

I was surprised to find out today that President Clinton is opposing title II and does not think it is a good idea for us to pass this piece of legislation in Congress. I think it is a shame when the President says he wants to cut back on regulations but then acts to prevent the agencies from doing that in opposing our title II provision.

There is also title III that says these regulations must come back to Congress for review, and that each House must consider them. If they do not approve the rules, they can pass a law, send it to the President, and he can sign or veto it, and the regulation will be overridden by that law; I think this is a very helpful procedure to add additional emphasis in cutting back on regulations.

But the most surprising thing to me is the demagoguery that is going along in the debate by opponents of this bill who claim that for some reason it may be gutting environmental laws, may be gutting health and safety laws, may be leaving poor and innocent Americans defenseless.

This is a very good bill that can actually strengthen those rules that make sense, get rid of those rules that do not make sense, and once again tell small businessmen like Bruce Gohman in Minnesota we are not going to have so many regulations that you would not add new jobs, create more employment in this country, because that is the reason we have to have regulatory relief.

I urge all my colleagues to keep a strong version of this bill tomorrow so we can tell the American people we have made a start in cutting back on unnecessary regulations and redtape.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from California [Mr. RIGGS] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

[Mr. RIGGS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

#### CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 927

Mr. GILMAN submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 927), to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes:

#### CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. 104-468)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 927), to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and

agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following:

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996”.

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Purposes.

Sec. 4. Definitions.

Sec. 5. Severability.

#### TITLE I—STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.

Sec. 102. Enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.

Sec. 103. Prohibition against indirect financing of Cuba.

Sec. 104. United States opposition to Cuban membership in international financial institutions.

Sec. 105. United States opposition to termination of the suspension of the Cuban Government from participation in the Organization of American States.

Sec. 106. Assistance by the independent states of the former Soviet Union for the Cuban Government.

Sec. 107. Television broadcasting to Cuba.

Sec. 108. Reports on commerce with, and assistance to, Cuba from other foreign countries.

Sec. 109. Authorization of support for democratic and human rights groups and international observers.

Sec. 110. Importation safeguard against certain Cuban products.

Sec. 111. Withholding of foreign assistance from countries supporting Juragua nuclear plant in Cuba.

Sec. 112. Reinstitution of family remittances and travel to Cuba.

Sec. 113. Expulsion of criminals from Cuba.

Sec. 114. News bureaus in Cuba.

Sec. 115. Effect of Act on lawful United States Government activities.

Sec. 116. Condemnation of Cuban attack on American aircraft.

#### TITLE II—ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

Sec. 201. Policy toward a transition government and a democratically elected government in Cuba.

Sec. 202. Assistance for the Cuban people.

Sec. 203. Coordination of assistance program; implementation and reports to Congress; reprogramming.

Sec. 204. Termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.

Sec. 205. Requirements and factors for determining a transition government.

Sec. 206. Requirements for determining a democratically elected government.

Sec. 207. Settlement of outstanding United States claims to confiscated property in Cuba.

#### TITLE III—PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS

Sec. 301. Findings.

Sec. 302. Liability for trafficking in confiscated property claimed by United States nationals.

Sec. 303. Proof of ownership of claims to confiscated property.

Sec. 304. Exclusivity of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission certification procedure.

Sec. 305. Limitation of actions.

Sec. 306. Effective date.

#### TITLE IV—EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Sec. 401. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have confiscated property of United States nationals or who traffic in such property.

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of—

(A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;

(B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic mismanagement by the Castro government;

(C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and  
(D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.

(2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.

(3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recovery.

(4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere.

(5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.

(6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.

(7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny.

(8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.

(9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(10) The Congress has historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.

(11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the President to encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act.

(12) Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 made by the FREEDOM Support Act require that the President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent to which they are acting to “terminate support for the communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other assistance”.

(13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States.