

teeming, protected by its own private police force. The Somali shilling was trading at stable rates—with no protection at all. And a half-dozen crude newspapers were circulating freely.

Most hopeful of all, we saw practically no guns on the street and heard almost none at night. Disarmament, the elusive goal of American and U.N. peacekeepers, finally seemed to be occurring in their absence, perhaps spontaneously.

To be sure, the only schools operating were Koranic schools. The only regularly scheduled air service carried bales of khat, the Somalis' narcotic of choice. The only telephones were satellite links. The only electricity came from noisy private generators, though it was often shared among neighbors. The only water came from private wells, and there wasn't much of it.

Hospitals were dismal and might as well have been closed. Drugs cost a fortune. Rubble and wreckage still choked the streets. Some buildings had been cleaned up windows replaced and shell holes patched, but we saw little major renovation. And the big problem on everyone's mind was how to create jobs for the youngsters who'd gone to war instead of to school. In a word, there was more poverty than progress in Aided's "new" Somalia—but at least no one seemed to be starving.

Was this just a "show" for foreign guests, as several Aided critics whispered to us? Or were Somalis themselves finally putting their nation and their political system back together again, absent our help?

As Powell observed of the people here: "They had been solving their political problems for a thousand years before Jeffersonian democracy came upon the scene."

Somalia Lesson No. 3: Even overwhelming force can't solve another people's political problems. They must do that for themselves.

When we lunched with Aided one afternoon before leaving Baidoa, I read him some excerpts from The Post's interview with his old adversary. He was fascinated. It was no surprise that he agreed with Powell's central point: We should have stopped while we were ahead.

But what bothered Aided wasn't so much our arrogance as our ignorance. "I think if Americans had tried to understand our system, our traditions, our history, our way of life before sending troops and experts into Somalia to change everything," he reflected, "we would still be close friends."

Perhaps. But it was fortunate for Somalia that Americans hurried to lend a helping hand, even as we were slow to understand how a nation can collapse in turmoil and misery. Had we delayed our intervention until we "understood" the conflict's root causes, many thousands more would have died and clan warfare might yet be raging.

Gen. Powell would probably agree.●

HEAD-IN-THE-SAND FOREIGN POLICY

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Washington Post on Monday, October 16, 1995, ran a column by Jessica Mathews that is absolutely on target.

My colleagues have heard me speak before about the need for a more responsible foreign policy.

I thought it was particularly fascinating to note the quotation in the Jessica Mathews column that it costs \$600 million less to run the United Nations than it does the New York City police department.

How foolish we are to fail to do what we should in support of a more enlight-

ened and responsible international policy.

I ask that the Jessica Mathews column be printed in the RECORD at this point, and I urge my colleagues to read it.

The column follows:

HEAD-IN-THE-SAND FOREIGN POLICY

(By Jessica Mathews)

A dispassionate foreign observer of Congress's budget choices would have to conclude that Americans' only international aspiration is to be global policemen. Or, to be scrupulously fair, policeman with a handout for refugees and the most wretched victims of disaster.

That isn't what Americans want, but its' what—unless drastic adjustments are made in the next few weeks of bargaining—they're going to get. In both the House and Senate versions of next year's budget every means of keeping the peace short of military action and every other cost of international leadership or national self-interest—political, economic, environmental, humanitarian—is stripped to near or below the minimum while more money than the Pentagon thinks it can usefully spend is crammed down its throat.

In round numbers, Congress has added \$7 billion to a \$220 billion military total that already dwarfs what all of the rest of the world outside NATO spends on defense. Meanwhile, in the name of deficit reduction, it is planning to cut \$3 billion to \$4 billion from all other international spending. That may not sound like much but it amounts to 15 percent to 20 percent of the \$20 billion total in international affairs spending and includes reductions for most international agencies of 25 percent to 60 percent.

The cuts mean that U.S. embassies and consulates will close when a globalizing economy and more independent countries mean that more should be opening. They translate into fewer foreign service officers, hamstringed diplomacy and less of the most cost-efficient means of intelligence gathering. They mean long lines and poor services for Americans at home and abroad. All of that is tolerable, if neither sensible nor necessary, given defense increases.

What will really hurt American interests—indeed already has—are the cuts to the United Nations, the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries and the host of small international agencies that provide hundreds of services Americans need and value and underpin agreements that both parties have spent years of tough negotiating to achieve.

Where the cuts are in dues for which the United States is legally committed, as are its U.N. dues, the cost will be measured in an unraveling of international law not limited to finances. If the United States can renege on its funding obligations why can't X on Y (fill in the country and topic of your choice)?

Even where the cuts are in voluntary contributions, the result of a U.S. pull back from the international community along a front that reaches from peacekeeping to environmental protection will be a declining interest on the part of other countries in supporting U.S. initiatives. That will fuel further disenchantment in the United States etc., with results that no one wants.

The cycle has already begun. The United States owes the U.N. \$1.5 billion, a debt that threatens to tip that institution into insolvency. The U.N. is limping along by not paying what it owes to contractors and to countries that supply its peacekeeping troops. In effect, the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh are covering our bad check.

Congress wants to see organizational reforms at the U.N. before it will consider even a partial payment. But for the rest of the

world, the No. 1 item on the agenda is that a country that can afford to do so does not pay its dues year after year. As Britain's foreign secretary remarked to an appreciative audience, the United States seems to want "representation without taxation."

Part of what has brought us to this sorry pass is too many years of cheap shot—and now almost obligatory—political rhetoric that has inflated the self-evident need for U.N. reform into a problem of unrecognizable dimensions in the minds of most Americans. Even while defending the U.N., U.S. Ambassador Madeline Albright called it "elephantine." It took Australia's Gareth Evans to provide some perspective by pointing out that the U.N.'s secretariat and core functions (in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and the Hague) cost \$600 million less than the New York City Police Department. Adding the development, environment and population agencies, the huge refugee operation, UNICEF and others, the total is still less than Congress's defense add-on.

Having launched a last-minute effort to reduce U.N. funds and the rest of the international affairs budget, the administration is battling a sentiment it helped create by blaming the United Nations for its own mistakes in Somalia and Bosnia, and an attitude on the part of congressional freshmen for which the politest description is a profound and willful ignorance of America's role in the world, its obligations, its interests and what it takes to meet them.

However long it takes, this struggle deserves attention and public support. No American doubts the need for a superlative military. But it should be obvious by now that the best-armed force in the world cannot meet more than a fraction of the threats of the post-Cold War world nor help seize most of its opportunities. An America served by a rich military budget and impoverished funding for every other international function will be a country both poorer and less secure than it should be.●

ALL BETTER NOW

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, a longtime friend who headed my Illinois operation for many years and still is associated with me, Jerry Sinclair, once again showed why he is a valuable friend by sending a column that appeared in World Business in their September-October 1995 issue.

It deals with the Canadian health care system written by Diane Francis, the editor of Canada's foremost business newspaper, the Financial Post. It views things from a business perspective. She is the author of five books on business.

Ms. Francis spells out very clearly why the Canadian health care system is far superior to the United States system.

The propaganda spread against the Canadian system here in the United States by those who profit from the present system terribly distorts what the Canadians have. This column helps to balance that.

I would add, in the last poll I saw of Canadian citizens, exactly 3 percent of them said they would prefer the United States system of health care to theirs. That does not, as this column points out, suggest there are no problems with the Canadian system. But they deliver superior health care to their