Let me say a word about Federal employees today. I have not talked about them as much in past days. This is a home of the Federal Government. Of course, it follows that our largest employer is the Federal Government and, therefore, we have a disproportionate number of employers, about 60,000, who were forced to stay home on forced administrative leave. These are some of the most stable employees. We are trying hard to keep them.

Imagine what they might be thinking now: ''At least if I lived in the suburbs, if they shut down the Federal Government, my vital services would still be available to me.''

Please help us keep our tax-paying residents. If we have to shut down, give us an exception for D.C. employees. Let me say what has happened to these employees. The effect on them is simply intolerable. Because of the District's financial crisis, they have already given back 12 percent of their income to the city last year and took 6 furlough days. This year our unionized employees will give back 3 percent to the city and have 6 more furlough days. Would my colleagues like to tell folks like that that they might risk not getting their pay or that they probably will get their pay but they have to stay home and let backlogs of work build up?

What about my cops, the cops who are now working straight time, not overtime, on the weekends and at night? These sacrifices are being made by D.C. employees at a time when the American standard of living has been stable or going down for two decades. Front-line services, from trash collection to day-care centers that happen to be in libraries, were closed because libraries were closed.

There was a plethora of services that were closed for business, vital services, services that keep the residents alive and going. One of the most vital actions that was closed down, however, had to do with the multiyear plan which is due here in early February, the plan that is central to reviving the District. If we missed that deadline, there will be howls throughout this body.

Virtually all Members directly involved recognize that something has to be done, and I thank them all. I thank the Speaker for recognizing it and telling me that he thought something special should be done for the District if we shut down the Federal Government. I thank Mr. DAVIS for the hearing coming up and for his cosponsorship of my bill. The gentleman from New York, [Mr. WALSH], our subcommittee chairman, recognizes it as well. He is now with the President heading a bipartisan delegation, as he is in this House, Chair of Friends of Ireland. I applaud that. I have no objection to his going and applaud opportunities for Members to work together like this in a bipartisan line.

I hope he comes back not only as a friend of Ireland but as enough of a friend of the District of Columbia so that we can guarantee that the city will not be closed down December 15.

BOSNIA POLICY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. KAPTUR] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss our Bosnia policy. In the past 4 years, nearly 250,000 people have been killed in that war-torn region, 2 million people have become refugees. Atrocities have been committed that have truly shocked the world.

The region has been a tinder box for European instability for centuries. Thus the peace agreement agreed to by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in Dayton, OH is indeed an historic step toward bringing peace and ultimate stability to this region.

However, the deployment of over 20,000 United States troops to Bosnia to enforce the peace raises many questions. One lesson I have learned from history is that when Congress and the President are not at once with the American people, our Nation suffers. First, the Nation must be committed, and only then should we send troops. Sending troops to Bosnia without broader public consensus will prove to be a mistake.

The President's recent efforts to convince the American people fell short of achieving that public support. May I ask, why in this post-cold war era, when our U.S. citizenry has been clamoring for more defense-burden sharing by our allies, has the United States again been asked to assume the central role in resolving this situation, even convening the peace talks in Dayton, OH rather than on the European continent. The short-term cost of U.S. participation will equal $2.6 billion.

This entire matter is a defining moment in U.S. foreign policy in that the United States is being asked to substitute for European resolve in this post-cold war era.

In the NATO nations of Europe, we have thousands of European trained, deployable troops that could be dispatched immediately to Bosnia in the event a final peace accord is signed in Paris. Let me read to you the list of European countries associated with NATO and the number of their combat ready troops. This does not even count their reserve forces:

In Belgium, 63,000 troops. In Denmark, 27,000 troops. In France, 409,000 troops. In Germany, 367,000 troops. In Greece, 159,300 troops. In Italy, 322,300 troops. In Luxembourg, 800 troops. In the Netherlands, 70,900 troops. In Norway, 33,500 troops. In Portugal, 50,700 troops. In Spain, 206,500 troops. In Turkey, 503,800 troops. In the United Kingdom, 254,300 troops, bringing the total NATO active forces to over 2½ million war-ready forces.

Identifying 20,000 ground troops from among these forces would represent less than a 1-percent additional commitment for NATO's European partners to enforce the peace. Is that too much to ask of them? If the United States maintains our logistical and our air support.

The administration has stated that Europe, since 1914, has been unable to effectively maintain the peace and there was no other recourse but for the United States to assume the lead in bringing the warring factions to peaceful resolution. They have urged us not to become isolationists. The truth is, the long-term prospects for peace in this troubled region are very slim. Once the NATO troops withdraw, it will require 50 years of cooling off between the warring factions and maintenance of borders by external forces to give peace a chance. A 1-year quick fix is not going to do it.

Who will commit to that long-term maintenance of peace? And who will pay for it? Is it not time for NATO's European partners to measure up to their common defense? The United States, as a partner in NATO, has a role in logistical and air support, but we should not be sending ground troops to Bosnia. NATO in Europe is perfectly capable of doing that on its own, if it wished to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from American Samoa [Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

ON BOSNIA AND BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SCARBOROUGH] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, although I am going to be speaking today primarily on the need to balance the budget for the American people, I would like to echo some of the sentiments that the gentlewoman from Ohio just stated before this House, all and all, to those that may be watching at home.

I just returned from a national security meeting where we had the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, coming and testifying before our committee one more time telling us why American troops need to be sent to Bosnia. Unfortunately, while we saw a lot of good charts and saw that General Shalikashvili obviously had done his homework and was going to try to carry this mission out in as impressive a way as possible, unfortunately, there was one question that was not answered over there. That question was,