

Mr. President, the CIA's statutory inspector general is an issue that is near and dear to me, particularly since it was at my initiative that this office was established. I, along with a good number of my Senate colleagues who served both on the Iran-Contra Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, had voiced concern with the need for objectivity, authority, and independence on the part of the CIA's Office of Inspector General. And, working in close collaboration with my colleague Senator GLENN, we crafted a provision that in 1989 was included in the Intelligence Authorization Act of fiscal year 1990—subsequently enacted into law—to establish an independent, Presidentially appointed statutory inspector general at the CIA. In November, 1990, the Honorable Frederick P. Hitz was formally sworn in as the CIA's first statutory inspector general.

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am pleased to report to my colleagues that in the 5 years since Fred Hitz was sworn in as the CIA IG, the committee has noted a vast improvement in the effectiveness and objectivity of that office. This has been due in no small measure to the capable leadership of Fred Hitz. While the committee has not always agreed with the judgments of the CIA inspector general's office, the CIA IG has been fearless in taking on difficult and controversial issues such as BCCI, BNL, the Aldrich Ames case, and CIA activities in Guatemala—just to name a few. And the work of Fred Hitz's shop has been an invaluable supplement to our committee's intelligence oversight role.

Mr. President, there was fierce resistance to the creation of a statutory inspector general at the Central Intelligence Agency, and there continues to be strong resentment of an independent IG in certain quarters of the CIA to this day.

This should come as no surprise. It is hard to think of another Federal agency in the U.S. Government more institutionally resistant to having an independent inspector general than the CIA. Accordingly, I believe that any CIA IG worth his or her salt would be about as popular as Fred Hitz currently is with some of his present and former CIA colleagues. It is a mark of his tenacity and integrity that Fred and his office continue to tackle the IG's mission of serving as an independent fact-finder and, when necessary, a critic of CIA programs and operations.

Mr. President, the statutory CIA inspector general has made the Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to the American people. I and my Senate colleagues wish to acknowledge and commend the fine work of this office, and congratulate Fred Hitz on his 5-year anniversary as the first statutory CIA inspector general.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join my distinguished chairman, Senator SPECTER, in introducing this reso-

lution to acknowledge the important role of the Central Intelligence Agency's statutory inspector general's office and noting the excellent work of Fred Hitz—the first CIA statutory IG who has recently celebrated his 5-year anniversary in this challenging position.

There was, to say the least, some skepticism about the wisdom of creating the statutory IG office at the CIA. Indeed, no one should be surprised that there was little support in the Agency for the creation of a statutory inspector general office. But fortunately, Senator SPECTER and Senator GLENN and others convinced the Senate to support this idea, and the office was created. Yet even after enactment, there was still resistance to an independent fact-finder within the Agency, and some of it persists even today.

The CIA has a proud but insular culture which tends to resist the scrutiny of an independent examiner. Also, because CIA operates in secret and undertakes—at the request and direction of policymakers—activities which the United States must deny, the additional oversight of an independent IG is essential. To perform this oversight effectively and honestly means to occasionally render strong criticism. Those who are criticized are sometimes offended. Their response to criticism ranges from the stoic silence we associate with CIA, to both attributable and anonymous counter-criticism of Mr. Hitz.

Mr. President, criticism of the IG by past and present CIA employees suggests to me that Mr. Hitz has been doing his job in the spirit Congress intended. I do not claim, nor would Mr. Hitz claim, that he has done his job perfectly. Few of us attain such a level of performance. I and some other members of the Intelligence Committee have not always agreed with his conclusions in particular investigations. But I would claim the CIA is a stronger, more effective organization today because he has been a strong, independent IG, as Congress envisioned.

Congress' own oversight of intelligence activities would be much more difficult without the insights provided by an independent IG. At the same time, an independent IG must not contribute to a climate in which CIA is afraid to take risks when vital U.S. interests are at stake. An independent IG must not create an internal empire of inspectors which has the same chilling effect on creative action in Government that excessive regulation has on business. Like the congressional oversight committees, a good IG must ensure that the Agency acts in accordance with U.S. law and U.S. values without inhibiting the Agency's ability to act boldly.

From what I see from the vantage point of the Intelligence Committee, Fred Hitz has been that kind of IG. I congratulate him on his completion of 5 years of service and I congratulate my colleagues who 5 years ago envi-

sioned what we now agree is a very necessary job.

Mr. SANTORUM. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table and any statements be placed in the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 201) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

S. RES. 201

Whereas, because of its concern with the need for objectivity, authority and independence on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Inspector General, the Senate in 1989 included in the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1990—subsequently enacted into law—a provision establishing an independent, Presidentially-appointed statutory Inspector General at the CIA;

Whereas in November, 1990, The Honorable Frederick P. Hitz was formally sworn in as the CIA's first statutory Inspector General;

Whereas the CIA's statutory Office of Inspector General, under the capable leadership of Frederick P. Hitz, has demonstrated its independence, tenacity, effectiveness and integrity; and

Whereas the work of the CIA Office of Inspector General under Mr. Hitz's leadership has contributed notably to the greater efficiency, effectiveness, integrity and accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate expresses its congratulations to Frederick P. Hitz on his 5-year anniversary as the first statutory CIA Inspector General and expresses its support for the Office of the CIA Inspector General.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to Frederick P. Hitz.

MEASURES INDEFINITELY

POSTPONED—S. 1315 AND S. 1388

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar No. 287, S. 1315, and Calendar No. 288, S. 1388, be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FARM CREDIT SYSTEM REFORM ACT OF 1996

Mr. SANTORUM. I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 2029 and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 2029) to amend the Farm Credit Act of 1971 to provide regulatory relief.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 3109

(Purpose: To provide a complete substitute.)

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I send a substitute amendment to the