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Senate

EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

(Continued)

WHY I OPPOSE SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO BOSNIA

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in recent weeks I have spent a great deal of time thinking about Bosnia. I have been to hearings and briefings. I have consulted with experts. I have had many discussions with my colleagues and my constituents. One month ago, I even went to Sarajevo and Tuzla myself to see the conditions our soldiers would face there.

Since my return, I have taken to the floor of the Senate many times, and used every public opportunity, to state my opposition to the President's imminent deployment of ground troops to Bosnia. In the days since the conclusion of the Proximity Peace Talks in Dayton, I have also spoken out against any conditional support of this deployment coming from the Congress. The decision to intervene on the ground in Bosnia is a bad idea, Mr. President, and while I will always support our soldiers wherever they are sent, I want no part of this decision.

My conviction that the administration's intention to put troops in harm's way in Bosnia is a huge mistake rests on three broad arguments. First, and above all, the conflict in Bosnia poses no real threat to vital American interests—simply put, there is nothing in Bosnia that Americans should die for. Second, the Dayton talks have produced a false peace that is inherently unstable and politically doomed. Finally, the implementation force [I-For] plan is self-contradictory and hopelessly optimistic, and will expose our soldiers to unreasonable risks even as they diligently pursue its unrealistic objectives.

WHAT INTERESTS ARE THREATENED?

The administration has repeatedly argued that two vital interests are at stake in the conflict in Bosnia. If we don't intervene now, they say, the war will widen to a point where it threatens all of Europe. If the U.S. does not lead NATO in intervention, they say, both the NATO alliance and U.S. leadership of it will be at risk.

The President is correct when he says that preserving security in Europe, and maintaining American leadership of NATO, are vital American interests. But it is one thing to refer to vital interests, and another to claim that they are really threatened by the conflict in Bosnia. I do not think they are. The administration asserts that the war in Bosnia will spread throughout Central Europe. But where is the evidence that this conflict threatens Bosnia's neighbors? Local countries like Italy, Hungary, and Austria do not seem concerned.

The President has often referred to previous European wars in this century. But comparing this war to either of the world wars—and likening those of us who oppose United States involvement in Bosnia to 1930's-style isolationists—is absurd. It shows a profound misunderstanding of history, and of the roots of those conflicts. World War I began in the Balkans because the world powers took sides in a Balkan war, not because they kept at a safe distance. What the Clinton administration is doing looks a lot more like taking sides. As for World War II, neither Serbia, Bosnia, nor Croatia are anything like Nazi Germany, in terms of ambition, population, industrial strength, military power, or anything else. They are focused on each other, not on external aggression.

The Balkan war has not spread in the past 4 years, and it shows no signs of spreading. So when the President states that stability in Europe is a vital American interest, he is right.

But when he says that European security is threatened in Bosnia, he is wrong.

The only other vital interest the administration refers to is that of preserving our leadership of the NATO alliance. Mr. President, I believe in NATO. It has served us well, and because there are still potential threats to European security, we must enhance and even expand it. But right now, the American people are divided on the question of NATO's importance. Many wonder if the alliance has outlived its usefulness. How does the administration expect Americans to feel about NATO when we get bogged down in a NATO mission in Bosnia? They will view every body bag as one more reason to get out of the alliance once and for all. They will ask: "This is why we are a part of NATO?" And they will be much less willing to act when a real threat to Europe comes along. There are still real threats to Europe out there, Mr. President.

Dragging—or being dragged by—the alliance into a conflict for which it was not designed and for which it is not suited is not leadership. NATO still has a viable mission, but not one of intervening in a nasty Balkan civil war that poses no demonstrable threat to European security. Why should we risk the inevitable conflicts with our NATO partners that will result when we all start taking casualties in a place where no one really wanted to be in the first place?

And why, if this is so important to NATO, should Russia—whose unpredictable future is one of the principal reasons for NATO's continued existence—be included so completely? Why would we go out of our way to include Russian forces with our own, when their natural sympathies lie with the Serbs that we will be trying to disarm, the Serbs we were bombing just a few weeks ago? We have been told by the

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administration that we would be even-handed in our actions in Bosnia, but I was told by an administration official not long ago that the Bosnians were our first priority. But Russia's first priority will certainly be the Serbs.

Not only will this forced alliance with Russia bring Russian troops into Central Europe for the first time since World War II; it will create the potential for misunderstandings and conflict with Russian forces that we have not seen since the Berlin Wall came down—all in the name of preserving European security.

Mr. President, I repeat—I support NATO. If and when this conflict truly threatens Greece and Turkey, or any of our other NATO allies, I will support action to contain it. But the administration proposes not to contain the conflict, but to jump right into the middle of it. If NATO is to become a rationale for America intervening in civil wars in states that are not even members of the alliance, then I say we should disband the alliance tomorrow.

WHAT KIND OF "PEACE" ARE WE TRYING TO IMPLEMENT?

Mr. President, in all the discussion of the implementation force, many people have lost sight of how shaky the agreement reached in Dayton is itself. Regardless of our interests in Bosnia, or our concern for the victims of the war there, the NATO force is being sent to Bosnia to implement what I believe is a fatally flawed agreement, one not likely to survive without the continued presence of large numbers of NATO troops. Let me quote at length from a study by John Hillen of The Heritage Foundation, dated November 30, 1995, and titled "Questioning The Bosnia Peace Plan":

Is a bifurcated Bosnian state a realistic and sustainable political entity? The Bosnian peace accord proposes a Bosnia-Herzegovina that has the appearance of a single state, but is in fact based on two very separate political entities—The Bosnian Muslim/Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic. In order for the central organs of Bosnia to actually function as intended, the two separate entities of Bosnia will have to show the most extraordinary goodwill and cooperation towards each other, qualities that have never before been in evidence in Bosnia.

Many experienced diplomats have expressed skepticism about the political viability of this Bosnian state and the realistic chances of its survival as a centrally governed and coherent nation. * * * Stephen Cambone of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that "any agreement reached in 20 days over issues that have been fiercely fought over for more than four years is fraught with compromises and internal flaws." Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution noted that the accord has "a lot of loose ends" and "many ways in which it could unravel." In short, the accord is diplomatically enchanting but realistically impractical.

Much of this skepticism over the accord is rooted in the fact that the accord does not address fundamental issues of sovereignty and ethnic self-determination. Instead, it freezes those unresolved issues in place and offers up an elaborate power sharing agreement for a Bosnian central government.

However, it will be difficult for a contrived central government to replace the bonds of loyalty, authority, and legitimacy that currently exist between Bosnian Croats and Croats and Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. Those existing bonds are rooted in centuries of political, ethnic, and cultural identity and are sure to prove stronger than bonds to a hastily fabricated central government. * * *

If history is any guide, this agreement does not stand much chance of lasting. In Cyprus in 1964, international negotiators reached a similar agreement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Much like the Bosnian agreement, the doomed Cyprus accord attempted to replace bonds to the "parent entities" for both sides (Greece and Turkey) with an unworkable central executive and ethnically aligned parliamentary blocs. This ensured continued intractability except in the event of the most extraordinary goodwill. This structure never worked because it never addressed the fundamental fears and aspirations of the warring factions and was completely predicated on a diplomatic fantasy: the hopes for a degree of cooperation that had never been present in Cyprus. After 10 years of sporadic fighting and instability under this makeshift arrangement, Turkey invaded the island, partitioned Cyprus, and put an end to the ephemeral peace; an imposed peace that was never locally supported. UN peacekeepers have been in Cyprus for over 30 years.

The same pattern can be expected in Bosnia. How can an imposed peace that does not reflect political realities or the basic concerns of the warring factions hope to survive except by the continued enforcement of thousands of NATO and American troops? The hastily concluded Bosnian peace accord is, by necessity, a weak plan. The weakness is inherent because the accord does not address the fundamental issues that caused the parties to go to war in the first place. It is, at best, a cease-fire that can only work under the continued stewardship of 60,000 heavily armed NATO combat troops.

Mr. President, it is my view that, in addition to finding threats to vital interests in the Balkans where there are none, the President is putting U.S. prestige on the line to implement a peace plan that has very little chance of succeeding in the long run even if everything goes well for a year.

THE REAL RISKS TO AMERICAN TROOPS

Maybe the most troubling thing about the Administration's approach to the Balkans is its confidence that it will be able to control the conflict after it jumps in with both feet. The President speaks of a "limited, focused" mission; he tells us that we are "not fighting a war." Then why are we sending more than 60,000 troops, reinforced with tanks, artillery, and airpower? What of this talk of "overwhelming force" and "robust rules of engagement?" Just what is "overwhelming force" when you are fighting against landmines? What are "robust rules of engagement" when you are fighting snipers—an airstrike on the village where you think the shot came from? Mr. President, I remind my colleagues that we had robust rules of engagement and overwhelming force in Vietnam, and they did not work in the end. I think that it is utter nonsense to apply these concepts to Bosnia.

Regardless of any paper agreement signed in Dayton, there are those in

Bosnia for whom continued fighting is a better deal. There are those who are profiting from the war as bandits or on the black market. There are those who are used to getting their way with guns; for them this war is about money, not ethnicity; one NATO commander told me that they had found cases where Serbs were selling black market ammunition to Muslims! What about those who will be displaced from their homes by the Dayton agreement, who will not willingly leave? What about those who have been displaced—there are up to three million refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina—for whom peace means "going home," but who will not be allowed to return as the result of the agreement? What about fighters who are demobilized as a result of the treaty, but cannot find jobs because the economy has been ruined? And those who just miss the power of a rifle? While I was in Tuzla last month, the commanding general of UN Sector Northeast, General Haukland, told me that there will be criminality and gangsterism when troops are demobilized. Mr. President, what about those who have a score to settle after four years of brutal war? One thing is certain, Mr. President—there are a lot of people in Bosnia who may be tempted to shoot at Americans, regardless of our "overwhelming force" and "robust rules of engagement."

A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

On October 17, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The U.S. has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe. The war in Bosnia threatens those interests, and the U.S. vital security interest is served by stopping this war." At the same hearing, Secretary Perry states the administration's commitment to bringing our troops home in approximately one year.

But the Administration cannot have it both ways. President Clinton cannot say that our vital interests are threatened in Bosnia, and at the same time pledge that we will be out of Bosnia in about a year. If two vital interests—European security and the NATO alliance—are truly threatened in Bosnia, how can there be a one-year statute of limitations on our response? Since when are American vital interests only worth one year's commitment?

The Administration has also said that United States troops will leave Bosnia if the peace agreement is violated and conflict resumes. In short, their plan claims to be defending a vital interest, but promises that we will leave if enough people shoot at us, or when the 12-month clock runs out. But if conflict in Bosnia really threatens a vital U.S. interest, are they not committed to ending that conflict no matter what it takes, or how long it takes? Is that not what "vital interest" means? Mr. President, if the administration can tell us that IFOR will leave in about a year, no matter what, then there must not be much of a

threat or much of a vital interest. If there are vital interests at stake, the Administration should be honest and tell the American people that we are committed to Bosnia for the long haul.

If I were sending one of my sons to Bosnia, I would want to know that his life was being put on the line to accomplish something important, something worth doing at any cost, and something that the American people stood firmly behind. But at best, the Dayton plan and IFOR will bring a few months' respite to the people of Bosnia. When the war resumes after we leave, or if "systemic violations" force us out, then the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans who died trying to impose a token peace in an artificial country will truly have been wasted.

Vital interests are the only thing we should ask our soldiers to die for. When U.S. vital interests at stake, the American people and our troops alike will tolerate things going badly for a while. They will stay the course. If there were vital interests at stake in Bosnia, the President would not be giving us all of these details about rules of engagement, exit strategies, and time limits—he would not have to.

Mr. President, administration officials in Washington seem to be the only people who think we can finish this operation in a year. Not one military or diplomatic person I spoke with on my trip, not a single U.S., NATO, or U.N. commander, thought that peace in Bosnia could be achieved in anything close to 12 months. Given the forbidding geography, harsh winter climate, and wholesale destruction in Bosnia, it will be months before even modest degree of stability could be restored, even if everyone cooperates fully. The UN commander in Tuzla, General Haukland of Norway, described a one-year presence as a hand in water—when you take it out, nothing has changed. In Balkan history, a year is no time at all.

The simple truth, Mr. President, is that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is about to become America's pet country. The United States of America is going to own Bosnia and all of her problems just as soon as the 1st Armored Division sets up in Tuzla. Does anyone really believe that we will leave Bosnia in a year if the threat to her stability remains? Does anyone really believe, after arming, training, and equipping the Bosnian Army for a year, that we will stand by and watch if our pet army is on the verge of defeat? Of course not; if Bosnia is as important as the Administration says it is, we will stay in Bosnia as long as we have to. We have already employed airstrikes against the Serbs; we will do so again if Bosnia is threatened again. I say to my colleagues—we are on the verge of what may be a very long commitment.

So Mr. President, I have said that I will resist this plan with all of my power, and I will do so down to the wire. I think the peace is false, the

plan is naive, and the risk to our troops unrealistically high. There is only one way to express these conclusions: I urge my colleagues to oppose the Dole-McCain Resolution of conditional support, and to support the Hutchison-Inhofe Resolution opposing the deployment of ground troops to Bosnia.

Mr. President, I want to make a couple of observations about the debate that is taking place tonight. There seems to be a lot of people who are going to vote, perhaps, for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, then turn around and vote also for the Dole-McCain resolution. I suggest, Mr. President, that would be a little inconsistent.

After looking at a final copy—and we only received a copy of the Dole-McCain resolution a matter of a couple of hours ago in its final version—I cannot see that it narrows the mission at all. It starts off by saying, "Before acting, pursuant to the resolution, the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination. . ."—and then they cover a number of things that they want the President to certify. For example, the Dole-McCain resolution says: "The mission will be limited to the implementation of the military provisions of the Dayton agreement."

But the administration has already, in effect, certified this: Secretary Christopher said, on December 1: "Let me assure you that IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement. They will not be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction."

Secretary Perry said the same thing: "The mission of IFOR is to oversee and enforce the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement." That is exactly the same as we find in the Dole-McCain amendment.

Second, Dole-McCain says: "An integral part of the successful accomplishment of the objective is the establishment of military balance." This is what the administration has been saying all along. For example, Secretary Christopher has said: "We are committed to achieve the stable military balance with Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia."

In another part of the Dole-McCain resolution, it says: "The United States will lead an immediate international effort to provide equipment, arms, training, and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality to ensure that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can provide for its own defense."

Again, on December 1, Secretary Christopher said: "The Armed Forces in the Federation will need to obtain some equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability. As for our part, the United States will ensure that the Federation

Armed Forces receive the necessary assistance."

What I am saying, Mr. President, is I think it is inconsistent for someone to vote for Hutchison-Inhofe and turn around and vote for Dole-McCain. Dole-McCain simply requires the President to say what he has been saying all along. Is that supposed to narrow the mission? Is that supposed to reassure us?

Second, Mr. President, I was listening very attentively to the very knowledgeable and scholarly Senator from West Virginia, Senator BYRD, talking about the constitutional rights of the President and the responsibilities of the President and also the constitutional rights of Congress. I thought, all the way through, that he was coming to the conclusion that the President cannot do what he has already done. At least that is what I was inferring from his remarks. But I gather he will support the President by voting for Dole-McCain.

I did hear several other valuable arguments during the course of the day. Senator FEINGOLD came out with some very strong constitutional arguments that would lead one to believe that the President has indeed overstepped his powers. He referred to an article by Louis Fisher, which I later made a part of this RECORD. He says: "The framers knew that the British King could use military force against other countries without legislative involvement. They gave to Congress the responsibility for deciding matters of war and peace. The President, as Commander in Chief, was left with the power to repel sudden attacks."

So that qualifies what the President is able to do within his constitutional rights. We made that a part of the RECORD. In sitting and listening to the debate today—and I stayed in the Chamber the entire day, as I feel this is the most critical vote we will have, probably, at least in the last year or 2, and I wanted to hear everyone's viewpoint. I think the distinguished Senator from Alabama, Senator HEFLIN, talked at some length about how this should be a European mission. I have said over and over again that maybe we have a responsibility—and I am not going to debate that because everybody is assuming that we have a responsibility to protect the integrity of NATO, to respond in some way to the atrocities that have taken place. I have suggested that there are atrocities taking place all over the world. Where do you draw the line? Do you draw it here? Or are we, in fact, doing this because the President, in February 1993, made a statement that he was going to send ground troops in?

But the Senator from Alabama, Senator HEFLIN, talked about the fact that this should be a European mission. Nobody will deny that it is more a responsibility of Europe than it is the United States. Yet, we talk about the contribution that our NATO partners are making to this.

Germany, who is in the backyard of the Balkans, is sending a total of 4,000 troops, and they debated it in their legislative body before agreeing to do that. We did not have time to debate it before we did it. Yet, we are talking about sending five times the troops that Germany is sending.

I listened very carefully while several people on the floor made points. I want to briefly respond to a couple of them. First of all, as far as our troops being supported, I think we all have made it abundantly clear that we in this body, as well as the other body, are supporting our troops, not just here, but all around the world. What greater support could there be for our troops than by not sending them into this hostile area to start with? That is real support of the troops.

That is what we are trying to do with the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution—make it abundantly clear that our troops should not have to be over there. When they are over there—if, in fact, they end up in a mass deployment—yes, we will support our troops all the way. I think that has been said over and over again. I do not think anybody is going to deny that.

The Senator from New Mexico, Senator DOMENICI, made a very good point. What we are trying to do is state our opposition to this before it gets started.

You see, the troops are not deployed yet. Yes, there are some there. We will support those. Those are the advance troops, logistic troops, but the mass deployment that the President has promised immediately after the signing of this agreement in Paris has not yet taken place. So this debate is taking place now, before the mass deployment has taken place.

The junior Senator from California commented in her remarks that this deployment was acceptable "as long as it remains a peacekeeping mission." I suggest to the junior Senator from California it is not a peacekeeping mission now. We keep hearing about peacekeeping as if there is currently peace to keep. There is a cease-fire in effect. But I have been in parts of Bosnia during this cease-fire when the gunfire was going off; in some parts of the northeast sector, near Tuzla, they do not even know there is a cease-fire. The title that we are giving ourselves now, giving to I-FoR, is "peace implementation." There is a big difference between peacekeeping and peace implementation. Peace implementation means we do not have peace now but we will implement it. That is a totally different mission.

Mission creep has already crept into this, Mr. President. The exit strategy seems to be to keep peace for a year, and then leave. As the junior Senator from California said, all we have to do is keep peace for a year and we are out of there. She is saying exactly what Secretary Christopher said, exactly what General Shalikashvili said as recently as last week before the Senate

Armed Services Committee, saying it is inconceivable we will not be out of there in a year.

During my visit with the Norwegian general who commands the U.N.'s northeast sector, in the Tuzla area, I mentioned "12 months," he smiled and said, "You mean 12 years." And when we talked about 12 months he said, "Apparently the American people do not understand the way the people in that region think, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Moslems. Their conception of time is totally different." He used an analogy I have used on the floor. It is like putting your hand in water for 12 months, you look and take your hand out and nothing has happened. When we leave the war will start again. If they know we will be gone in a year, which we have said we will be—the President has reaffirmed that as recently as last week, and it was reaffirmed a week ago by Secretary of Defense Perry—what will they do? Lay low for a year and then come back out swinging. By the way, Mr. President, the combatants in this conflict have a habit of laying low every winter.

I do not think I have ever in my life—and I did serve in the Armed Forces—I do not ever remember a time in our Nation's history or in the history of warfare where we went into a hostile area and then our exit strategy was geared to time, instead of being geared to events. But that is exactly what we are proposing to do here.

The senior Senator from California was talking about "A far greater risk in doing nothing than in sending our troops." I suggest that it is not quite that easy. It would be easy if we were able to pass the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution and the President would look at this and say clearly we do not have Congress behind sending ground troops in but we have a responsibility to NATO, we have a responsibility to Bosnia. If he felt that way he could do it and we could do it through air power. We have already been there with airstrikes. We know that works. We could lift the arms embargo.

Sure, our European partners do not want us to do that. They want us on the ground there. People talk about how well received our President was over in Europe. I think if I lived in Europe I would be receiving him well, too. He is coming over and proposing that we fight their battle for them. I suggest that there are other alternatives.

Senator ASHCROFT from Missouri was talking about the speech that the President made in 1993 and suggested something I had not thought about. Maybe the President made the commitment of United States ground troops back in February 1993 without having been really apprised of the situation in Bosnia, the deep hostility, the history of that area, the history of World War I, World War II, the 500-year-old civil war, and what has been going on over there for many years.

The Senator from Delaware, Senator BIDEN, was articulate and outspoken

when he talked about the different parties there. I think he referred to Milosevic as someone who was perhaps a war criminal, and certainly he talked about the others who had actually been indicted for war crimes. Lastly, it was Senator KOHL who said that we either support peace or we do not. I think there are many ways where we can offer our support without doing it on the ground. I will mention one other thing that the Senator from North Carolina mentioned when he talked about the fact that the bridges and the roads in that sector—from Hungary down south through Tuzla, down toward Sarajevo, in the area that goes from the Posavina corridor down to Tuzla—that the roads would not accommodate an M-1 tank. We found out when we were over there that there is only one bridge in that entire area that they say can handle it structurally. The Americans will have to come in and rebuild the bridges, rebuild the roads, and if they do not they will start a civil war because the people are upset for us coming in and messing up the existing roads with our tanks. This came from the people now in command, the U.N. people in the northeast sector.

The most profound thing I have heard on the floor of the Senate today came from the very distinguished Senator from Indiana, Senator COATS. He asked the question, "Have we so squandered American leadership that we must buy it back with American lives?" I think this puts it in perspective. If we are wanting to prove to someone that we have this leadership, that we must lead and whatever NATO decides to do is in the best interest of the allies and that we must blindly go along with them, do we do this at the risk of lives?

On October 17 we asked the question of Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry. This was after Gen. Michael Rose made the statement if the Americans get into this war they will sustain more losses than they did during the Persian Gulf war, where we lost a total of 390 lives.

I asked the question, is your mission here worth 400 or more lives? Secretary Christopher said yes; Secretary Perry said yes; General Shalikashvili said yes. I think that is a defining difference between the administration's view and my own.

I think that we need to at least acknowledge this body is already on record opposing what President Clinton is about to do. So it is not a matter of waiting until the last minute, until the last hour. Over a month ago we passed a sense-of-the-Congress amendment in both the House and Senate, attached to the Defense appropriations bill by Senator GREGG: "It is the sense of Congress that none of the funds available for the Department of Defense should be obligated or exploited for the deployment or participation of the United States Armed Forces in any peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina * * *."

This opposition is not something we are coming up with today for the first time. The Senate is already on record.

Lastly, let me go over some of the things that were talked about on the floor today in terms of danger. I think we are kind of trying to soften this thing, trying to gloss over the dangers. Some say we will go over and everyone will be kissing the American flag and everyone will love us because we brought peace into the Balkans. If you stop and look, and this came out of the Defense News, of the various elements over there, the Croats have 80,000 soldiers; the Croatian Serbs 50,000; Serbia, 125,000; Bosnia, 110,000; Bosnian Serbs, 80,000; Bosnian Croats, 50,000. That is not even talking about the rogue elements, and there are some nine rogue elements that are over there.

It is so convoluted it reminds me of the letter that came back from one of our warriors who lost his life in Somalia. It was the son of Captain James Smith, who read me the letter of his son. His son was Cpl. Jim Smith who lost his life. Capt. Jim Smith lost his leg in Vietnam and his son lost his life in Somalia. His was one of those corpses dragged through the street in Mogadishu. His last letter said: Dad, we cannot tell who our friends are and who they are not. We cannot tell the difference.

I suggest that is exactly the situation that we have here. Many people have talked about the fact that we are going to have just 20,000 or 25,000 troops over there. I hope no one is kidding themselves, deluding themselves thinking that is all we are going to have.

There was an article in the Defense News that gave a very persuasive argument that we would end up with a total NATO force of 240,000 troops. Keeping our ratio, that would be 80,000 Americans who will be involved over there.

Go back and read your history. British Prime Minister Disraeli, over 100 years ago, who had been observing the battles over there, said, "It will take a half-million troops to bring peace to the Balkans."

I think, when we look at the time-frame of 12 months—that is fictitious. It is not going to happen. The 20,000 troops, that is not going to happen. The mission is peacekeeping—that already is not happening, it is now peace implementation. We are kidding ourselves.

We have already had a vote on H.R. 2606. That was a very strong vote, even though there were just 22 who voted in favor of it. Those are the people who really feel the strongest about not sending troops into that area. But we are going to have another record vote. That record vote is going to take place this evening.

We are going to have two record votes. When you have the first vote on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, think very carefully. Because if you vote for that, as I said when I opened these remarks, you cannot turn around and vote for the Dole-McCain resolution be-

cause they are inconsistent with each other. This is the last opportunity that the Senators who are here and will be voting tonight will have to get on record. This is their last shot, the last chance they have to say no, we should not send ground troops into Bosnia.

I do not think it is possible for anyone to understand the hostility of the area if he or she has not been up there to Tuzla where our troops will go. To the best of my knowledge, only two Members of Congress have been up there, Senator HANK BROWN from Colorado and myself. When we had a meeting the other day in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I discovered that even Secretary Perry had not been up there, Secretary Christopher had not been up there, General Shalikashvili had not been up there, and certainly President Clinton has not been up there.

I cannot imagine that they would be willing to take chances in a hostile area without going up and looking at it. I can tell you firsthand, and I went over much of that area in a helicopter not more than 100 feet off the treetops with Gen. Rupert Smith, a British general. We looked down and for the first time we could realize how Marshal Tito was able to hold off the very best that Hitler had on a ratio of 1 to 8, because of the unique environment, the very hostile and forbidding environment.

Mr. President, this is going to be probably the most significant vote that many Members of this body will cast. It is going to be tonight. I would like to have them think long and hard. Because if you vote for—if you vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution and vote for the Dole-McCain resolution, you are saying we agree with the basic policy of sending ground troops.

You see, I think everybody knows now, we can support our troops and not support the policy. That is an easy thing to do. We all support our troops. The greatest support we could give our troops is to not to deploy them into that warring area.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senator from Minnesota is recognized for 7 minutes.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, 4 years of mass executions, mass rape, mass murders, brutal ethnic cleansing, sieges against civilians, terror campaigns, atrocities, and genocide not seen in Europe since the end of World War II—1/4-million people dead, 3 million people in the region refugees, and if we were to think about this in terms of our population, that would be the equivalent of 170 million American refugees.

The people of Bosnia deserve relief from years of armed conflict, relief from displacement, relief from malnutrition and hunger, relief from winters without heat or electricity, relief from war crimes and, yes, relief from the indifference of the rest of the world.

I traveled to the former Yugoslavia by myself 2 years ago. I went with my legislative assistant, Colin McGinnis. I visited with people in the refugee camps, and I saw enough pain and enough misery to last me for a lifetime. The Dayton agreement is the best and perhaps it is the last chance for peace in the region. That is why I intend to support it.

While I am speaking on the floor, I would like to express my thanks and my love to the family of three American diplomats killed in Bosnia while serving the cause of peace.

Our proper constitutional role as Senators and Representatives is to not give broad grants of authority to any President. I have talked to experts outside the Congress, had many briefings from people in the administration, met with people in the former Yugoslavia, and I have tried to the best of my ability to make the best decision for my country and for the world that I live in. I believe it is our responsibility to make sure the objectives are limited. I believe it is our responsibility to insist on as much clarity as possible.

There are several reserve units going from Minnesota, and, as a Senator, I owe those families. It is my responsibility to make sure that everything is done that can be done to preserve their safety and the safety of all of our soldiers who are there—not to go to war, as I listen to the Senator from Oklahoma, but are there to secure a peace.

Do I have concerns? You bet I have concerns. I do not think the arms control provisions of this agreement are very strong. I worry about the international police provisions; I think they are weak. I believe that there should have been, in the Dayton agreement, really a clear understanding—we keep talking about this 1-year time agreement—that the Europeans are a part of the transition and that they assume the responsibility for peacekeeping so that when we leave after a year or thereabouts, in fact the presence of NATO is there. Because it is not clear to me that we will be able to accomplish our objectives in that period of time.

Do I worry? You bet I worry. I have been up at night trying to decide what the right decision would be. I worry about the landmines. I have had briefings from our military, and there are reasons for all of us to worry. Our soldiers are trained, they have been doing the training in Germany, but I worry about that. I worry about depending on Milosevic. I think Milosevic is a war criminal. And when I hear Milosevic has made this commitment and that commitment, it makes me nervous.

I wonder what the meaning is when General Mladic says he has not agreed to this agreement. Does he go to the hills with his soldiers? I worry about that as well.

This has been a difficult decision for me, but in the end I really believe that we are doing the right thing as a nation. In the end, I think the alternative

to no peacekeeping force there—and there will be no peacekeeping force and there will be no agreement if we are not a part of that force—will be a living hell. The alternative, I say to my colleagues, will be a living hell: More genocide, more rape, more murder, more mass executions in Bosnia. And it could be a war that spreads to Central Europe.

We are there to do the right thing. I believe that. I believe that for our children. I believe that for my children.

In the end, I stand on the side of hope, hope for an end to this conflict, hope for an end to its attendant horrors, hope for a better world that we live in, hope for the peoples of that region, hope for an end to the bitter ethnic divisions, hope for an end to the religious hatred.

I believe that we, therefore, in casting this vote in supporting our soldiers and in supporting this peacekeeping mission—I believe we cast the right vote. That is why I will vote for the Dole-McCain resolution, and that is why I am in opposition to the Inhofe-Hutchison resolution.

Mr. President, on the day before the formal signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, we are gathered here for a historic debate. I want to share with my colleagues my views on the deployment of United States peacekeepers to Bosnia to participate in the NATO peacekeeping mission there.

Designed to help put an end to the violence that has cost so many lives and so much suffering over the last 4 years, it offers real hope for peace. After much thought, I have come to a simple conclusion. With U.S. participation in the NATO peace effort, there is a real chance for a durable peace that could break the brutal cycle of violence there. Without our participation, we face an almost certain resumption of the fighting, and possibly a wider Balkan war.

This war has taken a horrible toll, not only on the people of the region, but also on the conscience of people everywhere who have watched it unfold in all its horror on their TV screens, and struggled to figure out a way to help end it.

For 4 years the people of Bosnia have suffered some of the worst atrocities in Europe: mass executions, mass rapes, brutal ethnic cleansing, sieges against innocent civilian populations, and terror campaigns. Atrocities we have not seen since the end of WW II.

So far, the war there has left a quarter of a million dead, and nearly 3 million people from the region refugees, expelled from their homes and villages in brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Three million refugees. Think of that. If such a war were fought here in the United States, by population share that would be equal to about 170 million American refugees.

The people of Bosnia deserve immediate relief from the years of armed conflict, displacement, malnutrition and hunger, winters without heat or

electricity, war crimes, and at times indifference by the rest of the world. The Dayton agreement offers a promise of such relief. I visited the Balkans 2 years ago. I met many people there, including many refugees who had been expelled from their homes, and who had lost loved ones and friends. I know the trials and horror they have experienced.

Even in the face of these horrors, the President's decision to send United States troops to Bosnia is one of the most difficult foreign policy choices our country has confronted since the end of the cold war. The risks of the deployment, though I think they have been greatly reduced by the administration's careful planning, are real. From the millions of landmines left over from the war, to irregular forces, to weather, to other hazards, this mission is not without its dangers.

But while many of us have had differing views about the proper United States role in Bosnia over the past 4 years, and some of us had pressed for tougher action against the Serbs for many months, there is one thing that is becoming more and more clear. The Dayton agreement is the best, and perhaps the last, chance for peace in the region. That's why I intend to support it.

Full and effective implementation of this agreement offers the best hope to stop this brutal war, and to give the parties a chance to recover, and to rebuild their cities, to rebuild their nations. After months of fruitful negotiations led by the United States, and with the Europeans providing the bulk of peacekeeping forces to help monitor the agreement, I believe it would be a mistake for the U.S. Congress to sound an uncertain, quavering trumpet now regarding our commitment to peace in the region.

Through tough-minded, tenacious diplomacy, President Clinton's envoy Richard Holbrooke worked for many months to help the warring parties craft an agreement that could bring an end to the bloodshed. He deserves our praise, and our thanks—as do those three American diplomats killed in Bosnia while serving the cause of peace.

President Clinton observed in his recent speech that the United States can't be the world's policeman, but we can become involved in circumstances such as this, where we have a compelling national interest in maintaining the peace, where we have a chance to be effective, and where we have a clear duty to help.

Over the course of the last few weeks, I have talked with the President and with his chief foreign policy advisors, including Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry, and pressed them to ensure our mission was clear, limited, and governed by strict rule of engagement that would allow our troops to protect themselves in any circumstances. The Dayton Agreement provides for sweeping

NATO rules of engagement that will allow U.S. forces to use all appropriate force to protect themselves. In the last 2 weeks, I have been urging administration officials to clarify the limited, narrow goals of the mission; how they intend to measure progress toward those goals, and the limits they will impose on U.S. troop activity in the region. I believe they have made real progress in clarifying each of these areas.

This is our proper role in Congress: to press administration officials to clarify key points of their plan, ensure that objectives are limited and attainable, that an exit strategy is clearly laid out, and that planning for a post-U.S. presence upon withdrawal, composed presumably of Europeans, is moving forward. I believe that we have done that, pressing those responsible in the administration to close some gaps in their thinking that will serve our troops well in the long run.

I have thought long and hard about this deployment and, in addition to my discussions with the President and his senior advisors, have consulted extensively with those whom I represent in Minnesota, administration officials at the working level in the Pentagon, the State Department, and elsewhere. I have talked with outside regional experts, and others. I've talked with Minnesota military personnel who are being deployed to Europe. There are several reserve units from Minnesota whose members are being deployed to Europe, and I am aware of my direct and profound responsibilities to them and to their families—and to the families of all our troops—to ensure that everything possible is done to preserve their safety.

The Dayton Agreement, especially its key military annexes, were clearly designed with these concerns in mind. And it has garnered broad support. It has the support of the Russians, of the U.N. Security Council, NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, each of whom will play a key role in its implementation. It is truly a multilateral effort, of which the administration should be proud.

But even though we played a key role in the development of this agreement among the parties, let us not forget one critical thing; this is their agreement, not ours. It was developed by the parties, not imposed by outsiders. They have asked other nations, including the United States, to help secure the future of that agreement.

And they have assured us, NATO, and the U.N. Security Council that they will respect its terms, and take steps to protect our peacekeeping forces. Over 25 nations have responded to the call to help secure this peace. As the last remaining superpower, we have an obligation to join them. If the current ceasefire holds, and the peace agreement is signed tomorrow in Paris and begins to be implemented on schedule in the next few weeks, we have a duty, I believe, to help.

I think it would be irresponsible to sit aside and allow the horrors that have taken place in Bosnia to continue. Our great hope is that this peace agreement might finally secure a lasting peace; we must not abandon that hope now by cutting off funds for our troops, or by refusing to grant at least conditional support for the mission.

I have decided to support this peacekeeping deployment, even though I am fully aware of the potential risks and problems with it. For example, I believe the arms control and international police provisions of the Dayton Agreement are weak, and must be strengthened. And they are being strengthened and fleshed out, by NATO planners and through proposals offered last weekend at the London Implementing Conference. In the end, how they are implemented will make the big difference, and we in Congress must monitor this carefully. The reporting requirements of the Dole-McCain resolution will help ensure that Congress is kept informed on a formal, timely basis of developments in key areas of the accord's implementation, in both its military and civilian aspects.

Likewise, I remain somewhat concerned that the very broad NATO rules of engagement leave considerable room for interpretation on the part of NATO field commanders there about how to react when faced with violent civil disturbances, hostage situations, harassment by irregular forces, or other similar situations. I know they do so to provide flexibility to our commanders in the field, but this is another area which must be monitored carefully. Supervising the separation of forces, maintained by the parties, is one thing. But serving as local police forces is quite another. While I know the Dayton Agreement prohibits the latter, we must be careful to ensure that the potential for any mission creep is strictly limited.

We have heard a lot of heartfelt debate today, and expressions of concern about the potential for an extended, open-ended deployment. To those who are worried that Bosnia could turn out to be a quagmire, I can only say I have consulted as broadly as I could, weighted the risks as responsibly as I could, and I do not believe that is going to happen. I believe the administration has built into its implementation plans sufficient safeguards to avoid this problem, including strict limits on the areas where our troops will be, and on their mission. If I did believe this was a real risk, I would fiercely oppose this deployment. Let there be no mistake. This will be a NATO operation, with clear lines of command and rules of engagement, run by an American general. The mission is not open-ended. Our troops will be heavily armed, with the power and authority to respond to any potential threats as forcefully as necessary.

Of course, there are some concerns that can never be fully met. For example, I have doubts about the sincerity

of Serb President Milosevic, and about his ability to deliver on his promises. I have even less confidence in the Bosnian Serbs. I am frankly alarmed that General Mladic has not been willing to support the agreement, that Serb civilians in the Sarajevo suburbs have been so vocal in opposing it, and that the Bosnians have resisted cutting their ties with radical states like Iran. But those doubts should not deter us from at least supporting this attempt at peace; they simply offer reasons for caution.

I have raised some of these concerns explicitly with the President and his advisors. I have asked tough questions of administration officials about how they intend to make good on United States commitments to lead an effort to provide arms and training to the Bosnian Government while serving as neutral peacekeepers. While I have in the past supported lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians, I believe that with this agreement there is a real chance to stabilize the situation through arms control, rather than primarily through building up the opposing armies.

That's where our emphasis should be now. Demilitarization on all sides, not remilitarization, is the appropriate course to follow to establish a military balance between the Serbs and the Moslem-Croat Federation. Once a full NATO balance-of-forces assessment is complete, the report required by the Dole resolution is submitted to Congress, and the arms build-down begins in earnest, I am hopeful that full compliance with the arms control provisions of the peace agreement will go a long way toward equalizing the forces. And if it does not complete the task, there will be plenty of moderate Moslem nations willing to help arm, equip, and train the Bosnians to better defend themselves, as necessary.

I have also raised questions about the criteria that will be applied by NATO to measure progress toward its goals, and about the timetable for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. Administration officials have provided me with all the information they could on these questions. While many of us would like to know that our troops will come home by next Christmas, I do not think the administration can realistically provide firm assurances that that will happen, and I think that it would be foolish to demand them as a condition for our support, since it could place our troops in great jeopardy if they are pulled out prematurely.

I do know the President intends to have us get in, complete our mission, and get out, as swiftly as possible, and that General Shalikashvili has indicated that 1 year is more than sufficient time to accomplish the limited military goals of the mission. Completing our mission should be our primary goal, not meeting some arbitrary timetable that may be driven more by domestic politics than by the situation on the ground in Bosnia.

Whether 1 year is also sufficient time to secure other, broader goals, including return of refugees, free and fair elections, and rebuilding of war-torn Bosnia, is unlikely. I know of almost no one who believes it is possible in that timeframe. But at least this year-long respite can end the violence, and start them on the road toward peace. I hope that we will be able to work out an agreement with out allies that will provide for a much smaller, residual force that could stay there longer, if needed, to monitor compliance with the accord. Composed largely of NATO troops from Europe, this force could begin to shoulder primary responsibility for the mission after 9 to 10 months. I have urged the administration to explore this more vigorously, because I think it is key to our exit strategy in the region. I would have preferred that it be built into this resolution. But I am satisfied that the administration has taken seriously this concern, and will take steps to explore it with our allies.

On these and many other questions, administration officials have been very forthcoming. Where they were unable to provide clear answers, for example on the planned composition of a follow-on force if such a force were necessary after U.S. withdrawal, they outlined for me the state of their current thinking. Frankly, there is still much work to be done by NATO, the U.N. Security Council, and others over the course of the next few weeks and months to nail down answers to some of these key questions. But overall, I am satisfied that this deployment has been carefully planned and will be executed ably by our military forces. It is the responsible thing to do, the right thing to do. And that's why I intend to support it.

Many Americans remain skeptical of U.S. participation in this peacekeeping effort. I continue to believe it is critical that the President have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress before moving forward. And I think that as this process has moved forward, and the President and his advisors have made clear the limited, narrow nature of the NATO mission, more Americans are being persuaded that this peacekeeping effort is the right thing to do.

Whatever we decide today, the President has already started sending U.S. troops to serve as advance support for the U.S. mission there. We must support the troops, and their families here in the United States, in every way we can. This resolution expresses clearly our support for their efforts.

Mr. President, this has been a difficult decision for me. But in the end I stand on the side of hope—hope for an end to the conflict and its attendant horrors, hope for a better future for the peoples of that region, hope for an end to the bitter ethnic and religious hatreds that have engulfed the region. It is a hope tempered by realism, though, about the road that lies ahead, and the potential pitfalls of this agreement.

Finally, let me say this. Over the last few weeks, some have asked me why I would be willing to consider supporting this peacekeeping deployment, when I opposed our going to war in the Persian Gulf. There a host of major differences between the two situations, not least of which is that our troops were being sent to the Persian Gulf to go to war; in Bosnia, they are going to secure a peace. The have been invited by the parties in Bosnia to secure a peace agreement, under firm security assurances provided by the parties. I opposed the war in the gulf, among other reasons, because—like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell—I believed the tough U.N.-imposed sanctions ought to have been given more time to bite. In Bosnia, I do not believe that are realistic alternatives to this peacekeeping deployment that have gone untried.

This may be the opportunity that is needed, Mr. President, to break the cycle of violence in the lands of the former Yugoslavia by helping to keep the sides apart for a year in order to give them some time to begin putting their lives back together. Hopefully a year of peace will bring about something more lasting. It is my hope for the future of the peoples of that region that has led to me to conclude that we should support the President's action. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this resolution.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from North Carolina is recognized.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution opposing President Clinton sending American troops to Bosnia, I am obliged to note that the administration's problem is that it lacks a coherent policy for resolving the war in the former Yugoslavia. That is it, pure and simple.

A coherent policy must be based upon a clear-eyed assessment of the United States national interest in the Balkans. It must employ a means to address our national interest, calculated in direct proportion to the threat posed to the United States. Most of all, a coherent policy must have an end, a goal, a point at which we can define when the mission is accomplished.

The administration's plan has none of these elements.

The foundation of President Clinton's policy in Bosnia is not the national interest—it is desperation. This desperation to fill the vacuum of American leadership in Bosnia has led the President to make a disastrous decision. In a last, desperate act he is demanding that the U.S. military rescue his foreign policy.

The American people should be prepared for the possibility that American lives will be lost any time our national interest is at stake. I am certain that if asked to go to war our brave men and women in uniform would, without

hesitation, heed the President's call. I salute those who would serve the Nation so readily, but I cannot and will not support the President's decision to ask them to make this sacrifice. The risk to the lives of our troops far exceeds any national interest the United States could possibly have—particularly as defined by President Clinton—any national interest we could possibly have in the Balkans.

The question will not go away: "Mr. President, what precisely is your goal? What is your objective in Bosnia? Is it the creation of an inviolable Bosnian nation?" If so, the Dayton Agreement assuredly does not accomplish that goal. The agreement—pure and simple—is the partitioning of a sovereign nation on ethnic lines.

Is Mr. Clinton's goal to provide the people of Bosnia the means of defending themselves? If so, the President has so far shown no inclination to do so. Is it to save his own foreign policy and salvage his administration's standing on the world stage? If so, it is too late, and a disastrous military campaign in the Balkans can only do harm to the reputation and prestige of the United States far beyond what the 3 years of inaction by the administration already have.

The Bosnian people do not deserve war. Americans do not deserve to die in support of a policy that will not bring peace to the Bosnians. What we can and must do is help the people of that nation help themselves. If we truly want to guarantee lasting peace in the Balkans, we need to give the Bosnian people the tools of peace: the means to defend themselves from renewed Serb aggression.

Mr. President, more than 3 months ago I introduced legislation to provide the Bosnian people with American arms and training that they need to defend themselves. That legislation calls upon the administration to lead an international effort to coordinate contributions from those countries who wish to join in helping the Bosnians acquire the means of self-defense.

I will do everything in my power to help the Bosnians acquire the means to defend themselves. But I cannot, I do not, and I will not support sending American soldiers to fight, and to die, in Bosnia for the sake of an agreement that offers no more than a brief pause while all sides prepare for the next round of Balkan wars.

Mr. President, I thank you. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Washington is recognized for 9 minutes.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to express my qualified support for the deployment of United States military personnel as part of the NATO force to implement the Bosnia peace plan.

The President has made a compelling case to the American people in support of U.S. participation in the NATO peacekeeping force. He has said that

the NATO military mission will be clear, limited, and achievable; and that the risks to our troops will be minimized.

Congress has had the opportunity to go over this plan carefully, through a series of extensive briefings and hearings, which have been held over the last few weeks by at least four committees. Through this process, we have gotten answers to many of our questions, but certainly not all of them.

As the polls and phone calls reveal, the public is extremely wary about this operation. They know this is a mission with an uncertain outcome, where American sons and daughters may lose their lives. They are worried that our troops will be dragged into a civil conflict, despite our intentions to the contrary.

I have set aside extra time over the last several weeks to meet with and hear from constituents on this issue, many of whom have sons, daughters, husbands and wives likely to be deployed in Bosnia. I have listened to their fears and reservations. They are understandably worried—about landmines, snipers, civil disorder, undisciplined local factions, hostage taking, and other risks inherent in this mission.

And like most Americans, my constituents wonder aloud why the nations of Europe have not been able to solve this crisis on their own. Knowing how pressing the needs are here at home, they are weary of the constant need for American leadership abroad. Many resent the U.S. in the role of global policeman—again.

I have also met with relief workers who have been working on the ground in Bosnia, to learn from their perspective how much rebuilding lies ahead for the people of this war-torn nation. This is an extremely important issue, because the success of NATO's military mission will be measured against the gains made in the civilian sector to reestablish a viable economic and political life throughout Bosnia.

While it is important to point out that NATO's implementation force, or IFOR, will not be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian operations, the two operations will work to complement one another. But the IFOR will not be a police force, and it will not conduct nation-building. Nor will the IFOR address the numerous issues surrounding the return of refugees. Rather, IFOR's mission is simple and straightforward—to keep the peace so that civilian and political leaders have an opportunity to rebuild Bosnian society.

Our military leadership has repeatedly reassured Congress that the limited nature of this mission can be accomplished in 1 year's time, with most of the military tasks contained in the agreement accomplished in the first 6 months. After that, IFOR's role will be to maintain a climate of stability so that the civil tasks outlined in the peace agreement can take root.

In the words of Secretary Perry, the goal is to "break the cycle of violence" so that the civilian efforts—economic development, free elections, and the return of refugees—can have an opportunity to take hold. But regardless of what the situation looks like 1 year from now, the Secretary has said that "we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison."

Mr. President, it is this very limited mission that I am agreeing to with my vote today. I want to be clear—my support for this mission is qualified. I will be following developments closely in the weeks and months ahead. While I believe it is in our national interests to participate in a limited way in this operation, I feel very strongly that once we have paved the way for the Bosnian people to make peace, our role will be over and we should leave.

Yes, we can provide the opportunity for peace. But if, after a year's time, the Bosnian people themselves have not seized this chance, we should and must leave.

Having said that, I do believe that what we are about to do is incredibly important. Certainly this deployment carries risks. But I believe those risks must be measured against the promise for peace this agreement contains. The conditions are right for peace in Bosnia. And like Secretary Perry, I have concluded that the risks to the United States of allowing the war to continue are greater than the risks of enforcing the peace.

I agree with the President, our Secretaries of Defense and State, and our Nation's top military leaders. The United States has critical political, economic and security interests in Europe, and the war in Bosnia threatens those interests. The Dayton peace plan is the first opportunity we have had to end the war, and I believe we have to give it a chance.

In implementing the peace agreement, NATO will be embarking on its first land operation in history. Every NATO country with the exception of Iceland will be committing troops to this operation. The United States will contribute one-third of the necessary troops for IFOR. The British will provide 13,000 troops, the French 8,000. In addition, more than a dozen non-NATO nations have indicated a willingness to participate.

Our troops will be headquartered in Tuzla, where they will also have with them a Nordic brigade of close to 4,500 troops. 1,000 of those Nordic troops have been stationed in the Tuzla area for over a year, and will be able to provide our troops with important information on the region and its risks. Perhaps most astonishingly, there will be a Russian brigade that will be a part of the American division, numbering several thousand troops.

The NATO mission, while carefully planned and trained for by our Nation's best military leaders, faces many uncertainties. We owe our troops no less than the finest training and equipment

possible, and in this regard we can take great reassurance. We know that the troops we are sending to Bosnia are strong, capable and ready. They have undergone thorough and intensive training over the past several months. They have endured very rigorous and specific exercises, unique to the situation they will face in Bosnia, including mine training and basic combat proficiencies.

American troops will be heavily armed, and will have the authority to respond with decisive force to any threat to their own safety. Our troops will take their orders from the American General who commands NATO, General George Joulwan. For his part, General Joulwan has insisted that the daily training scenarios that our troops are subjected to be increasingly demanding, so that, in his words, "the scrimmage should be harder than the game".

Mr. President, one thing we do know for certain is that the nations of Europe have not been able to solve this crisis over the last 4 years. In absence of any clear leadership, day after day the war deepened, becoming a festering wound in the center of Europe. A quarter of a million lives have been lost to war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. A generation of children has been terrorized and traumatized. Thousands of elderly have been cast from their homes and turned into refugees with no place to go.

It has been American leadership that finally made a difference. American leadership generated a cease fire. American leadership brought the parties to the peace table. And now it will take American leadership to ensure that NATO remains strong enough to prevent the peace from collapsing.

Many Americans—including my own constituents—question the need for NATO as we approach the next century. The Soviet Union has collapsed. Why, they ask, should America pay the money and put our troops on the line in support of an alliance whose time—in the eyes of some—has passed.

I believe we have a very direct national interest in ensuring that NATO remains an effective and credible security arrangement for the United States and our European allies. Ours is an alliance in support of democracy and freedom, and we are the leader of that alliance.

Now is not the time in history for America to question our leadership role in the world. Continued American global leadership is in our national interest, not only in the matter before us regarding Bosnia, but more generally in this post-cold war era. Nations around the world are watching. If the aggression that has taken place in the Balkans over the past 4 years were to go without challenge, other nations will take a lesson.

Congress gathered just yesterday to hear the moving speech of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who faces the daunting task of keeping his

Nation on the path toward peace in the wake of former Prime Minister Rabin's assassination.

Mr. Peres reminded us gently of the role America has played in this century, and the responsibilities we carry into the next. He urged us to accept what history has laid on our national shoulders. He reminded us that there are some things that only America can do. America alone, he reminded us, can keep the world free.

We do not know who will be in charge in Russia, China, or Iran 10 years from now. Those nations may be moving closer to democracy, or they may be led by repressive regimes with nuclear capabilities. We simply do not know today.

Because of the uncertainties we face in the world, we in the United States can not afford to fall back to the approach we took after World War I, when a weary nation said "enough". The vacuum was filled promptly, in that case with the most horrendous outcome.

Mindful of such history, I would echo the sentiments of President Clinton when he says, "My fellow Americans, in this new era there are still times when America and America alone can and should make the difference for peace."

To my own constituents, and to Americans across this great Nation of ours, I want to say: I know you are weary. But in my view, we do not have the luxury of wishing away the world and tending our own garden as if events around the world have no effect on us. We must continue to lead, and in doing so, we are most certainly serving our own national interests.

But you are right. This will be a difficult mission to undertake. The climate in Bosnia at this time of year is brutal, the terrain difficult, and the risks many. Even if all goes extremely well, we must be prepared for casualties. This is an inevitable fact of life that accompanies every deployment. We should remember, for example, that during Desert Shield, the staging phase before the Persian Gulf war began, we lost 84 American troops before even a single shot was fired. And although the situation we are entering in Bosnia is vastly different, it is tragically unavoidable that accidents and mishaps will claim the lives of some of those deployed. And so we must prepare ourselves as a Nation for this consequence.

But we must remember that throughout this "American century", as it has been called by some, the United States alone has set the standard to which so many nations now aspire. And in keeping with our vision as a people, since the end of the cold war we have led the international community in breaking new ground on behalf of democracy and the rule of law. In situations ranging from Cambodia to Haiti to Bosnia, we have helped to secure peace and freedom.

I think we have to acknowledge up front that as we undertake these endeavors, we do not fully know yet what

model works, and under what circumstances. And that is what makes votes like today's so difficult. But this is no excuse for this Nation or any other major world power to throw up our hands and walk away from the difficult problems and challenges we face in this post-cold war era.

On this point, I think the observations of Lakhdar Brahimi, who heads the U.N. operation in Haiti, are relevant. When asked what we have learned in Haiti that may be relevant to Bosnia, he said:

... With operations like these (in Bosnia and Haiti), he said, the international community is embarking on something completely new for itself, and for which it does not yet have all the skills. It isn't even sure what it wants and certainly doesn't have all the money it needs to do it. So we take a country by the hand and accompany it a little bit, while it tries to stand on its own two feet. We don't do it perfectly, but it's still useful, even if it doesn't create paradise. But no one should kid themselves. It's a constant uphill struggle.

And so we should sober our expectations, but not dampen our resolve. For the sake of our own national interests and those of our allies, we have to move forward—with prayer and conviction.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Utah is recognized.

Mr. HATCH. I thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, this body now debates again whether we support the deployment of U.S. military forces into a European theater of war. We have debated this proposition twice before in this century.

In World War I, we sent our troops to engage in "the war to end all wars." After the slaughter, after the victory, America withdrew from the European stage; and, before the century reached mid-point, we found ourselves again debating whether it was the U.S. role to engage in European wars.

The world was transformed by our historic decision to enter that war. The world was transformed by our decision after the victory to remain engaged; and, for most of the rest of the century, this country stood for the expansion of freedom and the containment of tyranny.

Perhaps some of us forgot that one of the reasons we were so motivated after World War II was because this nation had been horrified by the scenes of depravity under the Third Reich and the Japanese empire. When we saw the horrors of the concentration camps, we declared, with commitment, "never again."

Generations of Americans raised after that great allied victory truly believed that never again would we tolerate genocide in Europe. The very notion of civilization was redefined to include this idea—until the war broke out in Bosnia.

For almost 4 years, we have witnessed the horrors of "ethnic cleans-

ing" in central Europe. Up until a few months ago, we regularly saw massacres of innocents, most often Muslims. "Never again," came back to haunt us. "Never again," became the hollow cry at the end of a century, taunting us that we could never assume progress from barbarity.

Many of us in this body believed we had to act. While we accepted that we could not make a persuasive case that U.S. troops needed to enforce or protect a vital interest, we believed that the world's remaining superpower had the power, the means, and the moral responsibility, to act.

We voted, again and again, to lift the immoral arms embargo on the young Bosnian state, which was largely unarmed, and was the target of the barbarians of "ethnic cleansing."

This summer, we passed legislation, with a strong bipartisan 69 votes, to lift the embargo.

The Administration, proclaiming concern for the Bosnians, argued that lifting the arms embargo would cause the Serbs to attack the eastern enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica. For this grotesquely false reason—a reason bloodily refuted by the massacres in Srebrenica that occurred anyway—the Administration argued that we could not let the victims defend themselves. The Administration argued—again and again—that lifting the embargo would spread the war and would require the use of thousands of U.S. forces to extract the U.N. and allied forces. And so, the Administration argued that lifting the embargo was not an acceptable course of action.

Now, less than a month after the signing of the Dayton Accord, the Administration is deploying United States troops to Bosnia to implement the military annex of that accord.

There is a temporary truce in Bosnia. The killing has mostly stopped. The ethnic cleansing has not. And, the administration believes, most sincerely, that the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force, now known as IFOR, will, in the words of President Clinton, "help create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives." The administration expects this to take approximately 1 year.

Mr. President, I respect the President's prerogative in foreign policy. I believe this is a principle we must respect if we are to convey the proper influence and power of this great Nation overseas. I supported this principle under previous Presidents, and I strongly objected when the Members of the opposing party in this body sought to frustrate Presidents Reagan and Bush.

I was disappointed when this body passed the resolution supporting President Bush's decision to deploy to Iraq by merely 52 votes. We had a clear vital interest at stake then. And, had we waited, we now know that our troops would have been subject to the weap-

ons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein was on the verge of using.

Mr. President, I respect the principle of the President's prerogative in making foreign policy, but I have grave reservations—grave reservations—about the Bosnia policy on which the President is embarking.

But, I wish to make one point exceedingly clear: I believe that the Congress must show our support for the U.S. military. This Senator will always support American troops abroad.

I have recently learned that a Utah reserve unit will be among those troops deployed to this region, and several other Utah reservists have been put on alert. There is no way that this Senator will not do anything and everything to make sure that those troops have the backing they need in terms of equipment and materiel and moral support for what they do to serve our country's objectives.

But, appreciation and support for how well our troops carry out our policy does not mean we cannot question the policy itself as well as engage in some retrospective about U.S. policy.

I wish the President had taken a different approach on Bosnia 3 years ago. Candidate Clinton said he would lift the arms embargo. As I have said, I believe it was immoral to maintain an arms embargo against Bosnia while it was subjected to slaughter by a heavily armed Yugoslavia. I must say that, with his record, there is a credibility question when the President asserts it is the "right" thing to now send troops to Bosnia.

I believe that the Atlantic alliance is the most successful military alliance in the history of the world. The major democracies of the world held together throughout the cold war, and Europe remained secure. The world is still a dangerous place after the cold war, and I believe that NATO must remain relevant. I support the enlargement of the alliance, because I believe the alliance promotes political values as well as enforces security, and I wish to support the democracies of central Europe.

But NATO's credibility has suffered greatly during the Bosnia debacle. Tied by the dual key with the United Nations, the greatest military alliance was ineffective while genocide occurred. NATO stood by while cities and towns were shelled, while humanitarian convoys were turned back, while helicopters violated a no-fly zone. A NATO F-16 was shot out of the sky this summer by Serbs using Russian military hardware.

The Administration argues that NATO credibility is at stake. But I must ask: What happens if the I-For goes to Bosnia, and, after 1 year and the departure of I-For, the parties return to war? Will NATO be more credible for having gone to Bosnia with great fanfare, but having returned without success, or worse, with casualties we cannot justify?

This administration proclaims that this is a chance for peace in Bosnia. I

do not doubt the President's sincerity. And I do not doubt that the administration is motivated by noble notions. I fear, however, that its ideals are immature.

Peace is not the absence of conflict, Mr. President. We will always have conflict. Peace, I believe, is the management of conflict, the management of conflict so that it does not escalate into violence and war.

And, when I look at the Dayton Accord, Mr. President, and the record of this administration, I fear that many issues about managing the conflict remain unaddressed.

The administration has spoken about a clear exit strategy, partly because we in the Congress have demanded it. But if we do not have a vision of how to manage the conflict after our mission expires, I see very little reason to go in at all. We need a post-exit strategy, Mr. President, and I've heard very little of one.

A post-exit strategy—and the success of the I-For mission—depends on a number of factors. I believe these include, but are not limited to: First, ensuring that the Bosnian Serbs do not pursue territorial gains beyond those they have won in this ignominious partition known as the Dayton Accord; second, completing the agreement between Croatia and Serbia over Eastern Slavonia; third, building and maintaining a cooperative relationship between the Bosnians and the Croatians; and, most importantly, fourth, maintaining the political and military viability of the Bosnian state.

Elements within the Bosnian Serbs have been proclaiming against the Dayton Accord since the day they were signed. Demonstrations have been staged almost every day. Are we to proceed while these rogue elements threaten, with arms, to ignore the accord?

The administration tells us that it will rely on President Milosevic of Serbia to control these elements. President Milosevic has been very cooperative and effective, we are told.

President Milosevic, I recall, was the instigator of the war against Bosnia and has reneged on his promises on numerous occasions over the past 4 years. Perhaps Milosevic has converted—and I believe in conversion—but I have doubts about the sincerity of those who convert after a mild NATO bombing campaign.

Mr. President, I still do not know what the administration intends to do if our U.S. forces are subject to mortar attacks from rogue elements.

For example, if we're attacked from a populated area by rogue elements that move freely within it, how will we respond? With a phone call to Belgrade? How does President Clinton plan to hold President Milosevic accountable for keeping the Bosnian Serbs in line with the accord?

I am also greatly concerned about the agreement between Croatia and Serbia over eastern Slavonia. We

should recall the brutal occupation of that Croatian territory. We should recall the pictures of the city of Vukovar, left a smoking rubble by the Serbs, complete with mass graves.

Since then the Serbian Army has occupied the area, cleansed it, and extracted its natural resources. The Croats and Serbs signed an agreement just before the Dayton Accord to return eastern Slavonia to Croatia. The agreement allows for 1 year to revert the territory to Croatia, but it has a 1 year extension clause, to be exercised by either party.

The implementation of the international force to monitor the territory is already stalling. I predict here that the Serbs will ask for that 1 year extension; and, 1 year from now, Eastern Slavonia will still be occupied by the forces of Belgrade.

It is a powder keg. If we do not ensure the peaceful transfer of that occupied territory, there will be a war within 2 years, and that war will spread to Bosnia, and the I-For mission, with its casualties, will have been for naught.

Mr. President, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not focused on this issue.

Mr. President, we need to do more to strengthen the ties begun with the Washington Agreement last year to build the Croat-Muslim relationship.

I have little expectation that the Serbian entity will ever participate in the unitary government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But without the Croats and Muslims cooperating, Mr. President, we may end up participating in a three-way partition conducted by ethnic cleansing.

Since the beginning of this war, I have argued for a policy of lift-and-strike. Lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Croatia, and allow them to defend themselves against Serbian aggression. Use air power to dissuade the aggressors while the victims arm themselves.

We saw a version of lift-and-strike this summer, when the Croatian Army, strong again, recaptured the Krajina and coordinated with the Bosnians to deliver military defeats to the Serbs. Our NATO forces went into the skies in August and September to force the Serbs to accept a choice: more military defeats or a negotiated settlement. Lift-and-strike worked, Mr. President, as we said it would.

Lift-and-strike was posited on the premise that a balance of power on the ground would effect a real peace, a peace based on the cessation of violence through deterrence.

Now that the President has decided to deploy the I-For, I believe that it is essential that we ensure that Bosnia is able to defend itself. That, Mr. President, is the only way that we can guarantee that the Bosnians shall not be subject to more ethnic cleansing, to more deadly attacks—unless we plan to keep I-For there forever.

Mr. President, if we are not absolutely dedicated to arming the Bosnian

Government, we should be realistic enough to know that the war will reignite shortly after IFOR departs. And then, Mr. President, we'll ask, what was the point? For what did NATO expend its credibility? For what did America risk its sons and daughters? A decent interval to another war is not an acceptable answer, Mr. President.

So 5 years before the end of this bloody century, we debate again sending our troops to Europe. We didn't need to come to this point. The Dayton Accord is abstract, the realities on the ground brutal and complicated. We didn't need to come to this point.

But America has given its word, and credibility of that word, we are told, is at stake. Let me preface my final comments by saying that I am equally concerned about America's standing abroad and about maintaining our leadership in NATO.

But, our credibility is more threatened, I believe, by pursuing a mission with guaranteed casualties and uncertain goals, than it is by telling our allies now that we do not support this policy, this deployment, and that we will arm the Bosnians until they can defend themselves.

But if this policy will be implemented—and already our troops are arriving in Bosnia—we must try to improve it. If we are to effect any positive influence here, Mr. President, we must insist that we arm the Bosnian government so that when we leave, we are not a few steps ahead of the next conflagration.

Therefore, Mr. President, I support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution opposing the President's decision to deploy, but strongly support the Dole-McCain resolution commending U.S. troops and setting conditions for the deployment which, I hope, will increase the possibility that this mission will not have been a waste of blood, treasure, and, yes, credibility.

Mr. President, I commend the majority leader for his statesmanship in recognizing that President Clinton is our President, that he does have a right to put these troops there, a constitutional right, and once they are there, we have an obligation, as patriots, to stand with them and to help them.

So I will support the Dole-McCain resolution, but I also support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution as well.

Mr. President, this is a serious thing. I have been over that land. I have been over that territory. I have met with people on all sides of these issues. I have read the histories of the last 600 years of that area. And I have to tell you, I think putting our young people there is a tragic mistake. But once they are there, I am going to do everything in my power to support them.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Vermont is recognized for 7 minutes.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the debate over whether the United States should contribute its troops to a NATO

peacekeeping force in Bosnia will be the focus of many speeches on this floor in the coming days. It is a subject all of us have anticipated and pondered and wrestled with for some months now, and it is one of those decisions that no one likes to make. It is fraught with uncertainties and the undeniable likelihood that Americans will be injured or killed.

There will be many chances to speak on this, but having thought about it for some time and discussed it with the President and Secretary of Defense and others over the past weeks, and after listening to the President's speech last night and the responses of some of those who oppose sending troops, I want to say a few words as the debate begins.

Mr. President, even before the peace agreement was signed at Dayton the House of Representatives passed legislation to prevent the President from deploying United States troops to enforce a peace agreement without the consent of Congress. I believe the President should seek the approval of Congress before sending troops to Bosnia, although I do not believe the Constitution requires it in this instance where the parties have signed a peace agreement. I felt it was both unhelpful and unnecessary for the House to pass legislation in the midst of the negotiations and before a peace agreement was signed.

But just as President Bush sought congressional approval for sending United States troops to the Persian Gulf—although half a million were there before approval was given—President Clinton has sought congressional approval, and there will be ample time to debate it before the formal signing of the agreement.

The decision to send Americans into harms way is the most difficult and dangerous that any President has to make. It should be done only when a compelling national interest is at stake, and when there is no other alternative.

Like many or perhaps even most Senators, the majority of my constituents, at least of those Vermonters who have contacted me, do not believe that it is in our national interest to send Americans to Bosnia. They genuinely fear another costly, drawn out quagmire like Vietnam. Some of them fought in that war, or had family members who died there. Others fear a debacle like Somalia, where in a matter of days a well-intentioned humanitarian mission became a poorly-thought out, ill-prepared peacemaking mission that ended in tragedy.

It is the President's job to convince the American people that Bosnia is not Vietnam, it is not Somalia, and that our national interests compel us to take part. He made a good start last night. There are still important questions that need answers—the President said as much himself—but I am convinced that the case for sending Americans to Bosnia can be made, and I intend to help the President make it.

Mr. President, in the past 4 years, a quarter of a million people, the vast majority defenseless civilians, have lost their lives in the former Yugoslavia. We have all read the blood curdling reports of hundreds and even thousands of people being rounded up at gun point and systematically executed or even buried alive.

Countless others have had their throats cut after being horribly tortured. Some have been made to eat the flesh and drink the blood of their countrymen. Thousands of women have been raped. Men have been forced to watch their wives and daughters raped and killed before their eyes. All simply because of their ethnicity, or because they lived on land others wanted for themselves.

The war has produced two million refugees, victims of ethnic cleansing. Hundreds of thousands more have lived in squalor for years in the rubble of what remains of their homes, without electricity, heat or running water.

There are many, including myself, who believe that NATO should have acted much earlier and with far greater force to stop the genocide in Bosnia. I opposed the use of American ground troops to try to win the war, but we gave too much deference to those who said that airpower would never compel the Serbs to negotiate peace. NATO should have been given the authority to use unrelenting force when UN resolutions were violated time and again with impunity.

Our greatest collective failure was to put the United Nations in charge of a peacekeeping mission where there was no peace to keep, and when it was unwilling or unable to back up its own threats. These failures, which caused grievous damage to NATO's credibility, will haunt us for years to come.

But the situation has changed dramatically since then. Sustained NATO bombing, coupled with gains by the Moslem and Croat forces on the battlefield, have shown the Serbs that they cannot win what they set out to achieve. The exhaustion of the warring factions, coupled with a period of extraordinarily forceful American diplomacy, has created an unprecedented opportunity to end one of the most brutal wars the world has seen in half a century.

There should be no mistake. The credibility of the United States Government is deeply invested in the success of the peace agreement, and success of the agreement depends absolutely on NATO's enforcement of it. The parties signed with that understanding. At the same time, NATO's own credibility and effectiveness depend on US leadership. Indeed, without US participation, there will be no NATO force, and the peace agreement will almost certainly collapse.

Mr. President, since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, NATO's future has been uncertain. Some have suggested that NATO has outlived its usefulness. Oth-

ers say that since the rationale for NATO—deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe—is gone, NATO should become a political alliance. Still others want to quickly expand NATO to include all or most of Eastern Europe, and perhaps even some of the former Soviet republics.

I mention this because NATO's future is one of the most compelling reasons why it is essential for the United States to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

I have been among the strongest supporters of assistance to Russia and the other former Soviet States. A democratic Russia is obviously a major foreign policy priority for the United States. Despite many setbacks, there has been remarkable progress in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. But who can predict the next decade? Who can say that the fervent nationalism that remains strong there will not increase to a point when it becomes threatening? It is simply too soon to say what lies beyond this transitional period. I have been reluctant to support the rapid expansion of NATO without a thorough discussion of the implications, for fear that it could fuel the very nationalism in Russia that we seek to discourage.

But neither am I among those who see no role for NATO today. On the contrary, the United States has an enormous stake in preserving NATO's strength. While NATO's focus will undoubtedly shift over time, the future holds too many uncertainties, and there are too many areas of potential conflict around the world where important interests of the United States and our allies are at stake, to allow NATO's strength to erode.

There is no other alliance that comes close to NATO, in power, in readiness, and in importance to the United States. NATO may not have sought the role of peacekeeper in Bosnia, but neither can it avoid it.

Mr. President, I cannot say whether this peace agreement will survive the test of time. Perhaps no one can. There is ample reason to be pessimistic, given the history of broken promises and ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia. Since the agreement was signed, it has become clear that no party is completely satisfied, and some have expressed grave misgivings with some aspects of it. If the agreement unravels, NATO Forces may be forced to withdraw, rather than be drawn into the fighting. Even withdrawal would be risky.

But virtually everyone knowledgeable about the situation there agrees that this is by far the best chance for peace since the war began 4 years ago. We and our European allies have an immense interest in preventing the continuation of a destabilizing war in Europe, and I believe we must take this chance.

The President has taken a courageous step, a step that reflects the best of this country. Every American should

consider the alternative. More mass murder. More towns shelled and burned. More starving children. More orphans. More horrifying atrocities that are reminiscent of the dark ages. If this does not compel us to help enforce an agreement we brokered to end this calamity, what further amount of inhuman brutality would it take? Should we wait for the slaughter of another hundred thousand, or two hundred thousand?

The President is right. We have a moral responsibility to take part. The Europeans were unable to end the war themselves. United States leadership was not the only factor, but without it there would be no peace agreement, and the war would go on indefinitely. We should be proud of it, and stand behind it.

Some have suggested that we can lead without sending troops. I disagree. We cannot maintain our credibility as the leader of NATO if we are not prepared to assume some of the risk. We should remember that two thirds of the NATO Force will be troops from our NATO allies and others.

Mr. President, our troops are the best trained in the world, but we cannot eliminate the risks. There are 2 million landmines in Bosnia alone, hidden under mud and snow. Each one cost only a few dollars, but one false step could mean the loss of any American soldier's legs or life. The Pentagon says that landmines are among the most serious threats our troops will face there.

This is ironic, since the Pentagon has been actively lobbying against my efforts to show leadership by halting the use of antipersonnel landmines, which claim hundreds of innocent lives each week. Two-thirds of the Senate voted for it, but the Pentagon refuses. In the past few months, several of our European allies have stopped their use and production of these indiscriminate weapons, but the Pentagon refuses.

A quarter of the Americans killed in the Persian Gulf died from landmines. A quarter of American casualties in Vietnam were from mines. I can only wonder how many more Americans will needlessly lose their legs or their lives from landmines before the Pentagon gets the message.

We cannot eliminate the risks, but President Clinton has established the right conditions before U.S. troops can be deployed. If the mission is limited in time, clear in scope and achievable, as the President has insisted, we should support it. Our troops must be backed by broad rules of engagement that enable them to defend themselves with whatever amount of preemptive force is needed in any circumstance. That does not mean waiting to shoot until they are shot at.

Mr. President, I expect to speak again as the debate on this unfolds. I intend to support the President, and I expect there will be Senators I deeply respect who are on the other side. But at the end of the day, if Americans are sent to Bosnia as I believe they will be,

I have no doubt that we all will support them, and we will all be proud of them.

Mrs. KASSEBAUM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MCCONNELL). The Senator from Kansas is recognized.

Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, there have been many eloquent speeches given today and last night. I am not sure that much new can be said. Over the last several years, we have debated the pros and cons of what to do about Bosnia, and I have begun to feel like Hamlet. If I could just review some of my thinking at this point, I would like to.

The tragedy in former Yugoslavia is truly momentous. Nobody will deny that who has watched this occur over the last several years. We have witnessed, in the past several years, atrocities in Europe that we vowed would never again be allowed. We have stood by while our most important and fundamental military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that is a fundamental part of our Nation's security, tottered on the brink of disaster, its members squabbling and indecisive while war waged on Europe's doorstep. And we have struggled to understand the nuances of a conflict fueled by both ancient animosities and a contemporary hunger for power, by both the collapse of communism and the friction of ethnic and religious hatred.

For most Americans, this is a distant war in an obscure land about issues that do not directly affect our interests. All that may be true. And, yet, we could not ignore it. For the past 4 years, we have feared, above all, that it would spread and embroil the great powers, particularly the United States and Russia, on opposite sides of a war neither of us wanted. We have felt deep compassion and remorse as this war, like all wars, took its greatest toll on the innocents: in refugees driven from their lands, in homes and towns and villages destroyed, in a generation of children, Mr. President, whose lives have been shattered.

We have tried to avoid involvement because our direct national interests were not at stake. This, we said, was a European problem. And, yet, because we understood that important national interests could be put at risk if the fighting continued, we could not simply wash our hands of the matter.

So America and our European allies took a series of halting steps and tentative measures that over 4 years tarnished our image and called into question our resolve. We imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and later came to regret it. We established safe havens and then failed to protect them against assault. We promised to deliver food and humanitarian supplies to refugees and displaced persons but then failed to use the force necessary to deliver.

Those efforts all failed. As a consequence of those failures, we had become involved in Bosnia. American credibility, prestige, and leadership,

the intangibles that are so important to our national security around the world, all were damaged. We found ourselves in the worst of situations. America put itself on the line in Bosnia, but we had made no commitment to shaping the outcome.

Now we are at a crossroads. The issue before us is whether America should help bring this war to a close. We should, and through our good offices and diplomatic leadership we have done so. I share President Clinton's view that the United States should be a leader for peace. However, I also share the deep reservations of many and that have been spoken of many times today about sending American forces into the Balkans. In my mind, the key to the success of the NATO operation is not the achievement of a military objective, but rather the commitment of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian leaders and their people to peace. Absent that strong commitment by the parties to make the Dayton accord work over the long term, no number of international troops will achieve peace. Mr. President, I am not convinced that the three parties to the Dayton accord will stand by their commitments and sustain the peace. We certainly would all pray for that result.

All three parties have incentives to sign now, but they do not have the same incentive to keep the peace come spring or after our troops depart. By setting an arbitrary 1-year timetable for the departure of our forces, we invite the parties to wait us out. The Dayton accord is full of ambiguities with empty guarantees of peace, and that probably would not have been possible.

Yet the reality is that our troops are going. They are already, many of them, there. Thousands more will follow in the coming days. Whether we like it or not, the President's decision to deploy is behind us. The United States has made a commitment to this operation. Having made that commitment, America must not cut and run. To do so would send a message of weakness around the world that would damage our national interests in a way that the Yugoslavian war itself never could. The reality is that we are involved in Bosnia, and all Americans must do what we can to see this operation through to a successful conclusion.

The decision now before us, to my mind, should involve how best to build the prospects for success. I believe Congress has little choice but to support our forces and the operation, because to do otherwise would be to diminish our chances for success, and success is the task at hand. Today we are considering three approaches to the matter. Each is troubling, I suggest. One has already been rejected. I do not believe we should cut off funding with our troops already on the ground. Provoking a constitutional crisis at this point would not serve either our troops or our national interests. I also do not believe expressing support for our troops

but opposing the President's decision to send them enhances the mission's prospect for success. That would send an unequivocal message that America's support for this operation is shallow; a message that would be heard, I think, loud and clear by the parties in former Yugoslavia.

That leaves us with the approach of the Dole-McCain resolution. I commend the authors of that resolution, who have struggled with the very basic but difficult question left unanswered by the Dayton accords: How will we know when our mission is completed? Or put another way, how did we plan to accomplish a lasting peace in the region after our troops have gone?

I have serious reservations about the dual policy the Dole-McCain resolution advocates as a solution to this difficult question. On the one hand, American troops would participate in ostensibly neutral peacekeeping operation to separate the warring parties. On the other hand, America would lead an effort to arm and train one of the parties, the Bosnian Moslems. I have had reservations about this policy articulated by the administration, and I have deeper reservations about endorsing or even expanding that commitment in a congressional resolution. An American-led effort to arm and train, to put our troops in Bosnia at greater risk, could undermine provisions of the Dayton accord that obligate all parties to reduce their armed forces and could lay the foundation for an arms race in the Balkans. Any American effort to arm and train the Bosnian Federation also must recognize and deal with the delicate and contradictory nature of the new Moslem-Croat alliance.

Finally, our European allies have serious reservations about a United States-led effort to arm the Bosnian Federation. While many of my colleagues have decried European leadership on Bosnia, I believe that as a member of NATO we have an obligation to coordinate our policies closely with our allies. But despite these concerns, the Dole-McCain resolution is, to my mind, the only real option now before the Senate. I do support it because I firmly believe that Congress must go on record in support of this operation which already is underway.

The President has made clear that the operation will proceed with or without congressional support, but I am not sure it can succeed without congressional support. With our troops at risk I believe success must be our highest priority. I yield the floor.

Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the very important question of whether or not to authorize the deployment of United States ground troops to Bosnia. Let me start with where I have been on this issue and continue with where I am today.

Mr. President, I have long believed that Bosnia itself is not a strategic interest of the United States. I have agreed more with Bismarck who said that the Balkans were "not worth the

loss of one Pomeranian grenadier" than I have with those European politicians who have seen it as the contested terrain necessary to extend their countries' reach to the middle East. In essence, the Bosnian conflict represents the conflict of Western Christendom, Orthodox Christendom and Islam and it flows from grievances passed on from grandparent to grandchild over centuries.

While the United States has long had a vital interest in the security of Europe in general, there has been no indication over the past 4 years that the conflict in Bosnia would spread in any significant destabilizing way, notwithstanding the legitimate worries about Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. Further, while the United States has humanitarian interests related to countering ethnic cleansing and other barbaric conduct, I do not think that it is possible for the United States to intervene and to stop every ethnic conflict in the world. Why Bosnia and not Rwanda has never been answered by the architects of our current policy.

The most striking thing about the Bosnian war is that virtually no one, from the beginning, championed pluralism. Instead, we accepted the premises of the warring parties and lost the high ground.

I also believe that there have been a lot of missed opportunities to curtail the horrors during the four years of this conflict. Because we did not seize them, we have been left with a much more difficult situation. For example, in the Bush administration, the United States, fresh from the triumph in the Gulf, could have threatened massive air power to deter the Serbian President Milosevic from pursuing by force his ambition to create a greater Serbia. We failed to do so and the conflict expanded exponentially into war.

Similarly, in the first 6 to 12 months of the Clinton administration, I believe that there was another opportunity for the United States to warn Milosevic and then to act directly against him if he persisted. The United States could have sent a high level emissary to apply diplomatic pressure and to threaten air attacks to deter Serb aggression. But the United States failed to act in any meaningful way and the war has continued for a period longer than the Korean war.

In the absence of U.S. action, I have supported equalizing the military imbalance in the region. While certainly not a solution to the underlying conflict, military parity is crucial to any last peace between the Bosnian Moslems, the Croats, and the Serbs. As a result, I voted repeatedly for lifting the arms embargo. But once again, we missed an opportunity and the embargo and military imbalance have persisted.

That is where I have been on this issue.

Mr. President, I recognize that some things have changed. We have a peace agreement initialed by Moslems,

Croats, and Serbs. We have the commitment of NATO to secure the military aspects of this agreement and we have the commitment of President Clinton to deploy 20,000 United States ground troops to Bosnia and another 5,000 troops to Croatia, as part of this agreement. Where Europe failed to get agreement, America succeeded but the results put us in the middle of Europe's most volatile region as not only a coguarantor, but the broker of the agreement.

Mr. President, I recognize also that several things have not changed. The ethnic enmity between the parties continues. The Moslem-Croat Federation remains fragile and divisions persist among the leadership of the various parties to the agreement.

As importantly, I still do not believe that Bosnia itself is a strategic interest of the United States. Indeed, if there were no counterbalancing factors, it would be my position that the United States should not deploy United States ground forces to Bosnia.

One of the primary problems that we are facing is that we are left to make this decision in a conceptual vacuum. Although the cold war has ended, no one has provided a coherent vision of the post-cold war world. Rather, ad hocism tends to rule the day.

This void is particularly pertinent for the United States. The United States is the most powerful country in the world. With that power, however, comes certain responsibilities. There comes the leadership responsibility to formulate a coherent vision of the world. Yet, no one, including the administration and its predecessor, has defined the role of the United States or NATO or their respective strategic interests since the days of the cold war. But those days have ended. Time after time since 1990, we have looked in the rearview mirror instead of ahead to the horizon of a new world. The retreat to a strategy of "cold war lite" is reflected in bloated defense budgets, confused priorities and a gradual erosion of American influence abroad.

I believe an administration's highest foreign policy priority is to develop a new conceptual framework and I believe a President's role is to first see that it is done and second, to articulate it often enough and persuasively enough so that the American people and the rest of the world know where we are going in foreign policy and why.

The administration's proposal for United States troop deployment in Bosnia is a prime example of the reigning ad hocism. And it brings with it, several grave problems:

To begin, how do we define success? The administration has not clearly stated how it will evaluate the success of the mission. Focusing only on the military mission, the administration has left great ambiguity, if not confusion, regarding the issues of refugees and disarmament. The result is very dangerous because you cannot really have an exit strategy unless you know

what it is you are supposed to achieve. For an exit strategy is not a deadline, it is a process for continuously evaluation means against goals.

By stating that the mission will not extend beyond a year, the administration also invites delayed violations. As a mechanism of control, a time limit leads to loss of control. A stated 1 year termination of our involvement is a temptation for the contending parties simply to delay a showdown for a year.

In hoping for a limited mission that could simultaneously solve the deeper conflicts, there has been an incomplete disclosure of where this action will lead. In a year from now, will United States troops be withdrawn only to allow the Croats and Serbs to carve up Moslem Bosnia? Will we feel any better just because our military objectives have been ostensibly achieved? Will the United States' leadership role be maintained and NATO's role restored if Bosnia falls into renewed conflict upon the withdrawal of NATO? Unfortunately, I think the answer is no. Do the Croats yearn so much for economic ties to Europe and the Serbs fear so much the resumption of sanctions that they will restrain themselves from conquering the Moslem enclaves once United States troops leave? Again, I fear the answer is no. Once we are down the road and involved, the most likely outcome is for this mission to continue—for NATO, with United States troops, to engage in the protection of Bosnia enclaves for the indefinite future.

A related, but distinct problem is the disconnect between the defined mission and our objectives. If the administration is to be believed, our mission is only military and can be completed in 1 year. Nevertheless, to justify the deployment of U.S. troops in this case, the administration has defined certain humanitarian interests—to prevent ethnic cleansing, to prevent a renewed conflict between the parties, and to create one federated Bosnian state. Neither the limited military mission that the administration has laid out, nor the hoped for year of "breathing space" will be able to accomplish those objectives. The administration is taking the rhetorical high ground, but its plan falls far short of delivering on the rhetoric.

No one is saying now that the Moslem enclaves are going to be the Berlins of the last years of the twentieth century with NATO forces placing a tripwire around them and protecting them in a dangerous world. Instead, the administration trumpets the brevity of the mission as if American forces 6 months on the ground is an inoculation against the deep hatreds that caused the ethnic cleansing in the first place. Such an attitude, from my perspective, is naive and wrong. I think the time has come for the administration to level with the American people about the logical end result of this mission. Only a lasting peace will avert us from being faced by Christmas 1996 with the choice of a longer commitment or failure.

In addition, there has yet to be any sufficiently comprehensive definition of either the rules of engagement or contingency plans. What will U.S. troops do in the case of cross-border conflicts, if the Serbs attack the Croats or the Croats attack the Serbs? What will United States troops do if the French troops in Sarajevo are directly attacked with the resulting loss of many French lives? Under what if any circumstances will U.S. forces be withdrawn prior to the completion of the military mission. These are very important issues, but there still are no precise answers as there were not when the Bosnian Serbs took UNPROFOR hostage following NATO bombing.

Lacking a coherent vision, there also appears to be little recognition of the implications of this 1 year decision and its potential outcome for our strategic interests throughout the world. If we withdraw our troops and Serbs or Croats subjugate the Moslem enclaves, there will be, for example, significant repercussions in the Islamic world, in the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere. Again the 1 year time horizon could put our withdrawal at a time of maximum uncertainty or danger in the Islamic world—a time when the old, well-known voices could be replaced by more strident fundamentalists—who regard renewed Bosnian horrors as a rallying cry and the United States as the villain who promised and then reneged. Whether such repercussions are worth the interests we are ostensibly saving have not, as far as I know, been addressed.

It is worth remembering the example of Ronald Reagan's Lebanon intervention. The Marines arrived, departed, returned after the Sabra and Shatila massacres and then spent over a year just hunkering down with tragic results.

Finally, those who say that there is no alternative are posing a false choice and ignoring the last 4 years. One might choose deployment as the best of two bad choices. But that does not mean that there were no more choices. A policy of strength that proceeded from a new strategic framework and was pursued from the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia was the alternative that no one talks about because it was not developed.

Despite these and other problems with this ad hoc approach, I recognize that there are counterbalancing concerns. Most notably, the President has pledged U.S. participation and the deployment of U.S. ground troops. I have said twice that the United States has not strategic interest in Bosnia itself. Paradoxically, because the deployment decision proceeded ad hoc, it places more emphasis on the downside of undercutting the solemn commitment of our President and of undermining the United States role in Europe where we do have strategic interests. As a result, we in Congress have a new level of responsibility. With all said, I believe that the word of the United States and

the ability of the President to lead and to make decisions as leader and Commander-in-Chief, are important elements of the United States' world position. The decision to deploy, however poorly thought out, if carried through and maintained over time, will send a strong message worldwide. It will, for example, show the Chinese that the American concern for human rights does not single them out, but is part of our worldview. It will say to the Japanese and other parties in Northeast Asia that an American President can deliver on his word. It will say to the Islamic world that, as with the gulf war, a non-treaty commitment made by the United States can extend to Islamic territory as well as to Israel, and it will say to all of Europe that the United States remains a European power.

Further, while not of major significance, there are benefits from United States and Russian forces working together in the same field. By engaging in a joint military mission that has very limited objective, I believe that we will be helping Russia to take positive steps in its post-cold war development and once again, it will have geopolitical value in Asia by showing that the United States and Russia are building a new spirit of cooperation and friendship.

There are also potential benefits for NATO, although as I noted before, potential dangers as well. NATO has been searching for a defining role since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This, the first actual NATO deployment, not just a patrol or reconnaissance mission, marks NATO's departure into peacekeeping. This mission will include troops from the new European democracies, thereby providing a more useful bridge into the West than the ill-conceived drive for immediate NATO expansion. In addition, this mission has brought the French back into the NATO command structure, making NATO a more complete European force. One hopes, however, that the ambiguities in the agreement will not lead to alliance bickering and disagreements, even though the seeds have already been planted—with disagreements already arising over refugees, disarmament and the arming and training of the Bosnian Moslems.

Having weighed all of these considerations, I have reluctantly decided that it is in the best interests of the United States to support the deployment of U.S. troops at this time. I believe, however, that, contrary to administration rhetoric, this will be a very difficult and long mission. I urge the administration to level with the American people now and to do all within its power to improve the circumstances under which U.S. troops are deployed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New Jersey has expired.

Under the unanimous-consent agreement, I would recognize a Republican.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois has been waiting. We will yield him time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I thank you and I thank my colleague from Texas for her courtesy.

There are some basic questions. Why have an Armed Forces for the United States? Why have a Chicago Police Department? Or a Louisville Police Department? One reason is to have stability, in a community and in the world community. And here, let me add that the great threat to the world today, unlike 10 years ago, is instability. Ten years ago it was nuclear annihilation.

The second reason for having an armed force and for having a police department is to save lives. Are there risks? Yes. If there is a problem in one part of the city of Chicago you may send in the police department. And, if there are problems around the world, the United States, along with the community of nations, may have to use the armed force that we had. There are, however, for the Chicago Police Department and the U.S. Armed Forces, greater risks in not maintaining stability here.

Let me add, while I support the President in this endeavor, the one thing that does concern me is the talk about getting out in 1 year. I hope that can happen. I hope we can be out in 6 months. I think the probability is, if our mission is to succeed—and it is important that it succeed—that we are likely to have to be there 2 or 3 years; maybe not with 20,000 soldiers, but with a substantial armed force.

I was critical of George Bush for not moving early, when problems erupted. And I cheered, in August 1992, when Bill Clinton made a campaign speech criticizing George Bush for not acting.

Then when Bill Clinton came in, I was critical of him for not acting. But I think what he is doing now is right. It is right for stability because of the danger of the spread of war.

If we do not follow through on this peace—and it is a peace, tenuous as it is—if we do not follow through, this is inevitably going to spread to Macedonia and Albania. Macedonia has more ethnic Turks than any other country, and Turkey has made clear, if there are problems in Macedonia, Turkey is going to move in. Our friends in Greece have made clear, if Turkey moves in, they are going to move if—and this thing will escalate very, very quickly. You will have hundreds of thousands of Americans—Armed Forces people—involved in a war, not 20,000 maintaining a peace.

The second thing we should remember, there are not too many clear lessons in history, but one of the clear lessons of history is religious wars spread very easily. What we have in Bosnia—nothing is completely clean there—but you have primarily a Moslem force, a Roman Catholic force, and an Orthodox Christian force. If anyone

thinks that when Moslem forces in Bosnia are under attack that Moslems in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, and elsewhere are going to pay no attention to that, you are dreaming. Religious wars spread very, very easily.

In terms of saving lives, it is very clear we should act. We have the agreement reached in Dayton, to the credit of this administration, the State Department, and others who were participants. Bosnia is half the size of Ohio. Bosnia has seen 250,000 people killed, 2 million people displaced.

We went into Desert Storm, invaded a country after a short time, and I do not know whether history is going to judge my vote against acting that quickly, though I said I was for using economic sanctions first and then acting. But I feared, if we acted, we would simply perpetuate Saddam Hussein in power. But make no mistake about it: One of the reasons we acted was oil.

Are we willing to act to save oil but not save lives? I do not think that is what America stands for.

I have heard on this floor reference to Somalia as a great disaster. Let me tell you. Somalia was George Bush's finest hour. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved. The mistake was made, and I was at the White House when we worked out the compromise that we would have to leave before too long. And I see I am being signaled for time. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Somalia saved lives. The mistake was in pulling out precipitously. I fear we may make the same mistake in Bosnia.

Finally, we have made a commitment to NATO. We have to live up—or we should live up—to that commitment.

Then I would add one other point. That is a word of gratitude to Senator BOB DOLE for being a statesman on this issue. He is not gaining any votes in Republican primaries in terms of the Republican nomination, but he is doing what a U.S. Senator ought to do, and that is look toward what is best for our country. What is best for our country right now is to back President Clinton.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask for 5 minutes. If I could be notified after 4 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, others have recounted mistakes and missed opportunities that have led us to this moment, a moment when 20,000 U.S. troops are either on their way or will shortly be on their way to Bosnia.

I will not take the time of the Senate this evening to recount these facts. They have been talked about in great detail already today.

The fact is, Mr. President, we are where we are. As we debate, and we have debated three different resolu-

tions today, the essential facts are as follows:

Fact No. 1: In 1993, the President made a commitment to deploy ground troops in support of a Bosnia peace-keeping mission.

Fact 2: This guarantee was a condition or underlying understanding of the entire Dayton peace agreement.

Fact 3: The President has now ordered these troops to Bosnia. Some have already arrived.

Mr. President, the troops are going to Bosnia. They are going to Bosnia no matter what this Congress does. They are going to Bosnia no matter which resolution is approved or not approved. That is a fact.

Fact 4: There are clearly not sufficient votes in Congress to override the President's veto of a bill that would prohibit funding of the troops. In fact, earlier today, there were only 22 votes on this floor—22 votes—to in fact cut off these funds.

Mr. President, with these facts in mind, what then should our objectives be today as we debate these resolutions? What do we want to accomplish? What can we reasonably expect to accomplish?

Mr. President, the question before us today is I believe a rather narrow one. Which resolution will be the most valuable in achieving our objectives? What can Congress try to accomplish this evening?

Mr. President, I would suggest that we have three goals.

First, the most important, unconditionally support our troops.

Second, to enhance the odds of them leaving as scheduled within 1 year.

And, third, to increase the chances of this mission being successful.

I believe the Dole resolution—Dole-McCain resolution—can help shape and help influence our Bosnia policy and can improve it. It does this in part by ensuring the training and arming of the Federation of Bosnia, so that they can provide for their own defense after the NATO troops leave.

Mr. President, the Dole resolution gives more support than any of other resolutions to our troops. The Dole resolution supports their mission and does so in clear terms. It ensures that America speaks with a clearer voice.

Mr. President, for the above reasons, it is my intention this evening to vote in favor of the Dole-McCain resolution.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, just 3 weeks ago, the warring parties in Bosnia initialed a peace agreement in Dayton, OH. That announcement marked the first real hope for an end to the tragic conflict in the Balkans which has left hundreds of thousands dead or injured and produced over a million refugees. It was only with the dedication and persistence of U.S. negotiators present in Dayton that this accord was brought to fruition.

While everyone seems to agree that the administration deserves a great deal of credit for the success at the bargaining table, some question whether the United States should send troops to monitor and implement the agreement. This is obviously a very serious question, and we have an obligation in this Chamber to think through the implications of that decision.

The question arises, what are the United States national interests that are at stake in Bosnia? The President addressed that issue in his speech to the Nation on November 27. At that time, he made the case as to why this agreement serves America's interests, reflects American values, and requires American leadership.

There are many arguments that can be made about the ways that this agreement serves U.S. interests. For instance, that it will prevent the war from spreading in a way that might lead to a much more costly and dangerous American involvement; that it will return peace and stability to a continent that is key to our economic and military security; and that it reflects the United States moral and humanitarian interest in seeing an end to the bloodshed and violence.

All of these are very important considerations which should be weighed heavily.

Furthermore, choices are not always a matter of what is the best theoretical option but what are the courses of action available to us at any particular moment in time. Right now, we have to decide between backing the peace agreement, which we were instrumental in developing with the undertaking of a U.S. military presence, or not taking part in the NATO endeavor, which would mean no NATO endeavor and the breakdown of the peace agreement.

Viewing it from that perspective, I come to the conclusion that the risks of missing this opportunity for peace are greater, significantly greater than the risks of implementing it, although that course certainly has its dangers. Let me discuss briefly the potential consequences of not carrying through on the peace agreement.

First, I think the administration is correct in the view that without a commitment of American troops as part of a NATO force, the peace agreement will not stand. Having helped the parties to reach this point, the United States would completely undermine their confidence in the agreement and their commitment to implement it if we do not participate. Should this happen, United States troops might well be called upon to evacuate United Nations protection forces in Bosnia, under much more dangerous circumstances than our troops will face under this agreement.

Second, it could seriously erode America's diplomatic strength. Our success at conflict resolution is due not just to the skill and determination of our negotiators but also to the perception that the United States has the

ability and the will to back up the agreements it makes. This is not to say that the U.S. must contribute forces to every peace agreement it helps to negotiate. But in this instance, the U.S. undertaking was a major reason the agreement was reached.

Our decision on Bosnia, therefore, could have long-lasting implications for the future of American leadership. It would be a major blow to U.S. world leadership if our failure to participate in this instance undermined our ability to move the world in a peaceful direction in other crises that might arise.

Third, it is imperative that a very clear distinction be made between this operation and Operation Desert Storm, to which analogies have been drawn. Let us remember that in the Iraqi situation the question was whether to go to war—whether to undertake a military operation to drive the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Here we are talking about helping to implement a peace at the invitation of all the parties to the conflict. That is not to say there are no dangers involved, nor that the mission will be easy. But there is a major difference between going in to fight a war and going in to implement a peace.

Finally, Mr. President, the choices before us are difficult ones. We have no assurances that, even with the participation of U.S. troops, the peace in Bosnia will be successful in the long run. But it is clear now that without our participation there will be no peace. The parties to the peace accord have made it plain that their confidence in a fair and evenhanded implementation of the agreement depends largely on American leadership and on American participation in the peace-keeping force.

Mr. President, consistent with our values and interests, we should exercise our leadership by supporting this opportunity for peace.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to be notified when I have reached 6 minutes, if I reach that point.

Mr. President, I was not a Member of the Senate when the debate occurred on Desert Storm, but I was nevertheless glued to the television watching every single person, back and forth across the aisle, talking about their vote of conscience. I thought it was the Senate's finest hour. Now I find myself in the position of making a similar vote. Although we are not going to an actual war, we are nevertheless voting whether to send our troops into hostilities where the President says we can expect casualties.

I feel so strongly, Mr. President, that this is the wrong decision. I feel that it is the wrong decision and that the price that we might have to pay for the mistake is too high. The cost of an American life is too high a price to support an erroneous decision.

I do not like not supporting the President in a foreign policy matter. I think we should bend over backward to do that. But I look at two things. I look at my responsibility as a Member of Congress not to rubberstamp the President in the matter of going to war, and I cannot do what I think is wrong when I also believe that we could have a small loss of face now to save a bigger disaster in the future.

We may lose a little face because we do something different from the actual commitment the President made. The President committed to 20,000 troops on the ground for this peace agreement.

There were other things the President could have offered to help the people of Bosnia keep a peace agreement. Arming and training the Moslems is the right thing to do. Although I cannot support the Dole-McCain amendment, I do think they are right in insisting that the arming and training of the Moslems happen; that it is consistent with this Senate's vote time after time after time over the last 2 years to lift the arms embargo, because anyone who has been there, as I have been, believes that there will not be stability in that part of the world until the three warring parties have some parity. That is what will keep the factions from going after each other in the future.

So arming and training the Moslems could have been done without our having troops on the ground. That would have been a fair division with our allies, and it would have fulfilled the responsibilities of the United States. But that is not what the President did. The President said we will have troops on the ground. He raised the expectations, and now we are voting whether to support that decision.

I wish to refer to an article that was written last month by James Webb, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the former administration, the Bush administration. And he talks about the need for strategic thinking, to determine exactly what our treaty commitments are as we go into the post-cold-war era.

And he says: "It is time that the United States had a global strategy before it puts out any more fires."

That really sums it up. We are running around the world putting out fires at the cost of billions of defense dollars and possibly hurting our long-term readiness for the future.

What he said we should be doing is absolutely correct. We should have a set of principles from which we react to crises.

"President Nixon," he quotes, "was the last President that set out a military policy, and it was fairly simple: Honor all treaty commitments in responding to those who invade the lands of our allies."

We have a NATO Treaty. If one of the NATO countries is invaded, we would be obligated under that treaty to respond.

This mission has expanded far beyond the NATO Treaty into a civil war in a non-NATO country, and yet we are being told NATO will fall if we do not come through with troops on the ground. It does not hold water, and it does not adhere to that very good and sound principle.

The second principle: Provide a nuclear umbrella to the world against the threats of other nuclear powers.

Mr. President, you know that we have debated theater missile defense on this very floor within the last month, and it has been a bone of contention. I strongly favor the theater missile defense.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used her 6 minutes.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, at the end of 4 minutes, I would like to be notified once again.

We must provide the theater missile defense that gives us the umbrella to defend ourselves from the 16 countries that now have ballistic missile capabilities. But sending troops into Bosnia is going to take \$5 billion from our defense readiness and from the capability to provide that kind of technology in the future.

The third tenet set out is to provide weapons and technical assistance to other countries where warranted but do not commit American forces to local conflicts. And that is exactly what we are doing. These are principles of a superpower. These are principles that keep the United States strong and uses our force when it is really necessary to keep a threat to the security of our country from happening.

Sending troops into Bosnia does not meet any of the tests of good, sound principles for our country, and we must make this President understand that there are many of us in Congress who do not believe he is within his power to go without consulting and asking the authorization of Congress to commit 20,000 troops on the ground. That is why we must adopt the resolution or get a good vote. I do not know that it will be adopted. But I hope that there is a strong vote that tells the President that we need to sit down and have a strategy and there is a difference between a U.S. security interest in which we would put American troops in harm's way.

We all want to help the Bosnian people, and we can do it in many ways. But troops on the ground, American lives at risk is not the right way.

Mr. President, finally, it has been said several times on the floor that somehow it would not be supporting the troops to adopt the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It is very clear. The resolution is simple. Section 1 says:

The Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy United States military ground forces into Bosnia.

The second section says:

The Congress strongly supports the United States military personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement the peace framework.

We are supporting the troops. I think every Member of the U.S. Senate intends to support the troops. We are going about it in different ways. I believe supporting the troops is narrowing the mission, is saying this is a mistake and, therefore, let us put a time limit on it, and if you would consider changing your mind, that would be the best of all worlds. This is a dangerous mission, and we hope the President will have every opportunity to reconsider this decision before it is too late.

That is why we believe this resolution should be adopted to support the troops by protecting them. Others may legitimately differ in passing the Dole resolution. Either way, we must support the troops, and I hope that we will adopt the resolution that opposes the President so that he will bring those troops home before the mass deployment occurs.

Thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, once again, this body is discussing the difficult issue of U.S. policy toward Bosnia. I regret that we are still here wrestling with this issue. I regret that American troops are on their way to Bosnia. I regret that peace has yet to come to the former Yugoslavia.

Americans have watched while some of the greatest atrocities since World War II have been committed in Europe. We have watched in despair as brutal strife has sundered families, neighborhoods, towns and cities, and the peoples of an entire region. We have recoiled in horror at the summary executions of draft-age men, the rape and murder of women and children, and discoveries of mass graves. An inhumanity which we thought long behind us has resurfaced with a shattering savagery.

It did not have to come to this. Ever since my first trip to the former Yugoslavia in August 1992, I have been convinced that the U.N. or NATO needed to take a more aggressive role in enforcing U.N. mandates, protecting U.N. personnel and at certain critical moments, reducing Serb military capabilities through selective aerial bombing. Yet, as we all know, international reluctance to take bold action, lack of consensus within NATO and the U.N. and political caution in Europe and the U.S. doomed any timely efforts to bring peace to the region.

I have also advocated lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia for several years. To me it is unconscionable that we would prevent Bosnia from defending itself against a vastly superior force, while at the same time refusing to step in, or allowing others to step in, and stop ethnic cleansing and the perpetuation of horrible atrocities against the Bosnian people. This proved to be a disastrous policy with tragic consequences. The only viable option seemed to me to be to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Over the last year, we have watched the European community struggle once again to find a solution to this seemingly intractable problem. But, as with past efforts, they fell apart in spite of strong U.S. support. It became clear to all involved that the only hope of ending this tragedy was to have the U.S. take the lead in facilitating negotiations between the parties. A belated but herculean effort by the Clinton administration resulted in the Dayton discussions, and the personal commitment of both the President and Secretary Christopher helped bring the parties together at last. I applaud the administration's intense efforts and believe the Dayton agreement provides the proper framework for a viable peace if all parties to the agreement are committed to working for peace.

I continue to be reluctant to see U.S. ground troops sent to Bosnia. Just as we took the lead in Haiti, I believe the Europeans should take the lead in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, particularly in providing ground troops. The U.S. has been providing air cover and surveillance for the past few years. And we provided much of the firepower when the U.N. decided it would allow aggressive action against certain targets. I approved of these actions and believe we should continue to play that role in the Dayton agreement implementation force. I do not think that U.S. leadership at the bargaining table required us to assume responsibility for providing one-third of all ground troops.

But the President made this commitment, and the option now before Congress is to support him at this stage in the process or perhaps precipitate the collapse of the most promising chance for peace. Given circumstances that we now cannot change, I do not believe there is really a choice here. If we care about the moral principles on which this Nation is built, if we care about the stability of Europe, for which we gave so many lives in two world wars, and if we take seriously the full responsibility of world leadership, then we must act to support the President's commitment. He should have come to Congress earlier in the process. But he didn't, and this is not the time to debate that issue further.

I am opposing the Hutchison resolution because I do not think anything productive comes from saying now that we oppose the commitment of U.S. troops. The time for such a statement has long passed. And stated in isolation from any constructive discussion about what our role should be, I feel this approach is not helpful to resolving the tragedy of Bosnia.

I will support the Dole resolution, because I believe it moves us in the right direction. I do this with reluctance on one point, however. This resolution calls on the United States to lead an immediate international effort to provide equipment, arms and training to the Bosnian Government Forces. I appreciate that this is seen as a way of

addressing the military imbalance that now exists between the parties. Obviously, rough military parity is a critical requirement for a successful NATO troop withdrawal. But I believe that balance ought to be achieved by bringing down the level and sophistication of arms in the region—not by raising it. Part of the problem in achieving peace and now enforcing it is that there are too many weapons in the region.

I am very concerned that focusing our efforts on arming the Bosnian Government instead of working to disarm and curtail arms flows into the area will merely stoke the fires for another explosion in Bosnia after we leave. What good is rough parity if all it does is set the stage for a resumption of the conflict after the withdrawal of the international force?

After speaking today with Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State, and Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am reassured that the administration is aware of the dangers of arming of the region and that every effort is being made to draw down the quantity of arms in the region, not to build them up. I also understand that General Shalikashvili is acutely aware of the potential danger to United States troops of direct United States involvement in arming, equipping, and training of the Bosnian Government Forces.

Tomorrow the President will witness the formal signing in Paris of the Dayton agreement. It is crucial to American credibility that the U.S. Senate go on record supporting his efforts prior to that time. I have received assurances that one area that will receive intense scrutiny in the coming weeks is this critical question of military balance. The Dole resolution requests a plan from the administration in 30 days. And it is critical to the safety of our troops that this issue be successfully resolved in that time frame. Therefore, I will cast my vote today to advance this process—to Paris and the signing of an accord—with the support of the U.S. Senate.

Finally, let me say that none of this would be possible without the professionalism, dedication, and commitment of the U.S. Armed Forces. The men and women who voluntarily serve under the Commander in Chief and who are now leaving their homes and families for a dangerous mission just before the holidays are the ones who make it possible to bring this hope of peace to Bosnia. We owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude and our hearts are with them. For it is they who put a face on what America stands for, and who are willing to take risks to see that others who want to live by these ideals are given a chance.

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution in opposition to the Clinton administration's decision to send troops to Bosnia as part of the NATO Implementation Force, known as

IFOR. I commend the Senators from Texas and Oklahoma and the other cosponsors of this resolution for their efforts in bringing it to the Senate floor. The resolution is brief, simple and to the point. It states: "Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy United States military ground forces into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its associated annexes."

Further, the resolution also states: "Congress strongly supports the United States military personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its associated annexes."

That is it. This resolution is the people's resolution, because it accurately reflects the views of the vast majority of the American people. Most Americans oppose sending our brave soldiers to Bosnia. And far more agree that, if the President insists on deployment, we must stand by our troops. Though we may disagree with our President, we must not do so in a way that would put the lives of American soldiers in Bosnia needlessly at risk.

Mr. President, debate on the use of United States troops should not be put in terms of whether we support a peace agreement in Bosnia. We all want peace. No one disagrees with that. Few deserve the chance for peace and stability more than the families in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What we have witnessed in the Balkans these past few years has been nothing less than tragic.

To his credit, the President has tried to achieve a negotiated peace framework. However, I am afraid that this peace agreement is fatally flawed in several respects. First, a large number of those responsible for the atrocities—a level of mass slaughter unequalled since Hitler and Stalin—likely will go unpunished.

Second, the agreement assumes continued cooperation between the Croatia and Bosnian Moslem leadership. That is a dangerous assumption. The fact is the Bosnian Moslems and the Croats often have been on opposing sides of this regional conflict. In fact, 2 years ago, Croat forces were launching attacks on Moslems in Mostar and the surrounding townships.

This peace agreement and the President's plan to enforce it fly in the face of history that dates back far longer than the last few years. The recent atrocities we have witnessed are an intensification of a conflict that dates back at least five centuries. This is a regional civil war. This is a civil war rooted in ethnic and religious differences. This is a civil war older than our own country. And at no time in our history has this civil war represented a national security threat to the United States. It was not a national security threat then. It is not one now.

Finally, Mr. President, this is a flawed agreement because it does not

have the support of many in the affected regions. In the last few weeks, Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo have made it very clear they will not support this agreement and allow for Moslem control of Sarajevo. The resolve of the rank and file in Sarajevo to stand their ground brings images and lessons to mind—of Beirut, Lebanon; Mogadishu, Somalia; and from my personal experience, of countless towns and villages in Vietnam.

Mr. President, our troops represent the finest, best trained military force on the planet. The fact is 20,000 of our finest soldiers cannot erase 500 years of hatred and bloodshed. Peace will not come from the resolve of American soldiers. Peace must come and must last from the resolve of the Bosnians, the Croats, and the Serbians to say and believe that more than five centuries of conflict is enough.

In fact, the injection of foreign troops into a civil war would only work to prolong the conflict in the long term. Our own Civil War would have lasted far longer and been far more devastating had Europe intervened. That was why President Lincoln worked tirelessly to prevent Europe's involvement. Though we will never know for certain, I believe Lincoln's efforts and Europe's decision not to intervene ultimately saved lives—American and European. Similarly, in the long run, I believe we could save more lives—American and European—by pursuing other means to achieve a lasting peace other than the limited deployment of IFOR.

Mr. President, I know what it is like to serve my country in a mission that did not have the clear support of the American people. I am a Vietnam veteran, a former second lieutenant in the United States Army. I am proud to have served my country in Vietnam. However, it was my hope that this Nation learned a few lessons—lessons that would make clear that sending troops to Bosnia is a serious mistake.

It is my hope that the President will reconsider his decision to deploy United States troops to Bosnia. However, my fondest wishes and current reality are worlds apart. The President has demonstrated his resolve to defy the wishes of the American people and the clear history of the region and put our troops in harm's way. That being the case, and once the troops are deployed, it is my hope that we in Congress will not do anything to jeopardize the safety of our troops. However, that should not deter us from closely monitoring the situation in Bosnia, just as we did in Somalia, and just as we did in Haiti. I intend to do so. The people of South Dakota, especially the families of the soldiers who may be deployed there, deserve no less.

Finally, my thoughts and prayers are with the brave young men and women who have been called to serve in or in support of the Bosnia mission, as well as their families and friends. I know this is a very difficult time. I know

what it is like to tell family members that I will be serving my country in a conflict half a world away. And now I know what it is like to learn that a member of my own family has been called to serve. My nephew Steve Pressler, son of my brother Dan and his wife Marcia, has been called to duty as part of an eight-member South Dakota National Guard unit that has been put on alert. It truly brings the matter home, both for my family and the other families with members who have been called to duty.

Again, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Hutchison resolution—the people's resolution. The President needs to understand that, as the people's representatives, we support the well-being of our troops, but we cannot support a policy that puts the lives of our troops on the line without a clear national security purpose. The policy is wrong. Our troops should not go.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today to say to my colleagues that President Clinton's decision to send United States troops to monitor the peace in Bosnia should not be a partisan issue. The President has decided to send American troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia; as Commander in Chief, the Constitution empowers him to do so. President Reagan exercised this power to send troops to Lebanon and Grenada; President Bush used this power to send troops to Panama and the Persian Gulf. As a newly elected Member of the United States Senate, I supported President Bush in sending troops to Panama, and I was 1 of 11 Democrats to vote for a resolution in support of Operation Desert Storm. I intend to support President Clinton as well, notwithstanding any reservations I may have about sending troops to Bosnia.

I do have serious misgivings about the deployment of American ground troops in the Balkan region; I wish that the President had not committed them. This is a high-risk mission, and the American people need to understand, as the President has stated, that casualties are almost inevitable. Some months ago I supported lifting the arms embargo, an embargo which prevented the Bosnian Moslems from securing the weapons necessary to defend themselves. Unfortunately, that embargo was never lifted. If it has been lifted, the Bosnian Moslems would have had the weapons they needed and American forces may never have been deployed.

I have two primary apprehensions about the assignment of troops to Bosnia; I am concerned that the mission need to be adequately defined, and I am concerned about the details of the United States exit strategy. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have had the opportunity to question closely Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili when they appeared before the committee. They

have assured me that the mission is narrowly defined and is confined to (a) the marking of the cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line, and zones of separation, and (b) the monitoring and enforcement of the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within the agreed period. With this mission so narrowly defined, I believe that we can avoid problems with mission creep we have faced in the past where troops have been committed without careful thought to what the goals of the mission were. Somalia is a case in point. Both Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili are convinced that the Bosnia mission can be accomplished in 1 year. Furthermore, U.S. troops are not going to be responsible for nation-building, refugee relocation, or other humanitarian activities. They have also assured me that the decision to leave the region will be up to the United States and the United States alone, and other NATO countries have pledged to follow our lead.

I believe the United States has played a critical role in this peace process. Without U.S. diplomatic involvement, the peace talks in Dayton would never have come about. Without the United States, this bloody war may never have ended. We have brought the Balkan peace process along this far, it would be terribly disingenuous for us to bail out now. The President has encouraged our allies to support this mission and all NATO countries with troops have pledged their support. It would be a tragedy for the United States to let the NATO countries down now, especially since we have done so much to promote peace in Bosnia.

The Congress has taken responsibility in this process as well. We sought to define the mission and a bipartisan congressional coalition has worked to insure that the mission is strongly defined and the exit strategy is clarified. We have an obligation to insure that the mission can be successfully executed. We know that the U.S. uniformed services are the best in the world, and we should stand proudly behind them.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose President Clinton's plan to send America's sons and daughters into Bosnia. On Monday evening, President Clinton asked Congress and the American people to support a policy that transforms the world's greatest fighting force into a band of peace enforcers and nation builders.

Unfortunately, this President is a poor student of history. He has quickly forgotten the tragic lessons of Somalia and Beirut. I can assure you, Mr. President, the families of those killed in those faraway places are reminded every day and will not soon forget the consequences of this type of ill-conceived foreign policy.

President Clinton wants us to support an undetermined scheme to enforce a precarious peace between factions that have been at war for almost 4 years and fighting each other for gen-

erations. He tells us it will take 20,000 American troops and less than a year. Mr. President, less than a year to bring peace to a place that has not known peace in recent memory?

President Clinton tells us that our troops will be peacekeepers and not war fighters. They will be neutral brokers of an agreed upon settlement between warring parties. The problem with this, Mr. President, is that we are not a neutral party in this conflict. President Clinton himself admits that we chose sides.

We imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and were an active participant in a sustained air assault on Bosnian Serb targets. To add insult to injury, the administration also proposes that we train the Bosnian Federation while we enforce the peace. Is there any doubt that the Serbs will view our presence as something less than neutral?

Mr. President, why is this any different than Beirut or Somalia and can we really expect a different result?

President Clinton said that we will send 20,000 of our troops. How did he determine that we would need 20,000 troops to enforce the peace?

Earlier this year President Clinton imprudently promised to commit up to 25,000 U.S. ground forces long before there was peace, before there was a plan, before there was a mission, and before we had any idea whether it would be necessary to become involved at all. Recently, the President told us that he still has not seen the plan.

As yet, there is no clearly defined mission, no attainable military goals and no way to measure success. However, President Clinton knows that we will send 20,000 of our troops to implement this unknown plan. Mr. President, without well-defined and achievable military goals, I fear that the world's finest fighting forces are about to be used as global hall-monitors, sitting ducks for disgruntled belligerents.

Mr. President, I suggest that the administration has yet to establish any credible case for this deployment.

President Clinton also tells us that the United States must lead when NATO is involved. Of course the United States must lead, but the President has equated leadership with American ground troops.

American ground forces offer no tactical or operational advantage to a Bosnian peace force. They offer only political advantage for our reluctant European allies. The Balkans are historically a matter of concern to Western Europe. If they do not believe the problem is important enough to solve—then we certainly should not.

President Clinton apparently believes that the United States must deploy troops in Bosnia to preserve NATO and that NATO is the proper vehicle for peace in Bosnia. Mr. President, by any measure this would greatly expand the alliance's mandate to include missions never even remotely contemplated by NATO's founders.

NATO was intended to be a military alliance to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. There is no doubt that the United States has a vital interest in the continent's security. President Clinton proposes, however, that we transform the basic mission of NATO from an organization that guards Western Europe from attack, into an organization that intervenes in civil disputes and parochial conflicts of nonmember states.

Mr. President, we should never seek to preserve an alliance unless that alliance serves the purposes for which it was created. NATO was not created to be the arbiter of civil disputes nor should it seek to become one.

What did President Clinton not tell us? He did not tell us how our troops will get out. He told us that it should last only 1 year, but as former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle testified before the Armed Services Committee, "An exit date is not an exit strategy." To compound the problem, the administration will be under enormous pressure to succeed. Especially in an election year.

Without clearly defined military missions and goals, mission creep is inevitable. As President Clinton expands the mission he will be compelled to escalate American military efforts to meet the requirements of new missions. This sounds very familiar, Mr. President.

President Clinton also did not tell the American people how much this will cost them. Some estimates run as high as \$2 billion and that is based on a best-case scenario. Mr. President, military planning must take into account the worst-case scenario. Our fighting forces must be prepared for any contingency.

Again, I fear that this administration has not prepared for unexpected events which are inevitable in any military operation. This could be critical not only to the financial cost of the operation, but to the incalculable human cost as well.

President Clinton asked the American people to choose peace. Mr. President, the American people do choose peace. We hope for a lasting end to the Bosnian civil war that has raged for so long. The American people and this body will support the President in his efforts to end the fighting, but we will not commit our fighting men and women when we have no vital national interest at stake. Just saying we have a vital interest, Mr. President, does not make it so. President Clinton has failed to make the case to the American people, and this body should not support a deployment of American troops to Bosnia.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I have serious concerns about the deployment of American troops in Bosnia. I certainly have concerns about the stability of the peace accord reached in Dayton. I have concerns about the potential disruption that Bosnian Serbs and other antipeace fac-

tions of the various affected parties may create. And I have no illusions about the vulnerability of Americans—our Nation's men and women who will be part of the Peace Implementation Force in Bosnia—to innumerable dangers as a result of this deployment. But leadership is not risk-free, Mr. President.

It is clear that even as we are debating this issue, United States troops are participating in the NATO effort to implement the Bosnia peace agreement. Every nation in Europe—in Western Europe and Eastern Europe, even Russia—is deploying troops as part of the peace accord. The achievements that were reached after painstaking negotiations between Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic with support and facilitation by United States representatives, particularly Secretary of State Christopher and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, have generated the best chance yet of achieving a stable outcome for the Baltic region. It is clear that U.S. support of this NATO effort is essential if we are to maintain our leadership role in the world, and if the peace enforcement effort is to succeed.

The November 21 peace agreement calls for the creation of a 60,000 member implementation force [I-FOR], which will be comprised of 30 countries. I-FOR's mission is not to side with the combatants, but is rather to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the settlement. I have listened carefully to testimony from defense and foreign policy experts on the use of military forces to enforce a peace regime. None of them has identified this as an easy mission and all have concerns. While I feel there are many risks which may potentially disrupt NATO's efforts to secure peace in the region, I agree with former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that "disaster is certain if the U.S. backs out of the situation now."

Mr. President, I do not support an open-ended time frame to maintaining peace indefinitely in the region. I think that the debates this Chamber has had, the testimony that has been provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the dialog that many here have had with the President and Secretary Perry have underscored the critical significance of limiting the scope of our mission in Bosnia. I am confident that the President is committed to the 1-year time frame and is committed to the limited objectives he has presented—namely, separating the parties and maintaining the cease-fire. And I have been assured that those who attack our forces or impede this process will be dealt with swiftly and decisively.

Mr. President, our troops are on the ground today in Bosnia; we are there, and we need to support our men and women. Congress should not withhold funds that are needed to support our

troops, and we should not tie the President's hands during this time when American leadership matters so very much. My vote is to approve of U.S. participation in the NATO initiative.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, what the Senate is faced with amounts to a shotgun wedding. The Congress and American troops find themselves confronting an unfortunate mistake, but one which we are now obliged to make the best of. Our decision—each Senator's choice—is whether we respond to the situation with a sense of honor and accountability or whether we abandon our principles and responsibility.

I am not happy with our choice. I don't think any one of us welcomes the prospect of sending American soldiers into Bosnia. I share the Majority Leader's view that we would not have been presented with this decision if the administration had worked as methodically to lift the embargo on Bosnia as it did to advance the deal in Dayton. But, at this stage it matters less how we got here—it is of far graver consequence how we proceed.

Why should we look forward and not back?

Because we do not have the option or choice to change the course of events. The agreement has been signed, now we must decide what kind of mission we will carry out and how we will assure it succeeds.

We are now presented with two unambiguous facts—the first being that the Dayton agreement would not have been reached without aggressive, rational U.S. leadership. This is not, after all the Tashkent Treaty. Leaders from many other nations have tried repeatedly to negotiate a settlement, but it was largely American diplomatic efforts which produced results.

And, just as the U.S. role meant the difference between a settlement and continued blood shed, so too, the immediate parties to the agreement and our allies in Europe believe we have a unique authority and capability to guarantee the accord's successful implementation.

But, the second fact is more important and that is that the President of the United States has made the commitment to deploy 20,000 Americans in support of a NATO Implementation Force to secure the accord. Whether we like it or not, those troops are going, indeed some are on the ground. To deny our support for Operation Joint Endeavor, flatly repudiates our longstanding NATO security obligations and undermines our troops committed to the effort.

The credibility of American leadership and American treaty commitments are the interests which are very much at stake if we now fail to fulfill the President's decision. Just after the President's Oval Office address, Henry Kissinger observed, "if we do not honor the President's words, the threat to our security would be greater because nobody would believe we are capable of conducting serious foreign policy."

President Bush, who so capably led this country beyond deep anxieties about committing our Nation to war in the Persian Gulf echoed that sentiment. He pointed out, "If it is seen that the President does not have the support of the Congress—our standing as leader of the free world and the standing of NATO would be dramatically diminished. That must not happen."

Now, we must make certain that our troops have the means to succeed. We must guarantee they are assured every conceivable operational advantage and the unqualified support of both the public and Congress.

Mr. President, I do not believe this Nation is by nature indifferent to international concerns—there is no inherent isolationist point of view. But the public is clearly troubled by this decision—they now seem at best divided and at worst deeply opposed to the President's decision.

I attribute the confusion to 3 years of flip flops, reversals, and irrational foreign policy inconsistent with our national interests. The public has little reason to believe that this time the administration will stay on track with a limited mission that protects our Nation's interests and our soldiers lives.

That is why I think it is incumbent on Congress to assure absolute accountability regarding the scope of the mission, the costs and the strategy for withdrawing our forces. We have a clear and compelling responsibility to the troops we are deploying to guarantee they are well equipped and are carrying out limited, achievable goals.

Unfortunately, there are already contradictions and uncertainties emerging which will only plague the administration's desire to strengthen public support. Last week, Secretary Perry testified before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that our financial burden would be limited to support for our troops. Within a matter of days, the Defense Department submitted a letter notifying Congress of the possibility of transferring \$300 million in defense articles and services to nations participating in I-For. Apparently, DOD anticipates reimbursement for this support, but those of us who monitor the United Nations have serious reservations about the reliability of these promissory notes.

The administration cannot afford to allow any ambiguity to creep into the public debate about the scope of our responsibilities. One of the reasons I support the resolution drafted by the leader is the requirement that the administration provide a full accounting of the mission, rules of engagement, command arrangements, goals, compliance with the agreements and all costs to all agencies involved in this endeavor. The leader's resolution is the best protection our troops have that their government will not fail them as they carry out their duties with skill and honor.

But, the real key to success and the heart of my support for the Leadership

resolution is the requirement that the United States lead an immediate effort to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics to enable Bosnia to provide for its own defense.

Mr. President, I do not think it is wise to establish an arbitrary date for the exit of American troops. That only guarantees a cooling off period before fighting resumes. We have seen the destructive consequences of just such an approach in Somalia. Knowing our departure was imminent, the warlords bided their time. Somalia today is indistinguishable from the chaos and anarchy which preceded our arrival.

That must not happen in the Balkans.

Our mission can only be deemed a success if we contribute to a durable solution, securing a lasting regional stability and peace. Stability and peace demand a military balance between the Serbs and the Bosnian-Croat Federation.

I realize that there are members with major misgivings about the possible consequences of lifting the embargo and arming and training the Bosnians. They want to allow the so called arms build down process to have time to take affect. Unfortunately, there are far too many unanswered questions about the arms reduction program to risk Bosnia's freedom and long term prospects for stability.

At this point it is entirely unclear who will assume the responsibility for enforcing arms control. As the Dayton agreement is constructed, the immediate reach of the disarmament regime is limited to the NATO patrolled ceasefire zones of separation. This makes obvious sense for the security of our soldiers, but offers no iron clad guarantees for the reduction of massive Serb stockpiles within the boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Let me add one final historical observation on arming the Bosnians. I think a majority of members in this chamber would share the view that it was not SALT or START agreements which brought about the demise of the Soviet Union. Arms control initiatives may reduce risks, but any level headed assessment of the Cold War reaches the conclusion that it was the credibility of our military power which guaranteed our security and global stability. So too, in the Balkans—only a credible military balance will minimize the risk of the war reigniting.

Mr. President, in 1990 the American public was ambivalent about the notion of sending Americans to war in the gulf. We all know just how close the vote was in the Senate.

From a parochial perspective, 20,000 soldiers deployed from Kentucky—if my memory serves me it was the largest contingent from any State. George Bush faced formidable opposition from families in Kentucky, but he was able to overcome their concerns by exercising leadership. In the words of his Secretary of State, "The U.S. had in George Bush a leader who was consistent, principled, decisive and strong."

Those have not been the words most of the members of this chamber would use to describe the President's record in foreign policy so far. I think it is worth noting very few Kentuckians have been called up for deployment in Bosnia—a handful compared to the gulf. Yet, there is more pronounced, stronger opposition to the President's decision to deploy U.S. troops to secure peace than there was to Bush's decision to wage war.

President Clinton has made the decision to deploy American troops to end the suffering, stop the war from spreading, and to build a Europe at peace. He has argued that this can only be achieved if the United States continues to lead. I take this pledge seriously.

Congress and American troops now stand at an altar—let us all hope and work to assure that it is not one which involves the unnecessary sacrifice of American lives. But as we proceed, let us share the understanding that there are crucial U.S. interests at stake. The lives of American soldiers and the credibility of American leadership and our security commitments to NATO now hang precariously in the balance. We must speak with one voice and honor the President's pledge.

Mr. MACK. Mr. President, the role of the United States in the world is unique. America has played a historic role in opposing tyranny, and giving hope to people denied their freedom. Similarly, our military has played a central and unparalleled role in the world. Only the U.S. Armed Forces combine the ability to achieve enormous and complicated military objectives with the commitment to use this force in pursuit of the values that made our Nation great—freedom, justice, democracy, and the protection of basic human rights.

Despite a great deal of theorizing about the so-called new world order, our role in the world should remain the same as it was throughout the cold war. Certainly, our interests remain the same. Even when not pitted against the Soviet Union and its Communist expansionism we can identify our interests clearly.

In Bosnia, they were deterrence of aggression, support for the right of self defense, abhorrence of ethnic cleansing, and support for multi-ethnic democracy. President Clinton's 1992 campaign emphasized all of these issues. His policy as President has reflected none of them.

Since early on in the conflict, I supported lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government and helping the Bosnian people to defend themselves. In my view this was required on moral grounds. It was also the strategically and militarily sound course. But most of all, it was based on the right of individuals and nations to defend their freedom.

The embargo condemned the people of Bosnia to a slow death, carried out not only by military engagements but also by savage attacks on civilians.

Serbia came to the war with a massive advantage in arms and throughout the war was able to acquire the arms it needed from other sources. The Bosnian Government's forces were at an extreme disadvantage. Aligning the United States with the embargo and the denial of Bosnia's right of self-defense was a disgrace. If this administration had pursued a policy of lifting the arms embargo and allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, negotiations would have been conducted from a position of strength and U.S. troops would not have been required.

Instead, this administration favored negotiation, compromise, and concession even when it was painfully obvious that only the threat of force and the willingness to use it by the Bosnians would allow any hope of democracy and freedom in Bosnia.

Ironically, the President now has found a use for force, not to promote freedom, but to try to enforce an unjust agreement. President Clinton has committed U.S. troops and credibility to implement an agreement which, as this resolution says, "ratifies the results of ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression."

This agreement is the inevitable result of the administration's policy of refusing to allow the Bosnian Government to defend itself and—let's be frank—its sentences the people of Bosnia to a peace of subservience and domination.

Peace has many forms. There is the so-called peace of the former Soviet bloc where the ever present threat of force subjugated the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. Bosnia and the countries of the former Yugoslavia were supposed to have escaped that domination. Instead, another venal and dangerous threat arose.

In the former Yugoslavia, the threat was complicated by historical rivalries and ethnic and religious differences. The administration seized on the complexity of the situation and used it as an excuse to do nothing. "There are no good guys," the administration said. Or "it's a civil war."

The peace being imposed on the people of Bosnia is the peace of domination and fear. Unless the Bosnian Government is given the means to defend itself now, we can expect that the war will continue.

We should not be in this position. It was avoidable. However, the decision to commit U.S. troops and prestige has been made by the President in his constitutionally prescribed role as Commander-in-Chief.

The Congressional role in providing funds for military operations is also set forth in the Constitution. Congress could exercise its constitutional power to deny the funds to carry out this or any other military mission. The President would certainly veto such a measure. Without the votes to override, ultimately, he would prevail.

Nothing would be served by undercutting the men and women of our

Armed Forces at this late date. U.S. troops have already begun arriving and more are on the way. A strong vote against the deployment would demoralize our troops and embolden those who would like to see the Dayton settlement collapse.

Congress must back our troops unconditionally and work to make certain they have everything they need to carry out their mission. If we learned anything from Somalia, it is that no corners can be cut where our troops are concerned. Their rules of engagement, their equipment, their training, everything about their mission, must be designed to remove all unnecessary risk. We can and we must achieve this for the young men and women serving their country.

This resolution allows the President to fulfill his commitment to deploy U.S. forces to implement the General Framework Agreement so long as the mission of the United States forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited to enforcement of the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement, that the exit strategy includes establishment of a military balance enabling the government of Bosnia to defend itself, and that the U.S. will lead an immediate international effort to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality to the Bosnian government.

These determinations are essential. In the last few weeks, the administration has made contradictory statements about U.S. intentions to help equip and train the Bosnian Government. On the one hand, the administration said it will help train and equip the Bosnian side. On the other hand, officials have said arming the Bosnian Government forces would not be necessary because provisions in the Dayton Agreement call for negotiated arms limitation agreements.

That sends exactly the wrong signal. This war was made possible by the inability of the Bosnian Government to defend itself. Late yesterday, the President made the commitment to lead the effort to arm and train the Bosnian Government forces. In light of the administration's recent ambivalence about arming and training the Bosnian Government forces, I expect that the administration will show, starting today, concrete steps toward fulfilling this commitment to the United States Congress and to the Bosnian Government, including getting a commitment of support from our allies. The Congress expects that commitment to be kept as a condition for passing the Dole-McCain resolution.

There is very little satisfying about the peace agreement reached at Dayton. As President Izetbegovic of Bosnia said, "this may not be a just agreement but it is more just than the continuation of war." That is little to go on for the people of Bosnia, but it will have to do.

Our role in brokering this settlement makes it incumbent upon us to help en-

force it. Our role in the world, and the unique role our military has played as a force for freedom requires that we work to establish a military balance which will protect Bosnia from future aggression. Therefore I support our troops as they endeavor to carry out the United States military mission in Bosnia.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as I rise to speak about American participation in enforcing the Bosnian peace agreement to be signed in Paris this week, I want to begin by making clear my firm belief that U.S. participation in this action is the wrong thing to do.

I would note here a few of the many reasons for taking this position:

The Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and others in the region have been fighting for hundreds of years, creating generational hatreds which no "piece of paper" is going to stop.

There are many elements in the region, not least the Bosnian Serbs—the main belligerents—who are unhappy with this settlement and will do everything they can to upset it, including by attacking our forces.

There is no clear national interest in our involvement in this endeavor other than, to some, the preservation of our leadership in NATO.

However, the question then is: "is this the issue upon which the future of NATO should be decided?" I certainly hope not.

U.S. troops will be in the middle of a situation fraught with antagonism and hatred. They will have to be arbiters, for example, of who lives where, who gets trained, who is "right" in the inevitable thousands of disputes which will arise.

Inevitably, they'll become participants, and in that part of the world that means they'll be victims of the violence they are supposed to prevent.

The map to which the parties have agreed is a disaster and creates ungovernable nations which the parties will, long after this incident is over, inevitably begin to fight about again.

There is no realistic "exit strategy" because there is no likelihood that these incredibly difficult problems are going to be resolved in 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, or even 100 years.

Mr. President, there are countless other reasons why this is the wrong thing to do. My colleagues will be discussing them at great length, so there is no reason for me to note them here.

THE ISSUE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

Rather I would like to discuss another aspect of this issue.

Mr. President, eventually the constitutional issue of whether the President must have authorization from Congress to participate in such ventures will be decided in the Congress' favor.

However, in the meantime, we have a reality, a sad reality: the President can make this deployment even without congressional authorization or support.

He's going to do so without congressional authorization or even congressional support. In fact he's going to do it even if the Congress disapproves.

This is unfortunate, and I think the President will regret acting in this way at a time when the Congress and, I believe, the overwhelming majority of the American people, have serious doubts about this policy.

WE HAVE TO SUPPORT OUR TROOPS

Mr. President, that is the reality.

We in Congress have to deal as best we can with that reality—that our troops are going to Bosnia, to Croatia, to Hungary, and elsewhere in the Balkans—by doing everything in our power to support our military men and women.

In short, our forces are going into a situation with many risks, with many dangers, with the potential for many of them to be injured or killed during their tour of duty. As they do so, we have to do several things: Make sure they have rules of engagement which allow them to defend themselves and deal with threats to themselves, including by force; make sure they have sufficient back up, including support forces in the region and air support to deal with threat; and, most importantly, make sure they know that no matter what the political differences at home, they have the 100 percent support of all Americans.

In sum, Mr. President, no matter how much we oppose this policy, and no matter how the situation evolves in the Balkans, we have to be prepared to show our forces, in every way possible, that they have our full and unequivocal support.

THE FUTURE

Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that it is essential that the Congress, with its oversight responsibilities, watch very carefully how this situation evolves, how our forces are treated, and how this complex and convoluted peace agreement is implemented.

As we do so, we must be prepared to take appropriate action if what I firmly believe are the overly optimistic predictions of the administration do not come true.

That too is an absolutely essential part of our support for our troops as they face this risky, dangerous, unprecedented, and, in my view, unfortunate endeavor.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, the decision on Bosnia is extremely difficult. But I believe our responsibility is clear.

The United States is being asked to participate in a peacekeeping mission by all the parties to the dispute in Bosnia. They say that without our participation, there will be no chance for peace.

It is important to remember that we are being asked to enforce an agreed upon peace. We are not being asked to wage war.

It is in our interest to help prevent the spread of this conflict to the rest of Europe. And it is morally right to help stop the slaughter and atrocities that have repeatedly occurred.

However, I have always thought that Bosnia was primarily the European's

responsibility. This conflict is in their backyard. It most directly affects their interests.

I also have serious doubts whether peace can be secured in 1 year. The history of the region is one of strife and struggle. There has been conflict in the Balkans for hundreds of years. For 45 years after World War II, the differences were suppressed by Marshal Tito. But when he passed from the scene, the old enmities resumed as violently as before.

Despite these serious doubts, I am persuaded we ought to help give the parties a chance to build the peace they say they want. They have said they are tired of war, and asked us and 25 other nations to give them the opportunity they need to try to craft a lasting peace.

Most importantly, I believe we must send a strong message of support for our troops, who are helping to create an opportunity for peace in Bosnia. Anything less will add to the risks that the brave men and women of our Armed Forces will face.

I have therefore decided to support the Dole-McCain resolution supporting our troops and limiting the mission they are expected to fulfill.

I will continue to carefully monitor our involvement to ensure that this mission does not expand beyond the limited one being authorized tonight.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the Dole-McCain resolution regarding the deployment of United States troops in Bosnia.

I would like to begin my remarks by commending the respected majority leader for his skill and leadership in this sensitive and vital area. I emphasize the word "leader," because true leadership has been required here and has been much evident.

There is, I believe it is fair to say, a great amount of shared rich feeling here in the Senate about this deployment. There is a palpable feeling of trepidation about this mission, on both sides of the aisle. Few in this body are certain that sending troops is the right thing to do, and for that reason, would not have voted to do it. At the same time, there is considerable sentiment here that we should do everything possible to fully support our troops once they are there, and to avoid any appearance of undercutting our Commander in Chief. To undercut our command structure while American troops are in harm's way is something that most Senators earnestly wish to avoid.

I believe that the Senate has plausibly wished to give voice simultaneously to these two conflicting impulses. The majority leader's initiative has made it possible for us to do so.

Turning that shared feeling into a constructive statement of policy is a tremendously difficult task. It requires not only considerable political skill and courage, but a detailed recognition of the factors confronting our forces in Bosnia, and confronting our President.

First, I do believe that there is broad agreement here about the President's constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief, to deploy U.S. forces to defend U.S. interests abroad. We in Congress do have the constitutional right and duty to be involved in fundamental decisions of war and peace. But the principal ways in which we do this are—first, to declare war ourselves, a congressional prerogative, and second, to use our power over the purse to limit the military operation pursued by the President. We do retain that power. But otherwise, we recognize that it is the President, not the Congress, who has the authority to command the Armed forces, within the limits of what Congress is willing to fund.

Earlier today, we voted as to whether to forbid the President to use DOD funds to support a deployment in Bosnia. Buy a 77 to 22 vote, we decided that we would not curtail such funding. Thus I believe that it is now incumbent upon the Congress to maximize the chances of success for the mission which the President has seen fit to initiate.

The President's decision to deploy U.S. forces is associated with his committing the United States to do its share in upholding a peace negotiated between the warring parties. I have my own grave doubts about whether this peace will hold. It may indeed hold, but I do not believe that it will hold simply because United States, British, French, or other NATO forces are present. If the warring parties in Bosnia are not satisfied with the terms of the peace, they will take out their hostilities on whichever forces are in this way. I believe that the historical record in that regard is so very clear.

It is possible that the peace will indeed hold, if an equilibrium has been reached there. If the various parties are satisfied with the territory over which they have been given jurisdiction, then there may indeed be peace. I would say, however, that there are troubling signs that this will not be the case in Bosnia. I am certain that my colleagues have read and heard about many instances of aggressive behavior in the last few days. One involved the touching of a town, by Bosnian Croats, which was slated to be turned over to the Serbs. Can we assume that these horrible actions will not meet with reprisals? Will the Serbs be satisfied that a town allotted to them under the terms of the peace agreement has been destroyed? Will vengeance not be sought at another time and place? I believe it would be highly naive to assume that these activities will cease the moment that United States troops take up their positions in Bosnia.

So it should be clear that I am most troubled by the President's decision to send troops to Bosnia. However, I would also say that we do not add to the safety of our troops by withdrawing support from our President at this

time. We know from our own tragic experience that no good comes from public disunity between the President and the Congress at such a time as this. To tell the world that America's commitment is soft, that it will be undone once the Congress can prevail over the President in such a matter, is to invite attacks upon our troops, and thereby upon our resolve. Certainly, any potential enemies will seek to test American resolve in Bosnia. "We must not," I say to my colleagues, lay any of the groundwork for those detractors by making it harder for the President to stand by his decisions.

The majority leader's resolution, I believe, recognizes that our desire to support our President does not mandate that we simply offer him a blank check to proceed in Bosnia in any which way. This resolution incorporates the insights of our able Majority Leader and others as to the reality that our troops can only safely and profitably be withdrawn once Bosnia can stand on its own without resort to the presence of American support. This requires the training and equipping of available Bosnian army. Much of the negotiations between the Congress and the President as to the substance of this resolution have turned on this point. I am pleased to see that we have received a commitment from the White House that America will assume a leading role in training the Bosnian army there.

That is the factor which can make it possible for the President to claim this mission as a success upon its conclusion; otherwise we run the risk of simply delaying whatever bloodshed would otherwise occur until the United States withdraws. If we have simply a target date for the hostilities to resume, and we will have accomplished nothing. The work of the majority leader in this area could help to ensure that this mission is not in vain, and that a lasting peace in Bosnia is possible, without a sustained and indefinite American presence.

So I commend the resolution offered by Senator DOLE and the intrepid and courageous MCCAIN and I urge my colleagues to support it. I trust that my colleagues will agree with me that the task before us—once such a mission is undertaken—is to ensure that it has the greatest possible chance for success. I believe that in this instance, we accomplish this by defining and limiting the nature of the mission in Bosnia, and by providing a strategy leading toward the orderly withdrawal of United States troops from this part of the world. The Dole-McCain resolution surely accomplishes this, and I urge the Senate to adopt it.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, before I begin my remarks on the resolutions related to Bosnia, I would like to express my unequivocal support for the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. I can think of no greater act of patriotism and devotion to this country than to enlist in the mili-

tary and devote one's professional life to the defense of our Constitution. It is made even more profound by the realization that these brave men and women do not have a say in how, or where, they will be employed. They go where they are told to go, fight where they are told to fight, and do so better than any other military force in the world. Throughout their service they must spend months, sometimes even years, away from their home and family. Children are born and start growing up while their parent is away in the service of their country. Few of us in America today realize the tremendous sacrifice these men and women make so that we may enjoy the fruits of liberty. It is time we honor their sacrifice.

But such sacrifice is not limited to our active duty forces. I have been informed that four Michigan National Guard and Army Reserve units will be deployed in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. To the officers, men and women of the 1776th Military Police Company, the 210th Military Police Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, both from Taylor, MI, the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion in Kalamazoo, MI, and the 415th Military Intelligence Detachment in Ann Arbor, MI, I wish you God speed and a safe deployment. I have also been informed that one of my own staff, a Naval Reservist, may be recalled to active duty to support these military operations. May you all return quickly and safely. I commend your patriotism, your bravery, and your devotion to duty. You exemplify all that is worthy and noble in Michigan, in our military, and in the United States. I'm sure all my colleagues here in the Senate join me in saluting your valor.

Now Mr. President, I would like to specifically address the issue of America's interest and involvement in Bosnia. This issue has implications for our foreign and defense policy that will reverberate long after this operation is completed.

America has always been viewed as a light to all nations, guiding them to peace, freedom, and self-determination. We are a nation dedicated to certain principles and ideals, and we take those principles and ideals seriously enough that we include their very preservation and advancement as part of our national interest. But we must never lose sight of the fact that a nation's first responsibility is to its own people.

We, in this body, must never develop a foreign policy that loses sight of that primary responsibility, and that the lives and safety of our troops, whether they be volunteers or conscripts, are just as much a vital national security interest as are the lives of our civilian citizens. In practice then, we should commit our forces only when, where, and to the extent appropriate, to meet our stated national goals and to protect our national interests.

Therefore, Mr. President, the level of our commitment to a particular under-

taking should be concomitant with the level of the threat to our national interests. Some situations threaten our very existence, while others only marginally affect us. Many will lie somewhere in the middle. Where such threats to our national security are significant and definite, like those we faced in World War II, we must respond decisively and with all available military force. But in those cases where our national interests lie somewhere between the extremes, as I believe is the case in the Balkans, it is not necessary to respond with the same level of absolute commitment and force that we would use against those definite threats to our vital national security interests.

Mr. President, we must also examine not only what our chances of success will be in a particular undertaking, but also what will be the potential costs—in the lives of America's soldiers and in our national prestige. Just as the level of our interests will lie somewhere along a broad scale, so too will the potential benefits and costs. Every effort must be made to assess and decide whether the potential benefits in advancing our national interests justify the costs.

Mr. President, in my view, the United States has an interest in long-term stability and peace in the Balkans. The war has consumed the interests of Europe for the past 4 years and has increasingly become an item of disagreement and discord between the United States and our NATO allies, an alliance where continued U.S. leadership is vital to our interests. Former adversaries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, with whom we previously thought we were developing new and friendlier relations, are using this war as an opportunity to expand their influence and control. Our leadership in NATO, and with the emerging European democratic states, will be pivotal to what Europe will look like for generations to come. We must remain engaged with these states, and must accept that their problems, more or less are our problems too. Further, old divisions between East and West are exacerbated by this conflict because of the critical role the mixing of Eastern and Western religions play in the continued hatred and strife of the region. These conflicts undermine stability and therefore directly impact upon U.S. national interests.

Finally, and certainly not least, the United States has a very real interest in putting an end to the atrocities and carnage that has shattered this region. At the end of World War II, we said we would never again allow another Holocaust. Where we have an opportunity to end mass and indiscriminate killing, which will live in our memories for generations to come, we must seize such opportunities where we legitimately believe we can succeed.

Mr. President, while there is a definite U.S. interest to be advanced in this situation, it is only worth acting if

we employ a strategy that both ensures the conditions for a genuine peace and which establishes a rational strategy for the eventual withdrawal of our troops. Therefore, I believe any strategy for peace and stability in the Balkans must, in part, be based upon addressing the fundamental military imbalance between the Serbs and the Muslim-Croatian Federation. If we had previously lifted the arms embargo, we would not be debating this deployment today. Yes, the conflict would have probably intensified at first, but I believe the Muslim-Croatian Federation would have then been able to develop a credible military deterrent, and there would be no need for 60,000 troops to implement the peace. Now, again, a balance must exist or peace will evaporate as soon as the Implementation Force withdraws. The current administration policy fails to set in motion a plan to achieve this balance.

It is also clear to me that any strategy based upon the deployment of United States ground troops to Bosnia must include a definition of what will be the conditions for declaring final success in this venture. A pitfall we must avoid in achieving that success is to utilize our troops in the inappropriate mission of nation-building. I understand suitable political structures must be in place to allow the ballot to replace the bullet as the agent of change, but the role of our troops must be strictly limited to establishing the necessary military stability so as to allow the civilians the opportunity to develop the necessary political institutions.

When we have defined our criteria for success, we must also have in place a definite withdrawal plan that clearly establishes the conditions and terms for the termination of this mission. In my view, the current administration plan is based upon the faulty assumptions that our mere presence in Bosnia is the goal, and that peace under any terms is preferable to battling for a just victory.

Mr. President, short of committing ground troops to Bosnia, I believe there are several roles which the United States can and should fill to advance the cause of a just and stable peace in the Balkans. Among those roles which I feel are appropriate for the United States include contributing significant air and naval forces to the NATO operation in the Balkans, providing a large part of the logistical and financial resources for this operation, and participating in efforts to provide military assistance and training to the Muslim-Croatian Federation.

However, the President's decision to deploy United States ground troops directly into Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in my view, a grievous mistake. As I stated earlier, I believe it is in America's interests to advance the cause of peace, justice, and stability in the Balkans. But it is not such an absolute or vital national interest that it justifies the extremely high risk of deploying ground troops to the region.

Mr. President, I believe U.S. troops are particularly ill-suited for peace-keeping missions of this type because they present such a ripe political target. Whether rightly or wrongly, a dead American soldier captured on TV cameras will be broadcast around the world. I doubt the same can be said for the soldiers from traditional peace-keeping contributors. And that is exactly what a belligerent wants; that intense media coverage and scrutiny that covers American troops. That is why our troops have rarely been used as peacekeepers. Look at what happened in Somalia. U.S. forces were specifically targeted, and subsequently drawn much further into the conflict than originally planned, because of the significant political position they occupy for no other reason than that they were American soldiers. Therefore, I believe peacekeeping is best conducted by smaller countries not perceived as having any vested interest in the outcome of a conflict, and therefore can undeniably claim to be neutral.

The question of U.S. leadership does not rest on the end of an infantryman's rifle barrel. The United States can maintain, even advance, its international credibility, its preeminence in the NATO alliance, and its role as the world's sole superpower, without having to contribute a disproportionate share of the troops on the ground. Indeed, I believe it is imprudent to claim that the sole measure of United States leadership and commitment to peace in the Balkans can only be measured by the number of troops we commit to the Implementation Force.

Were a more vital United States interest at stake in the Balkans, and were not it clear that the United States can still participate significantly in implementing this peace accord without using its ground troops, my views may be different. But given the extreme risk to which I believe they will be subjected, and the clear availability of for other countries to provide these peacekeeping troops, I believe placing our forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unjustified.

In light of the foregoing analysis, I concluded that I could not support H.R. 2606, which would prohibit the expenditure of funds for the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia absent a specific Congressional appropriation. Limiting the expenditure of funds at this stage of the operation will unduly jeopardize our troops in the field just at the exact time that they most need Congressional support. I would also refer to the arguments made by the Majority Leader, himself a distinguished veteran, who related the incredible damage done to the morale of our troops serving in Vietnam when this Congress debated cutting off the funds for our troops involved in that war. We should not, in my judgment, place our troops in that position.

Mr. President, as I stated earlier, our interests in the region are not so great

that they warrant placing United States ground troops under the extraordinary risk they would face in Bosnia. Therefore, I wholeheartedly support the Hutchison-Inhofe-Craig-Nickles resolution opposing the deployment of U.S. ground troops. This Sense of the Senate Resolution expresses, on the record, our disagreement with the President's decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unfortunately the President is, in fact, deploying U.S. ground troops. Mr. President, this deployment is a fait accompli, initiated unilaterally by the President over the strongest and repeated objections of both Houses of Congress, and one which the President will continue no matter how strongly we protest. Thus, even though many of us oppose this deployment, I believe we have an opportunity, and an obligation, to clearly define the limits under which the President can carry out this imprudent deployment.

It is in this light that I have decided to support the Dole-McCain resolution. I want to thank the sponsors for incorporating language that I had recommended making clear that the Congress is simply acquiescing to the fact that this deployment is a fait accompli. With this language, the resolution clearly states our misgivings, and I quote: "Notwithstanding reservations expressed about President Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . The President may only fulfill his commitment [and I stress this is the President's commitment] to deploy United States Armed Forces. . . subject to the conditions" of this resolution.

Mr. President, I can't speak for others, but my vote for this resolution in no way constitutes an endorsement, authorization, or approval of the President's decision to send United States ground troops into Bosnia. In fact, the language I submitted distinctly helps separate this resolution from any endorsement of the President's actions by citing our reservations and placing the origin of this deployment clearly with the President.

As I just quoted, this resolution further states that, in light of the President's decision to deploy U.S. troops, he may quote, "only fulfill his commitment," unquote if he meets the conditions established to safeguard our troops and further the success of the mission. Mr. President, I believe that point needs to be repeated. This is the President's decision, a commitment the President made over our repeated objections. Therefore, under the Dole-McCain resolution, he may only, and I stress only, fulfill quote "his" unquote commitment, if meets the following conditions.

First, the resolution recognizes the extreme danger in which U.S. troops will be placed, and establishes rational conditions for their safe withdrawal and limited military employment. The Dole-McCain resolution establishes

clear and unequivocal language that requires the President to take all possible measures to protect our forces, and to periodically report to Congress the success of those specific measures.

It also builds upon the recognition that the Muslim-Croatian Federation must be further armed, trained and strengthened if a credible and stable military balance is to be established in the region. We cannot simply accept the President's assurances that he will find some way to make this happen. If the United States forces withdraw only to see an out-gunned Bosnian-Croatian Federation quickly overrun by a patient aggressor, our troops' sacrifice will be for naught. We have the power to give meaning to their sacrifice, and this resolution does just that.

Last, the Dole-McCain resolution will strictly limit the operations of our forces to legitimately military tasks. We have repeatedly seen the inefficacy of using U.S. military forces for nation-building exercises. The General Framework Agreement is, in my opinion, fraught with pitfalls that will draw the Implementation Force fully into the tasks more clearly the purview of the civilian High Representative's authority. This body has the opportunity to protect our troops from being needlessly employed in such dangerous non-military tasks, and this resolution does so.

This is, in my opinion, far from a perfect response to the situation the President has presented this Congress. I believe the President has acted hastily, and that his policy places our troops in the unnecessarily dangerous role of vulnerable peace implementors. However, when presented with the reality that our troops will go to Bosnia, regardless of our actions, I believe we must act where we can to constrain the imprudent strategy of the administration. The Dole-McCain resolution does not approve, endorse or authorize the President's policy. However, it clearly constrains the conduct of this operation so as to better protect our troops in Bosnia, and to better ensure mission's ultimate success.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JEFFORDS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the Dole-McCain resolution.

As each of us decides whether or not to support U.S. involvement in this military operation, we must consider that we are sending young soldiers overseas and that their lives are possibly on the line.

As I evaluated our involvement in this effort, I reflected on my own situa-

tion during World War II. When I enlisted in the Army, my father was terminally ill and my mother was about to become a widow. I recall the letters that I wrote from Europe to my mother, who, like the parents of those soldiers being sent to Bosnia, prayed every day for my safe return. Those were not easy times. But I also recall the deep pride that I felt and the moral good that ultimately came from ending Hitler's fascist conquests.

Mr. President, like many Americans, I have been troubled by the prospective costs in human lives of the war in Bosnia. With America's diplomatic support, the warring parties have negotiated a truce and are prepared to sign a peace agreement and are requesting the assistance of America's military to help monitor and enforce it.

I do not agree with those who argue that our country has no national interest in helping to enforce a peace agreement. We must, if we possibly can, prevent the further spread of this tragic conflict, in part, because further conflict threatens the stability of, perhaps, the whole of Europe. If the war spreads, America runs the risk of being enveloped in a much larger conflict. By committing a small number of soldiers now, we may reduce the likelihood that more American troops could be required in Europe later on.

As the architect of the peace agreement, and as the leader of NATO, only the United States can lead this effort and put an end to this senseless bloodshed that has taken 250,000 lives, torn that country apart, and displaced 2 million refugees.

Mr. President, sending American troops seems to be the best option available to the United States to help guarantee peace in Europe. While the Dayton peace agreement is far from perfect, it is the only peace agreement that the parties in the conflict have agreed to implement. If successfully implemented and coupled with the arming and training of the Bosnian Moslems before IFOR departs, the agreement holds a promise, in the long run, of ending the violence that has terrorized the people of Bosnia. The alternative is unacceptable—to let the war resume. If the international community does not step in now, it is obvious that more lives will be lost and more refugees will be displaced, and there will be more bloodshed and carnage, and America's credibility as an international leader is also on the line. Our leadership brought the parties to the negotiating table, and our leadership was requested by those parties to help enforce the agreement.

I understand the view that the Congress should have been consulted more closely before the decision to send troops was made. But forcing America to back away from the President's commitment is not the solution. To do so would undermine the morale of our fighting force. Even more, it would diminish our credibility in the international community and send a mes-

sage to aggressors worldwide that they have nothing to fear from America.

I know that U.S. participation in this endeavor is not risk-free. Passions run high in an area where weapons are plentiful. Millions of landmines lay just below the Earth's surface, and weather conditions are likely to be unfriendly. I am persuaded, however, that General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have assiduously worked to minimize the risks, and they believe that the risk level has been reduced to its barest minimum level, and that the mission has clear objectives, a sufficiently potent force, an effective command and control structure under American leadership, no-nonsense rules of engagement, a clear time limit, and the cooperation of the various factions.

American troops will have well-defined rules of engagement. They will, as President Clinton said, fight fire with fire, and then some. Our troops will have a clearly defined military mission and will not participate in nation-building tasks. Once again, they will be under American command.

Our soldiers will have the firepower, training, explicit instructions, and authorization necessary to defend themselves and others. They have been trained to deal with every major threat, including landmines, civil disorder, and snipers. I have been assured by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that our troops have the appropriate level of training and are prepared and ready for this peace enforcement mission.

Mr. President, though it is always painful to send American soldiers overseas, I believe the goals of this limited deployment are appropriate. While it is our solemn responsibility to make wise decisions about sending American troops abroad, I have been assured by our military leaders that the members of our All-Volunteer force are prepared for this mission.

America can make a difference in securing the peace in Bosnia. We ought to remain engaged in that endeavor. I hope, Mr. President, that my colleagues will support the Dole-McCain resolution and our troops. I wish them well on this peace mission.

Mr. President, I support America's troops as they head off to Bosnia to help enforce and implement the peace agreement.

As each of us decides about whether or not to support U.S. involvement in this military operation, we need to be mindful of the fact that we are sending young soldiers overseas and that their lives are possibly on the line.

As I evaluated America's involvement in the international effort to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, I have reflected on my own situation during the Second World War. When I enlisted in the Army, my father was terminally ill, and my mother was about to become a widow.

While she tended to my father's minute-to-minute needs and also to see that my 12-year-old sister met her

school and personal commitments, I was in uniform.

As I considered America's involvement in this military operation in Bosnia, I recalled the letters I wrote from Europe to my mother in New Jersey, who like the parents of those soldiers being sent to Bosnia, prayed every day for my safe return.

I recalled the deep pride I felt serving my country, and have reflected on the values American soldiers fought for during that conflict and the moral good that came from bringing an end to Hitler's fascist conquests.

Like many Americans, I have been deeply troubled by the cost—in injury and human life—of the war that raged on in Bosnia for the last 3½ years. And I have been haunted by all-too-familiar photographs from the war in the Balkans.

Terrified children left orphaned after slaughter. Moslem women raped by their Bosnian Serb captors. Innocents lying dead in the street. U.N. soldiers chained to poles as human shields. Reports of mass executions and graves.

To their credit, the warring parties have agreed to end these atrocities and open a new chapter in their history.

With America's diplomatic support, they have negotiated a peace agreement which holds the promise of ending the brutality that has inflicted so much pain on their people for so many years. Now that a peace agreement has been negotiated, the parties to the conflict are requesting the assistance of America's military to help monitor and enforce it.

There are many reasons why I believe the Congress should support U.S. involvement in a NATO-led international peace enforcement operation.

I do not agree, Mr. President, with those who argue that the United States has no national interest in intervening to enforce a peace agreement to end this conflict.

The United States does have a national interest in supporting a peaceful end to the bloody conflict in Europe. We must prevent the further spread of this tragic conflict, not only because of its impact on the people of Bosnia, but because further conflict threatens the stability of Europe.

If the war spreads and more countries are drawn into the conflict, America runs the risk of being enveloped in a much larger conflict. By committing 20,000 American soldiers to this international peace enforcement operation now, we may reduce the likelihood that more American troops could be required in Europe later.

While I also understand the view of those who believe Bosnia is a European problem that the Europeans should enforce and monitor the peace agreement on their own, the reality is that without the leadership and direct participation of the United States in this international effort, the peace agreement would go nowhere. The Europeans, through NATO, will be engaged as our partner in this peace enforcement mission.

But as the architect of the peace agreement and as the leader of NATO, only the United States can lead the effort to enforce the peace agreement and put an end to the senseless bloodshed and loss of innocent lives. Only our Nation can lead the way in enforcing the peace agreement which will stop the carnage that has taken 250,000 lives, torn the country apart, and displaced 2 million refugees.

Sending American troops to help enforce and monitor this peace agreement is the best option available to the United States to help guarantee peace in Europe. While the Dayton peace agreement is far from perfect, it is the only peace agreement that the parties to the conflict have agreed to implement.

It will not reunite Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it will, if given a chance to succeed, restore peace, calm, and civility to the region. It will not bring back the lives of those senselessly slaughtered by perpetrators of war crimes, but it will guard future atrocities and ensure that such perpetrators are prohibited from serving in government.

If successfully implemented and coupled with the arming and training of the Bosnian Moslems before IFOR departs, it holds the promise, in the long run, of ending the bloodshed and violence that have terrorized the people of Bosnia for so long.

Mr. President, the alternative to sending U.S. troops to help implement and enforce this peace agreement, is to let the war resume. If the international community does not step in now to enforce this peace agreement, more lives will be lost.

More refugees will be displaced. More children will be orphaned. There will be more bloodshed and carnage. There will be a greater likelihood that the United States will need to intervene at a later time.

America's credibility as an international leader is also on the line. Our leadership brought the parties to the negotiating table, and our leadership was requested by those parties to help enforce and monitor the peace agreement.

I understand the view of many that the Congress should have been more closely consulted before the decision to send troops was made. But I do not believe that forcing America to back away from the President's commitment is the solution in this case. To do so would invite attacks on our troops by those opponents of peace who hope to force the international community out of the Balkans. It would undermine the morale of our troops.

Even more, it would diminish our credibility in the International community. It would send a message to aggressors worldwide that they have little to fear from America. It could be perceived as a green light for the North Koreans to march south. It could be perceived as a green light for Sadaam Hussein to do the same.

To be sure, it would also undermine America's role as NATO's leader.

I know, Mr. President, that U.S. participation in this mission is not risk free.

The parties to the conflict have been fighting for years, and passions run high in an area where weapons are plentiful. Millions of landmines lay just below the Earth's surface, and adverse weather conditions will, no doubt, create difficulties for our soldiers.

But I do not believe these difficulties are insurmountable. Nor do I believe they should keep America from joining the international community in enforcing a peace agreement aimed at stopping the worst atrocities on European soil since the Second World War.

I am persuaded that General Shalikhshvili and Secretary Perry have assiduously worked to minimize those risks. They believe the risk level has been minimized and that the mission has clear objectives, a sufficiently potent force, an effective command and control structure under American leadership, no-nonsense rules of engagement, a clear time limit, and the cooperation of the various factions.

American troops participating in this international peace enforcement operation will have well defined rules of engagement. Unlike the lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers previously stationed in Bosnia, American soldiers will be permitted to use force—including deadly force—in cases of self-defense or to protect against a hostile act or hostile intent. They will, as President Clinton said, "fight fire with fire, and then some."

Our troops will have a clearly defined military mission. They will monitor the cease-fire line, the zones of separation, and, when needed, enforce withdrawal from the zones of separation. They will not participate in nation-building tasks.

They will be under American command.

Our soldiers will have the firepower, training, explicit instructions, and authorization necessary to defend themselves and others. They have been trained to deal with every major threat, including landmine, civil disorder, and snipers.

I have been assured by General Shalikhshvili and Secretary Perry that our troops are well trained, prepared, and ready for this peace enforcement mission.

Though it is never easy to send American soldiers overseas, I believe the goals of this limited deployment are meritorious. While it is our solemn responsibility to make wise decisions about sending American troops, I have been assured by our military leaders that the members of our all volunteer force are prepared for this mission.

America can make a difference in securing the peace in Bosnia, and we ought to remain engaged in that endeavor. I hope my colleagues will support the Dole-McCain resolution and

our troops. I wish them well on this peace mission.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I wonder if the Chair could outline the current situation in terms of time allocation so that I might speak for a few minutes if it is available.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 34 minutes remaining; the majority has 29 minutes. If there is no objection, the Senator is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. President. I know the occupant of the chair is a very thoughtful Senator and reviews each situation that comes before him very carefully. We shared a trip to Croatia a couple years ago and had the opportunity to see just on the periphery what happens when the hatred and the venom is unleashed to deal with problems, as those who are there saw fit. We were shocked to learn about the murder of neighbors by other farm neighbors, using farm implements to do the killing and the maiming, and the story about the women locked in a gymnasium after they had been raped by then-renegade rogue Serbian soldiers and made to stay in that facility so they could not dispose of those pregnancies in any way but to deliver a child not of their choice, one that the enemy, their enemy, decided would be an appropriate way of fathering another race.

It recalls for all of us a time just over 40 years ago when it was decided by another Fascist that there would be a super race put upon this Earth, and by artificial insemination, rape and coercion, women were made pregnant to carry members of that super race. It was intolerable. When we learned about it we were shocked and horrified. Now we saw similar things taking place. The world stood by—an unacceptable condition—in a world purportedly civilized, and thusly when we debate the issue here, Mr. President, about whether or not we have a national interest, we have a global interest, we have a human interest.

Yes, it is true that America cannot be the police force around the world, and the questions are raised, why did we do it in this place and why did we not do it in that place? One of the reasons is we were not welcomed by anybody. We saw what happened when our young people were sent to Somalia with an indefinite engagement in front of them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair. I see my colleague from Florida is here.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Mr. GRAHAM. I thank my colleague, Senator LAUTENBERG.

Mr. President, I recently received a letter from Catherine and Crosby Dawkins of Jacksonville, FL. The letter read in part:

We cannot see any compelling reason for risking the lives of United States servicemen in a centuries old dispute, even though we grieve for the plight of the women and children. If European countries believe the conflict will spread, they should take action.

Mr. President, like many of us, I have received hundreds, possibly thousands of communiques similar to this—deep felt concerns about the risk of American soldiers in Bosnia. These thoughtful letters deserve a response. I take this opportunity to address not only my colleagues in the Senate but also my fellow citizens of Florida who have been so generous and so thoughtful in their letters.

Mr. President, this raises an issue of the United States military troops in Bosnia, a fundamental question of what are the options of the United States in this post-cold-war era? For half a century, the United States knew with clarity and with national unity what its objectives were. Its objectives were to suppress the totalitarianism of Nazism. The goal was to restrain the imperial impulses of the Soviet Union.

Now the United States is charting a new course of action. We have essentially limited options. One of those options, Mr. President, in the post-cold-war era is to stand on the sideline, to essentially be an observer of the world, as we were for much of our Nation's history.

The second option is to be the world's defender, to be prepared to intervene in every conflict.

The third option is to carefully assess our interest and, when a situation begs our involvement, to work within our capabilities to build international coalitions to respond to the conflict. I strongly feel that that third option is the option which is most appropriate and most applicable to the situation that we face tonight in Bosnia.

In assessing the question as to whether our interests in Bosnia are sufficient to beg our involvement, I suggest that our interests do require our involvement. This is not a complete list, but I believe a compelling list of those reasons. The United States has a deep interest in human rights. One of the things that distinguishes our country from those nations which preceded it is that we believe that the purpose of government is to protect and advance the rights of individuals. We found that not only to be a guiding principle in our domestic policy but also in our foreign policy.

One of the great initial disputes in this Nation was over the question of whether the United States should become involved in the French Revolution. Many said that the United States should stand apart, that we were too

small to be effective, and too distant to be effective.

Thomas Jefferson said we meant those words in the Declaration of Independence not just to stand for Americans, or for English colonialists, but they were universal principles of human rights, and that we had not only been given by God certain inalienable rights but also by God, responsibilities to defend those rights wherever they were in jeopardy.

That principle of America's special role in the world that from the very beginning of our Nation has so shaped our culture, is at risk tonight.

We also have some more immediate interests. We have an interest in preserving the international coalition which we know as NATO, a coalition which has served us well in terms of deterring the Soviet Union and which, in all likelihood, will serve us well in the unknown, uncharted future into which we move in the post-cold-war era. If we were to retreat from our commitments to NATO on this, the eve of the signing of the peace agreements in Paris, I think that institution would be forever shattered.

We also have the opportunity by acting tonight to avoid the potential of this horrendous strife, which has taken a quarter of a million lives, rendered 3 million people as refugees, from spreading—spreading first throughout the former Yugoslavia and then throughout the Balkans and then, as we have seen twice in this century, throughout Europe.

We have a deep stake in avoiding having to do what this country has done twice in this century, and that is send American men and women, not as peacekeepers, but as combatants in a war in Europe.

Finally, I think we have a strong interest in demonstrating to the people of the world that our concern for human rights is not limited to people who look like us, attend the same religious institutions as we do, have our same cultural background. There is today an emerging fundamentalism within the Islamic religion. That fundamentalism is receiving support and reassurance from what they see Western Europeans have done, including the United States of America, in Bosnia today.

I believe it is important that we, by our actions now, indicate that we are prepared to stand for the cause of human rights, and protect them wherever our interests indicate that it is appropriate to do so; that we, by so doing, will send a signal that we are prepared to support the responsible elements of the Islamic religion and Islamic nations.

Mr. President, I conclude by citing what we heard just a few hours ago in the House Chamber, the statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres.

Mr. President, less than 24 hours ago, Shimon Peres addressed the Congress and the American people on the need

for American leadership in the 21st century. He said:

Even in this very day, as Bosnia reels in agony, you offered a compass and a lamp to a confused situation like in the Middle East. Nobody else was able or was ready to do it. . .

America, in my judgment, cannot escape what history has laid on your shoulders. . . You cannot escape that which America alone can do. America alone can keep the world free and assist nations to assume the responsibility for their own fate.

Mr. President, that is what is at stake in the decision that we will make this evening.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, it is very difficult to make an important statement with a limited time, but I want to say that I support the President's peacemaking initiative and the Dayton accord and I support the NATO operation in Bosnia. I support the President because I believe that it is our patriotic duty and the right thing to do. I believe that we have an obligation to nurture the peace and to convince warring nations, whenever possible, that the United States will make an effort to help them resolve their conflicts.

This decision was not made easily.

I have, for a long time now, differed with the President on Bosnia policy. Specifically, I have favored the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Moslems—a policy change that would have assisted the Moslems in defending themselves.

My decision was made only after meeting with the President and his military advisers, carefully considering their views, and deliberating the pros and cons of a U.S. peacekeeping role.

It has been complicated by the fact that the State of Illinois has the largest number of reservists being called up to support our troop deployment to Bosnia. Moreover, I have an 18-year-old son whom I would not want to see put in harm's way should the situation in Bosnia take an untoward turn.

Like most Americans, I am concerned about the risks involved in sending United States ground troops to Bosnia. I want to be sure that the Administration has thought through and addressed all the important questions before United States forces are committed to Bosnia. These questions include the rules of engagement, command structure, the length of our commitment, our exit strategy, and our contingency plans should the peace plan start to unravel, or the warring factions fail to make good on their promises.

But the President has satisfactorily answered each of those concerns, and he has made a strong case on why Congress and the American people should support his decision to send United States peacekeeping forces to Bosnia.

First, the NATO mission is clearly defined, limited, and achievable. It is to implement the military aspects of the peace accord to monitor the cease-

fire, to control the airspace, and to patrol the exclusionary zone separating the former combatants. It does not involve "nation building" or acting as a police force. Moreover, it is not the kind of vague undefined "presence" that led to the United States tragedy in Lebanon. Most important, there is no danger of the kind of "mission creep" that occurred in Somalia.

Second, U.S. troops will not be passive, lightly armed peacekeepers as the U.N. forces have been. They will be heavily armed and have the tanks, the artillery, and the air power necessary to respond forcefully to any threat or challenge.

Third, the rules of engagement are clear, aggressive and unambiguous. They are designed to maximize the safety of our troops. Specifically, U.S. forces will have the authority to meet any threat or violation of the peace agreement with "immediate and decisive force."

Fourth, our commitment is not open-ended. It is planned that United States forces will be deployed in Bosnia for about a year. Military experts suggest it may be less than that.

Fifth, NATO peacekeepers will be under the command of Adm. Leighton W. Smith, Jr., and U.S. soldiers will only take orders from American commanders.

Finally, I have been informed that an effective exit strategy and a carefully constructed contingency plan have been developed, should the peace accord begin to unravel.

No one is underestimating, nor have we any illusions about the difficulties, dangers, and risks of this peacekeeping operation. Sending 20,000 of America's finest young men and women to Bosnia to implement the military provisions of the general framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a risky proposition. The conflict there has been long-standing and brutal. The weather is inhospitable and the terrain is treacherous. There are more than 6 million land mines scattered throughout the country. Renegade bands have openly stated their opposition to provisions of the Dayton accord with which they disagree. Finally, all previous cease-fire agreements have ended in failure. Viewed separately, each of these factors imperils the safety of our soldiers; viewed as a whole, the possibility of American casualties is unfortunately very real.

However, we also have to consider the consequences of a failure of United States leadership in Bosnia. If we retreat now on the commitment the President has made, the Dayton agreement would collapse. The war would likely reignite. The slaughter of innocents would begin anew.

Even if there were no Dayton agreement to go back on, however, failure to act would have the most serious kinds of consequences for the United States. A failure by the United States to lead now could well represent a turning point for the entire NATO alliance, and

NATO is the cornerstone of United States national security policy abroad. The United States is NATO's leader. If we fail to lead on an issue of such great importance to NATO, we must expect that kind of failure to have serious consequences for the United States, both in Europe and elsewhere around the world.

Moreover, a failure to act in Bosnia could well lead to broader conflict, one that could have far greater consequences for the United States down the road. If the current conflict is not at least contained, the losing side may well seek allies to redress its defeats on the battlefield. As more parties are drawn in, the conflict becomes ever more larger and ever more serious.

We have already seen that in Bosnia. We have already seen this dynamic at work, the conflict became much larger in the last year, with more parties, and more forces involved, than were engaged 4 years ago. Simply letting the parties fight it out, and watching the conflict continue to grow, is therefore not an acceptable option.

For all its weakness and risks—and the risks are substantial—the Dayton peace agreement still represents our best chance for a durable, lasting peace. It preserves Bosnia within its present borders, provides for free elections, and gives refugees a right to return to their homes.

The Dayton accord calls on NATO to implement the provisions of the agreement. As the unquestioned leader of NATO, U.S. participation in the proposed NATO peacekeeping operation is essential. Without a strong, visible American participation, the hard won negotiated peace in Dayton will unravel and be lost.

For these reasons I did not support H.R. 2206 and will not support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolutions. The Dole-McCain resolution at least acknowledges the leadership role of the United States in NATO and the necessity of our participation in the NATO peacekeeping operation. It also acknowledges many of the essential provisions of the Dayton accord. Finally, the Dole-McCain resolution unequivocally supports our men and women in the military. For these reasons, I will vote in favor of the Dole-McCain resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. President, problems in Europe have twice led to world wars this century. Problems in Europe caused the United States to fundamentally change its foreign policy posture. Since the end of World War II, the United States has made a conscious decision to stay politically, economically, and strategically engaged in Europe. During the cold war we spent trillions of dollars and based hundreds of thousands of American troops in Europe to protect these interests. Clearly the peace, security, stability, freedom, and prosperity of Europe are still vital national interests for the United States, and the vehicle for achieving those interests is NATO.

There is no more difficult—or unpopular—decision an American President can make than to put U.S. armed forces in harm's way. The President has exercised his constitutional prerogative as Commander in Chief, and American troops are being deployed to safeguard vital national interests. Our troops are well-trained for the challenges that await them, and they are prepared to do their duty. They are cognizant of the risks of their chosen profession and are more than willing to make the necessary sacrifices to bring peace and freedom to a war-torn land. All they ask is to know the parameters of their mission in advance, which the President has done, and that Congress and the American people stand behind them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, none of us in the U.S. Senate, as is clear from the quality of this debate, takes lightly the responsibility of sending American troops into the potential of harm's way. But as each of us decides whether or not to support the President's decision to deploy American troops in Bosnia, I think we need to keep two essential points in mind.

The first is—and it must be reiterated again and again and again—the President is not sending American troops, nor are we ratifying the sending of American troops to Bosnia for the purpose of fighting a war. On the face of it, that may seem like an obvious point. But as I talk to citizens in my home State and listen to people across the country, many Americans do not yet understand what the mission is about or how it may be performed.

We are not sending—nor do I intend to send or want to send—American forces to Bosnia to fight a war. We are not sending American forces to Bosnia to crush enemy forces the way we did in World War II. We are not sending American soldiers to Bosnia to roll back communism the way we tried to in Vietnam, nor are we sending them there to repeal aggression as we did in the Persian Gulf.

The President is asking us to approve sending American troops to Bosnia at the request of parties to a peace agreement, at the request of parties to a conflict who are asking us and other nations to join together to help them to implement a peace that they have stated they want.

To be sure, war has raged in Bosnia for 4 years, but it is not raging now. A cease-fire has been in place since October, and the parties to the conflict have exhausted themselves. And, for the first time in 4 years, they have opted for peace over war.

This Senator contemplates only keeping troops in Bosnia for so long as the parties continue to opt for peace over war. It is their challenge now, not ours, to ensure that all of the elements under their control, under the control of each of them individually, are prepared to accept the peace.

Recent events, such as the destruction by Bosnia and Croat troops of towns to be turned over to the Bosnian Serbs and the stated opposition of Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo to the peace accords, suggest that even after 4 years of fighting it will indeed take some time to convince those on the ground that this peace agreement is in their interest and that the risks for doing that are real. But that is precisely why this NATO force is needed and is so critical. And it is precisely why we must participate in that force, only if we are to try to give them the chance to make the peace they say they want. In no way should we contemplate making that peace ourselves.

The second critical point we need to keep in mind, Mr. President, is, as I listen to the debate, some Members assert that there is no vital national interest in Bosnia, and I have heard throughout this debate sort of a standard of vital strategic interest, vital national interest. Mr. President, that is the wrong test to apply to Bosnia.

Our vital national interests are our territorial integrity, our political system and ideology, our economic security, and our way of life. We have gone to war four times in this century with the belief that we were protecting them. But let us say clearly up front, in this conflict, in this effort, in this mission, they are not at stake. That is not what is at issue here, and no one pretends that is why we should be involved. That is not what we are doing. We are not going to war to protect a vital national security interest. We are not even sending troops for a vital national security interest.

Whether vital national security interests are at stake is the right question to ask, Mr. President, if you are deciding whether or not to send troops to war, it is not the right question to ask when you are being asked to participate in a multilateral, internationally sanctioned effort to help keep a peace which parties have said they want. And we should remember that we are not being asked to do this alone. We are doing this in conjunction with perhaps 30 other countries.

In many ways, Mr. President, Bosnia is the prototype of the kind of conflict the international community will face in the years ahead as forces, once held in check by superpower politics, are unleashed and, with them, the potential for conflicts all across the globe.

I think it is vital for us to understand that the test is really whether or not there are interests, whether or not there are important interests, that outweigh the risks of our participation.

Mr. President, I have heard colleagues talk about the issue of credibility. Some are going to suggest that the only reason they are prepared to vote to send these troops is to uphold the credibility of the country or the credibility of the President.

Let me say, Mr. President, with searing memories of Vietnam, that is not a reason to send our young military peo-

ple into harm's way. I remember the phrase, "I will not be the first President to lose a war," and we lost tens of thousands of young people over the issue of pride, over the issue of unwillingness to do anything except to sustain somebody's credibility as people saw it. Credibility has to have an underlying notion. It is not an abstract concept which merits the taking of the life of a young American or the giving of a life of a young American. Credibility has to be based on some underlying interest which puts your credibility at stake.

I believe, Mr. President, that that vote—the credibility—is a hedge against a willingness to commit to this President's vision of what credibility might be at stake here.

I believe there are legitimate interests for taking the risk of trying to uphold the peace—not to fight a war, but to try to uphold a peace.

First, how could we as a nation avoid the moral interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II? Whoever thought that after World War II Europe would again be the site of human beings being raped as a policy of war, tortured, murdered, separated from families, or thrown out of their homes simply because of ethnic background?

Who will forget quickly the stories recently that drove us to feel compelled to simply leave them to fight for themselves—headlines such as "Bosnia's Orphans of Rape; Innocent Legacy of Hatred," "Mass Graves Probed in Northwest Bosnia," "Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was Killed: Thousands Massacred on Bosnia Trek in July," "Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter"?

Who can forget the imperative of the words that we memorialize in Washington and elsewhere in this country, "Never again"?

That is an interest, Mr. President.

Twice in this century Europe was engulfed by war, and the United States fought to save it. We have already invested our blood in the stability and in the prospect of democracy and the future of Europe.

That is an interest, Mr. President.

The conflict in Bosnia has the potential for spillover—and could become a wider war—to areas where ethnic tensions are high: Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey.

That is an interest, Mr. President.

So we have an interest in ensuring that those things do not happen. We also have an interest in the risks to American forces and to NATO, and the cost of ensuring a peace in Bosnia now will inevitably be less than if we would have to respond to a wider conflict in the future.

Finally, we do have an important interest in demonstrating leadership on an international community level that we have the capacity and the will to lead in the post-cold war world.

For far too long American policy toward Bosnia was vague, vacillating and

ineffective. Now, to the credit of this administration, to our country, we have changed that. And now we are trying to join together with our European allies in an effort to provide the strong response that stopped the Bosnian Serb attacks, that did try to provide a humanitarian corridor, that upheld the notion of international law, and that was willing to try to enforce the concept of safe areas.

Having led the effort—an extraordinary effort by the President, Secretary Christopher, and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke—having led that effort, Mr. President, how do we not have an interest that goes beyond mere credibility in trying now to implement the settlement which we ourselves have instigated and helped put together?

As President Clinton has said, if we do not participate in this operation, there will be no NATO force and the war in Bosnia will begin again. Our moral and political interests in Bosnia and our sense of responsibility demand that we not let that happen—and that we not be ultimately dragged in.

So Mr. President, it is because credibility is based on real interests that I support the President's decision to send our forces to Bosnia but I believe just as firmly the President owes it to the American people and Congress to ensure that the operation is limited in terms of the mission, limited in terms of the goals we set for success, and limited in duration.

As defined by the Dayton peace agreement, the mission of our troops and others participating in IFOR, the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force, is to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement—that is, enforcing the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces to agreed lines, establishing a zone of separation between them, and returning troops and weapons to cantonments. Recognizing that they may need some help in making the transition from war to peace, the parties asked for a strong, NATO-led force. That is what they are getting and that is what they agreed to in the Dayton peace agreement.

Our troops will take their orders only from the American general who commands NATO and they will have the authority to meet any threat to their safety or any violation of the peace agreement with immediate, decisive force.

When American peacekeepers in Somalia embarked upon what turned out to be an ill-fated mission to apprehend warlord Mohammed Aideed, they lacked the equipment and other elements necessary to ensure success.

From what our military officials have told us, this scenario will not be repeated in Bosnia. Our forces are going in well-trained, well-equipped, heavily armed, and with robust rules of engagement.

I still remain concerned about the potential for so-called mission creep.

Under the terms of the peace agreement, I-For has the authority to “help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections;” to “assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;” “to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;” to “observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person;” and to “monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.”

True, these are authorities not obligations as Secretary Christopher has pointed out. True, the mission is defined by the NATO plan and these elements are not in the NATO plan, as Secretary Perry told the Foreign Relations Committee.

Nevertheless, these authorities create the potential for expansion of the mission beyond the military tasks cited by administration officials and for increased risk to our troops and those of other nations participating in the operation.

They also create an expectation on the part of the local populations and civilian organizations on the ground that I-For will protect and assist them.

If refugees are being attacked, can our troops really stand by and watch? Would we want them to? If UNHCR ask I-For to help resettle refugees in a given area, will I-For feel compelled to assist? If Catholic Relief Services asks French troops in Sarajevo to protect a convoy of humanitarian aid going into the city, are they bound to assist?

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] is responsible for organizing elections in Bosnia in the next year. What expectations does OSCE, or the parties for that matter, have about IFOR's role in this process?

I remain concerned that IFOR's role in assisting the civilian operations that are to occur in the next year is still somewhat ambiguous. I understand that NATO military planners wanted IFOR to have these authorities to avoid the situation U.N. peacekeepers often found themselves in in Bosnia—that is, standing by and watching as terrible atrocities were committed against innocent civilians.

I agree that our soldiers must act if civilians are under attack or directly threatened. However, the operative word in responding to any of these situations must be “limited.”

IFOR commanders from General Joulwan on down must understand that the American people and Congress will not support a broadened definition of the mission that has American forces serving as the constant protectors of civilian populations. That is not our job; the parties to the agreement must do this by fulfilling the commitments made in the agreement.

Much concern has been expressed in this debate about the exit strategy for American troops. Any exit strategy must be composed of more than a date; it must include criteria to determine whether or not the mission has been successful. I believe that that criteria must be limited solely to the military tasks that IFOR has set out to accomplish.

The civilian tasks that must be undertaken in the next year such as refugee repatriation and resettlement, elections, establishing governmental structures, monitoring human rights, apprehending alleged war criminals, are daunting. They must not become the criteria by which we determine success of the IFOR mission.

The President has stated that the mission which we are asking our troops to undertake will be limited to a year. Undoubtedly during this year, there will be violations of the Dayton agreement.

However, if there is a pattern of violations which indicates that the parties are not truly committed to this agreement, then American forces should be withdrawn. Our soldiers are there to keep the peace, not to fight a war or to prevent a war if the parties want to return once again to being combatants. If it becomes clear as the end of the year approaches, that the duration of the IFOR mission needs to be extended because success is within reach but not yet achieved, the burden of that mission must be shifted away from the United States and more to our European allies.

We must make it clear that we do not intend to stay in Bosnia indefinitely. Bosnia is first and foremost a European problem. If the peace implementation operation must be extended beyond a year, the countries of Europe must be prepared to share more of the responsibility and to replace our forces with theirs as we transition out. In other words, our troops must be out within the limited timeframe the President has set out.

The peace agreement provides for a build-down of the parties' military forces with the goal of achieving military parity by the end of the year, when IFOR is to withdraw. Administration officials have indicated that build-down may not be enough to ensure stability and that the United States will ensure that the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are equipped and trained.

While I agree that military imbalance at the end of a year could be a serious threat to peace, I am concerned about the risk that this process could pose for American forces on the ground. Even though American participants in I-For will not be arming or training Federation forces, they could be targets for Bosnian Serbs who object to the lack of neutrality on the part of the United States.

Beyond the risk factor, it is not at all clear to me, at least, when and

where build down ends and build up begins and who is going to do the building up.

Notwithstanding these concerns, I believe our overall interests in Bosnia warrant the sending of American troops to help keep the peace. Certainly there are risks associated with this operation, but every effort has been made to minimize those risks by ensuring that our forces are well-trained and well-equipped, and that the rules of engagement are robust in order that they may defend themselves against any life-threatening situation.

I recognize that many Americans and indeed some in this body do not believe that we should participate in this mission. As a Vietnam veteran, I know the pain and the difficulty of fighting without the political support of the American people and their representatives.

We are not sending our soldiers to Bosnia to fight a war, but we are asking them to undertake a military mission in the name of peace that is not without risk. No matter what concerns we may have about this endeavor, we owe them our full support. We should demonstrate that support by endorsing the President's decision to send them to Bosnia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I believe we must support the President, but let me say that with caution. This must be limited, limited, limited. It must have a clear strategy that does exit us at the end of the year, and we must define success in the context not of the civilian political success but only in the military separation of the forces and the giving of them the opportunity to make a peace.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, what is the remaining order under the unanimous-consent agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has up to 26 minutes.

Mr. MCCAIN. Followed by?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority now has 7 minutes remaining.

Mr. MCCAIN. And then the majority leader will speak after that. Is that the unanimous-consent agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no agreement to that effect, but that is the assumption.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, like all other Senators who have spoken today, I wish this debate were not necessary. I agree with those Senators who have said that they would not have undertaken the commitment made by the President of the United States to deploy American ground forces to Bosnia to implement the tenuous peace that now exists there. But that is no longer the central question of our deliberations this evening. The President did so commit and our obligation now goes beyond expressing our disagreement with that decision.

Many of us did disagree, as is abundantly evident by the number of Senators who support the resolution offered by Senators HUTCHISON, INHOFE, NICKLES, and others, yet we all recognize that the President has the authority to make that decision.

The troops are going to Bosnia, and any prospect that Congress could prevent that deployment disappeared in the overwhelming vote in opposition to prohibiting funding for the deployment, the only constitutional means we have to reverse the President's decision.

Our troops are going to Bosnia. Congress should do everything in our power to ensure that our mission is truly clear, limited, and achievable; that it has the greatest for success with the least risk to the lives of our young men and women. That is our responsibility, as much as the President's.

The resolution that the majority leader and I have offered does not ask Senators to support the decision to deploy. It asks that you support the deployment after the decision had been made. It asks you further to condition your support on some important commitments by the President which I will discuss in a moment.

I intend to give that support, and I commend the majority leader for exercising extraordinary leadership in trying to influence both the nature and security of our mission Bosnia as well as the outcome of the peace process there, to which we have made such a profound commitment. I believe Senator DOLE has significantly helped to improve both the security of our forces and the likelihood that the cause they have been asked to serve—peace in Bosnia—will endure beyond the year our forces will be stationed in that troubled country.

He has accomplished these important objectives by securing assurances from the administration that our soldiers will only be expected to perform those tasks for which they are trained, and will not be ill-used in nation-building exercises. Moreover, he has secured the strong commitment from the President that the United States will lead efforts to establish a stable, military balance in Bosnia which is the only undertaking that can be realistically expected to secure a lasting cease-fire there. Those commitments were well worth our efforts, and, again, I am grateful to the distinguished majority leader for his honorable and effective statesmanship in this effort.

Mr. President, what we should all strive to avoid is giving anyone—anyone—in Bosnia the idea that the American people and their elected representatives are so opposed to this deployment that the least provocation—violent provocation—will force the President to withdraw our forces. I do not want a single terrorist, a single Majahidin or Bosnian Serb sniper to think that by killing an American, they can incite a political uproar in

America that will compel the President to bring our troops home.

That is my first reason for supporting this deployment. I want our enemies to know that America—not just the American force in Bosnia—but all Americans are in deadly earnest about this deployment. Attacks on the safety of those troops should, and I believe will, be met with a disproportionate response. That response will not include abandoning the mission. We must begin now to impress upon all parties in Bosnia that any assault on the security of our soldiers would amount to nothing more than an act of folly on the part of the assailant.

Mr. President, opponents of the President's decision often claim that there is no vital United States security interest in Bosnia that would justify the risk of American lives to defend. I have long agreed that there was no such interest. But there is now. There are the lives of 20,000 Americans to defend. And anyone who thinks they can achieve their own political ends by threatening our troops should be forcefully disabused of that notion, and should not be encouraged in their action by the misperception that the American people and the U.S. Congress are not united in steadfast support of our troops, their safety, and the mission they are now obligated to undertake.

There are other important American interests involved in this deployment. All the parties to the Dayton agreement have stated unequivocally that should the United States renege on its commitment, the peace will collapse and hostilities will resume. We will then watch Bosnians suffer again the mass murder and atrocities that have repulsed all people of decency and compassion.

Moreover, Mr. President, abjuring our commitment now would do considerable damage to NATO, the most successful defensive alliance in history. Many Americans may wonder why we need to be concerned about NATO in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. But, Mr. President, the world still holds many dangers for our security, and our enemies are far less predictable than they once were. We will need our friends in the future, as much as they need us now.

Lastly, Mr. President, I want to talk about the relationship between the Nation's credibility and the credibility of its chief executive. In an earlier statement on this question, I asked my Republican colleagues to place as high a premium on this President's credibility abroad, as they would place on a Republican President's.

I asked this because the reliability of the President's word is of enormous strategic value to the American people. The President's voice is the voice of America. When the world loses faith in the commitments of our President, all Americans are less safe—and somewhere down the line American vital interests and American lives will be lost.

The credibility and authority of the President of the United States, and the security of American soldiers, compel our support of their deployment. They are vital interests worth defending whatever our current political differences may be with the President.

Again, by supporting the deployment, I do not confer my approval of the decision to deploy. As I have already stated, I would not have committed American ground forces to this mission, had that decision been up to me. But the decision has been made, by the only American elected to make such decisions—the President of the United States. And I have construed my responsibility in these circumstances as requiring my support for efforts to maximize the prospects for success of the mission and minimize its obvious risks.

My support, and the support I urge my colleagues to give this deployment by voting for the resolution before us, has been characterized by the media as grudging. Fair enough. But let me be clear, I do not want to feed the cynicism of the public—or any members of our free press who might succumb to cynicism from time to time—should they conclude that by our resolution, and our votes preceding this one, that we are trying to avoid speaking clearly in support or opposition, and evade any responsibility for our own actions.

I know what I am doing. I know that by supporting this deployment, if not the decision, I must share in the blame if it ends disastrously. I will accept that responsibility—not happily, but honestly, just as Senators who supported the prohibition on funding for the deployment would have had to accept the blame for the problems that would have occurred if they had been successful in preventing the deployment.

The President will be accountable to the families of any American soldier who dies in service to his country in Bosnia. He will have to answer for their loss. But so will I. I fully accept that in my support of the deployment, and my efforts to influence its conduct and its termination, I incur this obligation.

Beyond offering expressions of sorrow and regret, we will have to tell those families that they bear their terrible loss for the sake of the country. Nothing—absolutely nothing—is harder than that. Just contemplating such a responsibility makes me heartsick.

This may be the hardest vote I have cast as a Member of Congress. It may be the hardest vote I will ever cast. To send young men and women into such evident danger is an awful responsibility. I don't envy the President. Nor do I envy the Senate.

I was once on the other end of the relationship between the military and their civilian commanders. I served with brave men who were sent by our leaders into a calamity—a war we would not win. We were ill used by our political leaders then. We were ill used

by many of our senior commanders. I saw good men lose their lives, lives that were just squandered for a lost cause that the dying believed in, but that many of the living did not. Their cause was honor, their own and their country's. And they found their honor in their answer, not their summons. I will never forget that. Never. Never.

If I have any private oath that I have tried to abide by in my public service it is that I would never ask Americans to serve in missions where success was not defined, the commitment to achieve it uncertain, and its object of less value than its price.

I pray today that I have kept my oath. I will pray so every night for as long as this mission lasts. I wish the people of Bosnia peace. I wish them peace because they deserve that blessing, but even more importantly because the lives of many fine young Americans have been ransomed to that peace. I know that these Americans will perform magnificently, under very difficult circumstances, to secure the objectives of their mission. They will reflect, as they always do, great credit on themselves and on the United States, as they seek again to secure the peace and security in which another people may secure their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

Mr. President, I learned about duty, its costs and its honor, from friends who did not come home with me to the country we loved so dearly, and from friends who overcame adversity with far more courage and grace than I possessed. I have tried to see my duty in this question as they would have me see it.

In the difficult decision—and it is difficult for reasons greater and more honorable than political advantage or disadvantage—our sense of duty may lead us to different conclusions. I respect all of my colleagues for seeking to discharge their solemn responsibilities in this matter after careful deliberation and with honest reasoning.

But I want to make one last point to those Americans—and I do not include any of my colleagues in this category—who oppose this deployment and this resolution because they resent the costs of America's leadership in the world. The burdens that are imposed on the United States are greater than the burdens borne by any other nation. There is no use bemoaning that fact or vainly trying to avoid its reality. This reality will be so for as long as we remain the greatest nation on earth. When we arrive at the moment when less is expected from our leadership by the rest of the world, then we will have arrived at the moment of our decline. We should accept that burden with courage. We cannot withdraw from the world into our prosperity and comfort and hope to keep those blessings. We cannot leave the world alone. For the world will not leave us alone.

So I will support this mission, with grave concern and more than a little

sadness. I will support my President. I will, I believe, support my country and the men and women we have asked to defend us. I give my full support, whatever my concerns. And I accept, fully, the consequences of what I do her today. I ask my colleagues to do so as well.

I ask all Senators to support the Dole resolution, irrespective of their views over the policy that brought our soldiers to Bosnia. I ask for your vote as an expression of support for the American soldiers who, summoned to duty in Bosnia, will find their honor and ours in their answer. I ask for your vote to help reduce the threats to their welfare, and increase the chances that the cause for which they risk so much may succeed, and endure long after they have come home to a grateful nation.

And I ask God to bless the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who will render their Nation this great service; to bless the President; to bless the Congress; and to bless the United States. We are all in great need of His benevolence today.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition? The minority leader is recognized.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, this evening, President Clinton is traveling to Paris to sign the Bosnia peace agreement. The first of 20,000 American troops are on their way to Bosnia to help implement that agreement. And we in the Senate are being asked to make a choice. A choice with profound—even life-and-death—consequences.

Will we give our troops going to Bosnia our full and genuine support? Or will we burden them with the weight of conflicting messages?

In the more than 3½ years since war broke out in the former Yugoslavia, more than a quarter of a million people—including tens of thousands of innocent children—have been killed.

The Bosnian people are weary of war. They have negotiated a peace settlement. They are merely asking us to help them implement it.

Some may ask: Why us? Why must the United States become involved in this ancient conflict? I believe there are three answers.

First, it is in our national interest. Peace and stability in Europe are vital to the United States. Twice in this century, we have seen what horrors can occur when aggression in Europe is allowed to spread unchallenged and unchecked. Twice in this century, Americans have died to keep Europe free of such aggression. To turn our back on Bosnia now, especially after the President has committed American troops, would be to deny what we have learned, and what those earlier generations sacrificed. It would weaken American leadership in NATO. And it would undermine our credibility as a world leader.

Second, we have a moral obligation in Bosnia. For nearly 50 years, we believed that we would never again see concentration camps in Europe. We would never again see men and boys made to dig their own mass graves and then be machine-gunned into them. We were wrong. This is happening in Bosnia, and our national conscience demands that we take a strong stand against it.

In 1948, 3 years after the end of World War II, the French writer and philosopher Albert Camus appealed to the monks of a French monastery to help the children who had been injured and orphaned in that war. "Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which children are tortured," Camus said. "But we can reduce the number of children who are tortured. And if you don't help us, who else in the world can help us do it?"

That brings me to the third reason we must help implement this agreement. The United States must help bring peace to Bosnia because no one else in the world can. The leaders of all three factions—Serbs, Croats, and Moslems—have made it clear that they will not participate in the peace process unless we are involved.

I commend President Clinton and all the members of the negotiating team who worked so hard in Dayton to get us to this point. They accomplished what many said was impossible, and their leadership is already saving lives. Without the commitment of this President to peace in the Balkans, there would be no debate tonight, for we could not be on the verge of peace.

I also want to commend the distinguished majority leader, Senator MCCAIN, Senator NUNN, and all the senators in our Bosnia working group for the leadership they have shown in negotiating a resolution that says unequivocally to our troops, "We support you."

That mission will give the Bosnian people an opportunity to build a democratic society. Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved as a single State with a unified capital of Sarajevo. The Bosnian people will be allowed to hold free elections, and those who have been driven from their homes through fighting and other forms of terrorism will be free to return.

Our mission is clear, limited, and achievable. We are sending our troops to maintain a ceasefire. They will take their orders from an American general. And they will have full authority to respond to threats to their safety with immediate and overwhelming force.

Again, the critical question is, are we going to give our troops our genuine support as they seek to carry out their mission? Or are we going to burden them with conflicting messages?

Mr. President, I believe the Hutchison amendment is gravely misguided and even dangerous. It claims to support our troops, but, in fact, it undermines them. How can we support our troops if we condemn the mission

for which they are risking their lives? Have we learned nothing from our own history?

Sending such a contradictory message would badly undermine the morale of our troops and jeopardize their safety.

It would also undermine U.S. credibility—our commitment to peace, and our commitment to our NATO allies.

Finally, sending such a conflicting and wrong-headed message would undermine the peace agreement itself, and efforts to implement it.

The responsible vote is a vote for the bipartisan resolution offered by the majority leader.

This resolution supports our troops unequivocally. It commends them for their professionalism and patriotism and bravery. It assures that they will have all the resources and authority they need to protect the peace—and protect themselves.

It recognizes the vital interests our Nation has in preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict and ending the bloodshed. It preserves America's leadership within NATO, and it preserves our credibility with our allies.

And it requires the President to certify two important conditions. First, that the NATO implementation force is limited to implementation of the peace agreement and protection of NATO troops. And second, that the United States objectives in Bosnia are to maintain the peace and establish a military balance that will allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves when NATO withdraws.

As the Senator from Oklahoma noted earlier tonight, the Hutchison/Inhofe and Dole/McCain resolutions are contradictory. The Hutchison resolution, although it is non-binding, sends a dangerous and conflicting message that will undermine and endanger American troops.

The Dole/McCain resolution is binding legislation that asserts Congressional authority and responsibility and sends a clear message that we support our troops and the cause for which they are risking their lives. It is the right thing to do.

To echo the words of Camus, the United States cannot prevent all wars, everywhere. But we can reduce the number of children and adults killed in Bosnia. Our national security, and our national conscience, demand that we try.

Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WARNER). The majority leader is recognized.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send my resolution to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:
A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 44) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

Mr. DOLE. That resolution will be the second vote. The first vote will be on the Hutchison resolution.

Mr. President, let me indicate at 10:05 p.m. our time, and 4:05 in the morning in Bosnia, where many Americans are now and where hundreds and thousands more will be on the way, I think we have to understand what we are about to vote on here. We are not voting on a decision to send American troops to Bosnia. That decision has been made. It was made 2 years ago by the President of the United States. Without consulting Congress, the President of the United States made that decision.

So we say to those soldiers who may be on early duty there at 4 a.m. in the morning, in the bitter cold—from those of us in the warmth of the U.S. Senate, free from any danger—we are about to cast a vote. We are about to cast a vote, Sergeant Jones or Private Smith, whoever it is, to indicate that we support your efforts there. They may have some misgivings about why they are there, and we may have some doubts. I listened to the eloquent statement of Senator MCCAIN, and I listened last evening to the final speaker of the evening, Senator COHEN from Maine, but this is not about politics. This is not about a Democratic President and a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate. This is about a lot of frightened young Americans who are in Bosnia, or on their way to Bosnia. I assume they may not have thought of it directly, but I believe they will think of it one of these days; they are going to be looking back to see if they had the support of those who represented them in the Congress of the United States. They may not be thinking of that at 4:10 a.m.

So this is a very difficult debate for Members of Congress. It is a difficult debate because Congress was not part of the decisionmaking with respect to sending troops. Congress was not consulted. Congress was told of the President's commitment to send troops after the commitment was made. And then we were faced with the dilemma of undermining that commitment or acquiescing in a military mission with serious flaws. And make no mistake about it, the President has said he made this decision and he takes responsibility. It was his decision to send troops and his decision alone.

A lot of Members of Congress, some on both sides of the aisle—in fact, 69 of us voted the last time to lift the arms embargo to give the Bosnians an opportunity to defend themselves—which is precisely the reason we are here tonight—so that we would not be sending American troops or making that decision. But the President rejected that. That was bipartisan in the House and