for Greece and others in the past. The cold war is over. Europe is rich. These countries have money. We should not just stick U.S. taxpayers with the total bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. HARKIN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 24, nays 76, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 106 Ex.]

YEAS—24

Ashcroft	Graham	Moseley-Braun
Baucus	Harkin	Moynihan
Bond	Hutchinson	Murray
Bumpers	Jeffords	Smith (NH)
Byrd	Johnson	Torricelli
Conrad	Kempthorne	Warner
Dorgan	Kohl	Wellstone
Feingold	Leahy	Wyden

NAYS—76

Abraham	Faircloth	Lugar
Akaka	Feinstein	Mack
Allard	Ford	McCain
Bennett	Frist	McConnell
Biden	Glenn	Mikulski
Bingaman	Gorton	Murkowski
Boxer	Gramm	Nickles
Breaux	Grams	Reed
Brownback	Grassley	Reid
Bryan	Gregg	Robb
Burns	Hagel	Roberts
Campbell	Hatch	Rockefeller
Chafee	Helms	Roth
Cleland	Hollings	Santorum
Coats	Hutchison	Sarbanes
Cochran	Inhofe	Sessions
Collins	Inouye	Shelby
Coverdell	Kennedy	Smith (OR)
Craig	Kerrey	Snowe
D'Amato	Kerry	Specter
Daschle	Kyl	Stevens
DeWine	Landrieu	Thomas
Dodd	Lautenberg	Thompson
Domenici	Levin	Thurmond
Durbin	Lieberman	
Enzi	Lott	

The executive amendment (No. 2312) was rejected.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay it on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, MR. JOHN PRESCOTT

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in recess for 2 minutes for the purpose of welcoming Deputy Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. John Prescott, to the floor.

In addition, I ask unanimous consent the privilege of the floor be granted to Sir Christopher Mayer, the British Ambassador to the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:21 p.m., recessed until 3:23 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. KEMPTHORNE).

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the expansion of NATO. And how appropriate that our friends, colleagues, and allies from the United Kingdom have joined us on the Senate floor just as they have joined us in battle and just as they have joined us in keeping the peace, and we welcome them with affection, admiration, and gratitude.

Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate has returned to consideration of the ratification of NATO enlargement. I hope we will now have an uninterrupted debate. NATO enlargement deserves the dignity of serious consideration of this matter and to take such time as the Senate deems necessary.

Mr. President, I support NATO enlargement because it will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It means that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will share the burden of European security. It means that future generations might not have to fight and die in a European theater.

If NATO doesn't enlarge, the Iron Curtain remains permanent and the unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Communist empire did in the Soviet Union. NATO will remain, as President Havel has said, an alumni club for cold war victors. It will have little relevance to the realities of the 21st century.

Mr. President, as a Polish American, I know that the Polish people did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there by the Yalta agreement and by Potsdam and because they and the Baltic States and the other captive nations were sold out by the West.

Many Members of the U.S. Senate have stood long for the freeing of the captive nations. Many of our colleagues have been strong supporters of Solidarity. I, as both a Congresswoman and then as a U.S. Senator, supported the Solidarity movement. I was a strong supporter of the Solidarity movement. I was with President Ronald Reagan in a wonderful evening he held at the White House where he hosted the Polish Ambassador to the United States who had defected when Poland had imposed martial law on its own people, there sitting with President Reagan and the Ambassador from Poland who chose to defect rather than uphold where the Polish Army had been forced to go against its own people.

We pledged that we would make Poland free. And now Poland is free, but we have to make sure that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not only free but that they are secure. That is why my support is for the expansion of NATO. My support for NATO is not based on ethnic American politics nor is it even based on the past, but it is based on the future. What will the new world order look like?

I support NATO enlargement because it will make America and Europe more stable and secure. NATO enlargement means a future in which the newly independent countries will take their rightful place as a member of Western Europe. NATO played an important part in securing this freedom. It has been the most successful alliance in history. It is an alliance that helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the superpowers and helped prevent confrontation between member states.

But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to the needs of a post-cold-war world, or it will become irrelevant.

NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO on three different occasions. Each new member strengthened NATO and increased security in Europe. No expansion of NATO is easy. No expansion of NATO is done without thought. No expansion of NATO is ever without controversy. We can only reflect what the bitter debate must have been when we voted to include Germany because of their provocative role in World War I and World War II.

Today, we are facing difficult and different threats to security. We have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international crimes, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must change in order to meet these new threats. Europe's new democracies will help us meet those challenges.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address these new threats. How many times has the Senate discussed burdensharing in Europe—and we want others to share the burden, not only in the financial cost, but of the risk to be borne in defending democracy. How often have we in the United States complained that European countries were not willing to pay their fair share for their own defense?

Now, we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are asking to pledge their troops and equipment for a common defense. They are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are doing it right now in Bosnia, where thousands of troops from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are helping to secure the peace. Hungary has made itself available, so it is our base camp to go into Bosnia. They have even committed to joining us and ending Iraq's

chemical and biological weapon programs, which is more than can be said of some of our allies.

These countries are not asking for a handout, nor are they asking for our protection without their own ability to maintain their own defense. They are asking to be full partners in the new Europe. By transforming their countries into free-market democracies, countries that have a democracy, a free-market economy, with civilian control of the military, transparent military budgets, wow, these new democracies are ready to join NATO.

These new democracies will contribute to America's security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops and equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO. They will also provide the will to fight for democratic values. Their history and geography make them passionate defenders of peace and democracy. They know what it means to be occupied and oppressed by tyrants, occupied and oppressed against their own will. They will put our common values into action. They will join with us in defending our national security and our values, whether it means peacekeeping in Europe or preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world.

Opponents of NATO enlargement have valid concerns, and I think we need to discuss them. First of all, opponents of enlargement point to cost. They say that NATO enlargement has a cost, and they are right. The new NATO members must modernize their military and make them compatible with NATO systems. The new NATO members have committed to pay this price.

There will also be a cost to the United States. Our funding of NATO's common budget will increase. NATO estimates that the total common budget will increase $1.5 billion over 10 years. The American share of that will be $400 million, or $40 million a year.

But what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe it will be far higher. What will be the cost to European security, the cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe, the long-term cost to America? And, most important, will the benefits of NATO enlargement outweigh the costs?

As a member of the Senate NATO Observer Group, working on a bipartisan basis, I met recently with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I asked them those very questions.

The Polish Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, is a hero of the Solidarity movement. He said that Poland would feel abandoned once again by the West. He said that Poland will still pay to modernize their military. In fact, he said that the failure to include these three nations in NATO will cause them to spend more on their military budget. They also said they would form their own military alliance, which would be decidedly more anti-Russian than NATO. He went on to say that by refusing to enlarge NATO, we would give the hardliners in Russia a great victory. The antidemocratic forces in Russia would feel vindicated and proud. We would be handing them a victory that they could build on.

What would be the long-range costs to America of failing to prepare NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and the increased chance of being pulled into yet another European war. And the cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war.

I would like to discuss the benefits of enlargement, which I believe outweigh the costs. The strategic benefits of enlargement are most important. NATO enlargement will create a zone of peace and stability that does include Eastern Europe. It will extend NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and reduce the chances of aggression or conflict in Eastern Europe. Enlargement will bring peace and security to Eastern Europe, just as it did for the West.

There are also economic benefits. Europe is America's largest trading partner, with $250 billion in two-way trade each year. Our new NATO partners will increase trading opportunities. They are building vibrant free-market economies. Poland's economy is growing at 6 percent, which is more rapidly than many of the others. NATO brings stability, and stability brings prosperity. We are creating a prosperity zone across Europe.

Mr. President, in the best tradition of the Senate, I could expand, but I know my colleague from Texas is waiting to speak as well. We are both involved in the supplemental. What I want to say is that the treaty ratification is one of the Senate's most fundamental duties. We are extending our Nation's commitment to collective defense. I certainly don't take this responsibility lightly. In the very best tradition of the Senate, we are addressing NATO enlargement as a national security issue, not a political issue. NATO enlargement is bipartisan, and it should be. It must be fully supported by members of both parties and the leadership of the Senate.

We have worked closely with the President and Secretary Albright. The Senate has been fully consulted at every step of the process, as has been required by our Constitution. Senator LOTT and Senator DASCHLE, our Republican and Democratic leaders, appointed a NATO observer group, chaired by Senator ROTH, which has engaged in all aspects of discussing NATO enlargement, as well as the appropriate committees. So now we have had discussion at the committee level. Now it is time to debate this on the Senate floor.

I am proud to support NATO enlargement. By ratifying this resolution, we are marking the end of the cold war and the beginning of a new century. We are building an undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe for the new millennium. We are laying the groundwork for a new era of peace and stability.

Mr. President, a new century is coming, a new millennium is about to be born, and I do not want the repugnant and despicable wars that characterized the 20th century to be carried into and repeated in the 21st century. That is why I believe in the expansion of NATO with these three countries. I look forward to a full and ample debate with my colleagues, Mr. President. This is a moment that I think is a long time waiting. We appreciate the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, who brought the end of the cold war, and Mr. George Bush, who was willing to defend and fight against the weapons of mass destruction. And now, under President Bill Clinton, we look forward to expanding NATO and to keeping that momentum going.

I yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I was going to make my floor statement, but Senator SMITH and I have an amendment and we have been encouraged to go ahead and put our amendment forward. I will yield to Senator SMITH for his introduction of the Smith-Hutchison amendment that deals with MIA. I yield the floor to him.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending Kyl amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose of offering an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2314

(Purpose: To express a condition requiring full cooperation from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with the United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts of Cold War incidents)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH], for himself and Mrs. HUTCHISON, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2314.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) REQUIREMENT OF FULL COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF CAPTURED AND MISSING UNITED STATES PERSONNEL FROM

PAST MILITARY CONFLICTS OR COLD WAR INCIDENTS.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that each of the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are fully cooperating with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War incidents, to include the following:

(A) facilitating full access to relevant archival material; and

(B) identifying individuals who may possess knowledge relative to captured and missing United States personnel, and encouraging such individuals to speak with United States Government officials.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I will be very brief in my remarks regarding this amendment. First of all, I want to compliment and commend the Senator from Texas, Senator HUTCHISON, for her cooperation and support as we worked together to craft this amendment.

This is a very, very important amendment, which I will get into in a moment, regarding the cooperation of these new NATO nations—if they were to become NATO nations—that would require their full cooperation with the United States in order to obtain the fullest possible accounting of any military personnel missing from any of the wars, from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, to the cold war.

This amendment is supported by a number of veterans organizations—Vietnam Veterans of America, National Vietnam and Gulf War Veterans Coalition, MIA Families, Korean/Cold War Family Association, National League of POW/MIA families.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement in support of this amendment by each of those organizations be printed in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA,
Washington, DC, April 13, 1998.

HOLD FORMER SOVIET BLOC NATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR PLEDGES MADE ON POW/MIAS

During the current Senate debate on the expansion of NATO, Vietnam Veterans of America strongly urges the United States Senate to hold the former Soviet Bloc counties of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic accountable for their pledges of cooperation on POW/MIA archival research made to the U.S./Russia Joint Commission in July 1997.

The Joint Commission on the POW/MIA issue was established by President Bush and President Yeltsin in 1992. One of its goals was to research the military, intelligence, security, and communist party archives for relevant information on the disposition of American POWs from the Vietnam War. The Eastern Bloc countries actively supported and were allies of the communist government of North Vietnam during this conflict.

The former Soviet Bloc countries had a significant presence in Asia and were aware of communist POW policy. Membership in NATO guarantees an American military presence. Before considering expansion of NATO to include these Soviet Bloc countries, they must grant access to their archives and provide relevant information on American POW/MIA's from the Vietnam War. Vietnam Veterans of America strongly urges the United States Senate, in their current debate, to focus on the unsatisfactory follow up actions by these countries, and to delay the expansion of NATO to include the Soviet Bloc countries until they have fulfilled their previous commitments.

Vietnam Veterans of America is the nation's only congressionally chartered veterans service organization dedicated solely to the needs of Vietnam-era veterans and their families. VVA's founding principle is ''Never again will one generation of veterans abandon another.''

NATIONAL VIETNAM & GULF WAR VETERANS COALITION,
Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.

Hon. BOB SMITH,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Re NATO Expansion.

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: The National Vietnam & Gulf War Veterans Coalition is a federation of approx. 90 veterans membership and issue organizations dedicated to the advancement of ten goals for the benefit of veterans of these two wars. One of those goals is for full POW MIA accountability.

The primary argument in favor of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe has been said to be a means of encouraging enforcing Western, democratic norms on these former Communist countries. Under the circumstances, we do not find it at all unreasonable to also require the emptying of the closets containing defunct Communist secrets concerning the disappearance of many of our servicemen, apparently alive and in captivity at some point, from hot and cold wars fought during half a century.

We therefore endorse your rider, requiring the President to certify full co-operation by the NATO membership applicants on the POW–MIA issue that continues to haunt us.

Sincerely,

J. THOMAS BURCH, JR.,
Chairman.

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.

Hon. BOB SMITH,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: The lack of full and open cooperation by the governments of Vietnam and Russia to help account as fully as possible for Americans still missing from the Vietnam War has prompted our support for your efforts to seek such cooperation from the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

We recognize that the initiatives of the U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIA offer promise to POW/MIA families who have long awaited answers. Although less promising than through the leadership serving in Hanoi, Moscow and Pyongyang, there is increasing evidence that the countries who were a part of the former USSR have relevant knowledge about Americans still missing and unaccounted for from our nation's past military conflicts.

For this reason, the League expresses our gratitude to you and your colleagues who recognize the need to seek full cooperation from the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Respectfully,

ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS,
Executive Director.

NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF FAMILIES,
Bellevue, WA, March 16, 1998.

Re: NATO—A Resolution for Our POWs.

Hon. JESSE A. HELMS,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC

DEAR SENATOR HELMS: Within days, the Senate will vote to extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic. The membership of the National Alliance of Families asks that during debate on this subject, a resolution is introduced requiring the United States to formally request that these nations release all archival information the above Countries hold on American Prisoners of War from the Korean War, The Cold War and the War in Southeast Asia.

During the Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel, evidence was presented clearly showing Czech involvement with American and United Nation POWs during the Korean War. Evidence presented by the former Czech General, Jan Sejna, indicated POWs from the Vietnam War were transported to Czechoslovakia.

We do not wish to punish the present democratic nations of the former Eastern Bloc. However, we do not want to let a golden opportunity slip through our fingers. Each former Eastern block nation seeking NATO membership must be asked a series of specific questions relating to that Country's knowledge of American POWs. This mandate for questioning can only be achieved by a formal Senate Resolution.

Each former Eastern Bloc country should be asked to:

1. Search their records for the location of any Americans or former American citizens living in their country. Making said survivors available to U.S. investigators;

2. Open their archives, making all documents relating to American POWs or survivors. This should include all records of interrogations and medical experimentation; and

3. All records and documentation of the Country's involvement with American POWs on foreign soil.

These requests should be made with the understanding that no nation will be condemned or punished for involvement with American POWs or survivors.

Any nation coming forward with ''live'' American POWs (survivors) or information relating to POWs (or survivors) will be commended for their spirit of cooperation in this ''new age'' of democracy.

The Countries that once formed the Soviet Eastern Bloc, holds a wealth of information on American POWs. A resolution by the United States Senate, formally requesting this information assuring no reprisals or condemnation should encourage the cooperation of these new Democracies.

Senator, please do not let this golden opportunity to gain information about our POWs slip through our fingers.

Sincerely,

DOLORES APODACA ALFOND,
National Chairperson.

KOREAN/COLD WAR FAMILY ASSOCIATION OF THE MISSING,
Coppell, TX, April 27, 1998.

Re expansion of NATO.

Senator ROBERT SMITH.

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: The proposed expansion of NATO to include the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary presents a unique opportunity to gain information about the fate of the more than 10,000 American men who remain missing from the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold Wars. Although the governments involved might express the best of intentions at this stage of the admission process, experience tells us that promises made to gain

advantage are often broken when the incentive no longer exists. The window of opportunity to ensure significant cooperation is open to us during the admission process, and will be lost if not seized at this time.

As you know, the United States has considerable intelligence and other information that delineates a Soviet program during the Korean, Vietnam and Cold Wars to exploit American POWs. The governments of the former East Bloc countries most certainly had information about this covert program, and some intelligence suggests they participated in the effort to some extent.

The United States would be remiss if we did not set forth a clear expectation of full and good faith cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the proposed NATO Treaties, as a condition of membership. The nexus between a military alliance and the POW/MIA Full Accounting is both clear and appropriate. As an integral part of their membership in NATO, the three countries under consideration at this time, and all former East Bloc countries that might be considered in the future, should come forward with whatever information they might have about missing American servicemen.

Cooperation on this important issue should go without saying for these countries. If we fail to require a demonstrable level of meaningful cooperation, these countries will be justified in presuming that the United States Government really does not want to know what happened to our missing servicemen. Surely, the Senate does not want to send such an unacceptable message to these countries, to the families of our missing men, nor to the American People.

We thank you for your ongoing support for our efforts to account for American POW/MIAs.

Sincerely,

DONNA D. KNOX.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I also thank Congressman SAM JOHNSON, who, as many of my colleagues know, was a POW, along with Senator MCCAIN, and others, during the Vietnam war. Congressman JOHNSON and I have traveled to Prague, Warsaw, and to Moscow together in search of answers, along with former Ambassador Malcolm Toon, as part of the U.S.-Russia commission to seek answers on our missing.

There is a great window of opportunity here in the old eastern bloc countries as well as Russia to get some answers as to what may have happened to these Americans. I think as we went out and searched the countryside and met in the capitals of these countries, we received some cooperation. I want to make that very clear. But, Mr. President, there is much more to be done. There are clearly answers in these archives. I think it is very important that, if we are going to say that our military—our men and women in uniform—is going to be asked at some point, if NATO expansion occurs, to shed their blood, possibly, or defend these countries, I think it behooves these countries to provide us the fullest possible accounting of any service personnel who may have crossed their borders during the time the Communists held, basically, and controlled these countries.

I wish that I could say that all follow-up action to our trip had occurred properly and that we had every satisfactory answer that we wanted, but that is not true. It is disturbing because of the reasons that I gave. At some point in the future, by having these countries part of NATO, we are going to ask Americans to face possible combat situations to defend these countries. So the least they could do is to provide us answers that they may have now of things that occurred during Communist control. It has been said by some NATO advocates that we have an opportunity to ensure the cold war never resurfaces. Yet we still can't seem to get the cooperation we need from this region to address vital questions about our missing Americans, especially from the cold war but also possibly from Korea and Vietnam. If their pledges were genuine, as I believe they were, then, frankly, I question why leaders of these countries can't convince the old cold war bureaucracies to allow us access to the archives and allow us access to individuals who could provide us answers.

We have had some cooperation. I am very grateful for that cooperation. We met with some very influential people in the governments of those three countries when I traveled there last summer. Since last summer there have been follow-up communications by our commission support staff at the Department of Defense and also by my own office with each of these nations urging them to follow through. But most important is the fact that, based on current leads available, our commission really still believes that there is relevant information, very relevant information, which likely exists in Eastern Europe, especially in the military intelligence security Communist Party archives of these three nations in question.

Again, this is a very complex situation that has developed. The Communist Party controlled these archives, controlled all of the government activities, controlled the activities of intelligence and military and security. Now we have a different government, a friendly government. But the access to those archives has not yet been provided to us. If they are friendly and we are going to bring them into NATO and defend them, then they owe us that information, pure and simple. They owe us that information. They owe us every opportunity to get and find that information wherever it may be. I regret to say we really have not had that kind of cooperation, even though we have had some very interesting meetings.

Let me just conclude on this point. We should remember and not forget that these eastern bloc countries, when they were eastern bloc countries, were allies of the North Koreans, were allies of the North Vietnamese, and the Soviets, of course, during the cold war. They had a significant presence in both North Korea and in Vietnam. They were privy to information about Communist policies toward our own American POWs. That is very important. I want to repeat that. They were privy to a lot of information about our POWs in Vietnam, our POWs in Korea, and indeed some of the missing cold war losses. This information has not yet been shared with us.

It is very important that we delve into this and find out whether any American POWs were transferred, either stopping there permanently or transferred through any of the capitals of these countries. I want to emphasize again, this is not meant to be a hostile statement. We met with those governments, and they were very cordial and very cooperative but somewhat standoffish by basically passing the buck by saying, Well, you know those were the Communist days, and I am not sure we can dig that out.

Again, if we are asking Americans to shed their blood in the future to defend free nations, then asking them to dig into their archives a little bit is not asking too much.

I want to emphasize again and appeal to leaders of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to follow through on commitments that were made during our visits and help us to search for American missing service personnel from the cold war, from Korea, and from Vietnam and urge my colleagues on behalf of the veterans organizations that I have mentioned, on behalf of all veterans throughout America and the families, most especially the families of those who are missing, to please join with me in continuing to push for more progress on this humanitarian issue. We can do that and, I think, make a very strong statement here on the floor by voting for this amendment.

At this point I yield the floor for the purpose of allowing my colleague, Senator HUTCHISON, who has been a stalwart on this issue to speak. I am very grateful to her for her support.

I yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank Senator SMITH for leading the effort on this amendment.

I want to tell you a story about how this came to be an amendment to this bill.

Pat Dunton is my constituent. She is the president of the Korean-Cold War Family Association of the Missing. Pat Dunton's father served in the Korean conflict. She has been trying to get information about her father for all of these years since the Korean war. She still gets choked up talking about not knowing where he is or what happened to him. She came to my office one day and we started talking about how hard it is not to know. We started thinking. Well, you know, maybe we could do something with the new members who have been invited into NATO because during the cold war, which is when some of the MIA incidents took place, maybe the governments of these countries who were allies with the Soviet

Union, some of whom were in Korea, might be helpful in going to these families and providing the information that they might have knowledge of. I just believe that this is something that should be done. I also believe that all three of the countries being considered for NATO membership would like to help in this effort.

I went to Senator SMITH, who has been the leading advocate in the Senate for not forgetting our POWs and MIAs. I said, Let's do something in the NATO agreement that would require any information to be opened to the families of POWs from any conflict. But most especially, of course, Korea is where we think these countries really might have some information that could be relevant.

I am pleased that Senator SMITH decided to take the lead and work with me on this because I think it can make a difference. It calls for the full cooperation of the Governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in obtaining that accounting, and specifically calls for facilitating access to relevant archival material and for these Governments to identify any individuals that may possess knowledge relative to captured and missing U.S. personnel.

Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all thrown off the chains of Communist domination. But not so long ago and throughout the cold war their military forces and their intelligence services were closely aligned with the very governments who hold the keys to a great deal of information which may help achieve the full accounting we seek. For example, from the end of the Korean war in 1953, representatives of the Czech and Polish military were stationed inside North Korea as part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. Their military personnel had direct contact with the North Korean military and had at times a great deal of high-level access throughout North Korea. They met with their North Korean counterparts and may well have highly relevant information on the fate of Americans who were missing during the Korean war.

We also know that their intelligence services and their military often shared information with the intelligence services and military forces of the Soviet Union and that there are those who may have direct knowledge of events involving Americans who were missing during the Vietnam war as well as the numerous Americans who disappeared during military operations in other areas during the cold war.

As new NATO allies, it is certainly reasonable to expect that they would open their archives and provide access to our officials. I have already received assurances from representatives of the Polish Government that this access would be readily granted, and I am certain that the Czechs and the Hungarians would also be eager to work with us.

I have also been contacted by family members of the missing as well as by military personnel working in the area of POW-MIA recovery, and both groups have insisted that it would be helpful to make an official statement on behalf of Congress in the form of this amendment that this is an issue of national importance.

I think the amendment is necessary and important. It sends a message to the long-suffering families often forgotten that are still seeking information about the fate of their loved ones. We must take every opportunity to demonstrate that we understand their grief and their desire to find answers and that it is reasonable to expect any new allies to also respect our legitimate desire to learn all we can about those who are missing in the service of our country. The armed forces and the intelligence services of these same countries that seek to join NATO today were once on the other side of the bitter struggle of the cold war. So they would have information, and we hope that they would agree readily to help us in giving some comfort and perhaps providing answers, that final answer, to some member of a family who has been waiting maybe not patiently but certainly with hope in their hearts that someday they would know what happened to their father or their son who has served in our military and perhaps gave his or her life in service to our country. I think we owe them this amount of caring, this amount of assurance that we will go the extra mile to make sure they have that closure if it can possibly be given to them.

So I thank Senator SMITH. I hope the Senate will adopt this amendment when we have the vote.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues, just 1 or 2 minutes. I wish to expound a little bit on what the Senator from Texas, Mrs. HUTCHISON, just said in terms of the impact on families.

In the 1950s, there was a Captain Dunham who was shot down over Soviet territory—then Soviet territory—and as a result of the U.S.-Russian commission, of which Senator JOHN KERRY and I are members, we ran an ad in the Red Star newspaper in Russia that went all over; it was read heavily by former military people, veterans of the Soviet Union. And an individual read the article about this Captain Dunham who was missing. It turned out that this individual had been at the crash site and provided us the ring of Captain Dunham, his personal ring, which came back to his family, and as a result of following that up, we were able to find Captain Dunham's remains, missing since the 1950s, and returned just 2 or 3 years ago.

So I think this is a good example of what cooperation can really produce. Sometimes what might seem like a small, insignificant fact turns into a huge issue and a great relief to the family of a missing serviceman or woman. So this is very important, and I want to emphasize again that what this amendment does is very simple, Mr. President.

Let me just mention three things. It would require that prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that each of the Governments—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—is fully cooperating with the U.S. in order to obtain the fullest possible accounting of any military personnel from the cold war, from Vietnam, or any military conflicts; that they facilitate full access to all relevant archival material; and that they would identify any individuals who may possess knowledge relative to the capture of missing personnel. That is it. That is all the amendment does.

I thank my colleagues, especially Senator HAGEL, who has been waiting. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. I will be very brief. Speaking for myself and my side and I think Senator SMITH of Oregon, who will say the same thing, we are prepared to accept the amendment.

Let me just make a few very brief comments. I think that the applicants for NATO accession have provided cooperation, as was indicated in the U.S. efforts to locate American POWs and MIAs in the cold war.

In July of 1987, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs visited Poland; the Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office visited in December of 1997. Resulting from these visits, senior Polish officials pledged to search their archives thoroughly and open all relevant information to the United States. U.S. officials met with the Polish National Security Bureau, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Intelligence Services, the Office of Central Security, Central Archives. All, in the minds at the Pentagon, are fully cooperating. I can say the same relative to the Czech Republic and with regard to Hungary.

So although I, quite frankly, do not think it is necessary, I have no objection to the amendment. And let me say to my friend from New Hampshire, all you have to be is the brother, sister, mother, father, son, daughter, nephew, or niece of an MIA to understand everything the Senator says.

My mother lost her closest brother in World War II, shot down in New Guinea. They never found his body. To this day, my mother—and that was 1944—wakes up after dreaming that he has been found. To this day, he is a constant—''constant'' would be an exaggeration—he is a regular source of

painful memories for my mother. The idea that there is no closure, the idea that there has never been the ability to say his name was Ambrose J. Finnegan, God love him—his nickname was Bozy to everybody in my mom's family. My mother, when I was a kid, literally would wake up at night screaming from a nightmare. She would scare the hell out of us, dreaming that her brother was in the most extreme circumstance.

I do not mean in any way to suggest this is not important by saying we will accept it and that I do not think it is necessary, because it is being done, because it is true, the pain lasts. My mother just turned 80 years old. It is like yesterday for my mother.

So I appreciate what my friend from Texas and my colleague from New Hampshire are doing. Again, I do not think it is necessary, because I anticipate they will fully cooperate. But I see no problem in accepting the amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I would like to associate myself with the words of the Senator from Delaware and just tell my colleagues, the advocates of this amendment, I support it. I believe the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs would support it, too. These are nations that know something about prisoners of war and missing in action, gulags, and all the horrors that go with totalitarianism, and I fully expect that they would want us to accede to this.

I appreciate the Senators offering this amendment. I think it helps. And part of the reason to expand NATO is to heal these countries. Part of the healing comes from addressing issues like this. We will find they will do this with us and without any resistance to it.

I thank the Senators who are offering this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENZI). The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If I could just respond to the Senator from Delaware for a moment, I listened to his story about the personal episode in his family. I might say, we have found in the last 4 or 5 years, aircraft—I am almost certain that we located an aircraft in New Guinea and other areas where aircraft had been lost during World War II. I think it says a lot about our own Nation that we would still send teams out there in those jungles, searching for people who were lost. Maybe at some point, maybe—I know it was your relative, I did not hear, what relative?

Mr. BIDEN. My uncle. My mother was one of five children. It was her brother and her soul mate. It is amazing how, like I said, she is 80 years old, God love her, and it is still there.

The only reason I bothered to mention it—I never mentioned it before on the floor in all the debates we had about POWs and MIAs. I compliment my colleagues in their diligence to continue to pursue accounting for POWs and MIAs, and I didn't want them to think that, because I slightly disagree with their assertion of what these three countries have done—I agree with my friend from Oregon. I think they are clearly interested in helping. If there are any countries that are fully aware, as my friend from Oregon said, it is the Hungarians and the Czechs and the Poles, who have had people dragged off to those gulags, never to be heard from again.

These democratically elected officials, now—I would be dumbfounded if they did not fully cooperate. But I understand the motivation. That is my point, to my two colleagues. I am happy, from our side, to accept the amendment, as well as my friend has indicated he is willing to accept it.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I appreciate my colleague's willingness to accept it. It seems to be the consensus of those of us who are sponsoring it, we seek a recorded vote on it because of the significance of the issue.

With that in mind, I will ask for a recorded vote at the appropriate time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Obviously that is the Senator's right. I do not challenge it. I just am reminded, I remember one time when I first got here—and I know he has been here a long time. I went up to Russell Long, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, and indicated to him I wanted help on an amendment to a Finance Committee bill. Senator Long, the senior Senator and Chairman of the Finance Committee, said, ''Fine.'' He accepted it.

Then I thought later it would be good to have a recorded vote. I stood up and said, ''I have decided I want a recorded vote.'' He said, ''In that case, I am against it.'' We had the recorded vote and he beat me. So I learned, from my perspective anyway, that when someone accepts an amendment, I am always happy to do it.

But I understand the Senator's motivation. I will not change my position, but maybe he would reconsider whether we need the vote. But that is his judgment. I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I had great confidence that you would not do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to support the ratification of NATO expansion. I have had the good fortune, over almost the last year and a half that I have been in the U.S. Senate, to serve on the Committee on Foreign Relations. That has given me a unique opportunity to examine the NATO expansion protocol. I attended, start to finish, each of the eight full hearings we had in the Foreign Relations Committee on this issue. I also was appointed by the Senate Majority Leader to serve on the NATO Observer Group Task Force. I attended almost all of the 17 meetings that our distinguished colleagues from Delaware, Senator BIDEN and Senator ROTH, held. That does not give me a particularly unique perspective on this issue, but it gives me some grounding on understanding the complications of NATO expansion.

As I have listened to the debate the last 2 days, and in previous weeks when this Chamber debated this issue, and during committee hearings, I have come to the conclusion that, yes, a number of the questions and points raised by my colleagues are not only relevant but are important and they should be fully aired and fully debated. It is based on those observations that I have made, as I have listened to this debate, that I wish to offer some of the following points.

Aside from the obvious defense purpose of the expansion of NATO, there are other issues involved. The obvious defense purpose of expanding NATO is to help assure stability and security in Europe, all of Europe. There has been some debate on the floor about this issue, this fourth expansion—and, by the way, a not unprecedented expansion. We have expanded NATO three other times, to include West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and the third expansion was Spain and Portugal. So this would be not an unprecedented action we take, that we include three new countries. But I find interesting that there has been some reference made to ''we would split Europe.'' I say just the opposite, just the opposite. We would, in fact, do much to unify Europe. Why would that be? That would be because stability, security, economic development, development of democracy and market economies, would extend across the continent of Europe and no longer would there be the Iron Curtain that fell at the end of World War II. NATO expansion would help assure that.

I also find the argument interesting from the perspective of—I thought, when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, that meant something. It was beyond symbolism. It was a witness to history that authoritarian, totalitarian government does not work, under any name—Nazism, communism, it doesn't work.

Here we are, almost 10 years after the fall of communism, with the Berlin Wall, talking about, ''Well, I don't know, should we do this? We might offend our Russian friends.'' Certainly any important decision must factor in every dynamic in the debate and every dynamic of our national security interest—relationships, future relationships, and in this case it certainly does factor in our relationship with Russia. But, my goodness, why did we fight, for 40 years, a cold war? And we won it. Only 10 years later, to some extent, to be held hostage to what the Russians want?

You see, I don't see an awful lot of sense in that. Yes, it is important to understand the Russians. Yes, it is important to engage the Russians. But not allow Russia, or any other nation to dominate the final analysis and decisions of our Nation's security interests, nor all of the collective security interests of Europe.

There is another consequence of this that has not yet been fully developed and that is we would be helping provide role models for Central and Eastern Europe by these three new nations, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, coming into NATO, complying with—not as a handout, not as a gesture, but complying with all of the requirements established 50 years ago to belong to NATO. We just didn't invent these. They didn't ''happen.'' They are the same requirements for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as we had for the previous three expansions of NATO.

Other nations of Central and Eastern Europe can look to these three nations as role models, for help, and not just in the national security dynamic. Let's face it, I have heard, also, a lot of talk about the European Union—why not allow these nations to be brought into the European Union first? Mr. President, you cannot separate economics here. You can't separate economic stability from military stability. They are integrally entwined.

There is no question the world is a global community underpinned by a global economy. Of course—of course—these nations will benefit economically. And that will invent and give opportunities to other countries, and more opportunities as well. Now, this is not just—not just—a national defense issue and a security issue for the United States. This is an investment for the United States.

This is an investment because it is connected. And if we invest, yes, some money—my goodness, isn't that something? We would actually have to pay some money, not wild exaggerations that we have heard on the floor of the Senate, but some real dollars to invest, to expand the security and stability umbrella of NATO eastward.

It is an investment for us for a couple of reasons. One, it will help assure this country will not be sending its children and its grandchildren to fight another World War or a war in Europe. Democracies do not attack other democracies. Democracies do not go to war. So it is an investment in national security and peace for us.

It is also an economic investment. As these nations that had been under the yoke of Communist dictatorship for almost 50 years are now in a position to develop democracy and flourish economically as they develop their democratic governments and their freedoms, they are as well developing market economies.

What does that mean to us? That means markets, that means some stability, that means connection.

I also have found some of my colleagues, particularly on my side of the aisle, comment about, ''Well, but this President, this administration, wants to take NATO expansion beyond the boundaries of what the mission is of NATO.'' I remind my colleagues on this side of the aisle, my Republican colleagues, who might have some concern about this present administration, 10 Republican and Democratic administrations have presided over America's involvement in NATO, 10 administrations, Republican and Democratic.

This debate should not get confused with the underbrush of detail or who is in the White House today. This debate is about the future and how we are preparing for the future as we go into the next century—not about Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Bill Cohen. They are players on the scene for a very brief time, just like 10 administrations have been on the scene, essentially for a brief time.

Missions and organizations change, believe it or not. Missions and organizations change. Times change. Dynamics change, challenges change, circumstances and situations change.

To my colleagues who say, ''Well, prove to me that NATO is going to be important. Prove to me every dollar that's going in. Prove to me we need NATO,'' well, as brilliant as many of my colleagues are, no one can give them that answer, you see, because no one can predict the future. But that is what NATO expansion is about. That is why we established NATO 50 years ago, because the future was uncertain and was unstable. If we did not have NATO today, we would have to invent NATO.

To those of my colleagues who say, ''Well, why rush? We're rushing into this. What's so important about doing this now? This year? Next year?'' I say, I suppose you could have asked that question after World War II—there was relative peace in Europe after World War II—''What's the rush?'' And for every one of the previous three expansions into NATO, you could have said, ''Why West Germany now? Let's wait until about 1980,'' or for any of the other nations. But, my goodness, doesn't it make a little more sense to develop strong, bold, dynamic, futuristic policy now—now—when we can think clearly, when we can understand the dynamics of the issues rather than, well, let us wait for some country to be invaded and then we will show them what we are going to do? Come on, it does not work that way. It does not work that way.

Let us not squander the time we now have to plan as best we can for a surely uncertain future.

Another dynamic that gets lost in this debate, Mr. President, is another certainty—the diffusion of power in the world. The face of this globe will not look the same in 25 years. It will not look the same because the geopolitical, economic and military power structures of the globe of this 5.2 billion-people world are changing. Like life changes, everything changes.

It is in the best interest of this country and the world for us to lead as best we can to prepare for those new challenges and to prepare for that new diffusion of power, as it will surely come, as it is coming today.

Yes; yes, Europe is only one part of that. But look at the numbers—a rather significant part. Any measurement you take of the importance of Europe, any measurement you take—people, gross domestic product, exports—and do we really believe Europe still and will still be untouched into the next century with no war, no conflict?

Who would have predicted Bosnia? Who would have foreseen that in 1990 and 1991? Kosovo. These are deadly, real examples of how fast things can come unraveled even in—even in—Europe.

Another question that is asked, and appropriately so, is our force strength. It is a very good question. Over the last 10 years, we have been asking our military to do more with less—more deployments, longer deployments. We now have a force structure, in real dollar terms—in real budget terms—that is down as low as any time since 1940. Less than 3 percent of our gross domestic product goes for our national defense. That is below dangerously low. And if we in fact are going to ask our military to take on new responsibilities, like NATO expansion, which I support, and NATO and the Persian Gulf, and a hundred other nations where we have troops, then we are going to have to pay attention to our military. And we have not been doing that.

Another debate for another time surely, Mr. President, but one that is appropriately talked about in this debate and asked because if we are going to ask our military to do more, we are going to have to pay attention to the budget and to rebuilding our military. We are soon becoming a hollow military, and that is in any measurement you wish to take. In the President's own budget for fiscal year 1999, he cuts another 25,000 uniformed men and women from the services. We cannot have it both ways. But, as I say, part of the debate should be part of that debate, but that debate should come at a different time.

I conclude my remarks, Mr. President, by saying that we have a unique opportunity, as the most dominant nation on Earth, at a most unique time in history—not a time seen probably since Rome during the Roman Empire—when one nation has so thoroughly dominated this globe.

There is a bigger question for this country and a bigger challenge that will require a bigger debate than NATO. But it is part of the debate. And that is, yes, a great nation is required to do great things, to take on great burdens, and to give great leadership. It is an awesome responsibility the United States has. And our challenge, our debate is, do we wish in fact to go into the next century as that dominant

great nation and carry that great burden of leadership? This is part of that debate.

We have an opportunity, unique in history, to help build strong democracies, help to build structures that will give more people more freedom than the history has ever known, more market economies, better standards of living, better health, less conflict, less war. That is why NATO expansion is important. It is not the only issue, maybe not the most important issue, but surely it fits into the grander debate that we will have.

New alliances are being formed, new alliances will continue to be formed in the next century. We want to be part of that. As we rely on more nations and more relationships and more alliances, in the end that will mean less burden for us, less burden for us because we are helping develop strong democratic nations with resources, with economies that can defend themselves. That is in our interest. In the end, it is in the world's interest.

That, more than any other reason, is why I strongly support NATO expansion. I ask that my colleagues in this body who are still undecided, for legitimate reasons, listen to this debate closely, because in the end this debate is about our future and what is in our best interest.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is true the Delaware which touches New Jersey is owned by Delaware, but I am from Delaware. I would be proud to be from New Jersey, but I am prouder to be from Delaware.

Mr. President, I understand we are going to go to the Kyl amendment very shortly and I cosponsor and agree with the Kyl amendment. I think the manager supports the Kyl amendment, too. But while we wait for Senator KYL to make his opening statement in support of his amendment, I would like to reiterate a point I made yesterday with Senator SMITH, in the few minutes while we are waiting for Senator KYL to come to the floor.

Yesterday there was a good deal of talk here about whether or not this expansion of NATO was good, bad or indifferent. The distinguished Senator from New York, Senator MOYNIHAN, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, Senator WARNER and others, were taking issue with the expansion of NATO. I referenced why I thought the Poles thought this was in their interest because the comments were basically made that the Poles—Senator SMITH of New Hampshire said we support the Poles anyway.

I made the point that that kind of promise had been made to Poland before. In 1939, France was considered to have Europe's strongest army. It had built the massive defensive fortification called the Maginot Line which was widely thought to be impregnable.

Hitler's generals warned against an attack on France. In late August of 1939, of course, came the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany which—difficult though it may be to understand today—astonished the world then.

Little more than a week later, on September 1, 1939, Hitler's forces launched a surprise attack on Poland. Here we come to two critical points.

First, Great Britain and France had cobbled together an alliance with Poland earlier that year after Germany had annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia.

But that last-minute alliance, of course, can in no way be compared to today's powerful integrated military command of NATO. France and Britain had no capability to project forces eastward to defend the Poles. Furthermore, Poland was then ruled by authoritarian colonels, while Britain and France were democracies. Therefore, appeasers could and did proclaim that they would not ''die for Danzig.''

Hitler saw all this and correctly anticipated that France and Britain would not actively oppose his attack on Poland. And they didn't.

Secondly, Hitler's generals needed the attack on Poland to perfect their new tactic which was dubbed the ''Blitzkrieg'' or ''lightning war.'' The panzer attack on the Polish cavalry, as was pointed out yesterday, an incredible undertaking where Poles on horses were taking on armored divisions of the German Army, which the Senator from Virginia recalled earlier in the debate, was a metaphor for the effectiveness of the German's new kind of rapid, mobile warfare.

I said yesterday that France and Britain, after formally declaring war on Germany September 3, 1939, did nothing. In fact, Mr. President, for more than 8 months nothing happened on the Franco-German frontier. Commentators labeled this the ''phony war,'' a term which students of history will call and readily recall.

Meanwhile, after carving up Poland with Stalin, the Germans were freed to redeploy offensive combat units for use in the West. On May 10, 1940, Hitler invaded France and the Low Countries using the Blitzkrieg tactics perfected against the Poles, now against France. Going through Belgium and Holland, the Germans simply bypassed the vaunted Maginot Line, and soon they were in Paris.

So I repeat, Hitler's road to France went through Poland. We should ask ourselves what lessons can be learned from this sad tale and acknowledge Poland is east of Germany. How did it get to France? Had they not gone into Poland first they would not, in all probability, have been nearly as successful as they were in 1940. The road to France was through Poland.

First, the lesson we should learn from this sad tale is the alliance only means something if it has a deeper purpose. Today, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are democracies with Western values—not as Poland was then, a very different country. By the way, only extreme isolationists, I submit, would repeat a ''I won't die for Danzig'' slogan in 1998.

Second, the alliance must have military muscle to back up a paper agreement. NATO clearly has the military structure in force to make collective defense credible.

The third lesson, is NATO, through its Partnership for Peace Program, is actively cooperating with non-NATO countries, including Russia, to lessen tensions and make future conflicts highly unlikely.

So for all these reasons, Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, passionately want to become members of NATO. All three countries have successfully completed a demanding set of reforms in order to qualify.

History need not repeat itself, Mr. President. But history is always instructive. That is why I mention the connection between Poland and France in 1939 and 1940. I hope this explanation is helpful to my colleagues. I hope we keep it in mind.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I might engage our distinguished colleague, who just presented his views, in a bit of a colloquy.

First, I ask my colleague, did he make the statement that NATO is for the defense of all of Europe, or some broad, sweeping statement to that effect?

Mr. HAGEL. No, I didn't say it is for all of Europe. I said we would have a Europe, as we expand NATO eastward, that gives Europe an opportunity from east to west, all of Europe, to be democratic, opportunity to develop market economies, the potential to be a free continent, and that NATO could help do that.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I am just going back to read the charter, article V, and this is the heart and soul of NATO.

It says that parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, recognized by article V of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Now, it was very clear when this was written that we envisioned the Soviet Union as the threat. That was the purpose of it. And now with the demise of the Soviet Union and the threats now being fractured into many places and of many types, we are trying to determine what is the future mission of NATO.

One of my great regrets is that we are proceeding with this matter of including three new states at a time when NATO itself has not determined exactly what is to be the mission subsequent to the 1991 statement to that effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair reminds the Senator of the previous order.

Mr. WARNER. For the benefit of the Senate, the Chair should state the order.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2310, AS MODIFIED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is to be 30 minutes of debate on amendment No. 2310 offered by Senator KYL of Arizona to begin at 4:30 p.m.

Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for about a minute and a half.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. I direct my comment to the distinguished Senator who is proposing the amendment, Senator KYL, which will now be the subject of further debate. In particular, on page 1 entitled ''common threats,'' it says, ''NATO members will face common threats to security in the post-cold war environment, including . . .''—and on page 5 it says—I guess that was 4. It says, ''. . . conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.''

I find that far afield from the NATO charter itself. Indeed, it is somewhat far afield from the 1991 restatement of the mission of NATO. Speaking for myself, I have grave concerns about NATO incorporating in any future document the fact that it stands ready to stamp out ethnic and religious enmities and the revival of historic disputes. That is the very thing we are involved in now in Bosnia. I just don't have time to get into it, but I would like to have a clearer explanation from the proponent of this amendment as to what he intended by the inclusion of this paragraph in this amendment. Basically, I wanted to support the amendment, but I cannot support a document that says NATO is going to take it upon itself to put out civil wars and religious enmities and ethnic disputes. I am concerned about the future of American servicepersons and that the men and women who will proudly wear the uniform of the United States and be an integral part of NATO would be subject, under NATO commanders, to go into these areas and meet such conflicts.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be delighted to answer the question of my distinguished colleague from Virginia. I will begin, first of all, by setting forth the essential concept or idea underlying this amendment.

The future course of the NATO alliance, its core purposes and its strategic orientation in this post-cold war era, will be decided by allied negotiations upcoming on the so-called revised strategic concept of NATO. The new document is going to be agreed upon in a little bit less than a year—next April. Senate advice and consent to the NATO enlargement issue here presents a unique opportunity for the Senate of the United States to speak on this issue, an opportunity we would not otherwise have. We, therefore, can help to lay out the strategic vision of NATO from the standpoint of the United States and thus influence the outcome of these negotiations.

In my view, the current resolution focuses too much on what NATO should not be and should not do. The resolution does not attempt to lay out a comprehensive set of principles to guide development of the strategic concept. And so this proposed amendment will establish the Senate's vision of the future of NATO and, I hope, help to lay the foundation for American positions on the strategic concept.

Here is the background that will lead up to the answer to the Senator's question. I hope it is the only expression of concern about the amendment because I would certainly like to have his support for what I think is an amendment that will be overwhelmingly supported by both proponents and opponents of expansion. Our principal objective here, I say to the Senator from Virginia, is to ensure that NATO remains an arm of U.S. power and influence. NATO, not the WEU or the OSCE, must remain the principal foundation for the security interests of its members. This means NATO must be prepared militarily to defend against a range of common threats to our vital interests. We have tried to identify what they all are.

Now, some of us may not like what some of them are and may not like the fact that we will have to respond to them. For example, a radical Islamic terrorism threat in the North Atlantic region may require that we defend against that. That didn't used to be a big problem for NATO. What I have done is insert the words ''in the Atlantic area''—words that were not in the underlying resolution of ratification that came out of the committee. So what I have tried to do is both to, yes, acknowledge a threat that we all acknowledge that could arise, but to limit the nature of our response to that in the Atlantic area by the specific language of the section that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Texas are concerned about.

This amendment underscores that collective defense will remain the core alliance mission. But it acknowledges that new threats have emerged in the post-cold war era that will require NATO to adapt its military forces and defense planning mechanism.

Mr. WARNER. May I have one word of clarification?

Mr. KYL. I am happy to try to answer the question.

Mr. WARNER. The mix of NATO is the collective security of member nations and the collective security of the continent that they occupy. That has been the traditional mission. Now, you are recognizing these are threats, and I agree they are becoming more and more threats—religious and ethnic strife. But do you intend, by this document, to say that that should be written in as a mission of NATO, to stand ready to intervene in these types of conflicts? Or are you just recognizing them as potential threats and subsequently, depending on the magnitude of the threat, the NATO commanders, and the NAC, North Atlantic Council, can determine if in fact it threatens the collective security of a nation or the nations?

Mr. KYL. That is an excellent question, Mr. President, and it is, of course, the latter—something that I think the Senator from Virginia and I support. I point to the specific language to confirm my point. In paragraph 5, ''common threats,'' it says: ''NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-cold war environment, including. . .'' Then we list threats. We hope they will never arise. That is the context in which this particular provision is listed.

If I could just close my comment here, Mr. President, because the Senator from Delaware wishes to comment. This amendment merely conditions Senate advice and consent to its understanding of U.S. policy as it relates to the revising strategic concept of NATO. It acknowledges the principles that have animated our participation in NATO from the very beginning and also identifies the threats that we may face. It states that the Senate understands that the core concepts contained in the 1991 document remain valid today.

I say to my friend from Virginia, in essence, that the 1991 strategic concept provides a foundation on which to build the revised statement of NATO strategy and sets forth the 10 principles which the Senator understands will be in the new document.

I urge my colleagues who support and oppose the expansion of NATO to support this amendment and to put the Senate on record as defining the NATO of the future. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, collectively, with the Senator from Texas—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SESSIONS). The Senator from Delaware controls the time. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. How much time do I control?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. The Senator from Texas and I wish to discuss the capacity to respond to common threats. NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. And when you look at the definition of common threats, it includes historic disputes, religious enmities, ethnic and

the like. I fear that, although the Senator in his statement seemed to clarify that this is not to be a mission, somehow the language, I believe, is somewhat tangled. I yield to my colleague from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I have just been looking at the amendment with the Senator from Virginia. I like every other part of the amendment. I like every other part of the amendment. But it seems that the words define what a common threat is, and included in the common threat are ethnic divisions or uprising, and then it says that one of the missions of NATO is to respond to common threats. I just wondered if there could be a clarification, or perhaps a clarifying amendment that would assure that is not going to be a responsibility of NATO to come into a situation in which there is a border dispute or an ethnic dispute. In fact, that is one of the amendments I would offer later, which is to avoid having the United States get into an ethnic dispute.

If the Senator from Arizona can clarify it, I think the Senator from Virginia and I would like to support the amendment. But if it needs some work to assure its intent, then perhaps we could work on that as well.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. On my time, let my take a crack at that, if I may. I am a cosponsor, although I cannot take credit for the drafting. It is totally a product of my friend from Arizona, and it is an admirable job. The Senator from Oregon and I were just talking about what a good amendment this is. I am glad to cosponsor it. But let me maybe help.

I have in my hand the alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991, the last one that occurred. It is the present operating doctrine for NATO. My friend from Virginia pointed out that the North Atlantic Assembly committee gets together and they decide whether this should be updated periodically, what it should say, and what article V of the Washington treaty means. Article V of the Washington treaty, the NATO treaty, was read earlier by my friend from Virginia.

It starts off, the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, consequently, and it goes on from there. Let me read from the strategic concept, the alliance's strategic concept, which is the operating strategy of NATO, as we speak, the one that was, in effect, redone in 1991 to respond to the changed circumstances, meaning no longer the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall is down, and all these nations. We are talking about independent republics and nations themselves. OK. That is the concept in which the strategic document came about.

On page 4, under ''Security Challenges and Risks,'' paragraph 10, the present strategic doctrine of NATO reads as follows:

> Risks to allied security are less likely to result from calibrated aggression against the territories of the allies, but rather from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social, or political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes . . .

—border disputes, and ethnic rivalries. Excuse me. Let me be clear that I don't want to misquote. Go back to the quote:

> . . . political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, and territorial disputes.

Parenthetically inserted by me was border disputes, and what is going on in Bosnia now.

Back to the quote:

> . . . which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe . . .

Not members of NATO.

> . . . the tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance. They could however lead to a crisis inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts which would involve outside powers, or spill over into NATO countries having a direct effect on the security of the alliance.

Nothing to do with the expansion of NATO—zero, zero to do with expansion. Presently, NATO interprets article V to represent—is interpreted and laid out tactically in the alliance's strategic concept as interpreted by the 16 NATO nations. It authorizes and allows, and they in advance acknowledge that NATO will deem, under article V, instability as a consequence of ethnic rivalries, or boundary and territorial integrity. They will interpret that. They may interpret that to be a threat to the security of any of the member nations; ergo, you are then allowed under NATO strategic doctrine, if all NATO countries agree, as they do in this doctrine, to use force.

What is happening in this debate, unintentionally, as I said to my friend from Virginia yesterday, and what we are really debating in the biggest debate that has occurred is what the greatest differences have been over NATO strategy as it now exists.

That is really what people are arguing about. They are really arguing not about what these three additional countries will do to impact on strategy. They are basically arguing, as they should, as they should, whether or not this outfit we put together almost 40-some years ago still is relevant today, whether we should still have it. But the strategic doctrine today put in place in 1991 says, and I will repeat, ''Risks to allied securities are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but, rather, from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.''

Now, my friend from New York, who is opposing the expansion, is probably the single most qualified man in the Congress, having written about and predicting the kind of chaos that would come from the male fist of communism being lifted off of the sectarian rivalries that have been subsumed under that heavy hand in the Communist rule—he predicted in a book he published several years ago, that I recommend to everyone, that there would be crisis in Europe. It would not be Soviet armies invading.

So my friends who keep saying: Look, we ought to reflect reality, NATO should reflect the real world, as Senator SMITH from New Hampshire kept saying yesterday, NATO did just that in their strategic doctrine of 1991. They said the risk—paraphrasing—is not from Soviet divisions; it is from ethnic rivalries, economic, social, and political instability. That is where our risks lie and we must respond to those risks.

So nothing new is being stated by my friend from Arizona. He is not breaking new ground. He is reiterating a basic principle of the strategic doctrine that exists now. And if we vote down these three countries, it will still exist. To the extent you have a fight, an argument with that section of his amendment, which I cosponsor, you do not have a fight about expansion. You have a fight about why don't you introduce an amendment that says the strategic doctrine of NATO should not be what my friend states it should be and, in fact, is.

So, again, we tend to——

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I think we could settle this with two sentences. Do I understand from the sponsors—and you being a cosponsor of the amendment—that nothing in the amendment expands beyond what is stated in the 1991 doctrine, paragraph 10, which the Senator from Delaware just read? If it is to be interpreted as saying that remains as the goal, then I am comfortable with the amendment. But as drawn, largely due to the defining language, I have a problem with it in its present form.

I agree with the Senator from Delaware, if that is to be the mission in the future, a consistent one with paragraph 10.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond, since I am not the author but only the cosponsor, I do not want to take the liberty of suggesting what the Senator from Arizona meant, but that is my understanding. It is my understanding that the words as drafted now in paragraph 5—and I apologize. I am searching for the language—say each of the threats are self-evidently covered by present NATO doctrine: ''Re-emergence of hegemonic power confronting Europe,'' i.e., Russia. That is part of our existing doctrine today. ''Rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these

weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles,'' et cetera. That, as I read paragraph 10, is contemplated within the ''serious economic, social and political difficulties.'' It says, ''including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes'' but not limited to those two items.

No. 3, ''Threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources'' obviously would affect the economic security and the stability of the NATO nations. No. 4, ''Conflict in the North Atlantic stemming from ethnic and religious enmity.'' That is covered. So as I said——

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is a little swift in saying that is covered. Look, in paragraph 10, in referring to such disputes as ethnic and religious enmity, they say this response: ''These tensions which may result as long as they remain limited should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance,'' and therefore NATO stays out.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to respond, that is exactly what this amendment says. The amendment says, as my friend from Arizona has drafted it, it is a decision self-evident. In this amendment, it is a decision for the NAC to make whether or not it is an armed conflict that will spill over. There have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe which we had concluded not to get involved in because the NAC concluded they were not directly threatened, they did not directly threaten the security of those countries. They did conclude that the ethnic rivalries and the war in Bosnia did—did—threaten their security. They made that judgment internally within the NAC, within that governing body of NATO.

So I reserve the remainder of my time. I have 2 minutes, I am told.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes.

Who yields time?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous the following Senators be listed as cosponsors to my amendment—HELMS, ROTH, BIDEN, and SMITH of Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Oregon.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I thank the Chair. I thank Senator KYL. The Senator just took away some of the business I wanted to do.

I am very pleased to be added as an original cosponsor of this amendment.

Mr. President, I think the Clinton administration made a serious error in allowing the other NATO countries to reopen the strategic concept issue. The current document agreed to in 1991 needs no alteration. The approach taken under President Bush's strategic concept has served NATO well for the past 7 years and would have served equally well for the next 7. That said, what is done is done. The administration failed to prevent the French and others from opening a Pandora's box.

Negotiations on the strategic concept for the purpose of amending it will commence this summer, and I expect that a document will be agreed upon by early next year. Senator KYL's amendment establishes a vision for NATO's future. It does so by emphasizing those aspects of the current NATO policy which the United States finds most important. For instance, the Kyl amendment makes clear that NATO, not the European Union, not the OSCE or any other United Nations-type organization, must remain the principal foundation for collective security in Europe.

It also takes note of the broad range of threats that will face the United States and our NATO allies in the post-cold war world and calls upon NATO members to ensure that their forces can be rapidly deployed and sustained during combat operations.

Taken together with paragraph B of the current condition 1 of the resolution, which calls upon NATO military planners to put territorial defense above all other priorities, this amendment makes clear that the United States expects every NATO member to pursue the capability of operating with the United States in any contingency under any circumstance.

Finally, it reaffirms the key tenets of current NATO nuclear policy. I find this paragraph of the Kyl amendment particularly important.

In conclusion, Senator KYL has identified the 10 most important aspects of NATO's current strategic concept which must be preserved. His amendment sets forth the Senate's expectations that any future revisions to the strategic concept must reflect these principles. I welcome his contribution to the resolution of ratification. It provides a much-needed vision for the future course of the NATO alliance. The administration can expect that I for one will hold it to the policies established under the Kyl amendment during the course of future negotiations of the strategic concept.

Again, my thanks to Senator KYL. I think his amendment is forward looking. It is visionary. Unlike so many amendments offered here today which are sort of in the category of ''thou shalt not,'' this is in the category of ''thou shalt do.'' So I thank Senator KYL for that and his leadership. I am proud to be a cosponsor with him.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. I would be delighted to yield for a question from the Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would it be correct to say that the statement, ''Conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes or actions of undemocratic leaders'' does not represent any expansion of the 1991 doctrine?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from New York that I am in total agreement with the Senator from Delaware. That is the case, that this was not intended to be an enlargement of existing NATO policy.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my friend from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I make that statement in order to assure my colleagues who are concerned about enlarged missions that it is not our intention to try to expand the mission of NATO. But what we are concerned about is helping the administration of the United States define very clearly to our European allies our strategic vision of NATO as a defense alliance. Unfortunately, some Europeans have a different point of view. They would limit NATO solely to the mission of collective defense against an armed attack, elevate the WEU to the principal military organization for responding to all other threats to NATO security, and cuts the United States out of decisionmaking on issues affecting our vital interests. Some undermine our ability to shape NATO as a viable 21st century military alliance, and that is why I offered this amendment, to help make clear an unambiguous U.S. policy on the future direction of the alliance using the fundamental principles which have existed since 1949 when these concepts were first enunciated and which in the Foreign Relations Committee report at that time said that, of course, each party would have to decide in the light of circumstances surrounding the case and the nature and extent of the assistance whether, in fact, an armed attack had occurred and article 5 thus brought into play—armed attack relating to different kinds of situations that might not be a direct invasion but might, from other kinds of causes nevertheless, pose a security risk to the states within NATO.

So I really believe we have not expanded the current policy, but I hope we have clarified for our friends in Europe the limits of the U.S. policy, the vision, the strategic vision that we have. I appreciate the questions raised by the Senators from New York and Virginia to help us clarify that point.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we thank the Senator and with that assurance I will give you my support. But the amendment is to restrict in some way the expressions in the resolution that is before the Senate.

Mr. KYL. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator state that for the record?

Mr. KYL. Yes. Mr. President, that is correct. We explicitly, for example, insert ''in the North Atlantic area'' which is not in the underlying resolution of ratification.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?

Mr. KYL. I am happy to yield. I think I am out of time.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senator agree that in 1949 the issue facing Western Europe and the United States was not ethnic and religious conflict, it was international communism in the form of the Soviet Union, which had declared ethnic and religious conflict to be a premodern phenomenon, long since sent into the dustbin of history?

Mr. KYL. The Senator is correct that the concern at the time was the great conflict between the West and communism from the Soviet Union. I suggest the Senator probably knows better than any of the rest of us about the longstanding disputes, some ethnic and religious in origin, which were, perhaps, always under the surface. But at that time, of course, the Senator is absolutely correct.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my colleague.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not one for shilling for books, but for those of you who are interested in this subject and the religious and ethnic conflicts that have erupted after the mailed fist of communism has been lifted in Central and Eastern Europe, I strongly recommend—and I mean this sincerely—Senator MOYNIHAN's book entitled ''Pandaemonium.'' It is worth, as they say, the read, and is incredibly instructive. I mean it sincerely. It is incredibly insightful, and those of you who have an interest should take a look at it.

I yield the floor and yield the time, and I am ready to vote.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN) is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDNG OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 90, nays 9, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 107 Leg.]

YEAS—90

Abraham	Coats	Feingold
Akaka	Cochran	Feinstein
Allard	Collins	Ford
Baucus	Conrad	Frist
Bennett	Coverdell	Glenn
Biden	Craig	Gorton
Bond	D'Amato	Gramm
Boxer	Daschle	Grams
Breaux	DeWine	Grassley
Brownback	Dodd	Gregg
Bryan	Domenici	Hagel
Burns	Dorgan	Harkin
Campbell	Durbin	Hatch
Chafee	Enzi	Helms
Cleland	Faircloth	Hollings
Hutchinson	Levin	Rockefeller
Hutchison	Lieberman	Roth
Inhofe	Lott	Santorum
Inouye	Lugar	Sessions
Jeffords	Mack	Shelby
Johnson	McCain	Smith (OR)
Kempthorne	McConnell	Snowe
Kennedy	Mikulski	Specter
Kerrey	Moynihan	Stevens
Kerry	Murkowski	Thomas
Kohl	Murray	Thompson
Kyl	Nickles	Thurmond
Landrieu	Reed	Torricelli
Lautenberg	Reid	Warner
Leahy	Robb	Wyden

NAYS—9

Ashcroft	Byrd	Sarbanes
Bingaman	Graham	Smith (NH)
Bumpers	Roberts	Wellstone

NOT VOTING—1

Moseley-Braun

The executive amendment (No. 2310), as modified, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I have been privileged to participate in the historic debate on the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Since last October, the committee has held 8 hearings on this issue and heard testimony from 37 witnesses with a variety of opinions on NATO enlargement.

I will take this opportunity to thank the chairman of the committee, the Senator from North Carolina, and the committee's ranking member, Senator BIDEN, for the balanced manner in which these hearings were conducted and for their support for expeditious consideration of this important matter.

As we all know, Mr. President, NATO has been the most important factor in maintaining peace in Europe since the devastation of World War II. As we prepare to mark the alliance's 50th anniversary next year, it is appropriate to look back on its successes and look forward to see what role NATO will play in the next 50 years. The world will be a much different place in 1999 than it was in 1949 when this alliance was formed as a buffer against Soviet aggression and as a means of protection for nations whose people had just emerged from one of the costliest wars, in both human and financial terms, in our history.

But to fully understand and appreciate what the security of NATO represents to the people of Eastern Europe, we must first remember what they have endured in the years since we celebrated V-E Day. At the same time the people of Western Europe were working to found an alliance that would ensure security and were fighting to rebuild their countries and the economies after the fall of the Third Reich, a new threat was emerging on the other side of the continent.

The Soviet Union, which had been our ally against Hitler, was about to become our foe in a cold war that would last almost a half century and result in the sacrifice of lives, traditions, and religious liberty throughout Eastern Europe. The people of Eastern Europe barely had time to recover from the devastation of a world war when they were faced with Soviet tanks. Foreign subjugation was, of course, nothing new for the people of Eastern and Central Europe.

For centuries, Mr. President, this part of the world had been a battleground where people and territory seemed little more than spoils in a seemingly endless series of bloody fights. Bit by bit, the Soviet Union redrew Europe's map until it swallowed up the entire eastern and central region. Under the reign of the Communist Party, people lived in fear that they would be accused of being disloyal to the party. Religion was outlawed, and the myriad beautiful places of worship in the Soviet Union were left vacant; many were destroyed.

In spite of the treatment they were forced to endure at the hands of the Soviet regime, the people of Eastern Europe never lost their will to be free, as demonstrated by events such as the Prague Spring and the Solidarity movement. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was beginning to crumble and the people of Eastern Europe yearned to satisfy their hunger for democracy and freedom. Beginning in 1989, the people of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia peacefully ousted their Communist governments and replaced them with democracy. It was, in the words of Vaclav Havel, a ''velvet revolution.''

Because of modern technology, the world community has had a front-row seat for the transformation of Eastern Europe. We literally watched the Berlin Wall fall and marveled at cranes dismantling statues of Lenin and laying low the hammer and sickle.

Today, nearly a half a century after World War II, the Iron Curtain is gone and the Soviet regime is no more. The changing face of Europe is marked by newly-independent countries eagerly embracing democracy for the first time in more than two generations. But the people of these former Soviet satellite countries still live in the shadow of the history of Soviet domination. These nations and their people seek to rejoin the West, and seek a means to ensure that they will never again fall victim to a Soviet-style regime.

The lingering memory of Soviet domination was evident at the Winter 1998 Olympic Games, where a player on the Czech Republic's hockey team wore the number 68 to mark the February 25, 1968, invasion of his country by the Soviet Union. When the Czech Republic's hockey team beat the Russian team for the gold medal, many Czechs felt that the victory represented more than athletic excellence. It also symbolized their country's freedom from the Soviet domination of the past.

Now, there is a new, democratic Russia, and the nations of Eastern Europe,

which have become our friends and trading partners, are caught, both literally and figuratively, between this new Russia and the West. This is a critical time for the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe to establish themselves as countries in their own right, finally free of the yoke of Soviet domination.

It is only natural that these Eastern European countries would seek to join NATO, an alliance which shines as a beacon of democracy and security on the European continent. The proposed enlargement of this alliance represents a crossroads in American foreign policy, and, indeed, in the fragile balance of power in Europe. Some opposed to enlarging this alliance have said that it would create a new series of dividing lines in Europe, between NATO, Russia, and those countries which are caught in the middle—neither members of NATO nor under the sphere of Russian influence. Others have argued that all countries meeting the criteria for membership in NATO should be allowed to join. Opponents fear that this would lead to a different dividing line—one between Russia and the rest of Europe.

Many of my constituents, and indeed many people around the world, have a special interest in the debate over NATO enlargement due to their ethnic heritage or their memories of the iron fist of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. I share their commitment to a Europe which will never again fall victim to such oppression.

The proposed enlargement embodied in the protocols currently before this body leads to many questions: How many countries? How many rounds of enlargement? What about Russia? What about those that may be left out?

It is my view that the newly-independent countries in Europe should not be forever caught between Russia and the West. It is also my strong view that the United States must proceed carefully so that we do not damage our relationship with a democratic Russia. Unfortunately, parts of the debate over NATO enlargement have taken on an ''us versus them'' quality. We must not forget that the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and that we should encourage democracy wherever it takes root. Instead of the ''us versus them'' of the Cold War era, this debate should be about the new landscape of Europe. We must not make Russia feel as if it is being ganged up on by the West. We must encourage democracy there as we do elsewhere on the globe, and we must encourage the newly-independent states to take control of their own futures.

That is why the Administration helped to successfully negotiate the NATO-Russia Founding Act. And that is why the language in the resolution of ratification currently before this body encourages the continuation of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia.

I support the fundamental goals of NATO enlargement, and believe it is in America's national interest to pursue this first round, as it has. However, I do have some concerns, that I know are shared by many other Members of Congress, about the commitment—financial and otherwise—the United States will undertake as it pursues enlargement of the alliance.

On that point, Mr. President, I would like to speak for a moment on one of my concerns about this debate: the disparity among the various estimates on the financial commitment the United States would be undertaking if NATO enlargement were to proceed. There have been at least three major studies conducted on this subject, each of which has taken a different approach with respect to the basis for their estimates. While I understand that it is impossible to account for all of the different variables that will be included in this endeavor, each study assumes a different set of costs, and thus reaches very different cost projections for the U.S. share of this undertaking—anywhere from $2 billion to $7 billion.

I am pleased that I was able to get clarification on this issue through the hearings we held in the Foreign Relations Committee, and I am pleased that the members of the Committee devoted so much time to this important aspect of NATO enlargement. The Committee based its evaluation of the estimated cost of NATO enlargement on the following four assumptions that can be found in the Department of Defense and NATO studies:

First, because there is no immediate threat to NATO, the alliance will continue to operate in the current strategic environment for the foreseeable future.

Second, NATO will not station substantial forces on the territories of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Third—and this is a key point for me—NATO's standard burdensharing rules will apply to the costs of enlargement.

Fourth, the modernization of the United States military is considered to be a strictly American project that will not be funded through the NATO common budget, and, thus, NATO enlargement will not require the United States to undertake any new force modernization initiatives beyond those already planned.

Mr. President, I believe that these four assumptions are at the heart of the debate over the cost of NATO enlargement. While, in my view, the enlargement of the alliance is in the best interest of the United States, I remain committed to ensuring that the federal government achieves—and maintains—a balanced federal budget. The Committee's careful analysis of the costs involved in NATO enlargement addressed many of my concerns in this regard. I agree with the language included in the Committee Report which states that the Committee ''stresses the importance of all current and future allies to meet their commitments to the common defense. Anything less will result in a hollow strategic commitment.'' At the same time, I will look carefully at any of the amendments before us that seek to control the costs to the U.S. taxpayer of this enlargement.

Because of the necessity of all NATO members to meet their commitments to the common defense, I asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, at a February 24, 1998, Foreign Relations Committee hearing, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be prepared to take on these commitments. She told me that ''We are confident that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will take on the financial commitment involved in NATO membership. Indeed, to prepare for this commitment, all three have increased their defense budgets to fund necessary defense reforms, and to bring them in line with the standard outlays of NATO Allies. . . . Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be higher if these countries did not join NATO.''

In addition, I have been assured by both Secretary Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen that the United States share of NATO enlargement costs will not exceed $7 billion over ten years. They have insisted that the wide range of cost estimates can be attributed to the use of varying data and the fact that the original estimates assumed the admission of four new countries into the alliance. I respect the views of the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office in explaining the differential, and will continue to monitor revised cost estimates as they become available.

The many cost estimates involved in this first round of NATO enlargement also lead me to wonder if we will have a clearer picture of the cost of future rounds, or if we will be faced with the same financial uncertainties that loom before us today. This is an issue the Senate will be looking at closely as the Alliance develops its policies regarding future enlargement. This is also the subject of at least one amendment to the resolution of ratification currently before this body.

I also have concerns about the impact of new U.S. commitments to NATO on America's general military readiness, especially at a time when so many of our forces are deployed around the world in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, Korea, and other posts. I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, about this concern when he testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations. He said, ''I see nothing in the NATO enlargement concept that will detract from our overall readiness. To the contrary, the additional troops, military equipment and capabilities that the three new countries bring to the Alliance can only reduce the demands on current members.''

I am encouraged by his answer, and I am also encouraged by the willingness

of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace. All three countries were original members of this program, and all have provided troops and equipment for NATO missions. In my view, the willingness of these three countries to participate in NATO efforts will only strengthen the alliance.

As I stated earlier, I share the Administration's basic views on the merits of enlarging this alliance. The people of Eastern Europe must never again be subjected to the conditions they were forced to endure under Soviet rule. They see NATO membership as a means to ensure their future safety. My concern is about the extent of the commitment the United States will be making, and the uncertainty regarding the price tag that American taxpayers will be asked to pay in this time of fiscal restraint and personal sacrifice. But voting in favor of NATO enlargement should not be considered a blank check for military or other spending in the region. Should the Senate ratify the protocols we are considering today, I and my colleagues in both the House and the Senate will continue to monitor the new U.S. commitments to NATO—financial and otherwise—through the regular congressional budget and appropriations process.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of ratification.

I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have been watching with a great deal of interest the debate that is taking place. It has been a very healthy debate. Certainly the Senator from Wisconsin raised some very good points. As I listened to his comments, I can only say that I agree with almost everything he said except for his conclusion. I look at the cost of this, and we do not know what to anticipate should we extend NATO to these countries. I am deeply concerned about the costs that would be incurred. The range has been incredible. You talk about something between $400 million and $120 billion. That range is not one that gives me much comfort.

I would like to remind my colleagues that the same group of people that are giving us their assurances now—that is, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the White House—that it is not going to cost over a certain amount of money, are the same ones that told us in November of 1995 that it would not cost more than $1.2 billion for our participation in Bosnia. We knew better. But, nonetheless, that is what they said. They said that is a guarantee. Yet here we are now. Our direct costs in Bosnia have exceeded $9 billion. I suggest that is less than half of the total direct and indirect costs. So I don't have a very high comfort level when it comes to being able to rely on what it might cost us to extend NATO to these three countries.

The second thing as I read article V, which is the security guarantee, is that I see this as a very expensive security guarantee, and it is open ended. It stipulates that, ''An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all.'' It doesn't say that we would come to the aid of someone who is attacked if we have any national security interests. It doesn't say that if it should impair our Nation, we are going to be in a position to defend them. It is not like many of the situations where we have become involved in helping countries such as Nicaragua and others because we know it is cheaper actually to help them than it is to have to fight these battles ourselves. This just says, ''as an attack against them all.'' That means that if there is an attack, we have to come to their aid. We always take a much greater share of the burden than our partners do.

The third thing is that I have no doubt in my mind that if we do this, this is just the beginning and that we will be extending it to more and more countries.

I would like to remind you, Mr. President, of a quote from Secretary Albright that the door is open, she said, to other countries with democratic governments and free markets. ''The administration is fighting an effort by WARNER and others to place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.'' After the first three recruits were invited last year, Albright said, ''We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last, and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.''

So with the increased costs as we make these extensions, we are looking at Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Slovakia, and many others. I don't see where there is an end it to. However, I remind my colleagues that this is not a partisan subject.

I was honored to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee with the Democrat who is probably more knowledgeable than any Democrat has been—certainly in my recollection—on that committee, Sam Nunn. Sam Nunn was quoted as saying, ''Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and this NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less cooperative.'' He further said, ''The administration's answer to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''

I agree with Senator Nunn that this is opening the door to something that is very expensive, and also it could impair what progress we have made with Russia.

Just to quote the Duma, on January 23 they passed a resolution—this is in Russia, the Russian Duma—calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II.

All of these things have been talked about on this floor. One thing that has not been talked about is what I would consider to be the greatest exposure we would be inheriting by making this extension.

I can remember being here on the Senate floor back in November of 1995. We missed passing a resolution of disapproval to keep sending our troops over to Bosnia. We had no national security interest on a very expensive thing that now has caused the decimation of our entire defense system. We did that as a response to the strongest argument; that is, we must continue our commitment and our allegiance to NATO. So NATO is the reason that we are over in Bosnia today. Even though the administration said this would be something that would cost approximately $1.2 billion, it has cost directly $9 billion, and indirectly far more than that.

Mr. President, it wasn't long ago that we were talking about making some strikes on Iraq. We know there are problems there. We know they have not kept their commitment to the United Nations. They have not allowed our inspection teams to see what they had agreed they should be able to see, and it looks like those storm clouds may be there. If that happens, I don't know of one person who has a background in military strategy in the Pentagon or one person in the administration who can tell you that you can go in there and do surgical strikes from the air and not end up having to send in ground troops. Where are we if we should have to do that?

In the case of Iraq, we are talking about a theater that includes Bosnia. We are talking about the 21st COCOM located in Germany that was supposed to be offering the logistical support for any ground movement in any place within the theater. That would include Iraq.

Right now, you go over to the 21st COCOM in Germany, and you will find out that we don't have the capability of supporting any other ground operations in addition to Bosnia because they are at over 100 percent capacity right now trying to support Bosnia. They don't have the spare parts for their equipment. They don't have the equipment. They are using M–115 trucks that have 1 million miles on them. It is something that we can't afford. It is something that we can't afford in terms of using up our military assets and our capability. Yet we are not able to support any ground operation anywhere else in the theater so long as we are offering that support to Bosnia. And the reason we are there is this allegiance that we apparently have to NATO.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that in addition to all the other arguments we have heard, from the cost of the operation to our relationship with Russia and all the rest of them, that there is

another very serious problem we are facing, and that is how many more Bosnians are out there that we are going to be obligated to support as a result of increasing our commitment to NATO.

Mr. President, I would like to say that if you were in a position where most Americans think we are in right now, and that is where we are the superpower, that we are able to defend America on two regional fronts, then I would say maybe we should consider doing this. But right now we have a hollow force. We are in a situation very similar to what we were facing in the 1970s.

Mr. President, I think we can no longer afford the luxury of any more activities such as the Bosnian operation. I think we would be best served not to extend NATO to these three countries.

Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROWNBACK). The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues to discuss the issue of national security and the vital security interests to the United States and Europe, and obviously I am talking about the proposed expansion of NATO. To borrow a very well-known phrase, now we are engaged in a great debate, or at least a very good discussion, to determine and to test whether that alliance or any alliance so conceived and so successful in the past can meet the challenges of today.

We are in the amendment process, but I do want to offer some general comments and some concerns.

But for NATO and the collective security of Europe and the United States, the time has come. I must say that from the time of news accounts on old newsreels, or what we in my age can recall as the Movietone News or to CNN today, it has been quite a show for NATO. But it is time to turn off the movie projector, sweep up the popcorn, and turn out the lights. The old NATO show is over. Just as in that great 1971 movie, ''The Last Picture Show,'' when the camera pans back from the now-closed movie theater and pictures a deserted small, dusty town in Texas and tumbleweeds blowing down the street, we are not sure what the future holds but we know it will be different from the past.

We now face the uncertainty of NATO either enlarged or with the same 16 members. We don't know what it will be in the future, but we are certain it will be different than in the past and, quite frankly, peace and stability in Europe and throughout the world hang in the balance.

The debate on the addition of three new members will soon be over and the time for the vote will rapidly approach, perhaps as of this week.

The administration assures us that to fundamentally alter the most successful alliance in our history is a good thing. They tell us that we will be more secure with an expanded alliance, that the wrongs of Yalta will be corrected, the candidate countries will now be free to fully develop as democratic and market-driven societies. We are guaranteed that no new dividing lines between the West and the East will result from this or any kind of future enlargement, that the door is open to all, and that further rounds of enlargement are a certainty. The administration also predicts that although the Russians are upset, and they are, with the enlargement of NATO they will simply ''get over it'' and come to understand we have their best interests in mind with enlargement and Russia will also be more secure.

Now, we get all this for the amazing value of about $1.5 billion over the next 10 years. We are reassured that although the cost estimates have varied from $125 billion to $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, NATO's sharp-penciled budgeteers certainly have it right. Much to our relief, the burdensharing problems between our NATO allies that have plagued the alliance in the past will not be a problem now or in the future of an enlarged NATO, so the argument goes. The administration is confident the United States will not have to pick up any unexpected costs, although the allies have said they will refuse to pay one additional mark or franc for enlargement.

Now, I have spent considerable time looking into each of these controversial areas surrounding the enlargement of NATO, and one of the most amazing things about this debate is that in each concern for enlargement, the basis of the arguments, both pro and con, are fundamentally the same but the conclusions are the opposite.

Let me take a few minutes to lay out the pros and cons of NATO enlargement, if I might. First is the issue of cost and also burdensharing. Unfortunately, only time will truly show what the costs for NATO enlargement will be. With such a wide variance in the estimates, there clearly is not a single set of assumptions to gauge the true costs of enlargement. I do not know how we could. I can tell you the final costs will not be $1.5 billion over a 10-year period, but I cannot tell you what the costs will be, and I do not think anybody else can.

The opponents of enlargement say the $1.5 billion number is laughable, and the opponents breathe a sigh of relief that the agreed-to number is so low that no one could suggest we cannot afford the costs of enlargement. We are told the reasons for $1.5 billion being the correct cost include the fact only three countries are being invited as opposed to four or five, and the military infrastructure in the candidate countries is in much better shape than originally thought.

I am a little surprised at the infrastructure point. NATO has been involved in Partnership for Peace exercises and military-to-military contacts with those countries for more than a few years. We have a huge facility at Taszar in Hungary at a former Soviet air base. Didn't anyone in NATO or the United States notice the condition of the infrastructure during any of the exercises, and particularly in the three candidate countries?

Finally, another reason the cost has been reduced is that NATO has shifted some of what some thought to be shared costs to the three candidate countries.

I am concerned, regardless of the public statements by these countries, that they will not be able to fund NATO enlargement or, if they do, they will divert needed resources away from more important domestic issues and into military spending. If they are unable to meet their fiscal obligations for enlargement, will the costs be deferred or will NATO simply pick them up?

I might point out in terms of paying the contribution to NATO there are three accounts. The NATO Security Investment Program, formerly called the NATO Infrastructure Program, comes from the annual military construction appropriation. We do not have the money in that account to pay for this. The NATO civil budget money comes from the annual State Department appropriation ''Contributions to International Organizations,'' and that money is tight. The NATO military budget comes from the Department of Army annual appropriation, and that budget, too, is under very severe pressure.

Let's take up one other subject, if I might, Mr. President. What about the correction of the wrongs of Yalta? The candidate countries are proud, developing democracies and countries wanting very badly to become a part of the West. They have already made some great strides. We all understand they suffered terribly during the many years of Soviet domination. I applaud their efforts. I am confident they would be wonderful allies, capable at some point of carrying out their NATO responsibilities. I have been to Prague. I have been to Budapest. I have listened to the history. I have felt the pride of their accomplishments. A freedom-loving person cannot experience the strength of their conviction without reaching out to help them attain their stated goals of Western integration. But understanding and empathizing with their feelings and their desires are not reasons for the Senate to ratify a change in NATO membership.

The only reason to enlarge NATO is if it is in our vital national interest to simply do so. Proponents of enlargement do not see it that way. For example, General Shalikashvili in a recent Los Angeles Times article said, ''Meanwhile, there are urgencies to expanding NATO. It is nearly 10 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the countries of Eastern Europe—including my native land, Poland—have waited long enough for a place at the table where they have yearned to be for so long.''

That is a common theme for the enlargement proponents, including the

Secretary of State. They have the right to join NATO, and that is good enough to alter the alliance. Others argue that enlarging NATO will show the continued interest and commitment of the United States in a stable and secure Europe. As a matter of fact, I think the distinguished Presiding Officer has made that very cogent argument.

It is still not clear why NATO must enlarge to demonstrate, however, in this Senator's opinion, U.S. resolve or commitment to Europe. There is no question in my mind a secure and stable Europe is in our vital interest, but I fail to see the connection between an enlarged NATO and that end goal.

It is interesting to note that Austria, a Central European country, is not seeking NATO membership. There is no cry of a security vacuum in Austria or a concern for the right to join the primer alliance, which is NATO. In fact, Austria took a good look at NATO and decided it was more important to seek its long-term security within the European Union and the Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security for Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. This would have been the best approach, in this Senator's view, for security and acceptance into the West for the current candidate nations rather than immediate NATO membership. Unfortunately, that is not now an option. We have come too far. The administration has planted the flag of U.S. commitment and integrity—no small matter.

Let me share with you the results of a survey published in June of 1996 in an issue of The Economist. I am sure some will challenge these results, but I think it is worth reviewing these questions asked of citizens of the three candidate countries.

Would these countries support sending troops to defend another country? Only 26 percent of the people of Hungary, 43 percent of those polled in the Czech Republic, and 55 percent in Poland support sending troops to defend another country. Now, considering this is the best that the support will ever be, since the excitement of joining NATO will soon wear off, I suggest this is not a very good commentary on the weak support to carry out a core requirement of NATO. And that core requirement is the common defense and the commitment to send troops to defend an ally.

Let me ask another question: Would these countries support having NATO troops based on their soil? In The Economist, they reported that only 30 percent of the Czechs and 35 percent of the Hungarians support the notion of allowing NATO troops to be stationed on their soil. Although 56 percent of the people of Poland, obviously, supported the idea, it is still an idea that does not have broad support in any of the three of the candidate countries.

The next question: Would these countries support regular NATO exercises in their country, or regular flights over their country? Less than half of any of the candidate countries supported having NATO exercises on their soil or even allowing flights over their country, and those percentages range from 26 percent to 41 percent, representing, again, little support for the cost of simply joining the alliance.

Would these countries support spending a bigger share of their country's budget on military and social needs? The numbers in support for this question are very low, and it is a crucial question. In the Czech Republic, 8 percent; in Hungary, 9 percent; and 23 percent in Poland support spending a bigger share on defense. Unfortunately, there will be these costs associated with their membership in NATO. I know the agriculture problems they are having in those countries. A great deal of those expenses will have to be committed to the transformation from a collective farm system to a system more in keeping with the rest of Europe.

My only point in presenting these statistics is to show there are concerns in the candidate countries about the commitment to NATO. I am afraid the survey says NATO may no longer be a ''one for all, all for one,'' but rather it may become an ''all for me, but not for you'' alliance.

Let me say, in April of this past year the Roper Starch World Wide poll asked Americans the level of support for using armed forces in certain situations. I hope—and I do not believe that the American public has become so isolationist that they would never risk any American life in defense of freedom. But there is a clearly understandable concern about risking American lives in what some call a political war of gradualism where there is no clear and discernible vital national interest.

Listen to this. If the U.S. were attacked, 84 percent of those polled supported using force. This is in the Roper Starch World Wide poll. I would like to know where the other 16 percent are.

If our forces stationed overseas were attacked, 50 percent supported armed intervention. To safeguard peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations, the support dropped to 35 percent, which explains a great deal in regards to what happened in the gulf. Finally, to stop invasion of one country by another, the support fell sharply to 15 percent. That is why it took George Bush and Jim Baker and Dick Cheney and others a whole year to rally support among our allies in regards to the gulf war.

One issue we should all be concerned about is the collective security commitment that NATO makes in the post-cold-war environment, and that commitment is contained in article V of the NATO charter. During the cold war, obviously, everybody understood that if the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries attacked Western Europe, the very survival of the free world was at stake and every NATO member would strike back with all of their military capability. But is that still true today with no threat to the survival of Europe? Would all NATO members automatically strike back if another member was attacked tomorrow?

Article V can be read either way, and in fact the proponents and opponents argue both ways. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on this topic. I believe that if a member of NATO had a vital national interest at risk in the country under attack, they would respond with military force. If there was no threat to their vital interests, I doubt they would automatically respond with the same kind of military force. They would respond with outrage. They might threaten military force if the belligerents did not stop. But I am not sure if they would respond militarily. I am confident, however, that the candidate countries think NATO would respond to an attack on them, just as they would have during the cold war—that is, with all of their military strength.

The construction of article V is such that both interpretations are possible. Some argue—and I believe they have a point—that this ambiguity is good and may be just the right amount of deterrence in the minds of would-be belligerents. This is a serious issue, since it is at the very heart of the commitment and success of NATO during the cold war. We need to fully understand what article V means in today's environment. We just had an amendment on the floor of the Senate to try to spell that out.

The confusion over article V is only one mission concern. There is a more fundamental concern: What is the mission of NATO in the post-cold-war? The distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator BIDEN, and the distinguished Senator from Oregon who was just the Presiding Officer, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Arizona, had a lengthy debate over this and considered the Kyl amendment. Let me share part of former Secretary of Defense Perry's testimony before the Armed Services Committee.

> The original mission of NATO—deterring an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant. The original geographical area of NATO's responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. And the way in which NATO relates to Russia must be entirely different from the way it related to the Soviet Union.

One would think, with that array of differences, and before the alliance was changed forever, that some agreed-to long-range strategy would have been developed. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Listening to the discussion on the Senate floor by my colleagues, I believe there are many possibilities for future missions of NATO. Some say the Kyl amendment opened the door to more possible missions, and the Senator from Arizona firmly says that he wants to go back to the original 1991 strategic concept.

Can anyone in the Senate say with certainty what NATO's mission is? Can

anyone articulate what mission, what role, against what threat we are rushing toward enlargement of NATO, to fundamentally alter this great alliance?

Let me say that simply to bring NATO expansion into focus, the President, it seems to me, should become engaged. In Warsaw, St. Petersburg, and in Bucharest, the President did address general European security concerns. But to my way of thinking, despite all of the hard work by the Secretary of State and others, he has not made a personal case to the Congress or the American people.

As a matter of fact, in remarks during the European trip, the President said, in a post-Soviet era—I am paraphrasing here—military matters are no longer primary, that terrorism, illegal drugs, national extremism, regional conflicts due to ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds do matter. I can assure you, using an expanded NATO to address these concerns raises some very important questions.

What means would be used? Warplanes, ground forces, and naval power are of little use in fighting ethnic hatred and racism. If NATO membership reduces the threats of ethnic rivalries, somebody should tell that to the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain, and the Kurds in Turkey.

Do we really want to change the most successful security alliance in history to a European United Nations? With 16 NATO members and 28 other nations inaugurating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, it seems to me the protocol, rituals, and welcoming speeches will leave no time for any serious discussion. Exactly what force requirements are necessary to prevent a power vacuum? What is the strategy to ensure stability and security in Europe?

NATO's leadership understands there is some confusion in this regard and, as I have indicated, has directed a review of its 1991 Strategic Concept to see if it is in line with the changed world and threats—and we had a good debate on the Senate floor just earlier on this very matter.

Now the Secretary of State wants to ''spread NATO's security from the Middle East through Central Africa,'' but several of the current alliance members remain unconvinced of the utility of these so-called out-of-area operations for NATO. Again, let's quote from Dr. Perry's written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

> The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members. . . .

Let me repeat that:

> The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members—certainly including all of Europe, and certainly including the Persian Gulf.

That is a quote. Just think of that, even with the current membership and the world's global economy, what corner of this universe could not hold interest for NATO members? Are we considering NATO as a global alliance? If we are, are we to consider global membership for NATO? Is this alliance to become the military arm of the United Nations? We should be seriously concerned that we are changing NATO before we are certain of its future mission requirements.

Now, the last but most frequently debated point associated with NATO enlargement is the impact on United States-Russian relations. Here both sides of the argument can list exactly the same points but come up with opposite results. It is a paradox of enormous irony.

Unfortunately, this is the one area that will have the most profound effect on our country in the coming decades. We must be certain of what we are doing.

The proponents argue that Russia understands that NATO is no threat to them. Opponents point out that some 350 Members of the Duma, some of which we have met with in the Senate Armed Services Committee, have formed an anti-NATO group. Let me inform the President there is not one—one—Member of the Duma that is pro-NATO publicly. The proponents say the Russians will get over it—in time. Opponents state enlargement will sour our relations with the moderate Russians. The proponents vigorously point out that in dealing with the Russians, we can't be seen as simply giving in to the ''hard-liners.'' Opponents say if we enlarge NATO, we will play into the hands of the ''hard-liners.''

Let me say, I think I know at least in part what some of the blood pressure and the motives are in regard to expanding NATO and Russia. And I quote an article from the Washington Post from Charles Krauthammer, who I think is an outstanding columnist most of the time due to the fact that he agrees with my prejudice. Obviously, I think he is a very learned columnist, but on this he tells the truth. He says here that:

> . . .NATO expansion nothing more than extending the borders of peace; building new bridges; strengthening an alliance directed against no one in particular, certainly ''not arrayed against Russia. . . .

Then he tells the truth.

> This is all nice and good. It is, however, rubbish. In order not to offend the bear, the administration must understandably pretend that NATO expansion has nothing to do with Russia. Those not constrained by diplomatic niceties, however, can say the obvious: NATO, an alliance founded in that immortal formulation ''to keep America in, Germany down, and Russia out,'' is expanding in the service of its historic and continuing mission. . . .

And that is to contain Russia. We are poking the Russian bear.

So it goes with a host of NATO enlargement topics dealing with Russia-and-United States relations. Keeping or encouraging Russia moving toward a complete system of democratic reforms, I submit, Mr. President, is in our vital national interest and, from a timing perspective, it is more important than the addition of these three candidate countries.

These are the key issues surrounding the debate on NATO enlargement: cost, mission and strategy, and United States-Russia relations. Unfortunately, there are still many unanswered questions remaining on these vital areas. I trust the Senate, with the various amendments we will be considering and the very good debate that we have had, will answer these concerns. The show is over, and we must address this enlargement of NATO on the floor now with the facts we have before us.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, in closing, Mr. President, an article by John Lewis Gaddis, who is a professor of history at Yale University. The information was provided to me by the granddaughter of Dwight David Eisenhower. Susan Eisenhower has played a very important role in this debate.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times on the Web, Apr. 27, 1998]

THE SENATE SHOULD HALT NATO EXPANSION

(By John Lewis Gaddis)

NEW HAVEN—The decision to expand NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has produced some strange political alignments. There aren't many causes that Bill Clinton and Jesse Helms can both support, or that Phyllis Schlafly and the editors of The Nation can join in opposing.

Even stranger, to a historian, is the consensus that seems to be shaping up within our community. Historians normally don't agree on much, whether it is about the origins of the Peloponnesian War or the end of the cold war. And yet I've had difficulty finding any colleagues who think NATO expansion is a good idea. Indeed, I can recall no other moment when there was less support in our profession for a government policy.

A striking gap has opened, therefore, between those who make grand strategy and those who reflect on it. On this issue, at least, official and accumulated wisdom are pointing in very different directions.

This has happened, I think, because the Clinton Administration has failed to answer a few simple questions:

Why exclude the Russians? One of the few propositions on which historians tend to agree is that peace settlements work best when they include rather than exclude former adversaries. Within three years after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the victors had brought France back within the concert of Europe. Within six years of their surrender in 1945, Germany and Japan were firmly within American-designed security alliances. Both settlements survived for decades. The post-World War I settlement, however, excluded Germany. The lessons of history on this point seem obvious.

Who, then, will we include? The Administration has made it clear that expansion will not stop with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It has mentioned the Baltics and Romania as possible future members. The State Department's Web site claims support for NATO expansion from groups like the Belorussian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian National Association and the Armenian Assembly of America.

The State Department assures us, though, that the Russians view this process with equanimity and that we can expect relations with Moscow to proceed normally while we sort out just who the new members of NATO will be. Perhaps it will next try to tell us that pigs can fly.

What will expansion cost? The Administration's estimate for including Poland, Hungary and the Cezch Republic comes to only $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, of which the United States would pay $400 million. That sounds like a bargain, but the estimate assumes no change in the current security environment. Has it occurred to the Administration that the act of expanding NATO, especially if former Soviet states are included, could itself alter the current security environment? It doesn't take a rocket scientist—or even a historian—to figure out that actions have consequences.

What's the objective? Alliances are means to ends, not ends in themselves. NATO served brilliantly as a means of containing the Soviet Union, but the Administration has specified no comparably clear goal that would justify expanding the alliance now that the cold war is over. It speaks vaguely of the need for democratization and stabilization, but if these objectives inform its policy, shouldn't they apply throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia as well?

I heard a very different explanation from influential government and academic figures when I visited one of the proposed new member countries last month. NATO expansion, they boasted, will demonstrate once and for all that the Russians never have been and never will be part of European civilization. Yet Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that she wants to erase ''the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe.'' It is not at all clear how this policy will produce that result.

Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that eve if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most thoughtful, historically aware way to make policy, the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring. This sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's captain to cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs ahead. Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there are moments when it's just plain irresponsible.

Only future historians will be able to say whether this is such a moment. But the mood of current historians should not give the Administration—or those senators who plan to vote this week for NATO expansion—very much comfort.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I simply close in quoting the last two paragraphs:

Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that even if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most thoughtful, historically aware way to make policy, that the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring.

That is a good argument. As a matter of fact, I think that may be a persuasive argument. I have listed a lot of concerns that I have. I think the adjectives and adverbs that I have used and the language I have used would indicate, if somebody is watching, ''Well, Senator ROBERTS, he is going to vote no.'' I am undecided.

Again, what the professor has indicated that ''the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring.

Then he goes on to say this:

This sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's captain to cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs ahead. Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there are moments when it's just plain irresponsible.

That is the other view.

Only future historians will be able to say whether this is such a moment.

Professor Gaddis goes on to say:

. . .But the mood of current historians should not give the Administration—or those senators who plan to vote this week for NATO expansion—very much comfort.

I thank you, Mr. President, and I thank the indulgence of my colleague from Illinois. I apologize to him for going on a little bit longer than I told him, and I yield the floor.

Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Illinois.

Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Kansas for his remarks. It is always a great education to listen to his statements on the floor. Though we may not agree on any particulars, I certainly do respect him very much and have enjoyed our service together both in the House and the Senate.

I stand this morning not to give a long speech, even by Senate standards, but I would like to say I hope all Members of the Senate will put this debate into its historical context. This may be one of the most important foreign policy debates of the decade. It is to determine the future of the U.S. relationship with a new Europe, a Europe after the cold war.

Since 1949, the United States understood, particularly through the NATO alliance, our relationship with Europe. We defined that relationship in specific terms and committed not only the United States on paper but, in fact, at one point stationed some 300,000 Americans in Europe, in an effort to make certain that that sector of the world will continue to be safe from any type of aggression or invasion.

When I think back on my own life and all of the concerns of the cold war, it focused primarily on the possibility that the Soviet Union might expand through some manner through its Warsaw Pact nations into the a NATO alliance and force us to respond. It was a concern that cost us lives, it cost us money, and it really was the focus of our foreign policy for many, many decades.

With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet Union, as we knew it, and the emergence of countries in Eastern and Central Europe, formerly part of the Soviet orbit, we now are in a position to redefine the U.S. position in the world. There are some people who naturally tend toward the American tradition of isolationism. We are pretty far away from these countries. ''Perhaps we shouldn't be concerned about them,'' they will say. ''Let them worry about their own future, we have our own concerns here.'' But, we have heard that response many times in our past, and the Americans, by and large, have rejected it. We understand we are part of the world community. In fact, we are viewed by most nations of the world as a major leader, an example, in many instances, of democracy and a country which most nations choose to emulate.

I found it interesting, when the wall came down in Berlin and the Eastern and Central European countries started emerging as democracies, how many of the new leaders made a point of coming not to London, not to Paris, but to Washington, DC, in the hopes that they might address a joint meeting of Congress. To them, it was a validation that the new Czech Republic and the new Poland was going to embark on a democratic experiment, and coming here to this building in Washington, DC, was really shown to be a break from the past; that they would separate themselves from the past and their connection with the Eastern powers, with communism, with the old Soviet Union, and dedicate themselves to democracy.

Now we have the natural evolution of their emergence as democracies and our natural evolution as a leader in today's world. We are debating on the floor of the Senate the question of enlarging the NATO alliance to include newcomers, to include nations which just a few years ago were perceived as potential enemies and now we see as allies. What a refreshing change in this world that a nation like Poland, which we identify with certainty in my home State of Illinois and the city of Chicago very closely, that a nation like Poland now has a chance to join us as close allies.

I listened carefully as some of my colleagues talked about the attitudes in these nations about the possibility of NATO membership. Make no mistake, if you visit these countries, that is all they talk about—the possibility that at some point in time, they will be part of the NATO alliance.

This is an exciting prospect for them, not so much because they anticipate some military invasion or the need for military defense, but rather because they see this alliance with the United States and with other NATO allies as an assurance that they are committed to many things, to democracy, to a free market and, most importantly, to the principles of NATO.

It is interesting, this alliance, in our world's history, is a unique one because for 50 years this was not an aggressive alliance, this was a defensive alliance. We basically said we respect others' boundaries as we expect them to respect ours and we are not setting out to invade and claim territory but merely to protect our own. It was a defensive alliance. It has been throughout history. And that is its future as well.

As other countries come in—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic—they accept the premise. The premise is, you are on board as an alliance to protect our borders and to try our best to maintain stability in this new and developing world. I think that is the bottom line here. It is no longer a fight against ideology or even the aggression of some superpower but rather the stability of the region.

Is that stability important to the United States? I think it is critical to the United States. In just a few months we are going to see the creation of the Eurodollar, or the Eurocurrency, which is going to be perhaps one of the more dominant currencies in the world. We will see the European nations by and large coming together as an economic unit as a major competitor to the United States, and at the same time we will see opportunities in Europe for American firms.

If we are going to engender this relationship, this free market economy and this new democracy, it is entirely consistent for us to build an alliance with these countries through NATO.

I hear some of my colleagues arguing against the expansion of NATO, and as I listened carefully, they are actually arguing against the existence of NATO. I hope they are not. To pause on reflection, it has been one of the most successful military alliances in our Nation's history, perhaps in the history of the world. And it is important for us to maintain NATO and to expand it.

I watched carefully the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona, Mr. KYL, just an hour or two ago. I read it carefully, and I thought, does this amendment, which seeks to spell out the parameters of the expansion of NATO, in any way preclude the possibility that one day Russia would join NATO? Well, it does not, because it speaks in terms of principles and goals and values.

I think when we talk about the nervousness in Russia about the expansion of NATO, we should put it in historical context. The Russians have gone through a major transformation in a very short period of time. Once considered a superpower and a major leader in the world, they are now struggling to redefine themselves in the 21st century.

I know this causes angst and pain among many Russian leaders who can recall, I am sure with fondness, days of empire. But the fact is, it is a new world and a new opportunity, and they have a chance for a new relationship. A new and expanded NATO is no threat to Russia. A new and expanded NATO is an invitation to Russia to join us in the same principles and values. I think that should be our view, our vision of the new world.

When I hear about this Russian concern and nervousness, I really hope they will take the time to consider the history of this alliance, which has been a peaceful alliance, a defensive alliance.

Let me speak for a moment before I close about the Baltic States. I always confess my prejudice when I come to this issue. My mother was born in Lithuania. So when I speak of the Baltic States, it is with some particular personal feeling. I have visited Lithuania on four our five different occasions and have also visited Latvia and Estonia.

I did not believe in my lifetime that I would see the changes that have taken place in those three tiny countries. When I first visited Lithuania back in 1978 or 1979, it was under Soviet domination, and it was a rather sad period in the history of that country. The United States said for decades that we never recognized the Soviet takeover of the Baltic States. We always believed them to be independent nations that were unfortunately invaded and taken over by the Soviets.

When I went to visit them in 1979, I saw the efforts of the Soviet Union to impose upon the people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the Russian culture. They expatriated so many of the local people and sent them off to Siberia and places in the far reaches of Russia; and then they sent their own populations, the Russian cultural population, those speaking the Russian language, into the Baltic States in an effort to try to homogenize them into some entity that was more Russian than it was Baltic.

But it did not work. The people maintained—zealously maintained—their own culture, and they kept their own religion, their own language, and their own literature and their own dreams. I did not imagine in my lifetime that I would ever see these Baltic States once again free, and yet I lived to see that happen.

In fact, at one point I was sent as a member of a delegation by then-Speaker of the House Tom Foley to witness the first democratic election in Lithuania. The Soviets refused to give me a visa. I sat in Berlin day after weary day waiting for a chance to get in. And finally I was only able to be there the day of the election, that evening for the celebration. But I was there for an important moment, and I am glad I saw it.

Today these three nations are trying their best to become mature economies, to watch their democracies flourish. And they have ample evidence of real progress. The fact that they would entertain the possibility of being part of NATO should not be a source of concern to us but one of great hope and great optimism, because as countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and so many others that were either part of the Warsaw Pact or even Soviet republics become part of NATO, they really show this transformation and this progression into a democratic form and a new democratic vision in Europe.

One of the resolutions being offered by one of my colleagues wants to single out the Baltic States as if they are the real concern of Russia. If you took a look at a map of the world and saw the huge expanse of Russia today, and then took a look at these three tiny nations, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it is almost laughable that the Russians would look to them as any threat to their future or to their security. They are small nations with very small armies and virtually no sophisticated military forces. What they are asking for is a chance to flourish, and I think they should have that chance.

So I close by saying that I hope my colleagues in the Senate who have followed this debate will understand its historic importance and understand that those of us who are privileged to serve in the Senate and have a chance to vote on this question of NATO enlargement may be casting a vote on foreign policy that is going to be viewed for generations to come as a milestone—the end of the cold war, the new vision of the world, the new definition of an alliance involving the United States and freedom-loving democracies in Europe that led to stability and to growth. That is my vision of the world. That is my vision of NATO enlargement.

I hope that a majority of my colleagues will join me in supporting President Clinton and supporting virtually all of these nations that are asking for NATO to be enlarged to reflect this new vision.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLARD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Ms. SNOWE. I rise to express my intention to vote for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In taking up this decision, the Senate takes up one of its basic constitutional mandates. A nation's most sacred obligation is to protect its citizens and its territory from hostile forces. The NATO alliance has been the cornerstone of our efforts to do so on behalf of free citizens for nearly 50 years. It has emerged as the most successful enterprise of common defense in human history. Any changes in the membership of the Alliance that we contemplate must undergo careful consideration.

I have done so and am confident that this enlargement is in our national security interests and will ensure that NATO continues to do in the 21st century what it has done in the latter half of the 20th for the United States, and the people of Europe—guarantee their security, freedom and democratic forms of government.

Mr. President, last year, I was asked by the Senate Majority Leader and the Senate Democratic Leader to join a bipartisan group of 28 Senators to study the issues associated with NATO enlargement. I was honored to join in such a task. The NATO alliance has been for nearly 50 years the greatest force for maintaining peace and security in the world. When it was funded, the United States had just emerged from fighting the most destructive war in history on the European continent and was just beginning to lead the fight against imperial Soviet communism—a Cold War against a totalitarian foe who was committed to imposing another form of tyranny first in Europe and then around the world.

The nations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, therefore, faced the bitter prospect of exchanging one form of tyranny for another. I knew that if NATO was to continue to protect freedom and democracy in Europe, it needed to face the changing circumstances posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and communist ideology. The Alliance had to change in form to preserve the principles that it had safeguarded in modern times.

Today, the United States and the other 15 members of the Alliance hope to move the frontiers of NATO eastward at a time when there is not a visible threat to the security of any of its members. When the Alliance expanded between the 1950s and the 1980s to add Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain, the grim shadow of Soviet power menaced Europe and the West.

I believe that the parallels with the decision to expand NATO in the 1990s are in some ways similar to those which existed at the end of World War II. At that time, the strategic security situation on the continent of Europe was also in flux. The threat from Nazi Germany had collapsed, but no protective machinery had yet been set up to prevent the emergence of a new tyranny. As the great statesman Winston Churchill noted, ''From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended upon the continent [of Europe].''

Unlike the era beginning at the end of World War I, when we retreated from victory to a fateful isolationism, the United States realized that our own security depended upon the building and maintenance of a free and democratic Europe.

President Harry Truman, with the able leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, began the shaping of what became known as the ''containment'' policy. The United States and its friends in Europe would resist the westward march of communism. Harry Truman and his generation were determined to block the Soviet Union from leveraging the political fate of a continent that had drawn millions of Americans into war by ensuring that its expansion not go any further.

At first it was thought that economic assistance to Europe was sufficient. The Marshall Plan, named for the then Secretary of State George Marshall, was first articulated in 1947 and approved by the Congress in 1948. Just as today some believe that membership in the European Union is enough to ensure the security of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it was hoped in the 1940s that economic aid alone would suffice in strengthening Europe to resist the designs of the Soviet Union. However, that was not to be the case. Both the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the 1948 Berlin blockade, convinced the United States that more than economic aid was needed to protect freedom and democracy in the Western world.

As a result, on April 4, 1949, the United States and eleven nations of Western Europe signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. NATO was born, and for the first time in history, a military alliance was created for the sole purpose of defending freedom and democracy. And without firing one shot in 40 years, it gave ready firepower to the policy of containing Communism until that system collapsed under its own contradictions.

Our commitment to security in the North Atlantic Treaty is spelled out in Article V. The words ''an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all'' signify the commitment of this country to forego isolationism and to play a critical role in helping to guarantee freedom and security in Europe.

Today of course, there is no immediate threat to the security of Western Europe. The United States and the other 15 members of NATO face an incipient Russian democracy. Communism as a system and a power has receded from the tormented heart of Europe. The mighty Red Army of the 1940s is now a force that is in military decline. Today, we live in a different world—but not one without dangers or threats. Today, we face our own set of challenges—and we must create our own set of solutions.

The end of the Cold War has not meant that freedom has suddenly become free-of-charge. While the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the threat of invasion from a much weaker Russia has receded, this development by no means signals that NATO's mission has evaporated. To the contrary, just as NATO protected and guaranteed the freedom of the United States and Western Europe during the latter half of the twentieth century, it can, and must, continue to do so for all of Europe as we prepare to enter the new millennium.

For forty years, NATO could protect only the Western half of Europe—the other half was trapped behind the Iron Curtain of communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, three of those nations—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are now poised to enjoy the freedoms that the totalitarians so long withheld and to take fresh responsibility for their political pluralism as members of a voluntary alliance.

I know that some of my colleagues in this chamber, whose opinions I respect, assert that it is more important for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to achieve membership in the European Union and to enjoy the economic benefits that it offers as a prelude to joining NATO. This proposal brings the echoes of history to the Senate if we recall that some advocates of the Marshall Plan thought economic health was sufficient for the protection of freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, it was not true then, and it is not true today.

The European Union is not a substitute for the NATO alliance. If that were the case, then the nations of Western Europe would not need the benefits of NATO membership to ensure their security. They realize that the two entities each serve their purpose and reinforce rather than substitute for each other. The European Union is an economic entity that will shepherd the prosperity of Europe well into the next century. I have little doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will eventually become members. However, membership will only be part of the way they help fulfill their desire—for the first time in over fifty years—to determine for themselves how they will ensure their security.

NATO was and is more than a defensive military alliance. It reflects the civic values underpinning trans-Atlantic security through the cultivation of peaceful ties among governments that rest on the consent of the governed. It is a tangible symbol of the resolve of democratic nations, united in a common purpose, to promote freedom and democracy. While the threat in the Cold War was from a large conventional army led by the Soviet Union that could sweep across Germany, today the threat is far more subtle but just as real. Today we all face threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states and nationalistic passions liberated from Cold War restraints. The Gulf War showed that the United States and the European members of NATO face threats far from their borders. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must deal with these same threats, and they can overcome them as members of the NATO alliance.

Already, we have seen a preview of some of the potential security benefits of having these nations—all of which are now strong democracies that have worked to strengthen civilian control of the military—as NATO members:

All three have contributed to the success of the SFOR mission in Bosnia. Hungary's base at Taszar has been host to over 95,000 U.S. military personnel rotating in and out of IFOR and SFOR duty. And if there had been a need to fight Iraq, our new NATO members would have been ready to assist. Poland has chemical weapons experts

ready to support us if necessary. The Czech Republic would also supply chemical weapons experts. Hungary's Foreign Minister would have urged his nation's parliament to open its airspace and airports to U.S. aircraft if military action had been needed.

The spur to all of these actions was prospective membership in NATO, and the assumption of a fair share of responsibilities as full fledged members of the Western community. This enthusiasm should make us realize how important NATO is and how established members often take the Alliance and its benefits for granted.

It would be unjust to deny the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs a role in safeguarding the freedom of the European-American community—a freedom, incidentally, we rhetorically upheld for these nations over the past four decades. It would be morally wrong to create an artificial dividing line in Europe just a decade after another such line was erased.

Mr. President, what would happen if the Senate were to reject NATO expansion? I believe that we would signal the willingness of the West to confuse the tranquility of today with the potential turmoil of tomorrow for which history warns us to prepare. If we reject expansion now, we would also reject the enduring link, shown by our experience in NATO, between democratic institutions and the defense of peace.

The incentive of NATO membership has furthermore stabilized democratic forces in all three candidate nations. Poland instituted civilian control of the military and formed a joint battalion with the Danes and Germans. Hungary and Romania, the latter a possible future member of NATO, signed a treaty respecting the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania. If NATO membership did not provide the framework for these actions, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians could still be struggling with the social and military legacies of authoritarianism.

Mr. President, if we were to reject the logical first step of NATO membership for these three states, then the progress made by these nations might be reversed. All three nations could and would be entitled to feel that NATO and the West do not care about them. We in the Senate would be sending a message that while the United States and Western Europe are entitled to the benefits of freedom and the confidence that a military alliance will sustain them that NATO is an exclusive club which will not admit those willing to make it even better. All three nations might then form another military bloc.

Such an organization might turn inward or Eastward to make security arrangements without the participation of the West. But I would rather see Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic work within the NATO alliance to address the concerns of the Baltic states and other regional parties.

Another aspect of this issue which has concerned me and I know, many Senators, is the cost of this expansion. It is a legitimate concern. The General Accounting Office produced a report just last month concluding that the Defense Department's assessment of the NATO cost of expansion was reasonable if the current environment of a diminished military threat to the continent will continue for years into the future. New members, in turn, will sustain their own internal budgets for critical defense modernization. It is also up to them to meet their formal treaty commitments to the commonly-funded budgets of the Alliance.

The governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have agreed to specific 10-year obligations on payments for the integration of military systems and command structures with existing Alliance members. I commend our prospective new partners and the Defense Department for developing this blueprint for enlargement. They must also expect that NATO as well as Congress will hold them accountable for it.

Mr. President, Secretary Albright summed it up well last year when she said: ''Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power.'' We fought two world wars because much of Western Europe was threatened, invaded and occupied. The Cold War was fought because some of these nations were again threatened and others forced to endure Communist tyranny.

The enlargement of NATO will mean that more of Europe is part of an alliance designed to protect freedom and democracy. That makes conflict and the defense of our security interests much greater.

NATO will be stronger with the addition of more territory and more armed forces—200,000 in fact—a valuable addition if we account for the reductions in Western military forces since the end of the Cold War. Peace through strength may be a slogan to the cynics, but to me, it summarizes the invaluable lesson that we learned on the post-war ashes of a Europe leveled by aggression.

One of the Senate's most illustrious members, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, said at the time of NATO's founding in 1949 that ''[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts . . . It is built to stop wars before they start.''

The admission of these three applicants will strengthen NATO's ability to prevent war. I cannot imagine that the United States and the other members of NATO would do nothing if the territorial integrity of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were threatened—even if they were not a part of NATO. But by having them become members, we would bring into the democratic family a region that has hosted the century's bloodiest conflicts.

Furthermore, by formally extending NATO's territorial jurisdiction further east, the Alliance will be even better placed to prevent any security threat to all of its members. NATO's role has evolved from deterring an invasion of the West by the Soviet Union to preventing armed conflict on the continent of Europe, and admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will augment this shift in mission.

Others will argue that NATO expansion will cause problems in relations with Russia; that expansion undercuts efforts to build democracy in Russia; that we are still treating Russia as a Cold War adversary, instead of a nation building a democracy and a free-market economy or that expansion will anger Russia at a time when we need to work together on issues such as Iraq and the danger of weapons proliferation. Mr. President, I do not agree with these arguments.

Even if NATO had never promised to expand, the United States and Russia would continue to have international policy differences. There is also no evidence that the prospect of NATO expansion has hurt efforts to ratify arms control treaties or to address concerns over the need to control nuclear weapons of all varieties.

I also do not believe that enlargement will harm efforts to build a secure and strong democracy across the 11 time zones of Russia. The stability an enlarged NATO will bring to Eastern Europe will provide a more secure environment in which democracy's roots can grow stronger. NATO is furthermore not building a military force which can threaten Russia, as demonstrated by its intention not to station either nuclear weapons or substantial forces in the territories of the new members.

Finally, the United States and NATO have worked hard to address Russian concerns over expansion through the Founding Act and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The Permanent Joint Council allows NATO and Russia to talk directly about ways to promote and enhance Europe's security. It offers a means to discuss matters of concern to either or both parties. If Russia chooses to work with the Permanent Joint Council in a cooperative manner, then this Council can help take NATO-Russia relations to a level of cooperation that benefits all of Europe. The Permanent Joint Council, however, will never substitute for or supersede any NATO policy making organs. Russia does not have a veto over NATO actions and must never be allowed to obtain one.

It is not possible for NATO to remain static and at the same time effective in the post-Cold War environment of Europe. NATO is, and must remain a military alliance that will guarantee the security of its members. However, it does face a different set of challenges as the 21st century approaches. Because the threat to NATO's territorial integrity today is significantly diminished, the Alliance has the opportunity to vanquish the dangers posed by unbridled nationalism and great power policies and to replace them with free-

market democracies that can grow and prosper.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, she quoted an individual who appreciates what freedom means and that is not to be taken for granted. Czech President Vaclav Havel stated that ''Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war.''

By admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, NATO will be taking a giant step toward insuring that the freedoms won by Eastern and Central Europe at the end of this century will survive and prosper in the next. By expanding NATO, the West will ensure that the freedoms it preserved through the darkest days of World War II and the Communist threat of the 20th century will survive and prosper through the millennium.

In conclusion, NATO enlargement will enhance our national security and the stability of Europe. As my former Senate colleague and current Defense Secretary Bill Cohen stated, ''a stable Europe is necessary to anchor America's worldwide presence.''

The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will mean a stronger NATO, and our approval of this enlargement will show that the United States is ready to do so in the 21st Century what it did for the latter half of this one: be a force, with other democracies, for the protection of freedom today and for the generations to come.

MORNING BUSINESS

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ALCOHOL AWARENESS MONTH

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, as April draws to a close this week I want to remind my colleagues of Alcohol Awareness Month. I think the tireless efforts of many types of groups have raised our awareness about alcohol consumption. This includes efforts made by federal and state governments, citizen action groups, and the beverage alcohol industry itself. More than ever, Americans deplore the devastation of drunk driving. More than ever, Americans understand the consequences of failing to deal responsibly with alcoholic beverages.

Americans also need to understand that alcohol is alcohol. A standard serving of beer, wine, and distilled spirits contain the same amount of alcohol. Some fear that teaching alcohol equivalence would be paramount to promoting alcohol consumption. But I think it can actually have the opposite effect, promoting a rational approach to this topic and encouraging moderation The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Transportation, Agriculture, and Education, as well as the Dietary Guidelines for Americans all define a drink as 12 ounces of beer, 5 ounces of wine, and 1.5 ounces of distilled spirits. And the federal government is not alone is recognizing alcohol equivalence. Many leading organizations involved in this debate do as well.

Yet as recently as 1996, one survey found that only 39% of Americans understand that a 12 ounce can of beer, a 5 ounce glass of wine, and a mixed drink with 1.5 ounces of distilled spirits contain the same amount of alcohol. We owe it to Americans to do a better job of disseminating this information and providing basic facts on this topic. In recognition of Alcohol Awareness Month, it is the very least we can do.

WE THE PEOPLE—THE CITIZEN AND THE CONSTITUTION

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, on May 2–4, while their friends are celebrating the 124th running of the Kentucky Derby, some students from my home state will be answering questions about the Constitution, here in Washington, in a mock Congressional hearing. These students will be competing in the national finals of the We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution program. I am proud to announce that the class from Louisville Male High School will represent Kentucky. These young people have worked long and hard to reach the national finals, winning local competitions to get here.

I would like to recognize these students for their achievements. The members of this class representing Kentucky are Angela Adams, Perry Bacon, Katherine Breeding, Will Carle, Eric Coatley, Courtney Coffee, Brian Davis, Mary Fleming, Matt Gilbert, Amanda Holloway, Holly Jessie, Heath Lambert, Gwen Malone, Kristy Martin, Brian Palmer, Lauren Reynolds, Shane Skoner, LaVonda Willis, Bryan Wilson, Darreisha Wilson, Beth Wilson, Janelle Winfree, Treva Winlock, and Jodie Zeller.

I would also like to recognize their teacher, Mrs. Sandy Hoover, who clearly deserves a lot of the credit for the class' success. The district coordinator, Dianne Meredith, and the state coordinators, Deborah Williamson and Jennifer Van Hoose, also contributed their time and effort to help the class reach the national finals.

The We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution program is the most extensive educational program in the country developed specifically to educate young people about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The three-day national competition simulates a congressional hearing. Students are given the opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge while they evaluate, take, and defend positions on relevant historical and contemporary constitutional issues. The simulated congressional hearing consists of oral presentation by the students before panels of adult judges.

The We the People . . . program is run by the Center for Civic Education. The program has provided teaching materials to upper elementary, middle, and high schools for more than 75,000 teachers and 24 million students across the nation. Members of Congress and staff also contribute by discussing current constitutional issues with program participants.

This special program is designed to help students understand and appreciate the values and principles that unite us as Americans. The program also promotes the notion of citizenship—that the rights and benefits are tempered by the responsibilities of participation in effective government.

I wish these young people the best of luck testing their constitutional knowledge in the upcoming national finals of the We the People . . . program. I also congratulate them on reaching this level of competition.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Monday, April 27, 1998, the federal debt stood at $5,507,607,026,200.10 (Five trillion, five hundred seven billion, six hundred seven million, twenty-six thousand, two hundred dollars and ten cents).

Five years ago, April 27, 1993, the federal debt stood at $4,234,899,000,000 (Four trillion, two hundred thirty-four billion, eight hundred ninety-nine million).

Ten years ago, April 27, 1988, the federal debt stood at $2,500,616,000,000 (Two trillion, five hundred billion, six hundred sixteen million).

Fifteen years ago, April 27, 1983, the federal debt stood at $1,247,506,000,000 (One trillion, two hundred forty-seven billion, five hundred six million).

Twenty-five years ago, April 27, 1973, the federal debt stood at $456,773,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-six billion, seven hundred seventy-three million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion—$5,050,834,026,200.10 (Five trillion, fifty billion, eight hundred thirty-four million, twenty-six thousand, two hundred dollars and ten cents) during the past 25 years.

THE MURDER OF BISHOP JUAN JOSE GERARDI

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, in one of the most outrageous, cold-blooded killings I can recall in a region where such despicable acts have been commonplace, Guatemalan Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi was murdered this past Sunday when his assailant crushed his skull with a cement block.

The way he died is horrifying enough. But what senators should also be aware of is that Bishop Gerardi had just completed an extraordinarily courageous investigation of the thousands of atrocities committed against Guatemala