

II Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

(1) **NONCOMPLIANCE.**—If the President determines that a party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the "START Treaty") or to the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the respective Treaty or is in violation of either the START or START II Treaty so as to threaten the national security interests of the United States, then the President shall—

(A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;

(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;

(C) in the event that a party other than the Russian Federation is determined not to be in compliance—

(i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to accommodate the changed circumstances, and

(ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the United States; and

(D) in the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both of the START Treaties.

(2) **TREATY OBLIGATIONS.**—Ratification by the United States of the START II Treaty obligates the United States to meet the conditions contained in this resolution of ratification and shall not be interpreted as an obligation by the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or extension of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the "ABM Treaty").

(3) **FINANCING IMPLEMENTATION.**—The United States understands that in order to be assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.

(4) **EXCHANGE OF LETTERS.**—The exchange of letters—

(A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the territory of Kazakhstan,

(B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and

(C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention

of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to the Senate as associated with the START II Treaty),

are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of letters as equivalent under international law to actions inconsistent with the START II Treaty.

(5) **SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLES.**—Space-launch vehicles composed of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the respective treaty.

(6) **NTM AND CUBA.**—The obligation of the United States under the START Treaty not to interfere with the national technical means (NTM) of verification of the other party to the Treaty does not preclude the United States from pursuing the question of the removal of the electronic intercept facility operated by the Government of the Russian Federation at Lourdes, Cuba.

(c) **DECLARATIONS.**—The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:

(1) **COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTIONS.**—Pursuant to the Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May 10, 1995, between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach high priority to—

(A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security;

(B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements for the purpose of confirming the irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons reduction; and

(C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

(2) **ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS.**—It is the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the START or START II Treaty, the President should, within the parameters of the elimination schedules provided for in the START Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable warheads under the START and START II Treaties possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable warheads possessed by the United States to an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the national security interests of the United States results.

(3) **EXPANDING STRATEGIC ARSENALS IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN RUSSIA.**—It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of any further strategic offensive arms reductions the President determines there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States.

(4) **SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER REDUCTIONS.**—Cognizant of the obligation of the United States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of

July 1, 1968 "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control", it is the sense of the Senate that in anticipation of the ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty, the Senate calls upon the parties to the START II Treaty to seek further strategic offensive arms reductions consistent with their national security interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.

(5) **MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.**—The Senate urges the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). For purposes of this paragraph, the term "Missile Technology Control Regime" means the policy statement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments thereto.

(6) **FURTHER ARMS REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS.**—The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

(7) **TREATY INTERPRETATION.**—The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term "INF Treaty" refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. CRAIG, and Mr. BENNETT):

S. 1481. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for the non-recognition of gain for sale of stock to certain farmers' cooperatives, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. GRAMS:

S. 1482. A bill to amend chapter 13 of title 31, United States Code, to deem all Federal employees to be essential employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

By Mr. KYL (for himself, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, and Mr. DEWINE):

S. 1483. A bill to control crime, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. CRAIG, and Mr. BENNETT):