

argue the case for NATO's double enlargement to the American people than it is for NATO's eastward enlargement alone. Americans understand that we have vital interests in Europe and they are willing to do their share to ensure that the new Europe which is emerging remains stable. They understand a strategy that posits that we and the Europeans are in this together and that we will work together to defend shared interests—both in Europe and beyond. What they will not understand is an arrangement where the United States is asked to do more in terms of extending new security guarantees, and more in terms of budgetary commitments, in order to extend stability to Europe's eastern half—and at the same time be expected to carry, more or less on its own, the responsibility for defending common Western interests outside of Europe.

#### RUSSIA

This brings us to a discussion of Russia. We all know how important Russia's future is for the future of European and international security. But where does Russia fit into the vision of the trans-Atlantic relationship I have laid out? My vision of the alliance does not depend on the existence or possible emergence of a new Russian threat in the East. We do not want an alliance whose vitality and success depends on failure in Russia. Instead, we want a Russia that will successfully reform—and whose success at reform make it a more interesting and useful strategic partner for the alliance.

The United States and Europe have an enormous stake in the success of the reform process in Russia. A stable and reformed Russia can be an active partner in maintaining security in Europe, in resolving regional conflicts, and in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We wish to establish a strategic partnership with Russia that takes account of Russia's position in Europe, a partnership that could and should, lead to formalized relationship with the alliance.

Russia's place, in my vision, is clear. I do not see Russia as a candidate member of the alliance. Russia is simply too big, too different. No member of the alliance today or in the foreseeable future would be willing to extend an article 5 guarantee to the Russo-Chinese border. And the Russians—unlike the East Europeans—are not really interested in assuming the obligations and responsibilities that NATO membership entails. At the same time, Russia will inevitably be more than a mere neighbor of this new and enlarged alliance. We hope it will become a partner, indeed a country with which we have a privileged partnership.

The NATO I envision is one which guarantees stability in Central Europe, a stability which is just as much in Russia's interest as our own. The Russians should realize that enlargement is not directed against anyone, certainly not against them. Stabilizing democracy in Eastern Europe does not

threaten democracy in Russia. Russia will be better off with Poland in NATO than outside of NATO. A Poland that is secure within NATO will be less anti-Russian and more interested in cooperation and bridge building. We cannot save reform in Russia by postponing or retarding reform in Eastern Europe.

The Alliance can and should have close strategic relations with Russia. NATO and Russia are allies in IFOR in Bosnia. We hope that this is not a one time affair but the start of a longer and more stable relationship. I hope to see the day when the border between an enlarged NATO and its Eastern neighbors, including Russia, are just as stable and secure as any others in Europe.

But it takes two to tango. Moscow has increasingly spoken out against enlargement, with some Russian commentators already bringing out their list of real or imagined countermeasures that they claim Moscow will have to take. Such talk is counterproductive.

I belong to those who not only supported NATO enlargement from the outset, but who believed that the Alliance should have moved sooner and more resolutely in enlarging. The Clinton administration, as well as the Alliance as a whole, opted for a slower approach than I would have preferred. And they did so in the hope that dealing with Moscow on the NATO enlargement issue would get easier over time as Russia came to understand the Alliance's true motivations.

But by now I think it is crystal clear that a policy of postponing key decisions has not made our lives easier. Some in Russia have misinterpreted Western patience as a sign of Alliance weakness and lack of resolve. Some Russians still believe that they can stop enlargement—and some of them are still tempted to try. As it has become increasingly clear that Russians do not support NATO enlargement, our policy increasingly looks to them like a kind of Chinese water torture. For several years, NATO has issued every couple of months a statement saying that it will enlarge, to which Moscow feels obliged to say that it opposes enlargement. When nothing happens, some observers in Moscow think that they have slowed or even stopped the NATO train.

It is too late now to go back and undo the policy decisions on timing. What is important now is that NATO not waver, that it stick to the agreed-upon timetable and move ahead with the initial decision on enlargement—irrespective of the outcome of the Russian elections.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Let me sum up.

There are many other factors that could yet shape the U.S. politics of NATO enlargement. If democratic reforms in the candidate states were to stall, the entire enlargement plan might be put on hold. It also makes

some difference whom the next President appoints to key posts such as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Overall, however, while ratification of new NATO members faces many obstacles and pitfalls, there is little evidence for the claim that it is politically infeasible.

The real tragedy would be if the Senate, in successfully encouraging the administration through legislation to proceed with the inclusion of new members in the Alliance, jeopardized or neglected the development of a bipartisan consensus and public support necessary to secure the 67 votes it will take in the Senate to ratify NATO enlargement.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that the previous consent agreement regarding controlled time be amended as follows: Senator COVERDELL, or his designee, be in control from 4 p.m. to 5 p.m.; Senator DASCHLE, or his designee, be in control of 60 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry, if I might. It is my understanding that the hour from 4 to 5 has been designated to myself or my designee, is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The time between 4 and 5 is to be under the control of the Senator from Georgia.

#### KEEPING CAMPAIGN PROMISES

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I am just going to make a very brief statement to begin this hour. I understand the Presiding Officer would like to comment. So if he will allow me, I will make an opening statement, and then I will relieve him in the Chair so that he might make the remarks he chooses.

Mr. President, I have always felt that there should be a relevance, a connection, a linkage between what a public policymaker contends or discusses in