of our action if based on this prematurity that the peace talks fall apart, and the ethnic cleansing, the death, the destruction and the savagery go forward? We then have unclean hands.

I would suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we rise to this lofty moment. At the end of the day, whether one is for or against the President, take that stance, but do not perpetrate this kind of effort that would prematurely deal with this issue. I underscore the challenge of the post cold war. The challenge is one of peace.

Mr. SOLOMON. My Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time and say there are three issues at stake here. One is cost. We cannot drain our military of billions of dollars annually which causes massive layoffs of our military personnel. That is not right.

Second, American foreign policy has always been to defend our treaty allies against outside military aggression. That is not the case here. We cannot now begin to participate in a NATO event that is going to go out of area, go away from this concept and start trying to settle internal issues of civil strife. We must not do that; that is wrong.

Third and most importantly, my colleagues say, ''Why do it today?'' Because it may be our last chance to save the lives of American soldiers and Marines that might have to go in there and lose their lives in a place they have no reason being.

Lift the embargo, give them money, give them weapons, and let them defend themselves without putting an American serviceman in harm's way.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 239, nays 181, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 813]

YEAS—239

Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Menendez
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NAYS—181

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Callahan
Cardin
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Longley
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOT VOTING—12

Brewster
Collins (IL)
Fields (LA)
Harman
Hefner
Hyde
Largent
McDermott
Neumann
Smith (MI)
Tucker
Volkmer

☐ 1708

Ms. KAPTUR changed her vote from ''yea'' to ''nay.''

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was on an official excused absence earlier today to attend a funeral, and would like to indicate at the proper points in the RECORD how I would have voted on the earlier recorded rollcall.

On rollcall 810, I would have voted ''no.'' On rollcall 811, I would have voted ''present.'' On rollcall 812, I would have voted ''no.'' And on rollcall 813, I would have voted ''no.''

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, for some reason, my vote was not registered on rollcall vote No. 809, the final passage of the H.R. 250, the Congressional Gift Reform Act as amended. Had my vote been properly recorded, it would have appeared as ''aye'' on agreeing to the resolution.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 528

Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my name be removed as a cosponsor of H.R. 528.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

PROHIBITION ON FUNDS FOR BOSNIA DEPLOYMENT

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 273, I call up the bill (H.R. 2606) to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated by law, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of H.R. 2606 is as follows:

H.R. 2606

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF USE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR DEPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS PART OF ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION OR IMPLEMENTATION FORCE.

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for such deployment have been specifically appropriated by a law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 273, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

For what purpose does the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] rise?

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, as I understand the rules under which we are operating, there is 1 hour of general debate on the Hefley provision and 1 hour in the event there is a substitute to be offered. May I ask the Chair, is that correct?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DELLUMS. At this time I will inform the Chair and my colleagues on the other side that we have no intention to offer a substitute, and as I understand it, the 1 hour of debate on the potential amendment would then be rolled into general debate on the Hefley provision, is that correct?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would tell the gentleman that pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 273, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will each control 60 minutes.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, for the past couple of weeks, proximity peace talks have been taking place in Ohio between leaders of the warring parties in Bosnia. Reports indicate that a political agreement may be near, with the hope of moderating, at least, this latest chapter in the violent history of the Balkans. Yet the issues being discussed by the parties remain unclear to many Americans.

In order to bring these issues into sharper focus, the House National Security Committee has held a number of hearings over the past few weeks. I believe these hearings have helped many members on the committee to deepen their understanding of this complex conflict.

Although a peace agreement has yet to be finalized, the Clinton administration has, nevertheless, committed to deploy up to 25,000 U.S. ground troops in Bosnia as part of a larger NATO peace implementation force. This prospective deployment has raised questions about what the nature, scope, role, duration, and, most importantly, purpose of any American military presence on the ground in Bosnia would be.

It is with these questions in mind that the National Security Committee has sought to shed some light on the administration's plan and its potential impact on the readiness of our Armed Forces, the credibility of our alliance commitments, and the wisdom of placing American soldiers in harm's way for what remain ambiguously defined U.S. national security interests.

To date, we have heard the assessment of the United States intelligence community about the current situation in Bosnia. Regional experts, experienced military officers—both active and retired—seasoned strategists and veteran diplomats have also testified regarding various aspects of the Bosnian problem. And the administration has also been before us to present its case.

In presenting its case to the committee, the administration has raised more questions than it has answered. What we have learned so far is troubling. Moreover, from all I have heard, it appears that the American people find the administration's arguments unconvincing as well.

The committee was told that a United States military presence on the ground in Bosnia is necessary because our NATO allies want us there. This is hardly a sufficient rationale for deploying 25,000 Americans to Bosnia. Without American troops, we are told, neither a meaningful peace agreement nor an effective force to implement it are possible. One can only wonder how meaningful a peace agreement is that requires 60,000 foreign troops, including up to 25,000 Americans, to enforce it. Peacekeeping has worked in the Sinai because both sides are committed to making peace work. I don't believe the same can be said about the numerous factions involved in the Bosnian conflict.

Neither Secretary Perry nor General Shalikashvili identified any military tasks that only U.S. forces could fulfill. In fact, General Shalikashvili stated that from a strictly military perspective, the task of implementing a peace accord in Bosnia could be accomplished solely by European forces. The United States can and probably should bring some unique support capabilities to any peacekeeping operation, but these would not require the on-the-ground presence of up to 25,000 U.S. combat troops.

We were told that America must play a role on the ground because the United States is the leader of NATO and that Alliance solidarity would crumble if we did not. But to argue that the future credibility and effectiveness of NATO rest upon committing American forces to an ill-defined peacekeeping mission is suspect. In fact, the strains of a prolonged military deployment, in support of ambiguous objectives could do more to pull the alliance apart in the long run than to solidify it.

Further, we were told that failure to participate with troops on the ground would make peace impossible and therefore might lead to a wider conflict that would engulf all of Europe. Yet, for the first time in this conflict, the warring parties have attained a rough military balance on the ground. More than any other factor, it is this rough parity that has paved the way for the peace talks in Dayton. Since the Dayton talks have commenced, even the New York Times has recognized that ''the possibility of the Bosnian war spreading has been eliminated.'' What matters now is how committed the warring parties are to making peace, not whether U.S. troops will be on the ground to enforce it.

What we have learned is that the administration has a strategy for putting United States troops into Bosnia, but not for getting them out. The President has said that troop deployments will begin within days of completion of a formal peace agreement. And while the administration has promised to withdraw forces after 1 year, this deadline for withdrawal is arbitrary. Well troops be withdrawn regardless of the situation on the ground? What if the peace collapses prior to our withdrawal? Would we cut and run? Would we damage NATO credibility more by bugging out when the going gets tough? Who, if anyone, will be left to fill the void if the United States were to withdraw? These are just some of the many questions that remain unanswered.

On a broader point, I remind my colleagues that the first rule of peacekeeping is to take no sides and make no enemies. Yet the United States has already violated that cardinal rule through the application of airpower over the past several months. Consequently, how can Americans be seen as neutral after having crossed the line of impartiality through the use of force? Moreover, it strains credibility

to believe that U.S. neutrality can be maintained at the same time that we are indicating our intention to arm and train one party to the conflict. As a result, Americans are likely to become targets in a conflict where peacekeepers already have been killed. American peacekeepers were tragically killed in both Lebanon and Somalia after the mission changed, which, in turn, changed the perception of one or more of the warring parties. If Americans are not neutral, which they will not be perceived as in Bosnia, we will be a target.

Finally, the nature of the mission itself remains an open question, as is the yardstick by which we are to measure its success. Any decision to place American fighting men and women in harm's way must not be taken lightly. There should be a clear U.S. National interest at stake and a well-defined mission—neither of which have been articulated, in my opinion, to date.

Mr. Speaker, in May 1993 Secretary Christopher himself advanced appropriate criteria to guide United States participation in any Bosnia mission. At that time he claimed that any such mission should have military goals that are clear and understandable to the American people, that the chances for success must be high, that support of the American people must be assured, and that the administration must have an exit strategy. These, it seems to me, are the essential minimum preconditions for congressional support.

To date, the Clinton administration has not satisfied these conditions. Therefore, I would agree with the conclusion of General Lewis MacKenzie, the first UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo. A few weeks ago, he told the committee, and I quote, ''Don't touch this with a ten-foot pole.'' Over the past weeks of hearings, I have heard nothing to change that recommendation.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. HEFLEY, a senior member of the National Security Committee and author of the legislation before us today, manage time on this side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

□ 1715

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] the ranking member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill. I think we should vote against it for several reasons. The first reason is that this bill ties the hands of the President. It tells the commander in chief that he cannot deploy troops to Bosnia, period. When you are the commander in chief, you have the power to deploy troops. That is fundamental, and this bill takes away that power.

Now, the authors of the bill say that Congress must assert its constitutional right to decide whether to allocate funds for the commitment of troops. That is correct. We do have that constitutional authority and responsibility, but may I point out to my friends that this bill goes far beyond that. It simply prohibits the President from action as commander in chief.

Second, I think this bill does jeopardize the peace process. This is the make-or-brake weekend in Dayton. The Secretary of State is on his way back; the parties have completed a number of preliminary agreements, and we are told that they could be close to a final settlement. At this very delicate and fragile moment, the Congress of the United States ought not to take any step which would undermine these talks. The parties in Dayton expect the United States to help implement this agreement. They are insisting upon it. The bill states that we will not do it.

Secretary Christopher put it very bluntly to us. He said that at a time when parties must make difficult decisions for peace, a House vote on this bill could be misinterpreted and give the parties reason for delay and hesitation. Why take that risk? Why take that risk at this very hour?

The Bosnian peace talks should be given every chance to succeed and we should take no action that might kill the negotiations and send the parties back to war.

Third, I believe that this bill is unnecessary because Congress will have a chance to vote later on troop deployments. I know there are many people in this Chamber who want that right, and I think they should have it. We should vote on the question of sending troops to Bosnia. I think it is our constitutional duty to do so whenever the President puts U.S. troops in harm's way.

Mr. Speaker, I believe we will have that choice. The President has stated in a letter in writing to the Speaker that he will request a vote after an agreement has been reached in Dayton and before the troops are deployed. I think he will honor that commitment.

There is no need to vote tonight, because there is no agreement yet. We have no request in this Congress to send troops. There is no plan before us on the details of United States deployment in Bosnia. The President cannot submit the plan until the parties have reached an agreement. He cannot submit the plan until our military has drawn up its recommendations.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I think it is a mistake to pass this bill because I think a vote against the bill is that the stakes are too high to act prematurely. The stakes are too high in Bosnia. NATO and European security and stability are on the line in Bosnia.

We all know that we are at a decisive moment in Bosnia. We all know it could tip towards peace or war. We cannot get peace in Bosnia unless NATO enforces it.

The President made a commitment 2 years ago that we would participate in any NATO force implementing an agreement. Our NATO partners in Bosnia will not enforce a peace agreement without us. The people of Bosnia and all of the parties to the agreement in Dayton want our participation and they are dependent upon it. They know that without U.S. participation and leadership, there will be no peace. If we rule out now a United States role, and that is what this bill does, before we see the details of a peace agreement or an implementation plan, we risk the collapse of the peace efforts in Bosnia and a wider war.

□ 1730

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me say it is very important that we debate this measure now. This is not a trivial matter. I know the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] shares my deep conviction about that. I would hope that everybody who speaks on this will not put it in the context of politics, Democrat, Republican, conservation, liberal, presidential, Congress. That is not what we want to talk about here today. We want to talk about American lives and American families. For many American families, this is the most important vote that the 104th Congress will name and make no mistake about it.

As the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] said earlier, this is the vote on Bosnia. This is the vote on Bosnia. Do not think you can go home and say, ''Well, I didn't really approve of sending troops to Bosnia but we ought to do it, the timing was just bad.'' That is not the way it is going to work. If we want a meaningful vote, it has to be right now.

This bill does one thing: It requires specific appropriation of money prior to ground troops being inserted in Bosnia. That is all it does. It does not infringe on the rights of the Commander in Chief. It does not tell him what he can and cannot do. It simply says, do not do it until you have Congress and the American people behind you. How much stronger the effort will be if we have the President and Congress and the American people all together signing off the shame sheet.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MCHALE].

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Speaker, the Washington Times, November 17, 1995. I would urge Members, particularly those on the other side of the aisle, listen to these words:

''Bosnia, a Vote Too Far.

If ever there was a need for Solomonic wisdom, it would have to be in

Dayton, OH. Negotiations are not going well and what will surely not make the negotiations any easier are the votes coming up in the Congress today on troop deployment. With relations between Capitol Hill and the White House as poisonous as they can be, this is simply the wrong time and the wrong way to make decisions about the most pressing foreign policy issue of the day.''

The Washington Times.

''To vote preemptively before there is even something to vote on is inappropriate. The Republicans—again, the Washington Times—the Republicans should ask themselves, is that really what they want.''

Mr. Speaker, I believe that there are two issues that must be considered by the House. The first is the issue of the wisdom, dubious though I think it may be, of deploying ground troops in Bosnia.

I stood here in the House 2 weeks ago in a bipartisan effort prior to the commencement of the negotiations in an attempt with my good friend the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] to send a clear, unequivocal message to the President of the United States that we do not want ground troops in Bosnia. My views have not changed one bit. Three hundred-fifteen of us said to the President of the United States, do not send ground troops.

The issue before the House today is not the wisdom or lack thereof in sending troops. The issue before the House today is the timing of the congressional role. When do we exercise our constitutional responsibility?

The President of the United States in response to a request that several here in this Chamber made to him and contrary to the assertions previously made by some Members on this floor has said in unequivocal language that upon the conclusion of the negotiations, there will be a vote requested in this House.

Let me assure my Republican friends, if the President does not heed the will of the American people, if he does not correct the mistaken analysis of those who are advising him on the military issues, no one will stand on this floor and fight him more firmly with the full power of the law given us under the Constitution in order to avoid the deployment of ground forces. But today that issue ought not be before the House.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is constitutionally irresponsible for this Congress, or any Congress, to statutorily cripple the President, any President, in the conduct of foreign policy during a delicate stage of diplomatic negotiations.

If we pass this bill today, future Republican Presidents and future Congresses of the United States will regret the precedent. To stop this President, we need not weaken the presidency.

I urge a negative vote.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2606.

The resolution simply states that none of the Department of Defense funds may be used to deploy United States ground troops to Bosnia unless specifically authorized by the Congress.

I have been very concerned about Mr. Clinton's unwillingness to consult with the Congress and seek congressional approval for other endeavors. Mr. Clinton failed to get congressional approval prior to spending tens of billions of dollars in taxpayer money to bail out the Mexican economy.

Additionally, during the recent debate on the Federal budget impasse and the debt limit, Mr. Clinton has by-passed the requirement that the Congress pass legislation enabling the Federal Government to incur a debt in excess of $4.9 trillion.

This President has consistently demonstrated a willful disregard for the legislative process and Congress. In spite of Mr. Clinton's statements, I have no reason to believe that his actions with regard to Bosnia will be any different. Besides, if the President has said he would seek congressional approval before sending United States troops to Bosnia, he should have no problem signing this bill.

I am very concerned about President Clinton's plans to send United States troops to Bosnia, and I believe it would be wrong for the President or his administration to make promises of United States troops to Bosnia.

I welcome all efforts to reach a settlement in the region, but oppose any increased U.S. military role in this volatile area. I do not believe United States military intervention in Bosnia will bring a lasting peace. Even a minimal military involvement holds the very real potential of miring the United States in a prolonged and unwinnable struggle. The last thing we need is to get tangled up in another Vietnam-like war with the loss of many American lives.

Before taking another ill-conceived step, President Clinton needs to define our policy and objectives in the region. What are the specific objectives of U.S. military involvement? Why must the United States shoulder so much of this burden in Europe's own backyard? Why is Europe itself hesitating to use troops? What will be the next step if limited military engagement fails? These questions remain unanswered. At this point, the Clinton administration's policy seems to be driven by shifting winds instead of sound military strategy.

Unlike Kuwait, Bosnia is not a well-established State and is under attack from its own people. The civil war there results from resurgent nationalism, conflicting territorial claims, and past historic grudges that are centuries old.

The cold war may be over, but Mr. Clinton and his foreign policy advisors have not yet learned how to deal with regional conflicts that affect international security. The administration's vacillation in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti has eroded United States credibility abroad. In addition, defense down-sizing has reduced our ability to protect our own vital interests and the Clinton administration has asked for even deeper cuts.

Bosnia is not at peace. This centuries-old conflict is continuing. The Clinton administration is prepared to put our military men and women in the position of implementing the peace. I am not.

President Clinton has failed to demonstrate why United States troops should be sent to Bosnia and he should seek congressional approval before endangering the lives of our men and women in uniform by sending them to the Balkans.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY], the distinguished Republican whip.

Mr. DELAY. I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLY] for bringing this resolution to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, no matter how nicely we try to tell him, President Clinton still has not gotten the message that the American people have strong reservations about sending our young men and women into an extremely dangerous situation in Bosnia when our national interests are not directly threatened.

I would like to just read a quote from Philip Merrill, former Assistant Secretary-General of NATO, which appeared this week in the Wall Street Journal:

> Our future policy seems to be to simultaneously threaten Serbs from the air, act as peacekeepers on the ground, train the Croation army, arm the Bosnian military, conduct peace negotiations, and indict Bosnian war criminals. Any one of these policies is defensible; taken together, they're incoherent. As flare-ups occur, these inherently conflicting policies will leave us powerless to act effectively.

This is not a situation into which I could justify sending our young Americans. If a peace agreement is reached, and I truly hope that one is, the United States has the responsibility to help implement it, but not with ground troops.

It is neither in the President's nor the country's best interests to forge ahead with a plan to send United States troops to Bosnia without the full support of the American people through their representatives. H.R. 2606 sends a clear message to the President that he has not sufficiently made his case and that he is going to have to work with Congress if he wants to follow this path.

I support the Hefley legislation and I urge my colleagues to support it. Congress has a duty to exercise its power of the purse when it feels the President is making a grave mistake.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SISISKY].

Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Speaker, whether or not U.S. forces should be put on the ground as peacekeepers is one of the most troubling questions facing this country today. I can say it is a personal problem for me. There are risks whatever we do. If we go in, we may place ourselves in the line of fire by those who choose not to abide by a peace agreement.

I have been returned to this House 7 times, almost 14 years now. One of the reasons that I consider I have been returned is that I try to do what most of

my people that I represent want. I can say in all honesty, they do not want the troops to go into Bosnia. But there are times that I think that we have to rise above what our constituents read and hear, not trying to replace what they want, but I think we have to rise above that. That is why I am opposed to this.

This is a precarious situation. There is no easy answer, there is no certain outcome, and I hope the peace talks in Dayton make some of the questions easier to answer.

But the bottom line is that U.S. credibility, I believe, is on the line. Mind you, I did not say the prestige was on the line. I am not too concerned about prestige. But I think that our credibility is at risk.

The chairman of our committee mentioned General McKenzie. I want to just tell Members a little bit about me questioning General McKenzie and two of the brightest people in the Reagan administration in the Pentagon who testified before our committee. They were very simple questions that I asked.

I asked them, ''Are you in favor of a unilateral lifting of the embargo?''

They said, ''Absolutely.'' These are the two people, the former Pentagon secretaries.

I asked General McKenzie, I said, ''General McKenzie, is it true that the British and the French would pull out if we unilaterally lifted the embargo?''

He bowed his head, and he said, ''Yes.''

I said, ''Is it also true that the United States of America would have to extract the British and French with 50,000 troops under wartime conditions?''

And everybody—and those in that National Security meeting know what I am talking about—everybody ducked their head.

Because the truth of the matter is we are talking about not 25,000 troops, 20,000 troops, on the ground in peacekeeping. The other 50,000 troops if we lifted the embargo unilaterally would be at wartime risk. As members of the committee know, I never give up my time, and I said: ''I yield back the rest of my time.''

We cannot abdicate our responsibility, bury our head in the sand, and retreat into isolationism. That is a failed policy of the past and it will fail again if we try today.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] for yielding me the time and for bringing this matter before us at this time.

Mr. Speaker, it is most regrettable that we have come to this juncture on the question of whether United States armed forces should be deployed to Bosnia to help implement a peace agreement.

Ideally we would not be voting on this matter before an agreement has been reached. Ideally we would wait until an agreement was reached, carefully consider that agreement, assess the proposed mission of our forces, the likehood that our forces will be able to successfully accomplish that mission, and then, after careful deliberation, we would vote on whether to approve or disapprove the deployment of United States forces to Bosnia to help implement the agreement.

Regrettably, we are not in the ideal situation with regard to Bosnia. That is because the Clinton administration is apparently circumventing the Congress in its determination to deploy up to 20,000 of our armed forces to Bosnia.

The administration has kept us in the dark about the negotiations in Dayton. They have been evasive about what the precise mission of the U.S. forces would be, particularly the degree to which our forces will be called on to coerce the parties into complying with the agreement.

By refusing to talk about the degree to which the mission will be one of Somalia-style peace enforcement rather than Cyprus-style peacekeeping, they have precluded any serious consideration of the risk that this mission will turn out like the earlier United States operations in Somalia and Lebanon, where the United States became not a peacekeeper, but rather just another party to the conflict.

Most importantly, the administration has declined repeated invitations to commit that the Congress will have a reasonable period of time to consider whether to approve or disapprove the deployment before any United States forces are sent to Bosnia. They have, of course, hinted that Congress will have plenty of time to act. They have told us not to worry; the check is in the mail.

But, every assurance we have been given has been carefully hedged. Most recently, in the President's November 13 letter to the Speaker, the President told us there would be a timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act, but then he went on to say in the next sentence that: ''However, there is a requirement for some early prepositioning of a small amount of communications and other support personnel.''

We have tried to find out what that means. We have been told it means that as many as 4,000 NATO personnel may be deployed into Bosnia starting about 72 hours after an agreement is initialed in Dayton, up to half of whom may be Americans.

What it means, in other words, is that almost before the ink is dry in Dayton, thousands of American soldiers may be on their way to Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, I include our exchange of letters with the President on this issue in the RECORD at this point:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, October 26, 1995.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We wish to reaffirm our conviction that it would be a grave mistake to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement without the support of Congress and the American people. For this reason, we applaud the commitment set forth in your October 19th letter to Senator Byrd to ''welcome, encourage and, at the appropriate time, request an expression of support by Congress promptly after a peace agreement is reached.''

Last week's congressional testimony by Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili was a useful step in the dialogue that must take place between the Administration and Congress over this issue. At this time, however, we continue to have serious reservations about the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Bosnia.

In order for Congress to properly consider and act upon this issue, we will require considerably more information about the proposed deployment than has been made available to us to date. Further, we need some clarification of the sequence of steps leading up to the possible deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia.

Accordingly, we are submitting to you the questions set forth below. These questions are submitted in the spirit of your October 19th letter and are designed to foster cooperation between our two branches in this important matter. We hope that the following questions will receive the immediate attention of your Administration and a prompt and complete response:

1. The Sequence: What steps must occur between the time a peace agreement is reached and the time that U.S. Armed Forces are first introduced into Bosnia? How much time is each of these steps likely to require? At what stage in this process do you intend to submit your request to Congress, and how much time will this likely afford Congress to act on your request prior to the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Bosnia?

2. U.N. Authorization: Do you intend to obtain a new resolution from the United Nations Security Council before deploying U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia? If so, will your request to Congress be submitted before, simultaneous with, or after you go to the Security Council to obtain its approval? If such a Security Council resolution is vetoed, would you consider proceeding without such a resolution? How would the timeline for proposed congressional action be affected if the Security Council refused to authorize the operation?

3. U.S. Commitment: The Administration has argued repeatedly that the credibility of the United States and the solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will suffer if Congress does not back up your commitment to deploy up to 25,000 U.S. troops into Bosnia to help enforce a peace agreement. Precisely when did you make this commitment, to whom did you make it, and what conditions, if any, were attached to it?

4. Consultation With Congress: Was there any consultation with Congress about this commitment before it was made? If there was such prior consultation, could you please provide the dates on which those consultations took place and the names of the Members who were consulted.

5. Mission of U.S. Forces: In making this commitment, did you specify the type of mission the U.S. Armed Forces would be prepared to carry out? In particular, was the commitment limited to carrying out traditional peacekeeping operations—essentially

acting as a neutral observer of the parties' compliance with the peace agreement—or did it extend to using armed force to coerce the parties into compliance with the agreement?

6. National Security Interests: What are the vital U.S. national security interests that require sending American ground forces to support a peace enforcement operation? What are the political and security objectives and military tasks to be accomplished in Bosnia? What is the measure of success for the operation? Why is the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces limited to one-year?

7. European Capabilities: In recent testimony before congressional committees, General Shalikashvili states that ''strictly from a military point of view, [European] NATO forces are capable of carrying out this mission.'' If European forces have the capability to conduct this mission alone, why must U.S. ground forces be involved?

8. Arms Control: With regard to the Administration's plan to create a military balance in Bosnia through arms control, now and when will an arms control regime for Bosnia be established? Who will responsible for ensuring compliance with it? Is it possible that U.S. Armed Forces deployed to Bosnia will be asked to disarm Bosnian Serb or other forces in accordance with such an arms control regime?

9. Arming Bosnia: With regard to the Administrations's alternative plan to create a military balance in Bosnia by equipping and training Bosnian Federation military forces, is implementation of that plan conditioned on failure of efforts to create a military balance through arms control? If so, who will judge whether arms control has failed, and at that point will that judgment be made?

10. Lifting Arms Embargo: Will the U.N. arms embargo have to be lifted before equipment and training can be provided to the Bosnian Federation forces? Have Russia, France, and Britain agreed in principle to lift the arms embargo for this purpose? Will any lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia necessarily require that the arms embargo on Serbia also be lifted? If so, what will prevent the Russians and others from arming the Serbs while we arm the Bosnians?

11. Maintaining Neutrality: What role will the Implementation Force, U.S. Armed Forces, or U.S. contractors, have in providing military equipment and training to the Bosnian Federation Forces? How does the United States remain a ''neutral peacekeeper'' if it is simultaneously providing, either directly or indirectly, military equipment and training to one of the parties to the conflict?

12. Coercing Compliance: What happens if it becomes apparent after U.S. Armed Forces are deployed in Bosnia that one or more of the parties to the conflict is not committed to peace? Would you withdraw our forces at that point, or would you seek to coerce the misbehaving party or parties into compliance with the agreement?

13. Survival of Muslim-Croat Federation: Is the Muslim-Croat Federation likely to survive a peace? In particular, are Croatia and Serbia committed to survival of the Federation, or are they just waiting to partition the country?

14. Role of Russian Troops: What role will Russian troops play in the Implementation Force and in the peace process? Will the United States be asked to underwrite directly or indirectly any portion of the cost of Russian participation? Under what command and control arrangements will Russian forces serve?

15. Costs: What are the estimated incremental costs for this operation and what plan are those estimates based upon? Are these costs based on the deployment of 20,000–25,000 forces for one full year, or do they assume a phased drawdown during that period? Beyond the deployment of U.S. ground forces, what are the cost estimates for total U.S. activities in Bosnia, including costs for air combat units, naval carrier groups, support staff, etc. What are the cost estimates for NATO for this operation, and what percentage of those costs will be billed to the United States? Are these costs in addition to incremental costs identified above?

16. Supplemental Appropriation: How does the Administration plan to pay for this operation? If a supplemental appropriation will be requested, when will that occur?

17. Effect on U.S. Readiness: Even though the U.S. troop contingent alone will be insufficient to police the extent of the planned American area of operations in Bosnia, this mission, in conjunction with the ongoing border monitoring mission in Macedonia, will effectively tie up most of U.S. Army Europe. What will be the effects of the overall U.S. activities in and around Bosnia on U.S. readiness in Europe and worldwide? What effects will the deployment have on the Defense Department's ability to execute its strategy for responding to two major regional contingencies?

18. Command and Control: What are the current command and control arrangements for this mission? What assurances can you give us that there will be no ''dual key'' arrangements? Please explain the military and political chains of command. What are the rules of engagement for U.S. forces?

19. Return of Refugees: What is the long term viability of a peace settlement if the displaced persons in Bosnia—who constitute half of the country's population—are unable to return to their homes? Will U.S. Armed Forces have any role in ensuring the right of return is respected for those who wish to exercise it? If so, how will our Forces perform this function?

20. Casualty Estimates: What is the estimate of U.S. casualties over the one year period of deployment in Bosnia?

21. Agreements With U.N.: Will you make available to us all documents and understandings between those residual U.N. peacekeeping forces and the Implementation Force, including any intelligence-sharing arrangements, Status of Forces Agreements, and understanding or commitments involving the use of U.S. troops to protect any residual U.N. forces or observers?

22. Reconstruction of Bosnia: We understand that at the upcoming London Conference the United States will make a substantial financial commitment for the relief and reconstruction of Bosnia. What is the size of that commitment, how will it be paid for, and what are the implications for FY 1996 program levels? What programs will suffer reductions to fund this effort?

Thank you for your consideration of these questions, and we look forward to your prompt response.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Newt Gingrich; Tom DeLay; Chris Cox; Bob Livingston; Dick Armey; John Boehner; Bill Paxon; John R. Kasich; ——— ———; Barbara F. Vucanovich; Susan Molinari; Ben Gilman; Bob Walker; Bill Archer; J. Dennis Hastert; Floyd Spence.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, November 13, 1995.

Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In your letter of October 26, you and your colleagues posed a number of questions concerning current and future U.S. activities surrounding the Bosnian peace process. I welcome this opportunity to deepen the dialogue between the Congress and the Administration over the peace process and the U.S. role in it.

Your questions fell into several broad categories and for clarity of presentation, my responses are arranged to address each of those categories. I am providing the most current, definitive information available. As you know, however, negotiations in Dayton have been underway for less than two weeks. Many of the issues you raise are still under discussion by the parties themselves. The outcome of those discussions will significantly affect some of the questions you have posed. As I am sure you will understand, it is impossible to provide detailed information about aspects of a settlement that does not yet exist.

In addition, since some of the questions you raise concerning U.S. participation in implementing a Bosnian settlement depend on the terms of the agreement itself, you will understand that I must reserve my decisions until the actual details of the agreement are clear. There must first be an agreement among the parties to which they are seriously committed. I look forward to continued, close consultations with you and your colleagues as the peace process moves forward.

U.S. INTERESTS

This Administration, and that of previous Democratic and Republican Presidents, have been firmly committed to the principle that the security and stability of Europe is of fundamental interest to the United States. The conflict in Bosnia is the most dangerous threat to European security since World War II. If the negotiations fail and the war resumes, as it in all probability would, there is a very real risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve Europe's new democracies as well as our NATO allies. Twice this century, we paid a heavy price for turning our backs to conflict in Europe.

If the negotiations now taking place under U.S. leadership in Dayton are successful, we will have a real opportunity not only to end the dreadful humanitarian suffering and outrageous atrocities that we have seen in Bosnia, but also to advance our goal of an undivided, peaceful and democratic Europe—with benefits for our own security and prosperity. Such a result is clearly in our nation's interest.

This result, however, can only be achieved with U.S. leadership. The events of the past several months illustrate the importance of that leadership. Following the assaults on Srebrenica and Zepa by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States led the international community to take serious and effective steps to protect the remaining UN-mandated safe areas. We secured an agreement from our NATO allies to meet further assaults on the safe areas with a decisive military response. American pilots participated in the NATO bombing campaign following the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace, demonstrating our resolve and helping to convince the parties to turn from the path of war to the path of negotiations and peace.

Finally, U.S. diplomatic leadership has seized the opportunity for peace that these developments created. In August, I directed my National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, to present a new U.S. initiative to our Allies and the Russians. Since then, our negotiating team, directed by Secretary Christopher and led by Richard Holbrooke, has conducted tireless shuttle diplomacy throughout the region and Europe as a whole. Their remarkable progress over the past three months has resulted in a cease-fire and agreement on the basic principles of

a settlement, laying the groundwork for the current negotiations in Dayton.

U.S. leadership has brought the parties within reach of a peaceful resolution of the conflict for the first time in years of terrible human tragedy. We must not abandon this process now. The parties, in particular the Bosnians, have made clear to us that U.S. leadership has created this opportunity for peace after years of bloodshed, and that NATO and U.S. participation is essential if they are to take decisive steps toward a peaceful future. In short, if our commitment to helping implement a peace is broken, there will be no peace in Bosnia. I would particularly emphasize the importance of U.S. involvement with regard to NATO. For almost 50 years, the Alliance has been the anchor of America's and Europe's common security. If we do not do our part in a NATO mission, we would weaken the Alliance and jeopardize American leadership in Europe.

SEQUENCING/TIMING

If an agreement is reached at the Dayton talks, a number of steps must be taken prior to the deployment of troops. While the precise details of such sequencing depend on the terms of the agreement, let me suggest the general outline.

When and if all substantive issues are resolved among the parties, they would initial the documents that would comprise the comprehensive peace agreement. Following the initialing of the accord, NATO must promptly complete its operational planning for an Implementation Force (IFOR) based upon the terms of the settlement. I would review the agreement and the final NATO plan and determine whether U.S. participation in the IFOR is warranted. There would be an international conference to discuss aspects of civilian implementation, a final peace conference of all the parties and, ultimately, a signing of the agreement by the parties. During this period, the North Atlantic Council also must approve the final operational plan for the IFOR.

I will submit a request for a Congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia promptly if and when the parties have initialed an agreement that I consider to be a genuine agreement and after I have reviewed the final NATO operational plan.

While expeditious IFOR deployment is desirable, after initialing of an agreement, there will be a timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon my request for support before American forces are deployed in Bosnia. However, there is a requirement for some early prepositioning of a small amount of communications and other support personnel.

As I have said previously, I believe Congressional support for U.S. participation is important and desirable, although as has been the case with prior Presidents, I must reserve my constitutional prerogatives in this area.

Once a final decision is reached and the peace agreement has been signed and has entered into force, IFOR would deploy rapidly to minimize the potential for renewed conflict. The final peace agreement would contain the parties' request and authority for IFOR deployment, thus IFOR's presence would be consensual. The UN Security Council may also approve a resolution endorsing the deployment.

Without an agreement in hand, it is impossible to set an exact timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but the IFOR operation should have a finite duration. Based on current planning by my military advisors, we believe that approximately 12 months would be adequate to accomplish the needed IFOR tasks and allow the peace to become self-sustaining, although we cannot make that final judgment until the terms of the agreement are defined.

IFOR MISSION/COMMAND AND CONTROL

Once deployed, IFOR would monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the settlement in an evenhanded manner. The precise tasks depend on the terms of the agreement but would include maintaining the cease-fire and separation of forces. IFOR would be an active, robust force capable not only of implementing a peace agreement but also of defending itself vigorously under all circumstances.

Although the parties would have the primary responsibility for implementing the agreement, the parties have made clear that a strong international military presence would be needed to give them mutual confidence that commitments would be met and to provide them with a breathing space to begin rebuilding their country. NATO is the only force that offers the strength, effectiveness and credibility to provide the needed deterrent to renewed conflict. The United States, as the heart of NATO, must be an integral part of that enterprise. Though no details can be finalized prior to a settlement, we envisage that the United States would contribute approximately 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia to the force, with our Allies and non-NATO countries contributing approximately 40,000 more. Additional personnel stationed outside Bosnia would provide support for IFOR.

IFOR would not be a UN peacekeeping force. It would be a NATO-led peace implementation force, operating under clear and unified command and control, with robust rules of engagement. All political guidance would come from the North Atlantic Council to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. General George Joulwan. General Joulwan would, in turn, provide overall direction to the IFOR commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, the Commander of NATO's Southern Forces. NATO has learned the lesson of the problems associated with the ''dual key'' arrangement and there would be no return to that approach. This is an essential precondition for U.S. participation.

We expect that non-NATO countries, including Russia, would help implement the agreement. Secretary Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev agreed on November 8 to a military framework that would allow for the participation of a brigade of Russian troops in the Bosnia implementation force. They agreed on common principles for Russian participation. Russia would retain national command of its forces, as the United States would retain over U.S. forces. Operational control of the Russian contingent would come from General Joulwan, transmitted to them through a Russian deputy, and the Russian brigade would be under the tactical control of a U.S. division commander. While this arrangement would allow Russia to assert that their forces are not under NATO command, Russian forces would receive their missions and orders from U.S. officers who would report through the NATO chain of command, thus preserving the principle of unity of command.

The details for liaison arrangements with non-NATO nations have yet to be finalized. Let me make clear, however, that in no case would non-NATO nations or organizations have a veto over NAC instructions or authority over U.S. troops.

IFOR commanders would operate under operating procedures and rules of engagement that allow them great flexibility in determining the proper response to a violation of the agreement or a threat to IFOR. This would help ensure that violations are dealt with effectively and further violations deterred.

Violations of the military aspects of the settlement would be met with swift, decisive force if that is necessary. I would not ask American troops to implement a plan that cannot be enforced. In the event of a significant breakdown in compliance, the NAC would assess the situation in consultation with the NATO military authorities and authorize any necessary changes in operating procedures and the rules of engagement. Allies agree that if there were a total breakdown in compliance, IFOR would be withdrawn.

It is not possible to make meaningful casualty predictions, since casualty models for peace operations do not exist. Let me emphasize that our troops will not be deployed unless and until there is a genuine peace agreement. The parties must show that they are serious about peace. Given the size of the IFOR and its rules of engagement, as well as the high quality of U.S. and NATO troops, training, and equipment, we would have created conditions that would offer the minimum possible risks to our soldiers.

The signing of a peace agreement and the deployment of IFOR would mean the end of UNPROFOR's mandate. Some elements of UNPROFOR immediately would become part of IFOR under NATO command. The rest of the troops making up UNPROFOR would be withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command and control of the IFOR commander.

EFFECTS ON READINESS

U.S. participation in the IFOR would not seriously reduce the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win a regional conflict elsewhere. Combat forces most needed in the opening phase of a regional conflict would still be available to deploy on short notice. There would, of course, be some degradation in the preparedness of units deployed in Bosnia to engage in combat missions elsewhere. Units engaged in contingency operations sometimes lose the opportunity to conduct a full range of training.

I would note, however, that the need to withdraw combat forces from peace operations and redeploy them rapidly is likely to be required only in the event of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. In such cases, we envision that most of the forces from the peace operation would be redeployed to fight and win during the later phases of the second major conflict. This being the case, we anticipate that time would be available to provide units with retraining, restocking, and other ''readiness upgrades'' prior to being redeployed and committed to operations in the second major conflict. Readiness degradation to critical support forces can be prevented by implementing a planned limited call-up of the reserve forces.

Finally, timely reimbursement in the form of supplemental appropriations is the surest way to avoid any adverse impact on service operations and maintenance for ongoing operation.

ARMS CONTROL/STABILIZATION

The objective of our participation in implementing a peace agreement is the creation of a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. To that end, we are pressing for the inclusion of arms control and confidence-building measures in the final settlement. Initial steps, beyond a separation of forces, could include sharing of military information between the parties, restrictions on exercises and deployment of heavy weapons, and notifications of military activities. We will also press for a commitment by the parties to a regime providing for a ''build-down'' of forces. OSCE has already begun planning and may eventually take the lead in trying to forge a lasting arms control regime in Bosnia.

One important factor in producing a stable environment will be a balance of forces between the parties. We are hopeful that arms control and the other confidence-building measures cited above would help bring this about. To the extent arms control measures are not sufficient to provide stability after a peace settlement, we are prepared to play a role in an international effort, separate from IFOR, to help equip and train the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation to ensure that they have an effective self-defense capability. To this end, we intend to move for a lifting of the UN arms embargo after a settlement is reached, allowing the Federation to arm itself consistent with legitimate requirements of self-defense.

THE FEDERATION

A strong and effectively functioning Bosnian Federation is an essential prerequisite to a durable peace in Bosnia. It has been a central U.S. objective since last year's Washington accords that ended the fighting between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats and established the Federation. Strengthening the Federation has been one of my highest priorities in every meeting I have had with Bosnian and Croatian leaders.

On November 10 in Dayton, Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Federation President Zubak signed an important agreement that brings the Federation and its institutions to life. The Dayton agreement, witnessed by Croatian President Tudjman and Secretary of State Christopher, provides for the political, economic and social integration of the Federation. It also defines the division of responsibilities between the Federation and the central government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By strengthening the Federation, the agreement should give additional impetus to negotiations with the Serbs on the constitutional arrangements for Bosnia as a whole.

As you know, the parties have already agreed, in the basic principles adopted in Geneva, to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina within its current borders, and to rule out any arrangements that are inconsistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As I have stressed in the past, the United States will not support any settlement that represents a partition of Bosnia. A major goal in the current negotiations is to assist the parties in reaching agreement on amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that provide for effective central governing structures for the Bosnian state while defining the scope of autonomy to be provided to the two constituent entities. We expect the agreement would also contain provisions for elections throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the OSCE.

CIVILIAN/HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND RECONSTRUCTION

The conflict in Bosnia has taken a huge toll on the fabric of Bosnian life. The reprehensible practice of ethnic cleansing and the violence of war have uprooted millions of people from their homes. Atrocities unknown in Europe since the Second World War have occurred. The production and delivery of food and everyday necessities have been disrupted. Extraordinary damage has been done to economic enterprise and infrastructure.

We expect that as part of a settlement there would be a coordinated international effort to address these problems. These activities would not be part of the IFOR mission but would be undertaken by the entire international community under civilian coordination. We would not allow ''mission creep'' that could involve IFOR in such a nation-building role. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees would coordinate the return of refugees and displaced persons. The International Red Cross would deal with prisoners and missing persons. International aid agencies would help the people of Bosnia rebuild the immediate needs of survival. And an international police task force would work to monitor and retrain civilian police.

Separate from, but complementary to, the immediate humanitarian efforts would be an international reconstruction effort to repair the devastation brought about by years of war. The European Union has indicated a readiness to take the lead in these efforts in tandem with the international financial institutions. The nature and scope of what would need to be done in Bosnia, in terms of reconstruction and relief, is still under review, both within the Administration and with our allies. We do not yet have a complete analysis of Bosnian needs and have not made a commitment on the size of U.S. participation. For planning purposes, we are working with an estimated U.S. contribution of $500–600 million over a period of several years. We will be consulting with Congress on this issue in the coming weeks.

The British have proposed a conference in London to discuss and coordinate all aspects of peace implementation, including regional reconstruction. As the negotiations progress, we will work closely with the British to make the best use of their proposed conference, and, of course, consult closely with Congress on these issues.

COSTS

Obviously, the effort that I have described would involve costs, both for U.S. participation in IFOR and our contribution to reconstruction efforts.

The Administration's ability at this time to estimate the actual costs of a NATO deployment to Bosnia in support of a negotiated settlement is limited. This is because such an estimate is heavily dependent on the terms and conditions under which the force will be introduced. For example, factors such as force composition, scope and type of mission, operating environment, force sustainment and duration of assignment, among others, would all contribute to determining the ultimate costs that participants will have to pay. Additionally, the United States would seek equity and balance with European and other participants in any funding arrangement or material support we provide to such an operation. Our best estimate at this time is that it would cost approximately $1.5 billion to deploy U.S. forces for one year. Under any deployment plan, the Administration would share information with Congress on the terms, developments and support requirements affecting our commitment.

We will work closely with the Congress on funding U.S. participation in IFOR. No decision has been taken on seeking a supplemental appropriation to meet funding requirements associated with a Bosnian peace agreement. Until appropriations have been finalized for FY 1996, we will not be in a position to determine how best to fund this operation.

In terms of reconstruction and relief funding, we are studying a number of funding possibilities. For FY 1996, only a fraction of projected Bosnian reconstruction costs have been budgeted, and sources for reprogramming are likely to be severely limited.

As planning for economic reconstruction advances, a variety of funding options should be kept on the table, particularly given the large cuts already made to international affairs funding.

CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, there are costs and risks to all involved in making peace. But the costs and risks of failing to make peace are far greater. The human costs of continued war in Bosnia would be another cruel winter of starvation and suffering, followed by a spring of renewed, bloody conflict. The economic costs of continued war would be additional millions of dollars in humanitarian aid, in funds for ongoing sanctions and No-Fly Zone enforcement, and in the efforts of our Allies to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees throughout Europe. The security costs would involve the risk of wider and even more dangerous conflict, as well as serious damage to the credibility and effectiveness of NATO and U.S. leadership if the war resumes. Moreover, if the war resumes, NATO and the U.S. could be called upon to undertake a potentially dangerous mission involving the withdrawal of UNPROFOR under hostile circumstances.

Peace is the less risky alternative. But there will be no peace without America's engagement. If we turn our backs on this responsibility, the damage to America's ability to lead, not just in NATO but in pursuit around the world of our interests in peace and prosperity, would be profound. This truly is a decisive moment.

The meetings in Dayton offer the people of Bosnia and Europe a real opportunity for peace. The United States must stand by our principles and stand up for our interests. We must be leaders for peace. I hope you and your colleagues in the Congress will work with us in this effort.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is simply unacceptable that thousands of Americans may be sent to Bosnia without proper consideration by the Congress. Recent history reminds us that deployments of U.S. Armed Forces into hostile situations are untenable without the strong support of Congress and the American people. This resolution does not rule out the deployment of United States forces to Bosnia, but it does make certain that the President come to the Congress first.

The Clinton administration has avoided doing the groundwork of trying to win the support of our Nation and the Congress with regard to our involvement in Bosnia. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to pass this resolution as a signal of our strong concern over the direction of administration policy and our determination to assert the prerogatives of the Congress in this matter.

□ 1745

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, after 4 long years of war in Bosnia, we have seen:

Over 250,000 people killed.

Over 16,000 children slaughtered.

Tens of thousands of women raped.

Tens of thousands of innocent people herded into camps.

And nearly three million people left homeless.

We have seen cease fires come and go.

And through it all, there has been very little reason to hope.

But finally, we see the possibility to end the bloodshed.

Finally, we see peace talks that mean something.

Finally, we have a chance to resolve this horrible conflict.

And we should do nothing to interfere with that.

But this resolution today drops an 800-pound weight on a peace process that is balancing like a house of cards.

If we pass this resolution today, it won't advance the peace talks in Ohio. It will undermine and undercut them.

Mr. Speaker, it took a long time to get this peace table. There are a lot of delicate issues that need to be worked through. We should not tie the hands of our negotiators at this crucial time. We should let them do their jobs.

It's not hard to understand the concern that underlies this bill. The decision to commit troops is the most difficult decision any of us will have to make. And none of us take it lightly.

But that is not the issue today.

The Washington Times is right: this is the wrong move at the wrong time.

The President has already said: Before troops are deployed, Congress will have a debate and Congress will have an up or down vote.

There is a time and place when Congress should and will be voting on this issue. But now is not that time.

Congress has enough to worry about right now with the budget negotiations. This is not the time to be rushing head-first into the very delicate negotiations on Bosnia.

I would hate to think that someday, historians will look back on this day and wonder why the House of Representatives intentionally disrupted the peace process before an agreement was reached. We can avoid that fate here today.

I urge my colleagues: Oppose this resolution. Let our negotiators do their jobs. And give the peace process a chance to work.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. HANSEN].

(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.

I rise today in strong support of this bill which only reaffirms the Congress' constitutional right to control the way we spend the country's money and to participate in any decision to send large scale U.S. forces in harms way.

For me, and I think for most Americans, there are a few simple rules for peacekeeping.

First, if there is a real peace you don't need peacekeepers.

And second, that when there is no real peace, sending peacekeepers, and especially American peacekeepers is a recipe for disaster, as we have seen all too recently in Somalia.

When the two, or in this case three, sides decide it is in their own interests not to continue the war, peacekeepers, like the few Americans observing the Israeli-Egyptian peace, need only binoculars and tennis rackets.

Until there is a real peace, no American should become a target. When there is a real peace, supported by all sides in this tragic conflict, then and only then, American leadership may be necessary to help maintain that peace.

It is important that the Congress show that leadership now, and not blindly support the President's ill-conceived and arbitrary promise of 25,000 heavy armed American troops to police an agreement that does not yet exist.

This is too important for our Nation, and for the lives the brave young men and women who serve in uniform. The proper role for the United States is leader, not policeman. And the proper time for congressional action is before the decision is made, not after failure is guaranteed.

I urge all Members to support this bill and the President to include the Congress and the American people in this important debate.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. YOUNG].

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the many, many expressions of concern for the safety of our American forces should they be sent to Bosnia, that have been expressed by so many of our colleagues here today.

None of us can forget, will ever forget what happened to the American Marines in Beirut with more than 200 American Marines who were there as peacekeepers were murdered in their barracks. None of us will forget Somalia, where Americans went there on an honorable mission, in a humanitarian mission, but mission creep took us from that successful humanitarian mission to the disaster that became so-called peacekeeping when 18 American soldiers were gunned down in the streets of Mogadishu and their bodies dragged through the streets. They were there as peacekeepers.

The point that I would like to make, though, Mr. Speaker, is that on those missions and especially in the Somalia mission, I recall distinctly the fight that we had here in the House to get those who supported the mission creep to a peacekeeping mission refused to stand and vote for the appropriation to pay for it.

In the case of Bosnia, we have been told, we started out that the cost was going to be about a billion dollars. Then it went up to $1.2 billion, then up to $1.5 billion, now up to $2 billion. Now we are talking possibly about as much as $3 billion.

Again the point, where is the money coming from? The President's spokesman today at the White House, when asked about the defense appropriations bill that this House and Senate passed yesterday, indicated that the President would find it difficult to sign because maybe it included too much money. But where else would the President get the $2 billion to $3 billion to finance the deployment to Bosnia? He had better think twice about vetoing this defense appropriations bill because if it does not get signed, if it comes back here and should this resolution not pass today, I can almost assure you that the House will force us to put this same kind of binding language in the next defense appropriations bill.

I have an idea that the President and the administration should take the advice of this Congress, the advice of Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, and they should sign a good defense appropriations bill that will be sent to them shortly.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPRATT].

(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose the Hefley bill, and not because I support the deployment of American troops in Bosnia. I voted for Buyer-McHale and, frankly, I remain skeptical.

But if checks and balances are part of our Constitution, so is comity, and the circumstances here demand it. This is not the time to bind the President's hands; not the time to doom the peace in Bosnia before we even know the terms of the peace agreement. During most of the years I have served here in the House, my party has been in the majority. And though we were often tempted, we never preempted President Bush or President Reagan in the way this bill would.

President Bush sent 500,000 troops to the Persian Gulf, and long before most of us decided that we would give him the power to take those troops to war, we cut him the slack he needed to stand up to Saddam Hussein, and to bring the Security Council and rest of the world around to our position. President Clinton deserves no less.

The Constitution gives Congress the power to decide when our troops will be dispatched in a foreign theater and put in harm's way. But history has taught us that we have to be practical; and as a practical matter, we cannot expect the President to huddle with Congress before calling every play in foreign policy. We have to and can send the President strong signals, as we did when we passed McHale-Buyer, 315-to-103. But this bill is more than a warning signal; it flat-out prohibits the President from sending any U.S. ground troops to Bosnia as part of any peacekeeping operation unless funds are specifically appropriated.

Several problems came to my mind, just as a result of the drafting. For example:

Hefley could prevent U.S. troops from being sent to pull out U.N. personnel, and NATO allies, should the talks falter and the fighting resume. You may say that this is not the intent of the language, but if not, why not explicitly say so?

Hefley does not bar United States airstrikes, it is true; but it might stop a significant number of United States troops from being brought into Bosnia to search for and rescue American fliers who get shot down.

And what happens if a peace agreement is agreed to, and embraced by all the parties, and a majority of Congress finds it to be a genuine peace, one we can implement and not one we have to impose; but then, the appropriation gets attached to a bitterly contentious bill—like an omnibus budget reconciliation act?

After all, nothing in Hefley says that this appropriation must be sent to the President clean, or stand-alone, so we could see a Bosnian peace agreement bound up with the resolution of totally unrelated disputes in the Congress.

I know that these problems may never come up. But eliminate them, and the biggest problem still remains, and that is timing. If this bill passes, at this time, it is bound to cast a pall on the peace talks.

I have yet to be persuaded that sending American troops to Bosnia is a good idea or a necessary move. But I am willing to reserve judgment; willing to give the President and the parties the chance to produce an agreement that is workable and worthy of our support. In the end, I may cast my vote against sending United States ground troops to Bosnia—I reserve that right. But with the peace talks moving forward, and an agreement coming together, now is not the time to pass this bill.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I am not here to use my vote to undermine our President. I am an ardent supporter of our military, and I am a strong supporter of humanitarian aid to the people in Bosnia.

For the past 3 years I have worked with the gentleman who is here in the room with us tonight, John Jordan, and a volunteer firefighter from Rhode Island, who went to Sarajevo to help provide emergency relief to the citizens of all factions, the Serbs, Croats, and Moslems. He spent 3 years, was recognized by ABC News as their person of the week because of his unselfish efforts on the part of peace. The United Nations eventually canceled their support of him after 2½ years, and our State Department refused to pick it up.

But we did provide that assistance, tons of relief, and John Jordan was key in that process. I am concerned like everyone else about the cost, but the key concern here is the troops, the boys and the girls, the men and the women, the sons and the daughters of America who are going to be sent to this region without the support of this Congress on the ground. I would support the use of aircraft, sealift, and air strikes, but we will not have that chance to vote on when the President comes back to us, because the decision will have already been made for us.

When I had to make up my mind this morning about what to do on this issue, I did not seek Warren Christopher and his armchair estimates or the President or any of my colleagues. I went to John Jordan. John Jordan was shot twice directly in Sarajevo. John Jordan has had concussions. In fact, he has been wounded by shrapnel, had his chest beaten in by the butt of a rifle trying to rescue citizens in Sarajevo.

In an AP interview, this is what John Jordan had to say, and I encourage every one of my colleagues on both sides to read this quote in its entirety. This is not someone from Washington sending our boys over there and our girls over there, and this is the only chance you are going to get to vote on this. Read what John Jordan had to say about the Serb commander saying to him, ''I really wish the U.S., instead of the French, were running the airport,'' they said to him many times. ''If we can just get enough of you in one place at one time, we can kill 200 or 300 of you. You will be out of this war forever, and you will not be a problem anymore. You will leave just like you left Beirut.''

Mr. Speaker, that is what this is all about, and, my colleagues, you will not have a chance to vote on ground troops again, because the President will come back already committed to it.

I urge a ''yes'' vote on the Hefley amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I insert the following letter for the RECORD.

NOVEMBER 17, 1995.

Hon. CURT WELDON,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN WELDON: Congress and the President each have their own criteria regarding deployment of American troops to Bosnia. All these criteria ignore one important fact.

The war in Bosnia is not about Bosnia. It is in fact about one man, Slobodan Milosevic, turning neighbor on neighbor via his control of the media long before the first shot was fired.

To those of us who have fought fire and war in Bosnia, the thought of American troops sitting between victims and aggressors is a living nightmare. The picture of American troops deployed to ensure ''only half'' of Bosnia is stolen is too ugly to contemplate. Our troops will become casualties of both the aggressors and those who thought they were about to be saved.

Time and time again during my team's stay in Bosnia, we were warned by Serb commanders, ''If we could just get enough Americans here and kill them, America would leave like they did in Beirut and Somalia.'' At that point, the Serbs believe they will be able to finish off Bosnia.

There is no peace process worth the paper it is printed on if it is signed by Mr. Milosevic. Our troops should not be deployed on the basis of goodwill with a mass murderer.

Speaking for myself and those who have fought to see that Bosnia was not exterminated, we would rather see no deployment at all, to the choice of seeing U.S. troops supervising an honorless plea-bargain with the perpetrators of genocide. I urge you to do all in your power to prevent this deployment from proceeding.

Sincerely,

JOHN JORDAN
Chief, Global Operation Fire Rescue Services.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL].

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. This is the wrong bill at the wrong time.

You know, many of us on this side of the aisle voted to support President Bush in the Persian Gulf War. It was not an easy vote, but we did it because we think it was right. When the temptation arose amongst some colleagues to do this kind of thing to undermine President Bush at this same time, when the President was trying to build a consensus, we said, ''No; give the President a chance to put it together, and then let him come to Congress.''

Well, President Clinton has said he will come to Congress. So I do not understand why we are not giving President Clinton the same courtesy we gave to President Bush. I do not see why we are undermining the President and undermining the peace talks going on now in Dayton, OH, with this bill.

The same people that are talking against this now are the same ones that said Haiti would never work. Haiti, by all means, has been a success. And where were these people when Republican Presidents did not come to Congress and sent U.S. troops to Grenada, to Lebanon, and to Panama?

You know, my friends, we cannot afford to slip into a dangerous sense of isolationism. The NATO alliance is a very important alliance, and the United States has to be the leader of that alliance. We cannot undermine the NATO alliance and not participate and then at the same time say we are going to be the leader of the free world and at the same time say we are going to increase our defense spending.

One of our friends asked how are we going to pay for it. Well, let us kill two B–2 bombers. We will have $4 billion right there.

Some of us have been yelling for years to lift the arms embargo. Some of our friends on the other side of the aisle have been critical of this Administration. They say the President is not decisive, the President has done nothing, and now that the President has finally gotten the peace talks going and success seems to be right there, they are undermining the President.

□ 1800

I cannot understand that, for the life of me. The President is saying that he feels this will be detrimental. Mr. Speaker, I would say to my colleagues, I beg you, in a few weeks we can have this debate. This is the wrong debate to have right now.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I have before me the vote, three votes actually, from January 12, 1991, a shining moment in this House, a dignified and yet passionate at the same time vote.

One of the votes that is most impressive to look back on, and we need a lot

of corporate memory around here, is the one that was called roughly the Durbin-Bennett vote. Charlie Bennett, the great World War II hero is enjoying retirement, but the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] is still around.

I would like to say, the Democratic vote on that, where the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI], and our pal Steve Solarz, and 248 other people prevailed over all of the Democratic leadership and the one independent, for a total of 183. We won the vote, 250 to 183. But two votes before, after we crushed by the exact same numbers the Gephardt-Colin Powell vote to just use sanctions, and we would still be there today, Kuwaitis would still be tortured, here is the first vote demanding that George Bush come to the Congress of the United States before we crossed the line into deadly combat. Two hundred eighty Democrats said ''Come here, Mr. President,'' and five Democrats said no.

This is a good debate, and it is not ludicrous, ridiculous or premature. It is right on target.

I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. UPTON] for getting these votes for me. The gentleman has a good corporate memory.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, actually it was 260, not 280, Democrats that voted for it. But the outcome was the same.

As we go back home to our districts, people ask us, ''Why don't you take some action? What is going on?'' This is exactly the same vote in essence of what we did with the Durbin-Bennett vote on the gulf war, and, that is, Congress ought to have a say in what goes on. It does not say whether we will approve it or not, but Congress ought to have a say. And this vote, of which your side of the aisle voted 260 to 5, ought to reflect that on this resolution, which does virtually exactly the same thing.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, absolutely. Here is the chain of command supposedly the way it is worked out now in what will be in Bosnia. Here is the chain of command from Somalia. This got 18 Americans killed, or 19. Three days later, Matt Rearson. Five men, including two Medal of Honor winners, were dragged through the streets, without one of the six fighting vehicles in Waco 6 months before to come and rescue them, without the gun ships they trained with for 3 months.

Please read those commandments, particularly the last one, and tell me if anyone can tell the parents of any man or woman killed in Bosnia why they went in harm's way.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield three minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS].

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the ranking member of the Committee on National Security, for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my strong opposition to H.R. 2606.

The only hope we have for the former Yugoslavia is the fragile peace talks which are currently underway in Dayton. We arranged these talks, we invited the participants, and we are guiding them, hopefully, toward a satisfactory resolution which participants say might come as early as this weekend. Yet we consider today legislation which, if it passes, will show to the parties involved that we really have no intention of following through on our demands for peace. We bring the parties to the table, squeeze an agreement out of them, and then say ''Good that you came to an agreement, but don't expect us to help you implement it.'' This is not right.

Would we do this with other enemies who are trying to resolve their conflicts? Would we initiate peace talks to resolve a prolonged conflict and then bail out just before the matter is resolved?

Mr. Speaker, the real issue is this: Does the U.S. Congress want the United States to remain the last superpower? Because if the answer is yes, with superpower status comes superpower responsibilities. And this means carrying through on the commitments we made when we accepted the superpower mantle. A strong, stable Europe is in our best interest. Europeans will buy American products during peace, not during war. And a strong, stable NATO is also in our best interest because it lessens the chance that we will ever have to act unilaterally again.

As a superpower and a NATO member we have a vested interest in bringing stability to Europe. And if we fail in this responsibility the war will surely spread, and we will have lost our moral authority as well as the respect and trust of our allies around the world who depend on us to do the right thing.

We made war in the Persian Gulf to protect our oil supply. President Clinton is asking us to make peace in Bosnia to protect people. There are certainly risks involved. I am worried about our soldiers, I am worried about landmines threaded throughout the area, and I am worried that it may be impossible to negotiate through the region in the dead of winter. But we must take risks for peace. And I do not believe that saving the life of a Moslem person in Bosnia is any less valuable than a drop of oil in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.

This is not the right time for this resolution. President Clinton has said quite clearly that he would, although he does not have to, seek the approval of Congress before sending Americans to the region. And I think he should. This conflict may be resolved within a few days. Would it not be smarter if we were to wait to see how this conflict is resolved before we decide how we will respond? I think a good chess player would say, don't declare checkmate before focusing your chess piece on the king.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], the distinguished chairman of our delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises in strong support for H.R. 2606, and commends the distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] for his leadership on this vitally important question of national security.

Mr. Speaker, when I was trained as an infantry platoon leader, I was prepared to take those 40 men up any hill and accomplish any mission, because, first of all, it was a duty. Second, I had the conviction that the people in the military and civilian command structure in the Pentagon, the White House and Congress would make responsible decisions. Now, 30 years later, I am here, one of 535 people in the Congress and I think it is imperative that we not send ground troops to Bosnia—not send ground troops.

Mr. Speaker, read the President's letter of November 13. It says, ''After initialing of a peace agreement communications and supply troops will be sent almost immediately to Bosnia.'' We are talking about the dispatch of a minimum of 1,000 or 2,000 American troops immediately, and that is upon initialing. Then the President's letter repeatedly mentions expression of support being welcome by the Congress.

Well, my colleagues that is what we are facing. Therefore, this is the right time to take on this issue. To do otherwise is irresponsible.

Mr. Speaker, in the very short time available, this Member wishes to make three points regarding the President's announced intention to unilaterally deploy 20,000 American ground groups to Bosnia. First, the mission lacks clear achievable objectives. Second, there is no exit strategy worthy of the name. And, third, legislative actions to halt the deployment of U.S. ground forces will not, contrary to the Clinton administration's allegations, will not undermine U.S. leadership role in NATO or the world. In fact, a failed NATO mission to preserve a Bosnian government will damage the United States global leadership role and NATO.

First, look at the question of whether the proposed mission has clear objectives. The Clinton administration repeatedly has stated that NATO's mission would be to enforce an end of the hostilities that have plagued Bosnia for centuries. We would be injecting our troops between heavily armed factions that tragically seem incapable of living in peace. Presumably we are to serve as neutral honest brokers to prevent the three sides and the paramilitary groups from killing one another. This Member

would note that this is a peace enforcement mission, practically an impossible one, and not a peacekeeping mission.

Mr. Speaker, we have been informed by the administration that American troops also will train Bosnian forces and try to bring about a parity of weaponry so that the Bosnian state might survive after the year of NATO occupation is over. In contrast to the peace enforcement mission—which presumably is designed to avoid taking sides—the arming and training of Bosnian Moslem or Bosnia federation forces is taking sides. Arming the Bosnian federation is not the act of a neutral. This Member can appreciate the desire to level the playing field, but one can hardly expect the Bosnian Serbs to quietly sit back while our peace-enforcers are training and arming their declared ethnic enemy.

This Member would also say, as a former infantry officer, that it is almost inconceivable that rules of engagement can be crafted which will permit us to act as neutral peace enforcer at the same time that we are training and arming one specific faction. It is this type of dangerous, fuzzy logic and contradictory objectives that can lead to mission creep and, regrettably, the unnecessary loss of American lives.

Now let me turn to the notion of a proper exit strategy. The Clinton administration has announced that its exit strategy is to withdraw in a year. Out in ''approximately 12 months'' * * * that is the sum totality of their exit strategy. But this commitment is not linked to strategic objectives. Indeed, it seems that the only criteria in this exit strategy is the belief that 1 year is the extreme outer limit of American tolerance and beyond our next presidential election. They may be right about that, but specifying an exit time frame is a critical error, and probably a very tragic one.

Mr. Speaker, it has been suggested most importantly, by a range of military specialists, including some of NATO's leading planners and operations people, that this 1-year peace enforcement mission will at best provide the region with a brief, NATO-enforced respite during which time the Serbs and Croatians fine-tune plans for the ultimate dismemberment of Bosnia. Then, as soon as the United States and other NATO forces depart, war returns and the final vestiges of Bosnia will be divided up in violent warfare.

This body should say ''no'' right now to a mission that lacks strategic objectives, and to one that is likely, at best, to buy only a bloody lull in Balkan warfare. Unfortunately, American, British, French, Canadian, other allied lives surely will be lost in the process. This Member, for one, cannot justify this inevitable and ultimately futile loss of life.

Last, Mr. Speaker, this Member fails to see the clear United States national interest in deploying 20,000 American troops to Bosnia. Pointing to our role as an international leader and the critical role importance of preserving NATO misses the point. Does it serve our reputation and that of NATO to briefly restore order and then permit the violent dismemberment of Bosnia as soon as we depart? No, it most emphatically will have the opposite effect.

Of course this Member is aware of the charge that damage will be done to United States prestige in the event of a congressional failure to support the President's unilateral, hasty, and ill-advised decision to deploy American land troops to Bosnia. But I will tell my colleagues that it is the Clinton administration, through its ill-conceived proposal, and not the Congress, that will ultimately do the greatest damage to the U.S. international reputation as leader of NATO and as a superpower if we cannot deter it. The American people should be under no illusions—if damage is being done to NATO, it is occurring at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Mr. Speaker, this Member would urge support of H.R. 2606.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN].

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I hate to do this, but I have to wonder about the motivations of the timing of this resolution. There are some things we know for sure: For 2 years, at least a year and a half, the President has been saying he intends to deploy 20,000 to 25,000 peacekeepers if there is a peace agreement in Bosnia. He has said in a letter to the Speaker that he will submit a request for a congressional expression of support for U.S. participation, a vote of the Congress on this issue, before the peace agreement is signed and before he deploys these forces.

No one offered this amendment on the fiscal year 1995 defense appropriation. No one offered this amendment on H.R. 7, which sought in every other way to constrain the Commander in Chief from exercising his authorities in the peacekeeping operation as approved by the Security Council. No one put this on the fiscal year 1996 defense appropriation when it came through the House, or when it came back from conference.

All of a sudden, when the peace agreement looks possible, when the negotiations have gone a long way, when the ceasefire has held in place for a while, when it looks like the most dangerous cause of expansion of the war; that is, the question of whether the Serb military would resist a Croatian invasion of Eastern Slavonia looks like it might have been settled, when the siege of Sarajevo has been lifted, when the brutal killing has been stopped, all of a sudden we get this issue, even though the President has said ''You will have a chance to vote on this before I deploy the troops.''

It is as if you want to scuttle the peace agreement and a chance of the killing stopping for good because you do not want to have to deal with killing it after it has already happened, and I think that is grossly irresponsible.

There are so many good questions about whether or not we should do this. I have heard the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], and the gentlemen from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON], raise legitimate questions. But either do it when the President first announces it and do not raise these expectations and cause all the achievements to be scuttled, as they will be if you do this now, or do it when you see the full agreement and you can talk about exit strategies and can look at what is achieved in separation of forces and what the risks to our troops are, and you can weight the possibility that NATO will be emasculated or the war will spread, and balance them. We will have a chance to debate that. This is the time, before we got to Dayton. In the middle of Dayton is not the time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman knows that this bill is going to be vetoed. Now is the time to try to impact the plan that is being prepared over there in Dayton.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, let me respond to that. This bill will never see the light of day. You are right. Therefore, it is designed, I say, to scuttle what is happening at Dayton because of the timing, rather than to look at the final agreement, make a decision at that time, weigh and answer all the good questions that are being raised against the plan.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker. I might just point out this was in our appropriations bill, and it was in a resolution. I do not know how many messages we have sent to the President on this.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. MEYERS].

(Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I believe we must pass H.R. 2606 now. Otherwise, I am deeply concerned that we will wake up one morning while Congress is out of the city, and discover that President Clinton has started sending American troops to Bosnia. The President has not said he will ask us for authorization. He said that he would request support, but that there would be a requirement for early pre-positioning of support personnel. When he asks for that support, those personnel will already be there.

There might be a case that could be made for sending Americans to Bosnia. It would have to involve a rock-solid peace agreement. We would have to know what objectives our troops would be expected to achieve and how they could achieve them. The President would have to convince us and the American people that he knew what had to be done that would allow our troops to leave Bosnia in a better condition than it was when they arrived. Until he manages to make that case, we should make sure that he cannot put us into a quagmire. What the

President and the administration have told us so far has not made a convincing case with me, or with my constituents.

The decision to place the young men and women of America's military in harm's way is the toughest that any Member of Congress can make. I have had to make that decision before, to authorize the war against Iraq in 1991. Before I made that decision, I received a great deal of information from the Bush administration as to our objective, the threat our troops might face, and our ability to accomplish our goals with a minimum of casualties. The Clinton administration, on the other hand, has not provided comparable information about its plans for Bosnia.

The President wrote on November 13, that his military advisors believe that 12 months would be adequate to accomplish the needed tasks to make the peace self-sustaining. That one sentence has two serious problems. First, there has been no discussion as to what the needed tasks of the Implementation Force are. What would our troops have to do to accomplish these tasks? All that the administration says is that the force will keep the warring factions apart. Second, there is no such thing as a ''self-sustaining'' peace. Peace has to be kept by someone. Otherwise you get anarchy. So, the only way the IFOR would be able to leave would be if the various communities in Bosnia were able to keep the peace themselves. Does anyone here believe the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims will unlearn the hatred that has been incited that led them to commit such outrageous atrocities on each other in just 12 short months?

We need candid answers on how our troops would protect themselves while they are standing between the groups that hate each other so much, and would love to kill Americans and blame it on the other side. The President says that our troops would operate under robust NATO rules of engagement. Unfortunately, this begs the question, because nobody has any idea what those rules of engagement might be. NATO has never done this sort of mission before. The only rules of engagement NATO ground forces have ever had to operate under in the past, was what to do if Warsaw Pact forces crossed or fired into the territory of a member of the NATO alliance. Any deployment into Bosnia will be significantly different from defending the territorial integrity of one group of sovereign countries from the armed forces of other sovereign countries. NATO has no experience in settling this kind of conflict.

Finally, the administration has been patting itself on the back for getting the Russians to agree to a formula by which a Russian brigade will participate in the IFOR without being subordinate to NATO. The idea is that the deputy to General Joulwan will be a Russian general and the orders to the Russian troops will be transmitted through him. That Russian general will be Colonel General Leonty Shevtsov. His last assignment was chief-of-staff of Russian forces in Chechnya from December through April. That was when Russian forces were indiscriminately bombing and shelling Chechen towns, killing tens of thousands of civilians.

Congress must vote before we send 20,000 Americans on this doomed mission to Bosnia. Please join me in supporting H.R. 2606.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. HOUGHTON].

(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to take long. All the arguments have been made. I will try to be brief, but let me just say this. I may be the only person on our side of the aisle who is speaking against this amendment. I do it because I feel very deeply about this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I understand all the worries that were incorporated here about signaling the use of American troops before there is more of a resolution of the problems being solved, and all the other horrible things; about extraction of our troops and who is in charge of the military.

But, Mr. Speaker, I am going to oppose this resolution; not that I disagree with the words. Frankly, I may even vote against the use of troops. I could very well do this. But If we could pick a horrible time to pull our hand in this particular negotiation, this would be it.

I have talked to Cy Vance and I have talked to Brent Scowcroft and I have talked to Larry Eagleburger and all those people who are very wise on issues like this. I think they come down and say two things. ''It is a mess. We understand your worries. There is no question about this. It is not clear. But if you are going to do something do not do it now.''

Mr. Speaker, it is a horrible time, and as a result I am going to oppose this particular motion.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from San Diego, CA [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues, I support the Hefley prohibition because of what I call the leadership issue. This may very well intrude on the President's constitutional prerogatives to lead our troops, and I have to concede that with a different administration in the White House I might well vote the opposite way .

But, Mr. Speaker, I think we have to look at what happened in Somalia when American troops requested tanks, because they felt they were needed militarily. They were denied by the Clinton administration because of political reasons, admitted political reasons. We suffered because of that. When Mr. Aideed's troops butchered and dragged Americans through the streets in Mogadishu, we did not pursue Aideed.

Mr. Speaker, placing ground troops in this situation is going to require clear, decisive and tough American leadership, and I do not think we have it in the White House at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I will support the Hefley prohibition.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFAZIO].

(Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the legislation which would restrict deployment of United States troops to the former Yugoslavia pending congressional approval.

The language establishes an important requirement: no United States ground forces should be employed in Bosnia to enforce a future peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment. This would give an important and necessary opportunity for Congress to debate introduction of United States troops to former Yugoslavia. Equally important, it articulates a clear decision by Congress to exercise its constitutional duty with regards to war.

However, I strongly object to the short time allocated for its debate. A constitutional question as important as whether Congress approves sending U.S. troops into harms way should receive more than a few hours of consideration. This congressional debate should not be construed as representing an adequate consideration before sending United States forces to the Bosnian—or any other—conflict.

For more than 40 years, Congress has allowed the executive to continuously broaden its authority to put U.S. troops into harm's way. Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to initiate war is routinely ignored by Congress and Presidents alike.

Unfortunately, the current War Powers Resolution implicitly grants broad authority to the President to engage in wars of any size without advance congressional authorization. It requires the President to come to Congress only after he has put the prestige of our Nation and the lives of its soldiers on the line.

I have introduced a joint resolution (H. J. Res. 95) that seeks to reform the War Powers Resolution. The House of Representatives to address the balance of Presidential and congressional authority to make war. Indeed, the Constitution demands the collective judgment of the President and Congress on the grave question of war. The time is ripe for a congressional debate on the need to restore the balance of powers between the executive and legislature as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.

I welcome and support this legislation. However, it is my hope that Congress will spend more fully debate this issue and adopt a more effective War Powers Resolution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes and 30 seconds to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

(Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, as many on the floor of this House know, I have been one of the principal advocates of a policy not supported by the President of the United States, and that was lifting the arms embargo. I think that was a good debate to have and, frankly, I believe it has moved us towards peace.

In 1980, the dictator of Yugoslavia, the Communist leader, Tito, died, and since then Yugoslavia has been in the process of disintegration. As has unfortunately been the case so many times in history, hundreds of thousands of

men, women, and children, not political, not combatants, not even evidencing any ethnic or national hatreds towards one another, have died, been raped, been removed from their homes in that phrase we euphemistically refer to as ''ethnic cleansing.''

Jeane Kirkpatrick was asked just the other day, ''Does America have an interest?'' She said, ''Oh, yes, it does. America, as one, of if not the leader of the free world and of the civilized world, has a very direct interest when it sees genocide, when it sees the dehumanizing of human beings, for if it ignores that, it dehumanizes itself.''

It is well that we remember why we are here. What is happening in Bosnia and in the Balkans; and what has happened through centuries? First of all, we are not here, as we were in January of 1991, to make war. We are here to make peace. Will peace be successful? None of us know. Is peace risk free? All of us know it is not. But the question we have before us is whether or not we are going to give our president, our Nation, unrelated to party, the chance to help those people make peace. The chance to retreat from carnage and genocide and rape and homelessness and refugee creation. That is what this is about.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, a member of the Reagan administration, a distinguished American. Yes, she is a Republican, but more than that, she is a distinguished American who thinks hard and tough on foreign policy issues. She said this. ''The President's letter, directed to the Speaker November 13, must be taken very seriously. We all have a commitment also to coherent American government which enables us to deal responsibly with other governments and other powers, and we want our government to be effective in its dealing with other governments''.

This is the key phrase Jeane Kirkpatrick said. ''I guess I think that the President's initiative or his response in this letter makes it unwise for the Congress to pass a binding resolution in advance of the completion of that agreement''.

That is what the Washington Times, no great supporter of this administration, said today itself. Why? For the same reason that Speaker Foley in September of 1990, September, October, November, and December of 1990 said, yes, President Bush, we will not have a vote on this floor while you negotiate and Secretary Baker negotiates to create that alliance which confronted Saddam Hussein.

There were many people in this House who asked for that vote. Tom Foley, the Speaker of this House, said, as an American, we will not have a vote, and we did not have a vote until 500,000 troops were deployed in harm's way to serve the interests of security in the Middle East. Let us act as bipartisanly for America today and reject the Hefley bill.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I submit that any Member that would allow a White House veto pen to ultimately send troops to Bosnia learned nothing, nothing from Vietnam. I support peace in Bosnia. That is not the issue today. The issue is not partisan. The issue is will American troops be sent to Bosnia to enforce the peace, and we hope that happens. And, second of all, what is the jurisdictional authority for such deployment?

In that regard, Mr. Speaker, I want to perhaps pose a few questions. Does Congress give billions to NATO? Yes. Does Congress give billions to the United Nations for peacekeeping? Yes, Does Bosnia pose a national security threat to America? I say no. Does Europe have the military capability to provide the peacekeeping? Yes. And who is empowered by the Constitution with the jurisdictional authority? Who is empowered to commit those troops? The White House? I submit not. It is the Congress.

Now, with that in mind, I listened to everything. And no doubt we are the big superpower and we have responsibilities, but we are not the only power. I think it is time to ask the question here. Where is Great Britain? Where is France? Where is Spain? Where is Italy? The last I heard, the European nations were not considered a Third World military pushover.

I want to go on with my statement. I think it is bad enough over the years we have literally produced the world's policemen in Uncle Sam. And for some reason we are determined to make our military into a neighborhood crime watch after these issues seemed to be having some peaceful opportunities. I, for the life of me, cannot understand that.

I think we have gone to far, Mr. Speaker, I think it is bad policy and I will not support, I will not support surrendering any more congressional authority on this business of deployment of troops, surrendering it to the White House. That is our job; that is why we are elected.

And let me say this to my colleagues. This vote today is right on the point. I have listened to all the talk about the newspaper editorials, I have listened to all the talk about the newspapers saying it is not the time to discuss this issue. Ladies and gentleman of the Congress, this is the time because troops will be going to Bosnia.

Now, let us get real here. If the Congress does not act, we will find troops in Bosnia. That is not a decision, ladies and gentleman, for the President. This is a decision of the U.S. Congress and no troops should be deployed without an affirmative approval and corresponding vote by the Congress of the United States. That is what the American people want.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I think there are five compelling reasons to reject this bill tonight. The first is that it is at least inconsistent, at worst hypocritical to make our foreign policy based upon the party affiliation of our Commander in Chief.

In other words, I do think this bill is politically suspect in its motivation. But, second, for nearly a year now, the President under secretary——

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman's words to be taken down; . . . .

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman's words to be taken down.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend. The gentleman will please take their seats and cease.

The Clerk will report the words of the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. MORAN.

□ 1845

The Clerk read as follows:

I think there are 5 compelling reasons to reject this bill tonight. The first is that it is at lease inconsistent, at worst hypocritical, to make our foreign policy based upon the party affiliation of our commander in chief. In other words, I do think this bill is politically suspect in its motivation. But secondly, for nearly a year now our President under Secretary. . . .

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair rules that the words of the gentleman from Virginia are not personal references to any Member or to the President. Therefore, they are in order.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I realize the ruling on the comment of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN] being in order and not violative of the rules. What is the general standard that would be violative of the rules?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under clause 1 of rule XIV, Members should refrain from personal references to other Members.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my words.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would take this opportunity to remind all Members that we should attempt to restrain ourselves in our debate and avoid personalities in debate and urges all Members to maintain a sense of civility with one another as we go through this very sensitive debate.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, the Chair's points are well taken. Might I inquire as to the remaining amount of time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN]?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN] has 2–½ minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, let me share with my colleagues four reasons why we are to reject this bill.

The first of those four is that the President and Secretary of State have publicly and clearly stated for almost a year now that in the event a peace agreement is reached and only in that event we should be prepared to commit approximately 25,000 U.S. troops to that effort. This is a strange time to be questioning that publicly, clearly stated commitment.

The third issue is that this is as much about the viability and credibility of NATO as it is about the salvation of Bosnia. It is the United States that gave birth to and nurtured NATO, and it worked, as the billions of dollars and the thousands of troops we committed to NATO were worth it.

It is now our responsibility to continue to be a fully participating member of NATO. It is surely beneath this great Nation to back out of our international commitments when it requires more than words and dollars and the safe positioning of troops in a peaceful country.

The fourth reason is that there are over 2 million refugees scattered throughout Europe. They are a constant and serious threat to the long-term stability of our allies. That is a threat to our national security interest.

The fifth reason, my colleagues, is the toughest one to argue because in the cynically political context that influences many of our decisions, it is difficult to make a case for doing something purely out of principle, regardless of the political consequences. But every nation in the world respects our commitment to principle. For many of them, it is their vision and ideal. The people of Bosnia looked to America as soon as Serbia fired its first shot on them and as soon as it invaded its first village. And throughout the mass execution and the mass rapes, they have cried out to us, but they have cried out not because we invest more in our military than all other nations of Europe combined, which we do. It is because they believe that we are the same nation that rose above the seductive rhetoric of isolationism and selfish interests and saved Europe, not once but twice.

We who now control America's foreign policy and military actions must answer that cry and answer that question. With our vote tonight we will tell the world whether or not we are the same nation that they assume us to be. We owe it to our forefathers that risked and lost their lives in Europe for the cause of democracy, human rights, and religious and ethnic tolerance to continue to be that nation they fought and died for. That is why we must vote no tonight.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HOSTETTLER].

(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill.

I rise today in strong support of this bill.

It can be little doubted that proceeding in Bosnia is foolhardy. As I listened to members of this administration, there was no evidence that there is an imminent threat to any political economic institution of this country.

Accordingly, many have turned to the Constitution to justify a no vote. I contend that the Constitution will not support such a vote.

The Constitution has declared, and I quote from Article II, Sect. 2 that "The President shall be commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into actual service of the United States."

However, Article I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution places upon the Congress the following duties:

"To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water"

"To raise and support armies . . ."

"To provide and maintain a navy . . ."

"To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces . . ."

My friends, how can we argue that to limit a planned endeavor of the armed forces is not within the powers granted to Congress. To do so is to give disregard to the express language of the Constitution in favor of an implied power that is largely the product of the Executive branch's own interpretations.

Providing forces to the Balkans is an unnecessary endeavor. It is our constitutional duty to address this issue today. We must make the rule, today, that our forces will not be in the Balkans without express congressional approval—it is not in our national interest. This is independent of the terms of whatever peace agreement that may be wrought between the warring parties.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BONILLA].

Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, politics stop at the border. Each and every Member of Congress, each and every American, must always stand united in confronting any foreign foe.

When our troops are sent in harm's way they deserve our full support. They also deserve our measured judgement not to put their lives at risk in the first place unless the national security of the United States is at stake. We must respect the President's prerogatives as commander-in-chief, but not forget Congress' power of the purse. The President should feel confident that he can deploy our forces in a military emergency. But this, my colleagues, is not a military emergency. Sending U.S. combat troops to Bosnia has long been advocated by the administration as a political measure and linked to a flimsy, unrealized peace agreement.

We will be failing our troops, failing their families, and failing the American people if we fail to answer the following simple questions posed by the majority of Americans. Is there a national security interest in Bosnia? Do we have goals and objectives for our forces? Is there a strategy which would lead to the withdrawal of our forces? Will peace continue after we leave?

The answer to these questions is no, no, no.

No—we should not involve ourselves in an embattled country where we have no national interest, no clear objectives, and no exit strategy.

We owe it to our troops to vote for this resolution. We owe it to our troops to vote for no missions without objectives. We owe it to our troops to vote to keep our responsibility to declare war.

Each and every one of us was elected to fulfill these responsibilities. We owe it to the American people and to our troops to do no less.

There should only be two considerations when you vote today. The safety of our troops and the well-being of our republic. This legislation puts the lives of our troops and America's interest first.

Please join me in voting for this important resolution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EDWARDS].

(Mr. EDWARDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, for a land where Olympic bleachers have been dismantled to create caskets for children, I vote to give peace a chance.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from North Carolina [Mrs. CLAYTON].

(Mrs. CLAYTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I think it is premature that we do this at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2606.

Although I share many of my colleagues' grave concerns about the proposed interjection of American troops into Bosnia and I echo their misgivings, I can not in good conscience, vote in favor of a bill that will effectively tie the President's hands and remove his ability to bring about a negotiated and lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.

However, Mr. Speaker, while I do not offer my opposition to the President's proposal, I do not believe we should offer the President our unconditional support.

Placing the lives of American soldiers at risk is not something that should be done lightly. The President has an obligation to go to the American people and convince them that this mission is just and that the cause is pure. Further the President has an obligation to come to Congress if he plans to commit American troops and seek out consultation. This he has promised he will do. His letter to the Speaker confirms this commitment. He must ensure that these American troops will not be used to militarily impose an American solution, but rather, that they will be welcomed by all the

warring parties as custodians and guardians of a negotiated peace.

Through diplomatic pressure and NATO military coercion, the warring parties came to the negotiating table in Dayton, OH to pursue a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, a vote in opposition to the proposed American participation in a peace-keeping force is premature and will weaken the President's ability to influence the warring parties, thereby removing any leverage that he may have in seeking to bring forth a negotiated peace to this war-torn region of the globe.

The bloody conflict in Bosnia has assaulted our sense of moral righteousness, it has shaken our firm belief in the strength of our Democratic ideals, and it has tested our leadership and vision for a world predicated upon the ideals of democracy.

This conflict must end.

The negotiations taking place in Dayton, OH are the world's best chance to end this bloody war that has caused the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and left a stinging scar on the world's conscience.

Therefore, I cannot vote in favor of H.R. 2606, a bill that will in my opinion, bring to an end the best chance to bring this war to a negotiated settlement.

For our NATO allies, who look upon the United States for political, economic, and military leadership, such a vote will greatly diminish their faith and confidence in our ability to lead in a mutlipolar world. But, even more dangerously such a vote will embolden our enemies to aggressively pursue their own interests without regard for American interests or fear of reprisal.

I urge my colleagues to reject H.R. 2606.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, at the very end of the Bush administration, during the election, I went over to Bosnia for the first time. I flew into Sarajevo and was not able to get out of the airfield because the fighting was so heavy, the shelling, the mortar fire. As a matter of fact, only a few blocks away from where I stood two young children were killed in a bus. Members may remember the incident.

□ 1900

I have gone back four times since then, three times in Sarajevo. The second time I stood in the area, in the marketplace, where 35 or 40 people were killed by a mortar round. The last time I went into Sarajevo, every building had been damaged. I stood by the national library that had been destroyed by shell fire. The people were going to work, and dressed like they were going to work, and they were satisfied, that because the United States was involved, they were hopeful there would be a peace agreement.

Now I do not know why President Clinton suggested we put American troops in, but I believe he felt it was necessary in order to bring some sort of an agreement from a war that had been going on 3 years since this killing that had been going on. There is no one that has fought harder in this Chamber over the years to get a President to agree to authorization.

I do not think there is anyone in this Chamber that believes this fighting would have come to a halt if the United States had not gotten involved. I do not think there is anyone in this Chamber that believes if the President had not made a commitment of American troops, that the fighting would have come to a halt. But I also believe that he should have authorization; I believed in Saudi Arabia he should have had authorization.

Now this is not the time to ask for a vote. This is the weekend where we can come to agreement. The President in a meeting the other day said he would give us ample time to discuss and debate this issue. The President of the United States assured us that he would ask for authority to send troops, and I do not think he should send those troops unless he gets authority or authorization from Congress. I think it would be a mistake not to have the support of Congress and the American people to send troops to Bosnia.

But the point is they would not have stopped fighting and killing, and, if my colleagues stood there and looked at the blood on the ground, they would have understood how serious it was. They would not of stopped if it has not been for the intervention of the President of the United States.

Now the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and I have been on opposite sides many, many times, but I remember one meeting at the White House last year where everybody was clamoring for the United States to get involved. All the big shots around here wanted the United States to bomb them to oblivion, to send troops to lift the embargo, do everything, get this thing settled because the killing was so great. As soon as the killing slowed down a little bit, as soon as there was an agreement, things quieted own.

Everybody thinks it is going to end peaceably? It will not without our involvement, and down at Dayton right now they are talking peace, they are trying to come to agreement. This is a delicate time. Anything could disrupt it. The President of the United States said to us the other day this could very well destroy the momentum of the peace talks. This could stop the peace talks from coming to a conclusion.

Now I would ask the gentleman who is sincere, because I have had the same thought in my mind; I have tried over and over again to get every President to ask authorization for whatever deployment of American troops. But I would ask the gentleman to think about at this very delicate time why it is necessary to ask for a vote on something as important as this when he will have plenty of time later on to pass a resolution like this, and the majority party, they will have every right to bring up a privileged resolution and pass that resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I feel very strongly that all of us realize the sensitivity of what is going on in Sarajevo and in Bosnia. All of us feel we would like to see this end without one American life being lost. I have been to all the war zones. Every time there is an outbreak, I have seen our American troops frustrated. I was in Vietnam for a year with the gentleman from California, and I know what it is like, and I know how difficult it is to come to a conclusion. I know how important American power is, and I know how we were stopped in Vietnam. I know how we may very well be here, but we will have an opportunity, and I say that unless this agreement is an adequate agreement I will not agree to support the President of the United States in deploying troops to Sarajevo, to Bosnia.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

(Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, a lot of us have been working very hard on this bill, and I truly believe, if we can send a message to Ohio that we are not going to include in these peace talks 25,000 troops, and then we devise a peace plan with the backing of this body, with the backing of the American people and the backing of the President, and a peace plan comes out, it will be the most legitimate thing we could possibly do. If a peace plan comes out and the troops are in there in the minds of the people that are putting this peace plan together, and then we vote against it, in my humble opinion then we desperately taint this body, we taint the American President, and we taint the prestige of this country.

I apologize to the gentleman from Virginia. But I do not like the feeling that what I believe in to my bones, that it is politically motivated. I do not want these kids going to war and to be killed.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the legislation before us this afternoon which is ill-timed, overly broad, and unnecessary. But I wish to make it absolutely clear to my colleagues, to the President, and to my constituents the exact meaning of my vote today.

My vote against this bill today is a vote to endorse the peace process now underway to resolve the war in Bosnia.

My vote today is a vote in favor of peace.

But my vote against this bill is in no way a blanket endorsement for the President of the United States to send American troops to Bosnia at his discretion.

It is my hope that American troops will never be called to serve in Bosnia.

But should that ever become necessary, it will be the U.S. Congress, acting with the President, that will decide whether to approve their participation.

Mr. Speaker, the war in Bosnia is a tragedy. It is time for the parties to breach their differences and rebuild their society. The peace negotiations taking place in Dayton, OH, are critical to that effort and I support this effort. But the President should not misconstrue my vote as an endorsement for his discretionary use of American forces in Bosnia.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN].

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding this time to me.

I rise tonight in opposition to the Hefley bill. I think it is a well-intentioned measure, but I think it is ill-timed. It is premature.

Someone said this will be the only opportunity we will have to vote on whether we want to send troops into Bosnia. Not true. I carefully looked at the letter the President sent in which he made it very clear that he will come back to this body and seek our support before taking such momentous action.

As my colleagues know, Mr. Speaker, we become easily repulsed when we see pictures of the horrors of war, when we see dead bodies, when we see destruction, when we see evidence of rape. But when the time comes for action, sometimes we begin to pause, we become indecisive. We are a world leader. Moral indignation, rhetorical condemnation is not enough. We must act and act responsibly.

Now that is not to say that I am committed nor that I believe that we should send troops. But what I am saying is that we ought to treat our allies fairly. We ought to give the peace process a chance. We ought not undermine the process before it has reached a fair conclusion. We cannot preach multilateralism and preach burden sharing, and then before the issue is even brought to conclusion say we are not a part of this play. It does not work that way. We should not tie the President's hands.

People like to come down to the well and talk about how committed they are to peace. Mr. Speaker, there are some people in Dayton, OH, right now trying to fashion a peace after thousands of years of conflict. We ought to give them a chance. We ought not to send them a signal that we do not have confidence in what they are doing. We ought not send them a signal that we want no part of their efforts even if they come up with a lasting and significant peace process. We should not discourage the participants in this process before they have had a fair opportunity to complete their work.

It may be then in the final analysis, when the President brings his case before the Congress, we conclude that, no, we should not send U.S. troops into harm's way. We may, in fact, conclude that we may be helpful through other ways, through intelligence, through supplying materials and equipment, but that is not the decision today. We should not make a premature decision and handicap the peace process.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. CHABOT].

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, on October 30, 315 Members of this House, Republicans and Democrats, sent a resounding message to President Clinton. The message was simple, and it could not have been more clear: Do not send American troops to Bosnia without first getting authorization from Congress. But make no mistake about it. The real vote on Bosnia is here, and it is now.

We have asked the administration for casualty estimates for weeks now, but all we have gotten is silence. Mr. President, answer our question. How many American lives are you prepared to sacrifice in Bosnia? Not one drop of American blood should be shed in Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, enactment of this legislation could prevent a potential disaster from taking place, and therefore, I strongly urge its passage tonight.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. RAMSTAD].

Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I want to read a letter I received today from a constituent:

> Jim, please do not send our young men and women to Bosnia. I was a combat corpsman in Viet Nam, I volunteered to go. The death and carnage which is caused by war can not be described. This is not our war. We are being used by small ego driven foreign leaders. They could care less about our young men and women. You and your fellow representatives must care.
>
> Jim, I packed many body bags with parts of what was left of young men. I held young men as they died in my arms and there was nothing to do. You can do everything to save these men and women . . . it is not our war . . . for the mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, please do not allow our young people to be killed . . . Sincerely, Bill Wenmark.

Mr. Speaker, this letter says it all. Support the Hefley resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN].

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] for yielding this time, and I hope that through the rest of our debate that our passions will be sufficiently curbed, that we can maintain civility with one another as we deal with this issue that all of us have obviously anguished over, and I have anguished with my colleagues.

I would like to make it clear that I am deeply opposed to the way the President has gone about the negotiations ongoing in Dayton, not that we are there. I am proud of him and of this country, that we have produced those negotiations. But it was, I think, extremely improvident, at best, for the President to have said in advance of a military mission being identified and defined that we will contribute 20 to 25,000 ground forces, more than a third of the total that has been talked about. I think it entirely improvident for those negotiations to proceed on the premise that we will arm the Bosnian Moslems.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). The time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN] has expired.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I previously agreed to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bateman], and I do so at this time.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding the time to me.

I think it is extremely improvident for those negotiations to be cast in the context of our arming the Bosnian Muslims and training them when we are there in a capacity as a neutral peacekeeper. This is not a sound way to establish a peace.

□ 1915

There will come a day when we will have an opportunity to vote, and I cannot support that level of our participation. But we do have a role in Bosnia. There is a responsibility of the United States as the cardinal leader of NATO, and our interest of the stability on the continent of Europe, that dictates our participation. And that makes it in our national interest that we bring about a peace, but we must do it in a rational way, and on another day, on another time, I may well vote against dispatching American forces on the ground there.

For those reasons, tonight, and very reluctantly, because I am not opposed to the sense of what this bill would require, I would not be able to support it tonight.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. FOWLER].

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill to prohibit the deployment of ground forces to Bosnia unless Congress specifically appropriates funding.

The United States does have an interest in resolving the war in the Balkans peacefully, and we have engaged in appropriate efforts, including active diplomacy and the provision of air, sea, logistical and intelligence support, to that end.

But I disagree strongly with the President on placing United States troops on the ground to keep the peace in Bosnia. We must not forget that U.S. airpower has already engaged in military action against one party to this conflict. I, for one, cannot countenance placing our soldiers on the ground under those circumstances, where they will be convenient targets.

For me, the bottom line is this: I simply could never look into the eyes of a mother or father or spouse or child of a soldier killed in Bosnia and say that American interests in Bosnia were worth their sacrifice.

This legislation properly assures that Congress has a say in this affair, as it should in virtually any instance where United States troops are put in harm's way. I urge its support.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANZULLO].

(Mr. MANZULLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, let me pose one simple question: Why are United States soldiers being asked to flight the Bosnia's war? The Bosnians should fight their own war. The Bosnians should be arming and defending themselves. In fact, they have been asking us even since the war began in 1991. Yet, the administration has refused to allow the Bosnians a level playing field. It is unconscionable that President Clinton has refused to lift the Bosnian arms embargo, while making every effort to send 25,000 American troops to protect the very country he has worked to disarm.

This contradiction involves the proposed roles of the U.S. personal in Bosnian. Can someone explain to me how some U.S. personal can serve as neutral peacekeepers, while others serve as suppliers and instructors to the Bosnian government's army?

These contradictory jobs personify the conflict and confusion in the Clinton administration's Balkan policy. American soldiers will not be viewed as neutral, they will be viewed as Bosnian mercenaries. Therefore, we should vote for the resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. SEASTRAND].

Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation.

For more than 2 years President Clinton has failed to articulate a clear position in Bosnia. Now he tells us he will send up to 25,000 of our men and women to Bosnia to enforce a peace settlement that has yet to be agreed.

The President has failed to meet the clear objectives his own Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out 2 years ago:

Our goals must be clear.

The chances of this mission's success must be high.

We must have a clear and established exit strategy for our troops before they are sent.

The American people must support this effort.

Clearly, none of these objectives have been met.

This administration is preparing to put our sons and daughters in harms way because of offhanded promises from a President that has had no clear policy in Bosnia for more than 2 years.

Mr. Speaker, President Clinton has amoral obligation to come before this body and explain what our national interests are in Bosnia and our clear objectives for this deployment. The clearest foreign policy lesson of the past 30 years is the President's obligation to build a public consensus before committing American forces to hazardous long-term mission. America should never commit its troops without first committing the Nation.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR].

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, people may be quick to forget that the first President who tried to get us involved in Bosnia was President Bush. When he did that, I was against it. I was against it because of a conversation I had with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, when I asked him repeatedly whether or not we should send ground troops into Yugoslavia. He being a good soldier said, ''That is not my decision to make. I am going to do what I am told.'' Only after I cornered him and only after I asked him the question 5 or 10 times he said, ''No, we should not put ground troops in Yugoslavia. If you recall, I said that in front of Secretary Baker, and then-Secretary of Defense Cheney, in the meeting at the time when President Bush was trying to get us involved broke up.''

Folks, it did not make sense then. It does not make sense now. There is something worse than the sight of dead Yugoslavs. It is the sight of dead young Americans who were sent someplace with no clear-cut missions, who cannot tell the good guys from the bad guys, and who die in a needless cause.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maine [Mr. LONGLEY].

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult issue to address. In fact, this may be one of the most difficult issues that any one of us has had to address, certainly in my 10 months. I am not a supporter of putting American troops on the ground in Bosnia. I think it would be a terrible mistake. It is my intention to work as hard as I can to prevent in from taking place. I believe in the 10 months that I have been in office I have received more calls on this issue than on any other issue, and not a single call has been in favor of it; but nevertheless, I have to respect the authority of the Commander in Chief to conduct foreign policy.

I think the timing is not good. I think that there is information to which we may not be privy that could very well be instrumental in any decision that we might make. Again, we may be acting without knowing that information. We have to assume that the President does have that information and is prepared to exercise that constitutional authority.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, I think there is no greater threat to American lives than a Congress that attempts to micromanage foreign policy. I have told the President that I would respect his authority as Commander in Chief, and I would suggest, in all candor, Mr. Speaker, to the administration that they really have not consulted with the Congress. They have informed the Congress, but I know there are respected Members on both sides of the aisle whose opinions are valuable, who have a tremendous amount of experience, who have not truly been consulted on the development of this policy.

Mr. Speaker, I would also remind this Chamber that there is one other issue, an overriding issue that hangs over this Chamber. That is the question of the Federal budget. Here we are, debating one aspect of foreign policy at the very same time that 800,000 Federal employees have been furloughed. I would submit to the administration that under no circumstances could I see us deploying a single soldier anywhere in the world without resolving this issue.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. BAKER].

(Mr. BAKER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, there are three important points to consider before American lives are committed to serve as ground troops in Bosnia. First, there must be a vital American interest before one life is risked on foreign soil. There is no NATO country in the region and no economic, political, or military justification for this risk.

Second, Bosnia, the patient, has died. First, the Serbs; now Croatia sought territorial advantage. No one cares about Bosnia and the Bosnian federation. Let us put this State Department fiction to rest.

Third, who will vote to pay $2 billion to $3 billion to deploy ground troops in Bosnia? Let those in Europe and the Middle East who have been arming the combatants enforce the peace. The liberal Democrats who have been demanding that we cut to the bone our military spending are now insisting that we involve American lives in yet another military action.

Vote yes on the Hefley amendment. Keep American troops out of Bosnia.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. DUNCAN].

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation by the gentleman from Colorado, and I thank him for yielding me this time.

President Kennedy said in 1961:

> We must fact the fact that the U.S. is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—that we are only 6% of the world's population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94%—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

This statement by President Kennedy is even more true today, because we are now less than 5 percent of the world population and especially because we now have a $5 trillion national debt.

We should never send young American men and women to fight and die on foreign battlefields unless there is a real threat to our national security or a vital U.S. interest at stake.

Neither of these is present in Bosnia.

B.J. Cutler, the Scripps-Howard foreign affairs columnist, recently wrote: ''if guarding people from the savagery of their rules is America's duty, it would be fighting all over the world, squandering lives and bankrupting itself.''

We cannot solve the situation in Bosnia even if we spend billions that we do not have and jeopardize our own future in the process.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. MONTGOMERY].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. Mr. Speaker, we gave this courtesy to President Bush not to bring up the Persian Gulf resolution at a certain time. Mr. Speaker, I was part of that agreement.

Now this President, President Clinton, has asked the body to delay a resolution such as this, and President Clinton told me tonight, as he has told other Members, that before he commits total forces into the Bosnian area, he will come back to the Congress of the United States. I think this President is entitled to the same thing that we gave President Bush.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. ENSIGN].

□ 1930

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Speaker, on Veterans Day recently I was out in Boulder City, NV, at a veterans' memorial cemetery and I saw a woman who has obviously a mother kneeling over her son's grave weeping. I could tell the pain on this mother's face, and I thought about the pain of everyone who has lost a son or daughter in a military conflict in this country.

Mr. Speaker, the thought came up to me during that day, and during some of the conversations that I had on Veterans Day with so many who have sacrificed so much, would that woman that was kneeling over that grave that day, would she accept this mission that the President wants to send our young men into in Bosnia? Would this be a mission that she would consider in vital U.S. American interest? Would this be a mission that she thinks that threatens our allies or that threatens the very defense of our country?

Mr. Speaker, I think that that woman would say no, and I would agree with her. We should only be sending our troops where there is a vital U.S. American interest or a threat to the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. MINK].

(Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to rise in opposition to this bill, because several Members on the majority side have kept noting that on October 30, over 300 Members voted for House Resolution 247, which asked the President to consult the Congress before sending troops.

Mr. Speaker, I happen to be one of those individuals that voted for the resolution because, on principle, I deeply feel that the President has an obligation to come to consult with the Congress before taking such a major step. But, on this instance where the peace negotiations are in a position of just being concluded, the timing is absolutely wrong.

Mr. Speaker, if we vote on this bill today, and it should pass this House, I believe it will have untoward consequences in bringing together the parties in Dayton, OH. The cutoff of these funds today is absolutely premature. Passing this bill will seriously jeopardize the negotiations. In fact, it might even sabotage them altogether. I believe very deeply that the President must be given an opportunity to succeed, to bring peace to this area.

Mr. Speaker, I urge a ''no'' vote on this bill.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KNOLLENBERG].

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for the Hefley amendment. It has been stated there is no public support for a mission to Bosnia. There is no national security interest to send American soldiers to die in Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, we in Congress have a responsibility. We have a responsibility to say no to the funding. We can help this President. We can prevent the President from making a mistake that will cost him more than a few points in the polls. It will cost the lives of young American men and women, our sons and daughters.

Some may argue—and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] did a tremendous job—that this is not the role of Congress to deny the President the ability to forge his own foreign policy. But the President has never told us why he believes that peace can be established in a war zone, a civil war, a mission impossible. He has never made his case.

Mr. Speaker, we have tried to show the White House our concerns and the problems with their policies. They have looked away. Therefore, we must stand up and shout with our only real power: the funding. There should be no funds for Americans to die in a war that is not ours.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, might I inquire as to the remaining time?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has 14½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] has 16 minutes remaining.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from California [Ms. PELOSI].

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, I rise to join our chairman, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. CALLAHAN], and our ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON], in opposition to the Hefley amendment.

Mr. Speaker, with all due respect for the intentions of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY], but in all opposition to the timing of the gentleman's resolution.

Mr. Speaker, it has taken too many years and cost too many lives to get the warring parties of the Bosnian conflict to the peace talks. They are finally there. They are talking, not shooting. Voting today to prohibit a possible deployment tomorrow gives impetus to the parties to lay aside their voices, to take up their arms, and renew a genocidal conflict that is a blot on the world's conscience.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think this body wants to be responsbile for the collapse of the peace process. My problem, I have said again, is in the timing of the Hefley resolution. I believe that this legislation at this time before us today risks the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, 50 years ago when the reality of the Holocaust came to light, people said, ''Never again'' to ethnic cleansing and genocide. These abhorrent actions continue, despite this promise. I believe the world can no longer turn a blind eye to Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ''no'' on the Hefley anendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished gentleman from Maine [Mr. LONGLEY] to continue his earlier thoughts.

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Speaker, I would add to my earlier remarks that there is an overriding issue that hangs over this entire discussion, and that is the question of the Federal budget.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot conceive of a situation wherein this Congress could be approving any foreign policy decision without our resolving the issue that affects 250 million Americans and their future, and that is the need to balance the Federal budget.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CHAMBLISS].

(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, while I have some reluctance about overriding the authority of the President given by this body, we have no choice in this case. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to express my concern about the vote we are about to make tonight.

Scenes of the fighting in Bosnia have torn this country apart. The bloodshed is real, and the death is overwhelming. At this very hour, peace talks continue between the leaders of the warring parties, and there is reason to believe that a preliminary agreement is in the works.

Mr. Speaker, I was elected to this Congress with a commitment to the people I represent to seek a seat on the House National Security Committee. It is a responsibility I take very seriously because the decisions we make will

impact the lives of every brave American who volunteers to defend this great Nation.

The threshold decision we must make, Mr. Speaker, is whether the war in Bosnia invokes a vital national security interest for the people of the United States. If such interest exists, we must act and act decisively.

However, a vital national interest does not exist. This Nation, together with NATO, has made a firm commitment over the past several months in the form of air strikes in defense of United Nations safe havens. It is a humanitarian commitment that is worthy of our involvement. But the introduction of U.S. ground troops, American sons and daughters, is another matter, entirely.

Having said this, Mr. Speaker, I must also express my grave reservations over the soundness of judgment exercised to this point by this particular President. His indecisiveness and lack of vision could prove lethal to the many men and women who would serve as the ground force.

I also find it to the height of hypocracy for this President to send to Congress inadequate defense budgets in light of this newfound commitment to the projection of American power.

It seems that this sentiment is shared widely among my colleagues in this Congress. In my judgment, it is better that the negotiations in Ohio proceed with this fact in mind, rather than congressional action of disapproval after a peace accord is signed.

While I have difficulty casting this vote in light of the powers specifically enumerated this President as Commander in Chief, the safety of the men and women in our Armed Services demand me to cast a vote in support of this binding action.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. CHENOWETH].

(Mrs. CHENOWETH asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Speaker, observers are sickened by the strife and atrocities in Bosnia. The human reaction is to want to do whatever we can to restore peace. And as the only remaining superpower on the planet it seems to many that we have the power to accomplish this goal.

However, I agree with an observation offered by the columnist William Raspberry, ''If righting manifest wrongs were the only consideration, we'd be endlessly at war.''

History has shown that there is a limit on our ability to impose our will on other nations' internal problems. That limit is especially constricting when you add the problems caused if we place our soldiers under the command and control of an international organization.

Before our Government sends our most precious resource—young Americans—off to fight and die in a foreign land, we have to ask ourselves to support the Hefley amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLIETTA].

(Mr. FOGLIETTA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Hefley resolution. President Clinton has exercised extraordinary leadership in bringing the warring parties in former Yugoslavia face to face for the first time to work toward a negotiated peace settlement. At last, peace might be close at hand.

Mr. Speaker, now some of my colleagues seem determined to pull the rug out from under these fragile peace negotiations at this very most critical time. After years of fierce fighting and senseless bloodshed, we are finally on the brink of creating a lasting peace in Bosnia, a peace which will prevent the further killing of innocent women and children.

However, by passing this resolution, we threaten to create a new leadership vacuum which will ignite renewed fighting and result in the death of more innocents. Furthermore, without decisive American leadership, this fight could easily engulf Albania and Macedonia, leading to a dangerous escalation of hostilities between our important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Also, it could be the end of NATO as we know it. This would be disastrous.

Mr. Speaker, let us not sabotage our best and maybe only chance to bring peace to Bosnia.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. HERGER].

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Speaker, why is President Clinton insisting on sending 25,000 American troops into Bosnia where a number of them will most certainly die? We cannot take this situation lightly. Submitting our young men and women into a battle region is a dangerous proposition at best, yet President Clinton has still failed to articulate just what U.S. interest is at stake that requires putting American combat troops in war-torn Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, why should U.S. blood be spilled for a cause that is better handled within the European Community? What will we tell these brave soldiers' parents? What will we say their children died for?

Mr. Speaker, I do not believe President Clinton has answers to these questions. The administration should remember the lessons of Somalia and Beirut. When we commit U.S. troops to unstable regions of the world without a defined mission, Americans die.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to distinguished gentleman from Alabama [Mr. CALLAHAN].

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I have been listening to this debate for a couple of hours, and while listening to it I had an opportunity to read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of January 12, 1991.

Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to note that there is a difference this year from 1991, because the Republicans, with a Republican President, were saying the same things that the Democrats with a Democratic President are saying tonight. And the Democrats, with a Republican President, are saying the opposite of what they were saying in 1991.

Mr. Speaker, it would behoove all of my colleagues to get the CQ Almanac, the 46th annual edition of the almanac, and read the brief history of the entire debate on the Persian Gulf and the entire debate on whether or not the President of the United States has the authority to do what he is doing.

Mr. Speaker, this issue tonight is not over whether or not the President has the authority. It is over whether we ought to delay the vote on this for a few days until the peace negotiations end.

Mr. Speaker, in 1991, under a similar situation, a Republican President then called Speaker Foley and said, ''Could you delay a vote,'' because of some strategic timing needs that the President was aware of. Mr. Foley, who ultimately voted against the resolution that we ultimately submitted, granted that to the President of the United States.

Now, the President has come to us today. I understand he called the Speaker of the House and he requested the Speaker, and I know he called the sponsor of this bill, and requested that they at least delay this vote until after this weekend, when they are optimistic that most of negotiations will be finished.

Mr. Speaker, this is not going to be the law of the land after tonight. This is not going to be the law of the land because we pass it tonight. The Senate more than likely will not pass it. If they do, the President is going to veto it. So, it is not going to be the law of the land.

Mr. Speaker, if my colleagues want an expression, then they should introduce a sense of Congress resolution and I will vote with them, because I do not believe that we ought to send troops to Bosnia either. Mr. Speaker, I have sent that message to the President. I have told the Secretary of State this. All of us have this same right to do this very same thing, to express our views to the President.

But for this body at this time, when it is meaningless because it will not become law, to insult the President, let me tell my colleagues, I am not here defending Bill Clinton. I am here defending President Clinton, and there is a big difference.

Mr. Speaker, the hardest message I ever gave on this floor was in 1991 when I stood here and supported President Bush in the Persian Gulf resolution. If it gets to that, the President has sent us a letter and he has said that before he takes action, he will bring that message to the Congress.

So, we can talk about constitutionality; we can talk about right or wrong; we can talk about history, but to deny the President of the United States, during the middle of peace negotiations which conceivably will stop this horrible bloodshed in Bosnia, is wrong.

Mr. Speaker, I know that all of my colleagues on my side of the aisle are

going to disagree with me, and that is their prerogative. I am espousing my views. I am telling my colleagues that some of them, and I probably too, are hopeful that in 1996, that there will be a Republican President there. Mr. Speaker, I hope we are not in this type of situation. But if we are, I am going to protect that President, just as I am going to protect this President tonight.

□ 1945

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. THORNBERRY].

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, voting to prevent the President of whatever party from sending troops somewhere should never be done lightly, but no Member of this body can ignore our responsibility to our soldiers and to our Nation as well.

The issue is not whether a peace treaty or a piece of paper gets signed in Ohio this weekend. That is not what we are after. What we are after is a peace that will stick, a peace that will be enforceable. It has to be based on solid ground. If they negotiate a treaty that assumes U.S. combat troops will be part of the peace enforcement, they are making a false assumption because the support is not there in the Congress or the country to do that. It is better they know the facts now and tonight rather than find out the hard way later.

The fact is the President promised to send in troops without consulting Congress and now he is asking us to back him up. Our job, on the other hand, is to ask whether there is a vital national security interest in Bosnia that justifies risking the lives of young men and women. I do not think there is. Risking their lives just to make good on a rash, premature promise by the President is flat wrong and we ought to stop it.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH].

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me time.

This is the key vote this evening, whether we send troops into Bosnia or not. And the reason for that is because the President point-blank tells us that he is going to preposition a number of troops into Bosnia.

We are going to be deploying some 4,000 NATO troops, either a third or a half of them U.S. troops. So the next time this issue comes up for a vote, it is not whether we are going to send troops into Bosnia. The issue will be whether we are going to support the troops that are already there, and that is why this vote this evening is such a crucial vote, and that is why this vote this evening is a historic vote.

Speaking of history, Mr. Speaker, sometimes I think the only thing we learn from history is that we do not learn from history. I see in the paper here we have Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the time of Vietnam, and what is he saying is, he said I knew we could not win the war. He said I did not believe in the war. But they kept on putting thousands, hundreds of thousands of boys over into Vietnam. 58,000 names we can see when we walk out of this building and walk down to The Mall.

But where is McNamara? He is a big hero over in Vietnam. He is selling his book all around the country. But there are 58,000 names we have on the plaque down here. Look at history. Let us learn from history this evening.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER].

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, we hear give peace a chance; do not disrupt the negotiations. That is the central argument being offered by this side for us not to act. And I will tell my colleagues that if we do not act and we send 25,000 Americans into the Balkans meat grinder, it will be because we bought that argument that some of our colleagues have presented to us. But that argument is nonsense. Total absolute nonsense.

If peace talks are predicated on deploying 25,000 American troops into the Balkans, what is going on in Ohio is not a peace process but a tragic game. We are doing no one a favor. We are not bringing peace 1-inch closer by having the parties of a negotiation in Ohio base their agreement on predicating that 25,000 American troops are going to be sent to the Balkans.

What is reality? That is not reality. Ignoring reality and wishful thinking will not bring peace to the Balkans or anywhere else in this world. All it will do is put 25,000 young Americans in harm's way and possibly bringing them back in body bags. What is reality? The American people do not support the deployment of these thousands of young Americans, our young defenders, into this bloody and confusing morass.

Mr. Speaker, I worked in the Reagan White House when he made his worst mistake, and that was deploying the Marines to Beirut. This has every small of that same situation. We had very little chance of success. I ran all over the White House saying what are we doing? What are we trying to accomplish? They said, well, if this happens and that happens and this happens, we are eventually going to bring peace to the Middle East. I said, look, the chances of success are 1 in 10. The chances of this turning into a bloody failure are one in two. It makes no sense.

Well, that is exactly what we are doing tonight. The situation in Bosnia, our chances of success are maybe 1 in 10, maybe 1 in 100. The chances of a catastrophic failure and the death of many young Americans is very high. It is nonsense. This is a horrible policy. We must do everything we can not to let it happen.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the chairman of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, earlier today I spoke in support of this resolution. Let me please urge Members to vote for this. It may be their last chance to stop these troops from going into this place called Bosnia where they have no place being.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2606 and commend Mr. HEFLEY for forcing this critical issue to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I have been a member of the North Atlantic Assembly for 16 years and currently serve as chairman of the Political Committee.

I have been proud to be affiliated with what has been the greatest treaty of all time—NATO.

And for that matter, it has been the greatest peacekeeper of all time too.

NATO, with its laser-like focus on military deterrence and collective defense, kept the peace in Europe for over 40 years in the face of the Soviet threat.

But let me tell you what is going on in our allied European countries. There is a noticeable leftward drift, especially in terms of foreign policy.

More and more, NATO is being pushed by this leftward drift into out of area missions—missions that don't involve direct threats to NATO members, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and the like.

Missions like Bosnia.

And the Clinton administration has been getting us sucked into this morass for 3 years.

After 3 years of doing nothing, after 3 years of subjecting the Bosnian victims to a cruel and strategically myopic arms embargo, the administration now says that if we don't send 20,000 young people into harm's way in this hornet's nest, we will destroy NATO.

Ladies and gentlemen, that's baloney.

This mission will destroy NATO. Let me tell you how.

The administration has a plan, folks. They have a plan to partition Bosnia, divide it into sectors, and insert United States, British, French, and yes, Russian troops in to enforce the partition.

What does that sound like? It sounds an awful lot like Berlin to me.

And another Berlin is exactly what NATO cannot withstand.

We can't afford another 40-year deployment, Mr. Speaker, especially in this place where there is no vital national interest.

And we can't afford to let the Russians snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by giving them a free pass into the Balkans.

To be blunt, they have a history of coming to a place and hanging around for a while. How are we going to get them out?

And how are we going to prevent them from arming and supplying the Serb aggressors?

We know they will do this.

And are American soldiers going to square off with the Russians if they do this, or are we going to turn a blind eye as the Serbs re-arm?

Either way, it is a fiasco for NATO.

Mr. Speaker, let's stop this mission from proceeding until the President comes to us and secures our approval.

This is what the Hefley bill will do and I urge a "yes" vote.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. METCALF], who has been so effective and so helpful in helping to bring this matter before us tonight.

(Mr. METCALF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. METCALF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his kind words.

Mr. Speaker, American ground troops may soon be dispatched to Bosnia. These men and women are entering a combat zone plagued by centuries of conflict and three failed peace agreements in recent years. It is the duty, the constitutional duty of Congress to allocate funds or to deny funds for long-term troop deployments. We have learned through sad experience that it is easy to rush troops into a conflict, but it is extremely difficult to solve the problems once they get there, and even more difficult to get out in a timely and honorable way.

Mr. Speaker, the American people know that it is folly to send combat troops to Bosnia, and I ask Members to support them with their vote for this resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, November 17 is the 30th anniversary of the Ia Drang Valley. Three hundred two killed in action. Americans. Look where that led.

I rise again for this amendment.

I include the following for the RECORD.

IADRANG VALLEY BATTLE

About 1,200 troops of the U.S. First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) fought North Vietnamese regular troops Nov. 14–17 in the Iadrang Valley, between the Cambodian border and Pleime. The First Cavalry troops had been scouring the area in a search-and-destroy operation since the Communists had mounted an unsuccessful siege of a U.S. Special Forces camp at Pleime in late October. The Iadrang Valley clash was the operation's 4th contact with the Communist forces.

About 2,000 North Vietnamese of the 66th Regiment were reportedly involved in the Iadrang engagement. Before U.S. troops withdrew from the valley Nov. 17 a total of 890 North Vietnamese bodies were counted, according to a military spokesman in Saigon. Although First Cavalry losses were described as ''moderate,'' they were believed to have been the heaviest sustained by U.S. troops in any single engagement of the war.

The North Vietnamese opened their attack Nov. 14 with a heavy 4-hour assault on U.S. positions. The Communists renewed the attack Nov. 15 against 4 U.S. companies of 750 men defending a clearing in the valley for a helicopter landing. The North Vietnamese then broke off the attack, pressed the assault again Nov. 16 but were thrown back in 3 separate drives. The U.S. troops repelled 2 similar Communist attacks later in the day. U.S. commanders decided Nov. 17 to withdraw the First Cavalry units from the valley since North Vietnamese had a tactical advantage by holding positions on high ground. About ½ of the U.S. troops were evacuated by helicopters; the remaining soldiers walked out of the valley.

(A U.S. military spokesman in Saigon had reported Nov. 5 that 5 regiments of North Vietnam's 325th Division were in operation in South Vietnam.)

VIETNAM WAR ALMANAC—BATTLE OF IA DRANG

(By Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry)

Although it was not apparent at the time, the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley between elements of the U.S. Army's First Air Cavalry Division and regiments of the North Vietnamese Army was especially significant. It not only marked the first major engagement between American and North Vietnamese troops, it also presaged the final campaign almost 10 years later that would lead to the total collapse of South Vietnam.

In 1964 the North Vietnamese Politburo had made the decision to commit regular army units to the war in the south. After a buildup in supposedly neutral Cambodia, the North Vietnamese intended to attack across the Central Highlands and drive to the sea, splitting South Vietnam in two and ultimately seizing the entire country. They executed this plan on October 19, 1965 with an attack on the U.S. Special Forces camp at Plei Me, but they did not foresee the reaction to this attack. General William Westmoreland made the decision to commit the U.S. Army First Air Cavalry Division, just arrived from the United States, to the relief of Plei Me. The division's helicopters enabled it to fly over enemy roadblocks, and its firepower was instrumental in breaking the Plei Me siege. On October 26, South Vietnamese relief forces were able to break through to the camp. With this success, General Westmoreland ordered the U.S. First Air Cavalry Division to switch from defensive to offensive operations and its reconnaissance units began to seek out the fleeing enemy.

Unknown to the Americans, the North Vietnamese Army's 2,000-man 66th Regiment, joined by the 700 survivors of the 33rd Regiment that had laid siege to Plei Me, was regrouping in the Ia Drang Valley to the southwest. On November 14, the 430 men of the U.S. First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry were ordered to make a helicopter assault into what appeared to be an unoccupied landing zone in the Ia Drang Valley. As soon as they landed they came in contact with elements of the North Vietnamese Army 66th Regiment. Fighting was intense and one U.S. platoon was cut off from the main body. Reinforced by air by elements of the U.S. Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry and supported by intense artillery and air support, including strikes by B–52 bombers, the First Battalion was able to hold on in the face of heavy odds. On November 15 it was further reinforced by the Second Battalion, Fifth Cavalry, which had moved by air to a landing zone some two and a half miles to the southeast and had marched overland to the sound of guns. Thus reinforced, the First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry was finally able to reestablish contact with its isolated platoon. The North Vietnamese broke contact, with some troops fleeing back across the border into Cambodia and others fleeing eastward into the jungles of the Ia Drang Valley.

Ten years later the North Vietnamese would launch their Final Offensive to conquer South Vietnam just a few miles south of Ia Drang Valley with their attack on Ban Me Thuot on March 10, 1975. They had tipped their hand to their long-range strategic objectives in 1965, but because the United States was so obsessed with the doctrines of counterinsurgency, it could not see that with the Battle of Ia Drang the entire nature of the war had changed. The North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong, would prove to be the decisive military force in the war.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TORKILDSEN].

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the National Security Committee, I rise in strong support of the bill offered by my friend and colleague from Colorado.

Before this Congress offers its support for any commitment of troops, several critical questions must be answered.

What are United States interests in Bosnia? Are they solely humanitarian, or does the U.S. have other interests in the area as well?

What are United States objectives in Bosnia?

Can the commitment of U.S. troops protect these interests and achieve these objectives? If yes, how many Americans will be expected to give their lives to protect these interests and achieve these goals.

These are the questions that must be answered in advance of any congressional support to commit troops to this or any other area. I have voted in the past to give this President, and any President, the greatest possible leeway in setting the foreign policy of the United States.

But I cannot sit back and allow a President to commit troops to a part of the world when he has not defined U.S. interests, and has not identified what his objectives are.

Mr. Speaker, I reject the notion that this Chamber should withhold judgment on the critical issue of whether or not to commit troops while talks are underway in Dayton.

As we learned in Beirut and Somalia, once deployed, even for the most humanitarian and noblest of reasons, United States forces often become a target of aggression rather than a symbol of peace.

Peace may well be the objective, but the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers in Bosnia may escalate the conflict beyond anything this administration acknowledges.

I ask my colleagues to support this bill and require the Congress to be involved in any decision to commit troops in Bosnia.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. COX], chairman of our Republican Policy Committee.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, this debate comes on a day when the hot news topics in Washington are the Government shutdown, the question of whether we will raise the debt ceiling, whether we will pass a Balanced Budget Act. But I think all of us, if we pause for a moment, recognize that 6 months from now that will not matter so much. That will be old news. The Government will be back operating again and we will have our Balanced Budget Act in place and the debt ceiling will have been raised.

The more important decision is the one we are voting on tonight. I venture to say it is the most important decision we will make in the 104th Congress. Six months from now, this decision will undoubtedly loom large. What we do or do not do tonight is irrevocable. We cannot take it back.

I support the peace process. I congratulate President Clinton for bringing the parties together. But if we fail to act now, while there is still time, then, yes, an agreement will proceed

for Dayton, one built on the false premise that the United States will commit over 200,000 combat ground troops to Bosnia.

If we do nothing tonight, United States will have negligently sidled into the Balkans trying to be neutral just weeks after bombing the Serbs; treating war criminals like Slobodan Milosevic the same as victims of hideous ethnic cleansing; foolishly inviting Russian troops into Central Europe without any guaranty that they will not continue to side with the Serbs, without any guaranty that they will leave when we want them to; putting United States ground troops into the middle of a three-way crossfire with no military objective other than to be shot at.

If we do nothing tonight, make no mistake, it will be an irretrievable decision. While Congress could theoretically vote on this question after the commitment is made in Dayton, the reality is, as NPR has reported tonight, prepositioning troops will move into the Balkans from the United States within hours. Fourteen days later, when the final agreement is initialed, it will take, according to NPR, having been just briefed by the Pentagon, no more than 72 hours to get the bulk of the 20,000 United States troops on to the ground in Bosnia.

We will have no chance to turn back. And if we did, we would be voting to unravel the peace agreement. How responsible would that be? We would be voting to make seemingly worthless the executive commitment of the President of the United States in Dayton, OH. It is much more responsible to act now while there is still time.

Mr. Speaker, what is really at stake here is not the unquestioned power of the Commander-in-Chief to send troops anywhere he likes on the planet. He has the power. What is at stake here tonight is the power of the purse, because the Congress also has the power to pay for or not to pay for things over which we approve or disapprove.

The administration has made it clear they will send these troops. I have been down to the White House three times in the last few weeks. They have said so. If we fail to act tonight, we will be acquiescing to plans to divert funds from other vital and legitimate national security functions that will represent nothing less than an usurpation of this Congress' power of the purse.

I urge Members to vote yes on the Hefley bill, to act responsibly tonight and to say no while there is still time.

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Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, some Members rise with answers. I rise tonight with a question. What is wrong with us? What has become of this Chamber where for generations we have come together for common national purpose? Has our appetite for partisan differing made us lose our taste for national purpose? Is it not enough that the Government of our country has been paralyzed by bipartisan bickering that now, indeed, a desire to embarrass our President can make us lose a chance for a desperately needed peace?

Several hundred miles from here, in Dayton, OH, there is just a chance that the worst human carnage in a generation can be brought to a close, while in Bosnia the soil is still fresh from the mass graves of the victims. Children still seek to heal from their wounds. And yet there is an end in sight, just a chance that peace can be restored.

It is not right, it is not right that in a few moments from now we will have a vote and those negotiations will be interrupted by the passing of notes to those who came from peace and are told that the United States has lost the resolve. Our secretary of State has lost the credibility. Our President has been undermined.

Mr. Speaker, I do not come here tonight holding any brief for the President of the United States. I believed long ago we should have given the Bosnians the right to arm themselves. I come here for no administration but for the purpose of national unity at a time when we can give meaning to these peace negotiations.

Mr. Speaker, from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf, Democrats and Republicans have come to this floor, to this Chamber and put aside partisanship for national purpose. Indeed, it has become a national axiom, a national division stops at the water's edge.

Tonight this President has asked for no troops. He has proposed no plan of military involvement. Indeed, he has pledged to come to the this floor and ask for Members' support before we take that national step.

Mr. Speaker, if this were the British parliament and this vote were to pass, this government would come down. We have a different system. Our government will endure, but it will not be the same.

American power does not rest on our armed forces alone. We are not respected simply because of our wealth. We are respected, indeed, the combatants tonight are in Dayton and not in Paris and not in London and not in Rome, because of the credibility of those who sat in these chairs before us, generations of Americans who came here and put their partisan affiliations beside.

Mr. Speaker, that credibility is at issue tonight. I ask that this resolution be defeated. I ask that we stand together. I ask that we give the peace of Bosnia a chance and stand with Bill Clinton just for these days.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HOKE].

(Mr. HOKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], a gentleman who has invested an enormous amount of himself and his time in this effort.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, this is not about scoring political points tonight. I have worked with many of my Democrat colleagues, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. HARMAN] and others, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ROEMER], on this issue, along with my Republican colleagues.

If this body does not want to send ground troops to Bosnia, when do we deliver that blow? Do we do it while the parties and the diplomats are at the table, or do we wait until the diplomats go home? I would say that we place a greater blow than once they go home.

Let me add something that is thought provoking. I have been sitting there watching many come to the well in argument, and the Gulf war has been referenced. I have watched many, this is very thought provoking, from the last vote that we had there are many who voted that said, yes, it is all right to send ground troops to Bosnia, but voted against use of force in the Gulf war. I think that is extremely thought provoking.

When vital national security interests are at stake, vote no. But vote yes to send troops in harm's way to an ill-conceived, poorly defined and highly dangerous mission.

I will share with Members that I stand here tonight with the soldiers who took an oath to give their life to protect freedoms, liberties and economic opportunities. Sending troops in harm's way is very serious. Some feel that it is the military's job and there is something glorious about flexing our might.

My colleagues, war may sound glorious in verse or prose, but in reality it is not, because it is the soldier, the sailor, the airman and marine who sees the face of death and witnesses the long dark shadows of horror. But glory is found in the new levels of courage and fear that erupt from the American character.

However, the strength of the American soldier's character is in her willingness or his willingness to give the ultimate sacrifice to protect United States vital security interests, not for an ill-conceived, poorly defined and highly dangerous proposal that places ground troops as a predicate to a peace agreement.

We can, the United States, and should participate in the peace process by providing our leadership in NATO, our air power and sea power, our airlift and sealift and our logistical support. But we must vote now, not later, now, while they are at the table.

I ask my colleagues to support the Hefley amendment and send that message.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we are down to the last two speakers, the tail end of this debate. I would like to conclude this debate where my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] began this debate.

My friend and my colleague started this debate saying today is about American lives. With all due and profound respect to my colleague, I would dissent from that. Tonight is not about American lives. It is not about American lives because we all know that the predicate for deployment of American troops is a peace plan. There is no peace plan. Therefore, there is no request for the deployment of American troops. Therefore, this is not about American lives. The appropriate moment and the appropriate forum for that to take place is when the predicate becomes a reality.

So what is tonight about? Tonight is about the lives of people who are living in Bosnia-Herzegovina at this moment. It is not about American lives. It is about the lives of people over there, the lives that many of us came into this Chamber just a few months ago, with wringing hands about the murder, the slaughter, the rape and the pain of people.

I saw many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle march into the well with anger and with pain and with raw emotion about how women were plundered and raped, children killed, 16,000 of them, thousands of people dying in the insanity of ethnic cleansing. And as a black man, I understand that.

I would like to have believed that I would have had the courage and the dignity, in the context of Nazi Germany, to stand up and rise above the notion of narrowly construed vital national interests to assume the moral responsibility to say that we have the responsibility to save human lives.

So tonight is not about American troops. That issue is somewhere else. It is about those lives you cared about.

Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress voted to unilaterally lift the arms embargo because they were angry and frustrated at the killing, the dying and the slaughter and the rape and the plunder. And you argued that point on moral grounds.

I came here 25 years to raise my voice as an advocate of peace and the moral argument. It defied logic for me because I could not understand what was moral about placing more weapons in the hands of people so they could continue to slaughter, maim and kill each other.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, that the human being has the capacity to rise beyond that level of cannibalism, beyond that level of caveman mentality. I believe that we can rise to a higher order of how we deal with each other. Tonight is not about American lives. It is about those lives we cared about. If we could raise the moral argument that the only thing left to do was to lift the arms embargo, why then are we now presented with a new option?

People now who were slaughtering and killing each other are sitting down around a negotiating table. That has been my greatest dream. My argument has been that peace is a superior idea and the table of diplomacy is the best battlefield, not out there in the hinterlands killing, slaughtering and maiming human beings.

If you believe that so strongly, if you care about those human lives, then why is this about American lives when that is not the issue? Care about those people you cared about when you wanted to lift the arms embargo. Assume the moral imperative to embrace the notion that peace is a superior idea.

I have given my life to that notion. Suddenly, I would say to my colleague from California, the world is turned around. It has turned around because we find ourselves in the context of the post-cold war era where war itself is the enemy, where the challenge is peace. Remember what Rabin said, he said, you do not have to make peace with your friends. You make it with your enemies. And that is tough going. But we should do nothing in these Chambers that would shake that fragile process called peace, where people are engaging in the Herculean task of moving from the field of blood to the negotiating table where they have a possibility for peace.

As I said earlier today, there are moments, folks, when we need to rise far beyond pedestrianism, rise above our partisanship, rise above all of these things to achieve a lofty place, that notion that what we do makes sense.

We will have the chance, whether you are for or against deployment of the troops, that is a proper question. You have the right to step up to it. I stand second to no one in these Chambers about Congress's prerogatives. I took the President to the court of the United States to guarantee constitutional prerogatives when many of my colleagues did not have the heart to do it. I did it, if I had to stand alone.

So I believe in the right and the responsibility. I believe the President of the United States, as a practical matter, needs to come here to the people's representatives any time you put people in harm's way.

I conclude, tonight is not about American lives. It is about the lives of the people in Bosnia, and I think we have a moral obligation to stand on the threshold of peace.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this proposition.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FLANAGAN].

(Mr. FLANAGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the measure.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], first of all, I would like to start by thanking him for the level of this debate. By and large I think the level of this debate was excellent, considering the emotional foundation of it, how strongly we feel. I respect the passion that the gentleman just expressed here on this House floor. I appreciate that tremendously.

The gentleman says that we predicate sending troops on a peace plan. Let me say to my friend that we should have predicated committing troops on a peace plan, cart before the horse. We should not have committed and then say, oh, you have got to back up the commitment, when we have not even seen a peace plan.

What we are saying by this legislation tonight is that we want to see the peace plan; we want the arguments made. We want the questions answered. And then we may say, OK, it is worth doing.

Most of the disagreement tonight is about time. Member after Member on that side went to the floor and said, I may vote against sending troops but the time is not right.

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Mr. Speaker, let me say to my colleagues that I think, if we do not do it tonight, in this time, and insist that the President bring this matter before this House before troops hit the ground over there, the time is lost, the time is gone. If this hurts the peace process, then the peace process is too fragile for us to risk lives in.

I do not think this will hurt the peace process. What we are saving to the President is to get us together, how much stronger the process would be if we are together, Congress, and the President, and the American people on this.

Mr. Speaker, I am sorry, but I have to personalize this a little bit. I had one of our Members, one of our colleagues, come to me before the debate started tonight and said, ''Joel, I have an 18-year-old son that I do not want to go to Bosnia,'' and I think of that when I make these kinds of decisions. Have I been given the information necessary to say to my three daughters:

Janet, Bosnia is worth it; Laurie, go to Bosnia for your country; Julie, we need you to go to Bosnia.

And I would ask every Member in this Chamber to personalize it a little bit. Based on the evidence we have, would my colleagues say, yes, let us send our children, our fathers, our brothers, our sisters to Bosnia? Do my colleagues have the answer of ''for what?'' For a vague dream that it might create peace? Somalia. For What? Twenty-nine Americans lost. We sent some people, we did some good; but for what? Lebanon 241 lost. For What? Vietnam, 58,000 lost, and we look back on it today.

I talked to a Vietnam Veteran yesterday who said, ''The reason the pain of Vietnam is still so in people's hearts is because they cannot answer the ''for what?''

I sometimes go to Arlington Cemetery to help remind me what this country is based on. Started burying people there in 1863. Civil war; we could answer the for what. First World War; we could answer the for what. Second World War; the answers were there.

And all we are asking is that the President come down here and tell us, before he puts troops there, he tells us for what.

As my colleagues know, in the Book of Revelations the scripture tells us to beware of those who cry or shout peace peace when there is no peace, and I am afraid that is the situation we have here. Before our troops hit the ground, I want the answer for what.

I would encourage support of the Hefley bill.

Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2606, the pending legislation that would prohibit the unauthorized use of Defense Department funds for sending United States ground troops to Bosnia.

I realize that the situation in Bosnia is very complex and that the peace negotiations between the warring parties are at a very sensitive stage. I appreciate the concerns of some that every possible effort should be made to avoid adding further complications and questions to these peace talks. Therefore, given these circumstances, it is unfortunate that it has become necessary to consider and adopt H.R. 2606 today.

Approximately 2 years ago, President Clinton first stated that if a peace settlement in Bosnia was reached, he would commit United States troops to any larger NATO peacekeeping force. Clearly, the deployment of American military forces in as dangerous an environment as Bosnia should occur only after the Congress and the American people have been convinced that such action is absolutely necessary and that a comprehensive political and military plan for such action has been developed. yet, up to the present time, these conditions have not been met—even in the most minimal of fashion.

As a member of the International Relations Committee, I have received many briefings from many different administration officials regarding Bosnia. In his own testimony before our committee, Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out the four criteria that he said had to be met before the deployment of any U.S. forces: First, the goals must be clear and understandable to the American people. Second, the chances of success must be high. Third, the American people must support the effort. And, fourth, an exit strategy for getting the troops out must be established from the beginning. None of these criteria have yet been met, setting the stage for another Somalia debacle.

Despite these failures, it appears that the administration is blindly committed to sending substantial numbers of American ground forces into the Bosnian quagmire. The argument is made that modifying or conditioning this hastily-made commitment could jeopardize the Bosnia peace process. Everything seems to revolve around the purported overwhelming need for American military participation.

I understand the humanitarian motivation behind trying to end the bloodshed and suffering in Bosnia as soon as possible. However, Bosnian lives are not worth more than American lives. And, risking the lives of thousands—potentially tens of thousands—of American military personnel is a very, very serious matter. It must be treated as such.

Furthermore, I do not believe that a genuine, lasting peace in Bosnia is completely contingent on American ground forces. Consider the current paradox: if American troops and the military might they possess are required to stop the fighting in Bosnia, then it sounds to me like the warring factions really haven't reached a true peace settlement. They've really just been cowered into stopping their fighting by the overwhelming power of the United States military. Conversely, if the warring factions have truly found a way to live with and not kill each other, then why are American troops absolutely necessary? If neutral observers are needed to for peace monitoring purposes, why must they be American?

Because Congress is concerned about the administration's perceived indifference to these issues, on October 30, the House, with my ''yes'' vote, adopted H. Res. 247 urging the President to obtain Congressional approval before deploying any United States troops in Bosnia. While this was a non-binding resolution, its passage nonetheless should have sent a very strong message to the administration about the serious problems Congress and the American people have with its current Bosnia policy. Unfortunately, it seems to me that this important message was received by deaf ears.

Thus, I feel it has become necessary for Congress to assert its constitutional authority and require the administration to receive the approval of the American people—through their representatives in Congress—before any American ground forces go to Bosnian. This was the process used before committing to Operation Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War and it resulted in overwhelming success. Any future American military operations should try to duplicate the success of Desert Storm, not repeat the failure of Somalia. That is what H.R. 2606 is designed to do and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting it today.

Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. I oppose H.R. 2606 which prohibits the use of Defense Department funds for United States participation in a multi-national effort to implement a future peace agreement in Bosnia.

The national interest of the United States is at stake. United States foreign policy should be concerned with the security and stability of Europe.

Finally, we should support American participation in a NATO alliance with other countries. This is our job and responsibility to take a leadership role in ending the war. Without U.S. participation, NATO will be hard pressed to enforce a peace agreement.

There must be international military presence to give parties to the Bosnian conflict the confidence that they can lay down their arms and begin rebuilding their nation.

This bill that is before us will seriously derail the peace process and cause havoc in the entire region. The United States must not turn its eyes on the massive human rights violations.

I have been fighting for human rights for a long time. The bloody conflict of ethnic cleansing must end.

Democracy can be restored and democratic institutions of government at the regional and national levels will flourish if the United States keeps their promise to the peace efforts.

Also by limiting the President's authority as this bill will do, risks derailing the negotiating before any such settlement can be reached.

How can the United States work toward reaching a settlement with the Serbs and Croats when we are not willing to support the cause?

Let us defeat this measure. This undermines everything we have worked for in the name of peace. This is a crucial time.

Mr. EWING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I first want to thank the leadership in Congress for their quick movement and attention to this issue.

The President says that he wants to put 25,000 American men and women in Bosnia in order to facilitate a peace process. I think this action would be a mistake and has raised many questions not only in my mind, but in the minds of many Americans.

The President is asking Congress to blindly fund American involvement in an ethnic battle which represents no national security interest to America. The President has failed to explain to the American people what our goals and objectives are in Bosnia or what national security issues are at stake. While we are all deeply concerned about the terrible ethnic warfare in Bosnia, we cannot send American troops into a deadly situation without a clear mission, a timetable for their commitment, and a plan for getting them out. I do not think one American life is worth the President's misdirected, uncoordinated, loosely defined mission in Bosnia. I urge a ''yes'' vote on this legislation.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2606, prohibiting the use of funds for the deployment of United States forces in Bosnia for peacekeeping operations. By interfering with the constitutional responsibilities of the President of the United States this bill retreats from our obligations as Americans and world citizens to establish peace throughout the world. As the recent tragedy of the atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia clearly demonstrate, this is no time for America to retire from the world community.

The stated objective of H.R. 2606 is to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of United States ground forces in furtherance of the peace in Bosnia. This shortsighted and rushed legislation will reorder American foreign policy objectives by interfering with the peace negotiations taking place now in my home State of Ohio.

Bosnia has been torn by warring factions engulfed in a brutal civil war. The current level of tensions in Bosnia represent a real threat to world peace. On June 9, 1994, the House of Representatives voted 244 to 178 to unilaterally lift the arms embargo of bosnia. I voted against this effort.

It has been and continues to be my position that the United States should exercise leadership on this issue and continue to work with the international community to restore peace to the region. This includes support for the peace process, permitting humanitarian aid to the citizens of Bosnia and enforcing international laws prohibiting genocide.

Just last week this house voted 315 to 103 to support a resolution that stated that no United States Armed Forces should be deployed in Bosnia to enforce the peace process. Sensitive to the wishes of Congress, the President stated that if the negotiations in Ohio are successful, he will seek Congress' support for any

future deployment of ground forces in Bosnia. There is simply no need for H.R. 2606.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2606 will not only undermine the peace process in Bosnia, it also compromises the President's initiatives in foreign affairs. In a seven to one decision, the United States Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304(1936) held that because of ''fundamental differences'' in national power with respect to internal and external affairs, the President of the United States possesses additional prerogatives in the foreign affairs field that in my opinion this resolution compromises. This bill seeks to hamper the ability of the United States to follow through with its obligations to contribute to maintaining peace in Bosnia.

Contrary to the arguments that have been made by the supporters of H.R. 2606, President Clinton demonstrated admirable leadership in the quest for peace in Bosnia. Negotiations taking place in my home State of Ohio offer the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began nearly 4 years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to seize that chance and do what is right for Bosnia, for Europe and for the United States.

Making peace will prevent a war we have managed to keep from spreading. Making peace in Bosnia will promote our goal of a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe. A Europe at peace will make America more secure and more prosperous. We should not at this critical moment short circuit the peace process in Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt that with the end of the cold war the United States now reigns supreme as the world's only superpower. Over the past 7 years, our foreign policy has undergone a massive undertaking to adjust to a post-cold war world which as allowed us to help promote peace throughout the world. I urge my colleagues to vote against the bill.

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of Congress, I feel strongly that no United States troops should be deployed as part of a peacekeeping force in Bosnia without prior congressional authorization.

That is why the November 13, 1995, correspondence from the President to the Speaker of the House is so important. In that letter, the President stated:

> I will submit a request for a Congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia promptly if and when the parties have initiated an agreement that I consider to be a genuine agreement and after I have reviewed the final NATO operational plan
>
> After initialing of an agreement, there will be a timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon my request for support before American forces are deployed in Bosnia.

In light of this assurance, I cannot support the resolution before the House.

This resolution appears to be driven by a political motive to embarrass the President, irrespective of the peace negotiations underway between the warring parties in Dayton, Ohio.

The carnage and devastation in the Former Yugoslavia has been far too tragic to jeopardize the fragile hope of reaching a peace accord in any way by premature congressional action.

The President has said he will send no troops without a prior vote in Congress. If that event would occur, I will vote against sending troops unless a compelling case is made to justify the U.S. commitment.

I will reserve judgment on this important issue until all relevant facts are known, including the precise mission and objectives of U.S. forces, the number of troops, the length of the mission, the risk to U.S. troops, the probability of success, and the equity of our role relative to our NATO partners.

Congress—by the vote today—is callously jeopardizing vitally important peace talks. The memories of all the innocent men, women and children whose lies have been lost in this savage civil war deserve more responsible action by us sitting comfortably here in the House of Representatives this afternoon.

Mr. LAZIO of New York. Mr. Speaker, there is an old maxim that we ignore at our own peril when we consider sending United States troops to Bosnia: ''Look before you leap.''

Before we leap towards sending the young men and women of our Armed Forces to former Yugoslavia, we ought to know where they will go, what they will do when they get there and how they will get home.

Will our Armed Forces be assigned to keeping the peace or creating peace between the various warring factions? What will the rules of engagement be? Will our troops be able to adequately defend themselves? Will there be clearly defined and obtainable military objectives? Will there be a clear exit strategy and a finite time commitment? And will the mission have the full support of the American people?

Until we have clear, unambiguous answers to these questions, we should not be sending United States troops into harm's way, in Bosnia or anywhere else.

Recent history shows that well-intentioned peacekeeping missing sometimes end in disaster. Take the case of Somalia. This tragedy did not just result in the loss of young American lives, it led to the loss of American prestige and raised serious questions about American resolve among our friends and our foes.

The three sides involved in this conflict, Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs are meeting for peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH as we speak. On October 30, 1995, the House overwhelming approved a bipartisan resolution stating that there should be no presumption by the parties of any Bosnia peace negotiations that the enforcement of any peace agreement will involved the deployment of United States troops. We all pray that these talks will produce a lasting peace agreement on which all sides will agree. At the same time, I feel strongly that if the President wants to commit our nation to a military role in the former Yugoslavia, he should first make the case to the American people,and get the approval of Congress.

This bill prohibits the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense to pay for the deployment of United States ground forces, or any implementation force, in Bosnia, as part of a peacekeeping operation, unless such funds have been specifically appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Article I of the Constitution gives the legislative branch, the one that is closest to the people, the power of the purse, and the power to declare war. This measure simply fulfills our constitutional duty.

Without a doubt, the atrocities that the world has witnessed in Bosnia are reprehensible. That is why I supported lifting the United Nations arms embargo, so that the Bosnian victims of that embargo could defend themselves. But sending our sons and daughters who wear our country's uniform to Bosnia is quite a different matter.

We must look before we leap into a region that has been embroiled in conflict for generations. The stakes are far too high for precipitous action. Let's not give the President a free hand to send our troops to Bosnia without a full debate by this Congress. I urge my colleagues to vote for this proposal.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation to prohibit an unauthorized commitment of United States troops to Bosnia.

The war raging in Bosnia is one of the most terrible, unexpected results of the end of the cold war. No longer restrained by superpower rivalry, the ethnic and religious hatreds of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Moslems have been unleashed in an awful conflict. Sound evidence has recently come to light which shows Bosnian Serbs executed thousands of Moslems prisoners. There is also evidence of Croats shooting innocent Serbs and of Bosnian Moslems summarily executing Serbs. We should all pray for the success of the negotiations in Dayton.

However, President Clinton's desire to commit up to 25,000 American troops to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement is another matter. One of the hallmarks of the Clinton administration is its propensity to commit American troops to dubious causes. We all remember the disastrous loss of American lives in Somalia when President Clinton elected to expand a humanitarian mission to one of ''nation building.'' And while we are relieved the invasion of Haiti was accomplished without loss of life, at this point it appears we have only succeeded in replacing a right-wing military junta with a left-wing strongman. In neither case did President Clinton elect to seek the consent of Congress even though Congress was then controlled by his own party.

Bosnia is shaping up to be a similar situation. Approximately 2 years ago President Clinton pledged American troops as part of a NATO force to enforce a Bosnian peace agreement. Recently, the President has asked for an ''expression of support'' from Congress. But the President has also made clear that his deployment of American troops to Bosnia does not need the approval of Congress. If we take no action now, President Clinton may send troops to Bosnia over the holiday recess and then dare Congress to take the only action constitutionally left to its disposal, cutting off funds in the midst of deployment.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I simply see no national interest worthy of risking American lives in Bosnia. NATO was formed to defend Europe and the United States from communist aggression. It was not formed to act as referee to a centuries-old ethnic and religious conflict in the Balkans. If the parties truly want peace, an American presence is not necessary. This terrible situation's best hope for an enduring peace is in Dayton, OH, and on an agreement which is not based on American guns to enforce it.

I urge my colleagues strongly to support this bill.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R 2606 to prohibit the unauthorized use of Defense Department funds for peacekeeping in Bosnia.

Although I supported the Buyer-McHale resolution last month, that resolution was nonbinding and does not have the effect of law. President Clinton said publicly that passage of the Buyer resolution will not have ''any effect'' on the current settlement negotiations in Dayton.

I had pushed to include binding language in the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense appropriations conference report, but H.R. 2606, if passed, will achieve the same objective; it will prohibit troop deployment until Congress has authorized such a deployment.

The arguments against this bill and the timing of this vote are simply misguided:

This prohibition is not premature. We cannot wait. It would be more irresponsible to cut off funds after the troops are already committed.

Such action is not unconstitutional. The President does have the power as Commander-in-Chief to send troops abroad, but Congress has the constitutional authority to appropriate funds for the deployment of troops—or not appropriate funds.

This legislation will not hurt the peace process. Rather, it will prevent the President from making commitments the American people do not want to fulfill.

We are not tying the President's hands. If he makes a compelling case to the American people that 25,000 American service men and women are needed to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, Congress will authorize the funds for such a deployment.

Mr. Speaker, I welcome a debate on whether or not the United States should send ground troops to Bosnia. But until that debate occurs, and until I am convinced that sending American men and women to Bosnia is the proper course of action, I intend to do everything in my power to keep us out of that civil war.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2606.

Mr. MARTINI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2606 and ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The President of the United States is on the verge of committing our sons and daughters to a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

In May of this year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, established very specific criteria that should be met prior to the commitment of American ground troops in Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, in the opinion of this Member of Congress the President has not satisfied his own stipulations.

In view of this I firmly believe it is a reasonable request that the President should be required to gain approval from this Congress before one American life is placed in harms ways.

The commitment of U.S. troops to foreign soil is the most awesome power that the President possess.

We owe it to the American people and to the brave men and women who proudly serve their country in uniform to pass H.R. 2606.

Let us send the President a message by passing his important legislation today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOBSON). All time has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 243, noes 171, answered ''present'' 2, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 814]

AYES—243

Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bryant (TX)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Hunter
Hutchinson
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
Kingston
Kleczka
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manton
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOES—171

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bliley
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Callahan
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Davis
de la Garza
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
King
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Longley
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Portman
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Rivers
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
White
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

ANSWERED ''PRESENT''—2

Harman
Lofgren

NOT VOTING—16

Baker (LA)
Brewster
Collins (IL)
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Hyde
Largent
Livingston
McCrery
McDermott
Neumann
Smith (MI)
Stark
Tucker
Volkmer
Waxman

☐ 2038

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Stark for, with Mr. Waxman against.

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.