

FY2000; transfer Atlas-class expendable launch vehicle (ELV) management to Kennedy Space Center (KSC); phase out large chemical propulsion technology development and transfer the responsibility to MSFC; explore creation of an institute(s) to conduct activities of microgravity research, onboard propulsion, and space power; and reduce FTE level to 2,027 by the end of FY2000.

Those recommendations are to be fully implemented by FY2000. Some have already been implemented and others are currently in progress. A brief description of the status of the above recommendations follows:

Lewis is NASA's Center of Excellence for Turbomachinery and the Lead Center for Aeropropulsion.

The rocket engine test facility has been closed and is currently being dismantled. The land that the facility occupied may be transferred to the City of Cleveland which has plans for expanding Hopkins International Airport. All rocket engine testing is being consolidated in Louisiana at Stennis Space Center (SSC) which has been designated the Center of Excellence and Lead Center for rocket propulsion testing.

All testing that is now done at Plum Brook facilities is undertaken on a fully reimbursable basis. All NASA programs, the Department of Defense (DOD), other government agencies, and companies that use Plum Brook reimburse Lewis fully for all testing. NASA plans to keep Plum Brook open unless there are no requirements for testing at its facilities, at which point the facility would be put in a "mothballed" status.

Lewis has closed several facilities/structures that were not required to undertake current or planned work. Current analysis shows that the closures will reach the goal of achieving at least \$150 million in savings through FY2000.

The consolidation of aircraft at DFRC is currently on hold. Consolidation of the aircraft became controversial in 1996. NASA's Inspector General's office questioned whether the consolidation would actually save the agency money and whether there would be a negative impact on researchers based at other centers who use the aircraft for their experiments. Congress took an interest in this issue and passed legislative language in the VA-HUD-IA FY1997 Appropriations Act that prohibited NASA from moving aircraft to Dryden if they were stationed east of the Mississippi River. Recently, NASA Headquarters directed Lewis not to renew the lease on its DC-9, which is used for microgravity research. Lewis microgravity researchers will have to use a KC-135 based at Johnson Space Center (JSC) for their airborne experiments.

Like all NASA centers, Lewis is adopting performance-based contracting approaches for its facility maintenance and operations, institutional support, and technical services contracts. Lewis still expects this effort to yield at least \$100 million in savings by FY2000.

Lewis is in the process of determining how it will obtain information system services from Ames and Marshall. This effort may not achieve the \$50 million in savings by FY2000 that was originally estimated.

Transferring Atlas-class expendable launch vehicle (ELV) management to KSC is planned, but will not occur until 1999. Under current NASA Policy, Lewis is still responsible for the overall management of launch services for intermediate and large ELV services for NASA. The agency decided that Lewis would maintain responsibility for management until all planned launches took place. Only two Lewis managed launches remain—the launch of the Cassini spacecraft aboard a Titan-IV/Centaur scheduled between October and November 1997 and the

Atlas launch of Earth Observing System's EOS AM-1 in 1998. At that point, management of Atlas-class launches is to be transferred to KSC, NASA has no future plans for the larger Titan-sized launches. Even if Lewis were to maintain responsibility for Atlas-class launches, there are no near-term plans for launches for such vehicles after EOS-AM-1. NASA is instead focusing on the development of "faster, cheaper, better" spacecraft that require launch vehicles smaller than the Atlas-class.

Major chemical propulsion technology development has been phased out at Lewis. MSFC is now the Center of Excellence for space propulsion. Lewis, however, will retain some expertise in chemical propulsion and undertake research and development in this area as directed by MSFC.

The original concept of institutes involved the conversion of some civil servants to employees of an institute. Because civil servant retirement portability and conflict of interest issues that required legislative changes, the original institute concept was dropped throughout the agency. However on March 13, 1997, NASA created the National Center for Microgravity Research on Fluids and Combustion, located at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. The institute is a partnership between NASA Lewis, Case Western Reserve, and the Universities Space Research Association (USRA). Lewis scientists involved with the center will remain civil servants and stay at LeRC sites. There are no current plans to create institutes on space power or onboard propulsion.

After undergoing a FY1997 NASA-wide employee buyout, Lewis has reduced its FTE level as of March 29, 1997, to 2,152. This puts Lewis within 125 FTEs of reaching its FY 2000 target level of 2,027. Lewis expects to average 50 losses each year through normal attrition over the next 3 years. With normal attrition and currently assigned FTE targets, no additional buyouts or a reduction-in-force (RIF) are anticipated. If LeRC does not experience normal attrition or if its FTE target is lowered, then limited buyouts in targeted areas might be necessary. [See below for further discussion of Lewis' FTE reductions].

COMPARISON OF CENTER FTE AND BUDGET CHANGES

As of March 29, 1997, Lewis has reduced its FTE level by 671 since FY1993 (its peak level). This is a reduction of 18.96%. In addition, since FY1993, Lewis' budget has been reduced by 33%. Except for a few of NASA's smaller centers (Stennis and Dryden), all of NASA's centers have experienced a reduction in budget and FTE levels. That reduction has not been divided equally among the centers. Many employees at Lewis assert that the center has had to share a greater burden of the reductions than the other NASA centers. The following statistics show that Lewis has shared a greater burden of the reductions than most but not all, of NASA's other centers.

Through FY1997, Lewis, at 18.96%, has had the highest percentage FTE reduction of all centers except KSC which has had a 19.04% reduction. Although it is not a field center, NASA Headquarters has had a 36.14% reduction. The agency average over the same period was 13.29%.

Through FY 1997, Lewis, at 33%, has had the highest percentage reduction in its budget of all the centers. The closest center at Lewis was KSC with a 17.59% reduction. NASA Headquarters has had a 52.64% reduction. The agency average over the same period was 5.77%.

Taking into account planned FTE levels, Lewis is to have a 24.48% reduction in its FTE level from FY1993 through FY2000. KSC

with a 42.93% reduction and MSFC with a 29.86% reduction will have higher percentage FTE reduction. NASA Headquarters expects a 49.70% reduction. The total agency reduction over the same period is planned at 23.96%.

The impression that Lewis has incurred the greatest share of NASA's reductions is incorrect with respect to FTEs. While Lewis has had the highest percentage reduction in budget of all NASA centers, KSC has had the highest FTE percentage reduction, and KSC and MSFC have the highest total planned FTE percentage reduction through FY2000.

THE CASE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE VIEWS OF GEN. WILLIAM ODOM

HON. TOM LANTOS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 31, 1997

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, the debate over enlargement of NATO has now been engaged in earnest since NATO Summit in Madrid made the decision to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to become full-fledged members of the alliance.

The Congress now faces important decisions regarding NATO enlargement. Probably next year, the Senate will consider under the Constitution's provision on the ratification of treaties, the admission of these three countries, and the House and Senate will consider legislation that will be necessary to implement this expansion, including matters relating to the cost of enlargement.

In the wake of the Madrid Summit, the debate has been engaged on the merits and wisdom of expanding NATO. My position on this issue, Mr. Speaker, has been clear and unequivocal. As soon as the Communist regimes in Central Europe began to collapse in 1989, I urged the expansion of NATO in order to bring strategic stability, democratic reform and the cultivation of a civil society, development of free market-oriented economies, fostering of respect for human rights, and the institution of civilian control of the military forces in these emerging democracies. I continue to support strongly the enlargement of NATO. When the current expansion was being considered, I urged the inclusion of the three countries which were invited to join, as well as the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia. I continue to support expansion to include Romania and Slovenia as well as other countries which are prepared to contribute to NATO in the future.

As the debate on NATO enlargement has been engaged, one of the best expositions of the rationale for expansion was presented by my good friend, Bill Odom, who has had a distinguished military career. The Washington Post published his view in a recent Sunday "Outlook" section. Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of my colleagues to this excellent analysis, and I ask that it be placed in the RECORD.

[From the Washington Post, July 6, 1997]

A LOOK AT . . . EXPANDING NATO—HISTORY TELLS US THE ALLIANCE SHOULD GROW

(By William E. Odom)

Enlarging NATO is the last major strategic challenge confronting America in the 20th century. Previously in the century, this nation has failed to meet only one: keeping the

peace in Europe after World War I. Will it fail a second time? The two cases are disturbingly analogous: Many American political leaders are again obsessed with domestic issues, refusing to recognize their inextricable ties to security affairs and misunderstanding the new forces in Europe.

America withdrew from Europe after World War I, leaving a belt of new democracies, the so-called "successor states," extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. France, Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union soon entangled them in competing alliances. Although they all began as democracies, by the mid-1930s all but one were dictatorships. These developments ensured another war.

History does not repeat itself, but structural continuities often prompt similar political developments. That is why the period between the two world wars is so instructive today. The critics insist that NATO can survive without enlargement. In the short term, they are right, but the longer-term dynamics would inevitably fracture the alliance. Maintaining the status quo is a sure formula for bringing about U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Confronted by strong forces of change, NATO will either enlarge to moderate them or be broken by them. And the key to moderating them is Germany, not Russia.

Managing the emergence of German power peacefully has been the major problem in 20th-century Europe. Not only did German leaders fail in 1914, other European leaders share the blame. The resulting Great War produced the Soviet problem, the Nazis and a new war, the bloodiest in history.

After 1945, the United States rectified its earlier mistake, remaining engaged in Europe to resist Soviet expansion. As the rationale for NATO, however, the German problem loomed larger for most Europeans than the Soviet threat, especially for the French. NATO proved surprisingly effective in nurturing a new Germany as well as containing Soviet power, but today the Soviet threat is gone while the German problem is not entirely resolved. German leaders understand this reality well, and that is why they strongly support NATO enlargement. They seek to bind Germany within an integrated Europe as a way to avoid a return to their old predicament.

The European Union's (EU) goal of a "common foreign and defense policy," therefore, is conceived as a lasting solution to the German problem. Its realization, however, remains far from complete as the EU faces the changes caused by the end of the Cold War. In the absence of a multilateral mechanism incorporating Central Europe, competitive policies toward that region will be pursued unilaterally by Germany, France, Britain, Russia and others. (A reappearance of the interwar patterns of diplomacy was evident in the Europeans' reaction to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Finally, NATO forces were required to restore peace in Bosnia.) Thus, Central Europe will again become the scene of some, if not all, of the perverse dynamics of the interwar period unless NATO enlarges to preempt them.

Suppose the United States had followed the advice of the critics and rejected NATO enlargement. Could NATO survive the dynamics of the competition among its key members that would follow? Some argue that the EU could moderate them. But that is unpersuasive in light of the obstacles confronting the EU's adoption of a single currency, not to mention a common defense and foreign policy. Actually, Central Europe presents the EU with a paralyzing dilemma: to "widen" or to "deepen" its integration process? Widening into Central Europe would delay the deepening of existing political and military integration; deepening would leave Central Europe as a zone of diplomatic com-

petition, endangering the EU process itself. Why? Germany.

Britain and France, which were already uncomfortable with a federal Europe that included a strong but divided Germany, are more nervous about a unified Germany bound to be the federation's dominant component. Without a federal Europe, they will be tempted to engage Central Europe against Germany, a game that will invite the most mischievous diplomacy by Moscow. The only viable way out is through NATO enlargement—that is, engaging NATO in the same role in Central Europe that it has long played within Western Europe.

The opponents of enlargement wring their hands about Russia, financial costs and other problems while ignoring the crucially important German problem, no matter that German politicians from all parties warn against leaving Germany on its own to deal with the East.

To be sure, NATO enlargement will cause problems, but its opponents focus mainly on the manageable ones. They usually exaggerate the financial costs. So, too, Russia's probable reaction. The venerable Russia expert George Kennan warns that expansion will destroy Russian democracy. Why would Russia give up democracy to spite NATO? That would harm Russia, not NATO. Actually, Russia has very little "liberal" democracy to destroy. Civil and property rights do not yet enjoy effective protection in Russia. NATO enlargement will undercut those neoimperialist Russian politicians who oppose it and who also misrepresent Russian public attitudes toward it as reflected in polling data. Moreover, proponents of enlargement also urge a continuing and broad Western engagement with Russia, not its isolation.

Other problems, however, are serious, especially the reactions of those countries denied membership in the first round. Their plight demands effective attention—foremost, credible assurance that NATO enlargement is a continuing process, not a one-time affair. An active policy of continuing engagement with each is equally essential.

New members will also cause problems. Some may have embarrassing political scandals involving former Communists and KGB connections. Some may falter in their democratic transitions. NATO, of course, has already coped with such problems in some present member states.

Finally, some critics doubt the administration's competence to carry through NATO enlargement. The president has yet to make the case effectively to the public, and some European leaders believe they are being treated poorly (in French President Jacques Chirac's quaint language, "like crap") in the consultation process. This is worrisome, not just where it concerns Senate ratification but also realities in Europe. When the president told the public that American credibility was at stake if we did not commit troops to the NATO force in Bosnia, he also set an early date for their withdrawal, thereby undermining implementation of the Dayton accord. How can the United States, then, have sufficient credibility in Europe for carrying through on NATO enlargement if it walks away from Bosnia before peace is secure? Success in Bosnia is related to NATO enlargement. Fortunately, the administration evaded the one-year deadline, but the secretary of defense now calls for a pullout next year. Also, President Clinton's occasional remarks on reducing NATO's military essence—for example, after his recent meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia—do not reflect clear thinking about what is required for Partnership for Peace activities. Bosnia and other potential military operations. This is hardly reassuring U.S. leadership.

No great strategic departure is without risks, and enlarging NATO has some, as its opponents abundantly point out. Likewise, there are risks in not going forward, for that, too, is a strategic departure—backward from Europe.

The reunification of Germany within NATO is the greatest strategic realignment in Europe's history without a major war, an achievement no pundit would have conceded beforehand to be possible. But that is only half of the task. Consolidating a community of liberal democracies in Central Europe and beyond is the more difficult half. Failure would eventually affect America's own economy and security adversely, not to mention the negative political and moral consequences. Is America worthy of its liberty and prosperity if it no longer dares to accept such challenges with energy and optimism?

TRIBUTE TO MR. FRED DARIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE SOUTH BRONX COMMUNITY ACTION THEATER

HON. JOSÉ E. SERRANO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 1, 1997

Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to Mr. Fred Daris. He has been a dear friend and lifelong teacher to me as well as to the youth in the South Bronx community.

On August 4, Mr. Daris turns 70 years old. A man who has given so much of his life to our community, he still holds ambitious dreams for our youth, most of which he has very well accomplished.

Mr. Daris is the founder and executive director of the South Bronx Community Action Theater, established nearly 40 years ago at I.S. 139, in my South Bronx congressional district.

The theater was born from Mr. Daris' desire to provide our youth with quality education and the opportunity to express themselves through the wonderful world of the arts. This performing and creative arts center evolved from the Burger Players, a student theater group which performed in area schools and at special community events.

From the South Bronx Community Action Theater have graduated thousands of students who later became professionals in various fields. Some have joined the center's extended family, such as Mr. Rick Scott, who became the theater's administrator. I was also a product of that dream, as one of the first students to participate in the Burger Players.

Guided by Mr. Daris' determination, knowledge, and wisdom, youngsters who are part of the theater complete their studies with a sense of accomplishment and of a bright future before them.

At the center, students learn dance, drama, singing, the plastic arts, costume design, how to play an instrument, and all other components of an artistic production. They learn to visualize their dreams and to reach out for them.

In addition to Mr. Daris' commitment to the center, the South Bronx Community Action Theater has been in existence in large part through funding provided by title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and with the collaboration of parents and other members of the community.

Mr. Daris has always looked after his community. Before he founded the South Bronx