

## EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

### DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

HON. NEWT GINGRICH

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 12, 1995

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, as we consider the President's decision to deploy United States military forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I hope that my colleagues take a moment to read the following editorials. Now is the time to ask some very hard questions about the President's policy, and I believe that these points of view are instructive in reminding us of the difficulty of this issue.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1995]

THINK HAITI AND BE REALISTIC ON BOSNIA  
(By Thomas L. Friedman)

WASHINGTON.—Just a couple of months ago when you asked Administration officials exactly how the Bosnia peacekeeping operation would unfold, they would answer: "Think Haiti"—we go in big, stabilize the situation on the ground, bring in civilian reconstruction teams, hold elections and we're out of there in a year.

Well think again, Haiti is no longer being touted as the model for Bosnia, because the U.S.-led effort to restore democracy in Haiti is deteriorating. As we go into Bosnia we should still "Think Haiti"—but as a cautionary tale about the limits of American power to remake a country. The U.S. military accomplished its objectives in Haiti—busting the old regime and restoring basic security. But the political, economic and police objectives, which accompanied that military mission, are all in jeopardy today.

American officials were convinced when they restored Haiti's President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power that he really had abandoned his populist, radical impulses. But several weeks ago he suggested that he would not give up power after elections for a new President on Dec. 17. Then he told U.S. officials he would. Then he told his followers: If you want three more years I will not turn my back on you." Thursday, he said he really, really will step down. In the meantime, though, the other candidates have been afraid to campaign, because it seemed Mr. Aristide might stay on, and the main opposition parties were already boycotting because of complaints that the election process is not impartial.

U.S. officials always said in Haiti that prosperity would be the ultimate peacekeeper. But foreign investors have been reluctant to come in and President Aristide has hesitated to institute the privatization reforms demanded by the I.M.F., so his Government has not received the \$125 million in foreign aid for this fiscal year, which is half its budget. The number of boat people fleeing Haiti for Florida is again on the rise.

The military plan in Haiti was for the U.S.-U.N. peacekeepers to hand over control to a newly created, uncorrupted Haitian police force on Feb. 29. Some of those new police have been trained, and put through U.S. human rights courses. Others have not. On Thanksgiving Day one of these new policemen went on a shooting spree that triggered massive rioting in Haiti's Cite Soleil slum. Few police have dared venture there since.

"It is obvious that the Administration would like to tiptoe away from Haiti, declaring it a success, but unless our objectives in the areas of elections, police and economics are more fully achieved, the effort of the international community could easily unravel," said Robert Pastor, President Carter's adviser on Haiti during Mr. Carter's mediation there. "Without a concerted effort to bring the opposition into the presidential elections, the outcome will not be stable or legitimate."

The ultimate lesson of Haiti is not that we should stay out of Bosnia. President Clinton did the right thing in Haiti—trying to restore democracy. Haiti is a better, more secure place today because of that. No, the real lesson of Haiti is a humility. Haiti reminds us that with enough troops and money, we can make some difference for the better. But even that limited improvement is easily eroded or overwhelmed by the habits of generations, unless some foreign peacekeepers, international organizations and aid workers are prepared to stay on the job for a long, long time. Bosnia will be no different.

I phoned Lakhdar Brahimi, who heads U.N. operations in Haiti, and asked him what he's learned there that might be of use in Bosnia. He captured neatly the humbling, ambiguous reality of trying to rebuild failed states. He said: "Look, Haiti is a country with 200 years of horrible history. It would be totally naive to think you can put it right with 20,000 troops in a year. With operations like Haiti [and Bosnia], the international community is embarking on something completely new for itself, and for which it does not yet have all the skills. It isn't even sure what it wants and certainly doesn't have all the money it needs to do it. So we take a country by the hand and accompany it a little bit, while it tries to stand on its own two feet. We don't do it perfectly, but it's still useful, even if it doesn't create paradise. But no one should kid themselves. It's a constant uphill struggle."

[From the Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 3, 1995]

A PAGE FROM HISTORY

(By Bradford Smith)

American troops are preparing to impose a peace settlement in Bosnia that appears to have arisen largely from the fatigue of the negotiators in Dayton. History and the posture of the Serbs in Sarajevo make it doubtful that this latest agreement will lead to "peace in our time." But how much history can we expect the negotiators to remember after pulling an all-nighter?

Bosnians nearly always have played the pawn in the political games in the Balkans. When was Bosnia last an independent state? For that, we have to look back to the 14th century. Even then, Bosnia was a divided country. In the north, the Kotroman family held sway. In the south, the Subic family ruled. In 1305, the Subic family emerged as the dominant power, but Stjepan Kotromanic seized control with a little help from Hungary—the local "superpower"—and the Serbs. The modern outlines of Bosnia resulted from his conquests.

After Kotromanic's death in 1353, Bosnia fell apart, as local nobles attempted to gain autonomy. Several provinces broke away from the Bosnian state, again with Hungarian assistance. The centers of discontent

were the region around Banja Luka and Herzegovina. The political divisions of Bosnia then conformed to the current lines of conflict.

One thing seems clear: Foreign intervention has been more likely to produce disorder than concord. Hungarian involvement consistently prevented the restoration of equilibrium. This was also true in the 1920s, when Comintern and the Italian Fascists exploited the ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs, leading to chaos, terrorism and assassination.

Given that so many leaders have vowed not to respect the Dayton peace agreement, should we expect a new show of force to convince them otherwise? Is there any lack of foreign interest groups that could further their own agenda by giving aid and comfort to the Serbs?

The rulers of 14th-century Hungary always claimed that they were intervening in Bosnia to support oppressed Catholics from Bosnian heretics. Likewise, our intervention is justified by the ideals of "democracy" and "self-determination."

Bill Clinton is, in fact, merely continuing the policies of his two predecessors, who were trying to undo the legacy of the Cold War. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev long ago stated that as the Soviets supported "wars of national liberation," the United States would be forced to support dictators, on the pretext that they were anti-communist.

The result of that policy was our support for a host of petty tyrants, all of whom eventually caused us much embarrassment. And ultimately we lost in Iran, Nicaragua, Vietnam and nearly everywhere else we got involved. But with Ronald Reagan a turn began when U.S. military force was used to support "freedom fighters."

The invasion of Grenada was our first attempt to "impose" democracy, and the success of that little engagement led to other glorious wars. An episode in Panama and the specter of Manuel Noriega before the Inquisitor bailed out the War on Drugs, preparing Americans for a descent on the Middle East to liberate the oil barons of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. Soon we had Bob Hope shows and all those things we associated with good wars.

Clinton is merely trying to keep up the pace. Unfortunately, the situation in Bosnia is too ambiguous to provide the basis for a Crusade. Additional U.S. involvement is more likely to upset the balance of power even further. Unless the new Bosnian state can develop its own internal equilibrium, it cannot survive.

The United States must play a role in the negotiating process, but Clinton could find better venues for a military action to redeem his political career.

How about the Bahamas?

### WELCOMING THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, SHIMON PERES

HON. LOUIS STOKES

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 12, 1995

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, today marks a historic occasion in the halls of Congress. I

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