conjunction with organizations like Common Cause and others, got the signatures, took it to the vote of the people, and in 1990, it passed. The President is committed to cleaning up the problems in our democracy.

If the President is committed to it, then where is the problem? I see the problem, Mr. Chairman, as being the leadership in this House; specifically, the Republican leadership that will not let us bring this type of legislation to the floor. Since we have convened in January, we have had approximately 85 bills filed, but we have had no hearings on any bill, we have had, obviously, no bills passed, and so we find ourselves as we are talking now about winding down this first year, this first session of this Congress, making no progress on campaign finance reform, and I think that is a mistake. I think it is wrong, and I think the American people want something different.

My own preference in all of these bills is the Hutchinson–Allen bill, this is the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HUTCHINSON] and the gentleman from Maine [Mr. ALLEN]. And it is the freshman, bipartisan bill, Mr. HUTCHINSON being a Republican, Mr. ALLEN a Democrat, that has seriously looked at the problems and has tried to do the doable, and what it specifically does is ban the soft money, to do away with the potential of these huge, huge checks, the kinds of several-hundred-thousand-dollar, even million-dollar checks that sometimes come into political parties.

No one likes raising money. I do not know of any politician that likes raising money. My own feeling is that raising money makes you weird. Raising money just does weird things to elected officials. But for parties to raise those huge donations makes our democracy weird. It distorts the system, it disillusions the citizens, and we have to do something better.

So, Mr. Speaker, let me finally say, I do not want to see a check someday come in made out to a political party for $1 billion. I do not want to see checks come in to a political party for $500 million. We need to step forward. The Republican leadership needs to let this body consider campaign finance reform legislation, needs to let us vote on it, needs to let us debate on it, needs to let us move ahead with what the American people want: clean elections and a much-improved system of electing public officials.

TRIP TO SOUTH AFRICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I, too, want to thank the staff for bearing with me as I attempt to address two key issues that I think are extremely important to this country. I hope not to take the entire hour.

Mr. Speaker, my first issue has to do with a trip that I took this past weekend to South Africa. It was a very difficult weekend. I left Washington on Thursday and flew 22 hours to Durban, South Africa, and returned Monday to be able to be here for votes on Tuesday.

The reason I went to Africa, Mr. Speaker, and to Durban, was because the African Association of Physiological Sciences and the South African Physiological Society invited me to deliver the keynote speech at the conference representing those health care professionals throughout the African nations as they assembled for their annual conference, and in the case of the other organization, their biannual conference.

The purpose of the session was to convey what is happening in the technology area relative to this country and how it could assist Africa with the terrible problems they have with their medical care delivery. I was asked to give the keynote speech because of a major initiative that we are involved in in the Philadelphia area, including the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, to create the first smart region in America, and in fact, in the world.

Over the past 2 years we have worked on a project that is known as HUBS, which stands for hospitals, universities and businesses and schools, to link all of these institutions through an aggressive, large, fiberoptic network into one major supercomputing center, as well as 14 satellite sub-HUB centers throughout the four-State region, and in doing so to be able to provide the storage and capability of high-speed transportation of data so that our health care institutions, our schools, our colleges, can, in fact, provide better use of the Internet and information for our citizens.

In fact, one example in the health care area of what the benefit of this kind of an instrument will be is best evidenced by the example of what the University of Pennsylvania has been able to do just within the last 2 years in terms of our HUBS project. The University of Pennsylvania has been, in fact, the primary processor for the imaging data collected from an MRI unit by the Children's hospital in Philadelphia so that when a child would undergo brain surgery, the imaging data from the MRI unit would be processed by the computers at Penn, which are very sophisticated, high-speed computers. In spite of their speed, it would normally take the Penn computers 5 hours to process the imaging data so that the surgeon could have a look at that child's brain prior to surgery.

Partly because of the effort that we started and the fact that Penn's lab is now connected to the fat pipe supercomputing center in Illinois, Chicago, and in San Diego, we can now process that same data for a child's brain surgery procedure in 3 seconds. So we have taken, because of the speed and the capability, the processing of data that in the past has taken 5 hours and given those surgeons the real-time capability of looking at that child's brain image in 3 seconds.

We want to give that same speed and capability of using data in the health care field to every medical institution in our region, but we want to do more than that, Mr. Speaker. In fact, we have two initiatives underway in the region, one of which is to market the health care services of the four-State region worldwide, and to market the Delaware Valley four-State health care network as the world's health care resource center. We want to establish not just this fast supercomputing capability within the four States, but we have already agreed with the Shanghai Government to establish a direct satellite linkage to Shanghai as they are in the process of now developing smart capability there. And also we want to establish that same capability for the African continent, and specifically to the African health care system.

Now, I am going to Africa, and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, to enter into the RECORD the letters of invitation that I received from the African medical leadership.

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION
OF PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCES,
Lexington, KY, July 12, 1997.

Hon. Dr. CURT WELDON,
U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC.

The African Association of Physiological Sciences (AAPS) was founded in 1989 in Helsinki, Finland, by the African delegates to the XXX Congress of the International Union of Physiological Sciences (IUPS), the most important and prestigious international organization of this all important field in the medical science profession.

AAPS is a non-governmental, non-profit making organization that aims to unite the entire African scientific communities, especially those involved in active research into and/or teaching of human or animal physiology in Africa. The Association primary objective is to advance physiological sciences, bring it to cutting edge that has been left behind in global human scientific discoveries in the last 5 centuries. It is our earnest hope that through this, we will bring medical sciences practice in the African continent to the way it should be practiced in the 20th century and the 21st century!

AAPS held his first scientific congress in Nairobi, Kenya in 1992 with the participation of 800 scientists from 40 countries, nearly all from Africa.

Due to our active pursue of excellence, and our inclusive policy of welcoming all scientists of the world, especially those from the African continent, AAPS was admitted as a regional member by IUPS in 1993 and presently has over 2000 members from every country in Africa. We are very proud to say that this makes it the largest and probably most significant scientific association in Africa.

The second congress will be held in Durban, South Africa, September 21–24, 1997. It will be the honor of not only our large congress, but by extrapolation the entire scientific community of Africa if you, as the technological, educational and international relations champion in the United States Congress, could bestow us the honor of accepting our invitation to deliver the keynote address at this congress.

I have been informed by Professor K.J.R. Abaidoo, Director-General AFRET and Adviser to the Government of Lesotho on Health, that upon hearing the possibility of having you as the keynote speaker, the Vice President of the Republic of South Africa, the Honorable Thabo Mbeki, has agreed to serve as your host while you are in the country. They are also trying to arrange a meeting between you and your entourage to meet with His Excellency Nelson Mandela.

For your information, subsequent AAPS congresses will be held as follows:

2000—Nigeria.

2004—Sudan.

2008—South Africa.

2012—Tanzania.

The idea of setting up an African Regional Training Center for the Basic Medical Sciences (AFRET) was conceived at the AAPS meeting in Nairobi, as an attempt to address the major concerns for the African medical education system.

AFRET is a regional resource sharing facility established to support the basic medical science teaching needs of African medical schools. It's major objective is the training of suitably qualified Africans in the disciplines of anatomy, biochemistry, biostatistics, epidemiology, microbiology, pharmacology, and physiology.

It is a regional support program designed to strengthen the basic medical sciences and the quality of medical training, to meet current and projected basic medical science teaching needs of African medical schools.

The AFRET congress in Durban, September 19–21, 1997, will focus on how to effectively begin the activities of the center.

The Center will embark on the following activities:

1. Network teaching of basic medical science across the region to support the immediate teaching needs of all African medical schools.

2. Graduate academic programs (MSc/Ph.D) to be carried out in designated centers of excellence in the region.

3. Specially designed programs for short-term fellows and scholars.

4. Workshops and seminars.

5. Evaluation, research and development activities as they relate to basic medical sciences.

6. Consultation and technical support to African medical school.

7. Publication of learning resources and materials.

8. Maintenance of a resource library.

9. Promotion of staff development and in-service training.

Dear Honorable Curt Weldon, as medical practitioners, educators and scientists for Africa, our journey is a very long, and indeed very arduous one. Even so, the longest journey will always begin with a first step. We see AAPS and the AFRET initiative as steps aimed at propelling the continent forward in Health care delivery.

We hope that you, with your worldwide reputation as one of the most farsighted leaders of the most industrialized and humane nation of the world that you will allow your reputation and gesture to assist us in this exciting trip for Africa into the new millennium. This will also be consistent with your efforts to make available healthcare system from your region to the large number of citizens of the global village. We want to have a share in your vision, as we see it as the only way to forge ahead.

Sincerely,

KAYODE ADENIYI, Ph.D.,
Professor of Physiology,
University of Jos, Nigeria,
Secretary General, AAPS.

Ladybrand, South Africa, July 16, 1997.

Hon. Dr. CURT WELDON,
U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, It would be an understatement to assert that your reputation as a champion of the Sciences, Technology, Education and International Relations have permeated every corner of the globe. Those of us, who have keenly followed your tremendous career and endeavours feel a certain definable closeness with you even though we are thousands of kilometers away from your immediate constituency. It is in these regards that we feel this extraordinary honour to be associated with you in this African endeavour, whose ultimate objective is to strengthen Medical Education and Health Care delivery in the African Region.

We would be greatly honoured if your Excellency would consider becoming the Patron of AFRET. Your association with this worthy continental cause would unquestionably be an invaluable boost in our efforts to stimulate African Heads of State to these enormous responsibilities that they are undoubtedly capable of.

His Excellency, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Vice-President of the Republic of South Africa has been alerted of your participation in the AFRET and AAPS Congresses in Durban (September 19–25) and requested that he host your presence in the country. Arrangements are being made to ensure that you will also have the opportunity to meet the President, Mr. Nelson Mandela. Your vibrant voice in the cause of African health development will certainly echo throughout the continent and muster the kind of financial support needed to realise the noble aspirations of AFRET.

May I ask your Excellency to communicate with me in this regard at your convenience but timely enough for specific arrangements to be concluded.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. K.J.R. ABAIDOO,
Adviser on Health (Government of Lesotho),
Director-General, AFRET.

MEMORANDUM

To: Douglas D. Ritter, Chief of Staff, Congressman Curt Weldon.

From: Leonard M. Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Assistant Dean, College of Graduate Studies.

Date: 5 September 1997.

Re: Visit to African Regional Training Center, African Association for Physiological Science, Durban, South Africa.

The delegation of representatives of regional academic health centers which will accompany Congressman Weldon on his trip to South Africa includes:

Leonard M. Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Assistant Dean, College of Graduate Studies, Thomas Jefferson University.

Donald Silberberg, M.D., Associate Dean for International Affairs, Medical School, University of Pennsylvania.

Gerald J. Kelliher, Ph.D., Vice Provost for Education, Allegheny University for the Health Sciences.

Our backgrounds cover the range of basic medical science. I am a physiologist; Silberberg a neurobiologist; Kelliher a pharmacologist.

Not only was I to give the keynote speech about technology linkages to the American health care system, namely the HUBS project that we are working on, as well as all of the medical breakthroughs that we are involved in, telemedicine, distance learning, virtual surgery and so forth, but also, Mr. Speaker, I was there at the request of the two leaders of the African physiological societies to become the patron of what is called AFRET.

□ 2230

AFRET is a newly emerging technology linkage between the major health care teaching institutions in each of the major African nations. So in going to Africa on Saturday, prior to giving the keynote speech at the conference of the medical professionals of Africa, I sat down and in fact helped work out what is going to be a formal process that hopefully will get funded which will provide the first technology linkage between every one of the 92 teaching hospitals in every nation in Africa.

In addition, we will move to establish a linkage through the satellite systems, so we in fact can provide the same kind of capability being used in our medical centers to help the medical centers in Africa reach out to all of the people who in many cases are suffering under very severe limitations relative to their health care system.

In forming this initiative called AFRET, I took along with me, Mr. Speaker, on the trip three major regional leaders who are involved as cutting edge leaders in health care initiatives worldwide: the assistant dean of the College of Graduate Studies at Thomas Jefferson University, Dr. Leonard Rosenfeld; the associate dean for international affairs at the Medical School of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Donald Silberberg; and the vice provost for education at Allegheny University for the Health Sciences, Dr. Gerald Kelleher.

These three doctors, traveling with me to Africa, represent over 75 of the Nation's finest medical institutions, and involving themselves in the meetings that I chaired, they made solid commitments from their institutions to involve themselves in the development of this new AFRET system. In fact, all three of them have been named to the 21-member advisory council that would oversee the development of the AFRET system.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, in working with the African medical leadership in deciding who would be the 21 members of the council, we have tapped some of the finest health care leaders, not just in the U.S., and six of the council members will be from the States, not just three from the Philadelphia institutions, but also representatives of the University of Michigan, Oklahoma State University, and Duke University's health care systems, but also respected medical leaders from Finland, from Germany, from Sudan, Nigeria, Ghana, and from a number of other institutions throughout the African continent.

These 21 council members represent all of the regions of Africa, and are helping us to put into place both the bylaws and the working documents relative to this AFRET system.

We estimate the cost of bringing AFRET into reality is approximately

$600,000 over the first 3 years. That is a very modest amount of money when we talk about the benefits it will provide the people of Africa who are suffering so much in terms of a lack of proper medical care.

It will allow us to train their doctors, to help train their nurses, to do ''train the trainer'' sessions, to provide technical resources for every one of the 92 institutions that are involved in medical and health care education in each of the African nations. It will also allow us to send post-docs over to Africa to do their training, to provide capabilities through distance learning and telemedicine that the African health care community would not have access to.

In fact, the Chair of this council is the dean of the medical school in Zimbabwe. His name is Dr. Mufanda. He in fact is going to be leading this effort, which is largely under the control of the African health care system leaders.

Mr. Speaker, I am excited about this opportunity because it provides several opportunities for us. Obviously, it is helping Africa to empower its own health care system to meet the needs of its citizens, which are largely going unmet, into the 21st century, and to help accomplish that we are establishing a network of parliamentarians and ministerial leaders from each of the African nations to work with us to provide the solid support for this AFRET network. We are also networking with all of the professional medical societies in Africa to get their support.

In addition, we are identifying as we speak the major American contractors, the pharmaceutical companies who are today doing business in Africa so they can help us establish this system and this network.

The benefit to America is also significant. Not only will we be doing significant amounts of work to assist the African people to improve the quality of their health care and their health care education, but Mr. Speaker, we will also be opening new doors and new opportunities for the American health care system. Many of our institutions have been suffering dramatically because of the cutbacks in State and Federal funding. Many of them are having to close their doors. In speaking to many of these leaders, I have told them they have to find ways to grow their markets. The way to grow the market for the American health care system is to provide health care consultation and services not just to people in America, but to people around the world. This outreach effort to Africa is an example of how we can do that in a cooperative way.

Mr. Speaker, I am excited about what occurred this past weekend. The prospects I think are outstanding. We also met with the government leadership of Pretoria, in fact proposing to them that Pretoria and Johannesburg, which are already looking at high-speed high-capable telecommunications, that they become the network location where we can have a downlink capability that would ultimately reach all 92 medical institutions throughout Africa, and eventually become the high-capability technology center for the continent of Africa and for South Africa itself.

Mr. Speaker, I would ask our colleagues to become briefed on this initiative, to lend their support to this very worthwhile effort, so we can benefit both the people of the African continent and the individual nations in Africa, but also benefit our health care systems that are looking to establish new linkages around the world.

Mr. Speaker, the second issue that I want to talk about this evening is one that I have addressed many times on the floor of this body, and one which I think is certainly troubling to me as an elected official and as someone who works on issues involving the former Soviet States. This issue has to deal with two major news stories that have dominated the national media for the past several weeks, and which have raised very troubling concerns among both Members of Congress and the administration and peace-loving people around the world.

First of all, Mr. Speaker, significantly spread throughout the news of this country in our cities and even over in foreign countries, especially in Israel, has been the information that has linked Iran's missile technology development program with Russia. In fact, there have been reports that have been widely reported that the Russians have been actively working directly with Iran to help them develop a modification of their SS4 missile.

Why this is so significant, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that if in fact Iran develops this capability, which we have every reason to believe they are doing right now, within the next 2 to 3 years Iran would then have the capability of a medium-range missile, a medium-range sophisticated missile unlike the Scuds that Iraq used in Desert Storm, that would be capable of hitting any part of Israel, any part of the Middle East; in fact, any part of a 1,200 mile radius around Iran. This would be a missile that would be capable of carrying a chemical, a biological, a conventional weapon, or a nuclear weapon.

In addition to those nations, many of whom are our allies and friends, it would also be capable of being pinpointed onto American troops who are today involved in various operations in those nations within the range of the Iranian missiles.

What is so troubling, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that Iran has not developed this capability on their own. In fact, the evidence is that Iran has developed this capability with the strong, direct cooperation of Russia.

In addition to providing the direct cooperation of Russia, we have evidence, in fact, Mr. Speaker, that we are now trying to investigate thoroughly, in fact, I was at a closed CIA briefing today on this, that would in fact perhaps confirm what has been alleged in the American media, that Israeli intelligence is actually seeing documents that prove that actual agreements have been signed between the Russian space agency and the Iranian agency building the medium-range missiles.

Why is that so significant and important to us? It is important to us because we are the country pouring significant amounts of dollars into the Mir Space Station program which is overseen by the Russian space agency, meaning American tax dollars are going into the Mir space program, overseen by the agency that is also involved in contractual relationships with Iranian firms building medium-range missiles.

The problem with that is, Mr. Speaker, in effect, American taxpayers may in fact be subsidizing illegal treaty violation actions involving Russia with Iran. That is totally unacceptable.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, at last week's hearing in the Committee on Science I raised the issue publicly that in 1993 the administration witness before our committee, in discussing our involvement in the Mir program, said on the record that what would guide our involvement in the Mir program would be Russia's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime, better known as the MTCR.

So here we have the administration testifying in 1993 that we will cooperate with Russia in this joint project, but only if Russia complies with the Missile Technology Control Regime. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the facts are that since 1993 Russia has violated the MTCR seven times. Seven specific times transfers of technology that are covered by that treaty have left Russia, and those violations have not in fact been called by this administration. No sanctions have been imposed, no actions have been taken, as are required by that treaty. My point is, Mr. Speaker, what good is a treaty if we are not going to enforce it?

So here we have Iranian-Russian cooperation on the SS4 program. That has received a lot of attention. In fact, the people in Israel, and Binyamin Netanyahu himself has spoken on this issue repeatedly, are extremely concerned because of what this new dilemma presents to the people of Israel and the people around Iran who in fact could be hit by these missiles.

The second news story, Mr. Speaker, that has received a lot of attention, in fact, that was the subject of a ''60 Minutes'' story 2 weeks ago, was the issue of a conversation that I had with General Lebed in Moscow in May of this year.

Mr. Speaker, I met with General Lebed twice this year. The first time was in January in Washington for 2 hours. The second time was in Moscow in the office of his campaign organization, again for 2 hours, at the end of May.

On that trip, Mr. Speaker, I had six of our colleagues. We were meeting

with General Lebed without the media, without any reporters in, a very low-key, informal way to get his assessment on the ability of Russia to control its nuclear stockpile, and to also give us his insights as to whether or not there was in fact any problem with the control of Russia's strategic materials, and what the status of Russia's military in fact is at this point in time.

As we all know, General Lebed is one of the most respected generals who has served in the Soviet military. He was a command officer, actually, in helping to solve the Chechen uprising, and who in fact was Boris Yeltsin's point person on defense for a period of time.

In meeting with General Lebed, he went through a number of issues with us, giving us his feelings about the level of control of Russia over their nuclear arms, their nuclear devices, as well as the status of the conventional and strategic military forces.

All of what General Lebed discussed with us I wrote up into our trip report, which became public record about a month after the trip ended, and which was picked up by the producer of ''60 Minutes.'' In August I was called by the producer of ''60 Minutes'' and asked if I would repeat what General Lebed told me in that interview that we had in May.

The subject of the ''60 Minutes'' piece then became the fact that General Lebed said that one of his responsibilities as Boris Yeltsin's chief defense policy analyst and adviser was to account for 132 suitcase-sized nuclear devices, nuclear bombs, that were built by the Soviet Union to be used in the case of an attack on that country, or to be used to bomb cities or to cause terrorism in areas where the Soviet Union felt they had to take action because they were being threatened, or because something was perhaps leading to an armed conflict.

General Lebed said his responsibility was to account for these devices, and in fact, of the 132, he could only account for 48. Mr. Speaker, that is a very troubling statement. That is not the only troubling statement that General Lebed gave to us, but it certainly is a troubling one. In fact, he was saying that the Soviet Union built 132 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs, each with a capability of one kiloton, and yet could only account for 48. He had no idea where the others are, as he said to us when we asked him that question.

What is the capability of one of these suitcase devices? By the way, we have very complete descriptions of them which appeared in the Russian media in an article in 1995 describing these nuclear suitcases in great detail. A tactical nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton, which is equivalent to 2.2 million pounds of TNT, could kill as effectively as seven artillery battalions. One suitcase-sized bomb automatically being able to discharge itself through the mechanism that is in the bomb itself, activated by two individuals who knew how to operate the device, could in fact provide the same effectiveness as seven artillery battalions.

□ 2245

It could destroy a major portion of one of our cities in this country. It could kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people wherever in fact it was activated.

Now, do we know that Russia in fact or the Soviet Union in fact built these devices? Absolutely, without question. Do we know and do we have the assurance that the current leadership of Russia knows where they are? We do not. We do not have the assurance to know that Russia in fact has a full accounting for these nuclear devices.

General Lebed has said to me and he has said publicly in ''60 Minutes'' that he thinks that Russia does not have control of these devices. Now, as we expected, the immediate response from the Russian Government and from President Yeltsin and from Chernomyrdin and the other leaders in Russia and the military command operation was, ''That is not true. General Lebed does not know what he is talking about. He never had the ability to know where these nuclear devices would be located. He never would in fact have been able to find out whether or not Russia had these under control. Therefore, he is not an authority to be able to speak on these devices.''

Mr. Speaker, after going through a significant amount of briefings by our intelligence communities, after having talked to a number of people who are aware of this issue, I say that I am not convinced. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I can assure our colleagues tonight that we are not confident that Russia has control of these nuclear devices, nor are we sure that Russia has control of its strategic arsenal. And I will get into some of these items in a moment.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, since the article and the ''60 Minutes'' piece and other articles ran on the subject of the nuclear suitcases, another prominent Russian, Alexei Yablokov, who is one of the most outspoken Russian leaders in Moscow today, who himself was on Boris Yeltsin's staff, who was a key environmental advisor to Boris Yeltsin, who has been very critical of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, wrote an article in one of the leading Russian journals just last week where he in fact said that he thinks General Lebed was correct, that in fact Russia produced these devices.

Mr. Yablokov, who I know personally, who I had testified before my committee 2 years ago here in Washington on the issue of Russian nuclear waste and how we could assist Russia in that problem, Mr. Yablokov has said also that these devices were also under the control of what used to be the KGB, the Russian security forces.

So we have General Lebed and now Mr. Yablokov and others saying publicly that Russia built these devices and, in fact, they as Russians do not believe that the command and control situation in Russia is such that Russia's leadership know where they are and have full control of all the ones that were built.

Now that is extremely troubling, Mr. Speaker. Because if that is the case, that means the black market has been or could be right now and have been looking for the ability to buy one of these devices, pay the right price, and use it for a terrorist act.

Now these are the two major stories that have been dominating our news relative to our concerns with Russia over the past several weeks. Now, all of a sudden, Mr. Speaker, the administration has said they are shocked. The President says he is shocked that Russia would be cooperating with Iran on developing the SS–4 medium-range missile.

The administration has said it is concerned that Russia may, in fact, have suitcase size nuclear devices that they may not know where they are; even they said that they believe that Russia knows where they are. They cannot verify that, but they believe it.

My point today, Mr. Speaker, is, why is the administration shocked? Why are they shocked, when for the past 4 or 5 years we have repeatedly on this floor, in the House Committee on National Security and in every possible opportunity cited example after example of where this administration has ignored violations of arms control agreements, ignored them, where we know the Russians and the Chinese and other countries have in fact violated the missile technology control regime, have violated other arms control agreements, and we have not followed up action to go deal with that.

Why, then, is this administration shocked? In fact, my feeling is, Mr. Speaker, that the administration is the reason why we have the growing problem today of the lack of security as to where Russia's nuclear devices and strategic arms are. The administration's lack of strong and solid and consistent enforcement of arms control agreements, which they maintain are the basis of our bilateral relationship, is the very reason why Russia today is transferring technology, seeing nuclear devices being sold or attempted to be sold, missile material being stolen, attempts to buy long-range rockets, and in fact seeing Russia in a state today that could in fact pose a threat for peace-loving people everywhere.

I want to get into some of the specific examples that would lead me to believe that this administration should not have to wonder why and should not act surprised that Russia has been working with Iran, that in fact loose nuclear suitcases in fact could be out there. Let us talk about arms control violations.

Mr. Speaker, December 1995, front page story in the Washington Post. The front page story in the Washington Post in December 1995, the headlines screamed, ''Jordanian and Israeli intelligence intercepts accelerometers and gyroscopes going from Russia to Iraq.''

I was in Moscow in January 1996. I met with Ambassador Pickering, who was our ambassador at that time, at his office at the embassy; and I said, ''Mr. Ambassador, what was the reaction of Russia when you asked them about the Washington Post story about the accelerometers and gyroscopes that the Israeli and Jordanian intelligence people found going from Russia to Iraq?'' Ambassador Pickering said, ''Congressman, I have not asked them yet.'' I said, ''Mr. Ambassador, why haven't you asked them? Accelerometers and gyroscopes are very sophisticated, very expensive devices that are small that provide the guidance systems for long-range missiles. So that if Iran or Iraq could in fact develop a medium- to long-range missile, having Russian guidance systems would allow those missiles to be very accurate. So I would think it would be logical that we would ask Russia why were these devices going from your country to Iraq when that is a violation of the missile technology control regime? You are not allowed to transfer those types of devices. They are covered by the treaty.'' Ambassador Pickering said, ''That has got to come from Washington.''

So I came back to Washington, Mr. Speaker. On January 30, I wrote this letter to the President.

I include the letter for the RECORD, Mr. Speaker.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, January 30, 1996.

President WILLIAM CLINTON,
The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to express my concern about the recent attempted shipment of Russia missile components to Iraq. While this shipment, which included gyroscopes and accelerometers designed for use in long-range missiles, was intercepted in Jordan, it raises serious questions about the Russian government's willingness or ability to halt proliferation.

Reports of this shipment, in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Reime (MTCR), surfaced publicly in December, several months after Russia was admitted as a full member of the MTCR regime. Whether the Russian government sanctioned the shipment or not, the events which transpired underscore the fact that Russia is at best unable or at worst unwilling to fulfill its MTCR obligations.

Recently, I travelled to Russia and met with members of the Duma, defense advisors to President Yeltsin and officials of Rosvooruzheniye, the main Russian state arms export company. Russian government officials with whom I raised the issue denied all knowledge of this highly reported incident. Rosvooruzheniye officials were aware of the attempted transfer, but denied any involvement. I also met with Ambassador Pickering, who indicated that the United States neither sought nor received any information or explanation from the Russian government about the attempted transfer.

This recent incident is not the first time that Russia has transferred missile technology to non-MTCR states. In 1993, Russia sold an associated production technology for cryogenic rocket engines to India. Recently, Russia transferred missile components to Brazil. To this very day, Russian continues to aggressively market a variant of its SS–25 missile under the guise of a ''space launch vehicle.''

If nonproliferation agreements are to have any meaning, they must be aggressively enforced through careful monitoring and the application of sanctions for violations. I believe that the Russian shipment of missile components deserves a forceful response from the United States, and I am deeply troubled by the U.S. government's apparent inaction in this regard. I would appreciate answers to the following questions in that regard:

1. Has the United States demanded from the Russian government a detailed explanation of the attempted shipment of gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraq? If so, when did this occur and through what channels? If not, why not?

2. Has the Russian government responded, and what was the substance of the response? Does the Administration find it credible?

3. Do you believe that this shipment occurred with or without the knowledge of the Russian government, and what does your answer imply about Russia's willingness or ability to advance the U.S. nonproliferation agenda?

4. Why have sanctions not been imposed on Russia as a result of this attempted transfer of MTCR-prohibited missile components? What does the failure to impose sanctions, as required by U.S. law, say about the Administration's commitment to ensure the viability of the MTCR regime? Why wouldn't this set a dangerous precedent for other that might seek to circumvent or violate MTCR guidelines?

5. Russia's ascension to the MTCR regime as a full member imposes certain obligations on it that this incident demonstrates Russia is unwilling or unable to fulfill. What does the Administration intend to do to ensure full Russian compliance with its MTCR obligations in the future? Without acting firmly now in response to the attempted component transfer to Iraq, why should Russia believe that similar transfers will carry severe consequences in the future?

6. Please provide the dates and topic considered by the Missile Trade Analysis Group since the Russian shipment was reported.

7. Please list and describe all instances which raised U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the MTCR, all instances since 1987 in which the U.S. government considered imposing sanctions on a ''foreign government or entity,'' whether sanctions were in fact imposed and against whom; how long those sanctions remained in effect, and the reason why there were lifted.

Thank you for responding to these serious issues.

Sincerely,

CURT WELDON,
Member of Congress.

The letter asked President Clinton ''What is the story, Mr. President? What are we going to do about the accelerometers and gyroscopes going to Iraq.''

Well, the President finally answered me on April 3.

Mr. Speaker, I include the President's letter for the RECORD, his answer to me.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, April 3, 1996.

Hon. CURT WELDON,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: Thank you for your letter regarding the recent interdiction of Russian missile guidance components destined for Iraq.

Gaining Russian restraint on missile sales is a major objective of this Administration. As you know, in September 1993 we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Russia on the control of missile equipment and technology. We also successfully worked with Russia to meet the requirements for Russian membership in the 28-nation Missile Technology Control Regime.

I agree with you that for our nonproliferation agreements to have meaning, they must be fully enforced. For this reason, we have made clear to the Russian Government our deep concern about the shipment of missile guidance components interdicted in Jordan on its way to Iraq. We fully expect Russian authorities to investigate this case and provide us the details of their investigation as well as take steps to preclude similar incidents in the future.

As this case points out, Russia needs to continue to strengthen its new export control system. That is why, with the support of Congress, we are providing export control assistance to the Russian Government. I believe that our continued engagement with Russia on export control issues is the key to long-term improvement on their part.

I appreciate hearing your views on this important issue.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

Mr. Speaker, the President's response was, basically, Congressman, thank you for your interest. We are as concerned as you are about these accelerometers and gyroscopes. But Russia has not yet had time to fully investigate this situation. We will not take any action until we are sure that we know what happened here. But we guarantee you we will follow through.

That was in April, Mr. Speaker. Here we are, a year and a half later, and we have not taken any action under the requirements of the MTCR. We did not impose any sanctions. And, in fact, there has been little talk about the accelerometers and gyroscopes up until the news media started focusing on the Iran SS–4 cooperation.

Last Thursday, in the Committee on Science, I held up in the committee a Russian accelerometer and a Russian gyroscope. In fact, we have, Mr. Speaker, 180 of these devices. These were not transferred once. We know of at least three times that someone in Russia transferred the most sophisticated guidance systems available today that were taken from an SS–18 missile, which were the missiles in the Russian submarines that were aimed at American cities, clipped those devices in perfectly good condition, and shipped them to Iraq.

We intercepted one shipment with the help of the Jordanians and Israelis. The other devices were found in the Tigris River Basin where Iraq threw them because they knew we know they had them. We know of at least three times this technology transfer occurred, and we suspect there were more.

All of a sudden, the administration is concerned that Russia may be cooperating with Iran on the SS–4 technology? Where was there concern 2 years ago, Mr. Speaker, when I raised the issue in Moscow and with the President on the accelerometer and the gyroscope transfer?

Let us go beyond that, Mr. Speaker. Let us, for the record, put into the

RECORD seven specific violations of the missile technology control regime. Let us talk about the shipment of North Korea Scud launchers from Russia to Syria. That was in August 1993. What was the action on the MTCR as a violation? None, no action taken.

What about the sale to China of mobile multiple warhead high accuracy solid and liquid missile technology to modernize its strategic rocket forces? That was also in 1993. It is a violation of the MTCR. What was the response? Nothing, nada, no sanctions.

What about the Russian rocket builder who says it is still lending India space launch integration technology, that is in 1994, despite the MTCR and Russia's July 1993 pledge not to give India missile production assistance? No response, Mr. Speaker. No sanctions.

What about the Washington Post reporting in June of 1995 that Russia was helping Brazil build a large rocket? Violation of the MTCR. You cannot do that. No response. No sanction.

How about the shipping of the guidance sets to Iraq, as I just explained, which Jordan and Israel intercepted in November 1995 reported in the Washington Post in December 1995. No sanction, Mr. Speaker.

And now we have the sale of a 1,250-mile-range missile production technology to Iran in 1996 and 1997. Again no response accept a lot of hyperbole and the comment that the vice president just concluded serious meetings with Chernomyrdin, but no sanctions.

What about the sale to Armenia of 8 Scud-B missile launchers with 22 to 32 missiles through late 1996.

Mr. Speaker, I enter these violations into the RECORD.

RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS

Russian missile misdeed	Administration assessment	White House action taken to enforce U.S. missile technology sanctions law
Air ships North Korean Scud launchers to Syria (8/93)	Tel erector launcher units may have been mistaken by Russians to be trucks	None.
Sells China mobile, multiple-war-head, high-accuracy solid and liquid missile technology to modernize its aging strategic rocket forces (1993).	Russia made these transfers as an MICR adherent and so is legally exempt from US sanctions. Acting against Bejing would jeopardize U.S.-China relations.	None.
Russian rocket builder says it's still lending India space launch integration tech (6/94) despite MTCR & Russia's 7/93 pledge not to give India missile production assistance.	Shown evidence of Russia's continued missile assistance to India and warned it could jeopardize $100s of millions in U.S.-Russian space cooperation, White House tells House Space Committee Chairman (9/94) CIA will look into the matter.	None.
Washington Post reports Russia has been helping Brazil build a large rocket (6/8/95)	Waived U.S. missile sanctions against Brazil and Russia (citing US national security interest), admitted both into the MICR because of their creation of a ''sound'' systems of nonproliferation export controls.	None.
Ships intercontinental-range ballistic missile guidance sets to Iraq. Jordan interdicts shipment (11/95).	Shipment of gyroscopes was an ''aberrational'' action. Russia efforts to find who was responsible are inconclusive.	None.
Sells Iran 1,250-mile range missile production technology (96–97)	Administration official is quoted in Los Angeles Times explaining that the transfer may have been 'beyond the control of the government' (2/12/97).	None.
Sells Armenia 8 Scud-B missile launchers with 24-32 missiles (through late 1996)	Administration officials claim that there may have been no ''transfer'' since the Scud systems were in Armenia under Soviet control prior to the sale. Russian officials claim that they were only able to confirm these sales recently.	None.

Mr. Speaker, the point is simple: The administration should not show its shock. The administration should not say they do not understand what is going on. The reason why technology is leaving Russia is because this administration has not enforced our arms control agreements. We have put our head in the sand. How can we have a bilateral relationship based on arms control agreements if we are not going to enforce them?

It is not a case of embarrassing Boris Yeltsin. As I have said on this floor perhaps 50 times, I want Yeltsin to succeed. I spent as much time in dealing with Russia as any Member of this institution. I chair the new Dumas-Congress Study Group, which I formed with the Speaker of our Congress, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH] and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] coordinating with us, with the deputy speaker of the Russian parliament, Mr. Shokin. I chair that.

I formed the FSU American Energy Caucus six years ago to work on helping Russia develop its energy resources, and I still stay involved with that, bringing billions of dollars into Russia for their economy. I work on the environmental issues with Russia through programs called GLOBE and ACOPS on ocean protection. I have fought for and put funding into the defense bill to help Russia clean up its nuclear waste, to help Russia with its environmental problems relative to both nuclear and non-nuclear sources of pollutants.

I was in Russia twice this year proposing with CHARLES TAYLOR a new initiative to create a housing incentive program modeled after our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to help middle-income Russians own their own homes. I support the cooperative threat reduction program. I support the cooperative space station program through Mir. Every possible opportunity, Mr. Speaker, I have been there.

But Mr. Speaker, we cannot in fact cooperate with Russia and want them to succeed and then expect to put our heads in the sand when they have violations occurring in front of us and think that Russia will respect us. Russian people and Russian leaders respect strength and they respect consistency. And we have given them neither.

When the violations occur, we turn our backs. We say we do not have enough information or we say that Russia has excused itself and said they are sorry, it will not happen again. Imagine the signal we send to rogues and Mafia types in Russia today who see seven straight times where they are caught transferring technology and America does nothing.

What kind of signal is that sending, Mr. Speaker? It is sending a signal to Russia that we are just not going to call them on these violations. We have done the wrong thing. This administration should not be surprised at the technology cooperation with Iran.

□ 2300

They should not be surprised that Russia cannot guarantee us control of their nuclear assets.

There is a second reason why the administration, I think, has failed in this area, Mr. Speaker. That is the fact that this administration and this President has used the bully pulpit to create the impression in America that Russia is no longer a threat.

I am not one of those who wants to re-create the Cold War. I do not think Russia is the evil empire. In fact I hope Boris Yeltsin and I work to see Boris Yeltsin succeed. But let me repeat the quote that President Clinton has used 140 times across this country over the past 4 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, he used it three times standing in this room at the podium behind me. He looked the American people in the eye through the camera in front of me, the same camera I am looking at. Mr. Speaker, this is what he said: ''America can sleep well tonight, because for the first time in 50 years, there are no long-range Russian ICBMs pointed at America's children.''

One hundred forty times the President has used that same phrase in his speeches. For those who want to see, in past months I have placed all 140 times in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. He said it three times in State of the Union speeches. He said it on college campuses, international groups and national groups. He said it in Washington State, in California, in Texas, in Pennsylvania, in Florida, in Ohio and in Maine, in Illinois and in Indiana. And he said it even after last year on the defense bill, we asked the President to certify that to us. The Defense Department wrote back to us and said, we cannot certify that because Russia will not allow us to have access to their targeting practices, just as we will not allow them to have access to ours.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, even if we could verify that statement, you can retarget an offensive ICBM in under 30 seconds. But here we have a President going around the country, 140 times saying, ''Sleep well tonight, America, there are no longer missiles pointed at you. You're safe.''

So many of our colleagues who believe what the Commander in Chief

says, he should know, he is the Commander in Chief, and the American people then become complacent and think Russia is not a problem. We have solved that problem. The Cold War is over.

Mr. Speaker, as I said a few moments ago, I do not believe Russia is an evil empire, but I could make the case very easily that Russia is more destabilized today than it has been at any time in the last 50 years. In fact, there is more of a chance of an accidental launch today from a Russian ICBM than at any time during the Cold War. Let me back that up with some examples.

January 1995. The Norwegians are going to launch a weather rocket to sample the upper atmosphere for weather conditions. As is normally done, Norway notified Russia, ''Be prepared between a certain period of time, we're going to launch a weather rocket. Don't think anything of it. It is just to sample the weather.''

The day came. Norway launched the rocket. Because Russia is so paranoid about the status of their conventional military, their radar picked up that rocket launch, their system went into play, their nuclear response capability was activated, and Russia came within 10 minutes of activating an all-out response to a weather rocket from Norway. Boris Yeltsin has publicly said on the record that the black box that he controls with what are called the chegets that control the activation of a response or an attack were activated, which meant that for a period of minutes, Boris Yeltsin, General Kalashnikov, the commander of the general staff, and the defense minister, Pavel Grachev, the three of them had the ability to launch a response because they were mistaken initially and thought that that Norwegian rocket going up for weather sampling was an attack by the U.S. or some other Nation. Within 10 minutes of an all-out nuclear response.

The President though says, ''Don't worry. There's no more missiles pointed at America's kids.'' The fact is, Mr. Speaker, the situation in Russia today is unstable. The situation in Russia today is, in fact, troubling. We do not need to paint Russia into a corner, but we do not need to mislead the American people or the Russian people as well.

Major problems with the troops, Mr. Speaker. Let me cite from a book that is going to come out tomorrow that I am going to mention in a moment about the status of the Russian military.

> Forty-three percent of the draftees are found to be suffering from some form of mental illness. At a desolate far eastern military base at Komsomolsk-na-Amure, not far from where another Russian military leader died from hunger, two soldiers recently blew themselves up while trying to extract precious metals from the warhead of an air defense missile they had stolen from the ammunition dump. Others take the easy way out. Currently half the noncombat deaths in the military are due to suicide.

These comments are taken from a book coming out tomorrow called One Point Safe that documents in detail every issue I have raised on this floor for the past 4 and 5 years about the problems of lack of control, and the lack of adequate monitoring of Russia's strategic and nuclear materials and arsenal.

Mr. Speaker, it is not the right thing to tell the American people that there is no reason to worry. That is just as wrong as a conservative Republican standing up on the floor and recreating the evil empire. They are both extremes. The problem, Mr. Speaker, is one of those two people happens to be the President of the United States, who now expresses shock that we would find that Russia is cooperating with Iran on the SS–4 missile program; expresses concern that Russia may have nuclear suitcases that they cannot account for.

What else am I concerned about, Mr. Speaker, besides the violations of the missile control regimes and the bully pulpit creating a wrong impression in this country? I am concerned about deliberate distortions of intelligence data. Three years ago I had a senior American intelligence officer come into my office, ask to meet with me, I had never met the man before. He said: Congressman WELDON, I want to talk to you. I have been a career intelligence officer in the service of this country for, I think, 18 years. He showed me the highest award that you can get in the Intelligence Community that he had received from our government. He said, I have to tell you a story. I am coming to you because you work issues involving Russia, and because you are concerned about the proliferation of missiles, and because you work the issue of missile defense technology.

He said, my job at the intelligence agency for the Department of Energy has been to run a program called Russian fission. The Russian fission program, which was highly classified, was designed to monitor the ability for Russia to control fissile material in their nuclear stockpile. This individual, whose name is Jay Stewart, and I can say it publicly because this book now documents this story, this individual ran the Russian fission program.

This individual was asked to go over and brief the head of NATO, Manfred Worner, on the troubling conclusions he was coming to 3 and 4 years ago about the lack of control of Russia's nuclear stockpile. Manfred Worner cabled back in a secret cable to the State Department saying this briefing should be given to every country in NATO.

What did the administration do? The administration, through the Department of Energy, deliberately took apart the Russian fission program. They took Jay Stewart's job away. They eliminated the Russian fission program. In fact, Mr. Speaker, there was a briefing that was held on the status of the ability of Russia to control its nuclear stockpile 3 years ago. All of the documentation, all the film footage of that briefing was shredded.

This book, Mr. Speaker, documents the entire story. This book will be out tomorrow. I am not the author. I am not involved in any part of the marketing of it, except I have over the past 2 years helped these two writers identify the proper people to talk to to see whether or not they could verify the facts that were given to me.

I had our committee do a preliminary investigation of Jay Stewart's allegations, and they came back and said, well, DOE has circled the wagons, and under Hazel O'Leary's leadership they have all got their same story down, that Jay Stewart really was not removed for that reason, and it is really not true.

In our investigation, we found at least two other individuals who verified everything Jay Stewart said. Neither of them work for the Department of Energy. They were at labs, our energy labs in other parts of the country. One of those individuals, Jessica Stern, is in this book. She corroborates also what Jay Stewart said.

So now we have a third dimension, Mr. Speaker. We have a deliberate effort on the part of certain people in this administration to distort intelligence data that would allow this country to understand more about what was happening in Russia in regard to controlling their nuclear materials. And what was the administration's response? It was to destroy the data, rip up the records, shred the documents, shred the film footage and deny there is a problem.

Nothing could be worse for the security of this country, Mr. Speaker. In my opinion, our investigation coupled with what is in this book requires a congressional investigation that is not politicized; that, in fact, gets to the heart of what this administration now rails about, their concern and surprise and their shock at the fact that Russia would be cooperating with Iran on developing the SS–4. Forget the accelerometers and gyroscopes going to Iraq, forget the instability of nuclear devices as outlined by General Lebed. Forget about the problems associated with the Norwegian rocket launch. Forget about the morale problems in the military. Forget about all the other violations of the MTCR, but all of a sudden we are shocked.

I am not shocked, Mr. Speaker. And I am not here to stand here and blame the leadership of the Russian Government. I am here to say the reason why these things are occurring is because this administration has a policy that does not make sense. This administration does not have the backbone to enforce arms control agreements that it maintains are the basis of our bilateral relationship. This administration does not want us to put into play systems to defend our people and our troops even when we have technology being transferred that threatens our troops. And now all of a sudden they are shocked.

Here we are still cooperating and putting money into the Mir program when the agency in Russia running the Mir program has signed contracts with the same Iranian agency developing components of their medium-range missile.

Something is wrong, Mr. Speaker, and something is terribly wrong in terms of our lack of enforcement and our lack of dealing honestly with this problem that faces this Nation and people around the world who are concerned about nuclear material, who are concerned about technology that could be used against our troops, our allies and our people, and we just cannot brush it aside and say that all of a sudden we are concerned and we are going to do something about it.

With the most recent revelation about the Iranian cooperation, the President called back to work the retired U.S. Ambassador to India, Ambassador Wisner. Ambassador Wisner's assignment was to go to Moscow and to meet with the individual who runs the Russian space agency, Koptev.

Ambassador Wisner asked to brief me last week before he went to Moscow. He came in and we chatted for an hour. He said, Congressman, I assure you I am going to go over to Russia, meet with Koptev and tell him this is not acceptable.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad the Ambassador is doing that, and I am happy the administration is responding, but I think it is a little bit too late. I think that the policy of not enforcing agreements and not being consistent has now caused a feeling in Russia, especially with the problems of the Mafia being involved in a lot of the operations there, as General Lebed said. Former senior Russian commanders, General Lebed told us that the most capable generals and admirals in the Soviet Navy had been forced out of the military, and when they were forced out, they were not given housing to live in. Many of them have not even been paid their pensions. These are Russia's most capable military leaders. And General Lebed, who himself was one of those leaders, when asked what are they doing today, they are involved in rogue operations. They are selling the very equipment that they were responsible for maintaining and controlling as military leaders.

Do we know that to be true? Absolutely. In fact, we know, and it is in the record, and it is in this book that we now have evidence that a $1 billion sale of Russian military equipment took place that the Kremlin did not even know about. $1 billion of Russian military hardware, not nuclear, military hardware was being sold by a Russian official without the Kremlin even aware that the sale was taking place. And all of a sudden we are surprised?

Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because of my concern at this administration not listening to what we have said for the past 5 years. We are not about backing Russia into a corner. We are about helping Russia stabilize itself. But the policy of this administration has not worked. Now the President, as he has recently done in Helsinki, wants to reinforce the ABM treaty, a treaty based on mutually assured destruction, a treaty that was designed for the 1960s and 1970s when you had two superpowers, each with long-range missiles, the Soviet Union and America, that no longer is relevant today because mutually assured deterrence does not work when you have China and North Korea and India and Pakistan and Iran and Iraq developing long-range missile capabilities. They are not signatories to the ABM treaty, but this administration, instead of reflecting a new attitude toward Russia, considering what is happening in China and North Korea and Iraq and Iran, wants to reinforce the ABM treaty.

□ 2315

The administration, Mr. Speaker, continues to go down the wrong path and I pledge, Mr. Speaker, that as long as I am in this body I am going to call it the way I see it. I am going to be vocal on these concerns that I have expressed, and I am going to continue to pursue this administration, I am going to work with it in helping to build a strong Russia, as I have been, I am going to support it when it asks for money to help in the case, but not unless we get more cooperation in sending a signal to Russia that they got to be more open with us.

One other issue, Mr. Speaker. We found out that Russia for the past 18 years has been working on a project in the Ural Mountains. This project is in a mountain called Yamantau. The project has basically been mining, an operation that has built a facility down inside of this mountain the size of the city of Washington, D.C. Our experts estimated it could withstand a direct nuclear hit. We do not know what it is for. We have asked the Russians; they have not given any response except in 1991 the general who runs the project, General Zyuganov, said it was a project for ore mining. In 1992 he said it was a facility to store food and shelter. In 1993 and 1994 the intelligence officer for that region said it was a state secret and they had no responsibility to tell us what it was.

If we are going to rely on trust and if we are going to follow this administration's stated policy of building trust based on agreements, then we need to know what happens in Yamantau Mountain. When the Russian military cannot be paid their pensions, when they cannot be given housing, how can Russia continue to spend billions of dollars on a mountain in the middle of the Urals with a city of 65,000 people that is closed, working on this project day in and day out. We know it is there, our aerial surveillance has seen shots of what is going on, and yet Russia will not talk about it.

I raised this issue in May with the Minister of Atomic Energy, Mikhaylov, the Minister of Natural Resources, Orlov, and the Deputy Minister of Defense Kakoshin and the No. 2 general in the command, Staff General Manilow, and I told each of them, ''If you want me to continue to work Russian American issues, I need to know something about Yamantau Mountain.''

Each of them said, ''We know of this project, but we cannot talk about it. You have to go to President Yeltsin.'' I asked them to assist me. I wrote a 3-page letter in Russian to President Yeltsin in July, and I have yet to receive a response. President Clinton supposedly raised the Yamantau Mountain issue with Yeltsin a year ago at an international summit, and to this day we have no new information on Yamantau Mountain.

Mr. Speaker, our relationship with Russia is a very simple one. Yes, we need to help stabilize them, yes, we need to work together with them aggressively, but most important, we need Russia to understand that we are here to work with them to make sure they have control of the strategic weapons, their nuclear technology and that when they allow or deliberately violate arms control agreements, they have to pay the price.

And so I say, Mr. Speaker, as we discuss these issues it is critical for this Nation to understand what has been going on, and I also want to encourage each of our colleagues to read this book, the most recent Steven Spielberg movie, ''Peacemaker,'' the fictional movie is partially based on this book which is factual. This book in detail highlights all of the issues I have been raising on the floor of this institution for the last 4 years, and it names names, it names locations. I do not know how they got their data because much of what is in here was classified. But it is here in black and white. They are respected journalists. In fact Leslie Cockburn, who was a co-author with her husband Andrew, was a producer for ABC TV up until she resigned that position this year. They are capable, intelligent, articulate people who have finally documented all of the evidence that highlights the facts relative to this administration's position in terms of Russia and our relationship militarily and strategically.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff again for bearing with me in this special order.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. GIBBONS (at the request of Mr. ARMEY), for today after 6 p.m. and for the balance of the week, on account of attending a funeral.

Mr. HUNTER (at the request of Mr. ARMEY), for today, on account of a death in the family.

Mr. SCHIFF (at the request of Mr. ARMEY), for today through October 3, on account of medical reasons.

Mr. MCHALE (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT), for today after 3 p.m., on