to nuclear nonproliferation:

(1) All spent fuel from the graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities of North Korea should be removed from the territory of North Korea as is consistent with the Agreed Framework.

(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency should have the freedom to conduct any and all inspections that it deems necessary to fully account for the stocks of plutonium and other nuclear materials in North Korea, including special inspections of suspected nuclear waste sites before any nuclear components controlled by the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines are delivered for a light water reactor for North Korea.

(3) The dismantlement of all declared graphite-based nuclear reactors and related facilities in North Korea, including reprocessing units, should be completed in accordance with the Agreed Framework and in a manner that effectively bars in perpetuity any reactivation of such reactors and facilities.

(4) The United States should suspend actions described in the Agreed Framework if North Korea attempts to reload its existing 5 megawatt nuclear reactor or resumes construction of nuclear facilities other than those permitted to be build under the Agreed Framework.

SEC. 2. ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

It is further the sense of the Congress that the Republic of Korea should play the central role in the project to provide light water reactors to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

SEC. 3. FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA.

It is further the sense of the Congress that, after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President should not take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic relations with North Korea beyond opening liaison offices, or relaxing trade and investment barriers imposed against North Korea without—

(1) action by the Government of North Korea to engage in a North-South dialogue with the Government of the Republic of Korea;

(2) significant progress toward implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and

(3) progress toward the achievement of several long-standing United States policy objectives regarding north Korea and the Korean Peninsula, including—

(A) reducing the number of military forces of North Korea along the Demilitarized Zone and relocating such military forces away from the Demilitarized Zone;

(B) prohibiting any movement by North Korea toward the deployment of an intermediate range ballistic missile system; and

(C) prohibiting the export by North Korea of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, including related technology and components.

SEC. 4. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

''SEC. 620G. ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

''(a) IN GENERAL.—No assistance may be provided under this Act or any other provision of law to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization unless—

''(1) such assistance is provided in accordance with all requirements, limitations, and