ensure that employers are not subject to duplicative, inconsistent, or unnecessary regulatory burdens. OFCCP and EEOC staff routinely communicate on issues of mutual interest and concern. This coordination is prescribed in Executive Order 12067, the 1981 Memorandum of Understanding between DOL and EEOC, and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). EEOC and OFCCP have issued joint regulations which delineate the respective responsibilities for processing complaints that are within the jurisdiction of both the ADA and Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Further, employers generally are not subject to simultaneous or dual enforcement proceedings by OFCCP and EEOC. In the rare instance where both agencies may investigate or seek enforcement against the same employer, one of the agencies defers to the other, or the matter is handled on a joint basis by OFCCP and EEOC.

As you suggested, between August and October, we held meetings with representatives of the employer and constituency groups to discuss proposals to revise the regulations under the Executive Order program. We met separately with representatives of the following employer groups: the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), the Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC) and the Organization Resources Counselors, Inc. (ORC). We also met with representatives of civil rights and women's rights organizations. These recent meetings with OFCCP stakeholders were the latest in a series of consultations on regulatory reforms that began in April 1994 in connection with an earlier proposal to revise certain of the provisions in the Executive Order regulations. OFCCP also convened four partnership meetings outside of Washington with several hundred representatives from the contractor and constituent communities in the Spring of 1995. The purpose of the meetings, which were held in Dallas, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and Chicago, was to elicit recommendations for changing the regulatory requirements for written affirmative action programs and the procedures for evaluating a contractor's compliance with the regulatory requirements. The participants at the partnership meetings were also asked to suggest data requirements for a proposed affirmative action program summary format.

We have identified a number of issues we would like to change through regulatory reforms. OFCCP staff is in the process of drafting rulemaking proposals to effect the contemplated revisions to the regulations. These consultative meetings not only are required by Executive Order 12866, which requires agencies to involve the public in proposed rulemaking, but also have been an integral part of OFCCP's established rulemaking practices. The discussions with our stockholders have been worthwhile and productive. In addition, we are examining whether some of the issues raised during the consultations can be addressed through policy guidance or other kinds of programmatic changes.

Our overall objectives are to reduce paperwork, reduce the time involved in preparing a written affirmative action program, and establish practical reporting requirements without undermining the ability of OFCCP to be an effective enforcement agency. Further, revising the compliance review procedures would enable OFCCP to better focus its limited resources while reaching a greater percentage of the contractor universe than it currently reaches.

Finally, the agency also intends to prepare annual monitoring reports by geographic area and industry to track how different industries are performing. You also recommended that we develop a way of providing contractors early indications of compliance problems. We are considering the concept of an ''early alert system'' to give a contractor advance notice of potential deficiencies so that the contractor would have the opportunity to ''self-correct'' and thereby lessen (if not obviate) the need for a full compliance review. Such an alert system could assist the agency in targeting its limited resources. Accordingly, we are trying to determine the feasibility and administrative costs involved.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on our efforts to develop and implement changes to the Executive Order program.

Sincerely,

SHIRLEY J. WILCHER,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Contract Compliance.●

DANGEROUS PATHOGENS

● Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I intend to hold hearings in the Judiciary Committee in the very near future on the subject of possession of dangerous human pathogens, such as bubonic plague, anthrax, and similar pathogens. My purpose will be to determine what legislation may be necessary to protect the American people from the misuse of such pathogens.

These are very dangerous and deadly organisms which, apparently, are readily available to just about anyone, including those with legitimate needs, such as researchers, and those who, instead, may have an evil intent or who simply do not know how to store and handle properly these organisms.

The December 30, 1995, Washington Post has a story with a headline that leaps off the page: ''Man Gets Hands on Bubonic Plague Germ, but That's No Crime.'' The story is more chilling than the headline. An Ohio white supremacist purchased, through the mail, three vials of this extremely dangerous pathogen, which wiped out about one-third of Europe in the Middle Ages. When the purchaser called the seller to complain about slow delivery, the sales representative got concerned about whether the caller was someone who really ought to have the bubonic plague in his possession. Ohio authorities were contacted, according to the story. When police, public health officials, the FBI, and emergency workers in space suits scoured the purchaser's house, they found nearly a dozen M–1 rifles, smoke grenades, blasting caps, and white separatist literature, but no bubonic plague. The deadly microorganisms were found in the glove compartment of his automobile, still packed as shipped.

Apparently, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture requires permits for shipping animal pathogens, at least between States, there is no Federal domestic regulation of who may receive these deadly human pathogens. According to the Washington Post story, ''* * * the only domestic restrictions on human pathogens * * * are the rules the handlers impose themselves.'' As Kenneth Gage, acting chief of the plague section at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's vector-borne diseases division, stated: ''I don't think it's going too much out on a limb by saying this kind of thing shouldn't happen.''

So, for the purchase of three strains of bubonic plague, what was the purchaser charged with? Three counts of wire fraud and one count of mail fraud. And these charges have been plea bargained down to a guilty plea for one count of wire fraud. Even these charges would not have been possible if the purchaser had not faxed a false statement on the letterhead of a nonexistent laboratory stating the laboratory assumed responsibility for the shipment, as the seller had required.

Earlier this year, a group released a nerve gas in Tokyo's subway station, killing 12 and injuring over 5,000. The ready availability of deadly human pathogens raises the obvious concern that such organisms not fall into the wrong hands. The task will be to meet the legitimate needs of scientists while assuring protection of our citizens from the inadvertent or deliberate misuse of these pathogens.●

ENFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT

● Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the Enfield Fire Department on the occasion of their 100th anniversary.

For the past 100 years this dedicated group of men and women have strived to ensure the safety of the community of Enfield, CT. Their dedication is evident in their unshakable commitment to self sacrifice for the security of their friends, families, and neighbors. Indeed some have given the ultimate sacrifice, giving their lives while trying to protect their fellow citizens.

This organization's dedication and commitment to the town of Enfield can be seen not only through the fire department's actions but also in the great confidence and respect the residents of Enfield place upon these men and women. Ordinary men and women asked to perform extraordinary tasks, never asking what was in it for them. The community's faith in their fire department has not wavered in its first 100 years and will undoubtedly continue through the next century.

The Enfield Fire Department has been an important stone in the foundation of the town of Enfield. The people of Connecticut thank them for their service, dedication, and contribution to their community.●

U.S. TROOPS AS PEACEKEEPERS

● Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to address America's role in implementing peace accords around the world, and in providing peacekeeping troops to enforce them. As we all know, President Clinton decided unilaterally to send American ground troops to Bosnia. During our debate on that decision, I argued that our troops have too high a political profile and

represent too powerful a nation to successfully implement the Dayton Accord.

This is not to say, Mr. President, that our troops can never succeed as peacekeepers. In my opinion there have been and will continue to be occasions when our participation in peacekeeping efforts will advance U.S. strategic and political interests. But we do a disservice to our troops and to our Nation if we do not examine such operations coolly and dispassionately to determine whether we should, in fact, engage in them. Because we are likely to receive requests for American peacekeepers from a variety of sources in the future, Mr. President, I would like to further clarify my views on the criteria we should apply before putting our sons and daughters in harm's way.

In my view it is our duty in dealing with such requests to assess the nature of the conflict and determine if our troops are appropriate. We also, however, must assess how directly events in the area impact on our interests. We then must determine whether in fact a peace exists which we can help keep, and whether our relations with any of the parties to the conflict are sufficiently close that we would be willing to assume this greater responsibility.

Therefore, let me express an overall theme which I believe warrants specific elaboration. When we previously considered the issue of peacekeeping and U.S. troop deployments, I felt many in this body were searching for some absolute, universal theories to guide our actions. I do not believe that is necessary. In fact, I would argue that decisions such as these require us to accept that our national interests vary from region to region and from situation to situation. We must therefore consider our options on a case-by-case basis. These situations almost never call for black-or-white, do-or-die, absolute decisions. Instead we are usually presented with a sliding scale of U.S. interests, transitory levels of progress toward establishing a just and lasting peace, and fluid relationships with the parties involved. It may be possible to develop a theoretical model to address these gradations, and give us a quantitative output as to whether or not we should intercede, but I doubt such a model would be workable if it could even be developed. Therefore, I believe we must accept that these situations are best analyzed on an individualized and prudential basis, where the sliding scales of U.S. national interests, the probability of success, and the current state of U.S. international relations are all measured against one another.

Having said that, Mr. President, let me now discuss one area where I believe some generalizations can be made regarding the deployment of U.S. troops as peacekeepers. I believe American troops are singularly ill-suited to serve in traditional peacekeeping roles, and that their deployment in such roles should be the exception rather than the rule. Because our national interests are so extensive and widespread, we almost always will be seen as an interested party, taking sides in the conflict rather than serving as neutral arbiters. Traditional peacekeeping demands objectivity and strict neutrality. Peacekeeping troops themselves may be forced to take action against one side or the other in particular circumstances, but they must be perceived as being, on the whole, scrupulously neutral.

Our troops are the fighting forces of the world's sole remaining superpower. This means that they bring to the field their status as fighting forces for the world's sole remaining superpower, and the living representation of our Nation's political will. Because our influence and interests are so far-flung, the mere presence of our troops in a particular area is a political statement. Both sides will see our troops as potential allies or enemies who can decide the outcome of a continued conflict. Therefore, I believe traditional peacekeeping is best conducted by smaller countries who are not perceived to have any vested interest in the outcome of a conflict; who, because their country's interests are marginal in the area of conflict, are undeniably neutral.

However, even if circumstances favor use of American peacekeepers we must keep in mind that our ability to deploy troops is not sufficient reason to do so. In my view this administration has too willingly committed our troops and national resources to foreign hot spots on the naive assumption that we can and should develop a world police force. Mr. President, I believe we must remember that a peacekeeping mission is not just another peacetime deployment overseas. It is a dangerous situation in which troops are intentionally placed among warring parties in order to construct some sense of order and discipline.

American troops are highly visible and so will be especially at risk in these conditions. This makes it our duty, as policy makers, to commit troops only where our vital interests are at stake. We neither can nor should subordinate our interests to those of any abstract, world-wide organization beholden to dictators who see us as enemies. Rather, in deciding whether to deploy U.S. troops to a particular area, we first must weigh the extent to which success in that area will advance our national interests. Only where vital national interests are at stake should we expose our troops to extraordinary danger.

Mr. President, please let me also reiterate my earlier statement as to the sliding-scale of interests that usually lay before us. The more directly and significantly our national interests are effected by instability in a particular area, the greater will be the argument for the deployment of U.S. troops. Again, I do not believe that there is some definitive level of American interests that signals the call for U.S. involvement, but rather, the effect upon our interests must be measured against the degree to which the other criteria I have established are impacted.

Which brings me to my second criteria—the probability of success in furthering our national interests. It makes little sense to me to undertake a mission that has little or no chance of success unless the threats to our national interests are so great, that such a high level of risk is justified. With peacekeeping, compared to other, more traditional military missions, the risk should be low given the relatively low return we can expect from a mission, which by definition, is supposed to be nonconfrontational. I will repeat again that there is not, in my opinion, some definitive level of risk which we should not cross in a peacekeeping mission; the measurement of that risk should be weighed along the sliding scale of national interests and broader international relations we maintain with the various parties to the conflict.

Furthermore, the probability of success will, in my opinion, be much greater for those conflicts where a peace is already at hand, arrived at by the parties themselves from a true desire to end the conflict and find some common ground from which to build a future. In those situations, a peacekeeping force from a trusted friend may be just the step necessary to allay fears and allow the peace process to continue. But when the United States, from a position of superiority or paternalism, attempts to impose a peace upon warring factions in an essentially unresolved conflict, the underlying issues continue to smolder, and the chances for success drop dramatically.

There is, however, a third factor which I believe must be considered in any decision to deploy U.S. forces: the degree to which our relationships with the countries of the region will be improved by our participation. At times, for example, while both sides of a conflict wish for peace, one side or the other is so frightened that only American assurances will be sufficient to quiet them. Furthermore, there are countries who are such trusted friends and allies, that their security is a national interest for us too. And just as I have stated earlier regarding the sliding scale with which I believe we should make such analyses, the closer and more significant our relations are with the countries of the region, the more willing we should be to deploy our troops in support of a peace accord.

But in such a case we must not seek merely to mimic traditional peacekeepers like the Swedes or Fijians, following some inflexible policy of impartiality. Rather, we should, in my view, make clear that we will not tolerate threats to our interests, or to the interests of our friends. Precisely because we always are perceived as choosing sides, such a statement of interest, if backed up by military presence, will be believed.

Two cases where we have become involved may shed some light on how I

think we should apply these criteria. In the Sinai, America saw the confluence of vital national security interests, a strong probability of success emerging from a peace accord initiated and completed by Egypt and Israel, and a conflict where two of our close allies requested our involvement. The Middle East conflicts of the last 50 years have repeatedly placed the United States at odds with the Arab world. The threats to the vital energy supplies of the West's industrial base threatened our most significant national interests. Indeed, the world-wide economic recessions of the late 1970's and early 1990's are both directly attributable to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1990.

The threats to our national security alone were sufficient to warrant our involvement. But, in this case, the criteria of our international relations with the involved countries was also met through our ties with Egypt and Israel. The Camp David Accord was a consummation of a growing United States-Egyptian relationship, heralding a breakthrough in United States-Arab relations. Started with the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, and culminating in the extensive military-to-military relationship developing through our assistance programs, the deployment of American troops to the Sinai helped cement our emerging relationship with Egypt. Furthermore, our commitment to Israeli sovereignty and security has always been a cornerstone of United States Middle East policy. Our participation in the Sinai multinational observer force directly improved our relationship with both countries, helped stabilize the Middle East, and directly represented our commitment to the success of the Camp David Accords. It is doubtful our close relations with either country, the successful establishment of Palestinian authority, or the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreement, would have been possible without our peacekeeping pledge.

Finally, the probability of success for the Camp David Accord was particularly high given that the combatant states themselves initiated the process and had the most to lose by its failure. It was apparent from the start that both Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin wanted peace, but needed assistance in finding a way to protect their vital national security interests. In such a situation, the good offices provided by the United States, and the assurances to Israeli security provided by the presence of our troops, were the critical elements in securing the Accord.

The Dayton agreement, on the other hand, in my view represents a situation in which an American peacekeeping presence is not justified. As I stated during the authorization debate, there is a American interest in resolving the Balkan conflict arising from the threat of broader European instability, the strain the conflict places on our relationships with our NATO allies, and the friction it causes between Eastern and Western Europe. But none of these threats is so far along the scale of national interest that they warrant our involvement in and of their own right. In fact, when measured against the other criteria of success probability and our relationships with the regional states, I believe a compelling case is made for the United States to participate in a peacekeeping mission.

As I just explained, I believe American troops are particularly ill suited to serve as traditional, impeccably neutral peacekeepers. They present too ripe a political target and bring too much political baggage simply because of the flag they fly. Because there are alternatives to United States ground involvement, including the provision of air and naval forces, logistical support, and financial resources to support other nations' forces, I believe it is wiser to use smaller, more traditional peacekeeping forces from areas such as Scandinavia, Africa, and Asia.

Furthermore, I am not convinced the Dayton Accord was anything other than an imposed peace by a paternalistic Clinton administration. Whereas both the Israelis and Egyptians had concluded that further use of arms was fruitless and counterproductive, the Balkan parties, in my opinion, believe force may still be a legitimate tool to achieve their political aims. In fact, the Washington Times of 31 January 1996 quoted a draft version of a new national intelligence estimate as stating, ''the former combatants share a deep, mutual distrust and will continue to seek achievement of their fundamental goals, rather than accommodation, even as the Dayton agreement proceeds * * *. They will see compromise as a zero-sum game and attempt to divide and manipulate the international community in the way the accords are implemented.'' Until all sides truly want peace, I am doubtful that any peace agreement, no matter how elegantly crafted, will hold in the long run. An imposed peace is, to me, only conflict delayed. Once we leave, I believe the conflict will start anew.

Mr. President, I wish we could decide when and where to deploy American troops in support of peacekeeping missions by consulting a checklist of clearly definable and easily quantifiable criteria. Unfortunately, the world is not so simplistic. Each conflict, each situation that begs our involvement, each call for America to serve as policeman or arbiter of justice, presents an enormous range of national security concerns. Along the broad scales of national interests, international relations, and mission success feasibility, we must identify the net result for each situation and determine what action will best advance our national goals. It is not easy, it is not clean, but we must do it. Often times, I believe we will discover that our national interests are not sufficiently implicated to warrant the disproportionate risk under which our military must labor simply because they are the highly visible political force of the world's only superpower. But at other times, especially when our interests do lie with the protection of one or more parties to a conflict, the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers may reasonably advance our national interests. At times like these, we must be ready and willing to make such a commitment to assisting our friends and allies in achieving true and lasting peace.●

JOSEPH GENTILE

● Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Joseph Gentile from the State of Connecticut. over the last three decades, Mr. Gentile, who resides in the Morris Cove section of New Haven with his wife, Bernadette, and three children, has truly demonstrated a genuine love for his fellow man. He has devoted himself tirelessly to his community in his quest to help the area youth and underprivileged succeed. Through his participation in sports and community organizations, he has always extended a helping hand and his goodwill to those in need.

His accomplishments, as are the lives that Joseph has touched and help shape, are countless. As a coach, commissioner, administrator, and friend of the Annex Y.M.A. Little League, the East Haven Midget Football League, and East Haven High School he produced winners on and off the field. His football, baseball, and softball teams won numerous league, State, and district championships throughout his coaching career. More importantly, the youngsters he came in contact with learned lessons in humility, sportsmanship, and perseverance from a true role model.

Joseph Gentile has also exemplified these same qualities as a long-standing member and former board of governor and director of the Walter Camp Football Foundation, as a volunteer for the Connecticut Special Olympics and while serving as a New Haven commissioner for persons with disabilities. He has also played an instrumental role while serving as district coordinator for the New Challenger Division in Little League baseball for physically and mentally handicapped children. When called upon for assistance, Joseph Gentile has always answered the call.

Therefore, Mr. President, I see it only fitting that this outstanding and caring individual be commended for his many contributions, hard work and for always having a golden heart.●

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.