EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

AMERICAN INTERESTS, USE OF FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

HON. TILLIE K. FOWLER

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 26, 1996

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, in the post-cold war world, one of the most pressing issues that faces this Nation is determining where our Nation's true security interests lie. There has been a dearth of real debate on this topic, and U.S. defense policy and foreign policy sometimes seem to be on auto-pilot, in spite of the fact that the current administration is deploying our defense forces around the globe with some regularity to address various concerns.

I strongly believe that we can no longer afford this kind of a policy vacuum, and that we must undertake a comprehensive review of our national security status in order to fill it. I recently read an article by my National Security Committee chairman, Mr. SPENSE, in the Brown Journal of World Affairs, which echoed my concerns and contained some excellent commonsense suggestions. I would like to ask for unanimous consent to include it in the RECORD following my remarks.

WHAT TO FIGHT FOR? AMERICAN INTERESTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

(By Floyd D. Spence)

Last fall, the House National Security Committee held a series of hearings exploring the issue of American troops being deployed to Bosnia. Yet, even while the committee immersed itself in the particulars of the Balkan crisis, there was a more profound, overarching issue that remained unaddressed: in the post-Cold War World, what U.S. interests justify the use of American military force?

In this context, the debate over Bosnia was joined too late and ended too quickly. Indeed, Americans have studiously avoided confronting the issue of the relationship between national interests and the use of military force, and for good reason. It is a complex and difficult issue, and one that five decades of Cold War containment policy obscured. This nation simply has not comprehensively addressed the most basic question about what interests are worth fighting and dying for since the early 1950s.

Much of this inertia is a natural result of almost fifty years of preoccupation with the Cold War. The timing of the Soviet empire's collapse was so sudden that is has left American policymakers somewhat stunned. While we were successfully waging the Cold War, policymakers never planned for victory, especially one so complete.

Still, it has been more than six years since the Berlin Wall came down. One has only to reflect on the number and variety of major operations conducted by the U.S. military since 1989—Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, the enforcement of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and Bosnia, and now the commitment of 25,000 U.S. ground troops to Bosnia—to recognize that more serious thinking about our security interests is overdue.

In and of itself, the dramatic reduction that the U.S. military has undergone in the last decade ought to be sufficient reason to compel us to do a better job of establishing priorities. ''Doing more with less'' is an accurate description of the U.S. military over the past several years, but it is a slogan, not a plan, and a recipe for eventual failure. One certain constant of a post-Cold War world is that American might and global presence will remain central to the promotion and protection of our interests and will, similarly, play an instrumental role in shaping and sustaining an international order that is consistent with these interests.

In the immediate chaotic aftermath of the Cold War's end, the implosion of the Soviet empire, the reunification of Germany, and the conduct of the Gulf War were the central security preoccupations of the Bush administration. While the Bush administration's ''New World Order'' represented a rhetorical embrace of the impending international uncertainty, in practice, the administration's employment of American military power nonetheless reflected a cautious, measured approach toward the use of force.

''Cautious'' and ''measured'' do not characterize the Clinton administration's evolving approach to the use of American military force. The current national security strategy of engagement and enlargement seems more a prescription for solving the world's problems, without discriminating between those problems that affect the United States and those that do not. President Clinton sees virtually limitless opportunities to use the smaller U.S. military in an untraditional and quixotic manner ''to construct global institutions.'' Where previous administrations have used force to advance American national security interests, the current administration seeks to secure ''the ideals and habits of democracy'' with little regard for where, how, or at what cost. The deployment of more than 23,000 soldiers and Marines to Haiti, costing more than $1 billion in unbudgeted funds, is a perfect example.

The result, as Michael Mandelbaum concluded in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, has been ''foreign policy as social work.'' Mandelbaum, who served as one of President Clinton's early policy advisors, observed that where previous administrations had been concerned with the ''the powerful and potentially dangerous members of the international community, which constitute its core,'' the Clinton administration has paid more attention to ''the international periphery.''

In fact, by repeatedly deploying U.S. armed forces to ''the international periphery,'' the Clinton administration has strayed further even than Madelbaum suggests. It is one thing to divert national attention to matters of peripheral strategic importance; it is quite another to employ American military might repeatedly and put national prestige at risk where true security interests are not involved. In a world where the United States remains the only superpower, conducting national security policy as social work is a grave mistake. Security policy must always remain focused on the powerful ''core'' of the international community.

The administration's national security policy seems premised upon the idea that the end of the Cold War has ''radically transformed the security environment.'' While it is true that Red Army divisions no longer face NATO across a West German border that no longer exists, what is perhaps most noteworthy about the post-Cold War world is the remarkable continuity of American security interests.

Treating the Cold War conflict as a radical aberration in the history of international politics quickly leads to dangerous assumptions about the desired ends and means of U.S. national security policy in the post-Cold War world. Why did we consider the Soviet Union a threat? For three fundamental reasons: their massive nuclear arsenal could destroy the American homeland in a matter of minutes; their large conventional forces endangered the broader balances of power in Europe, East Asia, and the energy-producing regions of the Middle East; and their sponsorship of destabilizing political movements in the Third World threatened to undermine the foundations of the international state system.

Today, American security interests and strategic objections have changed very little, except that rather than facing the same adversary in every theater, we now confront multiple antagonists driven less often by ideology than by deeply felt national, ethnic, and religious hatreds. And our tasks remain constant. As essayist Charles Krauthammer recently testified to the National Security Committee, ''The role of the United States is to be the ultimate balancer of power in the world, and to intervene when a regional balance has been catastrophically overthrown and global stability threatened.''

Protection and promotion of U.S. security interests in the post-Cold War world will require as much effort, and arguably more, as before the Berlin Wall crumbled. There is no single, overwhelming threat, as was the case with the former Soviet Union, that will serve as the central planning factor in addressing questions of national interest, the use of force, and the linkage between the two. But even if the monolithic global threat of Soviet military aggression and communist ideology has dissipated, global questions endure. If American policymakers hope to find answers relevant to today's environment, they need to begin by taking at least three steps.

First, policymakers must realize that the United States cannot afford to take its strategic alliances for granted. Indeed, the lack of a clear and present Soviet threat has already revealed the fragility of the alliances that this nation relies upon, in large part to protect its regional interests and promote regional stability. One of the more serious lessons of the Bosnia conflict is that NATO will not go where America does not lead it, and that an alliance constructed to contain the Soviet Union cannot be reworked overnight to do things it was never designed to do. But alliance leadership, while necessary, is not sufficient; wise leadership is essential. In Bosnia, the Clinton administration is leading NATO in pursuit of what a majority of Americans see as a peripheral national interest.

Second, we must be measured in the application of military force. This does not mean employing the minimal force necessary to accomplish a mission. Such false economies lose wars and kill soldiers. Rather, it means

maintaining a parsimonious attitude—grounded in a realist's appreciation of national interests—about how and where the U.S. military should be employed. America's shrinking armed forces must remain the preeminent tool of U.S. international diplomacy in times of peace and the ultimate arbiter in times of war. Thus, their capabilities and resources should not be expended on the international periphery.

And finally, here at home, we must preserve properly sized and shaped military forces in anticipation of continued challenges to our security interests. A shrinking military establishment, devoted to a growing number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, will not be able to respond to more ominous challenges to U.S. interests or threats to regional and international stability. If history is any guide, it is only a matter of time before such broad challenges emerge. As Donald Kagan concludes in his epic survey, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, ''The current condition of the world * * * where war among the major powers is hard to conceive because one of them has overwhelming military superiority and no wish to expand, will not last.'' We stand a far better chance of helping to stabilize the post-Cold War world if we prove ourselves wise stewards of our superpowers status, continue to devote the resources necessary to prepare our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who preserve it, and judiciously employ armed force where the strategic stakes justify the risks.

The optimistic supposition of Western democracies that peace is the normal human condition is prevalent in the Clinton administration's approach to national security issues. But change (often accompanied by turmoil and conflict), not peace, is the natural human condition. The United States must preserve and reserve its military to deter and, if necessary, to resist those violent changes that threaten the peace or our global security. Conversely, we must be willing to accept change, even violent change, that we do not like but that occurs at the international periphery. Thus, while the nation recoiled in horror from the brutalities of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, fundamental questions of national security interest were not adequately confronted and certainly never answered prior to the commitment of a large force of American ground troops.

One of the notions now in fashion among defense intellectuals is the idea of ''strategic uncertainty.'' In sum, it reflects the belief that because the United States does not know who will challenge its vital interest or exactly where or when such challenges will occur, we are unable to adequately size or shape our military forces. However, if we approach the coming century by focusing on our consistent and central security interests—defense of the homeland; preventing a hegemonic power from dominating Europe, East Asia, and the world's energy supplies; and preserving a degree of international stability—the heralded uncertainty of the post-Cold War era will prove less perplexing. Defining what interests should be protected, while still challenging, will be a more straightforward exercise. and as a nation we will be in a far stronger position to know when we should ask our sons and daughters to fight, shed blood, and sacrifice their lives.

HONORING TINA HANONU

HON. VERNON J. EHLERS

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 26, 1996

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize and honor Tina Hanonu, a 12-year employee of the U.S. House of Representatives, who recently served as a staffer with Representative SHERWOOD BOEHLERT of the 23d District of New York and as the volunteer president of the House System Administrators Association.

Tina began her career on the Hill in 1984. She served as an advisor and consultant to Representative CONNIE MORELLA and went on to become a senior systems administrator for Representative BOEHLERT. She recently advanced her career in the House of Representatives, from that of a systems administrator, to become a senior technical representative for House Information Resources.

Tina has a real knack for organizing and problem solving. She has always taken the lead in mobilizing systems administrators and other computer user groups on the Hill. She has worked tirelessly to help solve problems and find solutions for others in performing their daily jobs. With her busy schedule she also found time to be a cofounder of the House Systems Administrators Association in 1990. She served as president of the group from 1993 until leaving to work with House Information Resources.

Under her leadership the House System Administrators Association has become a key organization in the House's efforts to use technology to better serve the country. Tina has been a great help not only to her employing office, but to the entire House of Representatives.

Over the years Tina has worked to forge better relationships between Member offices and House resource organizations. She can be credited with aiding in the growth and development of her peers and colleagues throughout her career in the House of Representatives.

As chairman of the Computer and Information Resources Working Group of the House Oversight Committee, I am determined to have our new computer system as user-oriented as possible. Individuals like Tina are invaluable in helping us develop such a system.

I, as well as the entire U.S. House of Representatives, recognize and congratulate Tina Hanonu for all of her hard work and dedication to this institution.

DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997

SPEECH OF

HON. GIL GUTKNECHT

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 24, 1996

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3814) making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes:

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer my support for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. DEUTSCH]. This national training initiative is a good next step in our continuing efforts to protect communities all across our Nation.

Dealing responsibly and effectively with cases of missing and exploited children is an immense undertaking, and we here in Congress should strive to assist our law enforcement officials to the best of our abilities. Whether we offer guidelines for community notification systems, Federal tracking plans, or now Federal training programs, our end goal is always public protection. But a coordinated and professional response by law enforcement officials from all over the country will help ensure quick and decisive action if such horrific cases occur.

I am proud to support the inception of the Jimmy Ryce Law Enforcement Training Act, along with the dedicated personnel of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children [NCMEC]; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, National Crime Information Center [NCIC]; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Child Abduction and Serial Killer Unit [CASKU]; Morgan P. Hardiman Task Force on Missing and Exploited Children; and the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP].

This is a good effort to wage a collective fight against some of the worst criminals in our country. I look forward to seeing this training program established.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 3734, WELFARE AND MEDICAID REFORM ACT OF 1996

SPEECH OF

HON. DONALD A. MANZULLO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 24, 1996

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, Paul Swanson from Lake in the Hills, IL, which I represent, knows what welfare reform means to him. Paul is a carpenter, a secretary for a union PAC committee and believes in welfare reform. Let me quote from Mr. Swanson's letter:

> More people going to work will reduce the welfare burden and thereby reduce taxes.

You see, Paul is one of those forgotten Americans, who get up at the break of day, pack their lunch, send their kids off to school, and are working harder than ever in their lives, but having less money to spend. The reason Paul has less to spend is that taxes are too high, and it takes high taxes to support the welfare state. Our goal is to help the Paul Swansons of this world by reforming welfare so that less money is spent on welfare, and Paul Swanson would have more money to spend on his family.