find themselves in agreement on most occasions, look at them and say, you have gone too far this time; we have to draw a line somewhere on this issue; it is not an absolute right for anyone at any point in time under any method to kill their children, that we have to have limits. Even Senator DASCHLE and, to some degree, although minor, Senators FEINSTEIN and BOXER have admitted there is some limit here as to what we can do, on what we should allow in the area of abortion.

The AMA and other professionals in the field have stood up and said this is the line to draw. I hope Members have the courage to stand up and say this is where we draw the line. I commend Members who have done that already. I commend them for their understanding that, frankly, this is less about abortion and more about infanticide; this is more about when we take a baby that is out of the womb, being born, outside of the mother and, frankly, gratuitously kill that baby. We have gone too far. There is no medical reason that a baby four-fifths delivered, everything outside of the mother with the exception of the head, there is no reason to perform a procedure on that baby that kills it at that point. There is no medical reason to protect the life or health of the mother ever to kill the baby at that point. In fact, it is more dangerous for the mother to insert instruments, to puncture bone by stabbing the baby at the base of the skull. That is dangerous to the health and life of the mother. It is obviously very dangerous to the baby.

That is not a safe procedure. You cannot argue that the baby sitting there in that position, that it is for the health of the mother to insert an instrument into the baby's skull. It is not. It can never be. So what we are saying is, whether it is partial-birth abortion or all length, give the baby a chance. Give the baby a chance.

There may be cases, and we understand that—folks who have gotten up and argued to ban this procedure have always recognized that there are situations in which the health and life of the mother are in danger and that separation of the child from the mother is necessary to protect the mother's health and life. But it is never necessary, certainly not by doing this barbaric procedure, to kill the baby in the process. You have a baby four-fifths born with a tiny head that is inches away from that first breath. Let the baby be born. Give it at least a chance to see if that baby can survive. Why do violence to that little baby? There is no medical reason. Why protect a procedure that does violence unnecessarily to little babies who otherwise would be born alive? They may not survive long. They may only survive minutes or hours. But give them the dignity of being born and brought into our human community. Give them the dignity of not having violence be the only thing they know of this Earth. Give them the dignity of life and memory as a part of our human family.

I am very hopeful that as a result of the endorsement of the AMA and other evidence that has come out, we can muster up the moral courage to say no to this procedure. I hope you can.

I hope that anyone who is in the sound of my voice will call, write, fax, E-mail, pray, send any kind of communication they possibly can to Members of the Senate who are going to be voting here tomorrow on this legislation asking that they now look at the evidence presented, look at the changes in the legislation, look at the evidence that has been presented and make the right decision for these children, make the right decision for our culture.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I appreciate so much the remarks of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I associate myself with everything he said, and I intend to speak on this subject tomorrow before we have the final vote. I trust that Members will give it great thought before they make their final decision because we are on the verge of making a determination that I think is very important to the future of this country.

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this evening I should like to take just a very few moments to report, along with my colleague from Connecticut, Senator LIEBERMAN, on the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review. It was released today by the Secretary of Defense. It is the culmination of a very extensive process at the Department of Defense over the shape and makeup, the characterization and the implementation of our Armed Forces for the next several years.

We are at a unique point in our history, particularly as it relates to defense issues. We have come through a period of time when our strategy was primarily based on the threat from another superpower—the Soviet Union—a nuclear threat that required an extraordinary commitment of resources, of manpower, of effort to try to contain and to try to nullify that threat. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the fall of the Soviet Union, with the realignment that has taken place with the United States emerging as the one superpower in the world, we may have the luxury of looking at our defense structure, of making decisions and beginning a process of fashioning our defense forces for the threats of the future and not the threats of the past.

It is important to recognize, as Secretary Cohen has and as acknowledged in this Quadrennial Defense Review which was just released today, this is not a status quo situation. We have made extraordinary strides in terms of reshaping our forces from perhaps what was the peak of our defense effort in 1985, a very, very substantial decline in the number of active duty forces and the percentage of our budget and percentage of our gross national product that is devoted to defense. In the process, much of the framework that puts us in a position to make decisions in the future has at least been initiated, and the QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review, encompasses a lot of that thinking.

Because so often in the Congress we receive the conclusion of the analysis of the Department of Defense after all the decisionmaking process has been conducted and after the options have been evaluated, we do not have those same resources here in the Congress to ask the appropriate questions and get the full view of where we think we ought to go with our national defense policy. So Senator LIEBERMAN and I, along with others, in last year's authorization bill created a National Defense Panel consisting of outside experts in military affairs, who had a lifetime of experience, who could give us through this process a second look, a second opinion. I am pleased that they were able to have access to the process, the thinking process and the decisionmaking process that was undertaken in the Department of Defense on the QDR. They will now undertake a very thorough and very complete analysis of this QDR and report back to Congress. We have their preliminary report. They will report back to Congress no later than December 15 of this year giving us their view of current threats and future threats the United States might face, the strategy that we ought to employ to address those threats, as well as how we ought to implement that particular strategy and how we pay for it.

So we are looking forward at a process, and I have described this process in some detail because I do not want Members to think that this is the final chapter in the book. This really is the initial chapter in the decisionmaking process that has to be undertaken by the Congress and the administration over the next several months, if not several years, as we look into the next century and try to define the national defense strategy and the force to implement that particular strategy.

I will say this: I think the Secretary of Defense and the people who have undertaken this effort, the QDR, have done this in good faith. I think they have asked the tough questions. They have evaluated the various options. They will admit that this is an initial stage of the process and not the final chapter. They will indicate that there is more to come. There are more decisions to be made.

But I also say to my colleagues, a lot of the burden and responsibility also falls on us. The Department of Defense has presented its viewpoint of where we are going in the future, but we are the ones who have to ultimately make the decision as to whether to ratify what they have said, modify what they have

said, or reject what they have said and come up with our own alternatives. There are issues in the QDR Report to which a lot of Members, various Members, are going to say: ''wait a minute, that gets a little too close to home.'' We are talking about two more rounds of base closings. We have reduced our force structure more than a third since 1985, and yet we have reduced our infrastructure, our bases which support that force structure, by only approximately one-half of the amount that we reduced manpower. There is infrastructure that is excessive, and we are looking at a very difficult decision, in terms of how to go ahead and continue to advance the process of closing bases, of scaling back infrastructure, because every dollar spent on a facility or a support function that does not go to support our forces takes resources away from more pressing needs. To simply preserve excess infrastructure because it happens to be in a particular State or particular Member's district, or to preserve it because we were not able to come to a conclusion about closing it results in dollars staying in infrastructure that take away dollars from the very badly needed modernization of our forces, from research and technology, and from support for our active duty forces in terms of their readiness and deployment, et cetera.

So we have to recognize that the decisions that will be made here, whether it is streamlining the Department of Defense, whether it is consolidating or streamlining various defense and support agencies, which is recommended here—I wish the QDR provided recommendations in more detail, but it is recommended here nonetheless—whether it is closing bases, and even decisions on modernization will be made in this Chamber, will be made by these Members, and they will not be easy decisions.

We all recognize, I think, that one of the most important actions we can take, as this report says, is make decisions about modernizing our forces and investing in research and development of new technology. Whether this relates to platforms like tactical air for the Air Force and the Navy, ships for the Navy, land forces for the Army and Marines, or new technology to advance the way they do their business, all of that requires resources. And all of that will have to be done with offsets, because we pretty much have a static budget line. Without an external threat that we can foresee right now and without a major conflict, we are going to be at a pretty level funding appropriation for the next several years. If that is the case, then, if we want to retain the forces readiness, if we want to retain our current forces capability to deal with the threats as we see them, and if we want to restructure and modernize the force, we are going to have to provide them with the resources, and the only place we can get the resources is from existing expenditures.

This report takes us some of the way down that road. I am a little disappointed in the QDR in that it did not more specifically outline how we can go about particularly restructuring the base closing procedure, how we can restructure some of the defense or support agencies, how we can restructure the Reserve and the National Guard to better complement our active duty; but also to define, in some sense, different roles for them in that process, how we could go forward in making the decisions on modernization, what the different options are, and so forth.

I think there are several questions that Congress is going to have to address. I just mentioned modernization. Commitment to modernization, yes, but where do we put that money? What research? What new technologies? What new military platforms—ships, planes, et cetera—should we select? And how many of those should we buy?

These are critical decisions. It is not enough just to say we need to increase our modernization budget. It is where we put those dollars that will be critical to define the military of the future, and how we address these questions about the role of the Guard and Reserve and the reductions in defense infrastructure, which I mentioned earlier. I am disappointed we did not address the medical care issue in the QDR. Clearly, how we provide medical care for our active duty servicemembers and their family members, Reserve forces and others such is a major cost item in the defense budget. That needs to be addressed in the future.

Missile defense, how we allocate funds to missile defense, the Secretary says we have a shortfall in research and development funds for a National Missile Defense System and we need to shift a substantial amount of money, up to $2 billion, into that particular account—where does that money come from? That is not identified.

These are all issues which the Congress is going to have to grapple with in the next several months. Beyond that, we need to ensure that, in our thinking, we realize this is the beginning and not the end of the process. We need to look to outside sources like the National Defense Panel to give us guidance in terms of what the proper questions are: How we look at the scenarios in the future that will require a defense structure to address those challenges; how we devise the right kind of strategy to meet the threats; how we build in the flexibility—because we do not know what all those threats are going to be—how we build in the flexibility to have our forces able to adapt to those threats of the future; how we avoid making critical mistakes in resource allocation that prohibit us from having that flexibility in the future; how we go about implementing all of this and how we come up with the resources to address it.

So there are many, many questions still outstanding. It is an ongoing process. I look forward to working with my colleague, Senator LIEBERMAN of Connecticut, as we explore this, as well as my other colleagues, both on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, as well as our colleagues here in the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend and colleague and, on matters of defense, my partner, Senator COATS from Indiana.

Mr. President, I want to add a few words to those spoken by my colleague about the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was released by Secretary of Defense Cohen earlier today. It has been my pleasure to work with the Senator from Indiana, as well as with our colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator MCCAIN, Senator ROBB, Senator KEMPTHORNE, Senator LEVIN, and many others in a bipartisan effort that led to legislation requiring the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel.

Our intent in sponsoring this legislation, was to drive the defense debate to a strategy-based assessment of our future military requirements and capabilities, not to do a budget-driven incremental massage of the status quo.

We were motivated by two factors in calling for this over-the-horizon review of our defense needs. First, we did not want this to be just another annual report on what our defense needs are. Second, we wanted to force the Pentagon to look beyond the short range and to understand that many of us inside and outside of Congress believe that the decisions we are making today will affect our ability to protect our national security 10 to 20 years out.

From my first review of the Quadrennial Defense Review I would say while the report issued today does not live up to the high expectations I had for it, it is a step forward in the process that Senator COATS has just described. If we want to make defense decisions effectively, we have to consider two dramatic changes that have occurred in our world, which are influencing our defense needs. One is the dramatic and ongoing change in the post-cold-war world; second is the extraordinary change in technology, the transition we have made from an industrial age to an information age, which inevitably will affect the way wars are fought.

Even before it was released, the Quadrennial Defense Review achieved, I think, an important part of our goal by catalyzing a broad and vigorous debate within the Pentagon which engaged more people who considered more options than either of the previous two post-cold-war security assessments done in the Bush administration and then in the first year of the Clinton administration. The reviewing process began, also, to stimulate similar debate outside of the Pentagon and outside of Congress. I believe that all those involved in the Pentagon effort

have done well by debating the controversial questions and in making recommendations they believed were essential, even though some of those did not, in my opinion, go far enough and were not bold enough, and even though some of them are recommendations that will be controversial here in Congress.

I want to particularly draw attention to significant steps forward that are made in the QDR in three critical areas.

First, I believe the QDR has developed a much more comprehensive view of our strategic future military environment than we had from the two previous studies; that is, the way in which the national security environment, will be affected by unconventional threats to our security, including, of course, terrorism and chemical and biological warfare, but also including the capacity of an enemy to strike at us in what the military calls an asymmetrical way, that is, to find our vulnerability, invest much less than we spend on our military, and then to strike at that vulnerability.

Second, I think the QDR has taken some significant steps forward in beginning to deal with management improvements within the Pentagon and in confronting the need for some reductions in manpower and some reductions in acquisition of high-visibility procurement programs and in recommending, as Senator COATS has indicated, two additional rounds of BRAC, of the base closure process. To put it mildly, that will not be popular on Capitol Hill. And, yet, the more you look at the reductions that have already occurred in the size of our military forces and the extent to which we have reduced tooth but not reduced tail, it is hard to conclude that, in the interest of our national security, we do not need to further reduce military infrastructure.

Third, although I would criticize the QDR for being more budget driven than strategy driven, the Pentagon has presented some conclusions about reducing forces that they assume can help bring the defense program more closely and realistically in line with the fiscal assumptions that they are operating under.

Nevertheless, why do I say the report, as I looked at it this afternoon, does not live up to my own hopes for it? I find it to be too much of a status-quo document. While it is true we have reduced personnel and force structure significantly since the close of the cold war, the shape and focus of our military remains substantially what it was then. This report represents, as others have said, essentially a ''salami-slicing'' approach. It is not a dramatic change, nor does it seem to point to future dramatic changes to deal with increased workload for our military forces to respond to the much more complicated geopolitical situation nor to changes in technology, which have created a revolution in military affairs.

Mr. President, as I said a moment ago, the report was more budget driven than strategy driven. Perhaps that is understandable for the Pentagon has to live within the constraints we impose, but I must say, Senator COATS and I and the others did not introduce legislation which called for this Quadrennial Defense Review as a way to cut the defense budget. That might be a result, but a future-oriented review might just as logically lead to an increase in the defense budget, depending on what a strategic review of the world determines that our future defense needs will be. In fact, as you look at the more comprehensive strategic review of the future of the military environment that is in this QDR, it argues for additional capacity to that which the report continues to advocate: Which is the capacity to meet two major regional threats, a series of additional requirements, including terrorism, chemical and biological warfare, missile defense, and peacekeeping. Yet, I don't see the connection between what I think is the more accurately described complicated strategic future we have and the programs the report advocates to meet that future.

The report is not strategy driven. It continues to require that the military be structured to deal with two major regional conflicts but its assessment of the strategic environment raises questions about whether that is an appropriate standard, particularly since one of those conflicts presumably would be on the Korean Peninsula against North Korea, a state that many question will constitute a threat to security very much longer. So, as we look 10 to 20 years out, will our major threat in Asia be on the Korean Peninsula, or will it come from another great power or midsize power that has gained nuclear capability and can disrupt the entire region?

The report makes no recommendations for change to the organization of the current force and only minor changes to the size of that force. As I have indicated, some weapons-purchasing programs were reduced, but no major programs have been canceled. Perhaps even more important, from my own point of view, as we look forward, no new programs were recommended to deal with the extraordinary range of threats and responsibilities that are described in the strategic review part of the report. The explosion in technology could literally and totally change the way enemies will fight us and what weapons they will employ, while at the same time creating enormous opportunities for us, if we wisely and boldly use technology, to fundamentally improve our military capability to defend our interests perhaps in a much more cost-effective way.

I also was disappointed that the report did not deal with the further implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which I think most observers would say has not fully achieved its goals for more jointness. The fact is, too much of what happens in the Pentagon and our military still happens in the stovepipes of the four services. We do not see enough cooperation across service lines—joint training, for instance—to either achieve the dollar savings or the increases in fighting effectiveness that many observers think will come from increased jointness.

Mr. President, a final word. There is a brief reference to space and the role space may play in future warfare. Remember, we are talking about 10 to 20 years from now. It is hard to imagine as we see the world depend more and more on space-based satellites that our future enemies will not rely on a wide range of space-based capabilities to fight us. It seems to me this suggests a very, very urgent need for us to consider the implications of that for our future military preparedness, including very controversial questions, which I think we have to consider in the responsible exercise of our duties, whether we should proceed with what might be called the weaponization of space, and what we should do to develop capacity to defend against attacks on us from space.

In summary, I feel strongly that we need to act more boldly and broadly now. We need to stop doing business as usual now so we can better respond to the challenges of the future, and that goes not just for those in the Pentagon, but also for those of us in Congress, because the decisions that we are making today will commit enormous national resources and determine the military forces we will have for decades.

The fact is that the extraordinary victory we achieved in the gulf war was the result not only of the extraordinary military leadership we had and the extraordinary bravery and skill of our troops on the ground, in the air, on the water, but it also was the result of decisions and investments made in the seventies in military technology that came online and were available to be used in the early 1990's in the gulf war.

We have to think, as we make the decisions we do committing hundreds of billions of dollars to defense programs, whether these are the programs we will need 10 and 20 years from now. The fact is, if we choose unwisely and a future opponent chooses more wisely, we may well be jeopardizing not only the lives of our soldiers, but also the lives of our children and our grandchildren. When we discover that, we will have precious little time and perhaps not the resources to fix our mistakes.

So in those ways, I find the QDR to be lacking, but Senator COATS and our cosponsors anticipated this and believed it would be the first step in a dynamic process. I hope that is the way in which the QDR, will be seen—as a first step, an important one—in a series of steps to determine what our future military needs will be. It does, in fact, provide a sound base from which this critical discussion can proceed.

I think Secretary Cohen himself has recognized this is only the beginning—

it is the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end—not only in what he specifically said, but in the fact that last week he announced the appointment of a task force which will now go the next step, particularly in considering reform of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

We all have high hopes for the independent National Defense Panel, that was created as part of our legislation, to go further and create clear alternatives and to begin to identify the critical unanswered questions that we are left with after reading the QDR. Then, as Senator COATS has said, it will be up to those of us in Congress and to those in the White House and the administration to absorb the recommendations of the QDR we received today; then of the National Defense Panel which will be presented to us in December; and then to push boldly against the status quo.

Our responsibility may require us to make difficult decisions about the weapons we buy and where our forces will be based and how they will be structured so that tomorrow's American military will be ready to meet the security threats of the next century in the most cost-effective and technologically dominant way.

The point is this: Some people will say, ''QDR says it all, we're doing well, our security is clear. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' Of course, we agree our security is strong today and it ain't broke today, but if we don't fix it, it will be broke 10 or 20 years from now, and we will not have fulfilled the fullest measure of our responsibility under the Constitution to provide for and protect the common defense.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. COATS. If the Senator will yield.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I certainly agree with my colleague—we worked on this together—that this QDR report doesn't meet all of our expectations. We wanted a more visionary document. We wanted some bolder challenges, at least a broader definition of what the future might look like and what options we would have to address it, because the point is that we are at such a critical decisionmaking point, in terms of allocation of resources, that we need that look into the future in order to try to make the decisions that will give us the flexibility and the resources to address those future threats.

The real concern here is that we stay locked into, not necessarily a status quo proposal, but one that closely resembles the current state of affairs within the military, and that we will, on that basis, make decisions that will preclude us from having the resources to make different decisions in the future or to address different threats in the future. That, again, is the reason why we wanted a national defense panel, outside evaluators and experts, to give us some guidance on that.

While that Panel's report will not be available to support us in this year's decisionmaking process for the fiscal 1998 budget, it will be available for us next year. So I hope we can keep that in mind when we are allocating these resources and making these decisions.

Second, I say to my friend from Connecticut that, while many of our colleagues, and many individuals, will criticize this QDR as a status quo document, my guess is it will be extraordinarily difficult to convince them that they ought to adopt even half of the proposals of this status quo document because it will affect bases that are located in their State, it will affect defense contractors that manufacture defense products in their State, and so on.

Each of us has our favorite service, I suppose, perhaps one we served in. We try to be objective in that, but, you know: ''I was a marine, and therefore, we're not taking one person away from the Marines,'' or, ''I served in the Navy, and we can't take ships down.'' ''They build ships in my district; therefore, I can't support any changes in shipbuilding.'' And on and on and on it goes. We have that fight every year.

So my guess is that, if we can implement half of what is here, it would be a pretty extraordinary step for Congress.

Now, what is the point? The point is that we cannot just always blame the Department of Defense for not being bold enough, challenging enough, visionary enough when we ourselves are not willing to take some of those steps. So it is going to require several things: one, some good outside evaluation and expert help for us to even ask the right questions in order to arrive at the right decisions; and, second, some bold initiatives and some courage on our part in order to enact and effect some of these decisions.

The Senator from Connecticut talked about a different kind of threat, driven by technology, that we are just now beginning to understand. We probably are not looking at the massed formation type of standoff, a mass army versus mass army threat that we have looked at in the past. We are looking at technology which can give our adversaries advantages that perhaps we have not even thought of and capability we have not even thought of; but yet also offer us great promise in terms of defense capabilities to counter those threats if we can anticipate them coming our way in the future.

So there is a lot of work to do. I guess the caution here is that we allow ourselves to get outside the normal pattern of how we make decisions and how we appropriate funds for defense, to think beyond the next election cycle, to think into the next century, to be willing to take bold steps in either saying no or in saying yes to decisions that will have tremendous future implications for this Nation.

What does that mean? That means that we have to have an open mind, we have to see this as a process and not as a fixed point for which decisions made today will necessarily be those decisions which will be implemented tomorrow. We have to retain that flexibility as we understand how to develop a national defense strategy for the future.

It has been said that no major changes in military affairs in history have ever occurred except after a crushing defeat. We had a stunning victory in Operation Desert Storm. I think a lot of that was accomplished because of the lessons we learned in Vietnam, the changes that were consequently made. Yet, for us now to rest on that success and pretty much indicate that we are not willing to make major changes would condemn us to the lessons of history; we cannot simply strengthen and retain the capabilities of our last success, but we must fully understand and prepare for the potential of our next war. We want to avoid preparing for the past.

That is going to take some bold thinking. That is going to take some stepping outside the box to take some challenging questions about current assumptions and the current status quo as we look out in the future. I think we have started that process.

I want to commend my friend from Connecticut for all the effort that he has put into this and our other colleagues who have been involved in setting up our National Defense Panel and working with the Department of Defense, working with the new Secretary, who I think is committed and pledged to do this very thing.

I thank the Senator for his time.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from Indiana for his comments, which I agree with totally.

Part of what we are saying—I echo him—is the world is changing so dramatically that we must make sure that our national security structure changes as well. There is not a company doing business in America today the way it did 5 or 10 years ago, let alone 30, 40, or 50 years ago. What strikes me as so stunning is that the companies that are doing best today are looking ahead 3, 4, 5, 10 years forward to figure out how they are going to need to change to make sure they are still on top. There are limits to that comparison, but that is what we are trying to do with our national security structure.

We are, in a sense, being the burrs under the saddle here because we are riding tall in the saddle right now as a country. We are very strong. But history tells us that unless you look forward and change with the times, particularly to begin to absorb the full measure of technological change in your military plans, then you are not going to be riding securely for very long.

Just to echo a final point, a very important one, when we drafted this legislation, Senators COATS, MCCAIN, ROBB, KEMPTHORNE, LEVIN, and others,

and I had in mind that it was not just the Pentagon—as big and bureaucratic, although very effective, an institution as it is—that needed an outside push; it was Congress, it was us because we are as prone to ride along with the successful status quo and not take the painful looks out over the horizon, particularly if they affect us, as some of these changes may.

So this is the first step. It is an ongoing process. I feel even more strongly that legislation was correct in calling for an independent panel, a national defense panel. And ultimately it will be up to the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Committees, and all the Members of both Houses to have the guts to make the tough decisions today that will guarantee that America is strong and secure tomorrow and a lot of tomorrows forward into the 21st century.

I thank the Presiding Officer, and I yield the floor.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 1:01 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1385. An act to consolidate, coordinate, and improve employment, training, literacy, and vocational rehabilitation programs in the United States, and for other purposes.

MEASURES REFERRED

The following bill was read the first and second times by unanimous consent and referred as indicated:

H.R. 1385. An act to consolidate, coordinate, and improve employment, training, literacy, and vocational rehabilitation programs in the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC–1872. A communication from the Under Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a violation of the Antideficiency Act, case number 94–05; to the Committee on Appropriations.

EC–1873. A communication from the Under Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a violation of the Antideficiency Act, case number 96–08; to the Committee on Appropriations.

EC–1874. A communication from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Depeartment of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the Master Plan for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education for fiscal year 1996; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1875. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, the notice concerning a retirement; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1876. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, the notice concerning a retirement; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1877. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, the notice concerning a retirement; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1878. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the notice concerning a retirement; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1879. A communication from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, a notice relative to live fire testing of the V–22 Osprey aircraft; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC–1880. A communication from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, a rule relative to the list of entities of proliferation concern, (RIN0694–AB60) received on May 12, 1997; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC–1881. A communication from the Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, a rule relative to expansion of short-form registration, (RIN 3235–AG82) received on May 9, 1997; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC–1882. A communication from the Acting President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, transmitting, pursuant to law, the semiannual report on tied aid credits; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC–1883. A communication from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve for 1996; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1884. A communication from the Acting General Counsel of the Department of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, two rules relative to Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, received on March 25, 1997; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1885. A communication from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the U.S. Uranium Industry for calendar year 1995; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1886. A communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on matters contained in the Helium Act for fiscal year 1996; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1887. A communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, the biennial report on the Quality of Water, Colorado River Basin, Progress Report No. 18; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1888. A communication from the Deputy Associate Director for Compliance, Royalty Management Program, Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, notice of the intention to make refunds of offshore lease revenues where a refund or recoupment is appropriate; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1889. A communication from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior (Land and Minerals Management), transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a notice on leasing systems; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1890. A communication from the Acting Director of the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, Department of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, two rules relative to Arkansas and North Dakota, received on April 23, 1997; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1891. A communication from the Chairperson of the Klamath River Compact Commission, transmitting, a report relative to Congressional authorization to implement a management plan; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC–1892. A communication from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1893. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report relative to Notice 97–28, received on May 6, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1894. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of Announcement 97–52, received on May 12, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1895. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report relative to Revenue Ruling 97–20, received on April 23, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1896. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report relative to Revenue Ruling 97–22, received on May 1, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1897. A communication from the National Director, Tax Form and Publications Division, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of rule relative to private printing of substitute forms W–2 and W–3, (Rev-Proc. 97–24) received on April 24, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1898. A communication from the National Director, Tax Form and Publications Division, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of rule relative to Medical Savings Accounts, (Rev-Proc. 97–25) received on May 6, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1899. A communication from the Chief of the Regulation Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule relative to Revenue Procedure 97–27, received in May 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1900. A communication from the Chief Counsel, Bureau of the Public Debt, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, a rule relative to United States Savings Bonds, received on May 1, 1997; to the Committee on Finance.

EC–1901. A communication from the Assistant Commissioner (for Examination) of the Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, two