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Senate

The Senate met at 9:15 a.m., and was called to order by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, Sovereign of this Nation, we begin the work of this day with an acute sense of our accountability to You. We claim Solomon's promise, "In everything you do, put God first, and He will direct you and crown your effort with success".—Prov. 3:6. In response, we say with the psalmist, "May the words of our mouths and the meditation of our hearts be pleasing in Your sight, O Lord".—Psalm 19:14. Help us remember that every thought we think and every word we speak is open to Your scrutiny. We commit this day to love You with our minds and honor You with our words. Guide the crucial decisions of this day. Bless the Senators with Your gifts of wisdom and vision. Grant them the profound inner peace that results from trusting You completely. Draw them together in oneness in diversity, unity in patriotism, and loyalty in a shared commitment to You. In the name of our Lord. Amen.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The able acting majority leader, Senator LOTT, from Mississippi, is recognized.

SCHEDULE

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, this morning the Senate will be in a period of morning business until the hour of 11 a.m. I believe the Senator from Delaware, Senator ROTH, is prepared to begin speaking immediately. Following morning business, the Senate will begin debate on House Joint Resolution 1, the balanced budget constitutional amendment.

Senators are reminded that a vote on passage on the balanced budget amendment will occur at 12 noon tomorrow by unanimous consent. It is also possible that the Senate may consider other legislative or Executive Calendar items that can be cleared for action. I know that the distinguished majority leader, Senator DOLE, has been working to see if some of these executive items can be cleared. We hope that can be worked out during this week.

I yield the floor.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INHOFE). Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business not to extend beyond the hour of 11 a.m., with Senators permitted to speak for not to exceed 5 minutes each. The Senator from Delaware, [Mr. ROTH], is recognized for 30 minutes.

UNCONDITIONAL MFN STATUS FOR CHINA

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise to talk about why I believe every Member of this Chamber should support the unconditional extension of most-favored-nation trading status to the People's Republic of China. As we are all aware, Senator DOLE declared his support for unconditional extension of MFN for China sometime ago. More recently, the President announced he would renew China's MFN status unconditionally for another year.

Now the matter comes before the Congress. We have to decide whether or not Senator DOLE's position and the President's decision deserve our support. The Chinese, of course, have not made this issue easy for us. Their destabilizing nuclear, chemical, and missile sales, their continued nuclear testing, their assertiveness in the South China Sea, their growing trade surplus with the United States, their piracy of

our intellectual property, their military threats against Taiwan, their moves to undermine democratic reforms in Hong Kong, and their abuses of human rights, these all demand a stern reply.

That is why it is tempting to revoke China's MFN status. But it would be a huge mistake to do so. I say this for four reasons.

First, revoking MFN would put at risk hundreds of thousands of American jobs, and billions of dollars worth of American exports and investments.

Second, revoking MFN is an ineffective weapon that would not solve any of the problems we have with China. Indeed, revocation may make them worse.

Third, more proportional, targeted measures currently available permit a more effective response to these problems.

Finally, extending MFN is fundamental to developing a coherent China policy—one that sets priorities and provides a strategic framework for the conduct of our relations with that important country. Mr. President, the United States, East Asia, and the entire world have much to gain from a positive relationship between Washington and Beijing and much to lose from an unnecessarily confrontational one.

Before going into more detail about these four points, I believe it necessary to clarify the meaning of the term, "most-favored-nation trading status." That's because the term gives the false impression that MFN is some sort of special privilege or reward.

The term even confuses our most prestigious newspapers. In their stories on the President's announcement to renew China's MFN status, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post,

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times all incorrectly described MFN as a "privilege" or in some way preferential or favorable.

In fact, MFN is not a special privilege or reward. It designates the most ordinary, most normal trading relationship among countries. Specifically, MFN refers to the uniform tariff treatment that the United States applies to virtually every country in the world.

For example, if the U.S. tariff on imported clock radios is 5 percent, all clock radios imported from countries with MFN status are subject to a 5-percent tariff. Imports from countries that do not have MFN status—and there are only six countries that fall into this category—are subject to far higher duty rates.

Another important point about MFN is that it is not a one-way street. When we give MFN status to a particular country, that country, in return, gives the United States most-favored-nation status.

Therefore, because we give Singapore MFN status, the clock radios we import from that country are subject to the same tariff rates as clock radios from Thailand, Spain, or any other country to which we extend MFN.

In return, when Singapore imports our computer chips, it imposes the same tariff on United States chips as those imported from Japan, Korea, Great Britain, or any other country to which it extends MFN.

What does the United States get out of all this? American companies get to compete on fair and equal terms with their foreign rivals.

Let me emphasize again: MFN status does not confer—let alone imply—special treatment.

In fact, when we decide to give special treatment to imports from other countries—as Congress has expressly chosen to do for certain products from over 130 nations—those imports are subject to tariff rates substantially below the MFN rate. Sometimes we even allow specified countries to export products to the United States duty free.

In short, MFN status denotes the standard, not the exceptional, trading relationship. Ending this standard trading relationship by revoking MFN is an extreme measure. In fact, because MFN is so fundamental to trade relations among countries, some correctly liken its withdrawal to a declaration of economic war.

These are the facts about MFN. Anyone who maintains that we do China a special favor when we renew its MFN status is either misinformed or disingenuous.

Because of the confusion created by the phrase, "most-favored-nation trading status," I am working with Senator MOYNIHAN to replace the phrase in U.S. statute with a more suitable term, one that underscores the unexceptional nature of the MFN concept. I believe that if we adopt such a change in terminology, we will all better understand

the issue, and our debate will be more constructive.

Now, I want to stress that those who favor MFN renewal, such as myself, share most, if not all, of the same goals as those opposed to MFN renewal.

We, too, want Beijing to cease its destabilizing nuclear, chemical, and missile sales. We, too, want China to end its nuclear testing. We, too, want China to resolve peacefully its territorial disagreements in the South China Sea. We, too, want China to lower barriers to U.S. exports and reduce its trade surplus with the United States. We, too, want China to end its piracy of our intellectual property. We, too, want China to end its military threats against Taiwan and resolve its differences with Taipei peacefully. We, too, want China to follow faithfully the dictates of the Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong. We also want China to cooperate with us in addressing serious global concerns such as environmental degradation, transnational crime, and narcotics trafficking. And we, too, want China to respect the basic human rights of its citizens.

Where we differ from the opponents of MFN is on how to achieve these goals.

The simple fact is that there is absolutely no evidence that the drastic action of withdrawing MFN will force China to satisfy any of our objectives. Indeed, sanctioning China by withdrawing MFN runs the great risk of making that country more belligerent and less cooperative on these and other issues.

Keep in mind that experience shows that unilateral trade sanctions generally don't work. The chances of success only improve when sanctions are applied in cooperation with our major allies. However, not one of these allies—not Canada, not the European Union, not Japan, not Australia—is debating whether to withdraw MFN status from China. That's because they all know withdrawal is neither a constructive nor effective option for inducing the Chinese to change their behavior. In addition, they understand the tremendous cost of withdrawing MFN status, a cost we ignore at our peril.

Let's be clear on this point. If we revoke MFN for China, Beijing would certainly be hurt, but so, too, would the United States.

As a result of withdrawing MFN, United States duties on goods imported from China would immediately rise to the tariff rates established under the highly protectionist, Depression-era Smoot-Hawley tariff law. Chinese imports, which currently face an average tariff rate of 6 to 8 percent, will be subject to an average tariff rate of 40 to 50 percent, with the tariff rates for certain items exceeding 100 percent.

Because MFN is provided on a reciprocal basis, China would respond to higher tariffs on its goods by slapping higher tariffs on United States goods. Such a move will slam the door shut on United States exports to the

Chinese market—the fastest growing market in the world. These U.S. exports totaled almost \$12 billion in 1995 and supported approximately 200,000 high-skilled, high-wage American jobs in critical sectors such as the aircraft, telecommunications, and automotive equipment industries.

Business conducted by United States companies in China will go instead to the Europeans, the Japanese, the Canadians, and firms from all the other countries in the world which continue normal commercial relations with China.

In addition to severely damaging United States exporters, the small and large American firms that have invested billions of dollars to penetrate the Chinese market would see their efforts and investments gravely jeopardized.

Some claim, of course, that in the event China's MFN status is withdrawn, those billions of dollars of United States investments in China will be brought back to the United States. The reality is, however, that United States companies forced out of China are far more likely to move those investments to other developing countries in Asia or Latin America.

The economic fallout from withdrawing China's MFN status is not only going to hit American companies, but also American consumers. Our lowest income citizens, in particular, would suffer from the dramatically higher prices they will have to pay for a variety of basic goods as a direct result of the imposition of substantially higher duties on Chinese imports.

Mr. President, some claim that pricing Chinese goods out of our market through higher duties would be beneficial. They maintain that we would eliminate our trade deficit with Beijing because the products we now import from China would be produced in the United States.

Let us be realistic. It is a mistake to think that most of what we import from China would be produced in the United States. The truth is that in most cases imports from other developing countries would be substituted for imports from China.

Moreover, it does not make any sense to try to reduce the trade deficit by ending all trade, as would likely happen if we revoke China's MFN status. You may get a balance of trade—zero imports and zero exports—but at a cost of hundreds of thousands of good, high-paying U.S. jobs and billions of dollars of U.S. exports.

The only way to reduce the trade deficit and retain American jobs and exports is to ensure that United States products have the same access to the Chinese market that Chinese products have to ours. This is not an easy task. But revoking normal trade relations with China would make it impossible.

While I believe the threat to United States jobs and exports alone provides a convincing reason to support renewal of China's MFN status, there are other

compelling arguments for unconditional renewal.

In particular, cutting ourselves off from China by withdrawing its MFN status will end any ability the United States has to directly influence developments in China, including how China treats its citizens and whether it permits the development of a freer society and more democratic political system.

United States businesses help advance human rights and civil society in China by being there, not by leaving or by being shut out. United States companies operating in China observe basic worker rights in dealings with their local employees. United States companies provide Chinese citizens with opportunities unheard of before China began to open its economy and society to the outside world in 1978. United States companies teach their Chinese employees the valuable lessons of American business culture, including independent decisionmaking and entrepreneurial skills.

Among other reasons, that's why Martin Lee, the Hong Kong legislator and human rights advocate; Hong Kong Gov. Chris Patten and Wei Jingsheng, the prominent Chinese dissident who has suffered for so long from state persecution, all support renewal of MFN for China.

Moreover, that is why the Taiwanese—who are not shy about voicing their opinions on China to Members of Congress—have not advocated revoking MFN. And that's why the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, four of whose members have territorial disputes with China, have not come to Capitol Hill to press the United States to revoke China's MFN status.

Mr. President, I think that it is the height of arrogance for opponents of MFN to assert that they know better than Martin Lee, Wei Jingsheng, the Taiwanese, and the countries of ASEAN, how to change China's behavior.

Indeed, as they know, there is ample evidence that the mere threat of revoking MFN will make China less cooperative and more confrontational.

For example, several weeks ago, China announced for the first time that it would buy several billion dollars worth of passenger jets from the European consortium, Airbus. This action was a deliberate repudiation of Boeing, meant to send us the message that revocation of MFN will result in costly economic retaliation.

Shortly thereafter, in an action designed to send us a signal on the security implications of recklessly confronting Beijing, China struck a deal with Russia to develop a long-term strategic partnership.

These actions indicate some of the problems and consequences we would face if we use the sledge-hammer approach of revoking MFN.

Keep in mind that the President already has specific, measured and targeted tools at his disposal that allow

him to address our problems with China without resorting to the indiscriminate and destructive approach of revoking MFN.

For example, we are currently preparing to hit China with trade sanctions on \$2 billion worth of specified Chinese imports because of Beijing's failure to honor its agreement with the United States to crack down on Chinese companies making pirated knock-offs of American music, movies, and computer software.

Similarly, we can invoke targeted section 301 sanctions for other discrete discriminatory and unreasonable Chinese trade practices.

When China illegally sells nuclear technology, we can apply sanctions which are specified by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

We can counter China's threats to Taiwan by considering sales of upgraded defensive weaponry to Taipei, as well as by reaffirming our unwavering commitment to a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Taiwan and China in the context of our one-China policy, a policy which has been supported by each of our last six Presidents.

We can rely on international law and the shared interests of the countries of Southeast Asia to counter aggressive Chinese territorial claims.

And we can continue to expose and condemn China's repressive human rights record in this Chamber and in organizations around the world.

The range of tools available to respond to specific problems with China is considerable. At the same time, however, their breadth reveals a fundamental weakness in our overall approach to our relations with Beijing—the absence of an effective, broadly based, clearly articulated and carefully coordinated China policy that sets priorities and guides our use of these tools.

I agree with those who say that the rise of China presents us with a serious foreign policy challenge. But it also presents us with enormous opportunities. We can only respond to that challenge adequately and seize those opportunities through a sensible overall China policy, one that enhances the chance of creating a positive bilateral relationship. The clear objective of that policy should be to encourage China's constructive and responsible behavior and discourage aggressiveness and irresponsibility.

The absence of a coherent China policy results in large measure from short-sighted political considerations. For example, the 1992 Clinton campaign rhetoric about coddling dictators in Beijing left the Clinton administration little room to maneuver on China policy. Early on, the President indicated he would link human rights issues to the MFN decision. The following year, however, he was forced to reverse himself and announced the two issues would not be linked.

Similarly, in 1994, the Clinton administration refused Taiwan President Li

the ability to play a round of golf in Hawaii while in transit to Costa Rica. But in 1995, the administration granted him a visa to visit Cornell University immediately after telling the Chinese it would not do so because such an act would violate our one-China policy.

These and other mixed signals from the administration, as well as the cacophony of voices from Capitol Hill on how to deal with China, have left the United States with a dangerously muddled China policy.

Without question, if the United States had a better sense of its priorities and aims in the United States-China relationship, and a clearly articulated China policy that reflects those priorities, we would be better able to influence Chinese behavior. Moreover, the tools we currently have available to respond to Chinese misconduct would be more effective when used in the context of a coherent China policy.

In brief, I believe such a policy must have four central elements. First, we must expand our economic relationship with Beijing, because a China integrated into the global economy is more likely to behave in ways more compatible with American interests and international norms. Thus, we should seek to encourage China's development and participate in its economic growth. That's why I assign importance to China gaining entry into the World Trade Organization based on commercial considerations and GATT principles.

The more China is integrated into the international economy, the more subject Beijing is to the harsh realities of the marketplace. Should China choose a path toward blatant aggression and destabilizing domestic repression, foreign investment will dry up and firms will move to other countries where the risks are lower and the returns are higher.

Moreover, we have a better opportunity to influence China to act in ways we prefer when we enmesh it in the sort of economic relationships fostered by most-favored-nation trade status. Renewing MFN thus is absolutely central to an effective China policy.

In addition, the economic growth fostered by participation in the global economy almost inevitably leads to greater demands for democratic reforms. Other Asian countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, have amply demonstrated the political evolution that accompanies economic development.

The second element of a coherent China policy is the resumption of high-level, regular dialog with China. I was delighted to see that in his speech on China 2 weeks ago, Secretary Christopher accepted Senator DOLE's suggestions on this matter. After all it has been 7 years since an American President went to Beijing for summit talks, and 8 years since a Chinese leader has been in this country for a summit. Mistrust is bound to grow when we do not

meet, particularly when the list of critical bilateral, regional, and global issues requiring discussion is so long.

Third, we must nurture aspects of the relationship where we share interests and can cooperate for our common good. For example, China played a useful role in bringing relative peace and stability to Cambodia. Moreover, China has the potential to play a key role in settling the serious threat posed by North Korea to the South, as well as the 47,000 American troops we have on the ground there. I cannot envision Beijing cooperating with us on North Korea if we revoke China's most-favored-nation trade status. Indeed, I cannot imagine the Chinese playing a constructive role on any matter of mutual importance—from protecting the environment to controlling transnational crime and narcotics trafficking—if we simply continue to threaten and sanction them.

The fourth element of any coherent China policy must include preparedness to deal with China if its participation in world affairs proves disruptive. Strengthening our current array of bilateral security ties in Asia is thus essential. In addition, I believe we must look more closely at the possibility of creating effective regional security arrangements.

Closer cooperation on security and diplomatic initiatives with nations in the Asia Pacific that share our interests on China would serve to prod Beijing to accept the moderating influence of global economic integration. It would also provide a hedge in the event Beijing instead chooses a more aggressive path.

In sum, continued economic relations with China, high-level dialog, cooperation with China on matters of mutual concern, and strengthened security and diplomatic ties with the rest of Asia should, in my opinion, form the basis of any effective China policy.

Mr. President, some claim that the decision we face on renewing MFN can be reduced to a question of whether "our lust for trade exceed(s) our loathing of tyranny."

This argument is disingenuous and the question is simply wrong. The right question is whether taking the draconian step of revoking China's MFN status is worth the potentially huge cost to the United States, especially when this action has an extremely remote chance of achieving its aims. I await a response to this question from the opponents of China's MFN renewal.

Mr. President, I must stress again that the United States, East Asia, and the entire world have much to gain from Washington and Beijing achieving a positive relationship, and much to lose should bilateral relations further deteriorate unnecessarily. Renewing MFN for China is only a step—but an extraordinarily important one—toward building a fruitful bilateral relationship. Therefore, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues in the strongest possible terms to support unconditional renewal of MFN for China.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, as the distinguished chairman of the Finance Committee has so clearly stated, discussions of American foreign trade policy are increasingly bedeviled by the use of an 18th century term, most favored nation, to describe trade agreements reached with other nations. The most favored nation involved is not the nation with which we are negotiating, but rather a third nation altogether which happens to have the lowest tariff, or whatever, with respect to some product or other. The United States agrees to give to country X whatever terms are the best terms it gives to some third country. Whichever that might be.

This issue arises for the simple reason that the last tariff schedule enacted by statute was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, with the highest tariff rates, overall, in American history. In response to the disaster that followed the Roosevelt administration began a series of trade treaties entered into as executive agreements. This arrangement continues to this day. As a result, nations entering the Western trading regime, which is to say, in the main, former or current Communist nations, must receive the treatment accorded under the GATT or the WTO, or else Smoot-Hawley. Granting the former status is no sign of favor, simply of normal trade relations.

For more than two centuries this has been our practice, but only recently has the term caused public misunderstanding. What we mean is that we will confer on country X normal trading relations. The time has come, then, to say so. We grant country X normal trade relations (NTR) in return for country X treating us in the same manner. Which is to say, NTR.

Just last month the Finance Committee acted on legislation to grant permanent most-favored-nation treatment to Bulgaria and Cambodia. Yesterday, the Trade Subcommittee held a hearing regarding Romania's MFN status, and tomorrow the committee will hear witnesses speak to questions surrounding the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to China. If one read the headlines, one might believe these four countries to be the most important in all of American trade policy.

But not at all. As the chairman has just said, MFN treatment is not special treatment. Countries to which we grant this supposed most favored treatment are not, in fact, the most preferred in our trade relations. When we undertake an obligation to provide most-favored-nation treatment to another country, we simply agree to give that country the same treatment that we give the great majority of our trading partners. The rationale is that, if every country observes this principle, all countries will benefit in the long run through the resulting more efficient use of resources.

Indeed, there is no single most favored nation in our trade policy. As

noted in a 1919 report to the Congress by the U.S. Tariff Commission, now the U.S. International Trade Commission,

It is neither the purpose nor the effect of the most-favored-nation clause to establish a "most-favored nation;" on the contrary its use implies the intention that the maximum of advantages which either of the parties to a treaty has extended or shall extend to any third State—for the moment the "most-favored"—shall be given or be made accessible to the other party. . . . "Reciprocity and Commercial Agreements," United States Tariff Commission, 1919.

In fact, over time, we have developed a great variety of relations with our trading partners. We have agreed to free trade with Canada, Israel, and Mexico. We offer special benefits to countries of the Caribbean and Andean regions. We have a longstanding policy of duty-free treatment for imports from developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences. If one really wants to identify a most favored country, one certainly must take note of these relationships, which are all more advantageous than general most-favored-nation treatment.

MFN is a principle from the past. The concept has been traced to 12th century arrangements between trading cities of the Mediterranean and the Arab princes of North Africa, although the phrase most-favored-nation did not appear until the end of the 17th century. In United States law, the principle was first recognized in the 1778 commercial treaty between the United States and France, stating:

The Most Christian King and the United States engage mutually not to grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect of commerce and navigation, which shall not immediately become common to the other party. . . .

Thereafter, an MFN clause became a standard element of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, the early formal bilateral economic treaties of the United States. In essence, this was our mechanism for assuring fair and equal treatment for the trade of the United States. Over time, an ever-lengthening chain of commercial agreements, incorporating the MFN obligation, reduced barriers and increased trade. Ultimately, this basic principle was adopted in 1947 as the central obligation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—article I, part I of the "GATT 1947". It continues central to the World Trade Organization created in 1994—article I, part I of the "GATT 1994".

But, as the GATT has been succeeded by the WTO, so it is time to consider a successor term to MFN. A term that recognizes that, in the modern world, it is the norm, not the exception, to treat our trading partners equally. Senator ROTH and I, along with Senator CHAFEE, would propose for the Senate's consideration a more accurate term—"normal trade relations." Shortly, we will introduce legislation changing U.S. law, as necessary and appropriate.

THE NATO ENLARGEMENT
FACILITATION ACT OF 1996

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I have long been a supporter of the transatlantic community of nations and its cornerstone institution, NATO. And today I wish to express my support for the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996—extremely important legislation which I also cosponsor.

This bill is designed specifically to support and foster the careful, gradual extension of NATO membership to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. If passed, this bill would direct tangible assistance to the efforts of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the alliance. These nations are the most prepared of their region for the responsibilities and burdens of NATO membership.

Equally important, it is the intent of the authors of this bill to assist other Central and Eastern European countries whose economies and democracies have sufficiently progressed to move forward toward eventual NATO membership.

Such a policy is absolutely necessary to ensure that NATO's acceptance of Polish, Czech, and Hungarian applications for membership not create new divisions in Europe, but is instead part of an inclusive and on-going process that will extend to the entire community of European nations.

Extending the alliance's membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, will help transform Central and Eastern Europe into a cornerstone of enduring peace and stability in post-cold-war Europe. It would do so for the following reasons:

First, the NATO enlargement would project security into a region that has long suffered as a security vacuum in European affairs. History has repeatedly shown us that the strategic vulnerability of Central and Eastern Europe has produced catastrophic consequences—consequences that drew the United States twice this century into world war.

Second, NATO enlargement would help facilitate the economic and political integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the transatlantic community of nations. Passage of our NATO enlargement legislation would demonstrate America's commitment to consolidating an enlarged Europe. This would give more incentive to all the nations of the region to continue their political and economic reforms by demonstrating that these reforms do result in tangible geopolitical gains.

By projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement would reinforce the regional stability necessary for nations to focus on internal political and economic reform. Mr. President, security is not an alternative to reform, but it is essential for reform to occur.

Third, two great European powers, Germany and Russia, are now undergoing very complex and sensitive transformations. Their futures will be

significantly shaped by the future of Central and Eastern Europe. Extending NATO membership to nations of this region will reinforce the positive evolutions of these two great powers.

In the case of Germany, NATO enlargement would further lock German interests into a transatlantic security structure and further consolidate the extremely positive role Bonn now plays in European affairs.

The extension of NATO membership to Central and East European nations would also be of great benefit to Russia. By enhancing and reinforcing stability and peace in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement would make unrealistic calls by Russia's extremists for the revitalization of the former Soviet Union or the westward expansion of Russian hegemony. Greater stability along Russia frontiers will enable Moscow to direct more of its energy toward the internal challenges of political and economic reform.

This point is too often forgotten in this debate. There has been too strong a tendency in United States policy to overreact to outdated Russian sensitivities. This overreaction comes at the expense of strategic realities and objectives central to the interests of the alliance, as well as to the United States.

I would also like to note that this NATO enlargement legislation reflects the attitudes of many of our parliamentary counterparts in Europe. The North Atlantic Assembly, a gathering of legislators from the 16 nations of NATO, adopted at the end of 1994, my resolution calling for the extension of membership in the alliance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Mr. President, America's defense and security must be structured to shape a strategic landscape that enhances economic, political, and military stability all across Europe. Careful and gradual extension of NATO membership to nations of Central and Eastern Europe is a critical step toward this end. This is in our national interest. It is action long overdue, and it is the intent of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996.

For these reasons, I call upon my colleagues in the Senate, as well as President Clinton and his administration, to embrace this legislation.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. BRADLEY] is recognized to speak for up to 40 minutes.

RACE FOR THE CURE

Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I will not take 40 minutes, but I am very pleased to be joined by colleagues in the Chamber today in recognizing the 1996 national Race for the Cure. The race, which will take place this year on Saturday, June 15, is a unique opportunity to bring together the many people whose lives have been touched by breast cancer.

This year, Capitol Hill has an opportunity to play a tremendous role in this race. Today is the first on-site Capitol Hill registration, and today is also the beginning of something very special in this race. For every Capitol Hill participant who registers, the company Eli Lilly has generously offered to match their registration fee in the form of a donation to Race for the Cure. So for every individual who signs up to participate, your contribution to the race will be doubled. In other words, one can really make a difference here and have that difference amplified.

For all those who are unfamiliar with Race for the Cure, the race is a 5-kilometer run or, in my case, walk that raises money for breast cancer research and for early screening for underprivileged women in underserved communities in the District, Maryland, and Virginia. The race also allows a new generation of women to be made aware of the risks associated with breast cancer. Although we still do not have a cure, we do have screening devices which can increase the early detection that prolongs life. Education and awareness is one of our strongest weapons in the fight against breast cancer.

Today in America, 500 women will be diagnosed with breast cancer. Most likely, each will be frightened, uncertain of her future, and in search of a treatment that, if it cannot cure her, will at least prolong her life. Each woman's family and friends, coworkers, and caregivers will worry deeply about her.

Today in America, 150 women will die of breast cancer. Their lives will be ended prematurely, their family, friends, coworkers and caregivers will be grief-stricken. Listen to the enormity of the disease: Fully one out of nine women in this country will get breast cancer, one out of nine women. Since 1960, nearly 1 million women have died from this disease. With their deaths, millions of their loved ones, including children and aging parents dependent upon them, have suffered as well. We stagger under these numbers, even as we search for the causes and for a cure.

All women are at risk for breast cancer, with the incidence increasing among older women and the mortality rate higher for African American women. While other factors that may put a woman at risk are being thoroughly investigated, we are still, ourselves, at risk for feeling helpless in the face of this killer. I speak about this with personal experience. In 1992, my own wife contracted breast cancer. Ernestine had a mastectomy and chemotherapy for 6 months. As I sat and watched the devastating impact of chemotherapy on her body, I thought to myself, 100 years from now people will look back and maybe consider this treatment like the leeches of the 18th century, it is so devastating. She persevered. It was a trauma for our whole family. It was, for me, the moment