

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. MICHAEL P. FORBES

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 28, 1997

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, July 17, 1997, I appreciated being granted an excused absence due to a serious illness in my family. Due to that absence, I missed several rollcall votes.

Had I not been unavoidably absent on June 11, I would have voted in the following manner pertaining to H.R. 2160, the Agriculture Appropriations Act: "Aye" on rollcall vote No. 285, a motion for the Committee to rise; "no" on rollcall vote No. 284, a motion for the Committee to rise; "no" on rollcall vote No. 283, a motion for the Committee to rise; "aye" on rollcall vote No. 282, a motion to table the motion to reconsider the vote; "aye" on rollcall vote No. 281, a motion to resolve into Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 28, 1997

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention my monthly newsletter on foreign affairs from July 1997 entitled "NATO Enlargement."

I ask that this newsletter be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The newsletter follows:

NATO ENLARGEMENT

At an early July summit in Madrid, President Clinton and leaders from the 16 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to enter talks to join the Alliance. The goal is to complete negotiations in 1997 and treaty ratification by 1999, so that these three countries can join in time for NATO's 50th anniversary.

A decision to forge a new system of international security by enlarging NATO has been long in coming—but came as no surprise. NATO established a program of cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries in 1994, the Partnership for Peace, and President Clinton made clear at that time that the question was when—not if—NATO would expand. NATO outlined a strategy for enlargement in a 1995 report, and announced in 1996 that invitations would be extended to new members in 1997. Two months ago, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This document spells out future relations between NATO and Russia, sets up a Joint Council for regular consultation, and seeks to ally Russia's concerns about enlargement. The Founding Act paved the way for Madrid, where there were some differences between the U.S. and its allies about those not invited to join NATO (Romania and Slovenia)—but no suspense about the three invited.

The spotlight on enlargement now shifts to parliaments and public opinion. So far, the U.S. debate on NATO enlargement has been a narrow one, attracting little interest outside of ethnic communities. The President's task now is to persuade the American people that it is in our national interest to defend the countries of Central Europe.

From my perspective, there are five major questions about NATO enlargement—commitments, costs, relations with Russia, what happens to countries not invited to join, and the impact of enlargement on the Alliance itself.

Commitments.—Twice in this century Europe exploded into world wars because of events in Central Europe. The United States intervened in 1917 and 1941 to protect its vital interests on the European continent, and formed NATO in 1949 to protect western Europe against the Soviet threat. The question now is whether countries in Central Europe should have the same security guarantee as current NATO members. This guarantee, which requires NATO allies to treat an armed attack against one as an attack against all, would come at a time when U.S. troop levels in Europe have been cut from 300,000 to 100,000 in the past six years. The threat to peace in Europe today is remote, but NATO enlargement means a pledge to intervene in tomorrow's unforeseen crises. The bet is that the promise of sending NATO troops to defend countries in Central Europe will make it unnecessary to do so.

Cost estimates of NATO enlargement vary widely, from \$5 billion to \$125 billion. The Pentagon's own estimate is \$27 to \$35 billion spread over 13 years, with a U.S. share of up to \$2 billion. There is reason for skepticism about all cost estimates, because military budgets across Europe have been declining. The three countries invited to join NATO spend a total of \$4 billion annually on defense, or less than Belgium spends. Current NATO members see little threat, and most are under pressure to cut spending to meet budget targets for European Monetary Union. If Europe won't pay, the U.S. Congress also will be reluctant to pay. More burdensharing disputes with Europe are likely.

Relations with Russia.—Opponents of a larger NATO stress that expansion will provide hostile reaction from Russia, creating a new line of division across Europe. Russia opposes enlargement, but has acquiesced in its initial stages. It remains to be seen how enlargement will impact on key U.S. interests in Russia's ratification of the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the future of reform in Russia. Much of the success of NATO enlargement will depend on how the U.S. manages relations with Russia.

Those Not Invited To Join.—Twelve countries emerging from communism applied to join NATO, and only three got what they wanted in Madrid. The challenge ahead for NATO is to enhance military and political cooperation with non-members. The Alliance has also made clear that the door is open to future members. No one knows how far NATO enlargement will go, but the first wave will not be the last. The toughest question here will be the Baltic States.

Impact of Enlargement on the Alliance.—There is a tension between keeping NATO's door open, and keeping the Alliance func-

tional. NATO decisions require unanimity, and so far the Alliance has been able to function well on the basis of consensus. It is an open question whether this round, or future rounds of enlargement, will affect the cohesion and integrity of the Alliance and its decision-making process.

CONCLUSIONS

NATO enlargement is going to happen. I still have many questions about it, and we have not had sufficient debate or consideration of its impact. Yet the risks of proceeding with NATO enlargement are less than the risk of not going forward. Sixteen governments cannot take a decision of this magnitude and then reverse course. The alternative to expansion—freezing NATO in its cold war membership—also carries risks of irrelevance or even dissolution.

NATO enlargement can increase the security of all of Europe, and decrease the chances of future wars. NATO enlargement certainly will assure new democracies in Central Europe and reinforce their democratic reforms. If done right, it can bring Russia into a cooperative relationship with Europe. The President needs to answer questions and address lingering doubts. If he articulates the case forcefully, the President can win the support of the American public—and the advice and consent of the Senate—for NATO enlargement.

A RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE THE VIRTUES OF OUR NATION'S YOUTH

HON. BOB CLEMENT

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 28, 1997

Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to join Representatives DUNCAN, ETHERIDGE, HALL of Ohio, and WOLF in introducing House Concurrent Resolution 127.

Traditionally, colleges and universities were founded on the premise of developing intellectual minds and moral character. Today, colleges and universities continue to play a vital role in these areas. Some of these institutions have been applauded for their success in fostering high moral values. However, we must not rest until all schools place proper focus on character.

Parents should be the primary developers of character in our Nation's children, but the role of education in character-building becomes increasingly important with every divorce, drug deal, juvenile crime, and teen-age pregnancy, which continue to undermine our Nation's moral code. The fact is, most Americans support the teaching of core values and basic morals such as trustworthiness, respect for self and others, responsibility, fairness, compassion, and citizenship. It is time for Congress to encourage these activities in our Nation's schools.

I would like to thank the John Templeton Foundation for its leadership and efforts on the subject of character-building in education across our Nation. The foundation has been a leading proponent of this issue since 1989,

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.