

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

AMERICA AND EUROPE—A TIME
FOR UNITY, A TIME FOR VISION

HON. TOM LANTOS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 10, 1997

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, just a few days ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies organized an outstanding conference in Brussels of leading European and American government, parliamentary, business, and intellectual leaders. A number of our colleagues were invited to attend and participate, and the Speaker of the House and the Democratic leader both strongly encouraged Members to participate in this outstanding conference.

Mr. Speaker, we are at a critical period in the relationship between the United States and the countries of Europe. We have—gratefully—come to the end of the half-century long cold war, but as yet we have not resolved the nature of the post-cold war world. We have not yet completed this important period of change and reordering of international relationships. We are on the eve of momentous decisions regarding the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty, and there is a solid consensus on the importance and wisdom of inviting a number of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to become members of NATO, with the prospect of further enlargement later. The European Union is moving toward inviting several of these same countries to become full members of the European Union.

At the same time that we are facing these changes in the international arena, however, we in the United States have entered into a period of more inward focus, and our domestic preoccupation unfortunately runs directly counter to what our role ought to be at this time of great fluidity in the international system. This is a time when leadership and far-sighted international statesmanship is needed by the United States and from the United States. We must actively and constructively participate in the shaping and forming of the post-cold war international system. It is essential that we actively participate because of our extensive economic, political, cultural, and other interests throughout the world.

This CSIS conference was particularly important in reaffirming and helping key participants define and redefine the Trans-Atlantic community of interests that we in the United States share with our friends in Europe—interests that are expressed through our commitment to NATO, our relationship with the European Union and its member states, and growing multiplicity of ties with the newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union.

Mr. Speaker, this excellent CSIS conference was most ably chaired by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security Advisor to President Carter and a distinguished scholar, and M. Jacques Delors, the distinguished French diplomat and former President

of the European Commission of the European Union. Both of these outstanding men guided the conference through a series of extremely productive discussions that more than fulfilled our hopes for this conference.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that Dr. Brzezinski's concluding remarks at the CSIS conference be placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and I urge my colleagues to read them carefully and thoughtfully. His observations are particularly significant in putting into context the importance of the decisions we and our allies and friends in Europe face. These are choices that will affect the future of our Nation and of the world—and our choice is either actively to participate by taking positive steps to influence the future or passively to watch as conditions develop that will profoundly affect our Nation but with or without our active participation in shaping them.

AMERICA AND EUROPE: A TIME FOR UNITY, A
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(By Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski)

Ladies and gentlemen, let me say that I personally feel very grateful for having had the opportunity to participate in these sessions, and also to serve as co-chairman with Jacques Delors who has added so much gravitas and distinction to our proceedings.

As we come to an end of what has been a very rich, very diversified discussion, I would like to share with you my own sense of what I have extracted from our dialogue. Obviously, it would be futile to recapitulate its various fine points or to replicate the specific foci of our debates.

I come away, however, with an intensified awareness of the fact that we stand before two grand challenges to which we jointly have to respond. In effect, we have to fashion two grand bargains for the next decade. The first involves a trans-Atlantic relationship, and particularly insofar as the United States is concerned, we have to come to terms with the fact that if Europe is to be our partner, it has to be an equal partner. There is a fundamental truth in this assertion and an enormous operational difficulty. Partnership has been the American rhetoric for years. It is the official rhetoric of our bureaucracy, but it is not necessarily practiced. And I think that we will have to adjust, step by step, to the idea that if Europe is to be a partner, there will have to be operational and institutional adjustments in how we make decisions and how we share responsibilities. And that will mean some American concessions.

But it also means something else. It means that Europe has to be there. We cannot create Europe for the Europeans. A European Europe has to be built by the Europeans. If America is to be Europe's partner, and if Europe is to be America's equal partner, Europe has to be prepared to shoulder larger responsibilities, and more equal burdens. And that is a very major undertaking which sometimes is overlooked by those who insist on greater equality across the Atlantic, on equality in decision making but not necessarily on equality in the burdens of decisions. So this is a task for the two of us.

The second task is that NATO and Russia have to agree on an accommodation which acknowledges the reality of a larger Europe, and of a Europe that by virtue of being larg-

er, involves also a larger Euro-Atlantic alliance. Russia and NATO have to agree, therefore, in that context, not only on the relationship, but on a role for Russia in the larger context of European security and in relationship to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. And that requires us to formulate serious proposals—which we are in the process of doing—for joint consultations, for some co-participation in the discussions pertinent to regional security policies and actions. But it also means that Russia has to accept reciprocal obligations. It is not only a matter of Russia having a voice which pertains—and I am being careful in my wording—not determines, but which pertains to NATO decisions. It does not only mean concessions which are reassuring to Russia regarding NATO troop deployments or weapons deployments. It also means symmetrical Russian concessions regarding NATO's voice on pertinent Russian decisions regarding troop deployments or weapons deployments. For example, NATO already has made a peremptory and preemptive concession (without even asking would-be members) on the question of NATO nuclear deployments on the soil of new members. I actually happen to feel confident that the new members would not want to have nuclear weapons on their soil, but they probably would have preferred to make that decision themselves once members of the NATO alliance. Nonetheless, NATO in its wisdom has already told the Russians that it will refrain from the deployment of nuclear weapons on the soil of new members.

I think it behooves us also to ask the Russians about the prospects for nuclear demilitarization, at the very least, of the Kaliningrad segment, which happens to be located in Central Europe and is very pertinent to the security of the Scandinavian-Baltic region. It is very pertinent to the security of Germany; it is very pertinent to the security of Poland. Similar questions could be raised regarding troop deployments on the western frontiers of Russia, particularly next to the very vulnerable Baltic Republics. In brief, the grand bargain with Russia has to involve, also, reciprocal understandings, reciprocal obligations. It is essential that these grand bargains be both completed because failure in either case would entail negative consequences.

If we do not accept, in a real sense, Europe as an equal partner, I rater fear that the United States will be torn in the years to come by the opposite poles of unilateralism and isolationism. If we and Europe do not share burdens in common, do not make decisions in common, do not have a genuine reality of partnership, the American public on the one hand will occasionally veer towards isolationism; on other occasions, it will favor unilateralism and even wallow in it. And that real risk could, over time, adversely affect the quality of the very unique relationship that we have with each other.

If Europe fails to unify and thus to become a genuine partner, I think it is a fair question to ask whether the forces of historical pessimism now at work in Europe will not begin to prevail over the forces of historical optimism in Europe.

Looking at Europe from the vantage point of America, but exploiting somewhat my own European antecedents, I sense that there are conflicting forces at work in contemporary European societies. That the era

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

of optimism, of Europeanism, may be challenged by forces which are much more inward oriented, which in some cases can be more domestically narrow minded, occasionally, even ethnically or religiously xenophobic. This would not be good for Europe. It certainly would complicate Europe's relationship with us, irrespective of what would happen in the American orientation.

If we do not reach the grand bargain with Russia, there is the risk that Russia will be more antagonistic, and that is something that we want to avoid. Though in seeking to avoid it, we should not be shy in saying publicly that the expansion of NATO will in fact help a democratic Russia. We should not be shy in saying it, and we should not be shy in coupling this with saying that the expansion of NATO will hurt an imperial Russia. And we should not be shy in saying that either, because that pertains to the fundamental question regarding Russia itself, namely what will Russia be in the future. This is a large, creative dynamic nation undergoing a profound crisis of self-definition. The collapse of the Soviet Union has brought home the reality to many Russians that the four hundred year long imperial history of Russia has come to an end. But many find it very difficult to accept that and this is particularly true of the former Soviet foreign policy establishment, which is now the Russian foreign policy establishment. The idea of the multinational Russian imperial power still is deeply rooted, providing the basis, therefore, for Russia's claim to global status. What the Russians should realize—they have to realize—is that if Russia is again to be a great country, it can only be a great country if it democratizes itself and modernizes itself, and indeed, the two probably go hand-in-hand. But the quest for an imperial restoration is futile, counterproductive, and we will not support it. And we will not pay a price to avoid Russian antagonism that the for the sake of avoiding the antagonism makes that restoration, perhaps, more feasible.

So failure to have the grand bargain would be regrettable. But even worse than that would be if NATO just expands a little bit or cuts a deal with Russia which dilutes NATO's identity by de facto making Russia a member of NATO while promising that there will be no further expansion. For that I think would be profoundly demoralizing to those who would be left out, and profoundly destabilizing, in terms of the future, for it would create a zone of disappointment, psychological vulnerability, as Congressman Lantos said yesterday, and geopolitical anxiety which would be fully justified. And it would create temptations in Russia to define itself in a historically adverse fashion. So the failure to have a grand bargain would be regrettable, but a grant bargain which dilutes NATO, and which limits the progressive expansion of the Euro-Atlantic scale would be even worse.

And the worst of all would be failure to deliver on that which we have undertaken, which is to expand, because we made a decision. We have made it, all sixteen of us have made it. We are committed. And if we now fail to go through with it, either in July, or more likely in the ratification process, we will be signaling that we have neither the will nor the capacity nor the determination to shape the kind of world we want to have which is democratic, pluralistic and secure. This is a fundamental historical challenge.

Thus at issue are three great realities: what is the global role of America, and how we share our global responsibilities with Europe as a partner who partakes of the same philosophy and values; at stake is the question whether Europe will be Europe, a real Europe, and not a truncated Europe, or worse, a Europe that is divided; and, ultimately at stake is also the question of how Russia divines itself, and whether it will

someday be a party of that larger community of which America and Europe are currently engaged in constructing.

Those are the great challenges that we face. And, therefore, the kind of judgments that we were making yesterday and today are not only strategic, they are historical. And the choice, I think is clear. If we have the vision, I trust we will also have the will.

KENYA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

HON. BILL MCCOLLUM

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 10, 1997

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, just as the international trade between Europe and East Asia and the flow of oil out of the Middle East are becoming increasingly important for the well-being and growth of the U.S. economy, a new threat to the safety of maritime transportation has emerged. Iran is rapidly moving to acquire blue water capabilities—the ability to use its navy on the high seas.

The Iranians are vastly improving their naval capabilities—a development of global strategic importance. The recent completion of a few acquisition programs of naval vessels and antishipping missiles from the PRC and the arrival of the third KILO submarine from Russia boosted Tehran's self-confidence in its ability to conduct combat operations on a far wider area. These weapons deliveries constitute a major upgrade of Iran's naval capabilities. Moreover, the recent deliveries are but the first phase of a major and far more comprehensive naval expansion program, mainly based on the acquisition of numerous surface combatants from the PRC, that will take several years to complete. By then, Iran will have the most powerful navy in the Persian Gulf region.

Ultimately, however, most significant is the doctrinal development reflecting strategic self-confidence and audacity demonstrated by Iran's recent naval operations. Iran is increasingly looking into acquiring regional blue-water capabilities. The Iranian Navy already has proven the capability to operate over long distances. Most impressive were their operations during joint naval exercises with the Pakistani Navy throughout the Arabian Sea, and the visits to Indonesia by their naval combatants. The Iranian Navy has also operated from several port facilities in Sudan and Somalia, where Iran maintains what amounts to several military and naval bases.

The significant development of early 1997 is Iran's acquisition of access to, and use of, naval facilities in Mozambique. In return for diversified military aid, the Iranian Navy will be able to use port facilities in Maputu and Ncala, where the Soviets and Cubans built military-compatible port facilities. The agreement between Iran and Mozambique specifically permits Iran to use the port facilities for its submarines, including the stationing of technical support teams in Mozambique and the maintaining of replenishment and crew-support installations.

The true significance of all these activities becomes apparent in the context of assertive military doctrine—to forestall, perhaps even launch preemptive strikes against, U.S. intervention in case of a major escalation in the Persian Gulf region.

The key to Tehran's war plan in the Persian Gulf is preventing quick U.S. military intervention. Hence, it is imperative for Tehran to be

able to prevent the timely arrival of U.S. Naval Forces. Tehran is determined to acquire military capabilities to perform this mission. Considering the disparity between the United States and Iranian Navies, the only way the Iranians can affect an American intervention is by actually seeking out and engaging the United States Naval Forces far away from the Persian Gulf before they can affect other activities in the region.

Iran need not engage primary objectives such as carrier task forces. For example, the sinking of the repositioned ships operating from Diego Garcia will significantly hinder any U.S. military buildup in the Middle East. Moreover, a credible threat to these resupply ships will compel the U.S. Navy to divert naval assets that could have been used offensively elsewhere to escort and protect the resupply efforts.

Iran's ability to maintain submarine patrols between Mozambique and the Arabian Sea constitutes this kind of threat, for they create a barrier between Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. One should remember that Iran is capable of threatening the shipping lanes along the Red Sea from its bases and facilities in Sudan and Somalia. Tehran is convinced that in case of a major war in the Persian Gulf, this kind of naval operation will be able to delay an intervention by the United States until it is too late to save the local Arab governments.

In the meantime, Teheran continues to raise the ante against the United States, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and specifically Saudi Arabia. Anticipating a new round of brinkmanship and a possible eruption in the Middle East, Teheran warns the Arab States against permitting the United States to operate against the Iranians. In early February 1997, Ayatollah Khomeini delivered explicit threats during his al-Quds Day sermon. "If any of these foreigners in the Persian Gulf makes one miscalculated move that could lead to instability, the first country that will burn will be the one that invited these foreigners here in the first place," he declared.

This strategic development is not irreversible. There are ways to remedy the situation. The key to countering and reversing this Iranian surge lies in the West being able to operate in the area and project power from local installations. In this context Kenya's strategic importance cannot be underestimated.

Kenya's geopolitical status is critical to the international community. It is situated in a key position to dominate sea lanes running into and out of the Red Sea/Suez Canal, as well as the sea lanes along East Africa. Therefore, Kenya's ability to act as a point of naval projection into the Indian Ocean is most important, particularly in light of possible Iranian-Sudanese attempts to close the Suez Canal, and the potential Chinese incursion into the Indian Ocean. In the event of radical Chinese moves against the Southeast Asian shipping lanes, and the eventual vulnerability of Diego Garcia, only India, Australia, South Africa, and Kenya would be able to effectively provide the springboard for Western security operations in the Indian Ocean. Kenya is the closest bastion, and its port system is at the heart of, the newly expanded theater of operations of the Iranian navy.