

Moscow, in my view, would be compelled to reach the conclusion that they reached in the document that was posited on the Senate floor for the RECORD today.

I do not in any way underestimate the impact of damaged psyches on national policy. I do not in any way, in any sense, underestimate that feelings of isolation on the part of the Russian military, the Russians, might produce an extension of a position that otherwise would have been reached anyway. But I would conclude by saying I do not believe that the strategic document that the Senator spoke to today is as a consequence—notwithstanding that it mentions the expansion of NATO—of the talk of expanding with the inclusion of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland into NATO.

But my friend from Rhode Island has another urgent meeting he wishes to attend. I am happy to yield the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN, I, too, yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the treaty be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The treaty will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, two-thirds of the Senators—

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The text of the Resolution of Ratification is printed in the March 6, 1998 edition of the RECORD.)

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—H.R. 2646

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, these are requests I am making on behalf of the leadership. I can only assume they have been agreed to by the minority.

Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the cloture votes with respect to the education A+ bill occur beginning at 5:45 p.m. on Thursday, March 19.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I want to remind all my colleagues that, under rule XXII, all first-degree amendments must be filed at the desk by 1 p.m. tomorrow and second-degree amendments must be filed by 4:45 tomorrow in order to qualify under the "timely filed" requirement postcloture.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from the great State of Maryland.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I wish to speak on NATO enlargement and wish to consume such time as necessary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, this is a truly historic occasion. Today the Senate begins debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement. By ratifying this treaty, we are building an undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe for the new millennium. I stand here to support NATO enlargement because it will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It means that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will share the burden of European security.

It also means that future generations of Americans might not have to fight nor die for Europe. America has fought and won three wars in Europe: World War I, when an assassination in Yugoslavia led to years of bloodshed; World War II, the bloodiest war in history when thousands of Americans left factories and farms to fight on the battlefields of Europe; and we won the cold war, when Soviet expansionism forced us to prepare to defend Western Europe when the captive nations of Eastern Europe were forced behind the Iron Curtain.

If NATO does not enlarge, the Iron Curtain will remain permanent and the unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Soviet empire did. As a Polish American, I and members of my family have been waiting years for this debate to occur. I know that the Polish people did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the Baltic States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world.

My great grandmother had three pictures on her mantlepiece: One of Pope Pius XII, because we were Catholic and are Catholic, and that was her Pope; my uncle Joe, who was on the Baltimore City Police Department, and we were so proud of what he had achieved; and the other picture, of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of what he had done for working people.

But after Yalta and Potsdam, my great grandmother turned the Roosevelt picture face down on her mantel and she let it stay there until the day she died because of what happened at Yalta and Potsdam. That is why many of us cannot forget the history of that region, the placing of a nation and the

other nations, the captive nations, involuntarily under the servitude and boot heel of then the evil empire.

But my support for NATO enlargement is not based on nostalgia, nor is it based on the past; it is based on the future, and it is support as an American. I support NATO enlargement because I believe that it will make America and Europe more stable and more secure. NATO enlargement means a future in which the newly free and democratic countries will take their rightful places as members of Europe. NATO played an important role in securing this freedom. It has been the most successful defense alliance in world history. It is an alliance that helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the superpowers, and it has helped prevent confrontation between member states.

But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to meet the needs of the post-cold-war world or it will become irrelevant.

NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO on three different occasions, and each new member strengthened NATO and increased security in Europe.

Today, we are facing very different threats to security and stability in Europe. We have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the very real threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must meet the needs of these new threats, and I believe it will do so by changing and expanding. Europe's new democracies will help us meet these challenges.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address these new threats. How many times have we in the Senate discussed burdensharing in Europe? How often have we complained that European countries were not willing to pay their fair share for the European defense?

Now we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are asking to pledge their troops and equipment for the common defense. They are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are doing it right now in Bosnia, where there are thousands of troops from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Mr. President, Hungary is a base camp for our troops which enables them to be in Bosnia. These new nations have even committed to joining us in Iraq to help us deal with ending Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program, which is more than some of our allies.

These countries are not asking for a handout; they are asking for a handshake, a handshake to welcome them into NATO. They are not asking for our protection; they are asking to be full partners in the new Europe and in the new world order. By transforming these countries into free-market democracies, they have earned this right. These new democracies will contribute

to America's security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops and equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO.

They will also provide the will to fight for our values. Their history and geography make them passionate defenders of peace and democracy. They know what it means to be occupied and oppressed by tyrants. During the 19th century, Poland was partitioned among three countries. At the end of World War I, she had a very brief moment of democracy, and yet this is the nation that sent its own men to help fight in our war of revolution, went back to Poland and wrote the first parliamentary constitution on European continental soil, had an elected monarchy, and began to establish a parliament when many of the other countries had not even been unified.

When we look at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in the days after Yalta and Potsdam, they rose with gallantry in terms of their dissident movement. We know about Charter 77. We, of course, know about Solidarity, and we know the role that dissidents played. In fact, the three foreign ministers who came here each had been in prison and even had suffered public humiliation at being dissidents in their own country.

What do they say when they come here and come to NATO? They say they will put our common values into action. They will join with us in defending national security and our Western values, whether it means peacekeeping in Europe or preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world. They are ready for us. I hope we are ready for them.

Opponents of NATO have very valid concerns, and I would like to comment on just a few.

First, opponents of enlargement point to the cost. They say that NATO enlargement has a cost, and they are right. The new NATO members must modernize their militaries and must make them compatible with the NATO systems. The new NATO members have committed to pay this price.

There will also be a cost to the United States. Our funding of NATO's common budget will increase. NATO estimates that the total common budget will increase \$1.5 billion over 10 years. The American share will be \$400 million, or \$80 million a year. That is a lot.

But, Mr. President, what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe the cost of not enlarging NATO will be far higher. What if we fail to enlarge NATO? What will be the cost to European security? What will be the cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe? I can tell you, as a member of the Senate NATO observer group, I met recently with the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and I asked them these questions.

The Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, a hero of the Solidarity movement, said Poland would

feel abandoned by the West and that Poland would still pay to modernize their military. In fact, in the absence of belonging to NATO, they would spend even more of their own money. The Hungarian and Czech Foreign Ministers agree that they would have to spend more money for defense if they did not join NATO. Also, they would form their own military alliances, which would be very decidedly more anti-Russian than NATO.

The other foreign ministers said that by refusing to enlarge NATO, it would give the hardliners in Russia a great victory. The antidemocratic forces in Russia would feel vindicated and proud and would say that they themselves stopped the expansion of NATO.

What would be the long-range cost to America of failing to prepare NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and the increased chance of being pulled into yet another conflict. The cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war.

I also will take a minute to discuss the benefits of enlargement and weigh them against the cost.

The strategic benefits of enlargement are important. NATO enlargement will create a zone of peace and stability that includes Eastern Europe. It will include NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and reduce the chance of aggression or conflict in Eastern Europe. Enlargement will bring peace and security for Eastern Europe just as it did for the West.

There are economic benefits. Europe is America's largest trading partner, with \$250 billion in a two-way trade each year. Our new NATO partners will increase trade opportunities. They are building vibrant free-market economies. NATO brings stability, and stability brings prosperity. We are creating a prosperity zone.

In addition, there are benefits for democracy. The young military officers of new NATO members are learning from us, learning what it means to be part of a democratic military, to be under civilian control, to have a code of conduct, also to have transparent defense spending budgets, no secret police. They are also learning English. When they leave the military, they will bring these skills. They will bring a sense of democracy. They will bring great skills to the operation of their free market. It is clear these benefits of NATO enlargement far outweigh the cost.

Let me conclude by saying this treaty is very important, and treaty ratification is one of our most fundamental duties. We are extending our Nation's commitment to the collective defense. We do not take this responsibility lightly. We are extending our Nation's commitment to collective defense, the so-called article 5. We do not take this responsibility lightly, and in the very best tradition of the Senate, we are addressing NATO enlargement as a national security issue, not as a political issue.

I am delighted and proud to say that NATO enlargement has been a bipartisan process. I remember when we began this debate some years ago with the really wonderful leadership of Senator Hank Brown of Colorado. It has truly been supported by members of both parties. We have worked closely with the President and Secretary Albright, and the Senate has been consulted every step of the way. I am proud to support NATO enlargement. By ratifying this resolution, we are marking the end of the cold war and we are also marking the beginning of a new century. We want the new century to be rid of the repugnance of the old century. We are laying the groundwork for a new era of peace and stability.

Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I note on the floor is a distinguished war hero, my colleague from the State of Arizona. I was not here yesterday to lend my wonderful tribute to him on the anniversary of his release from a prison camp. I extend my great respect to the senior Senator from Arizona.

When I visited Vietnam, I saw where they had taken the Senator prisoner. Obviously, he is a guy who will never let himself be taken prisoner. It is an honor to serve with him in the Senate and to enjoy these kinds of debates and discussions. God bless. Godspeed. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MCCAIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. President. I say to my dear friend from Maryland, with whom I have had the pleasure and honor of working on a number of other foreign policy issues, the Senator from Maryland and I were heavily involved with the issue of Central America when there was a struggle for freedom and democracy going on there. Due to her efforts and those of so many of us who have been involved in these issues, we now have a brighter day in Central America.

What the Senator from Maryland just articulated is a brighter day for the people of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. I thank her for her remarks about me personally, but I express my even greater gratitude for her continued leadership on issues of national security and foreign policy in this body, for which she has accumulated enormous respect and appreciation, as well as a fair amount of affection. I thank the Senator from Maryland.

I rise today to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement about which this body must vote in the near future. I would like to stress three points: That NATO enlargement is demanded by our American values; that it is in the strategic interests of the United States; and that efforts to delay a decision or to mandate policy on other European security issues through amendments to the resolution of ratification are unnecessary and potentially dangerous.

These points were made very eloquently by our former majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, in an op-ed published today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole's article that was published today in the Washington Times be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the op-ed was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Times]

NATO TEST OF U.S. LEADERSHIP

(By Bob Dole)

For decades, the United States urged communist leaders to "tear down the Wall." Within the past 10 years, the people of Eastern Europe have embraced liberty and undertaken major reforms in their economies and governments. Now the United States Senate should take the next step toward ensuring freedom and democracy for the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary by ratifying the NATO enlargement treaty and inviting them to join us in NATO.

American leadership on NATO enlargement is important to our security as well as to the security of Eastern Europe.

At the Madrid Summit last July, President Clinton and the other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to become members of the alliance, culminating years of efforts by these countries to meet NATO's strict entry criteria. Last week, under the bipartisan leadership of Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican, and Sen. Joe Biden, Delaware Democrat, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly endorsed NATO accession legislation by a vote of 16-2. I hope the full Senate will follow suit without delay.

Two world wars began in Europe, and strife in Bosnia continues today. Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help ensure that new threats, such as ethnic struggles and state-sponsored terrorism, will be kept in check.

During the half-century that NATO has helped guarantee peace in Europe, it has added new members three times, including Germany, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Each addition made the Alliance stronger and increased its military capability. Affirming the military importance of NATO enlargement, 60 top retired U.S. officers—including Colin Powell and four other former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nine former service branch chiefs, and top combat leaders such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf—recently signaled their support of NATO enlargement. Their statement emphasized that the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against security challenges of the future.

What these military leaders and many other Americans understand is that no free nation has ever initiated a war against another democracy. Integrating the military, economic and political structures of the Europe's newest stable democracies into the NATO alliance will help ensure that this remains true in the 21st century.

Let me take the opportunity to address four major concerns that critics have raised in this debate. First, some senators have engaged in a last-minute effort to postpone consideration of the NATO accession legislation. But members of both parties and both houses of Congress have already thoroughly examined questions surrounding NATO enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone has held eight hearings with more than 37 witnesses, resulting in 550

pages of testimony. The case has been made: NATO enlargement is in the interest of the United States. It is time to make it a reality.

Second, other critics in the Senate have suggested placing conditions on NATO expansion, thereby "freezing" enlargement for an arbitrary number of years. Like the administration, I oppose any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process. Such a move would send the wrong message to countries in both the East and the West, closing the door on current and potential new allies—and perhaps tying the hands of a future president.

Furthermore, freezing NATO's membership would create a destabilizing new dividing line in Europe. Currently, non-member European nations cooperate extensively with NATO through the Partnership for Peace Program. But if nations believe the ultimate goal of NATO membership is unattainable, any incentive to continue democratic reform will be substantially diminished.

The alliance's open door commitment, which has been supported by the United States, has been an unqualified success. The prospect of NATO membership has given Central European countries a strong incentive to cooperate with the alliance, strengthen civilian control of the military, and resolve longstanding border disputes. All of these advance U.S. interests. It would be a mistake to abandon a policy that is clearly achieving its objectives.

Third, some argue that NATO enlargement has hurt or will hurt cooperation with Russia, or may even strengthen the hand of hardline Russian nationalists. This has not been borne out by the facts. Since the NATO enlargement process began, President Boris Yeltsin has been re-elected and many reformers have been elevated within the Russian government. Mr. Yeltsin pledged at the 1997 Helsinki summit to press for ratification of START II and to pursue a START III accord. The Duma also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, creating a new, constructive relationship with the West.

The world has changed. The debate over NATO expansion cannot be recast as an extension of the Cold War. I believe imposing a mandated pause in NATO's engagement would appear to give Russia a veto over NATO's internal decisions, contrary to NATO's stated policy, and would strengthen Russian extremists by enabling them to claim that their scare-tactic objections swayed the world's most powerful military alliance.

And last, some skeptics would rather allow the European Union (EU) to take the lead in building Central and Eastern Europe's economic and security structure. But with due respect, NATO, not the EU, is the cornerstone of European security, which is vital to our own.

As the Senate considers this legislation to allow Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to complete their journey from communist dictatorship to NATO membership, we should consider the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:

"The Alliance should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of EuroAmerican civilization and thus as a pillar of global security."

NATO protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn political and economic systems. With Senate approval of NATO enlargement, it can, and should, provide similar security to our allies in Central and East-

ern Europe as they re-enter the community of free nations.

This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

Mr. MCCAIN. First, Mr. President, the morals and values we share as Americans—protecting and promoting human freedom and democracy—strongly point toward bringing Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland into NATO.

For centuries, these territories were fully integrated with the development of modern Europe—politically, economically, militarily, culturally, and psychologically. But these countries were unnaturally cut off from the West in 1945 by the Iron Curtain that was slammed down by the occupying Soviet Red Army. The close ties to the West of over a thousand years had been broken.

The people of Central Europe suffered horribly under communism. Their political and economic development was shattered. Arbitrary rule under a police state undermined normal relations within society. Citizens were pressured to inform on one another. Political prisoners were held and tortured simply for demanding freedom.

Let us be clear, these countries were forced into communism against their will by an occupying power. In each country—Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1981—freedom-seeking citizens sought to break free from the grip of Soviet-imposed communism, and, as we know, they were ruthlessly put down. While the United States and NATO staunchly defended freedom in the West, we could do little in the East other than offer our moral support, because the risk of nuclear war was too great.

After decades of oppression, when the Soviet Union itself began to decline, the people of these three countries again showed tremendous courage and determination by seizing the opportunity to throw off the yoke of communism. Hungary cut through the barbed wire on the Austrian border and allowed East German refugees to escape to freedom. Vaclav Havel's peaceful protests ushered out one of the most repressive Communist regimes in Central Europe through the "velvet revolution" of 1989. The Solidarity movement finally pushed the generals and commissars out of power.

In all three countries, communism was peacefully dismantled and replaced with parliamentary democracy and free markets. All three countries are now thriving, both politically and economically. Individual rights and freedoms are protected in both theory and in practice. Institutions that guarantee the rule of law are firmly entrenched.

These three countries now seek our help in securing their newfound freedom for membership in NATO—just as was done with Western Europe after World War II. While there is no immediate military threat, the Poles,

Czechs, and Hungarians know from bitter experience that they cannot afford to wait until a new threat emerges to protect their freedom.

Protecting freedom was the beacon of our policy in Europe during the cold war. It would be an incomprehensible tragedy for us to abandon that stance now when the opportunities for freedom in Central Europe are greater than ever and the risks are far lower than at any time during the cold war.

Second, beyond any moral arguments, NATO enlargement serves strategic interests of the United States. The national security of our country still depends on a stable and secure Europe where democracy and free markets can flourish. This was the lesson from two world wars and the reason we created NATO in the first place.

Today, the U.S. economy is more tightly tied to the rest of the world than it was in 1949. Thus, America's well-being depends more than ever on an environment of stable market democracies. NATO remains the only organization capable of guaranteeing security and protecting democracy in Europe.

Enlarging NATO will prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in Central Europe. Absent NATO, the states of this region would have no choice but to remain anxious about historical animosities and worry of a resurgent Russia. They would be forced to seek security through national means—creating the possibility of diverging military and security strategies and raising the risk of miscalculation.

NATO enlargement guarantees that there is a single, constructive focus to security and stability in Europe—West, Central, and East. Taking prudent steps now—enlarging NATO gradually to include these new democracies—will reduce the likelihood of a conflict that might later involve the United States.

More than just filling a vacuum, NATO enlargement will ensure that the security environment in Europe remains conducive to U.S. interests, and it will strengthen and expand our base of support in Europe. Ratification will enlarge the secure, democratic, prosperous space in Europe where countries share our values and can act as meaningful partners for the United States, helping promote democracy, free markets, and security beyond the bounds of NATO Europe itself.

Europe has already changed, and NATO enlargement is necessary to adjust to these changes. Not ratifying enlargement at this stage would isolate NATO from the fundamental political and economic changes that are reshaping the continent. A stagnant NATO would be relegated to the "dustbin of history," something the Soviet Union sought and failed to achieve during the cold war.

Equally distressing, failure to ratify enlargement would undercut U.S. leadership in Europe, with consequences well beyond NATO itself. We would not

only be demonstrating that we are no longer prepared to play the leading role in European security, a role that has served our common interests well for 50 years, but we would be undermining the only meaningful organization in Europe where the U.S. has a seat at the table.

Moreover, voting against ratification would deliver to hardline Russian nationalists the victory they failed to achieve through threats and intimidation over the past several years. Reformers, who argue that cooperation with the West is the only way to serve the interests of modern Russia, would be proved wrong. Instead, our action would demonstrate that confrontation, not cooperation, is the most effective policy for Russia.

Mr. President, an extraordinary array of the most senior foreign policy and military leaders of this Nation have spoken out in support of NATO enlargement, including former President Bush, two former Vice Presidents, eight former Secretaries of State, six former Secretaries of Defense, five former National Security Advisors, five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nine former Chiefs of the Military Services, and some 60 retired four-star generals.

Mr. President, I ask that their declaration of support for NATO enlargement be printed in the RECORD and that the list of names be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR NATO  
ENLARGEMENT

The Senate is faced with a historic opportunity—to extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The outcome of this vote will in large measure determine the future of the NATO alliance and whether it will continue to be a vital force for peace and stability in the Europe of the 21st century.

We believe that NATO has been the most effective military alliance in history. It was the centerpiece of the strategy that kept Europe secure and free during the darkest days of the Cold War. Under its protection, Western Europe recovered from the devastation of World War II to enjoy 50 years of increasing stability, prosperity, and freedom. Now, in an expanded NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can enjoy similar success.

The situation in Europe is very different than during the Cold War. But the need for NATO remains. The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make for a stronger NATO. It will strengthen NATO's ability to help Europe set aside old quarrels and overcome a long history of conflict and war. It will eliminate a source of instability that contributed to two World Wars and could again become a source of confrontation and even conflict. It will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against the security challenges of the future.

The admission of these three countries into NATO is not directed against Russia. Rather it is directed toward the stability of Europe—stability that will benefit Russia as much as anyone, and will ultimately facilitate a closer relationship between Russia and the United States.

We believe that the cost of bringing these three countries into NATO is manageable especially when compared to the potential cost of not doing so—a Europe moving not toward stability and peace but toward instability and contention.

We believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make a useful contribution to our common security. They already possess credible military capability and are engaged in adapting their armed forces to the standards of the NATO alliance. They have shown a willingness to participate in collective defense by their contributions during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of their histories, these nations know that freedom is not free. They take security seriously. They will make good allies.

The upcoming Senate vote is fundamentally a test of whether the United States will stay engaged in the Europe of the 21st century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has expended enormous effort to build a Europe of free and democratic states at peace with one another. For the first time, there is a realistic possibility of achieving this goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great project.

The lessons of history are clear. Two World Wars and one Cold one have established beyond question that American security and European security are inseparable. In the aftermath of World War I, America turned its back on Europe, only to have America's sons and daughters pay the price a generation later. We cannot afford to make that mistake again.

The creation of NATO in 1949 took foresight and determination to do what was right. Today, the stakes are just as high. We urge the Senate to reaffirm American engagement in Europe by ratifying the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO—to secure the peace, security, and prosperity on which we all depend.

General Joe Ashy, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSPACE/CINCORAD.

General George S. Blanchard, USA (Ret), Former CINC. USAREUR COMCENTAG.

General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant Commandant, USMC.

General Michael P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

General W.L. Creech, USAF (Ret), Former CINCAFLANT.

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General James Dalton, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE.

General Mike Dugan, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, COMAAFCE.

Admiral Leon Edney, USN (Ret), Former SACLANT.

General Ronald Fogleman, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

General Al Gray, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC Commander.

General Monroe Hatch, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret), Former CINCSPACE/NORAD.

General Andrew P. Iosue, USAF (Ret), Former ATC Commander.

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General David Jones, USAF (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General George Joulwan, USA (Ret), Former SACEUR.

General P.X. Kelley, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval Operations, SACLANT.

General William L. Kirk, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSAFE/COMAAFCE.

General Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army Europe.

General William Livsey, USA (Ret), Former CINC Combined/UN FORCES KOREA.

General John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, Air Combat Command.

General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.

General Robert T. Marsh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, AFSC.

General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret), Former DCINCEUR.

General Charles McDonald, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC Commander.

General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

General Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret), Former U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee.

General James P. Mullins, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC Commander.

General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

General Wallace Nutting, USA (Ret), Former USCINCREED.

LTC William E. Odom, USA (Ret), Former Director, NSA.

General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army Europe.

Admiral William Owens USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Binford Peay, USA (Ret), Former CINC, U.S. Central Command.

General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Bernard P. Randolph, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, AF Systems Command.

General Robert H. Reed, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE.

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret), Former VCSA/CINC UNCS/USFK.

General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (Ret), Former Army Chief of Staff and SACEUR.

LTG Edward L. Rowley, USA (Ret), Former Special Advisor on Arms Control.

General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret), Former CINC Central Command & Operation Desert Storm.

General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret), Former CINC Combined/UN FORCES KOREA.

General John Shalikashvili, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General John Shaud, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE.

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret), Former SACLANT/CINC, USACOM.

Admiral Leighton Smith, USN (Ret), Former CINC US Naval Forces Europe.

General Carl Stiner, USA (Ret), Former US CINC, Special Operations Command.

Admiral William Studeman, USN (Ret), Former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence.

General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Army.

General John W. Vessey, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Volney Warner, USA (Ret), Former CINC, US Readiness Command.

General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret), Former Air Force Chief of Staff.

General J.J. Went, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant Commandant, USMC.

General Ronald W. Yates, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, AF Materiel Command.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval Operations and Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#### THE NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE STATEMENT ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

(Presented by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake and Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, September 9, 1997)

The New Atlantic Initiative, an international network dedicated to revitalizing and expanding Atlantic ties, released the following statement in support of NATO enlargement on September 9, 1997. The statement was released by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake, and Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, where the original North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949.

NATO was the bulwark of America's successful Cold War strategy of containment. Largely due to NATO, Europe has enjoyed more than fifty years without war among its major powers, the longest such period in modern history.

NATO succeeded not only by providing a shield against aggression from without but also by helping to knit together a community of democracies in which old quarrels faded, the civic culture of democracy sank deep roots, and market economies prospered.

In part because of NATO's success, the Cold War has ended, and with it NATO's original mission. Its larger purpose of ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region endures. To continue to fulfill this purpose NATO is adapting to an undivided Europe. NATO is no longer an anti-Soviet alliance; nor should it engage in the self-fulfilling prophecy of pre-selecting new enemies. Rather it is defining itself in more positive terms: as an alliance aiming to promote peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted to the spread and consolidation of democratic ways in Europe, and capable of protecting Western interests against such future threats as may emerge. At bottom, NATO remains a mutual defense pact, and this solemn commitment gives all of its acts a weight and seriousness that distinguish it from other international organizations.

Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's willingness to admit new members able to meet meaningful criteria of democracy and military effort. Otherwise it will remain a relic of the Cold War of diminishing relevance to the contemporary world. Admission to NATO will consolidate democratic transitions, and the prospect of admission will spur reform and the resolution of disputes, as indeed has already happened. In addition, NATO has made clear its desire to develop cooperative security relations among all of the states of the Euro-Atlantic region including Russia. Czech President Vaclav Havel has put it: "NATO expansion should be perceived as a continuous process, in which the nations of Central and Eastern Europe mature toward the meaning, values and goals of the enlarged and revived alliance."

To those who say that the nations of central Europe face no threat today, we say that the most likely way to preserve this situation, which has been all too rare, is to extend NATO to that region. To those who say that the addition of these new members will somehow dilute NATO, we say that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, where freedom is dearly cherished having been so recently won, will add strength to NATO. To those who say that expanding NATO will draw new lines in Europe, we say that it will erase old lines, relics of a bitter time, and that NATO's openness to additional accessions means that new lines are not in fact being drawn. To those who worry that Russia will feel threatened, we emphasize that NATO is a defensive alliance that threatens no one and extends a hand of cooperation to Russia.

The decision on NATO expansion is of historic importance. The stakes are high. The issue is clear. Admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will strengthen the alliance, reinforce new democracies, renew the American commitment to Europe, and reaffirm American leadership. To turn back now would be a tragic mistake.

#### SIGNERS TO NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE NATO ENLARGEMENT STATEMENT

(Organizational affiliation given for identification purposes only. Views reflected in the statement are endorsed by the individual, not the institution.)

Richard V. Allen, Former National Security Advisor.

Morris B. Abram, Chairman, United Nations Watch, Former Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations office in Geneva.

Elliott Abrams, President, Ethics & Public Policy Center, Former Assistant Secretary of State.

David M. Abshire, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution, Former Undersecretary of State.

Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates L.C. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Bernard Aronson, Chairman, Acon Investments, Former Assistant Secretary of State.

Norman R. Augustine, Chairman, Lockheed Martin Corp., Former Undersecretary of the Army.

James A. Baker, III, Former Secretary of State.

Mira Baratta, Vice President for Programs, Freedom House.

Dennis Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute.

Michael D. Barnes, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Former Member of Congress.

Douglas J. Bennet, President, Wesleyan University, Former Administrator, USAID.

Lucy Wilson Benson, President, Benson Associates, Former Undersecretary of State.

Jeffrey T. Bergner, President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough & Brain.

Coit D. Blacker, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

J. Kenneth Blackwell, Treasurer, State of Ohio, Former U.S. Ambassador to the UNHRC.

John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of State.

David L. Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former U.S. Senator.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor.

Richard Burt, Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc., Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany.

Frank C. Carlucci, III, Former Secretary of Defense.

Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Hodding Carter, Knight Professor of Journalism, University of Maryland, Former Assistant Secretary of State.

Richard Cheney, Former Secretary of Defense.

Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State.

Clark M. Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.

Chester A. Crocker, Research Professor for Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Ivo H. Daalder, Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland.

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Midge Decter, Author.  
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Bob Dole, Former U.S. Senator.  
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Lawrence Eagleburger, Former Secretary of State.  
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Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Former Secretary of State.  
Edward T. Hanley, General President, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union.  
Marshall Freeman Harris, Director of Publications and Public Outreach, Freedom House.  
Carla A. Hills, Chairman and CEO, Hills & Company, Former U.S. Trade Representative.  
Richard Holbrooke, Vice Chairman, Credit Suisse First Boston, Former Assistant Secretary of State.  
Walter D. Huddleston, Former U.S. Senator.  
Samuel Huntington, Weatherhead University Professor, Harvard University.  
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Jeane Kirkpatrick, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.  
Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State.  
William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard.  
Melvin Laird, Former Secretary of Defense.

Anthony Lake, Professor, Georgetown University, Former National Security Advisor.  
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Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University.  
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Dave McCurdy, Chairman, McCurdy Group, Former Member of Congress.  
Robert C. McFarlane, Former National Security Advisor.  
John Melcher, Former U.S. Senator.  
Walter Mondale, Former Vice President of the United States.  
John E. Moon, Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.  
Joshua Muravchik, Convenor, New Atlantic Initiative Working Group on NATO Enlargement, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.  
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James J. Norton, President, Graphic Communications International Union.  
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Daniel Oliver, Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.  
John O'Sullivan, Founder and Co-chairman, New Atlantic Initiative, Editor, National Review.  
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William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense.  
Daniel Pipes, Editor, Middle East Quarterly.  
Norman Podhoretz, Editor-at-large, Commentary Magazine, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.  
Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former National Security Advisor.  
Dan Quayle, Former Vice President of the United States.  
David Rockefeller, Retired banker.  
Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Former Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State.  
William Rogers, Former Secretary of State.  
Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Edward L. Rowny, Lt. USA (ret.), Former Chief U.S. Negotiator to START talks.  
Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense.  
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute for International Development.  
Jeffrey T. Salmon.  
George Shultz, Former Secretary of State.  
Dmitri K. Simes, President, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom.  
Paul Simon, Former U.S. Senator.  
Alan Simpson, Former U.S. Senator.  
Joseph J. Sisco, Former Undersecretary of State.  
Leon Sloss, President, Leon Sloss Associates.  
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Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution, Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State.  
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Cyrus R. Vance, Former Secretary of State.  
Stephen W. Walker, Director, Balkan Institute.  
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Vin Weber, Partner, Clark & Weinstock, Former Member of Congress.  
William H. Webster, Former Director of Central Intelligence.  
George Weigel, Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center.  
W. Bruce Weinrod, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.  
Ross Williams, President, Secretary/Treasurer, Oklahoma State AFL-CIO.  
Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Former Undersecretary of Defense.  
Ronald B. Woodard, President, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group.  
R. James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence.  
Dov S. Zakheim, CEO, SPC International Corporation.  
Robert B. Zoellick, Vice President, Fannie Mae, Former Undersecretary of State.  
E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., Adm. U.S.N. (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations.  
Mr. MCCAIN, Third, Mr. President, because of the moral and strategic interests we have in NATO enlargement, it would be a grave mistake to endanger ratification by delay or by using amendments to the resolution of ratification to mandate specific policies on other separate European security issues.  
Some of our colleagues have argued for making ratification contingent on certain other matters of European security policy. I believe the enlargement of NATO warrants our support without further condition.  
The protocols on enlarging NATO are short, simple documents that do nothing more than extend the existing NATO treaty, in effect for nearly 50 years, to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The protocols say nothing about further enlargement, Russia,

costs, the changing role of the alliance, the EU, or intra-alliance disputes. Past rounds of enlargement have gone forward with little or no conditions attached.

There is something to be said for knowing this historical precedent as it demonstrates the nonpartisan U.S. commitment to NATO, the European security, and to being a reliable partner, setting the kind of example we want our allies to follow on this and many other matters.

Imagine our reaction if the parliament of one of our allies were to attach conditions to NATO enlargement that we would find unacceptable—for example, restricting use of NATO designated forces in strikes against Iraq.

To the extent conditions are attached, they must be of a nature so as not to impede or slow down the ratification of NATO enlargement, here or in other Allied capitals. There are many complicated issues at stake in European security that demand our attention, but these issues cannot and should not be solved through hurried words in the resolution of ratification.

We risk doing more harm than good by mandating simplified solutions to problems where there is need for more thoughtful consideration and where there is no consensus within this body or among our country's foremost experts. This applies in particular to questions about NATO's "new missions" and the alliance's strategic concept. Clearly, we need to pay close attention to NATO's growing out-of-area role and its greater emphasis on peacekeeping and crisis management.

In today's world, no longer dominated by an East-West divide in Europe, these new directions of NATO make sense. Rather than seeking to use a resolution of ratification to restrict development of these concepts in NATO, we simply need to continue to do our job in the Senate of exercising oversight to ensure that NATO's evolving strategic concept remains consistent with our treaty commitments and that the United States does not commit to foreign military engagements that do not have sufficient support in the Senate and among the American public.

I do not see the logic in a mandated pause before future rounds of enlargement. It is scarcely necessary, given there will be a de facto pause as the alliance absorbs the first round of new members. The United States always maintains a veto at NATO, and the Senate always has the right of advice and consent. All a pause would do is needlessly tie our own hands and those of a future President in the event a qualified country that could make a real contribution to NATO wanted to join. Even worse, it would eliminate the incentive other Europeans have to spend now the resources necessary to prepare for NATO membership in the future. A mandated pause buys us nothing we do not already have, yet has real down sides.

Burdensharing is an issue of constant concern and debate with our allies. It is a long-term struggle for this country to ensure that we bear only a reasonable and fair share of the costs of our common security through NATO. Enlargement itself already implies a small reduction in the U.S. share of NATO's common expenses, although the total dollar amount will go up as NATO takes on new costs associated with enlargement. But seeking to use the resolution of ratification to mandate further reductions in our share of NATO expenses that have not been consented to by our allies is simply another way to try to scuttle enlargement.

I also fail to see the logic of tying NATO enlargement to decisions by the European Union about its enlargement. Security is an issue in its own right, independent of economics, and we need to fill the security vacuum in Central Europe, bind these countries to the West, and guarantee a stable environment in Europe regardless of the state of European Union enlargement.

Moreover, the European Union is dragging its feet on enlargement. We should not allow this foot-dragging to delay our taking action to enhance security in Europe. The U.S. is not a member of the EU and has almost no influence over its membership decisions. There is no reason for the U.S. to abdicate to the EU the decisions about which countries we will end up defending through NATO and when.

Finally, the EU is negotiating with six candidates for future EU expansion. Three of these countries are the same as the three NATO invitees, but the others include countries such as Cyprus and Estonia for whom near-term NATO membership would be problematic.

In my view, the resolution of ratification, as currently drafted, addresses most of the concerns that Senators have raised in a responsible and thoughtful manner. It does not impose any unacceptable conditions. It calls for a reaffirmation from the administration on a few key points—the primacy of the North Atlantic Council vis-a-vis the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the maintenance of collective defense, not collective security and out-of-area missions, as the core mission of NATO; and the requirement to keep the costs of enlargement under control and shared equitably among the allies. These are sound policy positions soundly formulated. Neither the administration nor our allies should have any difficulty supporting them.

Mr. President, there is no reason to delay bringing this issue to a vote. This issue has received more attention in the Senate and in public discussion than most other foreign policy issues in recent memory. The proliferation of op-eds, articles, studies, think-tank papers, and conference proceedings is astonishing.

Over the past several years, the Senate has on 14 separate occasions,

through unanimous consent resolutions, voice votes, rollcall votes, on things such as the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, repeatedly given a strong endorsement to NATO enlargement. We even urged the administration to include one more country in the enlargement talks that was ultimately invited at Madrid.

Several Senate committees have held hearings on NATO enlargement. The Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings and published 552 pages of testimony about the issue. This level of attention has been the most extensive of any previous enlargement of NATO. Ratification of Spain's membership was done by a voice vote. To say that there has not been enough debate is to say that no amount of debate will ever be enough.

The complaints that there has not been sufficient debate—often coupled with a request to postpone such debate—instead seem like an effort by opponents of enlargement to scuttle the issue because they know a majority in the Senate has considered the issue and is prepared to vote in favor.

The issues before us are clear and well defined. For the moral, strategic, and practical reasons I have outlined, the most important thing the Senate can do now is to offer an overwhelming, positive "yes" vote on the enlargement of NATO—without crippling amendments—to bring these countries back into the Western fold forever. I urge my colleagues to support the current resolution of ratification with no further amendments.

Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. I thank his staff and others who have contributed enormously to this effort. I want to thank Senator BIDEN and I want to thank Senator HELMS for their efforts. Without their work, we probably would not have gotten this issue to the floor. The majority leader has committed on this issue, and I appreciate his leadership.

But I also cannot help but recall, Mr. President, our former majority leader, Bob Dole, whose op-ed piece appeared in the Washington Times today. I will not take the time in the Senate to read the whole thing, but Senator Dole sums up where he says—and I quote—

This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

Senator Dole, throughout his long and illustrious career here, always believed that the United States should lead the way. With our vote in favor of enlargement of NATO, the United States will again, in the words of Bob Dole, lead the way.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT  
AGREEMENT—S. CON. RES. 85

Mr. MCCAIN. As in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of S. Con. Res. 85, submitted earlier today by Senator NICKLES and others. I further ask unanimous consent