

I served on a U.S. submarine, the bravest of the brave
 Until a German depth charge gave us a watery grave.
 I bombed the Ploesti oil fields, they blew with one big roar
 But in the attack we were hit with flack—I'll never bomb anymore.
 In Korea I heard the C.O. shout "we'll make it—I'm sure we will"
 I lost my life to try and take a spot called Pork Chop Hill.
 Vietnam! Vietnam! When will we ever learn I'm one of sixty thousand who never will return.
 I left my town, my wife, my kids, my home so cozy and warm
 I was killed in a SCUD attack in a war called—Desert Storm!
 And so in my eternity my thoughts are all for thee
 I'll never forget my America—I pray she remembers me.

FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
 MANAGEMENT AMENDMENTS OF
 1995

SPEECH OF

HON. JENNIFER DUNN

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 18, 1995

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 39) to amend the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act to improve fisheries management with Mr. BUNNING (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

Ms. DUNN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington State. While the amendment is narrow in nature, it addresses one of the most important developments in fishery management in the last decade.

The Individual Fishing Quota [IFQ] system that is being used by the halibut and sablefish fisheries did not come about overnight, it took many years. The real challenge of fishing management has been to conserve limited resources in the face of large fishing fleets and improved fishing gear.

To prevent overfishing of the halibut resource, Federal officials began cutting back on fishing times. A season that started at 6 months in the 1980's was reduced to 4 and then to 2 and finally down to two 24-hour openings a year. These so-called derby days created misery and havoc in the overcapitalized fishery. The same situation was developing for the sablefish fisheries. When you have 2 days to fish you end up going to sea no matter what the conditions—or starve. Fishermen were working in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" environment.

An example of this was the September 1994 opening. In the Yakutat fishing grounds near Petersburg, AK, a storm system that was an offshoot of a typhoon was just beginning to hit when the fishery opened. By the time the 48-hour opening was over, four boats had gone down, one of them taking the skipper with it.

With the introduction of IFQ's, halibut fishermen do not have to risk their lives deciding between fishing and typhoons and there are other major benefits. They will be able to

schedule their trips to optimize the markets, eliminate conflicts with other fisheries, and could possibly reduce their bycatch.

Investigation of alternative management regimes began in the late 1970's and continued throughout the 1980's. In a series of public meetings and workshops, fishermen, market experts, and other members of the industry and public made suggestions, and systems from around the world including transferable quota programs were analyzed. Finally, in 1991, after closely reviewing open access fisheries, license limitations, allotments, and combinations of these programs, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended the IFQ program to the Secretary of Commerce. After public comments on a proposed rule, the final rule was published in 1993. The program was finally implemented this year.

The IFQ program is new to Alaska. It is new to the halibut and sablefish fisheries and new to the fishermen and women who make their living from these resources. With any new idea there is growth and change as the concepts are discussed by regional councils, fishermen, processors, biologists, and enforcement personnel. The program is "in progress" and cooperation is needed from everyone involved for this program to be successful.

The new management regime is bringing increased safety, protection of the target species, while encouraging the conservation of these stocks for the benefit of the present and future generations.

And for all of these reasons Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Metcalf amendment to ensure the continuation of the Individual Fishing Quota program.

THE "REAL" CUBA TODAY

HON. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 24, 1995

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, in the debate a few days ago over the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995 we heard conflicting appraisals of Cuba today. From time to time, "Dear Colleague" letters and even congressional newsletters are distributed in this body about Cuba.

One aspect of Cuba that our sense of decency demands to incorporate in our discussions about the island is the continuing imprisonment of hundreds of political prisoners by Fidel Castro. This past June, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and Natural Reconciliation prepared in Havana a partial list of Cubans detained for political reasons. The list has been submitted to Ambassador Carl Johan Groth, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Cuba, who has yet to be granted permission by Fidel Castro's government to visit the island to carry out his human rights work.

Regardless of the differences of opinion some may have on U.S. trade sanctions against Havana, it is my hope that we do not turn a deaf ear to the cries for help from Castro's political prisoners. We must all work to obtain the prompt and unconditional release of all political prisoners in the island.

Their suffering for their Democratic convictions is an undeniable part of Cuba today.

Here are just a few of the more than a thousand names that appear on the list of political

prisoners and the made up crimes they were charged with by the Castro regime: Alfonso Eduardo Agueda Perez, sentenced to 4 years for being considered dangerous; Arnaldo Pascual Acevedo Blanco, sentenced to 5 years for spreading enemy propaganda and rebellion; Antonio Guillermo Acevedo Labrada, sentenced to 7 years for spreading enemy propaganda; Ricardo Acosta Alvarez, sentenced to 3 years for air piracy; Humberto Dorga Acosta, sentenced to 3 years for disorderly conduct in public; David Aguilar Montero, sentenced to 30 years for piracy; Rafael Juan Alfonso Leyva, sentenced to 30 years for espionage; Alberto Guevara Aguilera, sentenced to 10 years for distributing enemy propaganda and attempted attacks against state officials and property; Ernesto Verto Aguilera, sentenced to 2 years for falsifying documents; and Arturo Aguirre Acuña, sentenced to 10 years for illegal exit from the island and piracy.

In the weeks to come, I will discuss other political prisoners languishing in Castro's gulags.

PRESIDENT TAKES DECISIVE ACTION AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND CRIME

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 24, 1995

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call my colleagues attention to the important steps announced by the President over the weekend with respect to fighting narcotics and organized crime.

As you are aware, the President announced a series of initiatives in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly designed to strike a blow against the everincreasing dangers posed by narcotics trafficking and organized criminal activity. Two of those initiatives, I believe, will seriously damage the narcotics trade.

First, the President issued an executive order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act freezing assets in the United States of 47 individuals and 33 companies associated with the Cali cartel and prohibiting any individual or company in the United States from doing business with these individuals or companies. By U.S. Government estimates, the Cali cartel controls 80 percent of the cocaine entering the United States. This executive order will hit the cartel where it hurts the most: their money.

Second, the President announced his intention to impose sanctions under the Kerry amendment against countries that do not control effectively the use of their financial systems by narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and other criminal enterprises. Under the Kerry amendment, countries which do not have in place adequate laws and procedures to deter money laundering can be denied access to the U.S. financial system. President Clinton—for the first time since the Kerry amendment was enacted 7 years ago—has sent a clear message to countries that turn a blind eye to money laundering in return for short-term economic gains: There is a heavy price to pay for such actions and we will exact that price.

The actions of the President have stepped up the pressure on narcotics traffickers and

organized crime, and show the commitment of this administration to attacking these problems both here in the United States and overseas. I commend the President and call on our friends and allies around the world to join him in his efforts.

H.R. 2517

SPEECH OF

HON. PAT ROBERTS

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 20, 1995

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I am inserting the following section-by-section analysis of H.R. 2517 into the RECORD at this time.

The analysis follows:

BRIEF EXPLANATION

Title I of the bill will reduce projected agriculture spending for farm commodity programs by \$13.4 billion over the period, fiscal year 1996 through 2002.

It consists of the final consideration by the Committee on Agriculture of the Chairman's reconciliation recommendations that are patterned in large part after H.R. 2195, the Freedom to Farm Act. The latter bill is designed to reform U.S. agricultural policy to perhaps the greatest extent since the 1930's. The title also conforms to the reconciliation instructions directed to the Committee on Agriculture in House Concurrent Resolution 67, the Current Resolution on the Budget—Fiscal Year 1996. The provisions in the title I recognize the realities of a post-GATT and NAFTA world trade environment within which U.S. farmers and producers must compete as we approach the 21st Century.

The balance of the budget savings within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Agriculture designed to achieve the budget reductions required by H. Con. Res. 67 were realized with the House passage of H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act, under Title V, Food Stamp Reform and Commodity Distribution, that is now scheduled for a House-Senate conference.

PURPOSE AND NEED

Subtitle A—Freedom to Farm

Background

Since the last time Federal commodity programs were addressed in a farm bill (1990) or in reconciliation (1993), major changes in world trade policy, domestic budget policy, and commodity producer opinion require a reconsideration of Federal commodity policy.

The new majority in the 104th Congress is committed to balancing the budget. With the passage of the first Budget Resolution in June, the House Committee on Agriculture, despite having cut over \$50 billion in budget authority in previous years, was directed in H.Con.Res. 67, the FY 1996 Budget Resolution to achieve \$13.4 billion in savings from Federal farm programs over the next seven fiscal years. Admittedly, reducing Federal spending by that amount will impact farmers. However, some economists predict that a balanced budget will lead to a 1.5 percent reduction in interest rates. Agriculture as a major user of credit has over \$140 billion borrowed in terms of long term and short debt would benefit from such a result. If interest rates decline by 1.5 percent, a balanced budget could lead to an interest rate savings for U.S. agricultural producers exceeding \$15 billion over the next 7 years.

Following 19 hearings on Federal farm program policy by the Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and the full Com-

mittee on Agriculture, the call from throughout the United States was clear: agricultural producers wanted more planting flexibility, more certainty with respect to Federal assistance, and less Federal regulatory burden.

The combination of these factors led to the following conclusions: (1) the U.S. production agriculture industry needed to become more market-oriented, both domestically and internationally; (2) the industry could not become more market-oriented with a continued Federal involvement that simply extended the current supply-management policies of the past; and (3) the required budget cuts would not provide adequate funding levels to allow the existing Federal programs to function properly in a post-GATT and NAFTA world-oriented market. Analyzing these conclusions in conjunction with a review of the current Federal commodity price support and production adjustment programs resulted in several observations about agricultural policy.

First, current Federal farm programs are based on the 60 year old New Deal principle of utilizing supply management in order to raise commodity prices and farm income. When the Federal farm programs were first created, the government relied on a system of quotas and allotments to control supply. However, over the last 20 years the primary justification for the programs has been the producers receive in return for setting aside (idling productive farmland) Federal assistance. That assistance was largely in the form of deficiency payments to compensate producers for market or loan levels that fell below a Congressionally mandated target price for their production. Additionally, when Federal commodity programs were set up, world markets were not a major factor in determining agricultural policy. This approach, while perhaps appropriate in the 1930's, ignores the realities of a post-GATT and NAFTA world.

Second, current programs no longer achieve their original goals and have collapsed as an effective way to deliver assistance to producers. Worldwide agricultural competition usurps foreign markets when the United States reduces production. With respect to wheat, for example, world demand, when combined with the United States' supply control approach of idling acreage (including acreage idled under the Conservation Reserve Program), has tightened U.S. supplies so much that there have been no set-asides for five years and there are not expected to be any in the foreseeable future, which eliminates the supply management policy justification for the present policy.

For the last ten years, congressional farm policy actions have been driven by budget reductions. The 1995 debate has re-affirmed the Federal budget as the driving force for agricultural program policy. Modifications made to the original farm programs since their inception have revolved around two main goals: further restricting supply in order to alleviate the overproduction which the programs encourage; and decreasing Federal expenditures by limiting the amount of production which is covered by Federal subsidies. These two factors have combined in a way which has made current Federal commodity programs less effective, both as a means of increasing farm income and as a means to manage production, with each successive modification. There have been several recent situations where producers, who received an advance deficiency payment based on U.S.D.A. estimated low prices, have had a poor harvest and were required to repay the advance because the nation-wide effect of the poor harvest was to drive up the market price of the commodity beyond the point at which current programs make a payment.

This has placed many producers in a difficult position. Even though prices were high, their income is down because they have no crop to market and the government assistance they had previously received must be paid back.

Government outlays under current programs are the highest when prices are lowest (and hence when harvests are the best). This has had the effect of encouraging production based on potential government benefits, not on market prices. This incentive, when combined with the government's authority to idle acreage (which is the only means that current programs contain for limiting budget outlays) results in a situation in which producers have an incentive to produce the maximum amount of commodities while the government restricts the acres that can be planted, thereby encouraging the over-use of fertilizers and pesticides in order to get the most production from the acres the government is allowing the farmer to plant that year. This environmentally-questionable incentive created by current programs has also resulted in Congress authorizing greater and greater bureaucratic controls on producers over the last ten years in order to minimize environmental damage by requiring conservation compliance plans, compliance with wetlands protection provisions, and compliance with many other land-use statutes. It would be hard to imagine a program which creates more inconsistent incentives than the existing commodity programs.

Added on top of the regulatory burdens which have resulted from the counter-productive environmental incentives of current programs are the additional regulatory burdens created by Congress over the past twenty years which attempt to target program benefits to small producers. These so-called payment limitation provisions have: (1) resulted in substantial paperwork requirements for producers whose operations do not actually approach the payment limit, (2) required a substantial amount of government administrative resources, which has inhibited the government-wide goal of downsizing; and (3) been largely ineffective as a means of ensuring that benefits are targeted to small producers because of the loopholes in the existing structure.

Third, preserving the current Federal farm program structure with the required \$13.4 billion in cuts will leave producers with an ineffective and counter productive agricultural policy. The resulting system would be an emasculated remnant of an out-of-date 1930's-era program which no longer serves the people it was originally intended to benefit. While further modifications of current Federal commodity programs may accomplish required budget savings, ten years of budget cuts has changed the fundamental nature of farm programs to the extent they have inhibited farm production and producer earning potential.

Retaining the present policy would be a mistake when other methods can achieve the goals of providing U.S. producers with increased planting flexibility and less regulatory burden while at the same time allowing for greater earnings from the marketplace and reducing the budgetary exposure to the Federal Government.

Rationale

With these conclusions in mind, the recommended changes in Federal commodity policy which are accomplished in this title have a cumulative reconciliation savings of \$13.4 billion, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office. The Federal farm policy for commodities, titled as the "Freedom to Farm" in Subtitle A, captures the CBO projected baseline for agriculture over the next seven years after incorporating the \$13.4