

and blackmail. North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that will be capable of reaching the United States once deployed. Other hostile and unpredictable countries, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq, have made clear their desire to acquire missiles capable of reaching the United States. The technology and knowledge to produce missiles and weapons of mass destruction is available on the open market.

It is also important to bear in mind that a national missile defense system can actually discourage countries from acquiring long-range missiles in the first place. In this sense, we should view national missile defense as a powerful non-proliferation tool, not just something to be considered some time in the future as a response to newly emerging threats.

The policy advocated in the Defend America Act of 1996 is virtually identical to that contained in the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill, which was passed by Congress and vetoed by the President. Like the legislation vetoed by the President, the Defend America Act of 1996 would require that the entire United States be protected against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized attack by the year 2003. It differs from the vetoed legislation in that it provides the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in determining the precise architecture for the system.

The Defend America Act of 1996 urges the President to begin negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for deployment of an effective system. But it also recommends that, if these negotiations fail to produce acceptable amendments within 1 year, Congress and the President should consider withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty. Nothing in this legislation, however, requires or advocates abrogation or violation of the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, it is important to point out that in 1991, Congress approved, and the President signed, the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which established policies similar to those advocated in the Defend America Act of 1996. Like the Defend America Act, the Missile Defense Act of 1991 called for deployment of an initial national missile defense system by a date certain and provided for a follow-on system. Both also urged the President to begin negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty.

Although there are clear differences between the Defend America Act of 1996 and the Missile Defense Act of 1991, I believe that these similarities are worth pointing out. A number of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are now saying that they oppose a policy to deploy by a date certain. But this is what we did in the 1991 Act. Several of these same Senators now also seem to be opposed to any amendments to the ABM Treaty, even though the 1991 Act clearly urged to the President to negotiate such amendments.

Mr. President, it has been asserted that a commitment to deploy a na-

tional missile defense system might jeopardize the START II Treaty. But the Missile Defense Act of 1991 was signed into law at the same time that negotiations on the START I Treaty were being concluded. Indeed, at the same time that START I was being finalized, Russian President Yeltsin proposed that the United States and Russia cooperate on a "Global Defense System". I find it hard to believe that anything in the Defend America Act would jeopardize START II any more than the Missile Defense Act of 1991 jeopardized START I. Those who make this assertion are simply giving Russian opponents of START II another excuse to oppose the agreement.

Mr. President, opponents of the Defend America Act have also argued that it would lock us into a technological dead end; that in 3 years we may have better technology available to do the job. The fact is that there are no technologies in development other than those identified in the Defend America Act. The Administration's so-called "three-plus-three" national missile defense plan relies on the exact same technologies that would be employed if the Defend America Act were passed. The only difference is that under the Defend America Act, development of those technologies would be accelerated. Once again the Administration and its congressional allies are just making excuses for not getting on with the business of defending America.

Mr. President, the last issue I want to deal with is the question of cost. We have heard some rather careless assertions made about the cost of the Defend America Act. It is true that if the Secretary of Defense decided to deploy a constellation of space-based lasers, a constellation of "Brilliant Pebbles" space-based interceptors, a constellation of "Brilliant Eyes" space-based sensors, and 300 or 400 ground-based interceptors at multiple sites the cost could be as high as \$60 billion over the next 15 to 20 years. But Mr. President, under the Defend America Act, the Secretary of Defense could also select a more modest deployment that could be achieved for \$5 to \$10 billion. The Air Force and the Army both have developed such low-cost proposals. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a system consisting of 100 ground-based interceptors, four new ground-based radars and a constellation of Brilliant Eyes sensors would cost approximately \$14 billion over the next 6 years.

These are clearly affordable costs when compared with the costs associated with other major items in the defense budget. An entire national missile defense system could be acquired for less than an additional 20 B-2 bombers. The cost would be about the same for the Corps SAM theater missile defense system, which the administration strongly supports even though we already have four core theater missile defense systems in development to protect forward deployed forces.

In my view, those who assert that we cannot afford an NMD system have simply gotten their priorities wrong. With an annual defense budget of \$260 billion to \$270 billion, it is irresponsible to argue that we should not spend \$1 billion per year on the defense of the American homeland.

Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that the Defend America Act of 1996 is balanced and timely legislation. I understand that opponents of this legislation do not want to allow the Senate to vote on this issue. But the President will not be able to hide from it. If the President's allies in the Senate stand in the way of a vote on the Defend America Act to protect him from having to sign or veto this legislation, the American people will nonetheless know who stands for their defense and who does not.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

DEFEND AMERICA ACT INCREASES NUCLEAR THREAT

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, while the stated intent of the so-called Defend America Act is to reduce the threat of nuclear missiles to the United States, in fact, the Defend America Act, so-called, will actually increase that threat. Its passage would actually make us less secure. It should be renamed the Make America Less Secure Act, rather than the Defend America Act.

Do we want defenses? Of course. The issue is not do we want to defend. The issue is, against what threats? What threats do we create in the process of deploying defense? At what price? What resources do we deny ourselves for other threats that may be more real?

This is not simply the Republican leadership of the Congress—Senator DOLE, Speaker GINGRICH and others—versus President Clinton. In support of President Clinton's position are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department.

Now, this is the letter which General Shalikashvili wrote to Senator NUNN relative to this bill. He said in this regard:

... efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.

He continues:

We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased cost and risks by planning [a national missile defense] system consistent with the ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is consistent with the ABM treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks from rogue countries.

So the conflict that exists here is between the congressional Republican leadership on the one hand and President Clinton, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department on the other hand. Of course, there are supporters of each of those two leadership groups. That is the contrast here. We have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department that have adopted, with the administration's support, a National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program. With this so-called Three-plus-Three program, we would develop the system in 3 years and then, depending on the threat, depending on the cost, depending on the situation that exists, we would then decide whether to deploy, and could deploy within 3 years of that decision.

That is the Defense Department position. That is the Joint Chiefs of Staff position. That is the administration position: not a commitment now to deploy prematurely and unilaterally, which would jeopardize our relationship with Russia and undermine our determination that they live up to START I and START II. Such a position, as is in this bill, would play right into the hands of those supernaturalists and jingoists in Russia who right now are running for President of that country.

This is the worst time to be introducing this kind of legislation. This is not just me saying this. I am not alone in saying or suggesting this. It is not just Senator LEVIN from Michigan who is doing it. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are saying: do not do anything unilaterally to undermine the ABM Treaty, because by doing so Russia has informed us that they will no longer comply with START I and will not ratify START II. They tell us the result—and now I quote—“with the result that Russia would retain hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.”

That is the issue before the Senate. Do we want to precipitate that kind of action on the part of Russia by a premature, unilateral decision that we are going to deploy a system which is inconsistent with a critical security agreement between ourselves and Russia? It was the wrong time to do it last year and, after much effort, we avoided it. It is particularly the wrong time to do it this year because there will be an election going on in Russia in the next few weeks. This bill will be seized upon by people in Russia who do not believe in START I, who do not want to ratify START II. It will be seized upon by them as evidence for why they should not ratify START II. That is the fear that General Shalikashvili has set forth.

Now, in addition, this legislation will threaten a number of international security efforts besides the START treaties. The so-called Nunn-Lugar, or cooperative threat reduction program, which helps to secure, store, and dismantle former Soviet nuclear warheads

so that they cannot again threaten any nation, would also be put at risk. Negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty to outlaw all nuclear weapon tests and help prevent the development of new nuclear weapons would be delayed. Russian ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would be sidelined. So, instead of eliminating the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, Russia could leave its chemical weapons in place.

This bill could relegate other important cooperative security arrangements with Russia to the scrap heap.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. I see no objection to that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. There are other important cooperative security arrangements with Russia that we have built upon and we have created. We have built, finally, some trust and some confidence between our two militaries. Our Defense Department does not view Russia as an adversary, but as a partner in cooperative security. Take a look at what is happening in Bosnia, where we have Russian soldiers under U.S. command in the implementation force. Take a look at what has happened with the United States and Russian targeting of our nuclear missiles, where no longer are missiles on either side targeted on the other's nations.

If we threaten unilaterally to violate the ABM Treaty, as the Defend America Act does, it could play right into the hands of those in Russia who want to return to a hostile relationship. By committing to build the system, by making that commitment now to build a system by the year 2003, the Defend America Act also locks us into possibly the least capable technology.

That is another thing that the Pentagon is not agreeing with. They want to develop the technology and, if and when a decision needs to be made, to utilize the best technology that is available.

The Defense Department's missile defense program, which is also the administration's missile defense program, the so-called three-plus-three plan, will develop missile defense technology that will permit a deployment decision as soon as 3 years, and then 3 years thereafter, if there is a threat that warrants the deployment, and if the military capability of that system is such that it is effective, and if the cost is such that it justifies the advantage to us, then we can deploy the system. And because the threat is estimated to be 15 years away, we can continue to develop the technology to make it as effective as possible.

Mr. President, we have threats now with terrorists acquiring and using chemical weapons. It happened in the Tokyo subway, and it could happen here in this country. That is a real

threat. And there have been efforts to smuggle nuclear weapon materials from facilities in the former Soviet Union. It is probably no harder to smuggle nuclear materials or weapons into the United States than to smuggle drugs. We have very few efforts underway to halt that deadly enterprise. Less than 20 pounds of plutonium could make a bomb which could destroy an American city. Mr. President, 20 pounds of very easily transportable plutonium can destroy a city. Yet the proposal before us is to spend tens of billions of dollars against threats which are uncertain, which the intelligence experts say has not materialized and is unlikely to materialize in the next 15 years, at the same time that we are underfunding needed defenses against real threats such as the terrorist threat using chemical weapons.

At best, the Dole-Gingrich crash program would only counter a handful of foreign missiles—less than the number contained on a single Russian submarine. Alternatively, some 50 Russian submarines and their missiles would be eliminated outright if the START I and II treaties are implemented. It is clear which approach is more reliable and cost-effective.

By committing to build a system by 2003 the Defend America Act also locks-in the least capable technology. The result would be a very “thin” system, according to the Pentagon. Why lock ourselves into such technology prematurely when the threat may eventually demand better technology? Our intelligence agencies estimate no new countries will build missiles able to reach the continental United States for 15 years. The risk of a missile launched against the United States is already drastically deterred by the guarantee of prompt and devastating retaliation.

Let's look at the price tag. The “Defend America Act” says, in essence, “build a system by 2003, whatever the cost.” When asked about the system's cost, Senator DOLE admitted ignorance. CBO estimates that just buying this system will cost between \$31-\$60 billion. If the Administration requested money for a new weapon system with no blueprint and no idea of the cost, Congress would flatly reject it. It should do so with the Dole-Gingrich bill.

If we pour money into premature missile defenses, resources will be lacking for other defense efforts that improve our security. To deal with security threats to the U.S. we must exercise cooperative threat reduction, non-proliferation and arms control efforts. We must also maintain our conventional military forces sufficient to dissuade any nation from using weapons of mass destruction against us.

Our strategy to secure the U.S. against weapons of mass destruction demands balance. Supporters of the Dole-Gingrich legislation are looking backwards at a non-existent Soviet

Union instead of looking forward to meeting the real emerging threats to our national security.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the letter from General Shalikashvili to Senator NUNN be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: In response to your recent letter on the Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the potential threat these missiles may present to the United States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs, Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we are prepared to field the most technologically capable systems available. We also need to take into account the parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile threat.

In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.

We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks from rogue countries.

In closing let me reassure you, Senator NUNN, that I will use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate CINCs, and all are in agreement.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. LEVIN. I close, finally, with the last line of General Shalikashvili's letter: "I have discussed the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate CINCs, and all are in agreement."

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if I may have 5 minutes within which to proceed.

Mr. THURMOND. The able Senator from Virginia can have 25 minutes if he wants to. I am very pleased to hear him speak.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will inquire of my distinguished colleague from Michigan, before he departs the floor. I ask my colleague from Michigan this. The Senator's opening statement was that we should call this bill "less secure."

Mr. President, my understanding is that we have absolutely no ability in

this country today to interdict an intercontinental ballistic missile, or indeed a short-range ballistic missile. I ask my distinguished colleague this. We have no security, so how can we be less than what I view is zero today?

Mr. LEVIN. Well, we do have some missile defense against the short-range missiles, as my good friend from Virginia knows. We are trying to improve those defenses. That is an effort that I think almost all Senators support, which is the defense against those short-range missiles that provide the real threat that those rogue countries indeed have. We have the Patriot missile capability, the anti-missile capability, and are trying to improve that, for which our committee funded the efforts. We are seeking defenses against those theater short-range missiles that provide the real threats.

If I can complete my answer, on the long-range missile, the question is twofold—

Mr. WARNER. If I can interrupt, I will first respond, and then I would appreciate it if we could continue. I am fully aware of the Patriot system. As a matter of fact, I am the chairman of the subcommittee, and my distinguished colleague from Michigan is the ranking member and, indeed, we work on that together. We recognize that those short-range systems, the Patriot, have to be deployed to the region. Theoretically, they cannot run all over the United States. So a rogue attack, if it could be mounted, with a short-range theater missile somehow against the continental units of the United States is dependent on the ability to quickly deploy from what few locations we have in that system to some other part of the United States.

To me, that is highly impractical. That is theoretical. Putting that aside, let us agree, I hope, that the United States does not have any indigenous ability to defend against an intercontinental missile, albeit fired by mistake, fired by a terrorist organization, or perhaps intentionally, against Alaska or Hawaii, from say, Russia or China. Am I not correct on that?

Mr. LEVIN. The Senator's question raises the exact reason why the Defense Department has adopted the National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which will put us in a position, in 3 years, hopefully, where we can make a decision as to whether or not—those are the key words, "whether or not"—to deploy the kind of defense which the Senator has just described, without committing us now to do so for two reasons. The two reasons are that we do not want to make a commitment now, according to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to deploy a system which could undermine the ABM Treaty, which, in turn, would then cause Russia not to reduce the number of warheads that she has and could cause Russia not to ratify START II. It is in the interest of this country that Russia ratify the START II Treaty. The other reason given for

the Defense Department's position in favor of the National Missile Defense Readiness Program, which will address the threat the Senator talks about, is that they will then be in a position to use the best technology available and not commit themselves prematurely to deploy a system that may be an inferior technology.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I listened carefully as my colleague from Michigan recited his argument. But I come back to his opening statement that this would make us "less secure." We have nothing from which to go to a lesser security today, in terms of our ability tomorrow or tonight to interdict a stray, unintentional missile, or indeed one fired by a terrorist at the United States. Can we agree on that point?

Mr. LEVIN. No. We can, I hope, agree on this. If, in fact, our commitment to deploy a system now causes Russia not to ratify START II, or to pull out from START I, leaving her with thousands of additional warheads that she otherwise would have gotten rid of, it will indeed make us less secure. That is why this bill should be called the Reduce America's Security Act of 1996—because the commitment to deploy this defense prematurely will, in the view of General Shalikashvili and the Joint Chiefs, who share his view, cause Russia to pull out from START I, not to ratify START II, and that will make us less secure.

Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, it is obvious that we are not going to come to closure on that point. But we have each made our positions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senators that under the rules we are operating by, there are five minutes for morning business. Does the Senator wish to ask for additional time?

Mr. WARNER. The chairman has put in a request that we have more time. I ask unanimous consent that we may proceed for a period in the colloquy of another 3 or 4 minutes, and then the Senator from Virginia will close with a set of remarks of his own.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Virginia is recognized to engage in a colloquy, following which the Senator from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes for morning business.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

I say this to my good friend. I, with modesty, mention the fact that in the period when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, I was privileged to be serving in the Department of Defense and, more specifically, under the Secretary of the Navy. I followed the preparations and the negotiations for the ABM Treaty. Mr. President, it was my privilege to accompany the President of the United States and the Secretary of State and our chairman to Moscow in May of 1972. My principal responsibility was to conclude the negotiation of the Incidents at Sea Treaty, on which I have been the principal negotiator, and to be

the signatory on behalf of the United States on that Executive agreement with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet Navy.

Mr. LEVIN. A landmark agreement it was.

Mr. WARNER. It is still in effect today, although modified. It is a living Executive agreement, in a sense.

Departing from that and going back to the ABM Treaty, I remember reviewing this at that time and in the past 2 or 3 years in the course of the debates. Those that were present at that time were clearly of one mind that that treaty was never designed to apply to the short-range theater systems. I might ask, does my distinguished colleague concur in that?

Mr. LEVIN. I do indeed, and that is why we are developing theater systems.

Mr. WARNER. Fine. Well, that is my concern. This ABM treaty has indeed, in my judgment, impeded the unfettered, unrestrained technical knowledge that this country has available to devise means for a defense of the short-range systems. I just wanted to put that point alongside the points of my distinguished colleague from Michigan. That concludes my inquiry.

Mr. LEVIN. If I could comment briefly on that, I do not think the Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs would agree that we have been constrained in the development of the short-range systems, the so-called "theater systems." We are proceeding apace with those systems, and I think we have been assured by the Defense Department that not only would we agree that the ABM Treaty does not cover the short-range or theater systems, but that the Defense Department does not feel that the ABM Treaty has constrained that development. Article 6 of the treaty was written, however, very expressly to prevent each nation from turning non-ABM systems into ABM systems. That was also part of the treaty which was ratified.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would simply close this debate with the observation that my criticism is not directed at President Clinton but, indeed, to a succession of Presidents who have laid down, should we say, a framework within which our scientists, research and development, and others have been contained. And, if you look carefully at the assertions by the chairman and others, yes, we have not limited them within that framework. But I take the position that the framework should never have been laid down in the first place predicated on the ABM Treaty in the short-range missile defense systems. That never should have applied to any of our research and development as components for a defense against short-range attack.

DEFEND AMERICA ACT

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to turn to the legislation at hand which was addressed by the distinguished chairman of the committee.

I rise today to join my colleagues in supporting this crucial legislation to protect the American people from the very real threat of long-range ballistic missile attack. I find it curious that the day after President Clinton made headlines by claiming that he supports a National Missile Defense System, the Democrats in the Senate are preventing the Senate, as the distinguished chairman stated, from even debating and considering a bill that would provide for such a system.

It was timely, in my judgment, for this debate because the interest of the American people have been drawn to the fact that we do not have a defense against an accidental or unintentional firing of a long-range strategic ballistic missile. That, I think, is agreed on by all.

During his speech yesterday at the Coast Guard Academy, President Clinton made a series of points on national missile defense. Let us examine carefully his assertions.

The President begins by talking about theater missile defense: "Our first priority is to defend against existing or near-term threats, like short- and medium-range missile attacks on our troops in the field or our allies." So far, I concur. This is also the priority that Republicans established years ago, in the wake of the Persian Gulf war. On trips to that theatre during that war I saw the destruction of Iraq's use of the scud. I experienced with other Senators, a scud attack on Tel Aviv on February 18, 1991. It impacted a considerable distance from where we were at the Defense Ministry Building.

The President then continues, "And we are, with upgraded Patriot missiles, the Navy Lower and Upper Tier and the Army THAAD." What are the facts? The facts are that the administration's recent BMD Program Update Review shifted the focus of TMD efforts to point defense systems (Patriot PAC-3 and Navy Lower Tier) at the expense of the more promising and capable area wide systems (THAAD and Navy Upper Tier). As a result of this review, \$2 billion was stripped from the THAAD program over the FYDP; and the Navy Upper Tier program remains little more than a science project—with no acquisition or deployment strategy. These actions were taken despite last year's clear legal requirements to accelerate both programs. Once again, the Armed Services Committee has had to come to restore both of these programs—adding almost \$500 million to the administration's inadequate request in the Senate bill.

Next, the President addresses the threat: "The possibility of a long-range intercontinental missile attack on American soil by a rogue state is more than a decade away." I say wrong Mr. President. The President and many of our Democrat colleagues are relying on a recent intelligence community assessment which reportedly claims that the threat of ballistic missile attack against the United States is 15 years

away. Several important qualifications must be highlighted. First, that intelligence assessment was carefully crafted to consider only threats to the continental United States—not Alaska and Hawaii. The threat to Alaska, in particular, from a long-range ballistic missile currently under development by North Korea is real and near-term. Also, that 15-year scenario is based on the assumption that rogue nations will develop their missiles indigenously—without foreign help. We all know that these nations are receiving substantial foreign assistance for their weapons development programs. Such assistance will substantially accelerate the threat.

We should not be lulled into a sense of complacency by such reports. Remember the assessments we received just prior to the Gulf War—Iraq was supposed to be least 5 years away from a nuclear weapons capability. After Desert Storm, and the U.N. inspections, we were shocked to learn the true extent of the advancements in the Iraqi nuclear program.

A focus on the threat from rogue nations also ignores the substantial military capabilities both Russia and China—both nations with intercontinental missiles capable of reaching our shores. We all know of the threats the Chinese made during the recent standoff with Taiwan. They correctly know that the United States is currently defenseless against ICBM attack. And the President may take comfort in the Russian promise that they are no longer targeting the United States. But we all know that—even if this representation is true—retargeting is a relatively quick and easy thing to change. I would prefer us to rely on limited U.S. defenses, rather than Russian promises, for our security.

In criticizing the Defend America Act, the President claims that "They have a plan that Congress will take up this week that would force us to choose now a costly missile defense system that could be obsolete tomorrow. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this cost will be between \$30 and \$60 billion." The facts? The Defend America Act does not specify a particular architecture for a national missile defense system—it simply says that the United States should have a highly effective system to defend against limited, accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks. There is nothing new here. This is technology that we have been investing in—to the tune of \$38 billion—since the early 1980s. We are simply saying that the time for "science projects" is over, the time has arrived to turn this technology into a deployed system that will protect Americans.

Weapons development programs—on average—take a decade from start to finish. As technology advances, those advancements are incorporated into the weapons. Why should NMD be any different—why does the President think that an NMD system would be