the President to waive the funding restrictions if he determined United States citizens were being held as prisoners of war in Cambodia by North Vietnam or the Viet Cong. This amendment failed. Believe it or not, the amendment limited to 5 or 6, and Cooper-Church passed, but only after troop withdrawal had begun.

Mr. President, while I understand opposition to and disagreement with the President's decision to send American ground forces to Bosnia, I believe that action to cut off funds for this deployment is wrong. It is wrong because it makes our brave young men and women bear the brunt of a decision not made by them, but by the Commander in Chief.

I will vote against H.R. 2606, sponsored by Representative Hefley, which was passed by the House last month. H.R. 2606 prohibits any use of Department of Defense funds for deployment of United States Armed Forces on the ground in Bosnia or on the way or already on the ground in Bosnia. I do not believe we should limit the funds for food, supplies, and ammunition for our troops. It was wrong during Vietnam, and it is wrong now.

I believe that passing the Hefley resolution would undermine our troops, as well as our credibility. I believe that even at this late date, the Congress can play a constructive role—supporting the troops by enhancing their prospects for a timely and safe withdrawal, and ensuring that there is a military balance upon the departure of our forces.

President Clinton does not have an exit strategy for our troops. Let us be clear, an exit strategy is not an exit strategy. In my view, it would be irresponsible to send thousands of American forces in without a concrete plan to bring them out. We will be debating that at a later time.

Furthermore, we need to do what we can to make certain that the sacrifices being made now—by our men and women in uniform, by the U.S. taxpayer—are not for nought. It would be inexcusable to undertake this immense endeavor, only to leave Bosnia a year later in the same situation it is in now—virtually defenseless and at the mercy of its bigger and stronger neighbors.

Later today, we will have an opportunity to vote on the Hutchinson-Inhofe and Dole-McCain resolutions. Now, we should speak decisively in support of our troops and defeat H.R. 2606.

This is not the way to go—cutting off funds. As I have said, in all the debates that I have engaged in, none of these are records of major votes between 1969 and 1973. It never seemed appropriate for me, when you had young men like John McCain, a prisoner of war, that we would cut off funds in the U.S. Congress, and I still have that same attitude today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on H.R. 2606. The question is: Shall the bill pass?

The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The motion to lay that bill on the table was rejected. The bill (H.R. 2606) was rejected.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate that we now have had our first vote. We would like to complete action on this concurrent resolution sponsored by Senators Hutchison, Nickles, and others and then have that vote very quickly if we can. I know a lot of people want to talk, but I think it is general debate. We would also like to have the debate on my joint resolution with the Dole-McCain joint resolution, sometime, hopefully by 6 o'clock this evening. So that gives us about 5 hours of debate. We have already had a number of Members, I would say about 20 Members, each requesting from 15 minutes to 90 minutes.

Now, we are not going to be able to accommodate everybody, or I hope they can accommodate us, and I hope we can, as much as we can, keep our time limited to 5 or 6 o'clock, because if I just add up these requests, this will take us beyond 6 o'clock, probably 7 or 8 o'clock. And I would say as the Republican leader, we are trying to accommodate the President of the United States. So, hopefully, we will have cooperation on both sides. I think the Senator from Texas would like to have a vote about what, mid-afternoon, on her concurrent resolution.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, yes, I would like to vote as early as we can. I think most people are speaking in general terms so I think midafternoon. And then I would like to see the floor opened up for these resolutions. I hope, though, that we could accommodate all Senators who wish to speak by shortening the length of our statements to the extent that it is practical to do so. Obviously, we will have more opportunities once the resolution passes to come to the floor and continue this exchange and to continue to express ourselves.

But if we are going to allow every Senator an opportunity to speak, for that reason, and because the Senate is moving on to other legislation, we will be somewhat limited in the time allotted for each Senator. So I hope everyone will bear that in mind and cooperate to the extent it is possible so that we can have a vote at the earliest possible time.

I yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, we need to get an unanimous consent on the next sequence of speakers. I wish to do that so that people know how to plan their afternoon.

This is the second list after the one that was agreed to earlier, and it would include Senator DeWine, then Feinstein, then Lott, then Biden, then

EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

The Senate continued with the consideration of the concurrent resolution. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 35, offered by the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison.

Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate resume consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 35 and be in order for this Senate to offer the Senate joint resolution and that no amendments or motions to commit be in order to either vehicle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate that we now have had our first vote. We would like to complete action on this concurrent resolution sponsored by Senators Hutchison, Nickles, and others and then have that vote very quickly if we can. I know a lot of people want to talk, but I think it is general debate. We would also like to have the debate on my joint resolution with the Dole-McCain joint resolution, sometime, hopefully by 6 o’clock this evening. So that gives us about 5 hours of debate. We have already had a number of Members, I would say about 20 Members, each requesting from 15 minutes to 90 minutes.

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ASHCROFT, KOHL, HATFIELD, LEVIN, INHOFE, BYRD, FAIRCLOTH, WELLSTONE, D'AMATO, MURRAY, LEAHY, SIMON, BRADLEY, and NUNN, and there will be Republicans between Murray, LEAHY, SIMON, BRADLEY, and NUNN. Senator MURRAY should be after Senator BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that we put that order in place so that people can begin to plan. And I urge, but do not ask for unanimous consent, that people hold their remarks to 5 minutes so that everyone will have a chance, with the vote in the middle, to vote around midnight on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution and then around 5 on the Dole-McCain resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection? The Chair hears none, and the additional Senators will be added to the list.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair. Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. EXON] is recognized.

Mr. President, for the past few weeks, military and civilian officials from the administration have come to Congress to discuss the case at hand. United States ground troops must be a central part of the international peacekeeping force that will go to Bosnia following the formal signing of the Dayton peace accord this Thursday in Paris. Congress does have with that final judgment on the advisability of this action, and I have kept an open mind to arguments on both sides of the debate. I listened closely to President Clinton's national address on Bosnia and have discussed, in both public and private forum, some of my concerns with members of his cabinet and top military advisers. In addition, I have sought and received the advice of my constituents in Nebraska, many of whom are members of the Armed Forces or have relatives in the services.

I have been impressed by the bipartisan leadership on this issue by Majority Leader BOB DOLE and Senator McCaIN. I support their bipartisan amendment.

The facts are that the President has exercised his constitutional authority to dispatch troops to Bosnia. What we do by vote here today does not start nor can it stop troop deployment. It's a done deal whether we like it or not. I have been1 preoccupied on the question of blessing or condemning the deployment of American peacekeepers in Bosnia. I believe there is no more solemn an action the President can take or we as Senators can take or vote to endorse the process. The deployment of American men and women overseas into a potentially harmful environment even though it is advisory, is a legislative action that requires particular care and a need for thoughtful introspection that is typically not required in the conduct of our day business. Let no one be under any allusions, the collective voice of Congress on the issue of troops to Bosnia along with the President's decision as our Commander in Chief will have great historic significance, affecting not only the short-term prospect of peace in the Balkans but also the long-term role of America in NATO and as a world power.

Some seem to believe that some of us who have served our country in the past by being placed in harm's way have some special insight or superior wisdom or license to be holier than thou in these decisions. Our wartime experience provides us with just that—experience—but not necessarily a privileged status in reasoned decision-making because of our past valor.

While the perils of participation in the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia are unquestionable, I believe a reasonable case has been made for the deployment of American troops there.

Once the three parties sign the peace agreement in Paris on Thursday, for me, the debate boils down to this central question: By risking the safety of American troops in the next year do we avoid an even greater threat to our national security interests and possible loss of life in the future? That is a judgment call. There is no certainty. The question is: Will this stitch in time save nine?

If the United States was to renounce on its promise by its President and constitutional Commander in Chief to join 27 other nations in the NATO-led peacekeeping force, I am concerned the consequences would be dramatic in provoking the immediate unraveling of peace and the furtherance of our security interests. If the United States does not follow through with its commitment to provide one-third of the Bosnian peacekeeping force, it would be the end of American leadership in NATO, and likely the end of NATO itself. NATO has been a stabilizing force for peace for 50 years. To pull the rug out from under it now at a time when the peace process is fragile and on the verge of ending 3-year war filled with ethnic cleansing, rape, mass executions, and torture would be unconscionable. To scuttle the agreement now would throw the region back into the horrific morass of war, guaranteeing more civilian deaths, more refugees, more instability in Europe, and the very distinct possibility that the fighting will spread and soon ensnare other bordering nations, allies of the United States, to armed conflict with one another. Opponents of the President's policy are fond of delving into history to discuss centuries old animosities that exist between the warring factions in Bosnia. Let us not compound the lessons of World War I and what happened when one regional ethnic conflict, left unchecked, draws in other nations, which in turn brings still other nations to arms. European incubation of World War I and World War II eventually cost nearly 522,000 American lives and 875,000 military casualties. Whether or not we like it, it is clear what happens in Europe does affect us.
lose scores of men and women each year due to training mishaps and other duty-related accidents. Life in the Armed Forces is inherently dangerous. Like law enforcement and firefighting, they are professionals. The profession of soldiers is also a voluntary one, filled with uncertainty and peril. That is the history of service to the United States of America. There are no guarantees about what will happen in Bosnia in the next 12 months. With or without congressional authorization, the President, as our Nation’s Commander in Chief, has the constitutional authority to commit troops to the multinational operation in Bosnia. He has done that.

Over the past 3 years a large number of Senators have taken to this floor and given an even greater number of speeches deploiring the bloodshed in Bosnia and the desperate need to do something—anything—to end the fighting, end the ethnic cleansing, end the raping, end the mass executions. Now, after years of handwringing, a window of opportunity has presented itself to see that the ceasefire becomes a peace and that the peace, in turn, can mature into peacekeeping. I urge strongly, disagree with the President’s decision to deploy U.S. troops there. It was the wrong decision. And it is that decision that I will address in the next few moments.

However, before I do, I want to make it as clear as possible that I am 100 percent behind our troops now that the commitment has been made and the process has begun to deploy them. I support the President’s efforts in every way possible. I will work to see that their mission is a narrow one, that the exit strategy is clearly defined, and that they return home as quickly and safely as possible.

There are several unsettling aspects of the President’s plan to send troops to Bosnia. They are questions that, in other circumstances, would have been asked and answered during open and public congressional debate. Unfortunately, that debate has effectively been denied to the American people by the President’s unilateral action in committing American troops to foreign soil. But I still think it is important to ask these questions because, perhaps if they are asked this time, then next time they will be answered before we take action.

The first question: Is this action in the vital national interest of the United States? Vital national interests can be clearly and specifically defined. They include defense of U.S. territory, support of allies who are threatened, support of treaty obligations, or protection of economic interests, international waters or U.S. citizens in operations abroad. In other words, Mr. President, vital national interests are the interests clearly worth fighting and dying for.

I listened to much of the debate yesterday and today and heard many of my colleagues address this very issue. Time and time again, the debate returned to the question of whether our reasons for being in Bosnia would satisfy the mother or the father whose son or daughter is killed there and who turns to us directly and asks, “Why?” Time and again, they have failed to hear a satisfactory answer. Some say because our credibility is at stake. But is it truly our credibility or perhaps NATO’s credibility? Mr. President, I believe the two may be very different, particularly in a post-cold-war world.

Others say, because without us there will be no peace. But where have we been for the last 3 years, and do we really believe that we can create peace for people who do not want it? Do we really believe that our presence for 12 months—for 1 year—will suddenly make the warring factions who have been at it for nearly 500 years suddenly forget what they and their ancestors have been fighting for and live as neighbors peacefully? I do not believe so.

Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia, no matter how tragic, does not equate to a vital national interest.

A second question: What is Congress’ role under the Constitution in the determination to send combat troops into a conflict such as the one we face in Bosnia?

Certainly the President has the authority to deploy forces in situations where vital national interests are threatened. But committing 20,000 American troops to hostile territory in an action where no vital U.S. interest is at stake, where there is no clearly defined goal or mission, where the facts have been changing for centuries, where the situation, since the initializing of the peace agreement, has clearly deteriorated and where casualties, by the administration’s own admission, are certain, in my view, necessitates a full and fair discussion between the executive branch and Congress. We owe that to the American people and particularly to the American service men and women.

The need for an open debate on this matter is further highlighted when we focus on the peace accord that was reached in Dayton. There are real questions as to whether a bifurcated Bosnian state will survive or, more importantly, whether two separate political entities can function as one country without the constant presence of troops to keep the peace.

Even if the Bosnian conflict did involve the vital interests of the United States, I am concerned that the underlying peace agreement is fundamentally flawed. Already we have seen towns burned, American flags burned, and demonstrations against the Dayton accord because this is a forced peace. And, Mr. President, the fact of American involvement is certain to add support to this imposed peace plan with little debate in Congress and virtually no support from the American people troubles me greatly.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, how can we prevent this situation from occurring again in the future? Before that question can be answered, we must first understand how we got to where we are. The slippery slope upon which we have now embarked began largely at the end of the cold war, with the world retracted to the ethnic, regional and subnational violence that characterized it before the rise of the bipolar world.
Unfortunately, at that time, America failed to define adequately the role it would play. Instead, we began a pattern of committing U.S. forces on hastily decided and hastily defined missions of peace, of peacekeeping or, tragically, of peacemakewithout the advice, consent or even the confidence of the Congress and the American people.

In each instance, we have seen a President obligate funds and scarce military resources and place U.S. lives on the line without definition of what can reasonably be called the vital national interest. And in each instance, rosy administration projections and lofty humanitarian goals bear no resemblance to the outcome of the missions. Just look at Somalia and Haiti today. They are sad mockerys of what we were promised they would become once the most powerful military in the world cleaned them up.

So we again face the question, How is it then we repeatedly discover such a radical difference between the intentions and the outcome and that the mission is murkier and the price too high?

In each and every instance, this disturbing and dangerous precedent has been reinforced, making it ever more likely that the pattern will be repeated again and again, with Congress offering fewer and fewer objections under its authority under the Constitution.

In each instance, States' rights fell by the wayside in the push for a stronger and ever more powerful Federal Government.

In the absence of vital national interests, a lack of clear mission has combined with the lack of support of the American people, and we have faced a loss of American life. We have ended these missions without reaching our goals, without achieving any semblance of peace and democracy, and at great cost, a mission of our Armed Forces: To be ready to defend, with overwhelming force and resolve, the real threats to our life, liberty, and well-being—or those of our allies. Again, Mr. President, we need only look toward our recent experiences in Somalia and Haiti.

In each of these instances, United States and Presidential credibility is offered as a reason such ill-conceived initiatives cannot be opposed. In the case of Somalia, the people are not even given the opportunity to approve or disapprove—but simply to give our approval and comment after the fact. Some argue that this is the President's prerogative under the Constitution, but it is not a shining moment in the life of American democracy. We are asking America's finest men and women to face possible death for a commitment outside of our national interests.

And finally, Mr. President, will we continue to commit our blood and treasure to every cause which captures the moment, and which appeals to our collective sense of justice and compassion? Or will we finally define our interests and our policies, so that when a dangerous situation arises again—and it will—and when our credibility and vital national interests are truly on the line, we will be fully prepared to defend them?

It's an unfortunate and dangerous chapter in the life of our beloved democracy, Mr. President, when we are told it was inappropriate to ask these questions earlier, because the matter had not been settled, and that is inappropriate now, because the decision has already been made.

At what point do we have the chance to answer those questions? When they are placed before us, and when it may be too late? The question then becomes, Mr. President: At what point will Americans define American interests? I think the time has come to answer these questions now—before we are faced with our next Bosnia.

I thank the chair and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Nevada is recognized.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, there is a unanimous consent that I will be ready in effect regarding the Senators who will speak. I ask unanimous consent that the next grouping, following me, would be, first, a Republican, and that name will be supplied by the leader. After that, Senator SARBANES, and then another Republican, and after that, Senator KERRY of Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, as Members of the Senate, we must take this important and really solemn votes that we cast are those which put at risk the lives of American servicemen and women.

I have long been concerned about the conflict in Bosnia and the potential United States military role in ending it. I believe that the President, I and many others have stated on many occasions on this floor, and in various places in the State of Nevada, that I personally do not believe that U.S. ground troops should be committed to keep the peace in this centuries-old civil war in Europe. But still, Mr. President, I recognize that I am not the Commander in Chief of the armed services of the United States, nor does the President need congressional approval to dispatch U.S. troops on this type of a mission.

Mr. President, I am going to support the resolution that has been drafted by the Senator from Arizona, the majority leader, and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn. But I say that I support that resolution, not because President Clinton is in office and is a Democrat. I would remind my colleagues, that I stood here and was the first Democrat to publicly support the Desert Storm operation in Iraq. I was standing here, and I received a call from then-President Bush. I was getting ready to speak on the floor. I told him that he did not have to ask me, I have already agreed. So I am going to support this resolution because I believe it is the right thing to do, not because the President is a Democrat. I would do the same for a Republican, as I have shown in the past.

There comes a time that we in Congress, despite our opinions about a President's prerogatives, must lay our criticisms aside. I have given plenty of criticism on this issue. This is a time, Mr. President, when, despite our opinions, we must lay aside. As I speak, troops are being deployed in Bosnia. As I speak, troops are on their way to Bosnia by train and airplane and other vehicles. Whether this Bosnian peace agreement will be recorded in the history books as the end of a centuries-old conflict remains to be seen. In the meantime, the President has made his decision, and I now believe all Americans should stand behind those whose lives will be on the line in Bosnia.

A number of my colleagues have cited the war in Vietnam in their statements in opposition to the deployment in Bosnia. I also would draw a comparison between the two situations, but for a different reason. The fundamental moral question was, Are we killing our own people? In each case, ground troops were asked to fight their lives and, in many cases, sacrificed their lives in Vietnam had to perform their missions in the face of enormous disagreement at home about their presence overseas. They came home to protests, and they came home to anger. We should have learned by now that dissent at home costs American lives, because dissent encourages the enemy to kill Americans. Dissent at home costs American lives.

Our colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona, understands what a blow that kind of civilian denunciation can mean to our military forces. His statements in this Chamber gave me great pause, as I pondered the Vietnam Syndrome and his personal misgivings. I commend Senator McCAIN, a war hero by any measure, for the work he has done on this resolution. I understand that in Arizona the vast majority of people think the President's decision is wrong. It is the same in Nevada. Therefore, it gives me even more pause to think how difficult this was for Senator McCAIN, but how right it was for Senator McCAIN.

I also commend the distinguished majority leader for crafting a compromise that gives congressional support for the deployment of troops, but that better clarifies and defines the U.S. mission and the criteria that will determine its success.

There is no risk that I will not fall into the trap of what is known as mission creep, where an initial goal grows vague and extended. Our troops must go in with a clearly defined and achievable goal and come out in a timely manner. This resolution, the McCain-Dole-Nunn resolution certainly does.

I intend, I think, along with a number of my other colleagues, to closely monitor the progress of the United
States mission in Bosnia, to do it throughout the year. I look forward to the return of the American troops—hopefully before the year is out, certainly by the time the year is up. The commanders of NATO and the U.S. military leaders who trained our troops for the mission have taken every step possible to ensure the troops' security, but we know it would be naïve to think there will be no casualties. We all grieve the loss of even one American life. But if there is any lesson we learned from Vietnam, it is that we cannot send American troops overseas with a denunciation of their mission.

I choose now to support the Dole-McCain resolution containing some defined parameters for American involvement rather than disagree with the President's decision. I was on the floor earlier today, right before the first vote, when the majority leader made a statement. He clearly defined the resolution, and he talked about heroes. John McCain was one he mentioned. He mentioned others. But it was interesting to note that he did not talk about himself.

We have in this Chamber some people who have sacrificed a great deal for our country. Senator McCain, of course, was a prisoner of war in Vietnam for 6 years, and it was a very grievous time for that period. We have other people who sacrificed a great deal. Senator John Chafee was a hero in the Second World War and the Korean conflict. Senator Hefflin saw service in the Second World War. General Glenn was a marine pilot in the Second World War, in Korea, and then, of course, was an astronaut. We could go on and on with the list of people who sacrificed a great deal who now are serving their country in the U.S. Senate. But I think it is interesting to note Senator Dole did not talk about himself. He has sacrificed as much as anyone in the service to his country. During the Second World War, he was wounded. He almost died.

So the record should reflect the courage of Senator Dole in sponsoring this amendment and drafting this resolution. It would have been very easy for Senator Dole—not only the majority leader but a Presidential candidate, who likely will be the Republican nominee for President next year—to have taken the easy way out. Would it not have been easy for him to demagog this issue and to be opposed to Bob Dole? What would have been the easy thing for Bob Dole to do, but he did not do it. That is because of what he did and what Senator McCain did that there are people like Senator Reid of Nevada, willing to swallow, maybe a little bit of pride, and support this resolution about which these two men, who are certifiable heroes, have said: Our troops are on their way there. Some of them are already there. It is wrong not to have this body support them in anything that they do while they are there.

So I want the record to reflect the fact that Senator Dole in his state-
In 1991 on this floor I had the privilege to participate in the debate on the resolution for the use of force as to the gulf war. I believe that it was indispensable that Congress pass on that matter, even though it was a Republican President. President Bush. Yet in the 1990s said a number of things about dispatching troops there involving the United States without congressional approval. But ultimately the President did bring back the issue to the House and to the Senate. And we had debates about the national interest. A number of us were on the floor at that time—Senator Warriner, Senator Nunn, and others—and comments in the media were that it was a historic debate about what are United States vital national interests.

At least, in my own judgment, we have not seen the establishment of the vital national interest in what we have present today in Bosnia. But that is a judgment call like so many other judgment calls we have here.

In the absence of a vital national interest, it is my judgment that the Congress should support the troops, without endorsing the President's policy. Our congressional action should show as much executive-legislative unity as possible under the circumstances and project American leadership to the maximum extent possible consistent with congressional policy not to give the President a blank check.

It obviously going to be a tough winter and a tough year for our troops, so we should be as supportive as possible where they are concerned.

I am encouraged by the testimony presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee from the executive branch. We convened those hearings in the Intelligence Committee, which I chair. The executive branch officials testified that our troops will be authorized by the Department of Defense to undertake massive bombing using our tremendous air power, and we were met with the response that in the absence of ground troops the bombing would not be effective. Once that bombing was initiated, however, quite the opposite occurred from what the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense officials had predicted, and it brought the Bosnian Serbs to their knees. It brought them to the bargaining table.

The agreement worked out, but it is in this context of the very severe disagreement that has been expressed by this Senator—and many others on this floor and in the House of Representatives—that the allies, the other party signatory to the agreement in Dayton, have been squarely on notice that the Congress might well disagree with the President.

The institutional conflicts between the Congress and the President on foreign policy have a long history. Many have challenged the President’s actions in ordering United States troops to fight wars without congressional authorization in Korea and Vietnam. The War Powers Act was an effort to establish a congressional balance of power there.

President Clinton took the initiative in ordering an invasion of Haiti in the face of overwhelming congressional resolutions expressing disapproval of that presidential action. Fortunately, it turned out to be a bloodless invasion when potential opposition withdrew.

So, Mr. President, our allies have been on notice. Depending on future events, the Congress may have to assert its authority to cut funding, if Congress concludes that the President has exceeded his authority or has pursued unjust policies. Those are congressional prerogatives, and under our constitutional system of separation of powers they have to be zealously guarded and observed. But since the President is not now usurping congressional authority to involve the United States in war, and since the votes are obviously not present to cut funding, we should make the best of the situation in formulating a resolution to support the troops, and demonstrate as much national unity as possible.

To the extent possible, the resolution should impose the maximum pressure to strengthen the Bosnian Moslems militarily to establish a balance of power in that area so that our troops may be withdrawn at the earliest practical date. An exit policy from Bosnia will turn on there being a balance of power there.

It is critical for the United States and its NATO allies to articulate a plan for equipping and training the Bosnian Army. Regrettably, the administration has not been able to articulate such a policy or a plan to withdraw the troops.

Arming the Bosnians is critical for two reasons.

First, it will help ensure a balance of power in the region—a balance that currently favors Serbia and Croatia.

Second, the Bosnian Army must be armed before the NATO implementation force can leave. As former Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, recently noted, "Until the Bosnians have the capability of defending themselves, it will be impossible for us to withdraw, without terrible consequences."

In addition, we should do our best to use the current situation in Bosnia to establish important international law precedents against genocide, and to prosecute war criminals.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army commander Ratko Mladic and others under indictment should be brought to trial in the War Crimes Tribunal. This is a unique opportunity to follow up on the Nuremberg precedent and to establish an international rule of law. Since 1991, the United States has been a signatory to the International Genocide Convention. The United States has been a leader in instituting the War Crimes Tribunal.

For years, I have pressed resolutions adopted by the Congress to set up an international criminal court with the principal thrust to control international terrorism and drug dealing.

It has been my view that, while it has been impossible to get resolutions like Colombia to extradite to the United States, if there were an international criminal court, that might be doable in a practical political context. And we have yet to be able to put our hands on the hands under indictment for the terrorism against Pan Am 103.

And there again, if an international criminal court were present, it might
be possible to have extradition to such a court if extradition to Scotland or England or the United States cannot be obtained. And it is very important for us to press ahead on these prosecutions under the War Crimes Tribunal.

In 1993, my amendment was adopted to provide $3 million to assist the prosecutor in gathering evidence against those who committed atrocities and mass killings in Bosnia. We should press all parties to the peace agreement to abide by theirmarvin's efforts to bring the war criminals to trial. My recent meeting with Chief Prosecutor Justice Goldstone provides encouragement that a significant international legal precedent can be achieved in that tribunal. International action against mass killings and genocide would promote an important goal of the law of nations.

My discussions with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake provide the firm U.S. policy to bring the war criminals to trial. For myself and many others in the Congress, continued support of the Bosnian operation would be materially affected by the intensity demonstrated to bring war criminals to justice. While I do think it an unwise policy to deploy United States troops to Bosnia, I am very much concerned about the kind of isolationist rhetoric that we have heard in this Chamber in the past 2 days. I have consistently supported a robust national defense and a robust foreign policy by the United States, an attitude gleaned from my earliest days studying international relations as a student many years ago at the University of Pennsylvania.

The United States should not turn to isolationism, but neither should we turn to being the policeman of the world when there are incidents around the world and so many of them, without having a vital U.S. national interest involved. But weapons systems, army divisions, and aircraft carriers are not enough to ensure our security. We must be committed to the notion that the United States needs to be engaged throughout the world diplomatically, economically, militarily, and always carefully. We need to use all our instruments of national power to shape the international security environment in a way that guarantees American security. In my judgment, for the reasons I have outlined, Bosnia and the Balkans do not rise to that level. But by the same token, we must be careful to resist instantaneous or knee-jerk reactions to any use of U.S. military force, even where we did so in Desert Storm.

Mr. President, these are obviously matters of great complexity. We vote on them in a series of resolutions trying to exercise our best judgment, knowing that the troops are on the way, whatever we do. We obviously will follow the matter very closely through our congressional action in a variety of committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee, which I chair, to bring our best judgment to bear on the Bosnian situation, to support the troops wherever we can and to bring them home as soon and as safely as possible.

I yield the floor.

Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KYL). Under the previous order, the Senator from California is recognized.

Mrs. BOXER: I thank the Chair very much.

I rise today in support of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as long as it remains a peacekeeping mission. I also rise to express my strong support for our men and women in uniform who will be one-third of the peacekeeping force.

We are here debating one of the most difficult and important decisions to face us as legislators, the deployment of American troops overseas. The commitment of our troops is never an issue to be taken lightly, so I thank the leadership for bringing this issue to the floor.

I also wish to thank those committee members who have held hearings on this issue over the past few weeks and the administration witnesses who have answered questions openly, candidly, and directly. These hearings have proven very informative and have helped me reach my decision.

I support the participation of U.S. troops in IFOR first and foremost because the mission as spelled out by the President and subsequently by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a true peacekeeping mission. This is not like the Persian Gulf war when we were sending our men and women off to fight a war. We are sending our men and women to be one-third of a peacekeeping force, keeping the peace as a result of the Dayton peace accord which is supported by all the parties involved.

This is a point I believe must be made perfectly clear. The major combatants in Bosnia support this peace agreement. We are not going to Bosnia to force a United States vision of peace upon them. We are going to help implement their vision, their agreement.

If we were not truly peacekeepers, I could not support this mission, and if at some future date the Dayton peace agreement is not upheld, I will immediately reevaluate my position.

I have listened with great interest to Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and other military and civilian leaders who have explained the rules of engagement for our troops in Bosnia. When I was a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I realized how crucial it is for our troops to have very clear rules of engagement. I have seen tragedy occur, and we have lost men in uniform because the rules were unclear. In my view, it is essential that our troops have the ability to aggressively respond to threats to themselves or to their mission. They must not be required to consult with anyone before responding to a potentially life-threatening situation.

On this point, I quote the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, who said:

If our forces are attacked or if hostile intentions are demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will permit the immediate and effective use of deadly force.

In all of his speeches, the President has been very clear on this point. The phrase he has sometimes used in the past is: the first enemy that tries to harm our troops will never forget the lesson of the fateful misjudgment of our power.

So the mission is clear and the rules of engagement are robust. The final element is to assure that our exit strategy is adequate and, in my view, it is. After close examination, I am satisfied on these points.

The administration has publicly stated that our troops will come home in about a year. I support that kind of a timeframe. Our mission is to keep peace for about a year, and after that it is up to the parties to the agreement to maintain it. Where we must leave with a much more balanced situation in terms of military balance. And I am pleased that Members of Congress have talked to the administration about this, and have received clear assurances that when we leave we will not go back to the status quo. This is very important.

I want to make it clear that I support our participation in the peacekeeping force, not because the President wants it but because I believe it is the right thing to do. I know that some have argued we should support deploying our troops simply because the President has committed us and we must not act to undermine the Presidency. However, I take a different view. I believe that as the President accepts responsibility for his decision as Commander in Chief, we must accept full responsibility for our vote on this matter.

I believe that the Congress has the absolute right to deny any President the funds to carry out this or any other mission. In this case, I did not vote to deny the President the funds, and I will not support the Hutchison amendment. However, the Senator from Texas has every right to offer it, and every Member here has every right to vote for it, just as they had every right to vote for the prior amendment we just disposed of which dealt with cutting off funds. So I believe that by a vote for the Dole-McCain-Nunn amendment, I am doing the right thing, and I take full responsibility for it. I am not ducking behind it and saying it is being done by the President. This is the right thing to do, I have not voted with this President before on the question of Bosnia. I have voted, in fact, against him on two other occasions. When I vote for this, I do not do so as a weak partner of an executive branch but as a strong partner. A strong partner. And in future time I disagree with the administration policy, as I have done in the past, I will speak out and vote accordingly.
We now have the opportunity to help bring peace to Bosnia. I believe that as long as our troops are part of a larger force, as long as the mission is peace and as long as we have an approximate exit date, I will be supportive of this mission.

Mr. President, it is a rare moment in history that we have a chance to stop a genocide and generations of hatred. It is rare that we have a chance to stop the spread of war in a region where we have been in a state of cold war with millions of Americans. Some of our very own colleagues walk on this floor with the wounds of those wars.

This is not some area of the world where war is unknown. Sadly, it is. We have seen war spread. Now, maybe, just maybe, the President has done something here that will stop a war from spreading. We do not know that. I may be back on this floor saying, "Bring the troops home. I was wrong." But I well remember that got me into politics, the Vietnam war, we said, "Give peace a chance" in those days, and I think "give peace a chance" has not lost its meaning in this circumstance, after generations of genocide and hatred. I lost part of my family in a genocide.

Now we have a chance to stop it. At the minimum—at the minimum—if things go reasonably well, when we leave there we will leave there in a way where the various parties to this conflict are at least on a level playing field, which I think is very, very important. If there is a pause in the fighting, it may lead to a lasting peace as a result of our participation in this force.

So let us give this peace a chance as long as it is truly a peacekeeping operation. Let us support our men and women who are going over there in a tough time, Christmastime. Let us not send signals of equivocation about that support. Let us send support the Dole-McCain amendment.

I thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, Senator DOMENICI and then Senator KERREY are to be recognized.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized to speak at the time that Senator DOMENICI was originally to be recognized in the unanimous-consent agreement, and that he take the place that I had.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Would the Senator from Virginia let me make one more unanimous-consent request?

Mr. WARNER. Absolutely, Mr. President.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of Senators HATCH and CHAFEE be added to the next available Republican slots, which I believe would follow LEAHY and SIMON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair. And I thank the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from California rose to say I was greatly taken by her closing remarks, and I think I jotted down accurately. I may be wrong, "I may be back here on the floor asking that we bring our troops home." I am not saying that is precisely the reason why I oppose this Presidential decision to send to Bosnia a third significant element of U.S. troops—that is, troops on the ground. This Nation experienced the problem of Congress acting to withdraw our troops from Lebanon. This Nation experienced that problem in Somalia. I happened to have been on this floor protecting Presidential prerogatives—at the time we took serious casualties in Somalia, some 38 killed in one day and some 80-plus wounded on that same day. And I said it is the President's decision as Commander in Chief when a military mission is completed and when our forces should be brought home.

We had a very vigorous battle right here on the floor of the Senate about that Somalia situation. And it was a tough fight to establish the President's clear right to determine when to bring those troops home and not rush to judgment in the sorrow of those severe casualties.

Mrs. BOXER. May I respond?

Mr. WARNER. This is what bothered me. The credibility of the United States of America will be far more endangered if we are faced in 6 or 8 months with a decision to bring our troops home because of casualties and other unforeseen problems, than if we make the stand now not to go forward with this mission.

Mrs. BOXER. Would the Senator yield for a second or brief moment?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. I do not yield the floor, but for a question. I yield the floor.

Mrs. BOXER. I understand.

I just wanted to respond to my friend. I will, of course, put it in the form of a question. The deployments that my friend talked about I did not support. I come here to say that I think it is worth a try in an area of the world where we have lost thousands and thousands and thousands of American lives.

If the Senator believes that there is no chance that this war can spread and this mission cannot change that, and not important and not worth trying, then he should absolutely vote against the Dole-McCain amendment. And I respect his right.

All this Senator is saying is that I have waited, and I believe—and I take full responsibility for that vote, and I respect my friend if he comes down on the other side. But I think that in this part of the world we have an opportunity to make a difference for peace. If it does not work out, we at least have tried to do so.

I do view it quite differently than in the other areas that my friend has pointed to. I did not support those deployments, I say to my friend.

I guess I did not have a question. I merely wanted to respond, but I have another question. I recall that, after whatever conclusion he reaches, and I hope he would have that same respect for this Senator if she comes down on the other side.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from California. This vote is a clear vote of conscience, not politics, and each of us has to draw on our own life experiences, our own best judgment and make this tough decision.

Mrs. BOXER. I agree with my friend. Mr. WARNER, I am on the side opposite the Senator from California and will oppose the President's deployment decision.

Mr. President, I will go into some details regarding my concerns. Indeed, this is one of the most important debates that I have been privileged to participate in in the recent history of the U.S. Senate. Our Nation has experienced a gradually growing involvement and deployment of its Armed Forces in the tragic civil war in Bosnia and other contiguous areas in the former Yugoslavia.

Over the past year, U.S. airmen have flown the majority of the air missions over Bosnia, and U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel stationed in the Adriatic off the Dalmatian coast have provided a very significant percentage of the ships and personnel involved in the naval operations in that region.

America is heavily committed militarily with its NATO allies and others at this very moment. There is a misconception that we are not involved in Bosnia and that we have to go. Wrong. We are there, very significantly, at this particular time, and we have been there for almost two years.

The President has directed a further and very significant expansion of U.S. military involvement. I credit the President, the Secretary of State, and others for working out an agreement which I do not refer to as a peace agreement. Nevertheless, it is an agreement that has led to a very substantial lessening of the hostilities. It is an agreement that possibly could at some future date form the foundation for a cessation of hostilities, but I do not feel that condition exists.

Therefore, the President has ordered ground troops, some 20,000, for actual deployment to Bosnia and approximately another 34,000 to be deployed to nearby geographic regions as support and back-up forces.

It is interesting, when this mission was first described by the President back in February 1993, it was always said that we were going to send in 20,000 ground troops. But now we learn that a very large portion will be regarded as backup. That is prudent military planning, but the initial impression across the land was of a lesser number.
S 18478

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

December 13, 1995

Ever since this Presidential decision nearly 2 years ago, I have consistently expressed my concerns. Today, I join with many other Senators in expressing my total disagreement with the President. I do so respectful of his role as Commander in Chief, but I am sure the President recognizes I have a right to express my views and I do so as a matter of conscience.

President Clinton made this decision on his own, without that level of consultation with the Congress that I believe was necessary and might have contributed to a different decision.

And now the Congress is left with trying to decide how best, as the elected representatives of the people, to ensure that the voice of the American people is heard. I am privileged to do so on behalf of many, many Virginians with whom I have visited and from whom I have heard over the past months.

Mr. President, I have always been a strong supporter of Presidential constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign policy—I expressed that in my colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Nebraska. And parallel to the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. This very phrase is embodied in our Constitution. As Commander in Chief, the President has the right to deploy, send beyond our shores the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Presidents have judiciously exercised that awesome power since the very formation of our Republic. Therefore, I do not challenge the constitutional authority of the President to deploy United States ground troops to Bosnia. He has that right under the Constitution. I do, however, challenge the wisdom of President Clinton’s decision to involve this third significant element of United States forces, namely, on the ground in the territory of Bosnia.

The question of constitutional authority on this matter, I ask unanimously, Mr. President, to have printed in the RECORD following my remarks a very fine analysis of that issue by Lloyd Cutler, former Counsel to the President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, since the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia in 1992, I have consistently opposed the use of United States ground troops. Today, we are faced with the situation of what do we do now, given the President’s commitment? My votes today expressing opposition to this Presidential decision go back to the fundamental question: Does the United States have a vital—and I repeat and emphasize the word vital—national security interest at stake in the region? If so, the Commander in Chief would have a right to deploy United States ground troops into a region that we know is fraught with risk?

I see on the floor the distinguished Senator from Nebraska. I was privileged to accompany him to this region, the region of Krajina, in early September. We saw with our own eyes the ravages of this war-torn region. We looked into the faces of the refugees, combatants and noncombatants alike. This was the fifth in a series of trips I have conducted to this region over the years since the conflict has started.

I wish to acknowledge, Mr. President, to my colleague, how much I value the opportunity to distinguish Senator, a former naval officer, highly decorated, a man whose judgment and opinion I greatly value on military matters.

The reason I raise this is that I wish to apply a test to this deployment decision along these lines: Would I be able to go into the home of a service person who had been either killed or wounded in Bosnia as a consequence of a proposed deployment and explain to a parent or a brother or a sister, who was loved one was sent to Bosnia and why their sacrifice was justified?

This is a duty I performed earlier in life as a young Marine officer and again as Secretary of the Navy, and it is not an easy task, Mr. President. I apply that test today.

I could not justify such a sacrifice, given the current situation in that region and the current status diplomatically and militarily of all the circumstances surrounding this peace accord.

I have listened carefully to the administration’s justification for this deployment, but I do not find a vital United States national security interest at stake in Bosnia that would justify the use of ground troops at this time in that nation.

I do not want to see further American casualties in trying to resolve a civil war, based on centuries-old religious and cultural hatreds, which none of us can understand, any more than as hard as I have studied, and based on five trips, I do not understand how people in this civilized age of mankind can treat one another this way. These are well-educated people. Yet, they behave in such a manner as to be on the border of savagery. I cannot understand it, Mr. President.

I remember so well a hearing of the Armed Services Committee in the aftermath of Somalia. I remember a Col. Larry Joyce, the father of a young Ranger who was killed in the October 3-4 raid in Somalia which I described earlier. He came before the committee and he said to the Senators as follows:

Too frequently, policymakers are insulated from the misery they create. If they could be with the chaplain who rings the doorbell at 6:20 in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman her little brother is dead, they would develop their policies more carefully.

I would hope that the Somalia experience would cause us to more carefully consider the policy decisions that put at risk the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces.

I have been deeply moved, as has every other Member of the Senate, and indeed all Americans, by the suffering we have seen in Bosnia as a consequence of the hatreds and atrocities in that region. I have seen it in their faces, in the hospitals we visited and in the homes and properties—homes which are so essential for the return of the many refugees. Senator Kerrey and I witnessed, as we went through the villages, a row of houses, and one house with the gara- den flattened to the ground—flattened because it was once occupied by a Serb. That Serb had fled this village where he or she or the family had lived for years with their neighbors, but they were forced to leave in the face of the Croatian military advance. And the locals destroyed the house—the house being a symbol of their hatred for that individual—and they blew it up, destroyed it, so that it would be of no use to anyone anymore. We saw that, as the Senator will recall, in village after village—a manifestation of hatred, which we cannot understand.

I remember so well the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before our committee saying, “My greatest fear in this operation is the hatreds among the people in the region.” That is what concerns me. I do not want to see 20,000 U.S. troops placed in the middle of this 500-year-old sea of hatred.

Mr. President, we have heard President Clinton say that United States troops are not being sent to Bosnia to fight a war, but rather to help implement a peace agreement. According to a December 2 radio address by the President, “It is a peace that the people of Bosnia want. It is a peace that they have demanded.”

Yet, I say to my colleagues, most respectfully, I disagree with the President’s assessment. It is my view that recent days, of recent weeks, of recent months, have been a harbinger of things to come. At the very time IFOR is beginning its deployment to Bosnia, Bosnian Croats are burning villages which will be returned to Bosnian Serb control—villages which we, the West, will have to rebuild. Reach into your pockets and take out the funds we are going to be asked to contribute to rebuild these houses, which have been wantonly destroyed, not as a consequence of troops marching through them, in some instances, yes—but largely because of the hatred that exists.

These are not the actions of a people who have embraced a peace. At this point, all we can really say is that the three leaders of this region have done their best to work out an agreement. But only time will tell the extent to which the people will eventually embrace this agreement.

I would hope that the President has made a decision, and it is within his constitutional authority. The troops are being deployed. Initial elements have already arrived. We have seen the pride
Mr. WARNER. He stated: 

Because they have volunteered, as opposed to being drafted for military service, it does not mean there can be less of a standard for when it is in our vital national interest to interject them into a dangerous environment.

It is important that the genesis for the All-Volunteer Force be a part of consideration for the justification for deployment of our military force. With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

MELVIN R. LAIRD.

Mr. WARREN. For example, I-FoR is called on to assist the UNHCR, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and other international organizations, in their humanitarian missions, to prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations and refugees, and to respond to deliberate violence to life and person. It is not clear what guidelines, if any, have been given to the commanders on the ground to help those commanders determine when I-FoR should get involved in supporting tasks. This must be clarified and the mission strictly limited to implementing the military aspects of the agreement. I think that should be done before another soldier, sailor, airman, or marine departs to go into a dangerous environment.

I am also concerned about the administration’s lack of an adequate exit strategy and an announced time limit of 12 months for this mission. I just announce that we will find 12 months not an exit strategy. We have to make sure that there is a balance of military power between these warring factions. That balance will serve as a far better deterrent, far better, than anything else we can do.

I salute the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. DOLE]. I have joined him in the past year, in trying to implement the concept of assisting one of those factions, the Bosnian Muslims, raising their level of armaments up to where they can possess a deterrent to attack.

I think it is naive to believe in 12 months the United States and NATO military involvement will wipe away centuries-old hostilities. What I fear we are facing is a temporary lull in the fighting until the international community withdraws its troops. Then, I ask my colleagues, what will happen to the vulnerability of the United States and NATO if this mission ends inconclusively, or is possibly even judged to be a failure because the conflict resumes after we depart?

Remember, remember those pictures of the brave Marines as they left Somalia with the people on the shore firing at them as they disembarked in their small craft to go out to a larger American warship and return home. I do not forget that. I do not forget those infections.

Because of the serious concerns which I have outlined, I will vote to oppose this deployment of U.S. ground forces to Bosnia.
troops. This was not an easy decision for any of us to make but I do it as a matter of conscience. However, if that full deployment is to occur and does occur, then I will, as I have in every day I have served in this U.S. Senate, support the troops 100 percent in every way I can.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that recent editorials on this situation by the former distinguished Secretary of the Navy James Webb, and by a former top naval officer, Admiral, Secretary, Col. Harry Summers, be printed in the Record and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 28, 1995]

REMEMBER THE NIXON DOCTRINE
(By James Webb)

The Clinton Administration’s insistence on putting 20,000 American troops into Bosnia should be seized on by national leaders, particularly those in Congress, as an opportunity to launch a forceful debate on the worldwide obligations of our military.

While the Balkan factors may be immersed in regional conflicts, Europeans may feel threatened by it, for Americans it represents only one of many conflicts, real and potential, whose seriousness must be weighed carefully before allowing a commitment of lives, resources and national energy.

Today, despite a few half-hearted attempts such as Gen. Colin Powell’s “superior force doctrine,” no clear set of principles exists as a touchstone for debate on these tradeoffs. Nor has either party articulated terms which provide an understandable global logic as to when our military should be committed to action. In short, we still lack a national security strategy that fits the post-cold war era.

More than ever before, the United States has become the nation of choice when crises occur, large and small. At the same time, the size and location of our military forces are in flux. It is important to make our interests known to our citizens, our allies and even our own parties, not just here, but around the world, so that commitments can be measured by something other than the pressures of interest groups and manipulation abroad.

Many of these concerns are far more serious than the challenges to long-term international stability and American interests. These include the continuing threat of war on the Korean peninsula, the United States’ representation in Asia as a powerbroker where historical Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Korean interests collide, and the need for military security to accommodate trade and diplomacy in a dramatically changing region.

Asian cynicism gains further grist in the wake of the Administration’s recent snubs of Japan: the President’s cancellation of his summit meeting because of the budget crisis, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s early return from a Japanese visit to watch over the Bosnian situation.

Asian leaders are becoming uneasy over the economic and militarily resurgent China that has not only put a strain on Japan but may become more aggressive. A perception that the United States is not paying attention to or is not worried about such long-term threats could in itself cause a major realignment in Asia. One can’t exclude even Japan, whose strong bilateral relationship with the United States has been severely tested of late, from this possibility.

Those who aspire to the Presidency in 1996 should use the coming debate to articulate a world view that would demonstrate to the world a solid understanding of the uses and limitations—in a sense the human budgeting of our military assets.

Richard Nixon was the last President to clearly define how and when the United States would commit forces overseas. In 1969, he declared that our military policy should follow three basic tenets:

1. Honor all treaty commitments in response to aggression, and wholeheartedly support the task at hand.

2. Support especially includes keeping their doubts to themselves. Commanding a rifle company in the 2nd Armored Division in 1965, my executive officer, Lt. Thomas E. Gray Jr., had good reasons about our emerging Vietnam policy.

3. Expressing those concerns in a Troup Information lecture, he was surprised when the soldiers in the room clustered around him and asked if they were already alerted for Vietnam, and they wanted to believe in what they were being ordered to do. They had their own doubts and fears that they did not discuss, and the signs from their leaders was reassurance that the task was both necessary and doable.
Like Jesus' centurion, a soldier is "a man under authority," and when his civilian and military leaders say, "go he goeth." Despite his misgivings, Lt. Gray himself went to Vietnam, where he was killed in action while serving with the 1st Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. Like Lt. Gray, who served in Vietnam, we will serve in Bosnia as well, despite their private reservations.

One who did so in Vietnam was Vice President Al Gore. On the day of the president's address, the vice president invited several of us to the White House for a briefing on Bosnia. In the course of our talk, he called Lt. Gray's death. The New York Times article headlined "Commanders Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work." But those comments may not as well be as telling as he believed. They may well reflect only the traditional military reluctance to undermine soldiers' confidence and morale on the eve of a hazardous operation.

Whether the military commanders have private misgivings about the Bosnian operation is not knowable, but what is becoming clear is that, in part, they have gone to ensure that the military mission was limited to doable military tasks.

Until recently, according to press reports, the military operation was to include not only the 'peacekeeping' task of keeping the warring parties separated, but the "nation building" task of rebuilding the Bosnian political and economic infrastructure and the job of training and equipping the Bosnian Muslim military to bring it up to its full capabilities.

At our White House meeting, the vice president took particular pains to disavow any such "mission creep" and "nation building." The mission that led to such grief in Somalia will not be a U.S. military mission, he said. That will be a task for the European Community, the OSCE, those interested in peace and cooperation in Europe, which has several ongoing missions in the area. Training of the Muslims, originally said to be a task for the U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Group, will now be done by third-party nationals. And the vice president categorically ruled out any manhunts for war criminals or, say, the one that led to the disaster in Mogadishu.

To their credit, the senior military leaders have done their best to limit the mission to doable tasks. On one thing they have not succeeded in doing is resolving the issue of military casualties. This is an issue of major concern, and at the vice president's direction, our troops have committed.' President Clinton has said he would follow the precedent set by George Bush before the 1991 Desert Storm invasion and seek a congressional "declaration of necessity" for committing American units to the enforcement of the Bosnian peace agreement. But he has also asserted the constitutional power to act unilaterally if he deems it necessary.

At the same time, it is Republican congressional leaders who are challenging a Democratic president's view that the president can lawfully act on his own, but, more typically it has been Democratic Congresses challenging presidents of either party.

During the coming debate, Congress would be wise to use the next five years to ask that the country consider the outcome of the war in light of the national interest. It is not necessary to choose between the war and peace for democracy. One can promote peace and democracy and also the job of training and equipping the Bosnian Muslim military to bring it up to its full capabilities.

In foreign and national security policy, as in other areas, the American people are divided. There was plenty of time after learning of a threatening event for the president to deliberate with Congress about the proper response. Occasionally the American people committed us unilaterally, as in our attacks on the Barbary pirates in Tripoli in Jefferson's time, but it was rare for Congress to claim the initiative when it was let to make a commitment over an extended period of time. Before the United States became a superpower, disputes over the authority to commit our forces rarely arose. We had few occasions to deploy our military units abroad, much less commit them to conflict. Armies, navies and news of battle traveled very slowly and uncertainly. Today we are a superpower, and the president is the one and only democratic superpower to have his say in the nation's affairs. And the president's word has become law.

Since World War II, all this has changed. As commander-in-chief of our superpower, presidents now deploy our armed forces all over the world. We can attack, or be attacked, within moments. On numerous occasions, presidents have committed our forces to armed conflict, sometimes of a sustained nature as in Korea and Vietnam, without asking Congress to declare war. In Vietnam, as it had in Korea, Congress initially supported the president's initiatives by appropriations and other measures. But as the duration and scope of our military actions in Indochina escalated, an increasingly restive Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto. The resolution laid down a series of rules that require the president to obtain the joint approval of both houses of Congress for military actions that involve the deployment of our armed forces.

In the case of Bosnia, the argument for committing U.S. forces to carry out a peace agreement is a strong one. All of us are resolved by the ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses that the various factions have committed. These abuses are likely to continue if the peace agreement is not formally signed in mid-December as now scheduled, or if it is signed but not carried out. If the war goes on or resumes, it may well spread to other parts of the former Yugoslavia or to the Balkans or the Black Sea.

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coast; President Carter launched a military mission to rescue our hostages in Iran; President Reagan put our forces into Lebanon, the Sinai, Chad and Grenada and ordered bombing raids into Libya; President Bush sent troops into Panama, Liberia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

As for the president, Clinton, he has already ordered our forces into Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Macedonia and has authorized our air units to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone over Bosnia itself.

Moreover, in the 22 years since the War Powers Resolution became law, Congress has never undermined these presidential uses of force by way of action in a resolution that would have blocked the mission or required withdrawal within 60 days.

All this does not mean that Congress must cede to the president any genuine national security decisions to the president. Congress successfully forced Johnson and Nixon to limit and finally to terminate the undeclared Vietnam War. Congress successfully stopped Reagan's covert sales of weapons to Iran and his covert and overt military aid to the contras. As these examples show, presidents cannot effectively control their separate constitutional powers over national security and foreign policy over an extended period without the cooperation of Congress. That is why Clinton, as I noted in 1990, has insisted that Congress express its views before our forces are committed to support the peace agreement in Bosnia.

A week ago Friday, while the Dayton negotiations were still going on, House Republicans passed a bill that would bar the expenditure of any funds to sustain U.S. forces in Bosnia. Fortunately, the Senate is unlikely to follow, and even if it did, a presidential veto would be difficult to overrule. But if以后 any launches this preemptive strike would do better to emulate former Republican congressman Dick Cheney. In 1990, when we had a Republican president and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, Cheney was the secretary of defense. As he said before we entered the Gulf War, "When the stakes have to do with the leadership of the Free World, we cannot afford to be paralyzed by an intra-mural stalemate." The decision to act, he noted in the letter to the president, was the one who bears the responsibility for sending young men and women to risk death. If the operation fails, it will be his fault. I have grave misgivings about permitting any launching this preemptive strike would do better to emulate former Republican congressman Dick Cheney.

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I also have a great honor to be able to travel with the Senator from Virginia earlier this year to Afghanistan and down to Split and down to Knin in the Krajina Valley where the Croatian forces had succeeded in driving, by some estimates, close to 200,000 military and civilian personnel from that valley. It was very clear to me that I was in the presence of a man who understood, not just that particular region as well as any, but understood the great value and importance of we Americans leading where we can and doing what is possible to make the world a safer and better place. I have many of the same misgivings the Senator from Virginia just expressed and I know that, in expressing opposition to the resolution and the deployment, in his own statement just now he wants him to be a success. He wants this operation, this NATO operation to be a success.

I also must say ——

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to thank my distinguished colleague. We will travel together again to other places in the world on behalf of our Armed Forces.

I will be pleased to hear the Senator's remarks.

Mr. KERNEY. I look forward to the travel. I learned a great deal in a relatively short period of time from the distinguished Senator from Virginia. I look forward to having a chance to travel and learn again.

The goal of any policy, particularly a foreign policy, I presume, is success. But the complex and confused conflict, such as this one, which has festered for centuries, success is extremely hard to define. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia is the consequence of a very confusing sequence of events that very few people understand fully. Yugoslavia itself was an intricate construct of religions and nationalities. Even the future consequences of U.S. inaction now are not entirely clear and even the idea of a NATO force has been considered disinflationary put out by all sides in the conflict, to justify the claims that all sides have to the status of being a victim.

The international solution coming around the Dayton agreement is not exactly simple either. A NATO force, including non-NATO units and even Russian units, is to separate the parties along a meandering 600-mile boundary line and then oversee the restoration of civilian government functions in Bosnia.

Meanwhile, the European Community and international donors put together a financial program to rebuild Bosnia's infrastructure. The plan may not be brilliant, but it certainly is not simple.

So it is not surprising, Mr. President, that well-informed citizens—and I am thinking in my case of Nebraskans who I had the honor of visiting with this week in Nebraska and not fully understand the Bosnian case.

As I indicated earlier, I had the opportunity to travel to the former Yugoslavia, have attended hours of briefings in the intelligence community, and have visited the National Military Intelligence Center in the Pentagon the last two Fridays. I must say I do not fully understand this problem, either.

Mr. President, I do understand that American leadership has already made it better. My response to those who despair of improving this tangled region is that from the moment of President Clinton's decision last summer to lead the way to a solution, the former Yugoslavia has become a more peaceful place. Bosnia is now a safer place for its inhabitants.

Mr. President, it was only last summer that the only access to Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, was over the dangerous Mount Igman road. Three American diplomats were killed in July on that road. The airport was closed. Sarajevo's very life was at risk from mortar attacks, from snipers, and from the cutoff of the electricity and food on which the lives of its inhabitants depended.

Then came the United States commitment to lead, Ambassador Holbrooke's full-court press, and today Bosnians are safer as a consequence. C-130's now land at Sarajevo. Sarajevans' daily brush with death are over, we pray forever. Energy and food deliveries are resuming, Mr. President. I am describing the indicators of success—success we have already achieved.

The distinguished Senator from Virginia earlier indicated, and I think quite properly, a test that all of us should apply to an operation, to a mission of this kind. That is, would be able to go into the home of a family...
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who had lost a loved one in a conflict and tell them what their loved one had accomplished? Was it worth their sacrifice?

Mr. President, you would, I think, be hard pressed not to be able to go into the House of Representatives or any Senate delegation and hear the word love. It was given to them to save the life of their countrymen, to save the lives of their own, in a country where there is a sense of urgency, a sense of impatience, a sense of the need to do something about the situation. They will have the opportunity to do so, and I think that the American people will have an opportunity to see what is going to happen in the situation that they will face. There are many people who are planning trips there and lots of travel going on there. Mr. President, there has been a tremendous success accomplished already.

Last August when I visited Yugoslavia, Sarajevo was judged so dangerous that the administration said that I and the delegation that I traveled with should not go there. We could not get to the capital of the country in which is at the heart of this problem. Today, not only is Sarajevo accessible, but Tuzla, where our troops will be stationed, is accessible as well. Already, several congressional delegations have traveled there in the past few weeks to see the conditions our troops will face. That access is the fruit of policy success.

But success in any enterprise, Mr. President, is temporary unless you are willing to secure it and to build on it. The Dayton agreement provides for military forces to enforce separation of the parties and to ensure compliance with the agreement. If all the parties comply with the agreement, success will be achieved and a peaceful, secure Bosnia will not just be a possibility but an odds-on likelihood.

Mr. President, given what has happened in Bosnia and what could happen without the decisive impact of American leadership, I contend this would be a highly successful outcome, one in which all Americans could take great pride.

Mr. President, much has been said—have listened to many colleagues, and I have heard, particularly on talk radio, concern expressed—about President Clinton as Commander in Chief. First of all, let it be said that Mr. Clinton, our President, is the architect of this policy and he is the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. As the distinguished member of the membership has stated, we only have one President, one Commander in Chief. Our Armed Forces have a high level of good order and discipline. They recognize that fact. They will follow the orders of the President gives them. They will proceed to the places named in his orders.

When we do our constitutional duty of debating deployment such as this one, we should not say or do anything which could undermine the diplomacy of the Armed Forces from their properly constituted chain of command. A resolution of this body declaring support for the troops but opposition to the action the President has ordered the troops to take could have very negative consequences for the morale of the Armed Forces as well as for the outcome of the mission. A statement by one Senator such as I read in this morning's New York Times that this instability threatens the United States, that he has spoken to soldiers at a military installation and said, "They're with me. They're mixed. They know I'm for them and I'm trying to keep them out," is not helpful. The troops are with the Commander in Chief and with no one else, regardless of the outcome of this debate.

There is also a good deal of talk, as I said, on talk radio criticizing Bill Clinton's right to deploy American forces and his ability to command those deployed forces because he did not go to Vietnam.

I will address this topic, Mr. President, head on. Having not served, I must say, can be a handicap for people who serve as the Commander in Chief of the military, no two ways about it. There are parts of a job you grow into, and I believe strongly that the President has really grown as a Commander in Chief. He inherited Somalia from the Bush administration, and as Commander in Chief of the Somalia operation, Bill Clinton has experienced the human tragedy of being the leader when United States casualties occur. He has not flinched from hard talks with the families of casualties that occurred on his watch and from the maturing experience for any commander, even a President. He is not naive or starry eyed about what he is ordering young Americans to do.

There is another aspect of Presidential service that must be considered, particularly as we engage in this kind of debate. Bill Clinton may not have been in combat in Vietnam, but in a very real way he, like all his predecessors, is experiencing combat now. Hardware and danger, which, unfortunately, is part of his job. His residence has been attacked twice. He suffered the loss of a friend and ally, Prime Minister Rabin. He knows firsthand every day the sense of an unknown but ever present threat to your life and the life of your family, which is an essential part of combat. In this sense, too, he has matured a lot. The job has that effect on people.

In the final analysis, though, the fact that he is properly sworn. He must say, can be a handicap for people who serve as the Commander in Chief of the military, no two ways about it. The Commander in Chief is the fact that he is properly sworn. He is the duly elected President of the United States of America. Mr. President, that is all it takes. Every American soldier, every American sailor, every American airman and marine must understand it.

As far as a national interest, Mr. President, it does fall to the President of the United States to define the National Security interests, the fact of being in a situation, the fact of being in a conflict, the fact of being in a situation where the United States has a stake in the outcome, that this stake, this interest, is American interest.

We have learned in this century that we ignore European instability at our peril. Twice we have made the mistake of thinking Europeans, with their money and sophistication and long experience as countries, could maintain the peace in the absence of an American commitment. We have had to send millions of our soldiers to fight in Europe to correct the mistake and to lead Europeans into stable, peaceful arrangements with each other. There may come a time when Europeans can do that by themselves, but the Yugoslavian experience of the past 4 years shows that time is not yet here. At the end of World War II, America determined to shore up the stability and security of Europe. Former friend and foe alike were a shambles, communism was a growing force in European domestic politics, and the Soviet Union showed both the ability and the inclination to incorporate all the continent into his family of satellite states.

To our farsighted leaders of the period, a crisis was apparent. They responded with a decisive commitment of American leadership. They organized an alliance of the United States, Canada, and 13 European countries, an alliance which, in a single but breathtakingly open-ended commitment, an attack on any member was an attack on all. In other words, we would go to war to defend any NATO member. With the implementation of the vision of the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the NATO alliance began a record of achievement that climaxed not a year later but 40 years later with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of Soviet communism.

Whenever we give speeches about what we are proud of in America's accomplishments since World War II, we brag, and very properly so, about our victory in the cold war and the U.S. leadership of NATO which made victory possible. Our commitment in 1949 was not totally assured of success. Far from it. And our commitment was not accompanied by a congressional requirement for an exit strategy. In 1949 our leaders acted boldly to leverage American leadership into an alliance with a good chance of success. Today, with a new situation in Europe, we face a requirement to act again, boldly, to restore and maintain European stability. Again, NATO is the best instrument to deal with the instability that will spread more broadly in a region in which major European powers have historic interests and have not shrunken from war to advance those interests. If we do not use NATO as our instrument, this alliance will not be available to continue its 40-year role as the guarantor of a peaceful, stable Europe.

It was not so long ago that our major European allies were usually at each other's throats. Mr. President, our framework of defense cooperation in which shared interests outweighed rivalries. Today NATO expansion carries the potential to extend the same cooperation.
into Eastern Europe and I hope, eventually, Russia and other former Soviet States. I cannot think of a better way to lock-in the benefits of the end of the cold war. But without NATO as a vibrant, capable organization, it will not happen. It will not happen without U.S. leadership. Mr. President, stability in Europe and the continued viability of NATO are our vital interests, and they are at issue today in the Balkans.

We have other, very important, but important interests there. We have an interest in a peaceful, stable, Russia which cooperates with us and with NATO on defense matters and with which we can share mutual confidence. The deployment of Russian units to the I-FOR under United States command provides a potentially priceless opportunity to build such a relationship. Also, we have an interest in developing a better relationship with the Moslem world. Moslems have clearly been the underdog in the Yugoslav war, and American leadership to preserve and secure a Bosnia which is again safe for Moslems will have positive effect on United States relations with the Moslem world. It will have a positive effect on our national character, which is we seek justice and fairness and do not play ethnic favorites.

**Draft a resolution to support success**

What we vote today matters. We should not hamstring our commanders with requirements that make success harder to attain. When we require the administration to supply armaments of the highest quality to one of the combatants, the highest quality being the best the United States has in its own arsenal, or when we pass a resolution which sets an artificial time limit on an operation which should only be bounded by accomplishment of the assigned task, we are placing handicaps on Admiral Smith's ability to accomplish the mission. I know none of us wants to do that. Once our troops are committed, all of us wants them to succeed.

I must also add my concern about Congress declaring U.S. credibility to be a strategic interest. We may be issuing an open-ended invitation to Presidents present and future to make unilateral commitments and require Congress to support them on the fuzzy basis of credibility. The stability of Europe is not enough for this operation, in my view.

Mr. President, I have been to briefings at the Intelligence Committee and have spent the last two Friday afternoons at the National Military Joint Intelligence Center at the Pentagon, trying to learn all I can about this mission and the intelligence support our commanders will be getting. I am immensely proud to have a military that can do a mission like this—to go into difficult places under dangerous conditions and be able to provide its own support and security while being prepared to engage any or all of three contending armies. I am proud of the work our national and military intelligence communities have done and are doing to support our troops with the best intelligence available, and also support the NATO and foreign forces in the I-FOR. No one else in the world could do this, except the United States. We are doing it to protect vital interests. We are doing it in a good cause.

If all the parties to the Dayton agreement abide by it, our leadership will be successful in the Balkans. More importantly, we will have extended the guarantee of European stability to which we have been committed in NATO, since 1949. If we lead with the vision of our post-war predecessors, we can achieve success in Bosnia. Mr. President, finally, let me point out what should be obvious. The success that has been achieved thus far has been a success of the President of the United States committed to achieve peace in the Balkans, but also of the United States, together with diplomats, by politicians, some elected and appointed leaders, not just of the United States but of all three of the nations in the Balkans. And if success is to be the end goal, and if we are to achieve that success, the mission alone can only do part of it. In order for the military to be successful, we political leaders are going to have to do the hard work of making certain that all the parties adhere to the agreement that we expect them to sign in Paris tomorrow.

I believe there is a good chance of success—of further and continued success—a chance of success that is worthy the risk that we take, the risk of lives and the risk of capital in the Balkans. I hope that the debate about this resolution—a nonbinding resolution that does not necessarily impact the President—I hope that the President hears throughout all of this debate perhaps some of the comments which have been grudgingly. I hope, acknowledge that there is peace in the Balkans, that you can fly to Sarajevo, that children and civilians in Sarajevo markets do not worry on Sundays—as they did when I was there on the 28th of August—that 120-millimeter rockets and mortars were raining down on them and take their lives. That fear is gone today. The fear of sniper attack is gone.

If the standdown of forces occurs in the first 30 days and in the next 45 days and the next 180 days, if we can just stand down the forces, the United States of America will continue to be able to say that we are saving lives. There are people alive today in Sarajevo that would not have been alive were it not for leadership of the President of the United States and the people of the United States backing that President.

I hope we understand and appreciate the great success that only the United States of America could achieve under the leadership of Bill Clinton. I hope this debate does not cloud that success, and I hope this debate does not prevent and make more difficult a continuation of our efforts to build upon that success.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator LOTT be traded in speaking order for Senator Domenici, who would be next, and also that Senator Kassebaum be added after Senator Nunn in the speaking order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas for accommodating my schedule and allowing me to change the order of the list of speakers. I also want to thank her for her leadership in this area. It is not easy. It takes a lot of courage, and the Senator from Texas has done an excellent job on this issue. I support her resolution because it best reflects my views on this issue.

The resolution expresses opposition to the decision to put United States troops on the ground in Bosnia, and also it says that we support our troops. Certainly, we all do, whether they are in the Continent United States or anywhere around the world. This resolution is simple. It is direct. It is to the point. And, I agree with it. I oppose the decision to send U.S. ground troops to Bosnia.

Conversely, I intend to oppose the resolution by the distinguished majority leader, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain. They have done excellent work on their resolution. They have improved it considerably. But it still has language that to me leaves the impression that a vote in favor of the resolution equates to authorizing, or agreeing with the decision to deploy ground troops. It does not say exactly that, but it still has language that gives me discomfort in that area.

I also have difficulty with our putting United States troops on the ground—supposedly as neutral I-FOR troops between the Serbs, the Bosnians, and the Croats on the other side—while the United States leads the effort to train, equip, and arm the Bosnians. That is a precarious position for U.S. forces. I think that is a very impractical arrangement. You cannot appear to be, or try to be neutral while you are in fact leading an effort to train one party of the three factions involved. So I have not been able to get that problem worked out in my mind with the language that is before the Senate in the resolution by Senator Dole.

Mr. President, in 1921, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:

"A page of history is worth a volume of logic."
Without an understanding of history, it is easy to repeat the mistakes of history, and it is in that context of history that we must carefully review President Clinton’s decision to send United States ground troops into Bosnia.

On November 21, 1995, President Clinton announced that an agreement had been reached in Dayton, OH, an agreement which he believed would secure peace in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Bosnia. According to him, key to this agreement would be participation of 20,000 American military personnel on the ground. Without American involvement, the President suggested there would be no peace and U.S. leadership of NATO would suffer, perhaps to the point of rendering NATO useless. But the President’s dire warnings must not be simply conceded under the assumption that he is right. The decision to send United States troops to Bosnia should not be reached because of feared diminution of United States leadership in the world or of NATO.

The fundamental decision should be based on answers to two simple specific questions: Are vital United States national security interests under threat in Bosnia? Do we have an effective exit strategy?

Before going further, I want to say that the President deserves credit for creating a negotiating framework which brought together the leaders of the warring parties and for fostering an environment of serious work to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia. But the decision to deploy United States troops to Bosnia is much more complex than just simply affirming a peace agreement negotiated in Dayton. Much more must be considered before our troops are deployed en masse.

Before addressing the two immediate questions regarding this decision, though, whether to deploy the troops we need to look at the history of Bosnia. If for no other reason than to gain some sense of the potential success or failure of that Dayton agreement.

In his second State of the Union Address in 1962, President Lincoln counseled the Congress to remember that we cannot escape history. That same counsel applies to the strife-ridden Bosnia. The former Yugoslavia found its birth in 1918 as the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and Slovenes united under the reign of King Alexander. In 1929, the country was renamed Yugoslavia, but the recent civil unrest in Bosnia can be traced much further back than that. Deep hatred and animosity of the Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian peoples was not born from their forced union in 1918. It reaches back to the mid-1300’s when the Ottoman Turks subdued the Serbian state. History is clear that death, civil strife, and genocide may sometimes be the result between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians was prolific between the mid-1300’s until Tito solidified his control of Yugoslavia at the close of World War II. In most cases, the hostility between the parties was based on religious and cultural divisions and the leadership of the day, whether it be King Alexander or Tito, used these religious and cultural hatreds as tools to suppress, to evening the potential aspirations of each of the parties in the region. The result was nearly continuous bloodshed between the three warring factions.

This backward, bloody, and ugly history led British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli to tell the House of Lords in 1878 these words, which are applicable to today’s situation. He said:

No language can describe adequately the condition of that large portion of the Balkan peninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and other provinces—political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public religions and absence of any controlling power . . . nothing short of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in this region.

That was in 1878. If it would have taken 50,000 troops then, how many troops would it take today?

When King Alexander was assassinated in 1934 by Croatian extremists, Yugoslavia began to split apart at the seams. Why was King Alexander assassinated? Well, in 1929 he tried to create an autonomous Serb, Croat, and Slovene government under a unified federalist structure called Yugoslavia. While one central government was to remain in power, the three parties would achieve independence.

The Dayton agreement—at its fundamental base—seeks to resurrect much of King Alexander’s failed plan of 1929. But instead of creating three separate states under one central government, the Dayton agreement seeks to create two parts, the Croat-Bosnian Federation and the Serbian Republic, all under one central government.

Just as President Lincoln said, “We cannot escape history.” Neither can President Clinton escape the history of Yugoslavia, nor can any of us afford to ignore it. Based on this history, it is likely—and unfortunate—that there will be no peace in Bosnia with or without United States troops on the ground to support it.

No international troop presence on the ground in Bosnia will restore peace to a region which has forgotten peace, which does not remember peace, and does not forgive. Peaceful intentions of peace United States troops should not be squandered on such a prospect.

Yes, we all hope for peace, but the peace must be achieved in the hearts and minds of the people there who have been warring for centuries. America cannot impose it with military troops.

The United States has a history, a noble history, and a heritage born from war in search of peace. Ours is a noble history and heritage, but this heritage should not blind us to our ultimate responsibility. Blind military commitments, the goal of which is to right historical wrongs or impose tranquility where tranquility does not exist or has not existed for over 600 years.

War is an ugly, gruesome undertaking. War should not be pursued or waged for mere political expediency or humanitarian gains. There are those who will say there is no war here; this is a tenuous peace. Yes, but how long will it be that way? As I pointed out, one of the things that worries me is if we go in some day, we are neutering ourselves in a partisan way supporting one faction, how long will that peace hold?

While we must be good at waging war, not all wars are fit for the United States to come in and solve the problem. Why must we always be the one that sends our troops in, no matter where it is around the world, when we do not have a vital national security interest? The United States should only participate militarily on the ground in places in which U.S. interests are clear and understandable.

I have looked long and hard to find United States vital security interests which are under threat by the civil strife in Bosnia. I have not found any. The United States does have vital security interests in Central and Western Europe, but the civil war in Bosnia does not threaten these interests. Therefore, we should not go. That is the fundamental hurdle that I cannot go over.

If our vital security interests dictate that we should place troops in harm’s way, then we must go. We should and we will. We will be prepared to fight for them. We should not repeat it. It may not happen. Now, there are those who will say, “If our troops go, there will be no peace.” We should go, though, as combatants prepared to fight, to do whatever is necessary, but only if our vital security interests are required.

The President has talked about robust rules of engagement. But he has not clearly and specifically outlined his commitment and intent to respond disproportionately should U.S. troops come under attack. Now, there are no limits. If Serb forces take hostages, or others, or attack U.S. patrols, the President must be willing, committed and intent on taking the conflict to the safe haven of other countries that are involved, specifically Belgrade.

I have not heard this commitment from the President, nor do I read this level of commitment as his intent. Anything less will sentence U.S. ground personnel to a hunkered-down, bunker existence suffering casualties in disparate hit-and-run attacks. U.S. personnel would become targets, plentiful and ripe.

We have made that mistake in the past. We made it in Somalia. And we should not repeat it. It will happen immediately. Maybe it will not happen in the cold, snowy winter months after we first arrive. But it would, I think, happen sooner or later. And the price of American lives should not be set so low that we are cowed from our own vital security interests.

As President Clinton announced his intention to send U.S. troops to...
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I have really come full circle on the question of whether or not to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to try to end the most recent conflict. I must say just in July of 1994—only 17 months ago.

The President’s own national security strategy does not warrant sending troops into this area. Bosnia does not represent a conflict in which our most important interests are threatened, nor have the people of former Yugoslavia assumed the responsibility for peace.

The second issue which must be considered prior to sending troops is the question of identifying a clear, definitive exit strategy. How will we know when the mission is completed and it is time to leave? We have been told a year, or was it about a year? Will it be 14 months or 15 months? How much will it cost? We were told, well, $1.5 billion. And then we were told, $2 billion. We all know it will be $4 billion or $5 billion.

The President said the U.S. mission in Bosnia will be “clear, limited, and achievable.” But I have not heard articulated the most important point.

How will we know the mission has been achieved so that we will know it is time for us to leave? If we do not have a clear, identifiable exit strategy, we will be suspect to expanding our reason for going. New missions will be added, like we have seen in other instances. Success will be harder to identify.

A successful exit strategy cannot be driven by a time limit as the President has suggested and, as, quite frankly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, we will stay 1 year, wait for the Bosnians to be sufficiently trained and equipped, and then leave? I do not think that is what was intended, but perhaps that is the real exit strategy. It must be constructed with the intention of leaving behind a locally supported peace that does not require an open-ended commitment of U.S. troops.

Once again, the history of the region does not lead one to any rational conclusion that is what would happen.

I do not believe that the American people are willing to support a prolonged occupation by U.S. troops in Bosnia, and we will have one if no clear exit strategy exists.

In the Persian Gulf we had a clear, measurable, and definite exit strategy—expel Iraq from Kuwait. Many people think we should have gone further. I am not one of them, because, you see, we had a strategy. It was to remove Iraq out of Kuwait and then leave. Nobody disputes the results of the gulf war.

This is not the case in this present situation. Under the President’s own National Security Strategy, he acknowledges that successful peace operations can only be sustained when the responsible parties want peace. Once again, the history of the region does not lead anyone to believe that the leaders of Serbia or Croatia and Bosnia want peace at all costs. And this plan will not grow the seeds for such a desire.

I urge my colleagues to look at the proposed settlement map. As I understand it, there is some disagreement and controversy about this—but there will be some repatriation of displaced Serbs into Croatian-held territory. Maybe we will not be actually doing that, but as I understand the agreement, we will be responsible for protecting them and at least in some ways assisting in this operation.

How do you think the Croatians will react to this repatriation? Appropriately? Or the Bosnians? When people of Serbian descent are repatriated to Bosnia? Do not forget that this current conflict started when the Serbs decided they wanted to exterminate the Bosnian people from territory they considered theirs from centuries before.

I just do not believe this plan will work. If it could work, it could work without U.S. ground troops on the ground. King Alexander tried it 66 years ago. He paid the price with his life at the hands of a Croatian loyalist and extremist. If we try it, Americans will die in a faraway land, one steeped in hatred and one in which we have no vital security interests under threat.

The United States should not resign itself to rubber stamp this decision—one based on noble intent, yet ill-conceived. The President has tried to explain the logic of deploying U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia, but only one page of the history of this troubled region explains why we should not go.

I urge my colleagues to vote for the Hutchison resolution and against the Dolle-McCain resolution.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator MACK be added in speaker order after Senator SARBANES and Senator JEFFORDS be added after Senator KERRY of Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Under the unanimous-consent order, the next speaker on the Democratic side was to have been the Senator from Virginia.

Does the Senator from California ask unanimous consent to change that order?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes. It is my understanding that for the time being I am taking his place.
We all support our troops. That goes without saying. But what message do we send to our troops if we send them off to do a job and in the same breath declare that the job that they are doing is illegitimate? How can you say, “I commend the mission you are being sent to do, but I don’t support your being sent to do it”? Will our troops really believe they have our support if this is what the Congress of the United States says?

Some have raised the specter of a repeat of Vietnam in Bosnia, but the real reason was not to send United States troops to carry out a mission without supporting that mission. Some of my colleagues have asked: “Does anyone believe we are really going to stand by our young men and women that we are going to send to Bosnia?” Well, I certainly am, the President is, the full force of the United States military is, and I believe that the Senate will in the long run as well.

In my view, the Hutchison resolution undercuts the troops. It supports the troops, but it is designed to give the President a back door to pull the rug out from under them. Instead of giving lukewarm support to the troops by questioning the wisdom of their actions, we should unify behind the policy and commit to giving our troops every advantage, all the equipment and all the support they need to carry out the mission successfully.

We cannot have it both ways. If we support the troops, we should support the policy.

I have had an opportunity to review the Dole-McCain resolution, and I support it and I support it strongly. I would like to set aside some of the myths that I think have been raised by those who appear to have bought into the argument of ultranationalists on both sides of this conflict. There are several myths that I think have been raised by those who appear to have bought into the argument of ultranationalists on both sides of this conflict. There are several myths that I think have been raised by those who appear to have bought into the argument of ultranationalists on both sides of this conflict.

The President and NATO leaders have been quite clear. Our forces in Bosnia will monitor the military aspects of the peace agreement, the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories and the lines of demarcation. They will monitor the redeployment of forces and heavy weapons to designated areas and the establishment of zones of separation. That is the mission.

I want to speak about the one part of the Dole-McCain joint resolution that I believe does not do justice to that mission. It appears on page 4 and speaks to the balance of power. A major portion of this effort is to see that when the United States pulls out in approximately 1 year, there is a defensive balance of power so that the Bosnians, if need be, can defend themselves. This can be a deterrent to future wars if it is carried out correctly. However, it cannot become the launching point for radical Islamic fundamentalism on the European Continent, and I want to stress that.

The Dole-McCain resolution very clearly describes periodic reports on the armaments provided to the Bosnians that the President will make to this Congress, and I think that is extremely important. I think every Member of this body should be militant in seeing that destabilizing weapons do not go into this area and that the balance of power that is achieved is a defensive balance of power. I think that is extraneous to war, and I think it has to be clearly stated.

There is another myth about the lack of U.S. interests in the region. People have said, “You know, many of our citizens can’t recognize Bosnia on a map. We don’t want to send our people there. They may die. We have no major national interest in the area.” And I thought this originally. But I believe the United States does have an interest, and a large interest.

The United States does have an interest in assuring that this conflict does not spread and become the third general European war of this century.

Because of World War II and because of the threat of Communist aggression from the Soviet Union, the NATO alliance was set up to provide peace and stability for the NATO nations, and this Nation has always been in the leadership of that effort. We have made the commitment to it throughout the years. The reason so is because of the failure of Europe in World War I to protect itself, in World War II to protect itself, and, I am sorry to say, that same failure we see there today. You see, very few strong European nations are willing to commit to the same. So, we say, “We will tackle this job alone because it’s on our back door.”

Now, we can be repelled by this, we can be reviled by it, we can view it with dismay and with some shock, but the real issue is, and, therefore, this is where the credibility of the NATO alliance comes in. The United States is critical to the success and survival of the NATO alliance.

As the British Ambassador to the United States said to me 2 days ago, “We will be there as long as the United States is. If the United States leaves, Great Britain leaves.” Period. The end. That, to me, spoke volumes of the importance of U.S. leadership. There was no European interest in supporting any of the forces that have been outside of the NATO forces.

I believe the United States has a moral interest in ending crimes against humanity. I, myself, could have been born in Eastern Europe, in Poland. I would never have been privileged to have a good life had that been the case. Well, the same circumstances are present today in Bosnia. I remember all during the 1940’s, when people were saying, “How could we not have responded? “How could we not have known?” “How did we not know that these boxcars were traveling throughout Europe and turn a deaf ear to what was happening?”

It is moral. It is just. It is noble. We are not asked to fight a war. We are asked to give peace a chance. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator HATFIELD is on his way to the floor, and he is next in line to replace Senator DeWine in the order. I wanted to take a minute, though, to say here to answer what several Senators have said on the floor—most recently, the Senator from California, and before that, the Senator from Connecticut—regarding people who would support my resolution, who are in full support of the Senate, many, though, those who have questions about this mission.

I think it is very important that every one of us in this body give to each other the right to have a vote of conscience. And there are many of us who do not think this is the right mission, but who are going to go full force to support our troops. In fact, we believe we are supporting our troops in the most effective way by opposing this mission because we think it is the wrong mission.

I do not question anyone’s motives, or how they feel, if they vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. But, by the same token, I think it is important that those who are going to support the Dole-McCain resolution and the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution—that it be known that they, too, are doing what they think is right.

It is a tough decision for anyone to vote to put our troops in harm’s way. And if someone decides that they can best support the troops by opposing the President’s decision, I think that everyone knows, or should know, that that is the right of every Senator to do.

There have been other missions in the history of this country, in which the people have been good people, supported by America, well equipped, given everything they need to succeed in their mission, but nevertheless the same outcome. America has not agreed with the mission.

I think the mission in Vietnam was certainly controversial. But the people of this country loved and revered the people who went to Vietnam from our Armed Forces and fought there for our country. So I do not think there is any question whatsoever that you cannot support a mission and support the troops fully. I think that each of us has the ability to make this decision for ourselves.

As I have said, I think it is incumbent on a Member of Congress to make this decision. It is a constitutional responsibility that we were given by the Founders. They did not want it to be easy to send troops into a foreign conflict. That is why they put Congress in the power to declare war. I do not know that our Founders had even thought about peacekeeping missions and the nuances that we would have on declaring war or not doing it. They thought about a Commander in Chief sending our troops into what is talked about as peace, but which, in fact, is sending our troops into military conflicts. I think they would have envisioned that Congress should authorize a peacekeeping mission that the President and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have said is going to put troops in harm’s way, but without authorizing, and I believe our Founders would have wanted authorization by Congress.

They did not want it to be easy to send our troops into harm’s way. That is why they made it the decision of the Commander in Chief who run the operation. The Commander in Chief does have the right to run the military. There is no question about it. But it is very clear in the Constitution that Congress should be consulted and authorized any time our troops are sent into harm’s way.

I was holding the floor for the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon, who has now arrived. I yield the floor to him for his comments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, on Thursday, the majority leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina will formally sign a peace agreement that was initialed last month in Dayton, OH. This formal signing will pave the way for the deployment of the 60,000-strong NATO peace implementation force.

Congress has a role to play in making decisions about the use of U.S. troops in hostile situations. In fact, we have an obligation to our constituents to raise questions about any mission that will lead to our troops being put in harm’s way.

After the Vietnam war, Congress insisted it have a partnership role with the President in future conflicts. So the Congress passed the War Powers Act. Under this act, the President retained the power to dispatch troops when there was an emergency. But within 60 days of the deployment Congress has to specifically authorize the deployment, tell the President to bring the troops home, or to continue to evaluate the situation after another 60 days extension. It was intended to force Congress to take action, to participate in the decision.

Unfortunately, Congress has found ways to avoid taking action. Since 1965, Congress has voted only twice to authorize the deployment of United States troops and, in recent years, we have had very few resolutions, in some cases, and we have allowed troops to be deployed in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, without authorizing legislation. We are about to do so again today.

During this debate, the Senate will have the opportunity to vote on three different measures relating to the use of United States forces in Bosnia. We have already completed the first one. The President has requested congressional authorization, but has said that he intends to deploy U.S. troops with or without that authorization.

Of course, he would like to have Congress’ support. The Senate’s consideration of these measures will provide us with the opportunity to participate in the debate. However, do not be misled. With the exception of the measure passed by the House that we have debated today, these two resolutions which we will consider, and likely pass, are not legally binding.

Mr. President, I want to reflect for just a moment on some very interesting history on Vietnam. Many who can recall during that war period, Members of the Senate, particularly, would stand before the television cameras for the evening news and wring their hands about how awful this war was and why it should not continue. But at no time during that period was any Member of Congress willing to take responsibility. All they wanted to do was to criticize the President. I have a feeling that there is a reluctance over the last few years, since we passed the War Powers Act, for Congress to take responsibility. It is much easier to criticize the President, whether Republican or Democrat, than to assume a partnership role, as provided under the War Powers Act.

I think we have the right to know that while I know that the President is sincere in his attempt to bring peace to Bosnia, I find it hard to believe that anyone can define a successful military mission which will ensure a lasting peace in the region.

The ethnic struggles which have led to war in Bosnia and Croatia are the result of more than 800 years of hatred and mistrust. How are we going to change the course of history in one short year? In my view, this is an impossible and unrealistic military mission.

I will go back to school-teaching days and say I hope that people would take the time to read one very brief synopsis of the history of this region of the world. Robert Kaplan’s “Balkan Ghosts” is a very straightforward treatise on the history, and the impossibility of this kind of a mission I would apply to that history. Read the history. We do so little reading, we do so little reflection on how we got to where we are and what were the forces that made that possible in our own country, let alone an area of the world that is probably one of the least understood areas of the world from either political, economic, social, or cultural history.

During the last 800 years we have seen more than 50 partial and general cease-fires signed in this region with these contestants, these parties. All have been broken within several weeks of their signing. My dear colleagues, they have been doing this for 800 years, lying to one another, not meaning what they were doing, because of that deep hatred that they have. To see this happening here, even in our own day we do not seem to be taking much less from it.

In addition, we have seen three previous peace agreements come and go. Given this history, it is impossible for
the President to promise he can protect U.S. troops. No one can guarantee their safety if the peace agreement falls apart.

The Dayton peace accord calls for the immediate transfer of peacekeeping control to U.N. peacekeepers. This forces to the NATO peace implementation force. The approximately 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia will be replaced by 60,000 heavily armed troops under NATO command.

Mr. President, this is not a peacekeeping force. This is an army. It proves that we are trying to solve a political dilemma, a religious dilemma, a cultural dilemma, with military troops rather than through diplomacy and negotiation.

One must only look at the peace agreement to see this. The primary mission of this course will be to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. This includes monitoring and enforcing the requirements that each entity promptly withdraws their forces behind a zone of separation which will be established on either side of the cease-fire line, and that within 120 days each entity withdraws all heavy weapons and forces to barricaded areas.

However, under the agreement, the current warring armies will continue to exist. Each entity is permitted to maintain their army. The NATO forces will be made up of enough firepower to, in the President's words "respond with overwhelming force" to any threats to their safety or violations of the military aspects of the agreement.

This does not sound like a peacekeeping mission to me, and it should not be promoted to the American public as a peacekeeping mission.

Furthermore, while the agreement calls for the parties to enter into negotiations before the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on future heavy equipment restrictions, the agreement also contradicts that arms control goal by lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

Now, get this. We are not only sending our troops in there and letting them maintain their own troops; we are saying we are going to lift the arms embargo so that they can look forward, after 180 days, to getting into an arms embargo. We cannot just pretend as the solution to the complex problem. How many people do we have to kill in actions of war to realize the total fallacy of that thesis? We now say we are going to send more troops in. We are talking about injecting our own troops into the war—and that is what it is, because there has been no peace reached yet. As I said before, we are going into Bosnia with an army and we are going to force the peace. This is different from the traditional notion of peacekeeping missions, such as the ones we have seen in countries like Korea and others.

I do not take this deployment lightly, nor do my colleagues. American soldiers will likely be killed during this mission in Bosnia. We have to accept that reality. Our brothers, sisters, wives, husbands, and children will be at risk. In Bosnia and Croatia there are nearly 6 million landmines in the ground. These hidden enemies pose the greatest risk to our troops. In fact, landmines have become the leading cause of casualties in Bosnia of peacekeeping forces.

Even though the peace agreement requires all sides to participate in identifying and removing these mines, the reality is that little information exists about the layout of the minefields scattered throughout Bosnia. As we have seen in Cambodia and Afghanistan, mine removal is a tedious task which cannot be done on paper. Landmines in Bosnia endanger not only our troops and peace implementation forces, but also civilians who are trying to return home and rebuild their lives.

I will not support any resolution that explicitly or implicitly gives the Senate's support for United States troop involvement in Bosnia. While I will wholeheartedly support our troops once they are there, not under their own doing, under the Commander in Chief, I cannot and will not endorse this military mission.

We must bring a lasting peace to Bosnia, but we must do so by limiting, not increasing, the war-making capability of all sides to this conflict. It is amazing how we can orchestrate 25 countries of the world for a common purpose to fight a war for oil, but somehow we do not find our way to the leaders of our own country were in a third-party transfer? We never did try with great effort to stop the flow of arms, even under the embargo. Now we are going to lift the pretense of an embargo in order to keep our troops in there and letting them continue to fight this war.
I have just been on the phone with the President. He would like to have the vote as early as possible. I know the House is involved in debating resolutions over there. I know some of our colleagues have yet to speak, but there will still be some additional reassurances, and that is the Dole-McCain-Nunn-Lieberman, and others, resolution. So people could still speak in general debate.

It seems to me there is no reason not to vote on the amendment by the Senator from Texas. There is no use making a request if it will be objected to. Does the Democratic leader think we can proceed on that basis and still have plenty of time for debate?

Mr. DASCHLE. I have consulted with a number of our colleagues on this side of the aisle, and many of them feel very strongly about their need to speak prior to the time they will be called upon to vote on either measure. They would prefer to give one speech rather than two.

In my urging to limit Members to one speech, and hopefully to keep those speeches to a minimum length, I will have to accommodate them and their interest in speaking and being protected in their opportunity to speak prior to the time that they would be called upon to vote. I am compelled at this point to object to the scheduling of the vote prior to the time that they have had the opportunity to speak.

My preference would be that we have both votes back to back to accommodate the speeches, and I think we can get some cooperation in limiting the lengths of time, if that can be done.

Mr. DOLE. Certainly this Senator does not have any problem with back to back—anything that would expedite the process. I think most people have spoken with reference to one or two of the amendments. I do not know how many more speakers are on this side. Some have spoken a number of times.

I think if we limit our speeches to one speech, at least on this side, that would help some. Maybe we can have a back-to-back vote at some time.

How much more time do you think it will take on your side?

Mr. DASCHLE. A lot of our colleagues are not willing to commit to a time limit yet. We are working on getting at least an agreement that everybody speak just once and then hopefully limiting their time for speaking.

At this point, I am not able to give the leader any specific estimate as to the amount of time we need.

Mr. DOLE. I do not make the request, then, because the Democratic leader to accommodate not been able to give me the consent, so there is no need doing that.

In the meantime, we will try to see if we cannot find some consensus, some agreement here, where we could have back-to-back votes at some reasonable hour.

We have how many speakers left now?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if I could answer, I think there are at least 20 people signed up to this point.

I was, of course, hoping that the distinguished minority leader might be able to put a time agreement together, and then I think we could gauge the length of the speeches a little more and perhaps reach a conclusion, and I assume that everyone would like to do this before the President leaves at 6 o’clock or so.

Mr. DOLE. I think there is a phone on the plane.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I am sorry to hear that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMPSON). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senator from Florida, Senator GRAHAM, be added in the next Democratic slot on the list of speakers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from Virginia yield for a unanimous consent request to add Senator HELMS in the next Democratic slot.

Mr. ROBB. I am happy to yield.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator HELMS be added in the next available Republican slot.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, we cannot and should not attempt to act as if the world’s problems can be solved by eminently sensible acknowledgment of the limits of U.S. power and cannot and should not deterr us from acting when it is the United States and only the United States that can end aggression and bloodshed, or in this case the genocide that has already claimed the lives of over 200,000 human beings and left over 2 million as refugees.

I understand the concerns and reticence of many of our colleagues, indeed cost of the people. Calls of the people, most congressional offices remain overwhelmingly against putting United States ground forces in Bosnia. But without U.S. leadership, there would be no peace. The Europeans tried nobly but in vain. The fighting did not stop until the United States led NATO in the air and led the diplomatic efforts which culminated in the initialing of the agreement in Dayton and the final signing that will take place tomorrow in Paris.

Without U.S. leadership and active participation on the ground, the peace will end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the last, best hope to end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the last, best hope to end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the last, best hope to end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the last, best hope to end and the carnage will continue. We now represent the last, best hope to end and the carnage will continue.

In the meantime, we will try to see if we cannot find some consensus, some agreement here, where we could have back-to-back votes at some reasonable hour.

We have how many speakers left now?
Mr. President, these war and peace decisions are difficult, and they reach deep into our emotions. I believe our Founding Fathers were wise to vest in the President the broadest and most complete authority for waging war and peace. As Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces while providing Congress with the power of the purse and the exclusive right to declare war.

We have only one President at a time, and I believe President Bush has made the best choice of deploying troops to Bosnia. We are in a war and our participation in it will have serious consequences in the Balkans, and ongoing war will have serious consequences in the world. I believe it is right for the American people and the American military to know what we will be fighting for and what our interest is.

Mr. President, the President has made the right decision to deploy our troops. We know that the President of the United States acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief has made the decision and it is a decision that the American people and the American military should know about. The President has decided to deploy our troops to Bosnia to protect American citizens. If the President does not make that decision, then it will be our job to work with him and make sure that the right decision is made.

Mr. President, I believe in this case is the right thing to do. And that is to support the deployment and to support our troops in the commitment that the President of the United States is making. As Commander in Chief, you have the authority to deploy troops to protect American citizens. If you do not make that decision, then it will be our job to work with you and make sure that the right decision is made.

Mr. President, I believe it is the President's responsibility to make the decision to deploy our troops. If he does not make that decision, then it will be our job to work with him and make sure that the right decision is made. The American people and the American military want to know what is being done.

Mr. President, I believe in this case is the right thing to do. And that is to support the deployment and to support our troops in the commitment that the President of the United States is making. As Commander in Chief, you have the authority to deploy troops to protect American citizens. If you do not make that decision, then it will be our job to work with you and make sure that the right decision is made. The American people and the American military want to know what is being done.
a real, bona fide probability that what we are trying to do will not work? I happen to know less than most around here about what went on in that country for the last 600 years. But I do know something. I do know that the only times these people have lived together in peace and harmony in modern times were two events in history: One, when the Germans occupied it. Clearly we do not intend to keep the peace among these people who do not seem to have peace among themselves with an occupancy like Hitler's. I hope we do not, and we are assured we do not.

The other peaceful time in modern history is the reign of the dictator Tito. The Communists' most pervasive way of keeping peace and harmony is block by block behavior that must be consistent with the state or something happens to you, right? That is a simple way of saying you behave or we will kill you. This was maybe not like the Nazi occupation, but that also maintained the peace.

We are not going to do that. There is no one around suggesting that anyone is going to do that. And so we have three new countries born of new boundaries and we are going to ask of that leadership, the leadership of those countries, what I perceive to be impossible. We are going to ask them to do a "Mission Impossible"—disarm those who would cause harm with weapons. How are they going to do that? I do not believe they are strong enough, and I do not believe they will get it done. There will be plenty of guns around for rebels who want to kill each other, who are angry because they do not belong in that country or their houses are occupied by people they do not want.

We are also asked to be part of making sure that these countries get a balance of military power amongst themselves. I am not even sure that will work. We have been talking about it for a long time, but I am wondering even if a balance is ever achieved, then pull our troops out, that Bosnia could be an even bigger tinderbox and more war with more killing. So my own feeling is we are sending our troops to do something that will not work, to exhibit our leadership in a situation that we ought not be leading or even supporting.

Now, obviously, it is easy to get up on the floor of the Senate and talk about how great America is, and how wonderful our military men and women are. We can almost envision in our mind's eye the great, beautiful sight when they arrive and show up with all of our new tanks and all of the American flags. It is going to be a great scene. But the reality is going to feel very proud, because it is a fantastic—fantastic—accomplishment of the people of the United States who regularly have been paying taxes. Let me make this right, now, they are paying about $270 billion for the defense of their country, so that we can have men and women like these that we are sending there.

So I close today very simply by saying I would not send any more people in, and I am voting for the resolution that says we do not approve of this. It is with reluctance that I will vote against the Dole resolution when it comes up because I do not think it is the right thing to do.

I hope I have explained myself that I am not trying to pass judgment on these constitutional powers, be they inherent or otherwise. I am talking very, very simply about what I perceive to be my responsibility. I express it as best I can here on the floor. And that is the way I feel. For those who have led this cause, with far more effort than I, I thank them for it. And I thank the junior Senator from Oklahoma for his leadership.

I do believe we are going to be there for quite awhile and spend a lot of money. I pray that is all we spend there, and we do not spend any money there. I truly believe it is possible that we will lose, but I am not standing up here saying I am frightened singularly of that. I just do not think we ought to do this. I do not think it is the right mission for us. And since I feel that way, neither our military equipment nor our military men and women should be there trying to accomplish this job. I yield the floor.

Mr. Nunn addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today or tomorrow the Senate will be voting on the President's decision to deploy United States military forces as part of a NATO peace enforcement mission in Bosnia.

There are many different views of how we got to this point. You have my own views on that. I will discuss them at another time. I have already discussed them in the past on numerous occasions.

But it is my hope that the Senate will now be able to concentrate its focus on the choices that are now before us. There are few things about the current situation that we know; a few things that we believe based on reasonable judgments but not certainty; and many unknowns that are subject only to reasonable speculation at this point, even if it is reasonable speculation.

The things that we know are what I will try to deal with in a short and brief set of remarks today.

First of all, we know that President Clinton has decided to commit United States military forces to this mission in Bosnia.

Second, we know that NATO has decided to commit the NATO alliance to this peace enforcement mission. And we know that all NATO nations that have military forces are participating.

Third, we know that several hundred American troops are now on the ground in Bosnia; and several thousand troops will be on the ground in Bosnia in the next few weeks.

Fourth, we can debate the constitutional power of the Commander in Chief, as we have many times in the past and we will again, and we can debate congressional responsibility to declare war, but we all know that Congress has neither the ways nor the means to prevent this deployment unless we cut off the funds. We know that.

Fifth, we know that the Defense appropriations bill has passed both the Senate and the House and the President, unlike his predecessors of both parties, will finance the operation out of operation and maintenance funds and then seek reimbursement of these funds next year in a supplemental appropriation.

Sixth, we know that if Congress cuts off the funds at this point, it would require a majority in both Houses to pass and two-thirds vote in both the Senate and House to override a certain veto. This is rejected this cutoff of funds decisively today when we voted on the first resolution because I believe the Senators concluded this would have an adverse effect on our own military forces, an adverse effect on our allies, an adverse effect on the future of NATO and the world, as well as an adverse effect on the parties on the ground in Bosnia.

The President has decided on deployment. The NATO alliance has decided on deployment. The United States forces are on the way to Bosnia. What then is the congressional role in this important national security decision?

Mr. President, I would like to talk at length today about the constitutional challenges we have in terms of determining the role of Congress in the post-cold war era. I will return to that subject shortly.

But today we must face a world of reality. The cards have been dealt. The administration's actions—starting with the President's commitment almost 3 years ago—and that was a public and international commitment that United States forces would participate in NATO forces to implement a Bosnian peace agreement—have put Congress in a situation in which a great deal is at stake, including United States reliability and leadership, but also including the peace agreement itself. The endgame is the tragedy in Bosnia, as well as the future of NATO as an alliance.

We also know that a cut off of funds will not become law, but passage of legislation by a veto and a vote to override, if the House passes it or we pass it today—would put our military forces in limbo in the middle of their deployment—when they are most vulnerable. To me this is unthinkable in our leadership.

We also know that the effect of such action would erode the value of U.S. commitments around the world and would increase the danger to U.S. military personnel in harm's way that are stationed in dangerous places around the world.

That danger certainly would be an increase to our military forces whether
in the Korean Peninsula or in Europe or in the Middle East because the greatest thing they have behind them is United States credibility and the credibility of our own word.

The bottom line—Mr. President—if today we decide to do the things we have committed to doing and to commit others to doing which include the NATO chain of command must make it clear to all others as well) that our country is giving them its full backing in the accomplishment of their assigned mission. We believe that the military forces to be drawn into mission-creep nation-building but are to be used for tasks military in nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro-management from afar, or to “dual-key” aberrations.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.

As American military forces are being prepared for commitment in Bosnia, we believe it is essential that they go with a clear understanding that they are supported by their country—that is, by the whole American people—in their difficult and dangerous assignment.

Our military forces serving in Bosnia will be under American command, acting in concert with military forces from NATO and other nations that participate in the military implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The mission statement and the NATO chain of command must make it clear that the military forces to be drawn into mission-creep nation-building but are to be used for tasks military in nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro-management from afar, or to “dual-key” aberrations.

As our leaders consider our country’s involvement in Bosnia, we encourage them to send a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines where they may be (and to all others as well) that our country is giving them its full backing in the accomplishment of their assigned mission. We believe it is time to close our support to our troops in the field, and concentrate on helping them do their job in the best possible way.

Mr. President, I urge the Senate today to support—tomorrow, when we vote—the Dole-McCain resolution. This resolution has been the subject of intense and constructive negotiations on a bipartisan basis with a Democratic working group headed by Senator Daschle, Senator Pell and myself.

The Dole-McCain resolution, as now worded, has a key paragraph which I believe conveys the kind of support our American troops and their families both need and deserve. I quote that paragraph because I think it basically follows almost exactly what these distinguished retired military generals and admirals have said to us in the way of advice.

Quoting the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution:

The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of the peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery and believes that they must be given all necessary resources and authority to carry out their mission and ensure their security.

Mr. President, that is the heart of what we are going to be voting on. I hope that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will understand the importance of what we are doing, and I hope they will put the military forces first and foremost in their minds.

Mr. President, before we vote on the Dole-McCain resolution, it is my understanding we will vote on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. I have great respect for both Senators who sponsored this resolution. They are on the Armed Services Committee, and they do a sterling job of representing their States and representing the American people on this committee. But the Hutchison resolution does not provide what our troops need. It does not provide a sense that the Senate backs them and their mission. It tells our military forces, in effect—“We don’t agree with your mission. What you’re doing is not important to the United States. It’s not important enough for you to risk your life.”

These are the people who are going to be risking their lives. It’s not important enough for you to risk your life and the other is the NATO alliance and its mission.”

“Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia” —and this is my paraphrasing of the Hutchison-Inhofe message; these are not the words, we can not any one to think I am quoting the words. This is the effect of those words. “Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia is not something we agree with.”

That
is what we are going to be saying implicitly if we adopt this resolution. Certainly we will be saying it if we adopt this resolution and do not pass the Dole-McCain resolution. We are also saying implicitly the President is totally on his own without the backing of the Congress and the American people.

We go forward and say in the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution—again, in effect, these are my words—"We will pay you, we will equip you and we will wish you well. We don't agree with the mission, we don't think it's important enough for you to risk your life, but we are going to equip you, support you and wish you well."

Now, how do the military men and women and their families going to feel about undertaking this kind of mission where, indeed, many of them will be risking their lives? I hope not many will end up being injured or killed. I hope none. But nevertheless, there is a very different message in that resolution. How are they going to feel if we send them off on this undertaking with this message from the U.S. Senate?

Mr. President, I understand the temptation my colleagues to vote for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It gives Senators the ability to say we were against this mission from the beginning but we support our troops. This resolution, which will be voted on today or tomorrow, may be what some Senators need, but it is not what our troops need at this juncture.

It is entirely possible—I hope it does not happen—but it is entirely possible the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution could be agreed to and the Dole-McCain resolution could fail. If this occurs, then our American military will have the worst of both worlds. We will be saying, "Full speed ahead on a risky mission that we do not agree with, don't approve of," and that is what we are going to do—"Full speed ahead on a risky mission with the clear knowledge the mission is denounced at the outset by the U.S. Senate."

I urge my colleagues to vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, and I urge them to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.

I urge all of those at this stage are thinking about voting for the Hutchison resolution to think very carefully. It is essential for the morale of our military forces and their families that we give at a later point in this debate or otherwise that the Congress of the United States undertake a fundamental look at the role we are playing or not playing in terms of these national security decisions.

Congress must understand—if we do not get all necessary resources and support to carry out their missions and ensure their security.

Mr. President, in closing, I urge the passage of the Dole-McCain resolution so that our military forces and their families will understand that we in Congress support them, but that the mission they are undertaking and the risks they will bear are important to America.

I know there are others waiting to speak, and I am not going to go into great detail, but I do want to say, just in summarizing my prepared remarks, which I will not give today but will give at a later point in this debate or otherwise, that the Congress of the United States needs to take a fundamental look at the role we are playing or not playing in terms of these national security decisions.

Congress must understand—if we do not get all necessary resources and support to, and I have understood it for a number of years—the War Powers Act does not work. The longer this outmoded and unworkable legislation remains on the books, the longer we will continue the illusion that Congress is playing a fundamental role of commitment of U.S. military forces to these types of missions.

President Clinton will be viewed by most in Congress as assuming the full responsibility for the fate of the United States military mission in Bosnia. That is because this commitment by President Clinton was made in 1993 without consultation with the Congress or the congressional leadership.

I urge my colleagues to vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, and I urge them to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.

It is based on the fundamental flaw that assumes that congressional inaction can require the Commander in Chief to withdraw forces from abroad. Congressional inaction will never, ever force a Commander in Chief to withdraw forces. The only way we can do that is by cutting off funds, and we need to recognize this.

No President will or should allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn from a military mission because of simple congressional inaction. If Mr. President, it is time to repeal the War Powers Act and replace it with legislation that is realistic and workable. We must find a way to create regular, full, and comprehensive consultation between the President and the Congress before the President makes concrete commitments and before U.S. troops are committed to harm's way.

We do not have that mechanism now. We do not have that consultation taking place in a timely fashion, and that has been true both in Republican and in Democratic administrations.

So I hope out of this we will begin looking at the War Powers Act and begin to make changes.

I see that the Senator from Delaware is on the floor. He and I and Senator Byrd, as well as Senator Warner and several other Republicans, several years ago sponsored a revision of the War Powers Act. I urge my colleagues will begin to think along those lines because it is leading us down the primrose path of having a law on the books that supposedly involves Congress in these decisions when, by the time Congress is involved, the international commitment has already been made and the choices are regrettably limited.

I yield the floor. Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I appreciate the debate that has been undertaken here in the U.S. Senate and the remarks of individual Senators. I would like to read section 2, which is entitled “Expressing Support for United States Military Personnel Who Are Deployed.” The wording is simple, straightforward, and unmistakably clear:

The Congress strongly supports the United States military personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement the general framework for peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina and its associated annexes.

It seems to me that that is a very clear and generous statement. It is an
honest statement by the U.S. Senate, which allows that even if we disagree with the President—and many of us do—when such a deployment is made, in the words of the resolution, we will strongly support the military personnel who are ordered by the President to implement the particular mission which has been designated. In this case, it is to implement the general framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the associated an- nexes.

Today, Mr. President, the United States again finds itself faced with the conflicting demands of a confused and chaotic world. Today's debate carries the name of "Bosnia," but it is a de- bate that this Congress has faced nu- merous times before—it is just the name that has changed.

At stake and at question are the spe- cific terms, conditions, and reasons for deploying U.S. troops, and the nature of U.S. foreign policy generally. These are not public policy questions to be de- cided for the President or for those of us here in the Congress, not for the military, and certainly not for the families of America's service men and women, who are preparing for deployment in Bosnia.

Like all Americans, I want to see an end to the killing and cruelty that have come to define the daily existence of millions of people in Bosnia. The atrocities committed by all parties are so heinous that we confess to all of our con- sciences and to fire within us justifi- able outrage. That these horrors come to an end is not a point of debate; that the United States has a special respon- sibility in the world, as the only super- power, is likewise not a matter of gen- uine debate. But today's debate is much more nar- rowly focused—it is a debate about a so-called peace plan—brokered by the United States, agreed to by the war- ring factions in Bosnia—Dayton. One of the merits of that plan is whether that plan warrants the in- volvement and possible deaths of U.S. ground troops in the Balkans. I believe that until the Clinton administration can clearly and convincingly answer why, how, and under what conditions we ought to be involved, I cannot sup- port the President's decision to deploy American soldiers to enforce the peace agreement.

In any deployment of U.S. ground troops, I believe that we must meet at least a five-part test. I will state the parts of that test again today, just as I have consistently over the course of the last year.

First, I think we have to identify the vital U.S. national interests. It has to be a security interest. It has to be an interest which is important to the con- tinuing existence of this country.

Second, we need to outline clear U.S. military and policy objectives.

Third, we need to construct a time- table and strategy for achieving those objectives.

Fourth, we need to develop an appro- priate exit strategy; and,

Fifth, we really need to gain the sup- port of the American people for the policy initiatives and the military ob- jectives in any deployment.

What we determine to be our vital in- terests is dynamic. A geographical re- view of the world today suggests that our inter- ests at one time may not be at another time. Technology might change. Broad- ly defined, "vital" U.S. interests are defined as being those interests that might have a substantially adverse eco- nomic effect on the Nation. They ought to have an interest about our capacity to sur- vive and succeed as a nation. Threats to strategic assets, to shipping lanes, to our strategic allies, and threats to our traditional sphere of influence, similarly represent "clear and present danger" to the United States. Less clear is the nature of humanitarian in- terest, and how and when such inter- ests are considered vital U.S. national interests.

Despite the protestations of members of the Clinton administration, it is this final category that I believe we are dealing here. In the course of the past few weeks, I have had the opportunity to listen to the heart- ists are considered vital U.S. national interests.

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accord, will we be going abroad with our troops to enforce things and values which are not things that we are willing to support or that we respect at home? As a matter of fact, are we going there to support or reinforce things that we believe at home? And are we going there to enforce a type of ethnic de facto segregation that we are fighting against at home? Is it possible that we are deploying America’s soldiers to fight for values of ethnic isolation that run contrary to America’s values and goals around the world? Are we going to defend strategic vital national interests, or where those interests are not self-evident, are we deploying our troops to defend territorial lines among ethnic factions which were gained through offensive atrocities? Are we validating ethnic segregation of the parties to promote peace, when our Nation painfully learned that it is only “united we stand, divided we fall.”

For generations we pursued an international strategy of promoting democratic values. I think we have to ask ourselves, is that what we are doing here? There are a lot of nuances and uncertainties about foreign policies. This is not one of them. We fight abroad for our interests and our values. We must not agree to work for something that is both not in our vital national interests, but contrary to our values.

Let me just say in conclusion that I believe that we must make sure that the deployment of our troops is not merely the appetizer and that the main course becomes massive foreign aid that is felt as an obligation of this country and Congress as a result of having had the deployment of our troops on the soil of a foreign nation. All too frequently, we feel that we learn that it is only “united we stand, divided we fall.”

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So I hear people stand here and say, "So given the choices, I support this engagement." I respectfully suggest, were it not for the embargo, provide enough time for the War Crimes Tribunal to go forward and let it be settled. Let me defend myself, and have the community. Have the War Crimes Tribunal go forward and let it be settled. We get to choose among bad choices.

I am here to take sides. Milosevic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, is a war criminal. He is no better than Himmler. He is no better than Goebbels. He is no better than the Vietnamese and South Vietnam were not sure where they wanted to be, North or South. That is why it never worked.

The Serbs used the phrase, I kept hearing on this floor that, "They are all the same." And that is, what is our interest? What is our interest, and Republicans. The word was then, if I do not like about being Senator is when President and the administration and the last administration, in my view, had the gumption, they would have told our European allies that we are lifting the arms embargo.

This is not a Vietnamization program. The Vietnamese and South Vietnam were not sure where they wanted to be, North or South. That is why it never worked.

The Bosnians know where they want to be. They want to be free. They will fight for themselves, and all they have ever asked for is lifting the arms embargo.

Prime Minister Silajdzic came after my first visit to Bosnia. I had him in the White House, and he looked at this Senator, and he said: "Senator, at least do me the honor and the privilege of letting me choose how to die." We must not send food to faten me and my family in the winter only to be assured that I will be killed with the full stomach. Give me a weapon. Let me defend myself, and have the good grace to let me choose how to die.

He then went on to add, "I am not asking for you to send a single American troop. I am not asking for you to send a single American. I am asking you to lift this immoral embargo."

In 1995 and 1997 and 1999 and 2001 and certainly in the same continent, in the same proximity, the same death camps—it is happening again. And it happened again.

What I am about to say is going to cause great difficulties if I am re-elected and come back here as the ranking Democrat of the Foreign Relations Committee. But Europe cannot stay united without the United States. There is no moral center in Europe. When in the last two centuries have the French, or the British, or the Germans, or the Belgians, or the Russians, or the Italians moved in a way to unify that continent to stand up to this kind of genocide? Have they done it? The only reason anything is happening now is because the United States of America—finally—is understanding her role.

So we do have a national interest. Our national interest goes well beyond the genocide that will spread like a cancer. I will not take the time, because others wish to speak, to explain what the rest of it is. But I do in my longer statement which I will put in the RECORD.

But there is a second question it seems to me after first asking what is the interest? Because he is the man of the Foreign Relations Committee. But Europe cannot stay united without the United States. Once you establish that there is a national interest—and I believe there is one—then, is the proposed action by the President the one that can meet that national interest? I respectfully suggest this is not the best one.

But we did not do that.

So I hear people stand here and say, "What is our interest? What is our interest?" Our interest is that history repeated itself.

Let me be presumptuous enough to go on a little more to what I think the next 100 years ago and 40 years ago are now uncovered again. There are 25 million Russians living outside the border of Russia, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic countries, in Kazakhstan. There is war in Armenia, in Georgia, and almost all of it is based on ethnicity.

What is the reason we send to the world if we stand by and say we will let it continue to happen here in this place but it is not in our interest? We do not fear that it will spread; I am not here to tell you that, if we do not think it can act, I see a man in Europe—tomorrow or next year. But I am here to tell you that within the decade, it will cause the spread of war like a cancer, and the collapse of the Western alliance. What is so important about the Western alliance? NATO for NATO's sake so that we can beat our breast?

What I am about to say is going to cause me great difficulty if I am re-elected and come back here as the ranking Democrat of the Foreign Relations Committee. But Europe cannot stay united without the United States. There is no moral center in Europe. When in the last two centuries have the French, or the British, or the Germans, or the Belgians, or the Russians, or the Italians moved in a way to unify that continent to stand up to this kind of genocide? Have they done it? The only reason anything is happening now is because the United States of America—finally—is understanding her role.

So we do have a national interest. Our national interest goes well beyond the genocide that will spread like a cancer. I will not take the time, because others wish to speak, to explain what the rest of it is. But I do in my longer statement which I will put in the RECORD.

But there is a second question it seems to me after first asking what is the interest? Because he is the man of the Foreign Relations Committee. But Europe cannot stay united without the United States. Once you establish that there is a national interest—and I believe there is one—then, is the proposed action by the President the one that can meet that national interest? I respectfully suggest this is not the best one.

But we did not do that.

So I hear people stand here and say, "What is our interest? What is our interest?" Our interest is that history repeated itself.

Let me be presumptuous enough to go on a little more to what I think the next 100 years ago and 40 years ago are now uncovered again. There are 25 million Russians living outside the border of Russia, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic countries, in Kazakhstan. There is war in Armenia, in Georgia, and almost all of it is based on ethnicity.

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If we thought we had a moral interest, a national interest in restoring the Emir of Kuwait to the throne—restoring the Emir of Kuwait to the throne. God bless his soul—to send 500,000 troops there, tell me, tell me why we do not have a moral interest in stopping what was international aggression by Serbia crossing the Drina River into a U.N.-recognized country and participating in genocide?

In Kuwait we had a single example of one young woman who was raped, and beaten, and beheaded. It turned out not to be true, to enrage people about the awful thing Saddam Hussein was doing. And here we have mass graves. I have visited with Bob Dole a hospital in Sarajevo. Do you know who was in the hospital? Seven children. Do you know why there were only seven children? Because the Serbs sit in those hills and they have as a campaign of terror, the maiming of children. Walk with me through Sarajevo’s streets and see draped across the roads blankets and sheets. I thought it was a Lower East Side in 1939 of New York.

I asked why. Do you know why they are there? To take over the line of fire from Serbian snipers shooting children. We pretended it did not happen. Ask Bob Dole.

We stood beside a beautiful raven-haired child who looked at us as we spoke. And the neurosurgeon said, “The reason she is not turning is she has no sight. He cut her head, severed the optic nerves, and came out the other side.”

There were seven children in that hospital. Nobody else. It was a planned campaign by Mladic and the Serbs to carry out barbaric atrocities against the war in Bosnia. There have been refugee flights in other countries that dwarf the Bosnian numbers.

This century has seen the Jewish Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, huge murder of children, the unspeakable. This unprecedented, central planned campaign of mass rape, the monstrous collection of Ukraine, and the killing fields of Cambodia. So, Mr. President, I suppose cynics might say that we have become hardened to the unspeakable.

Yet what has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina not only has had components of the other horrors the 20th century, it has actually added a diabolical new feature: The unprecedented, centrally planned campaign of mass rape that the Bosnian Serbs have used as a calculated weapon of terror designed to demoralize Bosnian Moslem communities.

Mr. President, why is this allowed to happen? To help answer this question, let me offer a place of counterfactual analysis that I have delivered before on this Senate floor: “What if” a Moslem-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina had attacked a peaceful, peaceful, peaceful Serbia, carried out barbaric atrocities against Serbian civilians, and then proudly announced that its policy of ethnic cleansing had been successful—would Christian Europe then have sat idly by, conjuring up excuse after excuse for not halting the cruel and cowardly aggression?

Mr. President, I think the answer is self-evident. Europe’s every war was yesterday’s victim. That Bosnian Moslems are today’s. If we let the barbarism in Bosnia stand, who knows who will be tomorrow’s?

Now at last, thanks to the belated—nonetheless, praiseworthy—leadership of the United States, we stand on the verge of a monumental effort designed to put a stop to the depravity, to try to restore a modicum of normal, civilized life to that sorry land. I fear that the chances for success are long-shot. But Mr. President, make no mistake about it: If the United States does not continue to lead this effort, the chances for even a semblance of peace in Bosnia are zero.

And yet the choice is not an easy one. Like almost every other decision concerning foreign policy that a U.S. Senator has to make, our choice about whether to support President Clinton’s decision to deploy 20,000 American troops to Bosnia is an international peace implementation force known as the I-FOR is a reactive one.

The U.S. Congress rarely gets to formulate policy. We cannot, and should not, write arms control treaties or banish international terrorism. Most of the time we are asked to react to proposed solutions that are far from ideal, perhaps not even the best. But often these solutions, however risky they may be, are nonetheless better than not acting at all.

That is exactly how I feel about the proposed deployment of U.S. troops in the I-FOR. For more than 3 years, since September 1992, I have been calling for agreement that offers the only real accomplishment for 3 1/2 years: a multilateral agreement ever is—-but we have to deal with the situation now at hand. Consequently, I have called for striking from the air at the offending Serbs while the Bosnian Government was building up its own military strength.

Finally I have advocated making clear to the Government of Serbia that it would suffer massive air strikes upon its territory across the Drina River if it increased its assistance to the Serbian Serb aggressors.

Moreover, the Biden Amendment, which I introduced in 1992, and which was successfully approved by Congress in 1993 and 1994, authorized assistance to Bosnia through a drawdown of up to $50 million of Defense Department weapons stocks and other military equipment. This year’s foreign operations appropriations conference report has increased this figure to $100 million. As soon as the President receives and signs the foreign operations appropriations bill, he will be able to use this source any time upon termination of the arms embargo.

Up until 1 month ago this policy that I proposed remained, I am convinced, the best option open to the United States. It would have created the conditions of military parity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are essential for maintaining a lasting peace.

Then came the talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The peace agreement that emerged from those talks is not perfect—no international agreement ever is—but we have to deal with the situation now at hand.

Let me take this occasion to congratulate Secretary of State Christopher and his negotiating team for their tireless efforts that achieved what no one else had been able to accomplish for 3½ years: a multilateral agreement that offers the only real prospect of ending the bloodshed in Europe since World War II. It is a highly significant achievement, which brings great credit to the United States of America.
Yet Secretary Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and General Shalikashvili would be the first to admit that the Dayton Accords are still only a building block for the structure of peace for the former Yugoslavia, which remains the precondition for an end to the conflict.

Let me underscore that the involvement of American ground troops in the peace enforcement effort—the solution less preferable than the lift-and-strike policy I have consistently advocated—in no way lessens the necessity of equipping and training the Bosnian Federation's army in order to allow it to defend itself when all foreign peace implementation forces leave. The bipartisan resolution specifically mentions this point.

So I would like also to be perfectly clear that if the administration had not assured that this equipping and training would take place—if not by uniformed U.S. military personnel, then by contractors—I would not support the mission of U.S. ground troops in the I-For. Third countries may, of course, also contribute weapons and training to the Federation, but a failure of Americans to take the lead in this effort would quite simply be a prescription for a protracted and incomplete demobilization of our ground forces in Bosnia, a policy which the American people will not countenance.

President Clinton's outstanding televised speech to the Nation went a long way toward explaining to the American people the rationale for, and mission of our troops in the I-For. I do not take issue with any of the President's arguments.

Above all, I would emphasize to those who wish to restrict America's involvement abroad that the choice facing us is not between a risky foreign mission and the status quo. If the United States does not participate in—or more precisely, lead—the I-For, I am convinced that the war will re-ignite, escalate, probably spread, and open the door for the killing and to re-enter the world community.

For all these reasons, then, our participation in the operation is vital. There are, however, serious risks associated with sending our troops to Bosnia, and it is incumbent upon the administration to explain to Congress how we are planning to minimize them. These risks include:

- Millions of lethal mines, which will probably be hidden by snow for several months;
- The brutal Balkan winter that makes driving hazardous;
- Irregular forces, foreign extremists, and other rogue elements that may specially target American troops; and
- The likelihood that an armed, hostile Bosnian Serb populace in several locations could both harbor attackers and engage in disruptive activity itself.

From administration testimony in hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, I am satisfied that these concerns have been thoroughly analyzed, and counter measures developed to the fullest extent possible.

Last Friday at 5 o'clock in the morning, I went to Dover Air Force Base in my State of Delaware to personally say good-bye to a detachment of our troops as they embarked for Bosnia. They are as fine a group of American men and women as has ever represented the Armed Forces of this country. Every possible precaution must be taken to lessen the threat to their person as they carry out their duties in Bosnia. In this regard, I emphasize that the robust rules of engagement for our troops must not be altered under any circumstance.

In larger terms, I believe that the criteria for the mission's success and a responsible exit strategy must be delineated even more clearly than has already been done. For example, is the absence of serious conflict after 1 year sufficient? Or, may the peace agreement be considered declared in mission accomplished? Stated more precisely, will we withdraw our ground troops after precisely 1 year even if the envisioned democratic institutions of the Bosnian central government are not yet functioning? If so, will other international units remain for a longer period?

My own belief is that the I-For mission should be limited to creating the conditions for military forces in what is known as the I-For, the NATO implementation force. The purpose of this is to monitor the Dayton accords. But it may well be unrealistic to expect construction of a working democracy in 365 days or less. Therefore, plans must be drawn up immediately for a follow-on force to remain in Bosnia after the United States troops leave. My strong feeling is that this force should be led by our European NATO allies, augmented by units of European neutrals with experience in peacekeeping operations.

Finally, let me repeat once again the absolute necessity of creating a balance of military strength on the ground so that when the international peacekeepers are withdrawn, the Federal army of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be vulnerable to renewed attack.

The peace settlement is far from perfect. There is no guarantee that it will be implemented. The involvement of American ground forces means—although I pray I am wrong—that casualties and fatalities are likely to occur.

But, as I have indicated, we live in a highly imperfect world. To do nothing would be to invite larger problems in the future that would require a much riskier and bloodier American involvement.

If the conditions I have outlined are met: retention of very robust rules of engagement for our troops; no mission creep for our troops; but close coordination of the I-For with international civilian efforts in Bosnia; a United States lead in coordinating arming and training the army of the Federation, but involvement have trotted out the cliche that the United States cannot be the "world's policeman." Well, of course we are everywhere, and it is incumbent upon the administration to explain to America how we are planning to minimize them. These risks include:

- The slaughter, rape, and destruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be an affront to the sensibilities of every American. The I-For mission at the very least will give the brutalized people of that land a last chance to stop the killing and to re-enter the world community.

For all these reasons, then, our participation in the operation is vital. There are, however, serious risks associated with sending our troops to Bosnia, and it is incumbent upon the administration to explain to Congress how we are planning to minimize them. These risks include:

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My own belief is that the I-For mission should be limited to creating the conditions for military forces in what is known as the I-For, the NATO implementation force. The purpose of this is to monitor the Dayton accords.
The Dayton peace agreement and this NATO deployment represents, in my judgment, the only opportunity to achieve a long-term peace in Bosnia and with it a more stable Europe. That is a very important point, Mr. President—a more stable Europe, which is a matter of profound interest to the United States.

The Senate's vote on the Dole resolution involves the question of what role the United States should play in Europe at the outset of the 21st century. Let us just take a brief look into history, if we might. It was an assassination in the Balkans, in Sarajevo itself, that triggered World War I, a conflict into which the United States was reluctantly drawn. Indeed, we stayed out of it for nearly 3 years.

At the conclusion of that devastating war, the United States made a very conscious decision, and that was to withdraw from any involvement in European security matters, nor should we. Our active engagement in Europe for the past 50 years since the end of World War II has brought enormous benefits to us, to the Europeans, and to the world at large. Western Europe has enjoyed peace, it has enjoyed freedom, it has enjoyed democracy, and it has enjoyed economic success ever since the end of that war.

This has largely been due to U.S. leadership in NATO. Our leadership has assisted in bringing about the fall of communism and the liberation of Eastern Europe. But despite these successes, Europe today is not free of war and bloodshed and instability. We need to look no further than the war that has raged in the Balkans for the past 3 years. Others have spoken about it, and sometimes we forget these statistics: 250,000 people have lost their lives in that conflict, and more than 2 million people have been displaced or are refugees. This war has the potential to spill over into Fortress America. It will show the world that the United States is a world power, and the United States will be there to help ensure the type of Europe we want: A Europe that is free, that is democratic, and that is peaceful.

I want to ask, Mr. President, those who oppose this deployment to answer this question. If we, as part of NATO, cannot lead an effort to try and end the war in Bosnia, then why should we be members of NATO? Let us forget the whole thing, at least our participation in it. It seems to me that helping to end destabilizing military conflicts inside the borders of Europe such as Bosnia represents the type of responsibility NATO should undertake in the post-Cold War world.

May I remind my colleagues that the implementation force includes many non-NATO forces—not just the NATO forces, but others—that share our interest in securing peace in the Balkans. This is a two-thirds vote, so the resolution, the Dole resolution, also argues that U.S. troops will be at a risk of being drawn into nonmilitary activities and may also suffer needless casualties. To this I say, take a look at the Dayton peace agreement. Unlike some recent failures—we have had them in this Nation, particularly if you think of Somalia—where United States military roles were not entirely clear, the Bosnian deployment plan and the agreement from September 14, 1995, is a more easily drawn. Indeed, we stayed out of it for nearly 3 years.

I would ask, Mr. President, those who abdicate our responsibilities to our NATO allies, it will send a clear and I believe very troubling signal that the United States has once again retreated into Fortress America. It will show that we are not there when a difficult job has to be done. That is not a signal we can afford to send. So, therefore, I urge my colleagues to support the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia and to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.

I further would urge a vote against the Hutchison amendment, which, in my judgment, sends a very confusing message. It says, on the one hand, to our troops, we do not think you should be in Bosnia, but nevertheless we support the deployment of U.S. forces. You can be sure that Congress, if it is so confused that it is not sure about what our troops will and will not do. I am reassured by this part of the written statements.

In addition to its own self-protection, the mission of our force is to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of this peace agreement. Now, what are we talking about? We are talking about cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, return of troops and weapons to their encampments. We are going to be monitoring this to see that our troops do not engage in any activities for which we are not responsible.

I do not want to suggest, Mr. President, that sending United States military forces to Bosnia is without risk. Regrettably, we may well suffer casualties, as is often the case in military operations such as in the Balkans. But please remember that the United States and the 25 other nations are sending a force totaling 60,000 ground troops, forgetting those that are in the air or on the waters. This is an overwhelming numerical advantage over any group or faction that would challenge our authority.

I would also point out that unlike former United Nations peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, we will be completely prepared to defend ourselves. This is a mission in which if we are shot at, we are going to reply with bullets and shells.

Mr. President, the rest of the world looks to the United States to be a leader in promoting peace and democracy, and this is certainly the case in the Balkans where the three signatories have authorized our intervention. If a United States-led NATO force can help secure peace in Bosnia, it will make an enormous contribution to world security.

On the other hand, Mr. President, if we abdicate our responsibilities to our NATO allies, it will send a clear and I believe very troubling signal that the United States has once again retreated into Fortress America. It will show that we are not there when a difficult job has to be done. That is not a signal we can afford to send. So, therefore, I urge my colleagues to support the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia and to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution.
and the Bosnian Moslems had been better armed, there still would have been the need for a peace accord, and we would still be facing the difficult question of whether to send in United States ground forces to guarantee the peace agreement.

After 4 years of anguish over the atrocities in Bosnia, I believe we have a responsibility to try to end this war. We cannot turn our backs on the innocent men, women, and children who have lived through the unspeakable atrocities committed by all sides. We cannot turn down a request that is probably the last and best opportunity to end this harrowing civil war.

At the same time, we cannot afford to sway our decisionmaking about sending United States ground troops into what until now has been a war zone. We would all like to see an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia, and an end, for that matter, to bloodshed everywhere. But, it is disingenuous to say that the reason we are sending ground troops to Bosnia out of a sense of moral responsibility that we must police the entire world. We have already determined that neither do we have the desire nor the means to be the world's policeman. Recognizing we are not the world's policeman does not mean that there are no circumstances under which we should send U.S. troops abroad. If we are to take advantage of winning the cold war and retaining our capacity to shape events in this changing era, then we must demonstrate leadership and be willing to take risks for peace. The difficult question is, when should we take these risks?

I have always held that any determination to commit U.S. troops abroad should meet four criteria:

One, there must be a clear and compelling issue of national interest.

Two, the benefits must outweigh the cost of endangering American soldiers.

Three, there must be an established plan of action—including plans for troop withdrawal.

And, four, there must be support and involvement of the international community.

Unfortunately, without the stark black and white of the cold war to guide our foreign policy, it is less clear when our vital national interests are at stake. The world has become a far more complicated place, and there is much more assessment whether there is a vital national interest at stake in Bosnia.

Some say this is a European problem and we should leave it to the Europeans to solve. Indeed, the Europeans realize that they have more at stake than we do. That is why they are supplying the majority of the forces and why they are providing most of the funding and technical support for the crucial task of rebuilding Bosnia.

The question I raise today is: could this be a European-led mission with American support? Frankly, the Europeans have been indecisive and unable to do this on their own. Yet, if this civil war rages on, it poses a serious threat to European stability. Just as that possibility poses a threat to our European allies, it also threatens us.

That is why America must assume the mantle of leadership. The future stability of Europe will always be, in our national interest. We have fought two major wars in Europe, and in the 50 years since the end of World War II we have committed U.S. troops and resources to the defense of Europe and to the leadership of the NATO alliance. Because of our ties to Europe, historically and economically—it is in our interest for NATO to be strong and it is in our interest to continue to lead NATO.

That said, do the potential benefits of this mission outweigh the cost? There are many ambitious—I might say overly ambitious—goals laid out in the Dayton accord: the return of refugees, the negotiation of arms control agreements, the prosecution of war criminals, the establishment of civil institutions. I am pessimistic about the prospects for realizing many of these nation building goals in the short term.

Nonetheless, I believe there is still a potential benefit to participate in a strong peacekeeping force. The ominous warnings of many opponents of this mission belie the fact that the NATO Implementation Force is not embarking on a combat mission, nor is it a mission to impose a peace. This is not Somalia. Furthermore, our troops will not be leading the nation building efforts. This is not Haiti. This mission is in response to a direct request by the combatants to help them implement a peace agreement that they negotiated. The greatest and most achievable goals of this mission are strictly military goals: Separating the forces and creating an environment for the continued cessation of hostilities. And 1 year may not be enough time to permit reconstruction of civil institutions. I am pessimistic about the prospects for realizing many of these nation building goals in the short term.

How do these benefits measure up against the potential costs? There has been a strong consensus in the United States that sending ground troops at an earlier date would have been too risky and not worth the cost. Are we now risking the same kind of engagement? Will we be sending in troops in such numbers that ground forces to implement this shaky peace? As peacekeepers, will our troops be a lightening rod for some of the more controversial provisions of the peace agreement? Are we sending troops to Bosnia, but we cannot underestimate the potential of a 1-year breathing period to lay the groundwork for a more stable peace down the road.

In the unlikely event that our efforts will pay off, and that the war is over? Unfortunately, it is too early to tell whether the conditions in Bosnia meet the requirements of a peace. But, that does not mean we should not proceed. If this diplomatic effort fails it will be a failure of the Croats, the Moslems and the Serbs to take advantage of the international commitment to help them implement the peace. Only time will allow us to test their commitment to the peace accord. In the meantime, we cannot afford to turn our backs on the most serious diplomatic agreement to date.

Mr. President, I am disappointed that the majority leader has been compelled by members of his party to have three separate votes on Bosnia. Either we support this policy or we do not. It is too easy to say that the President has made his decision, that he has committed U.S. forces, and then take no responsibility for the mission but still vote to support the troops.

In this case, I believe that the President has demonstrated leadership. He has acted in our national interest, and he has done so cognizant of the risks the men and women of our Armed Forces will face. Now that the Bosnian people have taken a step toward peace, we have the chance to do something concrete, specific and finite to help bring this nightmare to an end. And so I say, let us do it.

Mr. President, I will be voting in favor of the Dole resolution. I yield the floor.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, at the outset of my remarks on Bosnia, I want to state for the record my total support for our men and women in uniform deployed in the Balkans. I know they will serve the Nation with honor and dedication. I commit today that I will make every effort to provide for their safety, to make every available resource for their defense and to work hard and look forward to their safe return home.

Let me say that I have lived my entire life in a small eastern North Carolina town that is surrounded by Fort Bragg, Camp Lejeune, Seymour J. Johnson Air Force Base, and Cherry Point Marine Base. My whole life, I have literally been surrounded by people who are strongly committed to serving our Nation and our Commanders in Chief.

I am confident that the bravery of our soldiers deployed in Bosnia and their respect for their commanding officers will serve as an example and an inspiration to all Americans. While I have nothing but praise to offer for our troops, I come to the floor to voice my strong opposition to the President’s decision to deploy United States forces in Bosnia.

Despite repeated requests by Congress and the American people, the Clinton administration has yet to show a compelling national security interest which would justify the commitment of United States ground forces in Bosnia. In fact, President Clinton’s Bosnia strategy over the past 3 years has been an incoherent jumble of vacillating policies.

As a candidate, Bill Clinton criticized the policies of the Bush administration and advocated a forceful interventionist role for the United States. Once in office, President Clinton dithered while the Balkan situation degenerated into a brutal, dehumanizing ethnic civil war. Much of the tragedy we see today occurred on President Clinton’s watch.

Without consulting Congress, President Clinton entered into an agreement to commit U.S. ground forces. He has not come before a joint session of Congress to explain his policies on this issue. Rather, from the Oval Office, President Clinton delivered a televised national address and then boarded Air Force One bound for Europe. It struck me as though he was more eager to collect congratulations in European capitals than to explain his Bosnia policy to Congress and the American people.

Despite this absence of Presidential leadership, a rejection of the Clinton administration’s troop deployment plans does not mean a rejection of American involvement in the Bosnia peace process, nor a retreat into isolationism.

The United States has played a significant role in Bosnia, and we should continue to do so. United States military hardware and cut defense spending would now lay aside that advantage. Now is the time for the United States to seize the lead in enforcing this peace agreement, which grows less certain each day. It is simply a bad policy to put at risk 24,000 American soldiers and marines in Bosnia.

The administration failed to take a leadership role in convincing the United Nations to lift the arms embargo which would have allowed the Bosnians to defend themselves at a much earlier date and might have alleviated the need for our ground forces there at any time.

We brought the warring factions to the peace table, and we have an interest in seeing that the peace agreement is implemented, but we do not—we do not—have a vital national security interest, which is the only thing which would justify putting at risk the lives of 20,000 American soldiers and marines. The President was wrong to make this commitment, and Congress will be wrong if we endorse it.

Some believe that President Clinton’s hastily concluded decision on ground forces will demand congressional approval in order to preserve international respect for the Office of the Presidency. I disagree. Respect for the power of the Presidency is preserved and enhanced when the holder of that high office has led the Nation toward a consensus on military intervention before troops are deployed. Bill Clinton has turned Presidential leadership on its head. He is trying to build a national consensus after having committed U.S. forces. This is not leadership.

On the ground, our troops will face overwhelming logistic hurdles. In addition to arriving at the height of the harsh Balkan winter, our troops will face 6 million landmines covering much of Bosnia. The exact whereabouts of many of these mines is unknown and their detection will not be easy, as many are made of plastic.

The infrastructure of Bosnia has been devastated by years of war. The bridges, roads, and railroads which remain in working order are capable of supporting the weight of M1-A1 tanks and any other heavy armaments. Most existing airstrips have been seriously damaged.

Clearly, we will have to spend millions of taxpayers’ dollars, American taxpayers’ dollars, in infrastructure before we can begin to adequately police the so-called peace agreement. Once we begin that effort, we will then spend billions more on military equipment and personnel. How much will this later stage of the peace-building cost? And that is what we are doing, nation building. Some estimates are as high as $300 million a month. I suspect that probably is not high enough.

Further, I have written to the Clinton administration requesting information about its plan to start supplying foreign aid to Bosnia. I have not yet received a response.

We have an opportunity to avoid repeating the tragic mistakes of Somalia. Now is the time to use our technological superiority to spare American lives. Many of those who opposed our investment in advanced military hardware and cut defense spending would now lay aside that advantage. The effects could be felt beyond the region as well. Of great importance
here—and this is something which I do not believe has been given enough attention—is that Russia is now willing to participate with the United States and our NATO allies in the peace implementation force in Bosnia. In fact, Russia is willing to place their troops in Bosnia directly under an American commander. That would be historic cooperation with long-term benefits for European security and for world security.

But if this agreement falls apart and the war widens because we do not participate with NATO, and we know NATO will not carry out this operation without the United States, NATO would be weakened and fractured, and the United States and Russia could be pulled to opposite sides in a Europe newly divided.

Hardliners in Russia would balk at working with the United States and would gain political points domestically in upcoming elections. So, in addition to the region becoming inflamed again, in addition to the United States potentially being dragged into a widened war in Europe, just as we have been dragged in twice before this century, we could see a Russia become more of a centrifugal force, if necessary, and to United States interests, precisely when the United States interests, precisely when NATO is fractured and less able to deal with that newly threatening Russia.

So the failure to participate here could well sink our efforts to improve the United States-Russia relationship, to build strong democracies in Europe, to expand NATO, and to integrate Russia into permanent European security arrangements.

When President Clinton wrote to the Speaker of the House last month, he highlighted the costs of not trying to help secure the peace efforts of the warring parties, and this is what he said:

"Unquestionably, there are costs and risks to all peace efforts. Peace is the less risky alternative. But there will be no peace without America's engagement."

Madam President, I have asked a lot of questions about this mission over the last few weeks, as a member of the Armed Services Committee. The first question is: Are there important U.S. interests at stake? I believe the answer is yes.

The United States has an interest in helping the parties establish peace and stability. We have an interest in preventing the war from spreading, which also could fracture the NATO alliance and which could put Russia and the United States on opposite sides of a renewed and wider war.

The second question I asked: Is the mission clear, and is it limited and achievable? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified that it is, and the military commanders agree. The NATO mission has three primary military objectives: maintaining peace, maintaining the existing ceasefire, physically separating the warring parties, and overseeing the division of territory agreed to by the leaders in Dayton.

Our military leaders have been clear about what our troops will not do, so there will not be any mission creep. They will not oversee election security; they will not conduct humanitarian relief missions; they will not help civilians relocate or act as local police. The parties have actually been performing those tasks, which U.S. and NATO troops will not do and that the U.N. agencies and other private organizations will attempt to do, and helping to create a secure environment, which U.S. forces will not do while they are there so that those other tasks can be accomplished.

NATO and U.S. military leaders say that they have sufficient guidance to make the judgment about that fine line. Our troops will not be directly responsible for disarming the Bosnian Serbs or equipping the Bosnian Government to achieve an equilibrium of forces on the ground. While both of those missions are desirable, it is appropriate that NATO and all sides be able to maintain its evenhandedness in dealing with all of the parties and therefore to leave those tasks to separate mechanisms.

The third question I asked: Has the risk to our troops been minimized? Bosnia, even after this agreement, is a very dangerous environment. I have been particularly concerned, as have many of us, about the threat posed by landmines, which some have estimated to number 6 million. General Shalikashvili has testified last week that the troops have received extra training before deploying to the theater specifically against known hazards, such as landmines and snipers. They will be well-armed, equipped with robust rules of engagement that they need to protect themselves, and local commanders will have the authority that they need to make decisions about using force without any cumbersome dual-key arrangements.

Secretary Perry testified that they have the authorization to use deadly force, if necessary, and National Security Adviser Tony Lake warned that— ... if anybody fools with our forces, they will get hit, hit immediately and very hard, and we expect that any other challenge or threat to our forces would be intimidated.

In addition, there is a clear chain of command with U.S. commanders at the top. General Shalikashvili testified that he has repeatedly told his troops that the physical danger to be small and that he would anticipate more casualties from accidents than from hostile action.

The fourth question I asked: Are there clearly defined conditions under which United States forces will not go into Bosnia? The answer is yes.

We have received repeated testimony that NATO will not fight its way in. The parties have initiated an agreement, and they are scheduled to sign it this tomorrow. Vanguards of NATO units are in Bosnia. We will see evidence of compliance with this agreement before deployment. Otherwise, General Shalikashvili has testified that we are not going in. We are not going to fight our way in. We are going there to help implement a peace agreement which the parties want.

The fifth question: Is there a clear exit strategy? Administration officials said that the deployment of United States forces with NATO will last approximately 1 year, and they have said that most of the military tasks that the NATO force is charged with achieving may be achievable in less than 12 months.

There are two key issues here. One is whether an effective equilibrium of forces can be achieved between the parties in such a way that the Bosnians can defend themselves when the NATO forces leave. There is still a lot of doubt about this. The goal is not part of the military mission itself. It is a separate commitment from the United States to all of the parties, which all of the parties, we are told, have accepted.

Now I remain skeptical, as indeed do some of the officials who testified before us, that an arms control agreement as outlined in the Dayton agreement can by itself effectively achieve that equilibrium. Secretary Perry says that he believes that the United States commitment to combat the effort to rearm and train the Bosnians will help us get ahead of this effort to help control the arms control effort fails, will actually help that arms control effort succeed.

We will need to watch closely to see if the parties abide by their obligations to reduce armaments, working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. For instance, they have agreed not to import any weapons for 90 days and any heavy weapons for 180 days. If they do not abide by these aspects of the agreement, the United States is prepared to assure that arms and training will be provided to the Bosnian Government. This must be guaranteed, of course, on the most reliable assessment of all sides' current military capabilities, and the assessment of what constitutes an effective equilibrium: defensible territory with sufficient armaments. If the arms control agreements are not carried out, as Secretary Perry testified, the United States and will need to try to accelerate the arming effort during the 12-month NATO deployment period.

The second key issue on exiting is whether a secure environment can continue to exist after the NATO force leaves. Annex 11, signed by the parties, establishes an international police task force assistance program to monitor, observe, inspect, advise, and train law enforcement agencies to improve public and state security. But that may not be enough. In addition to the international police task force, full and lasting implementation by the parties of all aspects of the peace agreement is clear that the deployment of a residual military force in the former Yugoslavia for longer than the 1 year planned for the NATO implementation force, and any such residual force
should be comprised primarily of Armed Forces from European nations without U.S. Armed Forces.

I believe there should be planning underway now for a European residual force. The President should be encouraging NATO to move to a new level of contingency planning for such a force that does not include U.S. Armed Forces to maintain a secure environment for implementation of the peace agreement after the NATO forces leave.

Mr. President, this is no time to wring our hands in this body about not having a choice. Some say we have no choice, that the decision has been made. Well, we have three choices, at least.

Choice 1 is to say there shall be no funds for these troops. That was the choice that we voted against earlier today. But that was a choice. That is a constitutional capability that we have, if we decided to exercise it, to say that we will use the power of the purse so that these troops would not go to Bosnia. By an overwhelming vote, 22 to 77, we decided not to use the power of the purse, not to use that capability that this Congress has under the Constitution to restrict funding in order to prevent going into Bosnia. But it was a choice. We were not in a position where we were prevented from exercising that constitutional option.

We have a second choice. We can express an opinion which is in opposition to this mission, short of using the power of the purse, but nonetheless an expression of opinion. That is what the Hutchison resolution does.

It seems to me, however, that the Hutchison resolution would be a terrible mistake and would sap the morale of our troops terribly. To tell our troops that we will support you, we are all for you, as part of the Hutchison resolution does, to say that the Congress supports military personnel who may indeed be ordered into Bosnia, but we oppose the decision, is telling those troops who are put in a position of danger that we do not support their mission.

Now, if anything will undermine morale of troops, it would seem to me, it would be saying this to them: No matter how much we say in one paragraph of the resolution that we are behind the troops—you can say that all you want, but it runs exactly counter and undermines that message to say in another paragraph, you are being sent on a mission which is wrong. If that mission is wrong, then the power of the purse should be used to prevent it.

It should be one way or the other. We have the authority under the Constitution, we chose not to exercise it. I think we made the right decision. But we had that choice under the Constitution. Having rejected it, not to exercise a power that this Congress had to prevent the troops from going to Bosnia to be put in a position of danger, it seems to me now it is totally wrong for us to tell those troops we are now for you but your mission is a mistake. If that mission is a mistake, we should have voted not to allow it. We cannot have it both ways and expect our troops, who are being put in harm's way, to do anything except react in wonderment that the Congress could decide not to restrict the funds, and then to say in the same resolution we are behind our troops, although the mission is wrong.

Mr. President, I hope we will defeat the Hutchison resolution and adopt the third resolution which will be voted on, the Dole-McCain resolution, which in a qualified way, in a very careful way, supports the continuation of this mission.

Mr. President, it comes down to this: We have vital security interests in trying to help prevent a war in Europe from resuming and spreading into a wider regional war which would probably fracture NATO, which could very well pit NATO ally against NATO ally. We cannot protect the security of Europe by creating the chance of Europe becoming divided again with Russia on the other side from most of Europe, with a Russia that would be likely, if this peace agreement failed because the United States non-participated, to assume NATO as a military force, to then grow as a threat to the United States and to our allies. If this peace agreement falls apart because of United States non-participation with NATO, we would be playing into the hands of Russian militarists who are planning to expand Russian influence in Eastern Europe and furthering their election ambitions next year. If this NATO military mission succeeds, Russian troops for the first time will be under American command, an extraordinary development in history, and will be a greater part of a European security solution, instead of being part of the problem as they have for so many decades.

U.S. involvement in this NATO force is essential if the peace agreement of the parties has any chance of being implemented. This is a chance, a chance that only the parties can take advantage of. But by participating, we would also be giving the parties a chance to end the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing and the use of rape as a weapon. For all of these reasons, and having answered the questions which I put to myself in good conscience over the last few weeks, I have concluded we should participate in the NATO force, and I hope the Dole-McCain resolution is adopted.

Mr. President, against all odds and against most predictions, the warring parties in the Balkans came together and negotiated a comprehensive and complex peace agreement. It is not perfect, and its success is by no means assured, but it is their agreement, and as Assistant Secretary Holbrooke testified last week, it goes farther than anyone had reason to hope the parties would go. The hope is that it has started.

This agreement represents the best chance for peace in the region that we have seen after four years of devastating war. It is still up to the parties themselves to implement the agreement. The role of the NATO Implementation Force [IFOR] is to give them that chance, by creating a secure environment in which the many tasks set for IFOR will be accomplished.

But if the United States does not participate in that NATO force, after the parties have signed up to an agreement we urged upon them, with the expectation that we would participate, then this resolution, realistically, will probably spread. More civilians will be killed, tortured, and ethnically cleansed in a renewed war. More refugees will be displaced and dispersed throughout Europe. As President Clinton said last month:

If we're not there, NATO will not be. The peace will collapse. The slaughter of innocents will begin again. American citizens must not be the world's policeman. We cannot stop all war for all time, but we can stop some wars.

There is widespread support for this conclusion.

President Bush's former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft warned against the risks of this undertaking, but he said that "the alternative, in my judgment, is a clear disaster. To the back now would be a catastrophe... If we don't go in, a lot more Americans will die, somewhere, sometime."

Former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified to the Armed Services Committee that "if we go in, there is a modest chance of success. If we stay out there is a real certainty of failure." The cost to important U.S. security interests of a wider and more deadly war spreading throughout the region, possibly putting us in direct conflict with Russia again after 5 years of improving relations, would be enormous. It is not just the relevance and usefulness of NATO as an instrument of European stability that would suffer, but United States credibility around the globe.

Mr. President, there are indeed reasons to be skeptical that the peace agreement can be fully implemented. The region has seen centuries of historic animosities, and 4 years of brutality. There are still territorial disputes whose final settlement has been put off. The man who fueled war with dreams of a Greater Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, now claims to be the guarantor of the hopes of the Bosnian Serbs' compliance with the agreement.

Resettlement of refugees, guaranteed in the agreement, promises to be exceedingly difficult. We are not sure how many refugees will even try to reclaim their homes, or who will arbitrate claims of ownership. Even this past weekend, some Croat forces looted and burned homes of a town scheduled to be returned to Serb control.

Mr. President, I believe the United States should participate in theIFOR mission, although there are serious risks to this mission, the costs and risks of not acting with our NATO allies, would be even greater.
People around the world are watching the United States at this moment, watching to see whether we will fulfill again the role of facilitating peace that has long been our tradition. I recently received a letter from a old friend of mine, Bill, back in Brussels, but following our deliberations closely. Welcoming the Dayton peace agreement, he wrote:

"I think it is in the strategic interest of the United States to insist that peace reign in Southeastern Europe. The risks, if we fail to act, are, I think, far-reaching. They include potential Russian intervention, a conflict between Kosovo and other potential civil wars. It may be difficult for the U.S. to be involved in any major conflict on the continent of Europe. To me, the most important issue is how the U.S. has a chance to ensure that peace prevails over war and life over death.

Mr. President, the most important votes we take in the U.S. Senate are those involving the deployment of U.S. military personnel to dangerous spots around the globe. The volunteers who make up our Armed Forces are dedicated, talented women and men who live a life of value and whose service we cherish. That, my mission before you is challenging, but it is doable, as General Shalikashvili has testified, and however individual Senators vote on this resolution, the troops should know that we all stand behind them and will stand with them.

Mr. President, the Bosnian State outlined in the Dayton agreements has two armies, three administrations, and is surrounded by hostile neighbors. Can a civil society grow out of a land so steeped in mistrust, anger, and savage conflict? There is no guarantee. We cannot be sure that there will ultimately be any successful outcome—only the people who live there and those involving the deployment of U.S. military personnel to dangerous spots around the globe. The volunteers who make up our Armed Forces are dedicated, talented women and men who live a life of value and whose service we cherish.

That is a mission that the United States should not undermine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). According to the previous unanimous-consent agreement, the Senator from Maine is recognized.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, let me say at the outset, while many of us have serious concerns with the scope and the structure of the Bosnian mission, there is no doubt about our troops' ability and competence to carry out the mission that has been assigned to them by the President of the United States. Like many times in the past, when they have served our country well and they have made us proud, I have no doubts about the fact they will be our allies in this mission.

Despite what is being said here this evening, whether you are for or against the proposition that is before us, we will obviously not change the outcome. The deal, as they say, is done, because the troops are being deployed and will continue to be deployed, no matter what we do here or how we vote.

Congress is essentially faced with a proposition of accepting the President's position on Bosnia, having come full circle from "Mission Impossible" several years ago, to "fait accompli" today. By disavowing any congressional role, the President has presented this policy no longer as the administration's policy, but now it is America's policy. That is a very difficult position. What we can and should do today is to use this debate to express our reservations and concerns, our support—whatever the case may be.

Inevitably there are constitutional conflicts between branches of Government. Inevitably, we have been in this role before, with respect to whether or not we should assign troops and whether or not the President should come to the Congress. I happen to think it is very important to express our concerns to this and future Presidents about the fact that Congress is not playing such a role before the fact—and not after the fact. The fact of the matter is, it is part of America's international involvement and participation. It helps the President to advance his own policy and his own mission. It helps to broaden the support if there are doubts about such a mission. But, unfortunately, that is not what is before us today.

We have also considered other alternatives with respect to Bosnia. In fact, I can remember as far back as 1993, in the spring, when I was a member of the Independent Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives, we voted on lifting the arms embargo so that the Bosnian Moslems could defend themselves and their families, their property. And for over 2 years we fought that battle, and the administration did not support us in that endeavor. The Europeans resisted this effort as well. I think that is part of the Balkan tragedy, the fact that the Moslems could not defend themselves; that they did not have the arms or the equipment or the training to defend themselves and their families.

Now we are faced with the proposition of deploying troops to Bosnia. This should have been the last option and not the first. We should have exhausted all other means and all other possibilities before we resorted to deploying ground troops.

Back in 1993, it is interesting, the administration presented its own criteria, guidelines for a future mission in Bosnia. In fact, Secretary Christopher laid out these guidelines in 1993. They said that, in order to deploy troops, four criteria should be met:

First, that the goal must be clearly stated;

Second, there must be strong likelihood of success;

Third, there must be an exit strategy;

Fourth, the action must win sustained public support.

It seems to me the administration has fallen far short in meeting some of these criteria that the administration itself has established. But I would like to take a look at some of those guidelines tonight and how this agreement fits into the context of the criteria the administration laid out for such a mission.

First, the goal must be clearly stated. That is a peacekeeping mission. In fact, it is much of a deployment from a historic standpoint. It is a peace enforcement mission. That being the case, as the administration has suggested, is the goal simply to separate warring parties for 1 year and then leave? The administration has said yes, and so did witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee. But at other times the administration argued that we will only achieve success if we succeed in creating a single, unitary, multiethnic Bosnian state, as Secretary Holbrooke said after the signing of the agreement in Dayton, when he said, "Otherwise, we will have failed."

So, is it a part of our mission to also create a more stable arms balance in Bosnia, by ensuring the Bosnian Government forces receive the heavy armor they currently lack? Yes, that is part of the overall intent of this administration. But the administration has also agreed that the arms buildup will not occur until we can succeed first in pursuing an arms buildup. But there is no such mechanism for that buildup to occur.

Then we have the arming and training issue. It will certainly be one of the focuses of this resolution before us that will be offered by Senator Dole. But it still is not clear what the administration has in mind or how, in fact, it will be accomplished. The fact is, this could be accomplished without even deploying troops to Bosnia. But that, unfortunately, is not our option today.

So the arming, the training, the equipping of the Bosnian Moslems will occur in the face of opposition from our European allies and the Serbs. It was so much opposed that it was not even a part of the agreement. Yet it now happens to be, and should be, a very key component of the overall strategy. Because Senator Dole has been working on precisely defining this mission now, because it has not been precisely defined by this administration, it will remain one of the key components of this mission. Yet it will have to be done in the face of overwhelming opposition by our allies and the Serbs. How will that be done remains open to serious question.

Is our goal, as well, to facilitate elections? Protect refugees? Undertake reconstruction activities? Track down and arrest war criminals? The administration sometimes argues no. But then it also argues that the building of building activities are what will determine whether or not we have succeeded. So, are these our goals as well? In fact, this case is strengthened by the fact
that in the Dayton accords the United States insisted on granting our forces the power to become involved in these activities.

To quote from article 6, section 3: “Our NATO forces will have the authority to:

A. Help secure conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections;
B. Assist in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
C. Assist the U.N. High Commission for Refugees;
D. Prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations and to respond to deliberate violence to life and person.

If our powers under article 6, section 3, are not a recipe for mission creep, I do not know what is.

Second, there must be a strong likelihood of success. Is there? Of course, that all depends on the definition of our mission. And, as I have already stated, there are no number of such objectives, and we have seen that remains nebulous at best. How can a viable exit strategy define our mission outside of the treaty area itself. Third, there must be an exit strategy.

The administration has said it has an exit strategy by promising to be out within a year. But this is an exit timetable, not an exit strategy. It says nothing about what needs to be accomplished during that year to permit the evacuation of our forces. Again, any viable exit strategy defines our mission and ends the cycle of violence. But that really does not define an exit strategy. What it does is define an end date. It defines exactly what the state of affairs happens to be at the time in which we depart. But it does not define what we have accomplished.

As Dr. Schlesinger testified before the Armed Services Committee, he said, “We do not really have an exit strategy because the situation is too messy. We have an exit hope.”

Finally, the action must have sustained public support. Polls have shown that there is not strong support for this mission in Bosnia. In fact, it shows the opposite. The majority of the American people oppose the deployment of American troops into Bosnia. We could change as the troops are deployed and will continue to be deployed.

But what is the reason for the concern among the American people? I think the concern stems from the fact that the administration has yet to make a compelling case on the merits of the mission or even to clearly define the mission itself in terms of our vital national security interests. The American people need to know—and they deserve to know—that the mission itself constitutes our own risk and strain of our troops. The American people have the right to know that the parties involved in Bosnia are committed to self-sustaining and enduring peace. And at the very least they should expect that the administration has committed to a longstanding peace. That remains open to a very serious question. And it gets back again to the definition of our goal and mission.

I happen to think that it is very important that whenever we are deploying our men and women to an area of conflict, when we are putting them in harm’s way, that it is absolutely vital that the parties involved are absolutely committed to securing a long-lasting peace. I think that all that we have heard thus far remains open to very serious question as to whether or not that will be the ultimate outcome.

So I think that the administration has fallen short in meeting its own criteria for this mission. And above and beyond that failure, there is another question. And that is that the unprecedented nature of this deployment.

It has been said that this is the first time NATO has embarked upon a mission outside of the treaty area itself. And there are those who argue in favor of such a mission because they say that it will serve as a model for future NATO missions as well as securing the future of the alliance. That may be true, but it is not what the resolution was about. It is not what the administration considered, nor was the question as to what harm will come to NATO and its prestige if the mission should fail. And what damage will that do to the alliance? If 2 years from now we face renewed fighting—which indeed is a serious prospect and consider it a truly and a partition of Bosnia, as so many analysts believe is the most likely outcome, in the end what will we have accomplished? Will it have been worth the potential loss of American lives, if that loss could have been avoided by the means such as lifting the arms embargo?

Mr. President, one cannot help but feel that if we had pursued and ex-hausted all other possibilities and alternatives, Congress, the American people, and our troops would not be facing a situation that has now been forced upon us. But, unfortunately, the proverbial train has left the station.

In the final analysis, this is a mission in which success is in no way clear—whose mission is yet to be defined, whose goals are yet uncertain, and whose mission does not have the sustained support of the American people, and with parties who are not fully committed to peace.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. According to the previous order, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, of course, there is no audience—or very little—here on the floor. But I do not speak tonight to the audience on the floor. I speak to the audience that may be listening or watching through the electronic eye.

I also speak for the RECORD, Mr. President, because I want to know what we are going to look back on this debate. Ten years from now we will look back on this RECORD. And this RECORD will stand 100 years; 1,000 years. So I think the RECORD should be made for future guidance.

(Ms. SNOWE assumed the Chair.)

A CONTRADICTORY BOSNIA RESOLUTION

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, one resolution we are now debating, offered by the junior Senator from Texas, directly addresses the idea of supporting the troops and the role which they have been asked to play, in what I believe is a somewhat contradictory manner. The resolution before us would sign the Senate up to supporting U.S. troops in Bosnia without supporting the mission that they are called upon to perform.

In two simple sentences, this resolution would purport to support U.S. troops while simultaneously undermining the very work they are performing. How can we, as the resolution before us states, “strongly support the U.S. Armed Forces who may be ordered by the President to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . .” after having just voted for a resolution that “the Congress opposes President Clinton’s decision to deploy United States forces into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . .”?

What kind of mission are we supporting our troops supposed to find in that? And what kind of resolve does that demonstrate to anyone who might attempt to undermine the Bosnia peace agreement?

This is a clear flag, Madam President, to those who would target our troops telling them that, if they target our troops, we will yank them out of
that mission. So, the mission is under- 
cut and eroded from the very beginning 
by our own actions. That is not support 
of the troops, to my way of thinking. 

This resolution also fails to address 
Congress' Constitutional responsibility 
to work with the President to support 
our troops. It is simply silent on that 
point. With this resolution, we again 
fail to dip even our toes into the icy 
waters of a controversial and difficult 
political decision to risk the lives of 
U.S. troops, even in support of what we 
all hope to be a relatively unthreatening 
mission in support of a peace agreement. Because we cannot 
guarantee that the life of not one U.S. 

can be used offensively. President Jefferson 
supported the troops as a 

be repelled invasions and protecting 
U.S. forces, the President's authority 
as Commander in Chief was bound by 
the Congressional power to raise and 
support armies and the Congressional 
power to authorize the use of those 
forces in offensive operations. Congress 
not only supported the troops as a 
daily, practical matter, it played an es-

early sound with this trum-


tion in the sounds, how shall it be known 
what is spoken? for ye shall 

and other Senators on both sides of the 
aisle, I commend the majority leader, Mr. DOLE, as well as the distinguished Sena-
tor from Arizona, Mr. MCCAIN, for 
their resolution. And I commend them 
for working with the minority leader 
and other Senators on both sides of the 
awful mission bucket you are about to 
dive into. That is not support. Anyone 
can see that such a claim amounts to a 
hollow nut! There is no meat in it! 

and you're on your own!''

This resolution is a slap in the face 

to our troops, telling them that we 
support them, but that their mission is 
foolhardy.

What kind of support is that? You are 
up there on the high dive, troops, and 
we support you, but we do not believe 
there is any water of justification in 
the mission bucket you are about to 
dive into. That is not support. Anyone 
can see that such a claim amounts to a 
hollow nut! There is no meat in it! 

Let us read what the Apostle Paul 
said in his First Epistle to the Corin-

And even things without life giving sound, 
whether pipe or harp, except they give a dis-
tinction in the sounds, how shall it be known 
what is spoken? is it 

For if the trumpet give an uncertain 

sound, who shall prepare himself to the 
battle? 


Second, I believe that the language 
fulfills the constitutional requirement 
that the Congress authorize or approve 
the operation in specific enough detail 
to draw limits around it. In doing so, 
the Congress fulfills the exercise of its 
responsibilities that the Framers ex-
pected and that has prevailed through 
most of American history.

I think it is important for Senators to 

reflect on our constitutional respon-
sibilities in respect to our action 
today. The question of the actual con-
stitutional reach of the President, act-
ing alone, and without congressional 
authority to deploy forces into hos-
tilities or substantial risk of hostilities 
have become a recurring modern issue 
between Presidents, beginning with 
Harry Truman and continuing through 
to today.

When the Framers began their work 
at the Philadelphia Convention, exist-
ing models of government placed the
The argument for this break is set forth in Federalist Paper No. 36 in The Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 36, Alexander Hamilton explained that the President has "concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties," whereas the British king "is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties." The royal prerogative in foreign affairs was deliberately shared with Congress. Hamilton contrasted the distribution of war powers in England and the United States in the Constitution. The powers of the king "extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies." Unlike the King of England, the President "will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the Nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union." No such tether attached to the king.

In Federalist No. 74, Hamilton provided an additional reason for making the President Commander in Chief. The direction of war" most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single head." The power of directing was and emphasized the common strength of the separate states and "the integral part in the definition of the executive authority." Designating the President Commander in Chief represented an important method for preserving civilian supremacy, the removal of war power from the executive. Hamilton explained in later years, the President is commander in chief not because he is "skilled in the art of war and qualified to marshal a host in the field of battle." He is commander in chief for a different reason. Whatever soldier leads U.S. armies to victory against an enemy, "he is subject to the orders of the civil magistrate, and he and his army are always subordinate to the civil power."

The Constitution grants to Congress a number of specific powers to control war and military affairs: to declare war; to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy; the power to make regulations of the land and naval forces; the power to call forth the militia; and the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. Furthermore, the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, an area that has a direct relationship to the war power. Commercial conflicts between nations were often a cause of war. Farsighted, the Framers placed that power with Congress. James Madison later remarked: "The constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly been made the final resort that vested the question of war in the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war. And, most prone to it. The Ex. is the branch of power most in the art of war and qualified to lead troops into battle." The President Commander in Chief is the commander of the armed forces, the military.

England transplanted the title to America in the eighteenth century by appointing a number of commanders in chief and by the practice of entitling colonial governors as commanders in chief or occasionally as vice admirals (or captains general). The appointment of General Thomas Gage as commander in chief from 1763 to 1776 caused the colonists grave concern, for he proceeded to interfere in civil affairs and acquire considerable influence over the colonial assembly, the courts, and the judiciary. The bitter memory of his decision to quarter troops in civilians' homes spawned the Third Amendment
to the Constitution. These activities and others prompted the colonists in the Declaration of Independence to complain of King George III that he had "affected to render the Military Independent of and superior to the Civil Power."

But the colonists had no reason to fear the governors who were given the title commander in chief, even though they controlled the provincial forces, since the colonial assemblies claimed and voted to fund the militia as well as to call it into service. In fact, grievances came from the governors, who complained of the relative impotence of their positions. The colonists' "assemblies" (and later, the states') assertions of the power of the purse as a check on the commander in chief reflected an English practice that was instituted in the middle of the seventeenth century. By 1665, Parliament, as a means of maintaining political control of the military establishment, had inaugurated the policy of making annual military appropriations lasting but one year. This practice sharply emphasized the power of Parliament to determine the size of the army to be placed under the direction of the chief commander. The practice had a long influence, for, under its constitutional power to raise and support armies and to provide a navy, Congress acquired a right that the colonial and state assemblies had to vote funds for the armed forces. An additional historical parallel in the Article I, Section 8, clause 13 provides that "no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than Two Years." The requirement of legislative approval for the allocation of funds to raise troops underscores the principle of political superiority over military command. It also constitutes a sharp reminder that a Commander in Chief is dependent on the legislature's willingness to give him an army to command.

The Continental Congress continued the usage of the title in 1775, when it unanimously decided to appoint George Washington as general. His commission named him "General and Commander in Chief, of the Army of the United Colonies." He was required to comply with orders and directions from Congress, which did not hesitate to instruct the commander in chief on military and policy matters. The practice of settling the office at the apex of the military hierarchy as commander in chief and of subordinating the office to a political superior, whether a king, a parliament, or a congress, had thus been firmly established for a century and a half and was thoroughly familiar to the Framers when they met in Philadelphia. Perhaps this settled historical usage accounts for the fact that there was no debate on the Commander in Chief clause at the Convention.

President Thomas Jefferson understood the limitations of the Commander in Chief clause. In 1801, in his first annual message to Congress, he reported the arrogant demands made by Joseph Caramanly, the pasha of Tripoli. Unless the United States paid tribute, the pasha threatened to seize American ships and citizens. In response, Jefferson sent a small squadron under command of Captain Thomas Macdonough to protect Western waters against the threatened attack. He then asked Congress for further guidance, since he was "unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense." He requested Congress to authorize "measures of offense."

Jefferson's understanding of the war clause underwent no revision. Like Jefferson, President James Madison was aggrieved by the punishment and harassment inflicted on United States vessels. In 1812, he expressed to Congress his extreme resentment of the British practices of seizing American ships and seamen and inducing Indian tribes to attack the United States. Madison was concerned with the question of whether the United States shall remain passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force, to force in defense of their national rights is "a necessity and the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the Government."

Following his 1823 announcement of what has become known as the Monroe Doctrine, President James Monroe was confronted with international circumstances that seemed to invite the use of force, but Monroe repeatedly disclaimed any constitutional power to initiate hostilities, since, he maintained, that authority was granted to Congress.

President James K. Polk may well have initiated war with Mexico in 1846, when he ordered an army into a disputed area on the Texas-Mexico border. But Polk understood the constitutional limitations of the Commander in Chief clause and offered the rationale that Mexico had invaded the United States, which, if true, would justify a response by the Commander in Chief. Until 1900, no President departed from this understanding of the parameters of the Commander in Chief clause. But to justify President Truman's unilateral decision to introduce troops into the Korean war, revisionists purported to locate in the President a broader constitutional authority to commence hostilities.

Emboldened by Truman's claim, subsequent Presidents have likewise unilaterally initiated acts of war, from the Vietnam war to the incursions in Grenada and Panama. But this claim is cut from whole cloth. It ignores the origins and development of the title, the clear understanding of the Constitution's Framers, the nineteenth-century record, and the history of judicial interpretation.

The Supreme Court has never held that the Commander in Chief clause confers power to initiate war. In United States v. Sweeney (1895), Justice Henry Brown wrote for the Court that the object of the clause was to give the President "such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war." In 1919, Senator George Sutherland, who later became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, said that the war powers of the President under the Constitution are simply those that belong to any commander in chief of the military forces of a nation at war. The Constitution confers no war powers upon the President as such. While the Supreme Court has held that the President may not initiate hostilities and that he is authorized only to direct the movements of the military forces placed by law at his command, it has been contended that the existence of a standing army provides the President with broad discretionary authority to deploy troops on behalf of foreign-policy goals. Although the intrusion of a public force into a foreign country may well endanger the United States, Presidents have often manipulated troop deployments so as to present Congress with a fait accompli. Given the broad range of war powers vested in Congress, including the authority to provide for the noncommissioned forces to raise and support armies, and to decide, in Madison's words, whether "a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded," it seems clear that Congress may govern absolutely the deployment of troops outside the United States. As a practical measure, Congress may choose, within the confines of the delegation doctrine, to vest the President with some authority to send troops abroad, but there is nothing inherent in the Commander in Chief clause that yields such authority.

Representative Abraham Lincoln in a letter to William H. Herrndon said:

"Allow the President to invade a neighbor nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he deems it necessary for such purpose—and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose. If, to-day, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, "I see no probability of the British invading us," but he will say to you "be silent; I see it, if you don't."

The provision of the war-making power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving the people in war, pre-tending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppression of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole meaning of our President where kings have always stood.

We are aware of the nation familiar pattern of most recent Chief Executives in similar circumstances of invoking the
title Commander in Chief and description of him as being the sole organ of foreign relations or chief of administration to suggest a conclusion of constitutional invulnerability. No statutory or decisional authority is volunteered in the conclusion by the Constitution to declare war is shifted to another department? Are we to assume that any action short of a declaration of war, shifts the authority from the Congress to the Executive? As we have seen, wars can be waged, and have been waged, without a declaration by Congress. Such military actions, nonetheless, still constitute wars. The shedding of blood, the taking of lives, the destruction of property, the moving of ships and armies are all the same, whether done under a declaration of war or without such a declaration. War is war whether it is a "declared" conflict or otherwise. Are we to imagine that the authority is shifted to both of the executive and legislative representatives of the people in such instances to someone else, or to some other department, or to the executive? The lack of a declaration of war does not make the conflict any less a war than it would be with such a declaration. The sacrifices, the costs, the consequences are just as far reaching in the case of an undeclared war as in the case of a declared war. Why then, should we strain our imagination to the breaking point and pretend that, short of a declaration of war, the authority rests somewhere other than in the legislative department?

President Clinton has taken the position that he does not believe that he needs the authorization of approval of the Congress to conduct a military deployment in Bosnia, where warring parties have signed a peace agreement but where flashes of violence and hostile actions are so possible that NATO and other forces are needed to make the agreement work. His immediate predecessor, Mr. Bush, took a similar position in regard to his deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia to do battle against Iraq in Desert Storm. Nevertheless, both of them requested the formal support of the Congress in advance of their actions. I requested President Clinton on a number of occasions to seek the support and approval of the Congress and the American people, before committing troops. The Senate "authorized" Mr. Bush, in S.J. Res. 2, on August 7, 1991, "to use United States Armed Forces" against Iraq, by a vote of 52-47.

Again, here today in the Resolution offered by the Majority Leader, the Senate makes clear authorization for the President to undertake military action, and in this case in somewhat more specificity than was the case with regard to Mr. Bush, and for a limited time. The operative words are in Section 2, that "the President may only fulfill his commitment to deploy United States Armed Forces . . . for approximately one year to implement the general Framework Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pursuant to this Resolution, subject to the conditions in subsection (b)." That language fulfills the Framers' intent, from a constitutional perspective, for the Congress to authorize the President to undertake war making powers that he would not otherwise have.

The emphasis of the authority given here today is its limitation in scope and time. If, in the future, the missions engaged in by our forces go creeping into nation-building, to do the job of civil authorities for reconstruction or refugee movements, then the President would have exceeded his authority. I, for one, would certainly be prepared to have the authority shifted to another department. Nevertheless, both of them requested similar position in regard to his deployment of forces to the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, without the authority of Congress. The Framers anticipated that the Congress would be responsible for foreign relations. We have been said to be in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of power only to the American people. The Framers assumed was the best safeguard against autocracy. As Commander in Chief the President has command of the army and navy and may respond to an attack upon the United States. See, e.g., Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 642 (concurring opinion). Also, there is authority for the proposition that he may act to safeguard American lives and property abroad. See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4186); (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1806) and Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (1872). But see the Hostage Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. 1732, which excludes war from the President's options to obtain the release of Americans unreasonably detained by a foreign government.

On the other hand, aside from his powers "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States . . ." and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers", the President is totally dependent upon Congress for authority or money and thus to carry out his policies. Congress is under no legal obligation to supply either or both. For example, it has been said that "[w]hile Congress cannot deprive the President of command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy . . ." (Quoted in Yoder v. C. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 644 (concurring opinion)).

In the Dome resolution, the authority to implement the President's proposed Bosnia policy is clearly provided, and in so doing the Senate is accepting responsibility for the action. In doing so, a vital bipartisan political foundation is being provided for the President's actions, and I think it clearly follows that the consequence of authorizing the President to undertake such a military deployment is to give this branch as well as in the Oval Office. If it passes, we will be giving substance to the proposition that politics in America stops at the water's edge, and this is as it should be. The American people should know that the Bosnia implementation is a national policy, approved through the constitutional scheme that was intended by the framers.

The Constitution specifies that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . ." This provision has been held to be a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Executive Department, and means that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an Act of Congress. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 303 U.S. 308, 321 (1937). Accordingly, the absolute control of the moneys of the United States has been secure. Furthermore, the Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the American people. Harrington v. Bush, 558 F.2d 190, 194 note 7 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The power to
make appropriations includes the authority not only to designate the purpose of the appropriation, "but also the terms and conditions under which the executive department of the government may expend the appropriation. The Congress may not appropriate any amount in violation of the terms and conditions under which . . . appropriations [are] made is solely in the hands of Congress and it is the plain duty of the executive branch of the government to comply with the same." Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. at 986.

Mr. President, the Dole Resolution does not provide the appropriations needed to carry out the Bosnia operation. This is a policy resolution. That was also the case when we authorized President Bush to make war against Iraq in Desert Storm. In that case, the appropriations were provided later. In the same way, the Congress will have to approve appropriations for the Bosnia operation in the near future. I hasten to point out, Mr. President, that the power of the purse is our ultimate hammer, and one which is always available, to terminate the operation. If it turns out that the parties to this piece of geography fail to live up to their pledge to keep the peace and to provide for the security of our forces, and the agreement fails, the Congress can take swift action to terminate our involvement. We have exercised the power of the purse recently to terminate operations and limit them. This was the case in both Somalia and Rwanda. So, while I support this Resolution and believe it is appropriate and timely, I would certainly not hesitate to take action in the effort to end the operation and bring our forces home if the parties will not allow it to work.

Although Congress is enacting laws has to scrupulously avoid even incidental, adverse effects on fully autonomous powers (e.g., the commanding power, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), it is under no similar constraints in other areas. The fact that in the exercise of an acknowledged power, such as powers to fund or to regulate the Armed Forces of the United States, the Congress may incidentally impinge upon presidential authority as Commander in Chief does not render that exercise a violation of the separation of powers. "There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the Country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly of 'war powers,' whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army and navy to command. It is also empowered to make rules for the 'Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,' by what purport of some unenumerated power?" Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 643-644 (concurring opinion).

"The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control." Id. at 588 (opinion of the court).

Although Congress is subject to the Constitution in the exercise of its power to prescribe the exercise of all its powers, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), "[e]ven when the President act clearly within his powers, Congress decides the degree and detail of its support," Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 79 (1972), and does not provide for the security of our forces, and therefore, they did not attempt to go into any detail beyond that which would obtain in the event of all out war. Obviously, the President has the inherent and autonomous power to repeal an invasion, or a sudden and unanticipated attack on the United States or its military forces. In such instances, the President would have no alternative but to exercise such authority, there being no sooner action that would accredit or to secure authorization from the Congress, which might not even be in session at that moment. It seems logical however, to believe that the specific power to declare war—that being the ultimate action—and such declaration having been invested in the legislative branch, anything short of the ultimate circumstance, anything short of the declaration of war, the responsibility and authority for committing the armed forces of the United States in an offensive action, the authority would remain vested in the legislative branch. In other words, the lone authority to declare war being vested in the legislative branch, anything less than a declaration of war would seem to be reposed for its authority in the same source, namely, the Congress. It strains imagination to the utmost to believe that the authority to commit the military forces of the nation in an all out war, shifts elsewhere when the military forces of the nation are to be committed to a lesser action by the military forces than that of all out war. The authority to govern the ultimate unit would seem to carry with it the authority to extend the military action to something less than the all out or ultimate action of declared war.
I close by thanking the majority leader for his leadership and for his statesmanship in taking the position he is taking in introducing the resolution that we are going to vote on.

Mr. President, I urge that the Senate vote in favor of this resolution offered by the distinguished Senator from Texas and the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. INHOFE, and others, and that the Senate vote to approve the resolution offered by Mr. DOLE and Mr. MCCAIN.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the resolutions on which we will vote today in the order in which we will vote.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. CON. RES. —

(Purpose: To Oppose President Clinton's planned deployment of US ground forces to Bosnia.)

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1. That the Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy United States ground forces into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its associated annexes, including maintaining its leadership in NATO, preventing the spread of the conflict, stopping the tragic loss of life, and fulfilling American commitments.

Whereas on December 3, 1995, President Clinton approved Operation Joint Endeavor and deployment of United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a detailed description of the past, present, and future U.S. role in ensuring that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is armed and trained to provide for its own defense, including, as necessary, using existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE.

Within 30 days after enactment, the President shall submit a detailed report on his plan to assist the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense, including the role of the United States and other countries in providing such assistance. Such report shall include an evaluation of the defense needs of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including, to the maximum extent possible:

(a) the types and quantities of arms, spare parts, and logistics support required to establish a stable military balance prior to the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces;

(b) the nature and scope of training to be provided;

(c) a detailed description of the past, present, and future U.S. role in ensuring that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is provided as rapidly as possible with equipment, training, arms and related logistic assistance of the highest possible quality;

(d) administration plans to use existing military drawdown authority, and other assistance authorities pursuant to section 2(6); and

(e) specific or anticipated commitments by third countries to provide arms, equipment, and training to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT.

(a) Thirty days after enactment, and at least once every 60 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on the deployment of United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a detailed description of:

(1) the mission of the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

(2) an integral part of the successful accomplishment of the U.S. objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina in deploying and withdrawing United States Armed Forces is the establishment of a military balance which enables the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense without depending on U.S. or other outside forces; and

(3) the United States will launch immediate international effort, separate and apart from the NATO Implementation Force and consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 836, General Framework Agreement and Associated Annexes, to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the best way to achieve a permanent peace. This peace can be achieved only as the United States and other countries provide the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with comprehensive assistance.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

I close with the assurance that the United States will continue to be committed to the principles underlying the General Framework Agreement and the United Nations peacekeeping effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the commitment to the permanent peace in that region which will only be achieved as the United States and other countries provide the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with comprehensive assistance.

S. 18512

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

December 13, 1995

SEC. 1. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery, and believes they must be given all necessary resources and support to carry our their mission and ensure their security.

SEC. 2. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) Notwithstanding reservations expressed about President Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a way to achieve a military balance and a just and stable peace without the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

(1) the President has decided to deploy United States Armed Forces to implement the General Framework Agreement in Operation Joint Endeavor; and

(2) the deployment of United States Armed Forces has begun; and

(3) preserving United States credibility is a strategic interest of the President may only fulfill his commitment to deploy United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina for approximately the next two years to implement the General Framework Agreement and Military Annex, pursuant to this Resolution, subject to the conditions in subsection (b).

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION.—Before acting pursuant to this Resolution, the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, his determination that—

(1) the mission of the NATO Implementation Force and United States Armed Forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be limited to implementation of the military provisions of the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement and measures deemed necessary to safeguard the goals of the NATO Implementation Force and United States Armed Forces;
federal agencies, for the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including support for the NATO Implementation Force;

(9) the exit strategy to provide for complete withdrawal of United States Armed Forces in the NATO Implementation Force, including an estimated date of completion; and

(10) a description of progress toward enabling the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense.

(b) Such reports shall include a description of any changes in the areas listed in (a) through (d) since the previous report, if applicable. If the reports are submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Thirty days after enactment, and at least once every 60 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on:

(a) the status of implementation of non-military aspects of the General Framework Agreement and Annexes, especially Annex 10 on Civilian Implementation, and other agreements separate from the implementation of the Implementation Force, by the United States and other countries to support implementation of the non-military aspects. Such report shall include a description of:

1. progress toward conducting of elections;

2. the status of return of refugees and displaced persons;

3. humanitarian and reconstruction efforts;

4. police training and related civilian security efforts, including the status of implementation of Annex 11 regarding an international police task force; and

5. implementation of Article XIII of Annex 6 concerning cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and other appropriate organizations in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law;

(b) the status of coordination between the High Representative and the Implementation Force Commander;

(c) the status of plans and preparation for the continuation of civilian activities after the withdrawal of the Implementation Force;

(d) all costs incurred by all U.S. government agencies for reconstruction, refugee, humanitarian, and all other non-military bilateral and multilateral assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

(e) U.S. and international diplomatic efforts to contain and end conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including efforts to resolve the status of Kosovo and halt violations of internationally-recognized human rights of its majority Albanian population.

Such reports shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have been asked by the leader to make the following request:

I ask unanimous consent that the time on our side of the aisle be divided as follows, in the following order:

Senator WELLSSTONE, 7 minutes; Senator MURRAY, 9 minutes; Senator LEAHY, 7 minutes; Senator SIMON, 7 minutes; Senator BRADLEY, 10 minutes; Senator SARBADES, 5 minutes; Senator DODD, 7 minutes; Senator LAUTENBERG, 7 minutes; Senator GRAHAM, 7 minutes; Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN, 5 minutes; Senator KERRY, 10 minutes, and Senator DASCHLE, 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 10:15 this evening, the Senate proceed to the final vote on the pending Hutchison-Inhofe concurrent resolution without further action or debate, and immediately following the vote, the Senate proceed to the final vote on the Dole-McCain joint resolution on Bosnia, with the time between now and 10:15 p.m. this evening to be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I further ask that the Senate resume the Bosnia debate, and it be in order for the leader to offer his joint resolution at a later time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Once again, Madam President, I thank all Senators for allowing us to do this so that every Member of the Senate who might be looking for a timetable would know that the votes do start at 10:15, and that the time between now and then will be equally divided.

I yield the floor.