So indeed Medicaid is not only for the poor, it is for the elderly as well as for those who are disabled. To cut this program drastically or to put families of nursing home patients in distress or to block-grant this program is the wrong way.

Mr. Speaker, I started my remarks earlier to say that this debate was about people. It was about those we cared about, and it was about shared sacrifice.

I will end my remarks to say again, as we go into the next 5, 6, or 10 days, this debate, particularly around Medicaid, I urge my colleagues to consider the opportunity they have to make this program work.

Let me just further say, we ought to spend our money wisely even under Medicaid. There is a lot of demagogery that goes on on this floor about teenage pregnancy, a lot of demagogery about we cannot sustain a continuation of 10- and 12- and 15-year-old kids having children. I agree with that. We should. Demagogery is so easy, but actually coming to a solution or having a reasonable plan is far more difficult.

One way we could begin to think of this is using the Medicaid dollars to assist teenagers before they get pregnant and prevention of pregnancy, teaching them counseling and a variety of activities and techniques that are proven. If we enact it, we could use just a little of the Medicaid dollars and that could go a substantial way to reducing the Medicaid dollars we are now using.

One could use $1,000 in prevention and possibly save $10,000 in the care. Prevention and preventing pregnancy, unwanted pregnancy, particularly in teenagers, would mean not only that young teenager whose life is no longer productive, contributing to society, but also perhaps a troubled birth which would cause the Government to pay.

We pay for that teenager, mind you. Once she becomes pregnant, we will pay as much probably as $10,000. Indeed, if that young teenager has a troubled pregnancy where the young baby is not safe or underweight, that could be in thousands and tens of thousands of dollars. It makes no sense. It is unwise.

We should use our money wisely and use our money fairly. This debate about Medicaid is about what priorities we will set as a governing body and as a Congress as we meet this debate. I urge my colleagues to go forth in this but go forth with this in a reasonable way.

BOSNIA AND THE BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GANSKE] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, we are facing today debate on two big issues, the two B's, the two great B's, the budget and Bosnia. Since we have had some debate tonight on the budget, let me just spend a few minutes before I move on to the second B, Bosnia.

There has been a lot of misperception about what exactly is in the budget that Congress has passed. But let me give you the facts.

In 1995, we spend for Medicare $178 billion. This will go up every year for the next 7 years, so that by the year 2002 we will spend $290 billion for Medicare. This is an increase by anyone's calculations.

In the last 7 years, we have spent $926 billion on Medicare. In the next 7 years, we will spend $1.6 trillion. This is at twice the rate of inflation.

Just a couple of years ago, President Clinton, in speaking to the country about his health care plan at that time, said anything goes up at twice the rate of inflation is not a cut.

□ 1830

Let us look at some other areas. Medicaid, 1995, we have spent $90 billion. This will increase every year for the next 7 years so that by the year 2002 we will be spending $127 billion. In the last 7 years, for Medicaid, we have spent $444 billion, and we propose increasing that to $770 billion in the next 7 years. That is an increase of $330 billion.

SHOULD WE SEND TROOPS TO BOSNIA?

But let me get to the second issue, the issue of Bosnia. Let me begin with the basic issue. Should we or should we not put United States troops into Bosnia? Let us look at the various arguments President Clinton has laid before the public and why I believe they are flawed.

I have given the President the benefit of the doubt. I have listened carefully to United States negotiators, Richard Holbrooke and General Clark, and have discussed this issue with several Congressmen who have just returned from Bosnia. I am indebted to Charles Krauthammer's testimony on Bosnia recently before the House Committee on National Security, and to Michael Glenon's article on foreign affairs a few years ago on the role of Congress and war. Despite Mr. Holbrooke's protestations, the deal calls for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be partitioned by a 2-mile wide demilitarized zone, a DMZ that NATO will patrol. There will be a Croat-Moslem coalition and a Serb republic with a weak central government for show.

The NATO troops can kill anyone who stands in the way of separation or is presumed to constitute a threat. Approximately 60,000 troops, one-third English, one-third French, and one-third United States troops, will be on the ground. As many as 37,000 United States troops may ultimately be involved, and American reservists will be part of the operation, including some from my home State of Iowa. Up to one-third of current NATO forces may be committed to this venture.

Let us examine the reasons that President Clinton, in his speech to the American people, gave for putting the lives of American troops into harm's way.

First, in comparing the current situation in Sarajevo to World War I, President Clinton said, ''We must never go down the road of isolationism again.'' Now to argue that if we do not put troops on the ground into Bosnia will lead to United States isolationism ignores the facts. The United States is robustly internationalist today as compared to the Smooth-Hawley days of protectionism. Look at United States involvement in GATT, United States involvement in NAFTA, the $20 billion Mexico bailout or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Indeed, many would argue that the United States has been too internationalist in areas such as the 1993 Somalia fiasco or Lebanon in 1982.

Was the United States not involved in Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 1989, and in the Persian Gulf in 1991? How can one talk about isolationism when we have troops in Haiti?

Second, President Clinton invoked the moral imperative; sending United States troops to Bosnia is ''the right thing to do.'' It is true that for 3 years atrocities have been committed by both sides in a terrible civil war. Television has brought these horrors into our living rooms just as it brought the horrors of Vietnam into our homes 25 years ago. Our hearts go out to the victims, and compassion cries out for action. Yet, wise leadership calls for more than compassion in a world torn by strife in a dozen or more places around the Earth.

What is the difference between Bosnia and Rwanda, Bosnia and Liberia or the Sudan, Bosnia and Peru, Bosnia and Sri Lanka?

I was recently in Guatemala, where an insurrection has gone on for years. There are victims in all of these places that tug at our hearts. How do we decide where to put American troops at risk?

I believe that the American people support the use of troops overseas for very specific purposes only, to honor our treaties, to protect the lives of Americans overseas, to defend our country, and to protect our national security and interests.

This brings us to the third part of President Clinton's argument, ''Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and stability is vital to our own national security. That is why we fought two wars in Europe.'' Basically, President Clinton is resurrecting the domino theory for the Balkans.

I ask, what evidence is there for the spread of this war? This civil war has been going on for 3 years, and there is no evidence for its spread. This is not 1914. The situation is totally different. There is no European interest in the Balkans other than the major powers staying out of a confrontation with each other.

Fourth, the President says, ''As NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the

mission.'' Inherent in the President's argument is the rationalization that the United States has an obligation to assist its NATO allies whose troops are already on the ground. I think this is dubious reasoning.

In the first place, the United States has no NATO treaty commitments to policing a civil war in the Balkans.

Second, Gen. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, concedes that from a purely military standpoint the West European nations could undertake the Bosnian mission on their own.

Third, going forward with deployment could actually be worse to NATO than the damage of nondeployment. Krauthammer argues that deployment could result in one or two humiliations; first a humiliating retreat, as in the case of Somalia and Lebanon, in which our allies were left high and dry; or, second, we go in and then persist in a thankless, unwinnable, and costly operation that erodes the solidarity of the alliance.

More than 200 U.N. troops have already been killed in Bosnia. U.S. generals warn that there will be casualties. When U.S. body bags start coming home and television interviews American amputees, where will the support be in the United States for NATO?

The motives of the Bosnian accord are morally worthy. Who could not help but want to bring peace to those suffering war victims? Yet, as a political leader and as the Commander in Chief, the President has a responsibility not just to try to do good but also to have undertaken a mission that has a reasonable chance of success. By all reports, enforcing this agreement is going to be a tactical nightmare.

I recently spoke to a United States Senator who served in Vietnam and is just back from a fact-finding mission in Bosnia. He described the mountainous, forested terrain as some of the most difficult to fight in that he is seen. The difficult terrain will negate a lot of the technological advantage that our forces have. Our equipment will be too heavy for most of the roads and bridges. Winter weather conditions will complicate air superiority, and there are an estimated 6 million unmarked land mines.

This map of Bosnia illustrates several areas that are problematic. The red line represents the demilitarized zone. We have several areas here that are worrisome. We have an area, Gorazde, which is primarily Moslem. This is totally surrounded by Serb territory, and yet we have created a corridor in which there supposedly will be no Serbian arms.

Another problem area will be the narrow corridor up by Brcko.

Another area of great concern is the area surrounding Sarajevo controlled by the Serbs, none of whom are happy with this agreement.

The hair-trigger task of separating the warring parties is supposed to take place in the first 30 days, before most of the main occupying force has arrived. Will the U.S. troops play local cop? I ask this question because during the occupation of Haiti a year ago American soldiers had to stand back and watch while thugs beat up local citizens. Will our troops in Bosnia be forced to watch atrocities just outside the DMZ line that they are guarding?

If the participants want peace, why do we need to send an armored division? The answer, of course, is that as Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke has admitted that arms had to be twisted to get the agreement signed by the Bosnians and the Serbs. Recent news reports document that the parties to this agreement are not very happy with the territorial provisions, and as Mr. Krauthammer has said so forcefully, if you are unhappy with the imposed peace, there is nothing like blowing up 241 Marines or killing 18 U.S. Rangers to make your point. Killing Americans is a faster way to victory than killing your traditional enemy.

This brings us to the question: What role should Congress play in the Bosnia problem? Without getting into a long discussion of the constitutional law and the War Powers Act, it is clear that the Founding Fathers were fearful that the executive branch is most interested in war and most prone to it. This is why the Constitution invests the war powers with Congress.

Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, wrote, ''We have already given an example of one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the executive to the legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.'' One obvious advantage Congress brings to the decision whether to participate in these warlike endeavors is that Congress represents the diversity of opinion of the country.

President Lincoln knew the value of diverse opinion and legislative deliberation. He said, ''In a certain sense and to a certain extent, the President is the representative of the people. He is elected by them, as well as Congress is. But can he, in the nature of things, know the wants of the people as well as 300 other men coming from all the various localities of the Nation? If so, where is the propriety of having a Congress?''

Mr. Speaker, the wiser course of action is not to put American troops on the ground. What we should do is lift the arms embargo.

The Secretary of State has said recently that we will arm the Bosnians, if necessary, but we hope it is not necessary. Well, Mr. Speaker, it probably will be necessary, and we will then be viewed as taking sides. We already are not viewed as neutral by the Bosnian Serbs, but we also do not have troops at risk right now.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, while our motives are good, I fear that putting American troops on the ground in the middle of a civil war, where ethnic hatreds run deep, where the technical details of the plan are suspect, where a time-limited cease-fire is likely to resume into full-fledged war once our troops are gone and where there is no clear-cut U.S. interest is just plain wrong. My constituents have told me, ''Stop don't do this. Do not send American troops on a mission they can't win, for reasons we don't understand.''

□ 1845

Vietnam veteran James Smith recently wrote about his son, who was killed in Somalia:

> As my sacrifice was wasted in Vietnam and my son's sacrifice was wasted in Somalia, will there be more wasted sacrifices in Bosnia? This old soldier is not convinced. I cannot support sending troops to Bosnia.

This Congressman has similar concerns. I beg the House leadership to give this Congress the right to vote on a resolution that would stop the deployment of U.S. troops now, and I beg the President to reconsider his decision. It is not too late.

Throughout this debate we will hear many arguments for the need to support our troops. Let me be clear that I share this commitment that every Member of this body has toward the young men and women who will risk their lives to defend our freedoms. This weekend I will be in Bosnia with a congressional delegation, and as a physician who is in the Army reserve medical corps, I will be especially interested in the military medical preparations.

If United States troops do end up in Bosnia, I want to know how to best support them. But let me also be clear, that on the basis of my current knowledge, I believe that we can support our troops best by not sending them to Bosnia. This mission is simply breathing space before the next round in fighting. Congress should do all it can to stop this action. At the end of the day, it is not that Americans cannot tolerate casualties. It is that Americans do not tolerate casualties for nothing.

With that, I would yield to the gentlewoman from Idaho.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I appreciate his good comments, and I look forward to joining the gentleman and some other of the Members in our trip to Bosnia to look at the situation firsthand this weekend. I think that it is so incredibly important to be able to see what our troops are going to be going through and to be able to visit with our troops in Frankfort, not only to encourage our troops, but also to be meeting with the heads of State of the warring factions.

Mr. Speaker, I am of firm belief that the President in this case is not using the constitutional authority given to him and is abusing the power that was given to him by the Constitution. I have asked over and over and over again to have constitutional scholars show me where the President has the authority to commit military troops to the mission that he has in Bosnia. I cannot find anyone who can show me, outside of case law, and very vague

case law, not on point to what the President has declared to be our mission in Bosnia, which is, interestingly enough, not to keep the peace, because there has not been peace there since before the Roman Empire, when the Romans were trying to maintain peace in that area. But we will be enforcing the peace by the President's own words.

Now, you cannot enforce the peace without committing war to enforce peace. That is what war is. That is why we are arming our troops to go to Bosnia.

I have been very pleased to listen to Mr. DORNAN from California on many of his special order speeches as he compares the other commitments by the other NATO nations. I look forward to a colloquy with Mr. DORNAN on the other commitments by the other NATO nations, as well as getting into what the President's authority really is, because this President, I maintain, does not have the authority. He is maintaining his leadership by assertion, not by law, and certainly not by constitutional law.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I would like to followup on the gentlewoman's comments. There is precedent over the past 200 years for the President occasionally doing military exercises, that is, Presidents have sent forces against the Barbary pirates. There have been missions sent out with the various expansions of our country. There are quite a few examples. But it seems to me that there does come a time, and there is a line that needs to be drawn in the definition of what is a police action and what is a very, very significant military action.

When we are putting a division of forces on the ground in the middle of a civil war in the Balkans, when we are talking about 37,000 American troops involved, this is not a small operation. I believe it was clearly the intent of the Founding Fathers that in something of this magnitude, it was inherent in the Constitution, which gives Congress the right to declare war, the dominant position in terms of deciding whether we send American men and women overseas into harm's way.

With that, I will be happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN], a Vietnam veteran, somebody who has spoken eloquently on the role of the military, who may desire to also further enlighten us on the relationship between Congress and the Executive, who has been through some of the vigorous discussions related to the War Powers Act and other things, but who also I think can significantly add to this discussion in terms of some of the technical details and what exactly we are getting into.

Mr. DORNAN. Dr. GANSKE, I appreciate your yielding to me. I enjoyed getting to know you at a dinner in your district and seeing that beautiful great turn-of-the-century house that you live in, and knowing that as a healer of people, you, like all of us here on both sides of the aisle, of every ideological persuasion, are terrified of how quickly this could take a bad turn, not even any worse than the streets of Mogadishu, 19 young men dead, and another 90 carrying wounds, some more severe than others, the rest of their life.

This is a wonderful opportunity, during the first massive change of leadership in the House in 40 years, since I was a 21-year-old pilot in the very first election of my life, this House has been controlled by one ideology and one party, and now we get a shift. We have the Nation's attention, watching the political process, with this majestic C–SPAN broadcast of this, the world's greatest deliberative body, with all due respect to that gorgeous building on the Thames, the mother of parliaments, and we have a chance to educate one another.

Now, if there was someone who fell down in the entrance way, and their lips started to turn blue and they had a heart attack, there is not much I could do except scream for you or Dr. WELDON or Dr. COBURN and say, ''Come here, GREG, what do you do? I will hold people back.''

But let me tell you what you just said. I was only educated about 48 hours ago. My pal JOHN MCCAIN during the Haiti invasion invoked Thomas Jefferson as you just did, starting with our third President in 1801, his very first few months in office, that we can go in some instances, because, look, Jefferson did it.

MCCAIN did it again, our friend JOHN MCCAIN, served here honorably for years, a fine Senator, a western Senator, just south of Idaho down there in Arizona, he said again on Brinkley this weekend, ''Look what Jefferson did with the Barbary pirates.''

That is not only bad history; it is so wrong it is frightening. A scholar with a published book on Presidential war power that anybody can get from the Library of Congress, this one is printed by the University of Kansas in Lawrence, Lewis Fisher, brings me over his book, this scholar from our Congressional Research Service, and gives me a paper that was dated last year, a year and a half ago, in response to Haiti, and MCCAIN and others saying well, Jefferson did this, and it turns out that our friend with his big medallion right up here, Thomas Jefferson, right above the speaker, honored as one of our 23 lawmakers, Jefferson said, ''I can't do anything that is offensive or attacking in nature. I can only respond to an attack on the United States and defend it.''

That is pretty vital interest, an attack. He said, ''I need help on the Barbary pirates.''

The House of Representatives not only passed resolutions; they turned it into public law, and one of them was the very day before Jefferson was inaugurated, in those days, right up through Rossevelt's second term, was March 4, on March 3, 1801, when Haiti, by the way, it was then called Santa Dominique, was exploding in bloodshed, a result of the French reign of terror, had now come to Haiti, where the slaves killed every single European heritage person on the whole island of Hispaniola. That includes what is today called Santa Domingo, the Dominican Republic. While that turmoil is going on, Thomas Jefferson gets a law passed the day before he is sworn in that says in effect, go get the Barbary pirates. Nine more public laws, pushing him as it pushed the single termer that he beat, John Adams, before.

So we have got to get this scholarship, and that is why I asked HELEN, who sat there with you as a freshman on this historic day. On the 53d anniversary of Pearl Harbor, today is the 54th, NEWT GINGRICH told you, Dr. GANSKE of Iowa and HELEN CHENOWETH of Idaho, to read the Federalist Papers.

It made me want to go back and read it. Steve Horn, who has joined us, near me in the Long Beach area of California, did not have to read it, he teaches it. He taught it as a professor for years. Wait until we look tonight briefly at the Federalist Papers again.

HELEN CHENOWETH, would you please read Alexander Hamilton, another father of our country, and see what he says about the limit on our Chief Executive, because kings in England, and queens, declared war at will, how we wanted to take power away from our Chief Executive.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, Mr. DORNAN. I was very pleased to be able to read the Federalist Papers, and I turn to them often, because in Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton did say this: ''The President is to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces as first the general and admiral of the confederacy, while that of the British king extends to declaring war and to raising and regulating fleets and armies, all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the legislature,'' this body, Mr. DORNAN.

Further, Abraham Lincoln, in writing to his law partner in 1837, William Herndon, wrote this. It is very interesting. ''The provisions of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was dictated as I understand it by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to frame the Constitution so that no one should hold

the power of bringing that oppression upon us.''

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. GANSKE, I find that that oppression is being brought upon us by a man who would deem to be king.

Mr. GANSKE. If the gentlewoman would yield, I think this shows the essential wisdom of the Founding Fathers, because they understood that it is a lot easier to get involved in wars than it is to get out of wars. They did not want this power to be concentrated in the hands of one individual. Very specifically during the constitutional debates, they decided to vest that authority in the House of the people, in Congress, and over the years this has slipped, as has been mentioned.

I think, however, there were some very important lessons that all of us learned about 25 years ago, and that was that in order to sustain an overseas military operation or effort, you have to have the American people behind you. They have to be committed. It is like I said before, the American people, if they know that they are fighting for a cause that is justified by U.S. interests or fulfilling treaty commitments, can sustain casualties. We have shown that many times in our Nation's history, with some of the highest casualties ever.

The problem that we have with this current situation is that, quite frankly, the administration has not made the case to the American people that we have an overwhelming national interest in this area or that we have commitments, treaty, contractual commitments, that obligate us to this course of action, or that in the long run, after 6 months, 8 months, a year, when our forces are gone, that it will have made any difference 6 months or a year afterward.

□ 1900

Mr. DORNAN. Somalia.

Mr. GANSKE. Somalia.

Mr. DORNAN. And maybe Haiti next year.

Mr. GANSKE. I think we are seeing a backing away from the current Haiti administration from a commitment that they had made before.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield for a colloquy.

Mr. GANSKE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DORNAN. I am not a lawyer, but I want to ask Professor HORN something, and before a lawyer would say, ah, reductio ad absurdum, sometimes, if you step back and carry something to the absurd, it really clarifies a point.

Suppose, hypothetically, using all the arguments we have heard out of the White House, and some very excellent support that they got over the last couple of days from some of my conservative friends who have thrown up their hands using this phony Vietnam line, you have to support the troops, We all support the troops. I am still wearing my old Ironsides first armored division patch here. Of course, we support the troops. God love them.

But here is my example. Suppose tomorrow President Clinton said, I cannot stand the pictures of any more of these little beautiful black babies dying in Rwanda. We have to go in there with force to protect the distribution of food. And, by the way, Somalia haunts me. I should not have been so weak over 19 deaths. This is a volunteer army, they are paid to take chances. By the way, we hear that. So I am going back into Somalia. And while we are at it, I think I am going to reinforce Haiti. It is starting to get squirrely there. Aristide is starting to disappoint me, Bill Clinton, so I am sending the 10th Mountain Division back into Haiti.

Now, what is the difference, except that he is doing it in five places instead of two? He wants to go back in and reinforce Haiti, send the troops to Bosnia by Christmas, and go to Somalia and Rwanda. And once one person from an Air Force aircraft was on the ground, a loadmaster putting in supplies for the first GI to arrive, we would hear the cry, support the troops.

Is his power, STEVE HORN, utterly unlimited, since there has not been a declared war since 1941 tomorrow, on the 8th? And the one before that was this very day in the Senate on April 7, 1917. Is that it? No more declared wars? Imperial presidency?

Mr. HORN. Well, it is clear the President does not have that power, and only a rogue and a scoundrel would let a President have that power. And that is why Congress has to stand up, debate this one way or the other, and either by a majority vote give the President the authority in a special circumstance or deny the President the authority.

As you suggest, Mr. DORNAN, the bit of support our troops and waving it and saying that supports my policy in X, Y, or Z, is a true refuge for scoundrels and a misuse of the Presidency. And, of course, if it goes too far, and they just run over the Congress, as some Presidents have in the last generation, then I think somebody needs to get out the impeachment resolutions and say, thus, you will not go farther.

It is very clear in the whole history of the United States that unless we are in a defensive mode, where we are attacked and must immediately respond, the President needs to consult the Congress. And as the gentleman suggested, the early precedents are quite clear. President Washington, who had commanded the revolutionary army, and knew, as the first President, that whatever he did was setting precedence for future Presidents, and Jefferson, as the gentleman will recall was his Secretary of State.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right.

Mr. HORN. And Adams, who was deeply involved in carrying on the federalist tradition after Washington, he, of course, was Vice President under Washington.

So when Washington wanted to deal with an Indian tribe situation, which was the case in his time, he went to Congress and Congress gave that authority. That also happened with Adams. And as the gentleman says, when Jefferson got in, he convened his cabinet and listened to the arguments. Some of them wanted to give him more, quote, inherent power. Now, that game has been played by a lot of 20th century Presidents who say I have inherent power to do thus and so because I am either Chief Executive, or, more romantically, I am Commander in Chief. Utter nonsense.

When President Truman tried to do that by seizing the steel mills in Youngstown Sheet and Tube versus Saywer, even his own friends on the court said, no, you cannot do that, Mr. President. As the gentleman will recall, they had a resolution flowing through here in no time to draft strikers into the military at that time. Cooler heads prevailed in the Senate.

Interestingly enough the leader of that was Senator Taft of Ohio, who was very much disliked by labor at that time because he was the author of the Taft-Hartley Act. He said, wait a minute, you just cannot do that. That is improper conduct. Everybody cooled down, due to the Senate's cooling influences, and we went back to business as usual.

It is simply wrong for Presidents to claim inherent power. That is king John at Runnymede, and that is why the barons reigned him in somewhat. Not necessarily for the people of England, but certainly for the barons of England.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. HORN, for the younger people listening, I digress for something rather wonderful. When I got here, in 1977, the British had lent us one of the three surviving copies of the Magna Carta from June 1215 at Runnymede. That is about the time the Serbs started fighting the Ottoman Serbs. Well, a few years later. And it sat in the center of the rotunda from our bicentennial, when I had just won a primary in California, all the way through that year, through our Republican caucuses. And then there were only 19 in my class, and 19 in HENRY HYDE's class before, and we were suffering unfairly. The American people were punishing the Hill for Richard Nixon, and not a single Congressman or Senator had a scintilla of guilt on what came to be called Watergate.

But it sat there through my whole first 6 years. And also, in the old House of Representatives, in Statuary Hall, was Thomas Jefferson's first original draft, where he had erased things so hard, like public property to turn into pursuit of happiness, that he wore out the page and glued in a little strip, like I used to do in grade school, and then rewrote on top of it. And when I would walk over to the Senate, I would pass Thomas Jefferson's original draft, in the center of the old House Chamber, and just run my hand across the top of the plastic case, and within seconds I am looking at the Magna Carta.

When they took it home, they left the gold reproduction that is still in the Rotunda. We are still learning things here about the abuse of power and about the quotes that Mrs. CHENOWETH was just reading to me over here, and we will get to them later, when my hour starts, about our forefathers. We throw that off so flippantly in school, the Founders, and then the Framers. And trying to be politically correct, I always try to throw in an Abigail Adams and the terrific wives that did not get the vote until 1920, but they were weighing in with their opinions, and they were all talking about King George III. Excellent Academy Award movie about him losing his marbles right in front of everybody's eyes. But this is not kingly power.

And, remember, that when all these great thinkers in the beginning of that age of enlightenment, at least there was enlightenment over here and a reign of terror in Paris, they said their concept of a Commander in Chief was George Washington; a self-term-limiting man, two terms, a man who knew his limitations, and who was such a towering person of character, not with the intellectual ability to muse about things like Benjamin Franklin or Thomas Jefferson, but a tall character that presided over the Continental Congress in uniform. He was not puffed up about his uniform. He told people this lends me a little aura of dignity to settle some of these disputes here.

That is who they were thinking of when they talked about Commander in Chief, not this person down there in the White House who thinks he is going to coast this entire year making our life miserable vetoing everything except defense bills. We got him locked on that because of Bosnia.

Mr. HORN. He let that become law without his signature.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right. He thinks he has an escape valve there somehow, so he can whine to other people about things in there that he did not want.

By the way, and then I wan to turn to one of my other colleagues, people say how can he be so cavalier about where the money is coming for this? Not just the men on the ground, and I know I am annoying people I am saying it so much, but I want it in people's heads that I am not an isolationist. I am not echoing Pat Buchanan. I do want to help in Europe, and we are in there with air strikes. That is called air power. Sea power in the Adriatic, more than everybody else in the world combined. Airlift, sealift, fuel, food. I have walked in the hospitals in Zagreb. We are ready for massive casualties. Intelligence is dotting the ''I'' all right. It is 99, 98 percent ours. And we have 500 men and women as a blocking action in Macedonia wearing those Blue Berets. We are involved at great cost.

Put yourself in Clinton's shoes. He did not want $7 billion in that defense appropriations. He started out saying this will cost a billion. A week ago it was 2. Today it is 4. He still thinks he has $3 billion to burn. There is $7 billion in defense appropriations for this 1 year that started October 1 that he does not want there. If he burned up $7 billion in this operation, he is back to where he wanted the defense appropriations bill anyway.

Mr. GANSKE. Reclaiming my time, if the gentleman would allow me, I think the thing that will be on most of our constituents' minds in just a few weeks, unless Congress asserts the authority that it should, and that takes courage from the Congress to do this, as the gentleman from California was saying, but unless Congress at least has a full debate, up or down, should we be there, should we provide funding or not, then we will be. And I think what will be on our constituents' minds 2 or 3 weeks from now are the men and women in a cold, windy, mountainous, dangerous place at Christmas.

And this is a long commitment that we are talking about. The French have recognized the reality of this situation. They have basically said we recognize this is not a short-term proposition. The disputed areas held by the Serbs all around Sarajevo is a situation where the Serbs do not want to leave. We, the French, understand that this could be a 10, 15, 20-year commitment.

Remember the history in this area. A dictator with an iron hand ruled this country for 50 years. Peace was maintained. One might think that in a 50-year period of enforced peace that the various ethnic factions could begin to put aside their traditional centuries-old hatreds. And yet, as soon as that discipline was gone, we were back to a civil war.

Mr. DORNAN. If the gentleman would yield for a second, can I show him something about these hatreds that is very upsetting? And I called to California to ask 1 of my 10 grandchildren to watch, because you do not have to meet one of my grandchildren, named Kevin Griffin, to know what he looks like. Here is his picture in both Time and in Newsweek, and taken by different photographers, I might add.

Because these cameras will not zoom in this year, we will change that next year, I am going to pass these to Mrs. CHENOWETH. This is my grandson in San Juan Capistrano, Kevin Griffin, and he is a refugee, a Moslem refugee from Srebrenica that fled to Tuzla, where we will be. They look at our American GIs that arrived there the other day to a welcome, the 1st Armored Division, and they want to just touch the Americans.

Now, look at that blond haired, blue-eyed boy. And I am not giving any preferences, because I have Robert K. Dornan, III, here in Virginia, who is one-quarter Croatian with huge brown eyes. He is going to get a great tan and has dark hair. I have grandkids of all sizes and shapes, and 5 females and 5 males and a fifth female on the way, number 10, I think. I am asking my son not to tell me. But, of course, the hatreds are there and they are so intermarried for 600 years that if I look at somebody and I say, well, this guy has red hair, what, is he Irish? And they say, oh, he is a Moslem. No, sorry, he is Croatian. No, that is right, he is Serbian. And they are all killing one another based on traditions that are pathetic.

I just got informed by our chief of everything here, Ron Lasch, that I had the misimpression that I have an hour coming up.

□ 1915

The gentleman took our second hour, and he has got about 15 minutes left, and then I can take a 5. The gentleman from California already had his 5, but HELEN can take a 5, and that is about it.

I do have something newsworthy and earthshaking. This morning I got a call from a friend in New York. They said the National Review magazine, dated Christmas Day, that goes in the mail because it is fortnightly, tomorrow has an article from an eyewitness at Dayton that will absolutely boggle your mind. It is called ''Yalta in the Balkans.''

He says there was a secret deal. This is starting to leak out now. I do not believe Mr. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, knew. I think he was kept out of the loop by his number 2, Strobe Talbott, whose foreign policy has always been Soviets first, and now Russia first. He is fluent in Russian. Translated Khrushchev's memoirs when he was at Oxford with Clinton. He did the translating for this secret deal. The deal is: Poland go to hell; and Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, you will not be in an expanded NATO.

Let me read some of this, because I think this is really hot, newsworthy stuff. I have taken it over to the Senators. My pal, BOB DOLE, is in turmoil over there, because he is trying to drive the policy to make sure we arm the victims who have had all of those atrocities committed.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to put it in the RECORD. I will end the opening paragraphs, one gusty one at the close, then we will talk about it. Peter W. Rodman, a former national security adviser to both presidents Bush and to President Reagan.

One of the better arguments for the Dayton Accords and the dispatching of U.S. troops to Bosnia was that putting the Bosnian conflict on ice would serve larger American strategic interests. One such interest was the future of the Western alliance. We are being browbeaten with this.

The prolongation of the Bosnia war and the squabbles among allies were poisonous to the Alliance itself, and the resulting incoherence of policy was poisonous to NATO's credibility. A second key strategic was the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe and the prolongation of this Bosnian war was complicating this.''

During the climactic NATO bombing operations in September, starting in August, Boris Yeltsin gave a tempestuous news conference in which he conflated the two issues,

blustering that an enlarged NATO would soon be dropping bombs on Russia's doorstep. The Dayton accords offer us a chance, in other words, to put all of this behind us and to refocus our European policy on larger concerns.

The next three paragraphs are priceless, but in the interest of time, I will put them in the RECORD. It says this:

As usual, the administration has its strategic priorities totally bass-backwards. This guy is writing tough street words. It is wrong to pay a price to Russia over Bosnia in the strategic coin of our larger interest in consolidating security in Central Europe. It is wrong to sacrifice NATO enlargement to the Russians over Bosnia or anything else.

The administration's repeated assurances to Congress, and to the allies, that Russia would not have a veto over NATO enlargement turned out to be empty. Perhaps is just another of the ''terminological inexactitudes,'' that is the Clinton administration dialogue, that have become so familiar. A huge price will ultimately be paid for this.

There is no current threat to Central Europe. The newly liberated states of the region, however, have just recently awakened from a 60-year nightmare. Still find themselves situated between Germany and Russia, and know in their bones that their survival is not guaranteed by history. They consider themselves part of the West culturally, politically, and morally and, therefore, seek Western assurances that we feel a stake in their security and independence.

Seen in this light, NATO enlargement is not a new act, but a consolidation of the post-1989 status quo. They are free. This is Poland, Hungary, et al., sovereign countries exercising their free sovereign choice to associate with us. Either Russia accepts this, or does not.

Three more great paragraphs in the RECORD. Call your Congressman and ask for it.

Mr. Speaker, here is the punch line. By fear of antagonizing Russia, bad faith, whatever the short-term plot is for putting Bosnia on ice, in Central Europe we are seeing a strategic blunder of historic proportions.

Mr. Speaker, this is the hidden deal at Dayton, OH.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following article for inclusion in the RECORD.

[From the National Review, Dec. 25, 1995]

YALTA IN THE BALKANS

(By Peter W. Rodman)

WASHINGTON, DC.—One of the better arguments for the Dayton Accords and the dispatching of U.S. troops to Bosnia was that putting the Bosnia conflict on ice would serve larger American strategic interests. One such interest was the future of the Western alliance: the prolongation of the Bosnia war and the squabbles among the Allies were poisonous to the Alliance itself, and the resulting incoherence of Western policy was poisonous to NATO's credibility. A second key strategic interest was the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe, and prolongation of the Bosnia war was also complicating this (During the climatic NATO bombing operations in September, Boris Yeltsin gave a tempestuous news conference in which he conflated the two issues, blustering that an enlarged NATO would soon be dropping bombs on Russia's doorstep.) The Dayton Accords offer us a chance, in other words, to put all this behind us and to re-focus our European policy on our larger concerns.

These arguments for Dayton still hold, but National Review has learned of a stunningly duplicitous turn in the Clinton Administration's policy toward Russia, Bosnia, and the Atlantic Alliance: The President and his associates are reported to have given Moscow secret assurances that, in return for its cooperation with the U.S. in Bosnia peacekeeping, NATO enlargement will be put ''on the back burner'' for the foreseeable future. The rationale was that, given this demonstration of Russia's readiness to be a partner in a new cooperative ''European security architecture,'' the extension of NATO security guarantees to Central Europe would not be a priority any time soon. This account comes from official and authoritative sources, both Russian and American.

It has long been understood (indeed, admitted by some Administration officials) that concrete decisions on admitting new NATO members would be put off until after the Russian elections, especially the presidential election scheduled for June 1996—which meant, as a practical matter, until after the U.S. presidential election as well. Russian officials interpret the new assurances to mean that if Mr. Clinton is re-elected, nothing will happen on NATO enlargement in his second term either.

The story is accompanied by reports of other assurances to the Russians that their cooperation on Bosnia would put the United States in their debt and earn them greater American understanding on other issues, such as their reassertion of control in their ''near abroad'' (Central Asia and the Caucasus, including the oil-rich Caspian basin).

As usual, this Administration has its strategic priorities totally bass-ackwards. It is wrong to pay a price to Russia over Bosnia in the strategic coin of our larger interest in consolidating security in Central Europe. It is wrong to sacrifice NATO enlargement to the Russians over Bosnia or over anything else. The Administration's repeated assurances to Congress and to the Allies that Russia would not have a veto over NATO enlargement turn out to be empty—perhaps just another of the ''terminological inexactitudes'' that have become so familiar. A huge price will ultimately be paid for this.

There is no current threat to Central Europe. The newly liberated states of the region, however, have just recently awakened from a 60-year nightmare, still find themselves situated between Germany and Russia, and know in their bones that their survival is not guaranteed by history. They consider themselves part of the West culturally, politically, and morally; they therefore seek Western assurances that we feel a stake in their security and independence. Seen in this light, NATO enlargement is not a new act, but a consolidation of the post-1989 status quo: they are free, sovereign countries exercising their free, sovereign choice to associate with us. Either Russia accepts this, or it does not.

Leaving the security status of Central Europe ambiguous only leaves open temptations to Russian irredentists. NATO membership for Central Europe is among other things a way of telling the Russians that their acceptance of the post-1989 status quo in Central Europe is the sine qua non of any relationship with us. If the Russians have a problem with this—which they clearly seem to have—then we are all facing a major problem five or ten years down the road as Russia regains its strength.

The Administration's rationale for delaying NATO enlargement has been twofold. One is the claim that it will be easier to achieve such enlargement if we go about it gradually. But the nationalist turn in Russian politics, expected to be given new impetus by the December elections for the Duma, tells us that it will not get any easier. Russia is only getting stronger and more assertive; every month, the risks and inhibitions on our side will only grow. The Administration's second rationale (at least, so I suspect) is what philosophy majors will remember as Zeno's Paradox: the idea that if you divide a distance into an infinite number of tiny increments, you never get to the destination. This may be the Administration's real calculation. In other words, it just doesn't want to enlarge NATO—for fear of antagonizing Moscow. The first rationale is bad judgment; the second is bad faith.

Whatever the short-term plaudits due to the Administration for putting the Bosnia conflict on ice, in Central Europe we are seeing a strategic blunder of historic proportions.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time for a moment, I think the gentleman has pointed out, as I did in my initial statement, that possibly the worst thing that could happen from our getting more involved is that we now have increased the proximity to some significant interactions with the Russians.

The United States troops will be positions in this area right here, very close to the Russian troops that will be in this area. Mrs. CHENOWETH and I will be looking at this area this weekend. But, remember, General Clark informed us in a briefing that approximately one-third of NATO forces will be tied up in this endeavor.

Now, there is a great deal of unrest in Russia. What happens if later this year there is a significant turnover in power and then we have a problem not in the Balkans, but in the Baltics, and we have this type of commitment? I mean, it is a matter of weighing some real significant options.

Mr. Speaker, with that, I would yield to the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. CHENOWETH].

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Speaker, it is very interesting as we stop and think about the tests that we have been talking about, that the President, as Commander in Chief, simply has not passed. And one of those major tests is what I call the mother's test.

I guess my major claim to fame is the fact that I am a mother. I am a mother of a military man who would respond to the command of his Commander in Chief, because that is the way he has been raised. But my heart breaks to think of mothers across this Nation having to let their sons and daughters go because of a President who does not understand what his role is and the role of the military, his responsibility as Commander in Chief; because, since the beginning of civilization, mothers have been willing to send their sons off to war to protect the interests of the country or the tribe or the community, to preserve the peace and tranquility of their existence, to make sure that freedom and liberty will reign for their future generation. That silent mother's test.

But he has failed the mother's test. He has even failed the test of his own Secretary of State, who back in 1992 stated that we will commit troops only upon the following four criteria: No 1,

is he said if the mission is clearly defined; No. 2, would be if the people in this country are behind the mission; No. 3, is if there was a very clear and reasonable chance for success; and No. 4 is if there is a good, strong exit strategy. All four of those the President fails on.

And probably, Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman, the biggest failure is what will this do to the spirit of the military? The spirit of the military has been captured by a speech given by General MacArthur. I would like to quote just a paragraph from a great general who really understood warfare, understood how necessary it was for the general to take responsibility for his troops in the field.

On May 12, 1962, in his speech, ''Duty, Honor, and Country,'' General MacArthur said, ''And through all of this,'' he said this to the graduates at West Point, he said:

> And through all of this welter of change and development that you will face, your mission remains fixed, determined, and it is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but a corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment, but profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, and that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed.

What are we setting our troops up for? Are we disspiriting our troops? Are we putting ourselves on a slippery slope, like we did in Vietnam, where we never have recovered economically, like the post-Vietnam wars? And the spirit of America took a hit that we were not even able to begin to recover until we had a President like Ronald Reagan who could really again show us how we could go in and win with the likes of Colin Powell and Dick Cheney.

Mr. GANSKE. I thank the gentlewoman, and I am sure your phone calls have been the same as mine: overwhelmingly against this. The public does not understand the reason that we should be there, and my phone calls are 8 or 9 to 1 against this. Time and time again, people are phoning saying, do not do this. We do not understand. We think you will not accomplish anything of significance.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HORN. Well, Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman, we have exactly the same experience, and I know a lot of our Democratic friends had that experience. The other day one representative, when asked how many letters do you get on this subject and what are they saying, she said all of them are against, 100 percent; not even one or two out of 100 supporting it. And I think the wisdom of the people in this case is right on the mark. People are not stupid. They know where our national interests ought to lie.

No one has convinced us that American lives are at stake, even though Bosnia is one of the most tragic situations in the world. So was Cambodia, so were a number of places, so are those places right now in Asia and the Mideast and Africa. But we cannot be, as I said earlier today, super cop to the world, and that is sort of what we are getting ourselves into.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield for a minute, there is an option. The option is something that Senator DOLE, for instance, recommended a couple of years ago, and that was make for a level playing field. Lift the arms embargo. Allow the various factions to have a level playing field and to settle their own civil war with the same type of support that we have done in the past, logistical and air, and yet not interpose ourselves into the middle of essentially a civil war.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, one of our most successful operations, as the gentleman knows, happened under the Carter administration. It is ironic that many of the advisers of President Carter also are advising this administration. But what they did that was successful, they began the effort to provide arms to the Afghan Mujaheddin, and through Pakistan they did just that as really a covert operation without using American troops, and they were able to have sufficient arms go in that the world's second strongest superpower was driven out of Afghanistan where it never should have been in the first place.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, let me summarize, and I thank my colleagues for joining me in this colloquy. I believe that this mission is primarily going to involve a breathing space for the warring parties. They need to rearm. They will do that on a brief enforced peace.

I think at the end of the day it is not that America cannot tolerate casualties; it is that Americans just do not tolerate casualties unless they can see a real purpose.

UPDATE ON BOSNIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. SEASTRAND). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. Madam Speaker, I have got to collapse a 60-minute special order into 5 minutes, but that is all right. I am signed up for some next week.

Let me give you an update on what is happening with our leadership getting a vote before the 1st Armored Division officers and men arrive in the dead of winter in a very, the most dangerous area of Bosnia where most of the fighting has been going on, unit-to-unit, man-to-man combat. And a few women.

We see the terrible destruction of Sarajevo because of some cleverly hidden cameras and some of the people with the guts to come in from the Sarajevo airport to film that rocket fire at night, with huge shells slamming into modern Holiday Inn buildings. I mean actual Holiday Inn franchise buildings set up for the Olympics.

We saw the horrible killing and the marketplace explosions in Sarajevo, but the last nightmarish killing of innocent men, women, and children during what they thought was a breather, and God knows who fired the mortars, but the suspicion is that it came from the Bosnian Serb side. That was in Tuzla.

□ 1930

We are going into Tuzla. That is where most of the mines are around in the hills along with the hills surrounding Sarajevo. And I want to do everything I can to get another vote here.

Here is what I have been promised. I want to thank our conference chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BOEHNER], and the gentleman from California [Mr. COX], the policy leader on this side. I have been told I will get at 9:30 Wednesday morning, there is not going to be any votes until late Tuesday night, I want a full-court 235 healthy men and women in my conference, if that is possible on Wednesday morning, the so-called peace accords are going to be signed on December 14, the next day, I want on Wednesday, today is Pearl Harbor day, the 13th, Wednesday the 13th, 9:30, I am going to ask for a vote not to table my words and we can perfect my words, if this does not satisfy, not to put this off to the policy committee.

My words, which I have not read since two nights ago are, Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal fund shall be appropriated or otherwise available for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation or as part of any implementation force.

Now, the 30 or so, more conservative Senators in the other great body said that if they even tried to bring this up, it would never be allowed on the floor. Their words are simpler, and this a rough draft, that the Congress, House and Senate, opposes the deployment of United States ground forces into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its associated annexes.

I and other Members have pleaded with them not to have a section 2. Section 2 is insulting. They even indicate we might not support our forces, including all the aforementioned support forces, by the thousands and millions of dollars that are already functioning there to try and keep these people educated, intelligent, cultured people, from slaughtering and raping one another. But several of the Senators want this, that the Congress strongly supports the United States Armed Forces who may be ordered by the President to implement the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and