

guarantee workers very little in the way of real training.

Two amendments to be offered today will go a long way in providing workers with real training. The Breaux amendment will provide support for one of the most innovative training tools—training vouchers. Under his amendment, dislocated workers will be empowered to make key decisions about training.

Senator MOYNIHAN will offer an amendment to restore the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. Repealing TAA, as this bill does, breaks a covenant with America's workers, many of whom have felt the dark side of free trade. I believe strongly that free trade is, on balance, good for America and our workers. But it is clear there must be assistance in helping workers transition to, train for and locate jobs in growing industries.

Finally, I remain concerned about maintaining a Federal commitment to adult education. Adult education has provided thousands of needy Americans with assistance in gaining literacy skills that make them better citizens, better parents and better workers. For these Americans, these dollars provide dignity. I think we must assure that these adults continue to receive these critical services through this new system.

I want to come back to the big picture for a moment. Education and training have always been bipartisan issues and I hope they can be on this bill. Through the amendments today, it is clear we can work through some of the concerns that remain to fashion consensus legislation that will be good for American workers and good for American students. I pledge to be a part of that dialog and am hopeful that at the end of the day, this will be legislation that I can support.

Mr. KENNEDY. I see the hour of 11:30 has approached.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, we will be in a period for morning business for not to exceed 1 hour to be divided equally between the Senator from Texas [Mrs. HUTCHISON] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN].

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

NATO EXPANSION

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator NUNN's plane is late, so I am going to start this dialog. Senator NUNN and I and other Democrats and Republicans have been talking about NATO expansion. We are very concerned that the debate needs to take place, that Americans need to understand what is important, what the

questions should be, and what should be the criteria for the expansion of NATO.

After all, all of us understand that NATO is a mutual defense pact. And if we expand NATO, we must ask for and receive from the entering nation defense assurances, and we must also give those same defense assurances. Therefore, we are talking about American troops and American tax dollars, just as all of our NATO allies will be looking at the obligations they must accept.

All of us must realize how very important and crucial this decision is going to be. The expansion of NATO is a strategic decision that must not be made in haste and must not be made before we answer the crucial questions.

So Senator NUNN and I are taking this hour, along with others of our colleagues, to talk about it. Let us raise some of the questions that we think need to be answered, and let us look at potential alternatives, as well as the actual expansion of NATO, and the timetable that we might look at if we decide to make that decision.

The political map of Europe has changed dramatically since the toppling of the Berlin Wall. Just as these changes were a direct result of half a century of American leadership and NATO resolve, so, too, does the future of peace and stability in Europe depend on a strong and enduring NATO.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new governments, along with old ethnic and border disputes in Eastern Europe, a new set of challenges confronts the North Atlantic alliance.

A NATO study just released last week takes a decidedly positive stance toward the possibility of expanding NATO membership. The NATO study is specific in that it asserts that new NATO members will have the same benefits and obligations of all the other members of the alliance.

The study also anticipates no change in NATO nuclear policy or in the forward basing of NATO ground forces. These points are important, as far as they go. However, there are a number of very serious issues raised by the issue of NATO enlargement, and these questions need to be analyzed thoroughly before the United States and our NATO allies commit ourselves to this course of action.

First, although the NATO study talks about expansion leading to increased stability and security, it is largely silent on the real why of NATO enlargement. The real why is the deep concern in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries about a future threat from Russia and the West's stake in responding to this potential threat.

Second, the study does not address the Russian reaction to NATO expansion. It notes that Russia has raised concerns which NATO is attempting to address, but the fact is that eastward NATO expansion in the near future is almost certain to prompt opponents of

democracy and economic reform in Russia to new heights of paranoia and provocative nationalism. It could weaken the prodemocracy and proreform elements of the Russian polity that we should be striving to support. Rather than strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe, repercussions in Russia from rapid NATO expansion could undermine our most important national security goal.

Third, full NATO membership for the nations of Eastern Europe has the potential to draw the United States and our NATO allies into regional border and ethnic disputes in which we have no demonstrable national security interest.

Many Americans and many of us in Congress have serious reservations about President Clinton's proposal to commit United States troops to a peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. This is an issue we will debate here at a later date. But disagreements about the wisdom of this commitment within this body across our Nation and within NATO are directly relevant to NATO expansion.

Is it in America's interest to enter into treaty obligations that could end up committing American military and political power to current and future regional border and ethnic disputes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans?

When President Clinton argues that we must put troops on the ground in Bosnia in order to keep faith with our NATO allies and our leadership within the alliance, it illustrates perfectly the very real risks of rapid NATO expansion. Before the United States and our NATO allies take this step to guarantee mutual defense, we must acknowledge that the potential for civil war and border and ethnic strife in Eastern Europe is high. After years of vacillation and debate about what America should do about Bosnia, we must also acknowledge that there has not been a clear policy. To embark on NATO expansion without resolving this crucial question could be disastrous.

Potential flash points in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are easy to identify. Current and potential NATO members are directly involved in every one of them: Serbian opposition to Kosovo's aspirations to independence; Greek opposition to Macedonian independence; longstanding border disputes between Poland and Ukraine; unresolved problems stemming from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.

If we move ahead rapidly with NATO expansion and the full mutual defense and security commitments that such membership implies, would that set the stage for direct American military involvement in such disputes as we have been drawn into in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia? That is a very important question that we must answer before we take such a giant step.

Mr. President, there are alternatives to rapid NATO expansion, alternatives

which would establish a rational progression to eventual NATO membership and which would provide real encouragement and support to the nations we want to help.

The economic and political integration of all the nations of Eastern Europe is the best way to ensure long-range stability and a rational progression to expanded NATO membership. For instance, any country eligible for European Union membership should be considered for NATO membership. So you start with European Union membership requirements and the economic and trade alliances that would provide stability, and then you take the next step to NATO membership.

Expanding trade and strengthening free market capitalism in the newly emergent nations of Eastern Europe would establish a strong foundation for peace and stability based on mutual interests.

In parallel fashion, resolution of regional and internal disputes should be a precondition for eligibility for NATO membership.

The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should be used to help bring about permanent solutions to ethnic and other disputes involving European countries and the Eastern European countries anxious to join NATO. It will also strengthen the democracies in those countries. This would maximize security and stability within Eastern Europe and underscore that expansion is not aimed at Russia.

I believe American and NATO leadership and influence should be directed at setting up a means for arbitrating these disputes to bring an end to the existing conflicts and to head off future situations that could be caused by these disputes. No Nation should be considered for NATO membership unless it has committed itself for the present and the future to accept peaceful resolution of local and regional conflicts.

One approach would be to create a forum for arbitration, comprised of peers acceptable to all parties to the conflict. To be considered for NATO membership, all countries would agree to binding arbitration of border and ethnic disputes. This might be part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Partnership for Peace. But let us put that idea on the table. If the American labor negotiation concept is binding arbitration, if the parties agree to the peers that would be the judges, would this not be a way to stop the ethnic and border conflict before they erupt into the tragedy that we have seen in the former Yugoslavia?

Rather than pell-mell rushing into NATO membership, the implications of which are fraught with dangers and complications, the United States and its Eastern European allies and our Western European allies should initiate a series of coordinated efforts to strengthen new democracies and build

a stronger economy and bind the nations of Europe to a set of rules that would ensure peace and stability for decades to come.

The NATO allies should also make their position clear, with respect to the overarching goal of NATO membership, the possibility of future Russian aggression. Ironically, those countries with the most valid concerns in this regard—the Balkan nations and the Ukraine—are, because of their proximity to Russia, the least likely to gain NATO membership in the short run. The people of these countries are unlikely to feel more secure if NATO expands eastward but stops short of their borders, in effect, placing them in a buffer zone between an enlarged NATO and a more paranoid Russia. The NATO allies should ensure that all parties understand that accelerated and, if necessary, immediate enlargement of NATO would depend directly upon Russian behavior. And in this way we would provide a basis for accelerated NATO expansion in response to a real threat, but we would avoid provoking the very threat we are trying to guard against.

The key criterion would remain as outlined in the NATO study recently released, Enhancement of Europe's Security and Stability. This twofold strategy for the post-cold-war Europe would provide the affected nations with what they need most, a foundation to build greater prosperity and stability and a NATO security commitment against the possibility of future Russian aggression. This straightforward approach is also important for our citizens and those in other NATO countries who will have to pay the bills and make the sacrifices required by expanding eastward NATO's security commitments.

We, in America, cannot assess public opinion in other countries, of course. But when NATO expansion and the debate that will follow focuses on the issues of NATO nuclear policy, NATO troop deployment, NATO infrastructure development, and former NATO commitments, played against the background of repercussions in Russia and priorities for our fewer defense dollars in the United States, we must first understand public opinion in our country, and we and our allies must undertake our primary goal, to maintain the underlying strength of NATO.

NATO has the total support of the American people. As we move forward to an expanding cooperation and mutual defense, we must maintain that American support of NATO. All of the issues that I have raised must be considered before we expand, so that once the commitment is made, we can be assured that we have the absolute will and determination to keep our commitment. The American people must fully understand and support the role of the United States for that goal to be achieved.

Mr. President, as I said when I started, Senator NUNN and I and many of

our colleagues have traveled throughout the new Eastern European democracies. We have gone to Russia, as members of the Armed Services Committee. We have met with members of the Russian Duma. We want to take the steps that are right, and we want to take them at the right time. That is why Senator NUNN and I and others of our colleagues wanted to take this time today to start the debate, to start the thinking process, to make sure that we have thought of every eventuality and that the American people understand what is important, what questions must be asked, and what the criteria are for expanded NATO membership.

Mr. President, Senator NUNN has arrived. As I said, his plane was late, but he has now arrived. I want to take this opportunity before I turn the floor over to the senior Senator from Georgia to say that I, like so many of my colleagues, watched him yesterday announce that he would not seek a fifth term to the U.S. Senate. He said he needs time to read, write, and think. Mr. President, all of us understand in this body how very important the time to think and to write is to a good public debate and a solid public policy. I just want to say that I think Senator NUNN has provided that thoughtful public policy leadership in his four terms in the Senate, as chairman and now ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, on which I have been very fortunate to sit.

I have worked with Senator NUNN and have come to respect him greatly for the thought that he gives to public policy and for the leadership that he has given for our country. He and I agree in almost every respect about the need for a strong national defense, the need for us to think to the future, and I feel that by taking this time out, he is going to continue to provide even greater leadership for what we must do for the future to make sure that our country remains strong militarily.

I will end by just saying that I think the best of all things that can be said about the Senator is that he had the instinct to know when it was time for him to go and the judgment to do it while people still hoped that he would stay.

Mr. President, I thank you and I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague and friend from Texas on two points. One is her very kind comments about my difficult decision which has now been made. I appreciate very much her thoughtfulness and her comments. I appreciate her friendship, and serving with her on the Armed Services Committee has been a great pleasure.

I also commend her for her substantive remarks on the question of NATO expansion. I will have more to say about that in a few minutes as we proceed to discuss that very important issue. But I know that the Senator from Kansas has been on the floor. I

would much prefer to hear her address the subject. She has another bill to manage. I will listen to her attentively, and then I will make some comments on the substantive issue myself.

I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Texas for her kind remarks.

Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I was just here to fill in for the Senator from Georgia until he got to the floor. I just have a few very brief remarks to make.

First, I want to say that I am very appreciative of Senator HUTCHISON and Senator NUNN for organizing this debate—a beginning debate, perhaps—on a very important subject. I think it is essential for us to begin to think about the consequences of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and what that may mean.

I would also like to say that the announcement of the Senator from Georgia yesterday was one which I think all of us felt great disappointment with, but also thoughtful understanding. Senator NUNN has brought to the U.S. Senate, and to the United States, sincerity, integrity, and a depth of knowledge in a debate of the public policy issues before us in this country through the four terms he has served that will be remembered far into the future. And his legacy will be one that will be an inspiration to all who wish to follow in public service. So I join with all on both sides of the aisle who will greatly miss his presence in the U.S. Senate.

Mr. President, I would like to join for a few minutes in this discussion on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its future.

This debate has been ongoing for years in Europe among foreign policy experts, and in the administration. But in Congress, which would have to approve any changes in the North Atlantic Treaty to accommodate new members, it is long overdue. I enter this debate as a strong supporter of NATO and a firm believer it must remain the foundation of the security architecture in Europe, just as the Senator from Texas pointed out in her excellent statement. Supporters of the NATO expansion have said for some time the issue is not, why and how, but rather who and when? In my mind, we have gotten ahead of ourselves. The issue, I believe, remains very much why and how. I believe the first order of business must be to clearly define in our own minds, and with our allies, what we want NATO to do in Europe's new security environment.

The Soviet Union is gone and with it the clear threat that held NATO together. We know we still need a security structure in Europe and that America should be a part of that structure. But we have not in my mind made clear the new purpose for that structure. It seems to me difficult to construct a security system and to make significant decisions such as whom to include, and by implication

whom to exclude, without a clear, shared purpose to pursue. The dangers of fuzzy purpose have been made clear in Bosnia. For years, NATO hesitated, the allies could not agree, we did not act, and, in my view, the alliance has been weakened as a result. While NATO now seems to have found its footing in the Bosnia conflict, I suggest Bosnia has shown our first order of business must be to find anew our shared purpose for America's involvement in Europe. Only then can we properly consider what security structure will best serve that purpose.

Let me make clear that I am not arguing against changes in NATO. It is a cold war institution that must adapt to new realities. But I am not yet prepared to say that change necessarily equates with expansion. Perhaps President Clinton put it best in his speech at Freedom House last week when he called for NATO's modernization. It seems to me this broader question about how NATO should be updated to fit our new needs, not a predetermined notion that expansion is both desirable and inevitable, should be the debate we now take up. As this debate continues and reaches the Congress, we will face many questions. Are the American people prepared to pledge, in the words of the North Atlantic Treaty, that an armed attack against one or more of these potential new members will be considered an attack against all? That, I think, is a question we should keep first and foremost in our minds.

It is easy to say how important this expansion will be. It is important to the future of the organization. But when it comes right down to it, are we prepared to do what is asked for in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter as it stands? I do not know the answer to that. But I do know that it is the basic issue we are debating. Those who support this expansion have a heavy burden to make their case.

I look forward to the comments of Senator NUNN. I think the debate is called for by Mrs. HUTCHISON in her role on the Armed Services Committee and her important role as a Senator from Texas, where there are a number of military installations. Kansas has military installations also. Fort Riley is always very involved in forward deployment to Germany. And certainly the same for the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN]. These are issues of grave importance to all of us, and I think, as we can begin to reason together, it will be useful in this dialog.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ASHCROFT). The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Kansas, Senator KASSEBAUM, for her kind remarks about my service in the U.S. Senate. I am not here today to precipitate that discussion. We probably had enough retirement announcements around this institution for 1 year. That is not my purpose in taking the floor today, but I do thank her for her remarks.

I also agree with her words of caution on NATO expansion. We have a lot of thinking to do. We have a lot of debating to do. We have a lot of discussion to conduct, to make the right kind of decision, both for the alliance itself and for the stability of Europe.

I thank my friend from Texas, again, for organizing this discussion this morning. I think it is going to be very fruitful in precipitating other people to think and also speak on the subject. I talked to enough Senators on both sides of the aisle to know there are a number of people who are concerned, deeply concerned, and who have a lot of thoughts and a lot of questions about this matter. I think we will be hearing from them in the days and weeks ahead. So I thank both of my colleagues for their remarks.

I say to the Senator from Kansas, she has been a very fine leader. We have relied on her for so long in the field of foreign policy as well as many other fields, and I have such deep admiration for her and her leadership, and I am grateful to her for that.

Mr. President, the issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and careful consideration because it has important ramifications for the future of NATO, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for the future of Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, and for the future security order throughout Europe, East and West.

President Clinton has declared, and NATO has concurred, the organization's enlargement is not an issue of whether but of when and how. I, like the Senator from Kansas, believe the when and how need to be discussed more thoroughly.

On September 28 of this year, NATO released a study on the why and how of enlargement. It reserves for future decisions the question of who and when. On the positive side, the study declares that NATO enlargement will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It presents no fixed set of criteria for membership but specifies that enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the key judgments being whether a given country's admission will contribute to Europe's stability and security.

It states that new members will have the same benefits and obligations as all other members and it anticipates no change in NATO nuclear policy or in the forward basing of NATO ground forces.

On the less positive side, I believe three large gaps exist in the study and give it an unrealistically optimistic tone. First, the study provides no satisfactory answer to the key question of why, and merely expresses what NATO hopes will be the outcome of expansion: increased stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. All of us hope for that, but that does not really get down to the essential reasons of how and why expansion will lead to that result.

Second, it glosses over the increasingly negative Russian reaction to NATO expansion.

Third, it asserts that enlargement is part of a broad security architecture in Europe that transcends the idea of dividing lines in Europe, yet it is silent about the fact that gradual enlargement will create dividing lines between those countries admitted and those countries that are not admitted.

NATO was established primarily to protect the Western democracies from an expansionist Soviet Union that, after World War II, seemed determined to spread its influence through subversion, through political intimidation, and through the threat of the use of military force. With the end of the cold war, we have witnessed a heart pounding, terrain altering set of earthquakes centered in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. These seismic events have ended an international era. The European security environment has changed. We have moved from a world of high risk but also high stability, because of the danger of escalation and the balance of terror on both sides, to a world of much lower risk but much lower stability. We are all aware of the dramatic change in the threat environment in Europe resulting from these seismic changes.

The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups, by isolated rogue states, by ethnic, religious and other types of subnational passions that can flare into vicious armed conflict, as we have seen too well and too thoroughly in the Bosnian conflict.

The lethality of any and all of these threats can be greatly magnified by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as by the spread of destabilizing conventional weapons.

At the same time, Russia currently possesses at least 20,000 nuclear weapons—in fact over 20,000—at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, advanced biological warfare capability, hundreds of tons of fissile material, huge stores of conventional weapons, plus literally thousands of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. President, this is the first time in history that an empire has disintegrated while possessing such enormous destructive capabilities. Even if these capabilities are greatly reduced, the know-how, the production capability, and the dangers of proliferation will endure for many years. Even if we do our very best job, this is going to be our No. 1 security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world in terms of decades; not simply a few years.

As we contemplate NATO enlargement, I believe that we must carefully measure NATO enlargement's effect on this proliferation security problem, which is our No. 1 security problem.

Threats cannot be cleanly delinked, resulting in one section on proliferation and another section on NATO enlargement as if there is no

connectivity. Those two subjects are intimately related. And in the longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a resurgent and threatening Russia. Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous remnants of the Soviet war machine, but in its current weakened condition Russia contains potential resources by virtue of its size and strategic location. Russia exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the former Soviet Union's veto power in the U.N. Security Council, and, therefore, has a major voice in multilateral decisionmaking.

Mr. President, Russia will be a major factor, for better or for worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats that face us over the next years ahead. Russia can fuel regional conflicts with high-technology conventional weapons along with other political and material support, or, on the other hand, Russia can cooperate with us in diffusing such conflicts, particularly by preventing the spread of Russian weaponry to irresponsible hands. Russia can emerge as a militarily aggressive power. That is certainly possible. Or Russia can assist the United States and the Western World and the free world in averting new rivalry among major powers that poison the international security environment. Russia can pursue a confrontational course that undermines the security and cooperation in Europe, or Russia can work with us to broaden and strengthen the emerging system of multilateral security in Europe.

Mr. President, no one knows the answer to any of these questions at this juncture. Russia itself does not know the answer because it is in a period of economic stress, and political challenge and turmoil.

Mr. President, out of this background come five fundamental points. First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most important and the most difficult security challenge we face. And that is particularly true when you have a very large growth of organized crime, international organized crime, and terrorism in our own country and around the world.

Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons material, and weapons know-how. Thousands of people in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union have the knowledge, the access, and the strong economic incentives to engage in weapons traffic.

Mr. President, there are literally thousands of scientists in Russia that know how to make weapons of mass destruction, that know how to make high-technology weapons that can shoot down aircraft in the air including passenger liners, that know how to make missile technology to deliver these weapons of mass destruction across borders, and even across continents. They have this knowledge. But several thousand of them at least do

not know where their next paycheck is coming from. They do not know how they are going to feed their families, and they are in great demand around the world from both terrorist organizations and from rogue Third World countries.

The third conclusion is that increased Russian isolation, paranoia, or instability would make our No. 1 security challenge more difficult and more dangerous.

The fourth conclusion: Although the West cannot control events in Russia, and probably can assist political and economic reform there only on the margins, as the medical doctors say, our first principle should be to do no harm.

Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security priorities.

Mr. President, it is against this background that I offer a few observations on the current approach to NATO enlargement.

NATO was founded on a fundamental truth: The vital interests of the countries of NATO were put at risk by the military power and political intimidation of the Soviet Union. As President Harry Truman said in his memoirs, "The [NATO] pact was a shield against aggression and against the fear of aggression." Because NATO was built on this fundamental truth, and because we discussed it openly and faced it truthfully with our people, the NATO alliance endured and prevailed. There was no misunderstanding about why we were forming NATO when we did it. Today, we seem to be saying different things to different people on the subject of NATO enlargement.

To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that you are all theoretically eligible, and, if you meet NATO's entrance criteria, you will move to the top of the list. To the Russians we are also saying that NATO enlargement is not threat-based, and it is not aimed at you. In fact, we say to Russia you, too, can eventually become a member of NATO.

This raises a serious question. Are we really going to be able to convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical threats—that usually boils down to Russia—while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential military threat?

Are we really going to be able to convince the Ukraine and the Baltic countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO expands eastward but draws protective lines short of their borders and places them in what Russians are bound to perceive as the buffer zone? Is that going to make them feel more secure?

In short, Mr. President, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to explain the unexplainable? Are we deluding others, or are we deluding ourselves?

The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement cannot be ignored, and I do not ignore that. If NATO expands in the near term to take in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in self-confidence and stability. It is possible that border disputes and major ethnic conflicts would be settled before entry—for instance, the dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania.

What these countries really want and what they really need is the ability to have trade and economic relations with the European Community and the rest of the world. They really need markets now—not military protection. Their threat is economic at this moment, and probably for the few years to come. No one can conceive of an invasion by Russia in the near term. The question is in the long term. That is another matter. But in the near term, economic trade and entry into the European Community is what they need most of all to stabilize their democratic efforts and their economy.

Serious disadvantages must also be thought through carefully. If NATO's enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is almost inevitably going to be a sense of isolation by those that are committed to democracy and democratic reform with varying degrees of paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from across the current political spectrum. In next few years Russia will have neither the resources nor the wherewithal to respond to any NATO enlargement with a conventional military buildup. They simply do not have the resources to do that, even if they choose to.

If, however, the more nationalist and more extreme political forces gain the upper hand by election or otherwise, we are likely to see other responses that are more achievable, and also even more dangerous to European stability. For example, while Russia would take years to mount a sustained military threat to Eastern Europe, it can within weeks or months exert severe external and internal pressures on its immediate neighbors to the west, including the Baltic countries, and including the Ukraine. This could set in motion a dangerous action-reaction cycle.

Moreover, because a conventional military response from Russia in answer to NATO enlargement is not feasible economically, a nuclear response in the form of a higher alert status for Russia's remaining strategic nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed deployment of tactical nuclear weapons is more likely.

I recall very well when the United States and our allies felt we were overwhelmed with conventional forces by the former Soviet Union. How did we respond? We responded by building up tactical nuclear forces. We responded by deploying thousands of tactical nuclear forces because we did not have the tanks, we did not have the artillery tubes to meet the conventional challenge. Are we confident the Russians

would be so different from us if they truly have a nationalistic surge and end up believing the NATO enlargement is a threat to them?

I am not confident that would not be their response as it was ours years ago.

The security of NATO, Russia's neighbors and the countries of Eastern Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military finger moves closer to the nuclear trigger.

Where do we go from here? I recognize full well it is much easier to criticize than to construct, so let me make a few suggestions. I am not opposed to NATO expansion per se, but I feel that we need to alter the course of that expansion. I suggest a two-track approach to NATO enlargement. The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on political and economic developments within the European countries that aspire to full NATO membership. When a country becomes eligible for European Union membership, it will also be eligible to join the Western European Union, and then it will be prepared for NATO membership, subject, of course, to NATO's formal approval.

This is a natural process connecting economic and security interests. We can honestly say to Russia, and particularly the democrats in Russia who are struggling to be able to have a democracy in that country, this process is economic in nature and is not aimed at you.

The second track would also be a clear track. It would be a threat-based track. An accelerated and, if necessary, immediate expansion of NATO would depend on Russian behavior. We should be candid with the Russian leadership and the Russian people, above all be honest with the Russian people by telling them, frankly, if you respect the sovereignty of your neighbors, carry out your solemn arms control commitments and other international obligations, and if you continue down the path of democracy and economic reform, your neighbors will not view you as a threat and neither will NATO. We will watch, however, and we will react to aggressive moves against other sovereign states, to militarily significant violations of your arms control and other legally binding obligations pertinent to the security of Europe, and to the emergence of a nondemocratic Russian Government that impedes fair elections, suppresses domestic freedoms or institutes a foreign policy incompatible with the existing European security system. These developments would be threatening to the security of Europe and would require a significant NATO response, including expansion eastward. We would be enlarging NATO based on a real threat. We would not, however, be helping to create the very threat we are trying to guard against. And the Senator from Texas made this point very well a few minutes ago in her remarks.

Mr. President, this would change the psychology of the NATO expansion be-

cause the democrats in Russia would be able to say to their own people: Our behavior, what we do with our military forces, what we do with our tactical nuclear posture, what we do regarding human rights and freedom of the press, what we do regarding our solemn arms control obligations will have a bearing on whether NATO expands. If we do not cause a threat, we in turn are not likely to be threatened.

That changes the psychology completely from where it is now where the nationalists, any time you are in a meeting with Russian parliamentarians—and I am sure the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Texas have experienced this—what you see is that when the nationalists hear about NATO expansion, they start smiling and almost clapping because it feeds right into what they want to convince their people of, that is, they have to reconstitute not only the military but the empire. On the other hand, when you talk about NATO expansion, those parliamentarians that truly believe in democracy start wiping their brow with their handkerchief because they know the kind of problems it is going to cause them politically in their own country.

Finally, Mr. President, Partnership for Peace, I believe, is a sound framework for this two-track approach. Its role would be to prepare candidate countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either the European track or the threat-based track. Programs of joint training and exercises, development of a common operational doctrine and establishment of the inter-operational weaponry, technology and communications would continue based on more realistic contingencies. Tough issues such as nuclear policy and forward stationing of NATO troops would be discussed in a threat-based environment, one which we would hope would remain theoretical.

I know there are those in Europe and there are those here who say, How can we handle this expansion of the European community? We have complex matters like farm products. How do we handle farm products coming in from Eastern Europe, or any other type product?

When you expand NATO, you are extending a nuclear umbrella over the countries coming in. Are we to be told it is easier to say that if a country is attacked, America is going to respond if necessary with nuclear weapons, than it is to decide how many farm products come across our border?

I do not buy the argument that economic expansion is more difficult and more challenging than extending the nuclear umbrella.

As the Russian leaders and people make their important choices, they should know that Russian behavior will be a key and relative factor for NATO's future. This straightforward approach does not give them a veto. I do not favor giving Russia a veto. But I do favor putting them on notice that

what they do themselves in creating threats to others may very well determine what the others do in terms of enlarging NATO and enlarging the security umbrella.

This straightforward approach is also important for our own citizens here in this country who will have to pay the bills. They will have to make the sacrifices required by expanded NATO security commitments.

Again, I am not against expanding NATO. I think there are countries in Eastern Europe and Central Europe that will be eligible for NATO membership, democracies that will qualify and be eventual members. I am concerned about how we do it and how we go about explaining our logic. It makes a big difference.

The profound historical contrast between post-World War I Germany and post-World War II Germany should tell us that neocontainment of Russia is not the answer at this critical historical juncture. If future developments require the containment of Russia, it should be real containment based on real threats.

I thank again my colleague from Texas for organizing this. I know there are others who are not back in town who want to speak on this subject, and I hope by her leadership and the discussions we have had this morning we will precipitate debate on this subject. I know there will be debate on both sides. There are other people, whom I respect greatly, who have different views on this subject, but it is time for us to start paying attention before we get down to the point of having some agreement presented to the Senate for our ratification that we have not studied, that we have not contemplated, but that has profound implications.

I at this point again thank my colleague from Texas and yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a moment, I should like to say I really appreciate, of course, his very articulate view of this issue. He has given speeches on this subject. As I said earlier, he and I have traveled with the Armed Services Committee to Russia.

We have met with members of the Duma and we have also been to many of the new emerging Eastern European democracies. And I think that it would be very important for us to keep in mind the conflicts that we see in many of those different countries versus what we hear from members of the Duma. And I thought it was especially important that Senator NUNN mentioned the reformers, and I would like him, if he would, to comment on the upcoming elections and the impact that this discussion could have on those upcoming elections.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, we have had some very interesting meetings in both Russia and this country with our Russian parliamentary friends. And I believe that it is clear in those meetings that the fear among reformers and democrats is that

this issue, which most of them do not realistically see as a threat to Russia, but that this expansion of NATO will give the nationalists, the extremists, the demagogues, those who want to restructure and rebuild the empire and threaten their neighbors, will give them an argument to be made for the Russian population that has been hearing that NATO is an enemy for the last 40, 45 years.

So, it is the great concern of the reformers in Russia that I believe we have to take into account. We will not be doing anyone in Europe a favor if, by taking certain action regarding NATO expansion, we end up giving an edge in the political process to the most extremist elements in Russia.

This is not to say that we should give them a veto. They should have no veto. NATO should make its own decisions. But Russian behavior and economic reality in Europe also should play a very important role in how we go about taking these important steps.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Along that same line, if the Senator would yield, I think it is also important that we link Russian behavior to any expansions of NATO and how those will come about so that there will be an incentive on the part of Russia to make sure that they are cooperating in the community of nations and that they understand that it is only if we begin to see a buildup or some sort of aggressive behavior that then we would come in in a very swift manner and look at the expansion possibilities.

Mr. NUNN. I agree with the Senator from Texas on that. I think that is the way we ought to structure it. I believe having the natural approach of an economic admission to the European Community be one path, one option which is a natural course and would lead inevitably to NATO eligibility for those countries. That is one course.

But the other course ought to be very clear, the military-threat-based course. But where we are now is between those courses. We are saying that the European Community is not going to be able to expand fast enough and saying there is no threat from Russia. And we are saying that Russia can be a member of NATO at some point in time—and that simply does not ring true to people who have observed this process over a period of time from the European perspective, it does not ring true to those in the Ukraine who worry about Russian reaction and know they will not be the first country, one of the first countries, to be admitted, does not ring true to the Baltics where they know that they can be subverted by Russia on a 48-hour basis. It would take years for Russia to be able to muster the military power to invade Poland, but to destabilize politically the Baltics would take a matter of days. And that may very well be the pattern that could emerge if we are not prudent in how we go about this situation.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. One other point that I think is important. The Senator

from Georgia was very instrumental in negotiating the language that we put in our authorization bill regarding the missile defense capabilities that the United States would have and how that relates to the ABM Treaty that we have with Russia, and it also affects the START Treaty, which is being looked at for ratification by the Duma, the Russian Duma at this time.

I think those are very important issues, along with the nuclear warheads that are still in Russia. All of those are issues that I think must be looked at as we determine how our relationship with Russia and the impact that NATO expansion and the way we do it has. As the Senator from Georgia mentioned, there will be no Russian veto of NATO expansion. But as we move along, we can certainly make this decision in the right way that keeps our ability to negotiate with Russia on any changes in the ABM Treaty, on ratification of the START Treaty, those things that are very important to our security as well as their security and the security of Eastern Europe.

So it is not just an easy decision that we make with regard to any one country in Eastern Europe, as the Senator from Georgia fully realizes, especially having been so involved in the negotiations on what we will do in the future to protect our borders and our theaters from potential ballistic missile attack.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, I could not agree more with her on what she said. The threat in Europe now is not Russian invasion of one of the Visegrad countries. The threat is the huge proliferation problem with nuclear materials being smuggled across the borders to these countries, with Russian scientists under severe economic pressure being in demand in various parts of the world. But, hopefully, we can work together to prevent that. That is the threat.

The threat is terrorism, the threat is ethnic strife, the threat is religious strife. It could change in 10 years. Ten years from now Russia could reemerge as a real military threat to some of those countries. We have to be prepared for that. We have to make sure we are in a position to react to that. But now we have many mutual interests, and not just with Russians, but with the East Europeans and others, in proliferation and working together against organized crime, which is one of the biggest challenges Russia has right now, their organized criminal activity which is devastating to confidence for investment, economic kinds of commitments by business people from all over the world.

So we have so many mutual interests with Russia. We are also going to have many differences with Russia. They do not have the same interests we have in many parts of the world. They have historically had different interests. But we have got to build the common bridges. And even when we have a disagreement, we have to continue to

work at this proliferation problem because we do not want to wake up in 3 years or 5 years and find that the kind of people who just derailed Amtrak, if that was a terrorist group, the kind of people that blew up the Federal building in Oklahoma, or the kind of people who carried out a chemical attack in Tokyo, we do not want to wake up and find those people possess awesome weapons of mass destruction. Only by working with the elements in Russia who are willing to work on this are we going to be able to prevent this from happening. It will be difficult at best.

So I think this factor has to be very much considered in our overall deliberations about how we go about expanding a security alliance which, after all, is supposed to be about security. And this is the heart of our security threat. It is also the heart of Russia's security threat. I, like the Senator from Texas, believe they have a threat of missiles on their borders at some point.

I believe that at some point we will find it conducive to them and to us to work together in this overall area of preventing the spread of missile technology and also defending against it where required and where necessary. So I agree with the Senator from Texas and again commend her for her leadership and her thoughts on this subject.

THE FUTURE OF NATO—ENLARGING FOR A NEW CENTURY

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senators NUNN and HUTCHISON and others in this important discussion on the future of NATO and NATO's role in maintaining U.S. national security in the next century. My colleague from Georgia has been a powerful driving force in the debate on the relevance of NATO. He takes second place to no one in his intellectual honesty and in his ability to examine this issue with depth and intelligence. I appreciate his seeking this time to engage the Senate in thoughtful discussion of this important issue and I thank him for asking me to take part.

Like the Senator from Georgia and many others in this Chamber, I am deeply concerned about the role the United States will play in international affairs in the years ahead of us. Our involvement with NATO—more precisely, our leadership of NATO—has been a critical part of American involvement in global affairs since our victory in the cold war. There is an important role for NATO to continue to play for the stability and security of Europe and the United States and we must continue to be an active leader in this highly successful alliance of sovereign, democratic states.

As all of us know too well, during this century the United States fought two world wars in Europe. We recognized that a free and stable Europe is vital to America's own national security. Our victory in those wars was attributable to the courage and ability of our Armed Forces, the support of the American people, and the willingness

of the United States to form alliances with other nations when it was mutually beneficial.

At the end of the Second World War, we developed a strong alliance of free nations to ensure that America and Western Europe would remain safe and free. That alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO—successfully deterred Soviet Communist expansionism which threatened the security of the United States and our European allies for four decades. NATO has been the most successful defensive alliance the world has ever seen. By maintaining the military and economic strength, and political will of its members, NATO deterred war and, in fact, never had to fire a shot against any of the states it had been formed to defend against.

Now the cold war is history. People in most of central and Eastern Europe have made bold and significant steps toward democracy. They have elected governments which share our beliefs in freedom, human rights, and the power of free markets.

There are some in America and abroad who argue that NATO is no longer necessary because the cold war has been won. But in my view those who advocate the abandonment of NATO are wrong. NATO is not an anachronism. The fundamental purpose of NATO—uniting like-minded, free, democratic nations in common self-defense to deter attacks and prevent war—remains as valid and worthy a purpose today as it was in 1949. It is important to do all that is necessary to ensure that NATO can continue to fulfill this role. That does not mean, however, that the NATO of 2001 should be or even can be identical to the NATO of 1949 or 1995.

NATO must adapt to new political geography and continue to contribute to the development of an integrated, free Europe.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and defense thinkers have conducted a number of studies on the future of NATO. In 1994 the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] published a report by its Senior NATO Policy Group, upon which I was privileged to serve along with Senators NUNN, COHEN, and McCAIN. Earlier this year, the Council on Foreign Relations published the report of an independent task force chaired by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown entitled "Should NATO Expand?" This year Secretary of Defense Perry provided his views on NATO expansion in a March 10 report to Congress. Each of these studies has moved forward the debate on NATO enlargement and new roles for NATO.

Now the alliance itself has issued a major report on the question in its September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement." This most recent study by the 16 member states of NATO sets out the purposes and principles of enlargement and establishes a process under which NATO will consider admitting

new members on a case-by-case basis. It does not establish a specific timetable for the admission of new members, prioritize candidates for membership, or develop precise criteria which must be met in order to gain membership. It does, however, convey a number of important messages.

First, new members of NATO will need to accede to the Washington Treaty. No state may enjoy the rights and benefits of NATO membership without also assuming the obligations of membership.

Second, negotiations on admission of new members will consider both the candidate state's potential contributions to collective defense as well as broader political and security criteria.

Third, expansion of NATO, if it occurs, is intended to strengthen relations with Russia through increased European stability and security. While Russian sensitivities and security requirements must and will be considered, no country outside the alliance will have a veto over NATO enlargement.

Needless to say, a document such as this study which reflects consensus of 16 nations is unlikely to fully satisfy everyone. Because I have spoken often on the need for NATO to expand its membership sooner rather than later, I would have preferred to see in this study a statement of clear criteria for inviting new members to join the alliance. Unfortunately, in my view, many of these central issues have been left to the negotiations between NATO and each prospective new member.

I have read with great interest and attention the analysis of my friend from Georgia, Senator NUNN, on the question of NATO expansion. The questions he poses are good ones which need to be considered as we and NATO decide how to proceed. Senator NUNN continues to make invaluable contributions to the debate on these critical issues which affect our national security and I hope that he will continue to speak out and to help focus our attention on them.

Last week, the Senator from Texas [Mrs. HUTCHISON] and I had the opportunity to meet with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes and the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter. In the course of a wide-ranging discussion, we spoke of the importance of American leadership in NATO and the question of NATO enlargement.

In that regard, I would like to make a few observations.

First, NATO always has been and must continue to be an alliance which is both military and political. It will not just be the number of troops which NATO nations can mass which will keep Europe and the United States secure in the decades ahead as it was not just numbers which kept Europe secure during the cold war. Rather, it is the degree of political solidarity and agreement on fundamental principles of democracy, human rights, and the necessity for free markets which will keep

the alliance viable and provide security for its members. Candidates for membership must demonstrate the same commitment to these democratic principles as current members. There can be no exceptions granted with regard to belief in and enforcement of human rights, the exercise of freedoms by citizens, the transparency of defense budgets, real civilian control of the military and intelligence arms of the government, and adherence to the principles of peaceful resolution of disputes within and beyond a state's borders.

Second, membership in the alliance carries with it obligations and benefits. No candidate can be accepted just because it wants the fruits of membership; each state must be able to contribute something to the alliance. This will be a difficult issue to resolve for the new democracies are constrained by their defense budgets and economic difficulties. NATO must be realistic, but at the same time creative, in determining what capabilities NATO requires and how new members can contribute to them.

Third, membership in NATO is not a zero-sum game. The new democracies of central and Eastern Europe are not competing with each for some predefined number of spaces being allocated for expansion. No one knows today whether the right number for the composition of NATO is 16, as it is today, or 18 or 20 or more. Candidates must be evaluated on the basis of the political and military norms which members must demonstrate on an absolute—not comparative—basis. It should not matter if one candidate country is less able to contribute than another candidate country. If the required standards are met, both should be admitted.

Fourth, participation in the Partnership for Peace is an important transitional step for candidate countries though it need not be a mandatory one if a candidate can demonstrate it meets the requirements of membership without it. I personally find it hard to believe that a country which chooses not to take part in the Partnership for Peace would or should be an early candidate for membership. If new members are to be full participants in all aspects of the alliance upon ratification of their membership, they should want to start exercising with NATO, determining what they need to achieve full integration, and exposing their own leaders—both military and civilian—to NATO procedures and thinking.

Fifth, contrary to the assertions of nationalist forces within Russia, NATO expansion is not and should not be construed as a threat to Russia. I fully agree with the conclusions of the recent NATO study that no state outside of NATO should have a veto over the accession of new members to the alliance. These are decisions which the independent members of the alliance themselves must make. Nor do I believe that decisions on membership should be based solely on threat con-

siderations. NATO should expand to meet the requirements for security and stability in Europe well into the next century. Russian conduct today cannot be used as a criterion by itself to determine whether there is a need to expand the alliance's membership. To do so, in fact gives Russia a de facto veto over what the alliance does in the near-term and long-term. We must all do everything we can to assure the leaders and people of Russia that NATO expansion is not just a shifting of cold war confrontation lines to the east. At the same time we need to make decisions which are right for our security and that of our European allies today and into the next century.

Finally, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are a founding member of NATO not just because we wanted to help our friends in Western Europe, but because it was in our national interest. I believe that this is as true today as it was in 1949. NATO expansion is something we should do because it is in our interest and the interest of security and stability in Europe. It is not a gift which we offer up to former Communist States or a reward for beginning the movement to full democracy.

There is no doubt in my mind that it is in our interest to find ways to encourage and support the transitions to democracy which are taking place today in Europe. Expanding NATO membership is one way to do this. It should not, however, be done in isolation. Nor should it be done solely because of what is or is not going on within Russia. We have no desire to confront Russia along a new wall of tension and confrontation. All of us—Americans, Russians, current members of NATO, and prospective members—must continue to work together to find ways to cooperate and make the world a safer and more prosperous place for us all.

I hope that this discussion, which Senators NUNN and HUTCHISON have organized, will help set a positive tone for the policy debates which lie ahead on this important issue.

Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, could I inquire from the Senator from Louisiana if he wishes to speak on this subject or did he want to change subjects?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I did want to speak on this subject.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will be happy to yield.

Let me say, before the Senator from Georgia leaves, that I think that his last point was a very important one. That is, in the future as we look at the ABM Treaty and the missile defense technologies, I think that the strategic interests of the United States will probably be parallel with the interests of Russia because both of us will want to look for other ways to defend our own shores from potential ballistic missile attack. That is something that I think the Russians will be in agreement with the United States on, and I

certainly hope that we can pursue our mutual defenses as we keep the ABM Treaty able to change with the times. It is no longer a bipolar world but, in fact, a multipolar world. So we will want to make sure that the ABM Treaty can last by letting it change with the times.

Well, I want to certainly yield some time to the Senator from Louisiana.

I also do want to mention that Senator COHEN from Maine was going to be with us today to add to this discussion. And a very sad thing happened. He lost his father just over the weekend, so he was not able to come. And our thoughts and prayers are certainly with Senator COHEN at this time. And we look forward to having a debate with him included because he is a thoughtful person who has traveled through these countries as well and I think will add greatly to the debate.

I yield now to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I notice that the time is due to expire momentarily.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to extend the time for morning business for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT IS MADNESS

Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the occupant of the chair.

Mr. President, over the Memorial Day recess, I had the opportunity, along with the Senator from Georgia and other Members of the Senate and of the House, to go to a conference sponsored by the Carnegie Institute for Peace in Madrid. It was a joint conference between us and Members of the Russian Duma. Those Members had been selected on a broad philosophical spectrum properly and as fully representative of the Duma as we could get. There were those who were the nationalists, there were those who were the Democrats, there were those representing every spectrum of the Duma.

We thought we were going to discuss a whole range of issues, but the theme that came back over and over and over again was the threat that all of these Members of the Duma feel from making the bordering countries around them of Eastern Europe members of NATO subject to the nuclear shield of the United States.

It is an obsession with those Members of the Duma, and as we discussed it with them, it struck me, first of all, that what possible interest is there of the United States to so threaten Russia that all of the ongoing things we have with respect to nuclear proliferation, with respect to the dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear weapons to threaten that ongoing process?

I think it is one of those policies, I do not know how conceived, but we really ought to rethink that and rethink it immediately.

A number of things occurred to me as we were at that conference in Madrid.

As I say, first was the overwhelming universal feeling of all parts, all of the philosophical spectrum in Russia opposing this, not only opposing it but emotionally opposing it, feeling threatened by it.

Second, Mr. President, I was struck by what you might call the political immaturity, the fact that the political personality of Russia has not yet matured. Their national psyche is still in the formative process. Their emotional involvement in this new democratic experiment—it was just overwhelming to see the emotion of these Members of the Duma. At this critical time, at this time in a formative process for Russia, for us to come along, rather than portray ourselves as their friend, their ally, their helper, someone who is interested in seeing the country move forward, to come along, in effect, with a new policy of containment to me, Mr. President, is absolute madness.

It seems to me that we ought to find some way to have cooperation with these new Eastern European democracies to make them feel part of our political family without having them be part of our nuclear umbrella, particularly when that umbrella is surrounding the former Soviet Union, containing the former Soviet Union, and threatening the former Soviet Union.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR SAM NUNN

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, just for one moment, I want to congratulate, of course, the Senator from Texas for her leadership, but the Senator from Georgia for his leadership on this issue, which is just another one of those issues in which, through the years, he has led this Senate, has led this country in its political thinking.

Most Senators of this body are content to properly represent their people, to reflect their political views, to be popular in the polls, to vote right, to vote in the national good. Other Senators like to think of themselves as being effective enough to be able to take the ideas of others which they agree with, to take the speeches, to take the bills, to take the thoughts of others and effectively represent those thoughts and feelings and bills out here on the floor of the Senate so as to move the country in the right direction.

There are occasional Senators, Mr. President, by virtue of their wisdom, their training, their background, their effort, their industry, their dedication, their devotion, but mainly by virtue of their God-given gifts, who are able to lead, to conceive the ideas by which the country ought to move, to determine what those policies are and, in the process, to serve as the beacon, the guidepost by which the rest of us Senators may guide our thoughts and our policies and our votes.

The Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN] is one of those rare individuals. As Senator BYRD said here on the floor not too many months ago, Senator NUNN

will stand out in the history of this country through the 200 years of this Senate as one of the outstanding leaders, not just for the 1990's or the 1970's when he came, but throughout the history of the country.

He really gives lie to that old aphorism that no one is essential because, Mr. President, when Senator NUNN leaves this body, there will be left a tremendous hole. Of course, in his experience, and know-how and technique, but really in that kind of wisdom that guides the country, that forms policy, that gives Americans, and especially gives Senators, the confidence that the country is moving in the right direction. As long as Senator NUNN was here, we always knew there was a voice on foreign policy matters upon which we could rely, and defense matters.

He will be greatly missed and, I suspect, if he is ever replaced, it will be many, many decades before we ever develop a man of his ability and wisdom and judgment.

Mr. President, he will be greatly missed and, from a personal standpoint, I can say that many of us will miss him and certainly his wife, Colleen, who is one of the most beloved Senate wives in this body and certainly one greatly beloved by me and my family.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Louisiana for his kind remarks, for his friendship and leadership. As he well knows, I have the greatest esteem for him. We have been colleagues from day one. He tried to claim seniority when he first came here and had to be awakened to the fact that he did not have it. I was the senior Member of the new class of 1972, now ancient.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If the Senator will yield, I have only said I was second to "NUNN" in seniority.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator is corrected on that. I appreciate his kind words and leadership. I appreciate him coming to the floor. He has basically been a keen observer of the national security scene and the NATO scene for a long, long time. All of us who have had dealings in this area realize that this is a subject that needs some really careful consideration. So I thank the Senator from Louisiana for his comments.

USE OF THE CAPITOL ROTUNDA FOR A RAOUL WALLENBERG CEREMONY

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 94 regarding the use of the Capitol rotunda for a Raoul Wallenberg ceremony just received from the House, that the concurrent resolution be agreed to, and that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and

that any statements relating to this measure be placed in the RECORD at the appropriate place as if read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

So the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 94) was agreed to.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12:30 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will stand in recess until 2:15 p.m. today.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 12:40 p.m., recessed until 2:16 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. DEWINE).

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PRYOR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. HUTCHISON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PRYOR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed as in morning business. I ask unanimous consent that the time that I use not be charged against either side managing the bill that is now the pending business of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Reserving the right to object, and I will not do so, just to suggest we are waiting for, I believe, probably Senator JEFFORDS and Senator PELL to offer the first amendment. But certainly I look forward to Senator PRYOR being able to speak as in morning business.

Mr. SIMON. I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleague from Kansas.

I see the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island here at this time. I am wondering if he would like for me to withdraw my consent request and allow him to offer his amendment.

Mr. PELL. Madam President, I think I would prefer that the sponsor of the amendment have the first opportunity.

Mr. PRYOR. I thank the distinguished Senator. I will proceed. I will be sensitive to the time constraint that we are faced with.

(The remarks of Mr. PRYOR pertaining to the introduction of S. 1299 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I thank once again the distinguished manager of the bill and my colleague from Rhode Island, who allowed me to go before him. I thank them.

WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1995

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.