

any strategic assets. It is, in other words, a regional problem for Europe.

So why then are we spending 6.5 billion U.S. dollars, and why are we placing a division-size unit of troops in harm's way if it is Europe's problem to solve? Well, perhaps it is because administration officials have repeatedly warned that, if United States troops withdraw, the Europeans will withdraw and the mission will collapse.

Frankly, I am troubled by the implication that we are hostages to the Europeans' unwillingness to solve their own regional problems.

The fact of the matter is that the United States troops in Bosnia have been forgotten. The old saying, out of sight, out of mind, applies to our men and women in Bosnia. That is why I am an original cosponsor of H.R. 1172, the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act.

This bill limits the presence of United States ground troops in Bosnia to the end of 1997 and prevents mission creep. It also requires the administration to report on the steps it is taking to prepare our European allies to take over the mission.

Mr. Speaker, it is time for others to shoulder this military burden, as Uncle Sam already has a \$6 trillion national debt problem of his own.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to bring our troops home. Please join me as a cosponsor of H.R. 1172, the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act of 1997.

#### FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today is the first of three speeches I intend to make on the future of the U.S. military. This afternoon I will address the principles that should shape U.S. military strategy in coming years. In the second speech I will discuss whether projected budgets are sufficient to support U.S. strategy. In the final speech, I intend to consider how we are treating our most important resource for protecting national security, our people, the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces and the civilian personnel who support them.

I intend to begin each of these speeches by making a simple point that Congress is responsible for ensuring that U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to preserve and protect the security of the United States. Let me emphasize the key phrase in this statement: Congress is responsible.

Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Congress, not of the President, let alone of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are not constitutional officers, to determine the size and composition of the Armed Forces. Article I, section 8 of the Con-

stitution, which lists the powers of the Congress, makes this clear. It assigns to Congress the powers to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

It falls to the Congress, therefore, to ensure that our military strength is adequate to defend our Nation and our national interests. Indeed, there is no more important duty placed upon us as Members of this institution than to provide for the common defense. It is a duty which we owe not only to our fellow citizens today, but to the Americans of tomorrow.

We have a duty, as well, not to squander, through short-sightedness and neglect, the sacrifices which generations before us have made to grant us the peace and security with which we are blessed. We have a duty to future generations of Americans to pass on to them the legacy of peace, prosperity, and freedom which has been bequeathed to us.

It is the Congress, therefore, which is ultimately responsible for approving a strategy to guide U.S. military policy and, above all, for establishing a proper balance between national strategy and the resources available to carry it out.

Historically, Congress has often failed in this responsibility. In the years since the end of the cold war, many commentators have noted how badly the Nation has handled the aftermath of major conflicts in the 20th century. After World War I, after World War II, and after the war in Vietnam, we allowed our military forces to deteriorate to a degree that cost us dearly in the conflicts that inevitably arose later on.

In fact, such a failure is not unique to this century. A few years ago, I discovered a speech made in 1923 by then-Army Maj. George C. Marshall that discerned a similar, though not quite identical, pattern of failure even earlier in our history.

Major Marshall, of course, later became the most distinguished American soldier and statesman of this century, as Chief of Staff in the Army in World War II, Secretary of State in the early years of the cold war, and Secretary of Defense during the war in Korea.

"From the earliest days of this country," said Marshall in 1923, "the Regular Army was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity." It was perhaps understandable, he said, that there should be a reduction in the size of the military following a war. But, in fact, he discovered the pattern was not quite so simple.

Often, following a war, the size of the Regular Army was increased above what it had been before the conflict, but then, within a very few years, or even a few months, in some cases it was reduced below the pre-war level. In struggling to comprehend this inconsistency, Marshall offered the following explanation:

"It appears that when the war was over, every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned. So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the war and reasons therefor and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons."

It is this pattern of failure that I fear we may now be repeating. For my own part, I have been debating whether the current era resembles more the period of about 1903 or the period of about 1923. At the turn of the century, the Nation had just won a short, popular war against Spain, after which, support for the Army and Navy ran high. But within a few years, funding for the military was reduced, in part because the world seemed to be comfortably at peace, and many believed that war had become impossible.

Just a few years later, all of Europe was in flames, and by 1917, the United States had declared war on Germany, but without any degree of military preparedness.

□ 1415

Marshall recalled seeing United States soldiers in France at the end of 1917 marching through the ice and snow "without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks." The allies had to continue to hold the line for more than a year before the United States was prepared to participate in the final battles that brought the Great War to a close.

In 1923, the United States had recently participated in what was then the most horrible war in human history. But the public mind, as Marshall lamented, had already forgotten the lessons of that war and the costs of unpreparedness. The majority in Congress could not foresee circumstances in which the United States would again embroil itself in Europe's conflicts, and support for military expenditures had dissolved. Less than 20 years later, we were engaged in an even more destructive global war, for which we were also terribly unprepared.

Today, in the aftermath of a successful conclusion of the cold war with the USSR, we are well on our way to repeating the same mistake of denuding ourselves militarily. The world is no less turbulent or dangerous than it was during the cold war. Regional threats, along with rising terrorism and the possibility of nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation, should cause us to keep up our guard.

Today, a few of my colleagues frequently challenge me with a question

that surely echoed through these Halls in 1903 or 1923. "What is the enemy," I am asked? And with that question, there are many others. Why continue to support more spending for defense when the cold war is over? Why plan for two major regional wars when a second threat did not materialize during the Persian Gulf war? Why continue to pursue expensive, new, advanced weapons when U.S. technology was so dominant in Operation Desert Storm, and when no other nation is spending nearly what we do on military hardware? Why keep a robust force structure and a fair-sized personnel level?

Today, and in the two speeches to follow, I will provide answers to those narrower questions. But to the broader question of what is the enemy, there is no clear and simple answer; as, indeed, there was no clear and simple answer that Marshall could have given in 1923.

For my part, I think any attempt to see into the future is like looking into a kaleidoscope. We never know what new pattern will emerge. We only know that the colors making up the pattern will remain the same. In viewing the future of international affairs, we cannot foresee the new shape of the world, but we know that the colors are those of the human condition, including all the traits of human character and all the circumstances of human life that have ever led to war. Those colors have not changed, and the need to prepare for conflict has not diminished merely because an era of conflict with a particular foe has ended and a new era, of yet uncertain pattern, is emerging.

So to respond to my colleagues who ask, "what is the enemy," I say, true; today we cannot define precisely what the enemy is or will be. We can say, however, that we will fail in our responsibility in this Congress if, once again, we allow the armed forces to be unprepared for the enemies that may emerge.

In fact, as I will argue today, a failure to support a strong military in the present historical circumstances would be even more unfortunate and more unforgivable than in the past for two reasons.

First, today the United States is the only Nation able to protect the peace. In the past we were fortunate that allies were able, often by the narrowest of margins, to hold the line while we belatedly prepared for war. Bismarck once said: "God protects fools, and the United States."

Today, no one else is capable either of preventing conflict from arising in the first place, or of responding decisively if a major threat to the peace does occur. While I trust in God, I believe God has given us the tools we need to keep peace, and it is our task to use them wisely.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, if we fail in our responsibility to maintain U.S. military power, the United States, and, indeed, the world as a whole, may lose an unprecedented

opportunity to construct an era of relative peace that could last for many, many years.

Today, our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability. As such, our military strength is also a means of preventing the growth of one or more new powers that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now foresee.

Because of this, the very limited investment required to maintain our military strength, though somewhat larger than we are making right now, is disproportionately small compared to the benefits we, and the rest of the world, derive from it.

My fellow Missourian, Harry S Truman, stated this clearly: "We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war." These two premises, that the United States alone is able to protect the peace, and that adequate, visible U.S. military power may prevent new enemies from arising in the future, are, it seems to me, the cornerstones of a sound strategy for the years to come. These are the premises that will guide my evaluation of the current reassessment of defense policy, called the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, that the Defense Department is due to deliver to the Congress on May 15.

In the remainder of this statement I want to discuss what I have heard of the strategy that is evolving in the process of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the QDR, what I see as its strengths, and how I think it might be improved.

In carrying out this assessment, I will be referring on occasion to a draft of the QDR statement of strategy that was printed recently in a reliable newsletter called "Inside the Army." To be sure, this is not the final draft of this strategy, which is still to be released officially. It remains subject to change. I will refer to it, nonetheless, because it reflects the thinking going on inside the Pentagon to date, and moreover, because I believe it is a good start in defining a military strategy for the future.

That being said, I do not at all agree with the judgment, which appears to be emerging from the QDR, that the new strategy can be supported with a force smaller than the force determined to be necessary by the QDR's predecessor, the Bottom-Up Review of 1993.

The key theme of the new strategy is that U.S. military forces must be able to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, to respond to the full spectrum of crises when it is in our interest to do so, and to prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.

So the three elements of the strategy are these: Shape, respond, prepare. To shape requires forward deployment of U.S. forces; various means of defense

cooperation with allies, including security assistance; and joint trading with allies and others.

To respond requires the ability to execute the full spectrum of military operations, including showing the flag to deter aggression; conducting multiple, concurrent, small-scale contingency operations; and fighting and winning major theater wars, including the ability to prevail in two nearly simultaneous conflicts.

To prepare requires adequately sized forces for the air, sea, and especially the land; increased investments in weapons modernization; robust efforts to exploit the evolving revolution in military affairs; and investments in research and development that hedge against the evolution of unexpected but potentially dangerous developments in military technology in the future.

Now, there are those who will say of this statement of strategy that it fails because it is not selective enough in defining for what challenges U.S. military forces should prepare. Some have complained that United States military forces are being used too often to respond to crises, like the conflict in Bosnia, that are not directly threatening to United States security. I have sometimes agreed with those complaints.

Others with whom I have not agreed have argued that the United States should give up the Bottom-Up Review strategy of being prepared to prevail in two near-simultaneous regional conflicts, now called major theater wars, and instead prepare for one such conflict plus smaller peace operations.

Still others say we should focus less of our effort on the current challenges to our security and devote much more attention to preparing for potential new threats from a peer or near-peer military competitor in the future.

I think the QDR draft statement of strategy is preferable to any of these alternative views. As against those who would be more selective in identifying commitments, the emerging QDR strategy statements reflects the fact that Presidents have long been able to commit large numbers of U.S. troops to sometimes long-lasting operations abroad pretty much as they see fit.

President Clinton has done so more than others, but he is not alone in asserting his authority as Commander in Chief to undertake major new missions abroad. Since Presidents can define what U.S. interests abroad are vital enough to require the commitment of U.S. forces, then the U.S. military will have to be prepared to carry out an extraordinarily broad range of tasks short of major war.

It would be misleading, for military planning purposes, for a statement of strategy to identify only a narrow range of missions, when, in fact, the military can, at any time, be called on to carry out any imaginable kind of mission while still preparing for major wars.

Indeed, the key flaw of the Bottom-Up Review was that it failed to take account of the demands that would be put on forces by missions other than the requirement to be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

As against those who would give up the Bottom-Up Review's two-war requirement, that, to me, is a prescription for giving up on being a superpower. If we lack the ability to respond to a second crisis should a first arise, then in every case we would be hesitant in committing our forces to action in the first instance. Would we really respond to Saddam Hussein, for example, at the cost of critically weakening our deterrent posture in Korea? That is a choice we should never have to make.

As to those who would spend less on maintaining current readiness in order to invest in future technology, I do not agree that we are in a "threat trough". On the contrary, the evidence of recent years is that the world after the cold war is more turbulent than ever. We have to be prepared to deal with today's conflicts, or we may be critically weakened by confronting the challenges of the future by failure to preserve the peace today.

So a new statement of strategy that calls for forces able to shape, respond, and prepare seems to me to be a valuable contribution to the debate about U.S. military preparedness. It is a demanding strategy, and under current circumstances, one that will be challenging to fulfill. It is a matter of great concern to me, therefore, that everything I have heard about the rest of the QDR is at odds with the requirements implied by the new statement of strategy.

Earlier this year Secretary Cohen assured the Committee on National Security that the QDR process would be driven by the strategy, not by the budget.

The new strategy, it seems very clear, requires forces perhaps larger and certainly more flexible than the forces required by the Bottom-Up Review. The QDR strategy maintains the requirement to prepare for two major regional conflicts, now called major theater wars, and adds to that requirement the need to shape the environment, respond to lesser crises, and prepare for the future. It cannot be done with less. Yet, the QDR is, by all accounts, looking for cuts in the size of the force structure. Indeed, the draft statement of strategy to which I have been referring hints at reasons for cutting forces, despite the strategy.

One way to cut, it says, would be to rely more on reserves. Another is to rely more on allies. I believe that these are merely transparent excuses for making reductions in forces required by budget constraints and not driven by considerations of strategy. The bulk of reserve forces are already built into war plans in a wholly integrated fashion, and other forces constitute a valuable strategic reserve. To depend on al-

lies to be able to carry out our own strategy is the height of folly. At the very least, dependence on allies may force us to limit our strategic goals or make us hesitant to act.

□ 1430

Also, it is not clear that we can depend on the allies to provide forces of the quality we maintain in our own forces. We can and should expect the allies to contribute in the event of major conflicts, as they did during the Persian Gulf war, but we cannot afford to assume allied participation in making our own plans. The strategy emerging from the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding. The remainder of the QDR should address frankly what forces and what weapon investment are needed to carry it out.

Mr. Speaker, the time is now for the Congress to learn from the past and not repeat the mistakes of our predecessors, mistakes that allowed unpreparedness and led to battlefield disasters such as the costly defeat at Kasserine Pass in North Africa in World War II and the destruction of Task Force Smith in the Korean war. Such unpreparedness is paid for in the blood and lives of young Americans.

The warning of Major, later General, George C. Marshall in 1923, though not heeded by his generation, should be heard by our generation. This Congress must not fail in this responsibility.

Mr. Speaker, the 1923 Marshall speech follows for the RECORD.

(By Major George C. Marshall, Jr.)

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—

I must ask your indulgence this afternoon because, until General Gignilliat requested me to make this talk the latter part of the morning, I had no expectation of participating in this meeting.

You gentlemen, I am sure, are all interested in the National Defense, and I would like to talk to you for a few minutes regarding the effect of our school histories on this question.

The Army, which is the principal arm we depend upon for the defense of the country, can hardly be called the result of a slow growth. Its history has been a series of ups and downs, a continuing record of vicissitudes, with which you may be somewhat familiar in more recent years, but I cannot believe many people understand or are aware of what has happened in the past, because it seems improbable that what has happened should continue to happen if our citizens were familiar with the facts.

In looking back through the history of the infantry component of the Regular Army, we find that from the earliest days of this country, it was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity. From eighty men immediately after the Revolutionary War, it was increased to sixteen regiments, about as many regiments of infantry as we have today. In 1798, two years later, it was reduced to eight regiments. With the War of 1812, it was increased considerably and then decreased immediately afterwards. I am not talking about the temporary army, but the Regular Army. Another increase came during the Mexican War, about trebling its size; and immediately thereafter came the inevitable reduction. In the early months of the Civil War it was increased from about eight

regiments to sixteen. But the odd phase of this policy develops in 1866. Then the war was over, but the infantry was increased to forty-six regiments, and suddenly, but a few years later, reduced to twenty-five regiments, with which we entered the war with Spain. In 1901, this number was increased to thirty. Just before our entry into the World War, Congress provided for sixty-five regiments. Thereafter you cannot get an accurate parallel, because the Congress varied its method. Instead of authorizing regiments, it gave us numbers.

When the World War was over, in the summer of 1920, they gave us 285,000 men. Nine months later this was cut to 175,000. Three months later, came a cut to 150,000; followed six months later by a further cut to 125,000. And just by the skin of our teeth we got through this last Congress without a further cut to 75,000.

The remarkable aspect of this procedure to me, and I think to any one, is that both increases and reductions should have been order after the war was over and all within a brief period of time, which can be measured in months. A decrease following the establishment of peace is readily understood, but the combination of two diametrically opposed policies is difficult to comprehend.

In searching for reasons to explain this inconsistency, it appears that when the war was over every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned, the excessive cost of the war in human lives and money. So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the War and the reasons therefor, and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons. Now what has occurred but recently has many precedents in the past. There are numerous ramifications of the same general nature, but the astonishing fact is, that we continue to follow a regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the National Defense. We start in the making of adequate provisions and then turn abruptly in the opposite direction and abolish what has just been done.

Careful investigation leads to the belief that this illogical course of action is the result of the inadequacies of our school histories so far as pertains to the record of our wars, and in a measure, to the manner in which history is taught. During the past few months, the War Department has been concerned as to what might properly be done to correct the defects in the school textbooks which are now being published. Naturally, it is a matter that must be handled very carefully. The Department is loathe to take any positive action, because immediately the Army would be open to the criticism of trying to create a militaristic public opinion. Furthermore, criticism of the existing textbooks would probably arouse the hostility of the publishers, and particularly, of the authors.

Following a discussion between General Pershing and a prominent publisher, several of the more recent school histories were submitted to the Historical Section of the War College, and each reviewed by a number of specially qualified officers. When these reviews were assembled and digested, it became apparent that what had been done in the past, was again in the process of repetition. A reading of these reviews convinces

one that our military history would probably suffer another repetition.

It is apparent that you can talk about the present National Defense Act as much as you please and of the scheme of military education provided in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps Units, etc., but we will repeat our errors of the past unless public opinion is enlightened, and public opinion in these matters depends in a large measure on the written word of our histories, except for a few months immediately following such a National calamity as the World War. It is almost purposeless for the War Department to attempt to make an impression on Congress which is not in accord with public opinion.

When a boy goes to school he studies history. Thereafter I believe less than five per cent of the men of the country continue this study. You gentlemen are of a class apart, and if you were not familiar with the important facts of our military history, certainly no other class of men will be. The lasting impression of the American man on what has happened in the past, is absorbed from his school history. I remember studying Barnes' American History, and I still have, I suppose, the same feeling I acquired then regarding the English nation and the British Army, so depicted in Revolutionary days. In the course of my present occupation it has become necessary for me to learn something of the actual facts in the case, which I have found are often strikingly at variance with many of the ideas Mr. Barnes implanted in my mind.

You gentlemen are no doubt familiar with most of these facts, but I believe there are some of them of which even you are not aware. Certainly the average man is in the dark as to the difficulties our military leaders have invariably encountered. Take the history of the Revolutionary War for example; I imagine there are but few men today who have even a vague idea of Washington's troubles in maintaining his Revolutionary Army,—what they actually were and the causes that lay behind them. Virtually the same difficulties continued to arise in the history of our army and with the same basic reason for their recurrence. Is the average boy given an idea of the lessons of these incidents?

What has the American youth been taught of the War of 1812—that it was one of the most ignominious pages in our history,—wonderful on the sea, splendid at New Orleans,—but in almost everything else, a series of glaring failures and humiliating occurrences? Were you given any such idea as this? In the Mexican War the operations of our armies were carried out in very shipshape fashion, thanks to a long period in which to prepare. But I doubt if there are more than a few people who know that after the capture of Vera Cruz, General Scott's army, preparing for its advance to Mexico City, was well nigh emasculated and rendered impotent by the policy of the Government which permitted a large proportion of the Volunteers to secure their discharges and return home. It has been alleged that this course was intended to wreck any political aspirations of General Scott. But it was an American army on foreign soil far from home, that was imperiled in this fashion.

We find almost an exact repetition of this incident in the Philippines in 1809, when the obligation of the Government to return home the state volunteer troops, left a small force of the Regular Army besieged in Manila until fresh quotas of volunteers could be raised in the United States and dispatched seven thousand miles to its support. We do not realize how fraught with the possibility of National tragedy were these occurrences. Think what the result might have been had our opponent been efficient and made us pay the penalty for such a mistaken policy.

Until recently the Civil War formed the major portion of our military background. In your study of the history of that period was your attention drawn to any conclusions? As to why, for example, the North experienced so many difficulties and failures during the early years of the war, and the South was so uniformly successful? There are very definite reasons for this and therefore, lessons to be drawn, but the one time school boy when he casts his vote at the polls, or represents his District in Congress, must as a rule, base his action on false and misleading premises.

Popular American histories of the World War would more than startle the German reader. It is possible that he might think he was reading of some other struggles in which his country had no part. I will venture the assertion that for every boy who comes out of our public schools realizing that over a year elapsed before America's soldiers could make their first attack on the enemy,—for every youth so informed, there will be a thousand whose attention is not called to this, but who can recite the date on which we entered the war. This may seem a small matter, but it will have a definite effect on every paragraph of legislation attempted for the National Defense.

We talk of Valley Forge in Revolutionary days, and do not realize that American soldiers experienced something very like Valley Forge over in France in the fall of 1917. I have seen soldiers of the First Division without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks, marching ten or fifteen kilometers through the ice and snow. You do not have to go back to Washington's army at Valley Forge for a period of hardships experienced, because of unpreparedness. I have seen so many horses of the First Division drop dead on the field from starvation, that we had to terminate the movements in which they engaged. One night I recall Division Headquarters being notified that the troops in an adjacent village were out of rations and the animals were too weak to haul the necessary supplies. The question to be derived was, should the men be marched to the rations and the animals left to die, or would it be possible to secure other transportation. That was in the fall of 1917. It was a small matter but it reflects the general condition of unpreparedness with which we entered the war, and it was only the strength of our Allies who held the enemy at bay for more than a year, that enabled us to fight the victorious battles which ended the war. The small boy learns that we were successful in the end, but he is carefully prevented from discovering how narrow has been the margin of our success. Good luck has always seemed to be with us and the attending circumstances seem to prove Bismarck's saying that "God takes care of the fools in the United States."

Some of these days, now that we are a dominant, if not the dominant power in the world, we may have to make good without Allies or time or fortuitous circumstances to assist us.

There seems to have been a conspiracy to omit the pertinent facts or the lessons of our military history which would prepare the boy to be an intelligent voter or legislator. So long as this is the case, we will continue in a series of the errors I have been describing.

The study of ancient history reveals innumerable occurrences which have that exact parallel in modern times. There must be some lesson to be drawn. For example: General Pershing recently called attention to the fact that while the Peace Conference was sitting in Paris in 1919, building up the Treaty which we did not accept, there were English soldiers at Cologne, American soldiers at Coblenz, and French soldiers at Mayence,

and a general reserve at Treves, (General Pershing's own Headquarters). Eighteen hundred years before, during a prolonged peace, Roman Legions were stationed at Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence, with a reserve of ten thousand at Treves. The setting was identical with the recent deployment of the Allied troops along the Rhine. There must be some lesson to be drawn from this repetition of history, that is of much more moment than a recollection of the date of the signing of the Peace Treaty.

The other day I had occasion to look up something regarding Phillip Sheridan, who was one of the five Generals of the Army, of which General Pershing is the most recent, and General Washington was the first. After locating my information, I read a little further and came across, what to me, was a most remarkable coincidence.

General Sheridan after the Civil War was sent abroad to observe the operations of the Prussian Army in the Franco-Prussian War. He joined the Staff of the Emperor William west of Metz on the eve of the Battle of Gravelotte. The day after this fight, riding in the carriage of Bismarck, he drove through Point-a-Mousson. This town was the right flank of the American army in the St. Mihiel operation. Turing west, Bismarck and Sheridan drove on to Commercy and were billeted there for the night. They followed the exact route of the American troops being transferred from the St. Mihiel front to the Meuse-Argonne. From Commercy, Sheridan passed on to Bar-le-Duc, and he describes how he stood on a little portico of that town and watched the Bavarians marching through the Central Place as they turned north towards the Argonne in the great maneuver to corner McHahon's French Army on the Belgian frontier. American troops followed this same route and executed the same turn to the north, and I happened to have watched them pass through the Central Place of Bar-le-Duc. With Bismarck, Sheridan drove north to Clermont, following the principal axis of the advance taken by the American army in September, 1918. After a night's billet in that village, they drove through a series of towns, later to be captured by the Americans from Bismarck's descendants, and billeted in Grandpre at the other tip of the Argonne Forest.

Now comes a more remarkable coincidence. General Sheridan describes how he drove from Grandpre through the Foret de Dieulet into Beaumont, where a French division had on that morning been surprised and captured by the Germans. This was the opening phase of the Battle of Sedan. Our Second Division passed through that identical Forest at night and surprised Germans at roll call in the early morning in the streets of Beaumont.

Accompanying the entourage of the Emperor William, General Sheridan pressed on to Wadelincourt, and from a hilltop nearby looked down across the Meuse at the French Army, cornered but not yet captured, at Sedan. A battalion of the Sixteenth American Infantry on November 7, 1918, pressed forward to that same hill and looked down on the Germans in Sedan. Is not this a remarkable coincidence, and does it not point to the uncertainties of the future and the necessity of being prepared for almost any eventuality?

I hope you will pardon my very disjointed remarks and I deeply appreciate your kind attention. (Applause.)

The President, Dr. Newhall: "Factors Contributing to Morale and Esprit de Corps," by General L.R. Gignilliat.