BOSNIA AMENDMENT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to comment briefly on one of the amendments that will be considered this morning, an amendment by Senator CRAIG of Idaho.

Senator CRAIG is an outstanding Member of this body and one of my closest friends, but I reluctantly will oppose the amendment he offered. I think he knows that I opposed the President's decision to deploy U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia in 1995. I continue to have major problems with the situation there and questions about what the end game is. But I don't look at Bosnia in a theoretical sense only or without considering the history of that part of the world.

I have traveled to Brussels to meet with all of our NATO allies and discuss the situation in Bosnia. I spent the last 4th of July in Bosnia, Sarajevo, and Tuzla. I have looked at the situation firsthand. I spent many hours with administration officials and outside experts discussing the situation in Bosnia. I have grave concerns about the administration's completely open-ended commitment to remain in Bosnia. We were solemnly given dates and unequivocal assurances that U.S. troops would be out by December 1996. They weren't. Then it was July 1998. The President intends not to meet that date. The assurances we were given were wrong.

The fact that the administration has been so often wrong raises questions about their overall policy. Do we want peace there? Yes. Have we been willing to make a commitment? Yes. But the question is, How much, how long, and for what? Is the situation under control there? What is happening in Kosovo? Did the administration turn a blind eye and ignore that problem and only now realize the ramifications, the implications, that Kosovo has in the region?

There has been some progress in Bosnia. Many time lines and the agreements that were supposed to have been met, however, have not been met. We do need to continue to move forward and to encourage peace, democracy and freedom—not fighting and killing—in that part of the world.

But the U.S. taxpayers have already spent some $8 billion in Bosnia since December of 1995. Our European allies have been reluctant to shoulder more of the burden. There are even credible reports that a French military officer tipped off the most notorious war criminal and helped him avoid apprehension. Basically, they say, You are the world leader; without you, it won't be done. We assume a very serious responsibility and maybe a certain degree of pride in that. But I think more needs to be done by our European allies and there needs to be a plan, some way of dealing with this problem, just like there should be a long-term plan in dealing with Saddam Hussein. There is no plan there, no plan to find a way to remove Saddam Hussein so the people in Iraq can be free.

The pattern begins to be clear. I have been very careful as majority leader to try to rise above politics or partisan politics. I have taken a pounding from some sources for that. I did support the Chemical Weapons Treaty and I do support NATO. But there is a limit to how far I will go. I will not support the administration unconditionally—particularly if there is no policy, no clear plan. I think that is the case in Iraq, where the policy of containment is not working. So what is next? Quite frankly, it falls to the Congress to try to say: How about this? Would you consider that? Develop a plan to do something, anything. We are prepared to do that if we have to because of the absence of action by the Administration.

For all those reasons, I am concerned about the administration's policy in Bosnia. This issue should be addressed by the Senate on merits later on this year in the appropriations process. But we should not use it as a way to delay the decision to enlarge NATO.

NATO enlargement is the right thing to do. But it should rise and fall on its own merits. We should not allow it to tangle up our decision into issues like Bosnia. I agree with Senator CRAIG's concerns, but I don't think this is the place to have the debate or action based on what may or may not be the future in Bosnia to determine what would happen in NATO. We should not make the legitimate aspirations of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic subject to our differences with the executive branch on Bosnia policy. I hope the Senate will defeat this amendment and move to conclusion and pass NATO enlargement.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive Calendar No. 16, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Treaty Document No. 105–36, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Pending:

Craig amendment No. 2316, to condition United States ratification of the protocols on specific statutory authorization for the continued deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission.

Ashcroft amendment No. 2318, to require a Presidential certification that NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance.

Conrad/Bingaman amendment No. 2320, to express the sense of the Senate regarding discussions with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, increased transparency about tactical nuclear weapons, data exchange, increased warhead security, and facilitation of weapons dismantlement.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of the Craig amendment, No. 2316, with the time until 12 noon to be equally divided.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, yesterday I put before the Senate a very straightforward amendment to our resolution of ratification that speaks to the responsibility of the President as it relates to getting authorization for the continued mission of our U.S. military in Bosnia. I say that in the context of us debating NATO expansion because I think it is appropriate. It is appropriate because of the way this President has characterized the need to expand NATO from his perspective. He speaks about it no longer as just a defense mechanism for Europe; he speaks of it as a mechanism for the purpose of peacekeeping.

We have heard several of our colleagues come to the floor in the last good number of days as we have debated this issue, frustrated by what will be the role of a new NATO, and how should we define that—at least from our understanding—as we move for the purpose of ratification, upholding our constitutional responsibilities, which are paramount on this issue.

I am one of those Senators who has said very openly that I don't believe we ought to be expanding NATO at this time. We ought to be encouraging the European Community to reach out to those nations that have now emerged from behind the fallen Iron Curtain—reach out to them in an economic way, bringing them into the economic union, creating greater economic stability rather than, if you will, offering them the olive branch of inclusion into NATO as some coming of age process, and turning to the United States and, in essence, saying, now you have to pay for it or you have to play a greater role—especially when I don't think any of us sense the dramatic urgency of an expanded defensive mission for the whole of a freer Europe. That strength would come through the economic growth of those countries and the greater strength of their democracies because of the economic growth. Some of us have also expressed concern about, of course, Russia and how it feels as we tend to expand a defensive peacekeeping mechanism toward them, and not being willing to focus as much as we should on assisting, ensuring the democratic processes in Russia itself.

As a result of that, I think it is tremendously important that we cause this administration to define what its intent is. As you know, Mr. President, we are now in a period of time in Bosnia where we are operating without authorization from Congress. Costs are mounting in a tremendous way, and as

a result of that, we have no end game in mind, no mission intent at this moment.

My amendment is clearly straightforward. It is something the President should have done some time ago. But, of course, when he seeks authorization, then he can't keep diverting money out from under the defense system itself to fund an unending operation in Bosnia, or at least unending by his current definition.

So what I am saying is really very straightforward: Mr. President, as you move forward with your commitment to an expanded NATO, come to us and ask for an authorization and ask for a definition, if you will, in cooperation with us on the role in Bosnia. I think this becomes increasingly important. Colleagues from the other side of this issue have said I am amending the treaty. Well, we all know that is not true. What we are talking about today is a resolution of ratification. I am putting within that resolution—if my amendment were to become part of it by this process—a condition which the President would have to respond to prior to being able to move forward with the blessings of Congress in a confirmation of the resolution of ratification. That is the intent of my amendment. It is very straightforward, clear, and it is quite simple. I don't believe it is convoluted or confusing in any sense of the words. Maybe there are those who don't want the President to seek authorization. But I can't imagine any of us who are willing to fund and participate in putting the men and women of the U.S. armed services in harm's way—that we don't, for some reason, define how that all ought to be. It is with that intent that we bring forward this amendment.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose this amendment. It would throw real doubt and uncertainty into the NATO ratification process by linking the completion of that process to a subsequent action of Congress, specifically authorizing continued deployment of our forces in Bosnia. It is that doubt, that uncertainty, that complication, that ambiguity, creating an additional step before the ratification process is completed, that this amendment would create.

We simply should not do that, no matter how we feel on the Bosnia issue. I must tell my good friend from Idaho that I have been one who has been very cautious about our continuing to be in Bosnia. I have indeed offered and have had amendments accepted on this floor reflecting that caution. We can stop, should we choose, our presence in Bosnia at any time we want through the power of the purse. We are not lacking in tools to control our participation in the NATO operation in Bosnia. We have those tools. We have used those tools. We may not have used them to the extent that my good friend or I would have liked, but we have used them. We used them in the authorization bill last year. We used them in the appropriations bill last year. We have a supplemental appropriation right now that we have recently passed for our troops in Bosnia. People who opposed that continuance or wanted to attach additional conditions to that continuation could have attached those conditions, or sought to attach those conditions, in the supplemental appropriations bill. I offered an amendment that was accepted on the supplemental appropriation bill, which required certain milestones that we say are our goals for Bosnia, requiring that those milestones be presented to NATO so that we could have NATO consideration of milestones which would lead us to exit Bosnia which would allow us to remove our combat forces from Bosnia. We have the tools.

I understand linking things where it is necessary in order to gain for us a power we might not have otherwise. I could understand that. But where we have the power of the purse and could exercise that power to control the presence of combat forces in Bosnia, it seems to me that we are creating a needless ambiguity, a needless uncertainty, that we are throwing a monkey wrench into the ratification process by creating a subsequent step after the Senate votes on ratification. It is creating that doubt. It is the uncertainty. If we voted to ratify now, the instruments of ratification will not be deposited until the Congress takes an additional step. Again, if that were the only way of obtaining a power, then it would seem to me that there might be some argument for it despite the confusion. But where we have the power of the purse, we know how to exercise it. We have exercised it relative to Bosnia, not only in the supplemental but in the prior authorization and appropriations bills of defense. One other element is that another defense authorization will be coming to the floor hopefully in the next few weeks. We have another opportunity to exercise the power of the purse within the next month relative to our forces in Bosnia.

So this is not only confusing and I think harmful in that regard, introducing really a monkey wrench into a process where we already have plenty of tools to exercise our will, it is needlessly being done. The power of the purse is one of the most important powers this Congress has, and this Congress has, when it has chosen, exercised that power. We can exercise it again.

Just one final comment about this. In the supplemental appropriations bill, the amendment which I offered required that the President take to NATO the so-called benchmarks that were detailed in the President's presentation to the Congress. Last year we told the President in our appropriations bill that we want an exit strategy; we want to phase out American presence in Bosnia; we want to put more responsibility on the Europeans. By the way, I share those sentiments. I think the Europeans should take more responsibility and should take over that operation much more fully, and we should find a way to exit promptly in a reasonable period of time, removing our combat forces and instead supporting the operations with logistics and intelligence and certain other support. But that we should try to find a path for the removal of our combat forces from Bosnia. We have stretched our forces too many places around the world.

My amendment on the supplemental bill, which is presently in conference, tells the President to enter into an agreement with NATO on the benchmarks which he detailed in the exit strategy and which he presented to us as required by the authorization and appropriations.

I hope this amendment will be defeated because of the confusion that it would create relative to ratification, the uncertainty that it would create, the additional step, the roadblock that would be placed in the way of this process being completed and mainly, though, because it does all that, it does that damage unnecessarily. We have the power of the purse. We will have the opportunity to exercise that again within the next month relative to Bosnia should this body choose to do so.

For those reasons, I hope my friend's amendment is defeated and that we ratify this treaty, or not, but that we not say with our right hand we are going to ratify it and then with the left hand say but that process cannot be completed until Congress takes an additional step relative to Bosnia.

Mr. President, how much time is left to the opponents of this amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixteen minutes 5 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder how much time the Senator from Idaho has remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen minutes 44 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. The floor manager is not here. I would like to begin, and yield myself on the general issue of NATO, 5 minutes. I want to consult for one moment before I do that.

Mr. President, unless my friend from Idaho wants to give himself time at this point, I yield myself an additional 5 minutes on the underlying NATO ratification.

Mr. President, I want to speak today about three aspects of NATO enlargement. First, I want to focus on the stabilizing effect that NATO has had and that an enlarged NATO will continue to have on Europe; second I want to discuss the impact that NATO enlargement would have on Russia; and finally, I want to examine the common values that lie at the heart of the question before us.

It will come as no surprise, based upon my floor speech on NATO enlargement that I gave on March 19, that I favor NATO enlargement. I am satisfied that it will help to enhance

stability on the European continent, that it will not isolate Russia, and that the common values that undergird the Alliance are treasured in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

EUROPEAN STABILITY

Mr. President, Europe has experienced military conflict down through the ages. Indeed, it has been a constant spawning ground for war. The security of the United States is inextricably linked to that of Europe by a common heritage and shared values. Because of those links, twice this century, America has shed blood and treasure in major wars in Europe.

In my view, one of the two major accomplishments of NATO, the first being deterring the former Soviet Union, has been its serving as a balance wheel to keep the peace in Western Europe. The NATO Alliance has enabled Europe to experience peace for almost fifty years.

One of my home-town newspapers, the Detroit Free Press put it well when it said:

> It (NATO) has been a vital means of maintaining a stable balance between Germany and its neighbors. That was a major unavowed purpose of NATO in the years after World War II. To manage Germany's role in Europe may have been a secondary purpose, but it was important in providing stability while Europe evolved toward unity and reconciliation. Preventing a recurrence of Europe's chronic civil wars is an important NATO function.

NATO has helped keep the peace in many ways.

As a defensive Alliance, one of NATO's major strengths is that member nations are able to pool their complementary military assets rather than developing totally separate and redundant military capabilities.

This pooling of assets allowed the Alliance to present a strong and united front to deter aggression from the Soviet Union. This pooling of assets precluded the need for any one European NATO nation to build up its own military arsenal of a type that would threaten its neighbors and destabilize the continent.

The Alliance has also had a moderating influence on its member nations and has served to prevent the inevitable frictions that arise among nation states from erupting into armed conflict. When Representatives and military officers of different nations meet and work together on a daily basis in Brussels and elsewhere, disagreements among those nations are more likely to be subordinated to common defense requirements. For instance, Europe is more secure with Greece and Turkey as members of the NATO Alliance than if one or both of them were not members.

The prospect of NATO membership has already had a moderating influence on events in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. They are all downsizing and reorganizing their militaries, thus avoiding the expenditure of scarce resources that are needed for economic development. If rejected for NATO membership, they will almost surely renationalize their approach to defense, with potentially destabilizing impacts on their neighbors and on their neighborhood.

The Alliance contributes to European stability in a number of other ways.

NATO's military might has the potential for application in so-called ''out-of-area'' conflicts, but which affect stability in Europe. For example, NATO's air bombing of Bosnian Serb targets served to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table and led to the Dayton Peace accords. NATO then led a military mission to implement the military aspects of the Dayton accords and to provide a secure environment for implementation of the civilian aspects of the accords.

This action by the Alliance ended a conflict that posed a real threat to European stability and demonstrated a willingness of Alliance members to take action before its members were drawn into the conflict. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all provided military forces to the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Hungary has provided facilities for logistic support and training for United States and allied forces in support of that same effort in Bosnia.

The Bosnian conflict demonstrates that NATO provides the multinational mechanism that we and our European allies need to deal with small conflicts that threaten to spread and involve all of Europe. The addition of these three new members will strengthen NATO's capability to deal with such threats.

NATO's action in Bosnia could pave the way for Alliance action if the world's energy supplies were threatened in the future as they were in 1991 in the Persian Gulf. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have promised military support in the event that the United States has to use force to ensure the destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This leads me to believe that enlargement of the Alliance will increase support for our actions in pursuit of our national interests in other regions either in the form of formal Alliance action or coalitions of the willing.

This type of cooperation and common action is already taking place in situations that, while not representing direct aggression against a NATO member nation, are examples of the new threats we face. In the area of counterproliferation, at NATO's January 1994 Summit, Heads of State and Government formally acknowledged the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery means. NATO noted that this threat was not confined to nations or non-state actors, such as terrorists, on the periphery of the Alliance and specifically cited the cases of Iraq and North Korea. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can contribute to NATO action in this matter by political and diplomatic means and, in the defense area, by the sharing of intelligence and detection technology.

Finally, with respect to European stability, the very prospect of NATO membership has also produced significant positive results in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of resolution of border disputes and relations with their neighbors, civilian control of their militaries, and protection of minority rights and advancement of the rule of law. The September 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement, while noting the there was no rigid criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance, did state that possible new member states would be expected to take these positive actions.

Poland has signed friendship agreements with all seven of its neighbors—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany. Poland has reached out to its neighbors and has created one joint peacekeeping battalion with Lithuania and another with Ukraine. Poland's laws now subordinates the Chief of General Staff to the Minister of Defense and shifts control of the budget, planning and military intelligence from the General Staff to the Defense Ministry. Poland's press is free and the government maintains a strong record in support of basic human rights. It has held six fully free and fair elections at various levels since the fall of communism in 1989.

Hungary concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania in 1996. Hungary has entered into a Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Slovenia in 1996 and has signed bilateral cooperation agreements with Ukraine dealing with organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking. It has good relations with all its neighbors. Hungary has legislative and constitutional mechanisms in place to guarantee extensive oversight of the military by the Defense Ministry and by the parliament. Hungary upholds Western standards on human rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law, checks and balances among branches of government, and an independent judiciary.

The Czech Republic now enjoys very good relations with all of its neighbors and has no border dispute with any country. The Czech Republic signed a formal reconciliation pact with Germany in January 1997. Under the Czech Constitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief and governmental authority is exercised through a civilian Minister of Defense. The Czech people enjoy free speech, free assembly and a free press. The Czech Constitution guarantees human rights and provides for an independent judiciary.

In sum, NATO and its enlargement enhance the stability of Europe in many ways: it fosters good relations among its members; avoids the nationalization of members' defense; prevents frictions among its members from erupting into conflict; provides a mechanism to deal with small conflicts in Europe before they spread; provides

a mechanism to address threats outside of Europe but which could affect Europe and the United States, including new threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, indeed, just the prospect of membership has served as a moderating influence in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to encourage settlement of border disputes, civilian control of their militaries, and the advancement of the rule of law.

IMPACT ON RUSSIA

But what about the impact on Russia?

Mr. President, how we enlarge NATO is critically important, along with whether we enlarge NATO, since we do not want to isolate Russia and contribute thereby to the very instability that NATO enlargement is aimed at deterring.

At the Armed Services Committee's first hearing on NATO enlargement on April 23, 1997, more than a year ago, at which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified, I stated, with specific reference to Russia, that I believe that we must do everything we reasonably can to enlarge NATO in a way that contributes to greater, rather than less, stability in Europe.

The Administration has worked hard and worked successfully to do just that. On May 27, 1997, subsequent to NATO's decision to expand, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President Clinton and leaders of the other NATO countries signed the ''Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.'' The second paragraph of the Founding Act succinctly states the relationship between NATO and Russia and the goal of the Act. It reads as follows:

> NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms their determination to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. By making this commitment at the highest political level, we mark the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

As part of the Founding Act, the NATO member nations reiterated that ''they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.'' NATO also reiterated that ''in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.''

The Founding Act sets up a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to ''provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination, and to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.''

It is surely noteworthy that the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council it created were adopted after NATO's decision to enlarge. The Act represents both NATO's acknowledgment of Russia's important position and Russia's acceptance of NATO's enlargement.

Mr. President, subsequent to NATO's decision to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, wrote an article entitled ''We are not adversaries, we are partners,'' for the Spring 1998 edition of the NATO Review. It is significant that he even wrote an article for the NATO publication. Even more importantly, in that article, Marshal Sergeyev wrote the following:

> It is my profound conviction that, in spite of the problems that exist, the NATO-Russia Founding Act provides extensive opportunities for creating an atmosphere of trust. This can facilitate settling existing differences in our relations as well as establishing efficient and productive machinery for cooperation between the military establishments of Russia and NATO member states. Only in this way can we complete the common task of creating a community of free and democratic states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Again, the signal from Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev is acceptance and cooperation with NATO, not hostility and withdrawal.

Mr. President, President Clinton and the other NATO leaders are to be commended for the manner in which they have sought to carry out NATO enlargement in a way that minimizes any possible negative reaction in Russia.

Some of the strongest evidence of the success of their efforts is that Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in November 1997, four months after NATO invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance. Some of the most recent evidence of the success of their efforts is that just two weeks ago Russian President Boris Yeltsin resubmitted the START II Treaty to the Russian parliament for ratification. In other words, on the eve of Senate action on the Resolution of ratification of NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin took a critical step towards continuing the mutual reduction of nuclear arms by the United States and Russia.

The clear message was—''we know NATO is about to enlarge and we are prepared to ratify START II anyway.'' The message wasn't—''we will withhold acting on START II until we see what you do about NATO enlargement,'' or that—''we won't proceed to ratify START II in this environment.''

Beyond the clear evidence of the acceptance of NATO enlargement by the Russian leadership, there is some evidence of support among the Russian people. A Gallup poll conducted in Moscow and released in March revealed that 57 percent of Muscovites supported the Czech Republic's bid to join NATO, 54 percent supported Hungary's admission, and 53 percent said Poland should be allowed to join NATO. More than a quarter of those polled had no views on the subject.

Finally, I would note that United States and Russian troops are serving side-by-side in Bosnia, are conducting joint patrols, and, based upon my personal conversations and observations, have developed an appreciation for each other's soldierly skills and a comraderie that benefits both our nations. On March 18, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov stated that if the U.N. Security Council passes the appropriate resolution, ''Russia will be ready to take part in this operation.'' There hasn't been even the slightest hint by any official in the Russian government or parliament that ratification of NATO enlargement by the United States Senate or the parliaments of our NATO allies would threaten the continued participation of Russian troops in the NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia.

Mr. President, we should care about our relationship with Russia and we do. Other countries also have a great interest in their relationship with Russia. That why it is so important to note that thus far all the Parliaments of our NATO European allies that have taken up the issue have overwhelming ratified NATO enlargement. The three countries—Denmark, Norway, and Germany—are much closer geographically to Russia than we are. As a result, they are more likely to feel the impact of a reversal of democratization in Russia, and they are very likely to pay great attention to Russian sensitivities. Based upon the voting margins in those countries—the Danish Parliament voted 97 to 17; the German Bundestag voted 553 to 37 and the vote in the Bundesrat was unanimous; and Norway's Storting voted 151 to 9—it appears that the parliaments in those countries are satisfied that NATO enlargement will not play into the hands of anti-Western forces in Russia or otherwise negatively impact relations with Russia.

SHARED VALUES

Mr. President, that brings me to the last subject I want to discuss briefly today—shared values.

The Preamble to the NATO Treaty expresses the reasons why the United States and its partner nations decided to create NATO. It states in part that ''They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.''

Mr. President, those are words that resonate very well with all Senators, indeed with all Americans. How much those words—democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law—must mean to the people of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic! During the twentieth century, those countries have faced

first Nazi aggression and then communist oppression. How much it means to their peoples to be joining an organization that is dedicated to safeguarding their freedom, common heritage and civilizations.

Mr. President, I and those of my generation remember when the Red Army moved in and crushed the Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956. Many Hungarian refugees fled to my home state and were present when we greeted Cardinal Mindszenty in Detroit after his release from the United States Embassy in Budapest in 1971, where he had spent more than 15 years. More recently, we watched with admiration as the Solidarity-led movement of Lech Walesa guided Poland to democracy. Many Polish-American families and indeed all of us took great pride in Solidarity's success in helping to bring down the Soviet Empire. In Czechoslovakia, former dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, who was named President in December 1989, guided first Czechoslovakia and then, after the split, the Czech Republic with a steady hand ever since. My wife Barbara and I were visiting Prague after Vaclav Havel had been elected but before he assumed the office of the presidency. We recall with admiration and draw inspiration from the memory of the people of Prague massing to ensure that the election results were upheld and how they escorted Vaclav Havel to the castle where he would assume his office. Some of the most powerful blows that eventually demolished the Berlin wall were struck by the brave people of these three nations. They laid their lives on the line to bring down the Soviet empire and to promote democratic values. I am confident that they, having experienced tyranny first hand, can be counted on to do what is necessary to protect freedom recently regained.

Mr. President, President Havel put it this way:

> Our wish to become a NATO member grows out of a desire to shoulder some responsibility for the general state of affairs on our continent. We don't want to take without giving. We want an active role in the defense of European peace and democracy. Too often, we have had direct experience of where indifference to the fate of others can lead, and we are determined not to succumb to that kind of indifference ourselves.

Mr. President, if we reject the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the NATO Alliance, we will be effectively dimming the flame of liberty that sustained these courageous peoples through decades of first Nazi and then communist darkness.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, I intend to vote for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO membership.

The enlargement of NATO does not violate any treaty between the United States or any NATO country and Russia, does not pose a threat to Russia and will not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course towards democratization and a market economy.

The accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic does contribute to European stability, and does promote the spread of democratic values and will fulfill the democratic yearnings of their peoples.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am going to note the absence of a quorum for the purpose of the Presiding Officer having an opportunity to speak to this issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAIG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia and the continued participation of U.S. soldiers in the NATO operations is an issue about which many Senators have very strong opinions.

I agree with my colleague from Idaho that the decision to keep U.S. troops there is one that the administration did not adequately discuss with the Congress. The past actions of the administration on this question, promising twice that American soldiers would come home by a date certain and twice breaking that promise, rightly gives the Senate reason to wonder if the administration is serious about its commitment to withdraw U.S. soldiers from Bosnia.

However, I want to be clear about what this amendment does. Simply, it punishes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These are three countries that have all met the criteria for NATO membership and have chosen the path of democracy and freedom after 50 years of Communist domination. I remind my colleagues that the troops from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are, as we speak, standing side by side with American soldiers serving in Bosnia. Earlier this year, all three countries publicly stated that they were willing to commit troops if the U.S. showdown with Iraq led to military action. I am convinced that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be among our strongest allies in NATO, and preventing them now from fulfilling this role simply does not serve American interests.

I support a vigorous debate on the merits of U.S. participation in the NATO force which is keeping peace in Bosnia, but I do not believe that the resolution of ratification to enlarge NATO is the appropriate place for this debate.

I think Senator CRAIG's concern that NATO should not be reformulated into a peacekeeping organization is right on target. NATO is the most effective collective defense alliance in history, and to maintain its critical article V capabilities we cannot allow the NATO mission to drift towards peacekeeping and nation building. The amendment offered by Senator KYL, however, on Tuesday, approved by a 90 to 9 vote, clearly states the U.S. view of what the mission of NATO should be and what it should not be. However, I cannot support delaying action on NATO enlargement until Congress has authorized the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia.

My colleagues well know, in December of 1995, the Senate approved the Dole-McCain resolution on the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia by a vote of 69 to 30. Since then, the Senate has, on at least two occasions, approved appropriations to support U.S. troops in Bosnia. I understand that many Senators do not want U.S. forces in Bosnia, but the Senate has had the opportunity to speak on this issue and we will again in the future. Now is simply not the time, and the expansion of NATO ought not to be the vehicle. So I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment of my friend from Idaho.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I just turned to my staff and I said, ''I'm going to wait to deliver my statement until Senator CRAIG is on the floor,'' not realizing Senator CRAIG was presiding. I am delighted he is here.

(Mr. SMITH of Oregon assumed the Chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. Let me state my opposition and why I oppose the Craig amendment.

I find this debate over the last several weeks to be, in a sense, fascinating—fascinating in this regard. The Members of the Senate who express the greatest concern about the ability of Russia to veto any action NATO takes, the Senators who—with the exception of the Presiding Officer now, who expressed that concern himself—the Senators who have been most vocal about a NATO-Russian accord are now on the floor being the most vocal about their concern about how Russia is going to greet our expanding NATO or voting to expand NATO. So that is one thing I find somewhat anomalous.

Yesterday, I found it somewhat strange that those who did not want us entangled in border wars in Europe, as they phrased it, or ethnic conflicts in Europe, were the very people who wanted to give up our veto power to be involved in those. That is, right now, under the organizational structure of NATO, if all 15 NATO nations say we should go in and settle this dispute here in Europe and we say no, that is it, we don't go. I found it somewhat anomalous that they were, yesterday, prepared to say: Look, let's have this new dispute resolution mechanism which forced us, whatever iteration it would have come out in, to give up our veto power over that.

Now, today, Senator CRAIG, who has been one of the most outspoken opponents, to his credit, to the former Soviet Union, concerned about Russian interference in American affairs—I may be mistaken, but I think he has a very healthy skepticism about any aid to Russia—is now on the floor. He, I think—I know unintentionally, at least in my view—is on the floor unintentionally giving Russia another veto power.

Mr. President, to reiterate, the amendment of Senator CRAIG would delay U.S. approval of the accession of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO until Congress passes specific authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia. This amendment should be rejected because it mixes two vital questions of national security that deserve to be debated and decided, each on its own merits.

On Bosnia, the U.S. has led successful IFOR and SFOR missions there composed primarily, but by no means exclusively, of NATO forces. The Senate will continue to address the question of whether and how we should continue our participation in the Bosnia mission just as we did during the emergency supplemental budget appropriation adopted prior to the Spring Recess.

Today, we face an entirely different question: should we vote to bring three worthy countries into NATO as new allies?

If we are using contributions to the Bosnia mission as a criterion for NATO membership, then all three of the applicants before us are highly qualified.

Hungary provided a 400–500 troop engineer battalion to IFOR, and a 200–250 troop group to SFOR, as well as a staging area for some 80,000 American troops on rotation through Bosnia at one of its air bases.

The Czech Republic has been one of the largest per capita contributors with an 870-person mechanized battalion for IFOR, and a 620-person battalion for SFOR.

Poland, with troops already deployed in half a dozen U.N. peacekeeping missions, contributed a 400-troop airborne infantry battalion to SFOR.

All three nations provided these assets well before they were formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating early their willingness to share this burden with us.

The Senate should reject this amendment. Let us decide these two important questions as they should be—separately, with due consideration for the merits of each case.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I will vote in favor of the Craig amendment that would require specific congressional authorization for the deployment of troops to Bosnia.

However, I would like to make clear that I am supporting this amendment for reasons that I think differ slightly from the intentions of its author, the distinguished Senator from Idaho.

As my colleagues in this Chamber know well, I have always had serious questions about U.S. involvement in this mission. I was the only Democrat to vote against the deployment of U.S. troops back in 1995, in large part because I did not believe the United States would be able to complete the mission in the time projected and for the price tag that was originally estimated.

Now—more than two years later—I think I have been proven right, and I take no pleasure in it.

But, regardless of my objections to the mission, I have always felt it is vitally important that when large-scale deployment of U.S. troops is involved, it is necessary to have specific congressional authorization for it. And I have tried on several occasions to move the Congress to enact such authorization. In that light, I view the Craig amendment as another such attempt.

Unlike Senator CRAIG, however, I support the expansion of NATO and do not feel this amendment is inconsistent with that support.

Unlike Senator CRAIG, I am not necessarily opposed to the involvement of NATO in peacekeeping missions.

There may be times in the future when it would be appropriate for NATO to become involved in peacekeeping missions when conflicts threaten the security of NATO members.

But I do agree with Senator CRAIG that if and when these situations arise, if the deployment of U.S. troops is proposed, it will be necessary to get specific Congressional authorization for such deployment.

It is for this reason that I support Senator CRAIG's amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time available to the opponents of the amendment has expired. The proponent, the Senator from Idaho, has 7 more minutes.

The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. President, I would just like to make a couple of comments, a couple of observations, one along the line of connections. Some people have said there should not be a connection between what is happening in Bosnia and the proposal to expand NATO to the three countries; and, second, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, how this impacts—how Bosnia has impacted our state of readiness.

I think in the first case, as we stood on this floor in November of 1995 and we talked about where we were going to go and how we were going to stop the deployment of troops into Bosnia, where we had no security interests, I was somewhat in the leadership of that losing battle—but we only lost it by three votes.

I think if you could single out one thing that had a major impact that persuaded those three more people or four more Senators to vote in favor of allowing our troops to be sent to Bosnia, it would be our commitment and our obligation to NATO. There was not a discussion on this floor where NATO wasn't brought out and it was said, we have to do this to protect the credibility of NATO; to protect our status with NATO and our leadership in that part of the world, it is going to be necessary to send our troops into Bosnia.

We know what happened after that. We know they went over with the idea they were going to be back in 12 months. We were told the total cost would be $1.2 billion. Now our troops, 2½ years later, are still over there, with no end in sight. Our direct costs have exceeded $9 billion, and I suggest that it is actually more than double that, because if you take the cost of the operations in the 21 TACCOM in Germany, take the cost of the 86th Airlift in Ramstein—all of them dedicating almost their entire operation to supporting the operation in Bosnia—then the cost is much, much greater. So there is a relationship between NATO and our troops in Bosnia.

I see this as something that is very critical, because so long as we are supporting the Bosnia operation, we are not in a position to be able to logistically support any type of a ground operation anyplace else in that theater.

Let's keep in mind that theater area does include the Middle East. It was not long ago when it was pretty well publicized that we might have to do surgical airstrikes on Iraq. They are talking about that again today. While the general public is deceived into thinking that we can do this without sending in ground troops, they are wrong. There is not anyone that I know of, who has a background in the military, who would tell you that you can go in and accomplish something from the air without ultimately sending in ground troops. We are not in a position, as a result of Bosnia, to support ground troops anywhere else in that theater.

If there is any doubt in anyone's mind, all they have to do is call the commanding officer of 21 TACCOM in Germany, and they will tell them there is not the capacity to send one truck to logistically support an operation anywhere else in the theater. It is not that they are 100 percent occupied by Bosnia, they are 115 percent occupied with their support of Bosnia. So that has had a dramatic effect on our state of readiness.

Second, we are using our troops at such a high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO that we are not in a position to retain these people. And the cost of this is incredible. Mr. President, it costs $6 million to put a guy in the cockpit of an F–16. These people are leaving. Our retention rate has now dropped below 28 percent. That is unprecedented, and that is exactly what has been happening.

So I do applaud the Senator from Idaho for bringing this up and making

an issue out of this, because there is a definite connection. I think it is perfectly reasonable for us to have to give some type of approval, on an annual basis, for our troops being someplace where there are no national security risks at stake.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise in support, strong support, of the Craig amendment and commend the Senator for offering it. It is a very reasonable amendment that simply says, prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that there must be enacted a law containing specific authorization for the continued deployment of troops in Bosnia. I don't know how—if Congress wants to exercise its responsibility—I don't know how anyone could object to the amendment. Surely, if the comments that I have heard on and off the floor over the past couple of years regarding the issue of troops in Bosnia are any indication, this vote ought to be overwhelming in support of the Craig amendment. I certainly don't think anyone has any right to complain ever again if they are not going to vote to at least have the opportunity to say that we ought to have a vote here in the Senate to put forces in Bosnia.

I hope those who have been doing all of this complaining over the past couple of years will vote for the Craig amendment so that we can get a vote by the Congress to authorize the extension of having troops in Bosnia as part of the ratification process.

When the Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia in 1995, the administration placed clear limits on the duration of that commitment. On every single occasion that I can think of, that I know of, administration officials stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia for 1 year—1 year. That was 3 years ago. They are still there.

Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995:

> We believe the mission can be accomplished in 1 year. So we have based our plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic, because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first 6 months and, therefore, its role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated in 1 year. But even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

That is what Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995. He used the term ''indefinite garrison.'' And 3½ years later, we are still in Bosnia with no end in sight, no plan to get out, and here is the opportunity for Congress, certainly the U.S. Senate in this case, to speak up.

I hope the Senate will speak responsibly here and agree with the Craig amendment.

Let me give you some more testimony. Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995:

> The military tasks in Bosnia are doable within 12 months. There isn't any question.

That is a quote—

> The deeper question is whether the nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That's the real question. But it's not NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's us on the civilian side working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough. Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, until everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No. That is not their mission.

That was Secretary Holbrooke on December 6, 1995, and yet troops remain. There are still troops there sitting in the middle of a war zone between warring factions. Yes, holding the peace, but the commitment that was made to the American people and to this Congress by this administration in 1995 was that we were not going to keep them there beyond 12 months, and he said there isn't any question about that, we don't need to keep them there.

Nothing has changed. There is nothing different today than there was 3 years ago regarding that kind of comment. He says the deeper question is whether nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That is the question. But the military is still there, and they are using the military to try to accomplish nonmilitary functions, which in and of itself is a real problem.

Many of us who closely studied the conflict in Bosnia saw this, frankly, as an unrealistic comment. We didn't believe—I certainly didn't believe and I know many of my colleagues didn't believe—that this made sense. There was no way that you could make that kind of a military commitment and allow this whole situation to become resolved in less than 12 months. But, what choice did the American people have but to take the President and the Secretary of State and others at their word? That is what we did, we took them at their word. What do we have for it?

I was disappointed, but not surprised, when right after the 1996 elections, the President said that we are going to continue this military commitment for an additional 18 months, until June of 1998. I happen to be a veteran of the Vietnam war. This has a familiar ring to it, a very familiar ring to it. I can remember the McNamara charts and the one more battle and, ''In just another year or two, we'll wrap this up.'' Mr. President, 58,000 lives and about 13 years later, we got out of Vietnam.

That could happen here. This is an extremely sensitive area that has a lot of problems that could escalate in a hurry.

Last December, the President said that he acknowledged that our commitment to Bosnia is open-ended, but he is still talking about clear and achievable goals. If you have an open-ended policy, you don't have clear and achievable goals. They are two direct opposites. There is no clear and achievable goal. There is an open-ended policy, and as long as it is open-ended, we are just going to give a blank check to the administration to stay in Bosnia and do what? To nation build, is that what our troops are there for?

This policy must come to a vote in this Congress. We have to act responsibly, otherwise, another Vietnam could occur. After people are killed or injured or maimed, it is too late to debate it. It is too late for those people. We need to be debating it now, and the Craig amendment is simply asking for a vote in the affirmative if we are going to continue the policy and continue to keep troops in Bosnia. I don't know what the policy is. The policy to me is just open-ended. Just keep them there, keep them there, keep them there; make another promise, another promise, another promise.

The administration has had a free ride in Bosnia now for 2 years. It is wrong, to put it very bluntly, for this Government to conduct its foreign policy without the participation of Congress and the public. For the life of me, I don't understand how anyone could oppose the Craig amendment.

The American people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the commitment or not. We represent the American people, supposedly. The President has stated what he wants to do and he said why. He said, ''I want an open-ended policy in Bosnia, and I want to do it because I feel like I have a clear and achievable goal.'' He hasn't said what it is, just to keep the peace.

War has been going on in Bosnia for a thousand years. I am not sure just how long we have to hold American military forces there. Under this open-ended policy, maybe it is another thousand years. I don't know. But Congress has to act. The President gave his reasons, and now the American people ought to hear Congress' debate on this proposal, and that is what this amendment is about. This is no longer a Presidential use of force based on his judgment of an immediate threat. It is nation building in Bosnia. That is what we are talking about. It is now a deliberate foreign policy, and it must be approved and funded by Congress or not.

Mr. President, how much time is remaining in the debate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter to me from President Clinton dated April 20, 1998, in which he said:

> To ensure that NATO functions as effectively in the next century as it has in this one, we must preserve its ability to respond quickly, flexibly and decisively to whatever threats may arise.

It is the ''whatever threats may arise'' that bothers me in this debate, Mr. President.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 20, 1998.

Hon. ROBERT C. SMITH,
Chairman, Select Committee on Ethics,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter on United States and NATO involvement in Bosnia. You raise important questions about our mission and the impact of our military operations in Bosnia on U.S. security interests around the world.

Since you wrote your letter, I have forwarded to Congress my certification and report regarding our mission in Bosnia. This document includes detailed answers to the range of issues you raise in your letter and I am enclosing a copy for your review.

I strongly believe that our mission in Bosnia is critically important to the security of Europe. We are making increasing progress in implementing the Dayton agreement and establishing conditions under which Bosnians can live together in peace. In the past six months, we have seen rising returns of refugees, reform and restructuring of police and media, emerging anti-corruption efforts, capture or surrender of more than a dozen war criminals and improved cooperation among the parties. Most significant is the recent installation of a pro-Dayton government in Republika Srpska. SFOR's support for civilian implementation was essential to achieving this result.

We must succeed in Bosnia if we are to prevent instability from spreading to other volatile parts of the region such as Kosovo and Macedonia. Broader instability could threaten the vital interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, and endanger the overall security and stability of Southeast Europe. Success in Bosnia also reinforces the credibility of American leadership in Europe and demonstrates the capability of NATO to respond with its Partnership for Peace partners to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

The Bosnia mission also underscores NATO's value in protecting the security and interests of its members, but it does not signal a departure from the Alliance's enduring purposes, as described by the Washington Treaty of 1949. Its primary mission is, and will remain, the collective defense of Alliance territory. However, as we have seen in Bosnia, it is sometimes necessary for NATO to act beyond its immediate borders in order to safeguard its members. To ensure that NATO functions as effectively in the next century as it has in this one, we must preserve its ability to respond quickly, flexibly and decisively to whatever threats may arise.

Again, thank you for your letter. I am pleased that we have had the opportunity for an extensive dialogue with members of Congress on the continuation of our mission in Bosnia. We will continue to work with you and other members of Congress in the cause of peace in this important mission.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. SNOWE). The Craig amendment will now be temporarily laid aside.

Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon having arrived, the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, is recognized to offer an amendment on which there shall be 1 hour of debate.

The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2321

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the relationship between NATO membership and European Union membership)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I send to the desk an amendment for myself and Mr. WARNER and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New York [Mr. MOYNIHAN] for himself and Mr. WARNER, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2321.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 3 of the resolution (relating to conditions), add the following:

( ) DEFERRAL OF RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION.—

(A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have each acceded to membership in the European Union and have each engaged in initial voting participation in an official action of the European Union.

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as an expression by the Senate of an intent to accept as a new NATO member any country other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic if that country becomes a member of the European Union after the date of adoption of this resolution.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In the brief period that I will be speaking, I would like to concentrate on the central issue: the dangers of nuclear war in the years ahead.

Earlier, in an address to the 150th anniversary gathering of the Associated Press, I cited a comment made last autumn by Richard Holbrooke, the American diplomat, now temporarily in private life.

Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton agreement regarding the former Yugoslavia, commented that ''almost a decade has gone by since the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe, the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill the void.'' As if this were an accidental policy that derives from the unwillingness of our European friends—some of them our NATO allies—to engage in the more serious work of bringing the once more independent republics of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the European Union, a common market from which their economic development can grow, that being clearly the single most pressing concern they have in the aftermath of the half century of a Stalinist economy imposed upon them with the same results for them—not quite so bad, but bad enough—that Russia itself experienced.

The disaster of this era for the Russians cannot be exaggerated. I say to my dear friend from Delaware, who has been so generous in letting us speak on these matters, Murray Feshbach has recently established that the life expectancy of Russian men dropped from 62 years in 1989 to 57 years in 1996. There is no historical equivalent. A century ago, a 16-year-old Russian male had a 54 percent chance of surviving to age 60. Two percent less than had he been born a century ago. Such has been the implosion of Soviet society—in every respect, including the nuclear one.

Now, earlier on in a statement, I remarked, and I will take the liberty of remarking once again, that the origins of NATO seem very distant to most Members of the Senate. That age seems like another era. And in a sense it was another era. But there are a few witnesses from that era who are still active and who still speak.

George Kennan, who conceived the whole idea of containment, of which NATO was an expression and perhaps the most important one, George Kennan has said NATO expansion, in the aftermath of the defeat of the Soviet Union, he says, would be ''the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era.'' ''The most fateful error.''

Paul Nitze, who was the principal author of NSC–68, the national security directive written in 1950, which established the American policy of containment, recently wrote to me to say, ''In the present security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary, it is gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble.''

In my remarks to the Associated Press, I simply said that expanding NATO at this time, and particularly should we move up to include the Baltic States, which we are pledged to support, would put us at risk of getting into a nuclear war with Russia: wholly unanticipated, for which we are not prepared, about which we are not thinking.

Professor Michael Mandelbaum, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said ''that is not hyperbole.'' That is what we are dealing with here. And the reason, NATO expansion is viewed throughout elements of the Russian political system as a hostile act. Some think of it as a hostile act they could live with; some think it is a hostile act they will have to defend against; and they have said if they have to defend their territory, they will do so with nuclear weapons; it is all they have left.

Their Army has all been disintegrated—not entirely, but they remark in a December 17 National Security memorandum signed by Mr. Yeltsin, that stretches of their borders are undefended. Their Navy is rusting in a seaport, nominally part of the Ukraine.

They have nuclear weapons. After all we have gone through to achieve rational nuclear postures: a no-first-use policy, graduated response to threats, only resorting to strategic nuclear weapons at the very last moment when no other options are available—that is gone. We are back to the hair trigger that we knew when I was a young person in this Government, in this city,

when we could imagine having use air-raid shelters. We could imagine it, because we could remember the Second World War.

I was called back into the Navy in 1951, briefly, as it turned out, but found myself in Bremerhaven, in the submarine pens there that the Nazis had built. The British finally got a bomb through one, but never did during the war. We were sent on an expedition to Berlin. We had the practice of sending American officers on trains through Soviet-occupied Germany to establish the fact that we had the right to do so. I arrived in Berlin, and it wasn't there. Just ruined rubble; early in the morning, a few men stumbling out of a few bars, lost to the world.

We knew what war meant, and we can imagine what nuclear war means. We just had dropped two bombs on Japan. From the time of President Eisenhower, we have been negotiating ways to control atomic weapons—and we had success. Those early arms control agreements, apart from the agreement President KENNEDY reached on atmospheric nuclear testing, those early agreements typically just ratified the increases in nuclear weapons that each side wanted, but we got the START agreement and we reduced our nuclear arsenals.

The START Treaty, negotiated with the Soviet Union, was signed by four entirely different countries, because by the time it was finished the Soviet Union had disappeared. Russia has not yet ratified START II. The idea of START III, to reduced deployed nuclear weapons ever further, hasn't even begun. They haven't ratified START II, not least because of NATO expansion. I don't claim to know what the actual decisions in the Duma are, but that is what one hears, and one can imagine it.

Tomorrow there will be a report by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, an American group, principally, that has won a Nobel Prize on the issue of preventing nuclear warfare. They will publish a report in the New England Journal of Medicine which says that the danger of nuclear attack continues and may even be thought to escalate. The New York Times reports this in the terms we have been speaking about on this floor, the exact same terms, with no idea that was coming.

It says, ''Russia's Disarray Brings a Nuclear Risk to the U.S., Study Says.'' The Physicians write, ''Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the cold war there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to compensate for its weakened conventional forces, Russia has abandoned its no-first use policy.''

Madam President, that is all I and my friend from Virginia has said on this floor this week of debate and when the expansion of NATO was debated a month ago. Suddenly we have it in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, saying to those who think this threat is behind us. Indeed, it is ahead of us, and we must be very careful, so careful, about what we do. That is why so many of us, starting with the great men—Kennan and Nitze—who conceived the strategy for the cold war, which we won, are saying, ''Don't do this.''

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article from the New England Journal of Medicine and the New York Times.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 30, 1998]

RUSSIA'S DISARRAY BRINGS A NUCLEAR RISK TO THE U.S., STUDY SAYS

(By Tim Weiner)

WASHINGTON, April 29.—Russia's deteriorating control of its nuclear weapons is increasing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack on the United States, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning group warned today.

A dozen missiles fired from a Russian nuclear submarine would kill nearly seven million Americans instantly, and millions more would die from radiation, according to a study conducted under the auspices of Physicians for Social Responsibility, which won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in nuclear weapons in 1985. The study is to be published tomorrow in The New England Journal of Medicine.

Thousands of Russian and American nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alerts, despite the end of the cold war, and Russia formally abandoned its longstanding policy that it would never be the first nation to use those weapons four years ago, the study noted.

Repeated assurances from President Clinton that the two nations are no longer aiming their nuclear weapons at one another are ''a gross misrepresentation of reality,'' said Bruce Blair, an author of the study and a former Strategic Air Command nuclear weapons officer. In fact, the study said, Russian missiles launched without specific targets would automatically aim themselves at their cold war targets: American cities and military installations like the Pentagon.

Nor are these weapons necessarily in safe hands. Russia's once-elite nuclear weapons commands are suffering housing and food shortages, low pay, budget cuts, deteriorating discipline, desertions and suicides. Such problems are not unique. The study says that about 40,000 American military personnel were removed from nuclear-weapons responsibilities from 1975 to 1990 for alcohol, drug or psychiatric problems.

Neither nation has abandoned its cold war doctrine of launching its missiles after receiving warning that the other side is attacking. Each nation gives itself 15 minutes to decide that the attack is real; both nations have experienced major false alarms over the last two decades.

The study considered what would happen if the captain and crew of a Russian submarine decided to carry out an attack without authorization, or went mad and fired off their arsenal. This, Mr. Blair said, would require ''a conspiracy of some magnitude'' between a captain and three or four officers.

The missiles could also be fired after a false alarm or an unauthorized order from a political or military leader in Moscow. Once launched, they would reach their targets across the United States in 15 to 30 minutes.

The blast and shock of the fireball from each of the exploding warheads would kill nearly everyone within three miles instantly; people living in a swath up to 40 miles long and 3 miles wide would receive a lethal dose of radiation within hours, the study said. It assumed that one-quarter of the missiles would malfunction, and that 12 missiles would reach their targets in eight American cities in the middle of the night.

In New York City, more than three million people would die immediately; in San Francisco, 739,000; in Washington, 728,000—in all, some 6,838,000 deaths within hours of the attack, the study said, which would ''dwarf all prior accidents in history.'' A near-complete breakdown of systems delivering food, water, electricity and medicine would follow and millions more Americans would die as a consequence, the study said.

[From the New England Journal of Medicine, Apr. 30, 1998]

ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR—A POST-COLD WAR ASSESSMENT

(By Lachlan Forrow, M.D., Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., Ira Helfand, M.D., George Lewis, Ph.D., Theodore Postol, Ph.D., Victor Sibel, M.D., Barry S. Levy, M.D., Herbert Abrams, M.D., and Christine Cassel, M.D.)

ABSTRACT

Background.—In the 1980s, many medical organizations identified the prevention of nuclear war as one of the medical profession's most important goals. An assessment of the current danger is warranted given the radically changed context of the post-Cold War era.

Methods.—We reviewed the recent literature on the status of nuclear arsenals and the risk of nuclear war. We then estimated the likely medical effects of a scenario identified by leading experts as posing a serious danger: an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We assessed possible measures to reduce the risk of such an event.

Results.—U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain on high alert. This fact, combined with the aging of Russian technical systems, has recently increased the risk of an accidental nuclear attack. As a conservative estimate, an accidental intermediate-sized launch of weapons from a single Russian submarine would result in the deaths of 6,838,000 persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal radiation from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear missiles from high-level alert status and eliminate the capability of a rapid launch would put an end to this threat.

Conclusions.—The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale. Physicians and medical organizations should work actively to help build support for the policy changes that would prevent such a disaster. (N Engl J Med 1998; 338:1326—31.)

During the Cold War, physicians and others described the potential medical consequences of thermonuclear war and concluded that health care personnel and facilities would be unable to provide effective care to the vast number of victims of a nuclear attack. In 1987, a report by the World Health Organization concluded, ''The only approach to the treatment of health effects of nuclear warfare is primary prevention, that is, the prevention of nuclear war.'' Many physicians and medical organizations have argued that the prevention of nuclear war should be one of the medical profession's most important goals.

CONTINUED DANGER OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War, there

is considerable evidence to the contrary. The United States and Russia no longer confront the daily danger of a deliberate, massive nuclear attack, but both nations continue to operate nuclear forces as though this danger still existed. Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to compensate for its weakened conventional armed forces, Russia has abandoned its ''no first use'' policy.

Even though both countries declared in 1994 that they would not aim strategic missiles at each other, not even one second has been added to the time required to launch a nuclear attack: providing actual targeting (or retargeting) instructions is simply a component of normal launch procedures. The default targets of U.S. land-based missiles are now the oceans, but Russian missiles launched without specific targeting commands automatically revert to previously programmed military targets.

There have been numerous ''broken arrows'' (major nuclear-weapons accidents) in the past, including at least five instances of U.S. missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear devices flying over or crashing in or near the territories of other nations. From 1975 to 1990, 66,000 military personnel involved in the operational aspects of U.S. nuclear forces were removed from their positions. Of these 66,000, 41 percent were removed because of alcohol or other drug abuse and 20 percent because of psychiatric problems. General George Lee Butler, who as commander of the U.S. Strategic Command from 1991 to 1994 was responsible for all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, recently reported that he had ''investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces.''

Any nuclear arsenal is susceptible to accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use. This is true both in countries declared to possess nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) and in other countries widely believed to possess nuclear weapons (Israel, India, and Pakistan). The combination of the massive size of the Russian nuclear arsenal (almost 6000 strategic warheads) and growing problems in Russian control systems makes Russia the focus of greatest current concern.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's nuclear command system has steadily deteriorated. Aging nuclear communications and computer networks are malfunctioning more frequently, and deficient early-warning satellites and ground radar are more prone to reporting false alarms. The saga of the Mir space station bears witness to the problems of aging Russian technical systems. In addition, budget cuts have reduced the training of nuclear commanders and thus their proficiency in operating nuclear weapons safely. Elite nuclear units suffer pay arrears and housing and food shortages, which contribute to low morale and disaffection. New offices have recently been established at Strategic Rocket Forces bases to address the problem of suicide (and unpublished data).

Safeguards against a nuclear attack will be further degraded if the Russian government implements its current plan to distribute both the unlock codes and conditional launch authority down the chain of command. Indeed, a recent report by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was leaked to the press, warned that some Russian submarine crews may already be capable of authorizing a launch. As then Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned last year, ''No one today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems. . . . Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled.''

A particular danger stems from the reliance by both Russia and the United States on the strategy of ''launch on warning''—the launching of strategic missiles after a missile attack by the enemy has been detected but before the missiles actually arrive. Each country's procedures allow a total response time of only 15 minutes: a few minutes for detecting an enemy attack, another several minutes for top-level decision making, and a couple of minutes to disseminate the authorization to launch a response.

Possible scenarios of an accidental or otherwise unauthorized nuclear attack range from the launch of a single missile due to a technical malfunction to the launch of a massive salvo due to a false warning. A strictly mechanical or electrical event as the cause of an accidental launch, such as a stray spark during missile maintenance, ranks low on the scale of plausibility. Analysts also worry about whether computer defects in the year 2000 may compromise the control of strategic missiles in Russia, but the extent of this danger is not known.

Several authorities consider a launch based on a false warning to be the most plausible scenario of an accidental attack. This danger is not merely theoretical. Serious false alarms occurred in the U.S. system in 1979 and 1980, when human error and computer-chip failures resulted in indications of a massive Soviet missile strike. On January 25, 1995, a warning related to a U.S. scientific rocket launched from Norway led to the activation, for the first time in the nuclear era, of the ''nuclear suitcases'' carried by the top Russian leaders and initiated an emergency nuclear-decision-making conference involving the leaders and their top nuclear advisors. It took about eight minutes to conclude that the launch was not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western submarines—less than four minutes before the deadline for ordering a nuclear response under standard Russian launch-on-warning protocols.

A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense. We have chosen to analyze a scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-missile submarine, for two reasons. First the safeguards against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.

Delta-IV submarine carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea. These missiles are believed to be aimed at ''soft'' targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military installations. Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16 missiles failed to reach their destinations because of malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets.

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume that the targets have been selected according to standard military priorities: industrial, financial, and transportation sites and other components of the infrastructure that are essential for supporting or recovering from war. Since low-altitude bursts are required to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks, concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground facilities, most if not all detonations will cause substantial early fallout.

Physical Effects

Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are determined primarily by the area of the ''superfires'' that would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city. Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter, coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds and average air temperatures above the boiling point of water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching 100 percent.

For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly 100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles), the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles), which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used Census CD to calculate the residential population within these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for areas where circles from different warheads overlapped. In many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the casualties, would be much higher.

Fallout

The cloud of radioactive dust produced by low-altitude bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable, because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour (15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles) long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600 rad within six hours. With radioactive contamination of food and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely.

Deaths

Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas, with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile, it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms.

Medical Care in the Aftermath

Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources. Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied). The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived.

FROM DANGER TO PREVENTION

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable. The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.

TABLE 1. PREDICTED IMMEDIATE DEATHS FROM FIRESTORMS AFTER NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN EIGHT U.S. CITIES.

City[1]	No. of Warheads	No. of Deaths
Atlanta	8	428,000
Boston	4	609,000
Chicago	4	425,000
New York	8	3,193,000
Pittsburgh	4	375,000
San Francisco Bay area	8	739,000
Seattle	4	341,000
Washington, D.C.	8	728,000
Total	48	6,838,000

[1] The specific targets are as follows: Atlanta—Peachtree Airport, Dobbins Air Force Base, Fort Gillem, Fort McPherson, Fulton County Airport, Georgia Institute of Technology, Hartsfield Airport, and the state capitol; Boston—Logan Airport, Commonwealth Pier, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University; Chicago—Argonne National Laboratory, City Hall, Midway Airport, and O'Hare Airport; New York—Columbia University, the George Washington Bridge, Kennedy Airport, LaGuardia Airport, the Merchant Marine Academy, Newark Airport, the Queensboro Bridge, and Wall Street; Pittsburgh—Carnegie Mellon University, Fort Duquesne Bridge, Fort Pitt Bridge, Pittsburgh Airport, and the U.S. Steel plant; San Francisco Bay area—Alameda Naval Air Station, the Bay Bridge, Golden Gate Bridge, Moffet Field, Oakland Airport, San Francisco Airport, San Jose Airport, and Stanford University; Seattle—Boeing Field, Seattle Center, Seattle–Tacoma Airport, and the University of Washington; and Washington, D.C.—the White House, The Capitol Building, the Pentagon, Ronald Reagan National Airport, College Park Airport, Andrews Air Force Base, the Defense Mapping Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency headquarters.

Limitations of Ballistic-Missile Defense

There are two broad categories of efforts to avert the massive devastation that would follow the accidental launch of nuclear weapons: interception of the launched missile in a way that prevents detonation over a populated area and prevention of the launch itself. Intercepting a launched ballistic missile might appear to be an attractive option, since it could be implemented unilaterally by a country. To this end, construction of a U.S. ballistic-missile defense system has been suggested. Unfortunately, the technology for ballistic-missile defense is unproved, and even its most optimistic advocates predict that it cannot be fully protective. Furthermore, the estimated costs would range from $4 billion to $13 billion for a single-site system to $31 billion to $60 billion for a multiple-site system. In either case, the system would not be operational for many years.

A Bilateral Agreement to Eliminate High-Level Alert Status

Since ballistic-missile defense offers no solution at all in the short term and at best an expensive and incomplete solution in the long term, what can the United States as well as other nations do to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear attack substantially and quickly? The United States should make it the most urgent national public health priority to seek a permanent, verified agreement with Russia to take all nuclear missiles off high alert and remove the capability of a rapid launch. This approach is much less expensive and more reliable than ballistic-missile defense and can be implemented in short order. In various forms, such an agreement has been urged by the National Academy of Sciences, the Canberra Commission, General Butler and his military colleagues throughout the world, and other experts, such as Sam Nunn, former chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, and Stansfield Turner, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and an interagency working group are completing a detailed study of dealerting options that will be presented to Defense Secretary William Cohen.

Major improvements in nuclear stability can be achieved rapidly. In the wake of the 1991 attempted coup in Moscow, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev moved quickly to enhance nuclear safety and stability by taking thousands of strategic weapons off high alert almost overnight. Today, there are specific steps that the United States can take almost immediately, since they require only the authority of a presidential directive. These steps include putting in storage the warheads of the MX missiles, which will be retired under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II in any case, and the warheads of the four Trident submarines that will be retired under START III; placing the remaining U.S. ballistic-missile submarines on low alert so that it would take at least 24 hours to prepare them to launch their missiles; disabling all Minuteman III missiles by pinning their safety switches open (as was done with the Minuteman II missiles under President Bush's 1991 directive); and allowing Russia to verity these actions with the on-site inspections allowed under START I. Similar measures should be taken by the Russians. These steps—all readily reversible if warranted by future developments or if a permanent bilateral agreement is not reached—would eliminate today's dangerous launch-on-warning systems, making the U.S. and Russian populations immediately safer. Both nations should then energetically promote a universal norm against maintaining nuclear weapons on high alert.

The Role of Physicians

In awarding the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize to International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Nobel Committee underscored the ''considerable service to mankind'' that physicians have performed by ''spreading authoritative information and by creating an awareness of the catastrophic consequences of atomic warfare. This in turn contributes to an increase in the pressure of public opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to a redefining of priorities. . . .'' No group is as well situated as physicians to help policy makers and the public fully appreciate the magnitude of the disaster that can ensue if changes in the alert status of all nuclear weapons are not instituted.

The only way to make certain that an accidental (or any other) nuclear attack never occurs is through the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the air-tight international control of all fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. In 1995, the World Court stated that the abolition of nuclear weapons is a binding legal obligation of the United States, Russia, and all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under Article 6. Preferring the term ''prohibition'' to ''abolition,'' the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded in its 1997 report, ''The potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are so attractive relative to the attendant risks—and the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War . . . are so compelling—that . . . increased attention is now warranted to studying and fostering the conditions that would have to be met to make prohibition desirable and feasible.''

Leading U.S. medical organizations, including the American College of Physicians and the American Public Health Association, have already joined Physicians for Social Responsibility, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and over 1000 other nongovernmental organizations in 75 nations to support Abolition 2000, which calls for a signed agreement by the year 2000 committing all countries to the permanent elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. The American Medical Association has recently endorsed the abolition of nuclear weapons, as have the Canberra Commission, military leaders throughout the world, major religious organizations, and over 100 current and recent heads of state and other senior political leaders. Some supporters of the abolition of nuclear weapons have specifically called for immediate steps to eliminate the high-level alert status of such weapons, as urgent interim measures. All parties should cooperate to ensure that these measures are implemented rapidly.

CONCLUSIONS

The time, place, and circumstances of a specific accident are no more predictable for nuclear weapons than for other accidents. Nonetheless, as long as there is a finite, nonzero, annual probability that an accidental launch will occur, then given sufficient time, the probability of such a launch approaches certainty. Until the abolition of nuclear weapons reduces the annual probability to zero, our immediate goal must be to reduce the probability of a nuclear accident to as low a level as possible. Given the massive casualties that would result from such an accident, achieving this must be among the most urgent of all global public health priorities.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I conclude by saying, I just happened 20 minutes ago to be speaking to our revered former majority leader, Howard Baker, who was in the Capitol to testify before the Finance Committee. I said I was coming over to offer this amendment. He and Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and Alton Frye have said, ''Don't do this.'' He said with respect to Russian nuclear weapons; they have them, but they don't know how many they have and they don't know who controls them. The whole situation of command and control is very limited and weak and uncertain.

Not many years ago, after the end of the cold war, Norway put up a rocket

for purposes of research which put the Russian on nuclear alert. They had 15 minutes to decide whether to go to launch on warning. It was that close. We were that close to nuclear war. We will be closer in the aftermath of NATO expansion.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield to my colleague, who has somewhere to go, but I want to ask the Senator from New York a question. Is he aware that the point he is making about a hair trigger—that is, that the Russians have moved to a doctrine of not eschewing the doctrine of first use, that they are now saying they may have to rely on the first use of nuclear weapons? Is he aware that that doctrine which was changed in 1992 had nothing to do with the expansion of NATO?

In 1992, when the Russian military realized that they, in fact, had imploded when they were incapable of defending their borders, they did exactly what NATO did when we concluded we did not have the conventional force capacity to stop an all-out attack in Europe and indicated that we would use nuclear weapons if, in fact, we were attacked.

I ask my friend—I am fascinated by his rendition, and I share his concern about the hair trigger. But is he suggesting the decision in 1992 where Russia declared that it would not any longer abide by its previous policy of no first use of nuclear weapons—is he aware that was long before the contemplation of expansion of NATO?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Is the Senator aware of how little time I have to respond? He put that question on his time?

Mr. BIDEN. I put that question on my time, and then I will yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes, I do. I am very much aware of that. But I am also aware, on December 17, in the context of NATO expansion, a formal document was put out saying, ''we may not have much else but we do have nuclear weapons.''

Mr. BIDEN. On my own time, if I might say, that is a little bit like my wife deciding that she is no longer going to cook dinner because she is receiving her Ph.D. and is taking too much time in class, and then 6 months later, after having made that decision, when I, in fact, do something she does not like, she says to me, ''I want to formally tell you I haven't been cooking dinner, but I want you to know the reason I am not cooking dinner now is because you were late coming home tonight because you didn't call me from Washington and we missed going to that play.''

That is what it is like. It has nothing to do—she didn't cook me dinner before for reasons unrelated to me coming home late, but if she wants to make a point that I missed a play, she may very well reiterate, bring out of an old bag something that is already being used.

That is what the Russians have done, and Mr. Kennan, a revered figure we both know—you know him better than I—believes this is dangerous. Paul Nitze thinks it is dangerous for totally different reasons. Kennan thinks it is dangerous because he thinks it will exacerbate the prospects of any democracy occurring in Russia. Nitze thinks it is dangerous because he is worried that NATO will get fat and flabby now and not be available as a significant military force, were things to go back in Russia.

I think it is comparing—with all due respect to my learned friend—apples and oranges.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might, on the time of the Senator from New York——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Oregon yield time?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I will take the time jointly of my colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a cosponsor of this amendment. Of course, I will grant the Senator the opportunity to speak, and then I will follow the Senator from Oregon.

The point is, to Senator BIDEN's comment on the issue of the nuclear weapons. The Senator from New York and I are not rattling the nuclear saber and trying to utilize fear as a point. There is a very logical argument as it relates just to the Baltics, that that is part of the equation if indeed they are admitted, and indeed NATO has to become a part of the defense system. But let's put that to one side. What the Senator from New York was trying to say, and did say very eloquently, is that since 1992 the Russian military, across the board, with the exception of their nuclear arsenals, has suffered severe degradation. How well we all know, their officer corps has no housing, their military enlisted no pay, and they haven't put a surface ship of any significant numbers to sea in a long time. The one system that threatens the United States, and always will, is the strategic nuclear system.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the Senator knows, they are routinely dismantling that system under Nunn-Lugar, in the face of expansion of NATO. I find that fascinating, and I also find it fascinating that they overwhelmingly ratified the CWC in the Duma. And as recently as two weeks ago, the number two man in the Kremlin is here telling us—excuse me, the foreign minister is here in the United States saying, by the way, by the end of the summer we are going to ratify START II. I don't fail to share the concerns of my friends about the nuclear hair trigger.

My point is, as we are talking about expanding NATO, what they have been doing is exactly the opposite of what is being implied here. They have continued to move forward on arms control agreement, they have continued to destroy their nuclear arsenal, they have continued to go along with the CFE arms agreement and other treaties and destroyed their conventional weapons, saying they will no longer abide by the doctrine of no first use, which occurred in 1992 when they realized that all they had left was their nuclear arsenal. That is my point.

It is non sequitur to suggest that the reason why we should be concerned is we are expanding NATO. That has nothing to do with it. There is not a shred of evidence of that. Now, there may very well be a hardening of positions in the domestic political situation in Russia. It may very well be that the browns and the reds get a little more muscle and the nationalists gain some. I don't think so, but I acknowledge that it may be. But their nuclear doctrine is unrelated, put in place 5 years before NATO was a glint in the eye of President Clinton.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I say to my good friend that he is quite right in his recitation. There has been an active number of steps taken by Russia. We are still in question as to whether the Duma is going to move and approve the pending arms control. I do not yield that point. In an hour or so, I will be addressing the moratorium of 3 years. Russia has more or less accepted the fact that, in all likelihood, these 3 nations will come in. But I say to my colleague, they may draw the line with those 3. That is why I am going to ask this body to consider very carefully a time period in which to assess the impact of the 3 before we move forward with further consideration. We will wait an hour or so to address that.

I take strong disagreement with the fact that the Russians are going along with everything we are doing.

Mr. BIDEN. That is why the Senator should vote against his first amendment and for the second amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I find it very humbling to be among these giants as a newcomer to this body. I feel something like the student questioning the wisdom of his professor because when it comes to names like PAT MOYNIHAN, JOHN WARNER, and Sam Nunn, these are men whom I admire and whom I have read about for years in history books.

Yet, I rise to oppose this amendment for reasons that I think are very, very important. I wonder as we consider the feelings of the Russians—and I am not saying those considerations are illegitimate, but what are the feelings of the Pols, the Czechs, and the Hungarians? Do they have no right to qualify to self-determination to be a part of the western alliance? I have had officials from all of those countries tell me that if they had to choose between the EU or NATO membership, they would take membership in NATO; whether right or wrong, they are afraid of Russia. I believe they have a right to qualify to be a part of the west. And, yes, strong

economies are so important; but, frankly, they recognize that security precedes strong economic growth.

Madam President, the European Union may be many things, but it is certainly not a substitute for U.S. leadership in Europe. The EU has proved time and again that it is incapable of acting together on matters of foreign and security policy. Its military arm, the Western European Union, refuses to take action when European interests are threatened and, instead, turns to NATO or individual member states to address problems on the continent of Europe.

The political vision of the European Union extends no further than its trade interests, shown most recently by its rush to reengage the regime in Iran and its refusal to jeopardize commercial contacts by even mentioning the civil rights record of the Chinese government.

In contrast, for 50 years, NATO has been the defender of freedom and democracy and has shown that it is willing to make the necessary sacrifices to assure the success of these valued principles. In its membership, NATO includes two countries that will apparently never be in the European Union—the United States and Canada. It includes Norway, which rejected EU membership in a public referendum, and it includes Turkey, whose application to the EU has been repeatedly rebuffed.

How ironic it would be if we pass an amendment here that says before these countries can be in NATO, they must be in the EU, but, by the way, Turkey, which is a member of NATO, apparently will never be a member of the EU. Austria, Finland, and Sweden are all members of the EU, with continued neutrality policies. It is not just the different missions of NATO and the EU that made denying NATO enlargement to EU membership untenable, but the different membership of the two organizations lead it to take varying positions on issues of importance to both.

Further, the economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are growing faster than almost all of the countries of the European Union. Consider some recent statistics that demonstrate the disparity between these 3 countries and the current EU members. In 1997, Italy's estimated economic growth rate was 1.5 percent, Germany's was 2.2 percent, France's was 2.4 percent. Meanwhile, Poland's growth rate was an astounding 7 percent. Hungary's economy grew by a healthy 4 percent. Growth in the Czech Republic was less impressive in 1997, due to severe flooding in that country, but their economy is expected to rebound in 1998. The European Union's regulation, taxes, subsidies, and labor laws could very well hurt the economic development and growth potential of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The pursuit of membership in the EU should be a careful decision made by countries in Central and Eastern Europe and should not be a requirement for NATO membership. Even if these countries elect to seek EU membership, the European Union has made it clear that it will take years for them to conform their legislation to the multitude of EU laws and regulations.

In short, the amendment of my friend from New York is a delaying tactic that runs counter to U.S. security interests. Therefore, I oppose any effort to link NATO enlargement to membership in the European Union, and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I want to follow along. The Senator from Oregon touched on the historical context of how nations are admitted into NATO, and there was some thought that Turkey—regrettably they are not a member of the EU, but we must remember that at the time Turkey was admitted it was really at the height of the cold war. NATO made the decision that it was imperative. In 1952, Europe was facing the pinnacle of that tragic period, and Turkey brought with them an enormous military strength which was proven.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. On the southern flank.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is absolutely right. On the southern flank. It was in NATO's interest at that time to admit Turkey. Turkey, of course, throughout their participation in NATO, has been in the forefront of strength on the southern flank as it is today. It is my hope—indeed, my expectation—that someday the EU will have a realization of that contribution and consider their membership. But I don't think this argument that NATO has admitted nations without EU membership carries any weight in the face of the historical context in which Turkey was admitted.

I wish to engage my colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a cosponsor.

The struggle today of the three nations that we are considering for membership is not a military one. There is no threat. The administration candidly admits that. I think the Senator from Delaware would admit that there is no significant military threat. Russia today, in terms of its land forces, engaged them in the battle of Chechnya. That dragged on for an almost interminable period. It really ended by virtually exhaustion of both sides militarily as opposed to a military victory. Certainly they don't have the forces to mount any aggression in the context of a land attack on the three nations the subject of which we are discussing today. The military put it aside. It is an economic struggle all through the former Warsaw Pact to have their democracies, to have their participation in a free market system.

Along comes the conferring of NATO membership, presumably, on these three nations. Immediately, in my judgment, that gives them a very significant advantage over the others who are waiting for admission into NATO and the world market. It is not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. You put your money in our bank. It is guaranteed by the Federal Government. They can advertise in the world market. We are now a member of NATO. You build your plant here. Invest your dollars in our countries. It is a lot safer than it would be in, say, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, or other areas of the world. It is going to give them an enormous advantage economically over those nations patiently waiting in line. I think it will breed friction. That friction could, indeed, involve confrontation, hopefully not with the use of arms.

But I ask my distinguished colleague if he agrees with that thought.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, with a measure of trepidation I hear the former Secretary of the Navy refer to me as a distinguished colleague, I certainly am honored to be with him in this debate, I say that I completely agree. Just the fact of NATO's guarantee of the borders of these three countries gives them an advantage over the rest of Eastern Europe. That is formidable, among other things.

Could I just take a moment to agree that the idea that Turkey can't get into the EU is appalling. When we were fighting in Korea in the first real war of the cold war, the Turks were there.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I remember it well because their units were alongside the Marines.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That the Senator from Virginia was in.

Mr. WARNER. I was in the air part. I went up to the division, and I remember the Turkish units, and they were superb fighters.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I couldn't agree more. The EU should be extending membership to Turkey, in my view. Why not? When Europe was in ruins we went to rescue them by creating NATO. Now, by God, it would be not too much to hope that their precious Common Agricultural Policy might be adjusted to include Poland, if it costs them a little. It would cost them a great deal more if instability returns to Europe.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. Of course.

Mr. BIDEN. Does this mean that Turkey has to get out of NATO now?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. No.

Mr. BIDEN. Good. I thank you.

Mr. WARNER. We thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for bringing up that point.

But, if I may further engage my friend and colleague, if I had to list my concerns in this debate on this amendment and the others today, cost always comes back and rings in my ear, as well as the security of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, who in years forward

will be a part of our NATO force. But let's go to cost.

I have said it before. The distinguished Senator from Iowa has said it. There is a blank check involved in these votes today. EU membership would be a way to evaluate the economic ability of these three countries to meet their financial obligations to NATO. Should those financial obligations fall short, Madam President, guess who is going to pick it up. The United States of America, in participation with nations and other countries, by virtue of the EU giving their imprimatur on these countries will be further assurance that they will have economic productivity and the like to generate the dollars to meet their requirements to pay the bill to upgrade their militaries, militaries which today are largely equipped with old Soviet equipment, which has to be replaced if you are to have interoperability with the NATO forces. All of that is going to be a very, very hefty bill. I would like to see the EU pronounce their economic viability as nations, which gives us a certain amount of assurance in return that the American taxpayer will not be picking up a greater and greater portion of their obligation to modernize their forces.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it must be that I am a little slow on the uptake here, because it seems to me that my friends are making my case. Let me explain what I mean by that, and they can correct me.

First of all, in the Foreign Relations Committee, I recall when we had this vote—and I say it again—in Europe, farm—f-a-r-m—policy always trumps foreign policy. Both have made my point. They acknowledge that. There is no possibility that Europe is going to do the right thing. They have not thus far. The reason, in my view, we must stay as a European power is that they have continued to demonstrate their immaturity over the past, and not much has changed in 50 years in terms of the willingness of anyone to lead.

If we acknowledge that farm—f-a-r-m—policy always trumps foreign policy in Europe—I challenge anyone to give me an example where it has not—then I ask you: Is this not a red herring? Join EU first before you can get into NATO.

The second point I will make: No one knows the history of this nation and Europe on this floor better than my friend from New York. As I said before, and I mean this sincerely, I am always uncomfortable when I am on the opposite side of an argument with my friend from New York.

Let me review very, very briefly the history of NATO and its founding, and the relationship between the economic health of a nation being invited in, and the ability or the willingness of the United States and other NATO members to invite that nation in.

From a policy perspective, NATO membership and EU membership—that is what this amendment is about, EU membership first before NATO—it is supposed to, and has been suggested by my two friends who are the sponsors of this amendment, somehow put the cart before the horse, that is, military alliance before economic unity, economic growth, economic security.

I quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 1949, the document that was brought to the floor of the Senate urging us to sign the Washington treaty. It said:

> This treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relationships, to strengthen free institutions of the parties, and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote the conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future.

That was the original purpose. The original purpose was to promote economic stability. Nobody said then nor has—and I will quote Acheson and a few others in a moment. Nobody has said then or at any moment in our history since that time that, by the way, a condition of joining NATO must be economic integration first, should be economic integration first, must be a demonstration of a strong economy first. No one has ever said that, including George Kennan. George Kennan argued and thought this would promote economic stability as well as military security.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield for a quick question?

Mr. BIDEN. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Does it occur to him that that passage in the Foreign Relations report referred to economic cooperation between France and Germany, the Schuman Plan?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, it clearly did.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That finally led to the iron and steel community.

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In time to be the European Union?

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did. But they needed military security——

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. BIDEN. To be able to ensure their economic stability. There is no question it referred to that. And there is no question that Acheson, referring to the relationship in 1952, said so in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee when he urged Greek and Turkish membership by first recalling that the two nations already joined us in an associate status with NATO, as do the countries we are talking about now, and Acheson emphasized that ''the positive action rested not on their military contributions to the alliance but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, western orientation and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this.''

The only point I am trying to make is the obvious one we keep forgetting. My colleagues who oppose expansion and wish to slow it or change it or alter it come to the floor and argue that this was uniquely a military alliance; its soul purpose was to make sure the Fulda Gap was not wide open for Warsaw Pact units to come pouring through.

That was its essential purpose. It is still its essential purpose. But it was not its only purpose in the beginning, in the middle, in the end. And so I would suggest that we tend to intentionally confuse our colleagues and the public when we say that we raise all these questions about the economic stability. The economic stability of the countries in question coming in is relevant in terms of whether they can pay their freight. That is an important question.

But this notion of winners and losers, now, I would ask the rhetorical question, if in fact by bringing the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into NATO, that would in fact seriously disadvantage Romania, Slovenia, and all the other countries in question, does anyone ever stop to ask themselves the question, why is Romania ardently for Hungary's membership? Is it because they like being put at an economic disadvantage? Is it because they think this is a good idea; it will spur the competitive juices of our people? Is that why? If this is going to be so debilitating because there is going to be losers, that this is a zero sum game, why are they all for it? Not for it tepidly, not for it on the margins, but for it with an enthusiasm to the degree they send their Foreign Ministers to this country to importune me and many others. Please.

Now, obviously, they want to get in. They want to get in in the future. They have no promise of getting in. They have the hope of getting in. But the idea that we are going to debilitate, we are going to worsen, we are going to put at a serious disadvantage the economy of our other friends seems either to suggest that our other friends are too stupid to know what their own economic interests are—and they clearly are not, in my view—or it is not debilitating to their economies.

Madam President, it seems to me if you want to take a further look at this, in 1955, the Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West Germany as ''not only a major step toward the elimination of intra-European strife but in a broader sense these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies. The committee was impressed with particularly Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association, the increased effectiveness of the sense of duty, and the cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by Germany's participation in the Western European Union as well as NATO.''

Again, to make the point. Spain, in 1982, bears the closest resemblance to the current applicants. Spain, having

returned to democracy only 5 years earlier, believed NATO membership would consolidate Spanish democracy and assist at a lesser cost, as the Poles believe, the process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership. And aside from geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization. Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, 4 years after, 4 years after NATO.

Madam President, historically, the economic component of the impact on the relationship with NATO of a new member state has been considered from 1949 on, and every time since, and it has been viewed consistently as better for the economies of the countries that have been unable to gain these larger economic relationships to join NATO first. That has been a stated purpose of bringing them in as well as the military component. Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in the European Common Market, or any economic grouping, in every instance.

Reserving the remainder of my time by saying this—when I finish this one comment. Why in the Lord's name would we, unless we just were simply flat against expanding NATO—which I understand. If this is designed as a killer amendment, it is a good strategy, but the logic of it I am lost in trying to comprehend. I find no logic to it, other than it being a killer amendment. You might as well attach an antiabortion amendment to the treaty. That would kill it. I don't want to give anybody any ideas. In this place, it may generate some ideas, but not by any of the Members on the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Hyperbole. Hyperbole.

Mr. BIDEN. But—it is hyperbole that I am engaging in now, it was just pointed out by my friend from New York. But let me tell you what is not hyperbole. There is no historical precedent for this. There is no logical rationale as to why this would, in fact, facilitate NATO membership down the road, because we all know farm policy will prevail over foreign policy.

And lastly, I respectfully suggest that it bears no relationship, no relationship whatsoever, to anything anyone in the past has thought was necessary to strengthen NATO—none, zero, none, historically, politically, economically, socially, in any way. It may be a good idea, and I have been battling the Europeans, in my capacity as the chairman of or the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for years, to ''do the right thing. Do the right thing. Let your brothers in.''

Let me point out, if tomorrow you went to the Russians and said, ''I have a deal for you; here is what we are going to do: All those European countries or former satellite states will become part of the EU and you will never be a member of the EU; or they will not be members of the EU, but they will be members of NATO, which you may be able to do; you choose''—there is not an economist, there is not a democrat, in Russia who would choose the former over the latter, in my humble opinion, not a one.

So the fear—if you are worried about Russia being isolated, then isolate Russia economically from the rest of Europe as a condition before they can enter, anyone can enter, NATO.

The Europeans may grow beyond that and show their largess and bring in Russian farmers and all that wheat—all that wheat, as we give them the technological capability and the transportation infrastructure to be able to transport it to Europe. You watch. You watch. I am willing to bet any of you anything you would like, the likelihood of the EU being economically generous, extending any largess to the East, is zero, as distinguished from this defensive military alliance that provides political security for Russia on her border and diminishes the realistic prospect that any demagoguing nationalist will be able to inflame people enough to think that they could, in fact, realize any dead dreams.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first I ask the Parliamentarian to advise the Senate with regard to the balance of the remaining time, if the Chair would address that issue, please?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 2 minutes remaining, and the Senator has 3 minutes 44 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Of course, I urge the proponent of the pending amendment to proceed with the remainder of his time. Then we have the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who has been patiently waiting. At the appropriate moment, if the Chair will advise the Senator from Virginia, I will introduce my amendment, which then begins a 2-hour time equally divided. I am certain the leadership entrusted to us the management of these two amendments in such a way that we stay on schedule, because the Senate has a very heavy load with regard to this treaty for the remainder of the day. I personally said to the leadership—and I will stand by it—we will do everything we can to see that this vote, final vote on this treaty, is cast tonight in a timely way, hopefully earlier than later, to accommodate a number of Members.

I yield the floor at the moment. The distinguished Senator from New York is seeking recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, may I express my gratitude to the Senator from Delaware for his thoughtful comments. Might I simply respond that the behavior of the Western Europeans and the European Union has been self-interested. But perhaps, after half a century of our defending them, having in the first instance liberated them, we might hope for a more open view.

For half a century, half the defense expenditure of the United States has gone to NATO. I believe that is correct—half. We have had American troops on the Rhine since 1944. That, Madam President, is the stuff of Roman Legions. But out of that commitment which we have made—an unparalleled act of generosity and self-interest, but informed self-interest and extraordinary generosity—has grown a vibrant and wealthy European community. On Saturday, many of its members will form a common currency. It is not too much to ask them to do themselves and Europe the favor of extending membership to these newly independent nations. I can imagine that they will if we make the effort. We are the ones who first came along with the proposal to expand NATO and therefore expand American force. Isn't a half-century enough? I would have thought it was. I would not give up hope that we might see some enlightened self-interest in Brussels. There is really reason to hope for that.

When the Senator from Delaware mentioned the economic divisions of the Washington treaty as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee, they were talking about the Schuman Plan, an unheard of plan to have France and Germany unite in a common market—common production of iron and steel and the coal that goes with it. The disputes over Alsace-Lorraine, which they fought over for all those years, might come to an end. It did. And it could happen again.

I thank the Chair. I very much appreciate the courtesy that has been shown to Senator WARNER and myself. I see Senator TORRICELLI is on the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds.

Madam President, the Treaty of Rome wasn't until the mid-1950s, and it was unheard of in 1949, as the Schuman Plan was. The only point I am making is, any cooperation in Europe was one of the purposes of NATO; it was to encourage that cooperation. But what they had in mind in May of 1949 may have been only the Schuman Plan and/or something else. The EU wasn't even around until the mid-1950s. That wasn't even thought of either.

So the whole notion was that economic cooperation in Europe produced stability, enhanced democracy, and, in turn, allowed for military security. It is still the case.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 seconds of the time has expired. The Senator has all the remaining time.

Mr. BIDEN. I beg your pardon?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute 20 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my friend from Texas the remainder of time on this amendment, if I may yield him a total of 5 minutes, whatever that takes off of

the WARNER amendment—if I am able to do that?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire). Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, whenever the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia offer an amendment, we know it is well reasoned and we know it is well intended and so I think, as a result, we are always correct in being cautious in opposing such an amendment.

But I am opposed to this amendment because, while I think their argument is well reasoned as far as it goes—it is certainly well intended—I think it is an amendment which does not belong in this legislation and which is fundamentally destructive.

If our colleagues want to encourage the European Union to expand and to grant membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I am for that. I think that EU membership expansion to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should occur, I strongly support it, and if we were voting on that issue, and that issue alone, I would vote for this amendment.

I remind my colleagues that NATO membership today is not made up of countries that are solely members of the European economic community. Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Canada and the United States are not members of the European Union. I, for one, would support American membership in the European Union, but I don't think they are going to let us join.

Might I say that while we are encouraging the European Union to expand its membership, we ought to start with Turkey. It is absolutely outrageous that the opposition of one country is preventing Turkey from having an opportunity to be part of the European economic community when Turkey has been an anchor of NATO for 46 years, when Turkey did as much as any other country to keep Ivan back from the gate, when Turkey provides the largest land army of any European NATO nation. These contributions ultimately helped check the Soviet expansion and through the power of ideas and freedom tore down the Berlin Wall, liberated Eastern Europe, and freed more people than any victory in any war in the history of mankind.

If our objective is to start urging the European Union to expand its membership as a precondition for membership in NATO, let's begin by urging them to expand their membership to nations which are already part of NATO and which contributed greatly to winning the cold war.

I think this is an arbitrary distinction that does not belong in this bill. If we want to do something to encourage the European Union to expand, I am in favor of that. I would certainly vote for a resolution urging them to expand, to take in Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, but I think we ought to begin with Turkey.

But that is not what is before us today. What is before us today is a fundamental decision as to whether we are going to let an arbitrarily drawn line, a line drawn by Stalin in Europe through the Iron Curtain at the end of World War II, stand as a permanent division of Europe in terms of military alliance.

I am not oblivious to concerns that have been raised about the cost of expanding NATO. I am not oblivious to other concerns with regard to Russia and to its response, but in the end, I am sway by the argument that we should not allow communism, which is now on the ash heap of history, to determine the composition of our military alliance in Europe. Therefore, I intend to vote to expand NATO, but I do not believe that that expansion should be conditioned on membership in the European Union.

Let me also remind my colleagues that Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are members of the European Union, but they are not members of NATO.

This is a clear-cut choice. I think this amendment is the wrong thing to do, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, it would be a great mistake to condition the future of the NATO, a transatlantic military alliance of unparalleled success led by the United States, to actions and decisions of the European Union. The EU is a strictly European political-economic organization of which the United States is not a member and has no say. For this reason, it is with great regret that I stand in opposition to my good friend, the Senator from New York, and urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

EU enlargement is highly desirable on its own merits. Indeed, the Resolution of Ratification specifically states it is the policy of the United States to encourage EU enlargement.

However, as worthy as EU enlargement is, it should not be formally linked to NATO enlargement. Nor should EU membership serve as a condition for NATO aspirants. Let me emphasize three basic reasons:

First, this amendment is inconsistent with the Washington Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership in NATO is open to, and I quote, ''any European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.''

The North Atlantic Treaty makes no mention of the European Union. Moreover, several NATO member states are not EU members, including the United States, Canada, Turkey, Iceland and Norway. Are they any less effective members of the Alliance because they are not part of the EU? The answer is unambiguously NO.

And what if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic decide, as Norway has—a founding member of NATO—that membership in the European Union in not in their interests? I point this out to highlight that this amendment establishes an arbitrary standard that is not necessarily a reflection of a NATO aspirant's state of economic and political well-being.

Second, Mr President, by conditioning NATO membership on attainment of EU membership, this amendment would strip the Alliance of control over its own future—specifically its decisions over future membership—and transfer it over the European Union. The EU is not a transatlantic organization. It has no effective security or defense capability or policy for that matter. Let us not forget, it was a complete failure in the effort to end to the conflict in Bosnia. Do we really want the EU to have such significant influence over NATO?

And, let us not over look the fact that this amendment could well suspend NATO enlargement indefinitely. EU enlargement is far from certain. It is far from clear when the EU will extend its membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It could be a decade, if not more for all we know. There are still significant political forces and economic interests within the EU deeply opposed to EU enlargement.

Third, this amendment would undercut U.S. leadership of NATO by relegating the United States—and the United States Senate for that matter—to a second class tier of Alliance members. Why? because NATO members who are not in the European Union would be denied the same voice and authority over the future of the Alliance that this amendment would reserve for those NATO countries that are members of the European Union.

In one fell swoop, this amendment would: impose an unprecedented restriction upon the Washington Treaty; transfer key decisions over NATO's future to the EU, an European institution that lacks an effective security policy; demote the United States to a new second-class tier of Alliance members; and, thereby weaken U.S. leadership of NATO.

I am sure that these are not the intentions behind this amendment, but they would clearly be the consequences. My colleagues, we have no choice but to vote this amendment down.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, from a strictly American foreign policy viewpoint, requiring EU membership first is sheer folly. Why would we want to place such a key element of our national security decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union—an organization to which we do not belong?

Already we are seeing the EU members disagreeing over how quickly those invited should be allowed in.

To give the EU, in effect, a veto over NATO membership, might encourage the creation of an EU caucus within NATO, limiting the United States'

ability to advance our diplomatic and military goals in the committees of the Alliance.

Moreover, advocates of this amendment have misunderstood the importance of NATO membership prior to EU membership, both from a policy and historical context.

From a policy perspective, NATO membership in advance of EU membership will provide the security these countries need to continue their economic reforms and help to ensure a climate of confidence essential for continued foreign investment and economic integration.

From a historical perspective, in all its reports on all three rounds of NATO enlargements that took place from 1952 to 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cited European economic development and integration as one key benefit of expanding NATO's zone of stability.

I would like to briefly quote from these Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports:

1949 Report establishing NATO:

The treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future.

The Committee believes that the [1949] North Atlantic Pact, by providing the means for cooperation in matters of common security and national defense, creates a favorable climate for further steps toward progressively closer European integration * * *

In 1952, Secretary of State Acheson, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, urged NATO membership for Greece and Turkey first by recalling that these two nations already enjoyed an associate status with NATO's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was in response to Athens' and Ankara's formal request—their belief that associate status was inadequate to their national defense needs—that they were favorably considered for NATO membership. Acheson emphasized that positive action rested not only on their military contributions to the Alliance, but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, and Western orientation, and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this.

It should be noted that Greece did not enter the European Union until nearly twenty years after its accession to NATO. Turkish membership in the EU remains a contentious, unresolved issue. Are we supposed to kick Turkey out of NATO because it doesn't belong to the EU?

The 1955 Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West German accession:

* * * not only as a major step toward the elimination of intra-European strife but in a broader sense, these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies . . . The Committee was impressed in particular with Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association—the increased effectiveness and the sense of unity and cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by German participation in NATO and the Western European Union.

Of all the examples, the last one—Spanish accession to NATO in 1982—bears the closest resemblance to that of the current applicants.

Spain, having returned to democracy only five years earlier, believed that NATO membership would help consolidate Spanish democracy and assist, at lesser cost, a process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership.

Aside from its geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the Alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization.

Nevertheless, in favorably reporting Spanish accession to NATO to the full Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee recorded a brief exchange between then-Chairman Charles Percy and then-State Department European Bureau Chief Larry Eagleburger explaining why Spanish accession to NATO was so important to broad U.S. national security interests. Because this exchange is so similar to our situation today, I would like to quote from it. Chairman Percy noted:

At a time when NATO's cohesiveness and viability is being critically questioned in the press, I find Spain's NATO membership application a reaffirmation of the fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a group of sovereign nations sharing common values and aspirations and committed to working together despite differences to guarantee the security, prosperity, and defense of Western democracy.

Assistant Secretary Eagleburger replied:

* * * in terms of that question of Spanish democracy, it is terribly important that we do everything we can to tie Spain to Western institutions, to have those people be able to deal with Western parliamentarians who also have a commitment to democracy * * * Every tie we can create between Spain and Western Europe and the United States, institutional tie, in fact, I think, strengthens the whole process of democracy in Spain.

Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, four years after accession to NATO.

Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in European common market or economic integration groupings.

It is much easier to develop habits of cooperation in common defense as a precursor to the much more complex negotiations leading to economic integration.

If we wait for the EU to act, we may be waiting for a long time. For example according to recent polls, the Austrian public opposes EU membership for four of the five recent EU invitees.

Finally, recent history has shown that, in European capitals, when presented with a choice between farm policy and foreign policy, farm policy always wins.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, I oppose the Moynihan amendment and urge my colleagues to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized to offer an amendment if he chooses to do so.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2322

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the further enlargement of NATO)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of myself and the distinguished senior Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN. We are joined by Mr. BINGAMAN, Mrs. HUTCHISON and Mr. DORGAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER], for himself, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mrs. HUTCHISON and Mr. DORGAN, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2322.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING FURTHER ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.—Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three years beginning on the earliest date by which Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment by the senior Senator from New York and myself and on my amendment in which I am joined by the senior Senator from New York, the two amendments which are before the Senate at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request on both amendments? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I point out in the beginning that this amendment does not affect the decision with respect to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, nor does this amendment concede what I believe is the right thing to do in voting against the admission of those countries. But this amendment is sent to the desk simply because, in recognition of the reality, through conversations personally between myself and many, many Members of this Chamber, indeed, with the President and the Secretary of State and many others, the likelihood that the resolution of ratification will be approved.

Given that reality, I think it is imperative that this body have before it an amendment, which has just been

sent to the desk, which indicates there will be a pause, so to speak, a strategic pause of 3 years only before our country, our President, whoever will be President at that point in time, can agree to accession of additional countries.

Mr. President, I established in my opening statement my strong allegiance to NATO in the past, and now and forevermore that I am privileged to be a Member of this body. I said the importance of America to have a voice, and how this treaty for 49 years has surpassed the expectations of all and remains the most important military document apart from our own Constitution in many ways, and that is why I ask for these 3 years. I will recite the reasons, one, two and three.

Should not another President duly elected by the people of the United States have a voice in further modifications by virtue of further accession of additional nations to this alliance?

If the Good Lord gives me the strength and the breath in the consideration of that next Presidential election, I will do everything within my power to make sure that is an issue that is debated among those candidates seeking that high office. Regrettably, in the last election very little attention was given to national security policy. But the world is rapidly changing. The world is becoming a more dangerous place. Indeed, in the next election I will do my part, as I am sure others will likewise, to see that the security policy of our Nation and the free nations of the world will be a subject of discussion in that election.

I think the next President should be given the opportunity to assess the merits and such disadvantages as may arise by virtue of the accession of three more nations before we leap forward under pressure, which will be unrelenting. That pressure will begin the day 1 year from now when these three nations will be accessed. That pressure will begin the day after. The bugles will sound. The march will begin to bring in other nations perhaps numbering as many as nine.

I say to my colleagues, should not the next President be given the opportunity to study the record, make an assessment, and then give his advice or her advice, as the case may be, to the people of the United States?

That is my first reason for asking for reasonable delay of but 3 years. This amendment will avoid that stampede. This amendment in fairness will say to the other nations it is not only to the advantage of the NATO countries but, indeed, it is to the advantage of the other nations to let this experiment ferment for a period to determine the purity, or the lack thereof, of the decision.

Then I turn to a second reason. That is the cost. Whether it is $1.5 billion over the next 2 years or $125 billion, there will be no piece of evidence before this body which has sound credibility as to the cost associated with accession of these three nations.

This afternoon we will have further amendments on the question of cost. But we are dealing from an unknown. NATO is studying the question of cost, and is studying the question of the degree to which these nations must rebuild and modernize their military. But those studies will not be available until later this summer. Yet our vote will be taken before the sun falls on this day on two very vital pieces of information, totally lacking. We have, therefore, a blank check. We do not know the cost now. We will not know for months even the opinion of the NATO Council, which is really the organization that can best evaluate these costs. But there is credible evidence on both sides. The range of costs go from $1.5 billion over 2 years to $125 billion.

I want to touch a sensitive nerve among my distinguished colleagues. Those listening and those advising Members might just take their pencil and put a little asterisk by this point.

America is in its 14th year of decline of funding to the U.S. Armed Forces of the United States, a collective decision by a series of Presidents. This is not a political argument. We have irrefutable evidence that our Armed Forces today are behind in their modernization program. They are stretched too thin. They are over committed worldwide. We see that in the retention rates. There is all sorts of mounting evidence that we are asking our military to do the same as they have boldly and bravely for years with less and less—less in dollars, less time at home with their families, and with fewer and fewer pieces of equipment.

Shipbuilding: A handful of combat ships every year in the budget. We are rapidly approaching a Navy that could be well below the 300-plus, a few ships of today, in the year 2000. We, a maritime nation faced with that small Navy. Dollars from the American taxpayer profits have been, are being, and will be committed to these three nations.

We have been contributing money regularly to the establishment and refurbishment of their military at the same time we are denying to our military what, in my opinion, are the necessary dollars to perform their mission. We will be taking those dollars and putting them through NATO into other nations, the three that are our subject, for their military, to help them come up so that they have the capability to take on a full partnership commensurate with their size in the NATO alliance. Think about it. You are taking from your military and giving to another military.

Now, as a part of the consideration of this year's military authorization bill, there will be discussion, indeed, there could be legislation, about a future base closure. That should ring a bell—a future round of base closures in the United States. That should get the attention of some Members.

Secretary of Defense Cohen has made an admirable and, in my judgment, a credible appeal to the Congress of the United States to address that question and address it now. If we do not, he has little alternative but to literally starve a base, turn off the current, transfer the people, and leave the buildings standing unattended because he is properly exercising his judgment that the dollars are needed for modernization, the dollars are needed for the ever-rising number of commitments beyond our shores rather than keeping in place a base that no longer contributes to our overall national security.

Tough decision. What do you say, colleagues, when you go home to defend a base closing in your State, as you will do and as you are duty bound to, and at the same time we are contributing money to build new bases in these three countries, and unless my amendment passes I daresay in other countries in a very short period of time.

They have to modernize more so than the United States. They have to take their old infrastructure which was designed for Soviet military tactics, take their old tanks and artillery pieces which are, by and large, old Soviet weaponry and modernize so they have interoperability as a nation with NATO.

That is a further drain on the American taxpayer at the very time when in your State the next round of base closures may have a potential impact. And you will be fairly asked by your constituents: do you mean to tell me they are closing our beloved hometown base that has been here defending America all these years and you are helping to build bases abroad? Do you not have a conflict?

Those are questions that are fairly to be asked in the not too distant future if we allow a stampede of three now and three in the next 18 months and three thereafter, up to as many as 28 nations potentially to join NATO.

We are also asked to approve this measure without full knowledge as to the strategic concept of what NATO is and is not going to do in the years to come. We are operating under a 1991 doctrine today. Listen to the Secretary of State, as the distinguished Senator from Missouri pointed out yesterday, who desires to expand the missions of NATO far beyond the borders of their nations, to be involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There may be some merit. But should we not fully have in mind before we begin to add country after country what is to be the mission of NATO?

Ironically, it is not until 1 year from this month, April, at the summit at which these three nations will be admitted when NATO will finalize the doctrine for the future. Yet, we are asked to vote today to change the bases of this treaty by virtue of new membership not knowing the risks that will face the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces as well as the other NATO nations. I ask you, is that the way to do business? Not in my

judgment. And that is why I say if three are a reality, then we should stop and study a reasonable period of time. Let another President, let the American people in the context of the next election, let the American people at that time have a careful examination of what NATO brings forth a year from today as to the new mission and adoption. Those are just reasonable requests. And time, and time alone, can establish the record on which those important decisions can be made. Three years, in my judgment, is not an unreasonable period of time.

Lastly, I refer to Russia, not in the sense that I fear Russia, not in the sense that Russia—and I have said this consistently—should have any veto power as to any decision which is in the security interests of the United States of America. The Founding Act was established, I think, as a quid pro quo for the accession of these three nations. Russia signed on. But there is mounting evidence that you cross over and begin another three, and particularly when you get to the Balkans, all the arguments which we have heard in favor of voting yea tonight will fall. I believe this Chamber will resonate with deep concern as reflected by the instabilities in Russia that could exist in the year 2000 when they are moving on possibly to another political structure, another President. There is a great deal of uncertainty in Russia today—economically, politically, and militarily—in their struggle to survive as a fledgling democracy, as they struggle to survive in a free-market world, and I think the next President should be given the opportunity to make an assessment as to the measure of threat posed by Russia in the context of any further accession of new nations to this most valuable of all treaties. Time and time alone can achieve that purpose.

So they should not have a veto. We do not act out of fear. But we act out of reality, that that is the only nation that possesses weaponry which poses a direct threat to the United States of America; namely, their strategic forces. You cannot be unmindful of that fact.

Therefore, I think a period of 3 years is appropriate to allow another President, to allow the studies to be performed, to allow the American people to better understand the value of this NATO alliance and what should be done for the future, and, therefore, I respectfully ask my colleagues to consider to vote in favor of the Warner-Moynihan amendment for a 3-year moratorium.

Mr. President, other Senators have been waiting patiently. I wish to continue my remarks and will do so momentarily. I know the distinguished Senator from New Jersey has been here for some time. Therefore, I yield him 10 minutes off the time under the control of the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Virginia and, indeed, the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, in each of their amendments and speak to them today.

It is, I think, worth noting that the decision before this Senate is neither new nor without the apprehension that should come with historic experience.

On March 31, 1939, Neville Chamberlain rose in the British Parliament and announced unambiguously, unequivocally, the British will defend the Polish frontier with the threat of war. To be certain, it was a war that inevitably was going to be fought and should have been fought. But what is instructive about the experience, as Winston Churchill later noted, ''Here was a decision at last taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground.''

More than a generation later, the Senate has a chance to ask all the questions that were not asked in the British Parliament on that day, because before this Senate is the most solemn question that the representatives of any free people can ever ask.

We are pledging the good name of this country to go to war, to consume the lives of our sons and our daughters for the defense of another people. That does not mean it is a pledge that sometimes should not be made. Maybe it should be made in this instance. But there are questions that should be raised that are the foundation of the amendments offered by the Senator from Virginia, Senator WARNER, and the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN.

Those questions are, in my judgment, whether or not, having made this pledge, the United States and our NATO allies genuinely have the military capability, in our resources, to fulfill the obligation, whether or not the United States and our NATO allies have the political will to lend credibility to this pledge, and whether or not this promise of defense enhances or detracts from the general security of the United States and the NATO alliance.

Let me begin, Mr. President, by addressing the question of the military feasibility of this most expansive American pledge to defend other nations since the NATO alliance itself and the Japanese-American security agreement. Indeed, this expansion of our security guarantee is based on an unspoken but a very real sense of a change in historic realities in this Chamber. It is based on the belief that Russia is weakened, an historic opportunity has arisen, and that the views of Russia are either no longer relevant or that she is without choice in this question.

Mr. President, the current state of affairs with regard to the military and economic power of Russia is an aberration. Russia has been a great power for more than 1,000 years; and it will be a great power again. Its affairs are part of the calculus of American security and cannot be discounted.

It is a nation of nearly 150 million people with over 6.5 million square miles of territory. It possesses 40 percent of the world's natural gas reserves and rivals any power on Earth as a source of natural resources, including petroleum. Russia is a technological leader. It is a major industrial power. And it continues, in spite of its current economic difficulties, as the only source of military technology, production and power that potentially rivals the United States.

So, Mr. President, there may be many things uncertain about the future, but this much is certain: Russia will continue in the future to be a great power. And yet while it may not be spoken on this floor, this calculation of immediately extending the American security umbrella to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary is based on the calculation that at some point Russia might be a threat to their frontiers, and we will provide for its defense.

Mr. President, I know us as Americans to be an ambitious people and a confident people. But this is an extraordinary guarantee the people of the United States are extending to these three new democracies in Eastern Europe.

No nation in history has been able to defend against the territorial ambitions of Russia when she was an imperial or in an imperialistic mode. It is worth noting, from Napoleon to the Third Reich, people have miscalculated on their abilities to deal with Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe.

Russia was challenged in the borders of Poland by the Third Reich and 162 divisions of the Wehrmacht. We are an ambitious people, Mr. President. The U.S. Army today, 4,000 miles from our borders, has three divisions.

What military means is it by which we are going to give credibility to this pledge? Not next year, not 10 years, not at some point in the future, but the day this treaty is signed. Three divisions, half a world away on the borders of Russia herself?

There is, Mr. President, another irony to this military pledge related to the comments of the Senator from Texas, Mr. GRAMM, in noting that in some ways the current borders of NATO are a relic of the Iron Curtain of Josef Stalin. Well, now, Mr. President, we are to draw a new line. And it may have its benefactors and its beneficiaries. But what of those nations not inside this new line? The great lesson of Yalta was that those nations that fell on the other side of the line were lost to a Stalinist equation and calculation that they were now in a new sphere of influence.

This Senate is faced with a question of tomorrow, next month, this year, drawing a new line in Europe that may bring Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary in, but leaves the Baltics and Romania and the Ukraine out. How would a future adversary, not in a democratic Russia but in a possible

successor Government, interpret this new sphere of influence? Not as a check on ambitions but as an invitation to ambitions?

Equally important, I believe, Mr. President, from my first, and in this instance, military review of this instance, is that we are entering ourselves again into a military calculation that for 50 years we have wanted to escape. Because if we are to make this pledge of defending these three new democracies, and we do so with three divisions of the U.S. Army and no indigenous military capability whatsoever, we are entering into, again, something which we feared and have so fought to escape. The only means of defending these governments is through atomic weapons. We are pledging unmistakably a nuclear exchange to defend the Polish frontier from possible future invasion. It is where we were during the cold war with New York for Berlin, Chicago for Paris, San Francisco for Rome.

It is easy to make the pledge, Mr. President. The question is whether to do so without military resources is responsible. It is not simply that our own resources are insufficient. My friend, the Senator from Delaware, has drawn a parallel between this expansion and the initial NATO treaty or expansions in other instances. In this instance, we are not joining in mutual defense with the British army or the Germans or the French; we are pledging to defend Poland, whose armed forces consist of 1,700 Soviet tanks designed for the 1950s and 1960s, a Hungarian air force which will contribute to its own security 50 aging Soviet MIG fighters, and the Czech air force whose pilots fly an average of 40 hours a year in training for their own self-defense.

The Senate can make this judgment. You can decide to extend the American security umbrella all over Eastern Europe, even though there are insufficient American forces to contribute to their defense, and rely on indigenous forces. But at least make the decision based on the reality that there are no indigenous forces. It is a military pledge without military capability.

Second is the issue of whether or not there is the political will in the United States and in Western Europe to give this promise meaning. The NATO treaty is the most successful military alliance in history. At a time when the Soviet Union had overwhelming military means, it was the foundation of the defense of Western Europe, but it was not based on the fact that the United States signed a treaty. It was based on historic and economic realities. Through two world wars the American people had demonstrated they were prepared to defend one Europe because they believed that the security of Western Europe and the United States were inseparable. Our quality of life, our security, our economic future could not be distinguished from Great Britain, France, in the first instance, Italy and Germany and other member states at other times.

In a free society, the President of the United States may sign a treaty pledging to defend Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, but if the economic realities are not such that the American people believe that our futures are indistinguishable, it is a dangerous promise because it is a hollow pledge.

The reality is today that there may be a time when each of these republics have sufficient economic intercourse with the United States and Western Europe that we believe they are part of the Western alliance by economic and cultural and historic definition and this pledge has meaning. But no one can argue—indeed, this is the foundation of the rationale of the amendment by Senators MOYNIHAN and WARNER—no one can argue that that reality is true today.

Total economic intercourse with the Czech Republic today is .09 percent of American exports.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes has expired.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator yield 10 additional minutes?

Mr. WARNER. I grant another minute and a half.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Is that all the time the Senator has?

Mr. WARNER. The Senator has other time under his control, but there are a number of Senators who wish to speak. Perhaps, if there is more time in the course of this debate, I am certain both sides would be happy to have the contribution of the Senator.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. President, no one can argue that we have reached that state of economic dependency at the moment. That is the rationale of the delay, to allow these bonds to form and to give this pledge meaning.

Finally, the foundation of American security in this generation and as far as the eye can see is the Russian-American relationship. Any judgment we make which enhances Russian democracy enhances American security. Most fundamental to this debate is the fact that Eastern Europe and the NATO alliance's first line of defense is the Russian ballot box. If Russia is democratic and capitalistic and free, Eastern Europe is secure. If it is not, no force on Earth is going to defend the Ukraine, the Baltics, or even these republics.

I believe strongly this pledge and this NATO expansion will be enhanced by both of these amendments. I accept the reality that NATO is going to be expanded, but I believe it is a more responsible judgment if we address these questions, allow for this delay. I believe it would lead to a better expansion of NATO, and we would be pleased and proud that we made these exceptions.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator from New Jersey leaves the floor, I want to briefly make two points. I find his argument absolutely fascinating that economic dependence or integration with the United States is a prerequisite for NATO membership. I wonder if he could explain to me what that dependence was we had with Norway or that dependence we have with Denmark or Portugal or Spain?

As each came in, as each of these nations came in, if there is a notion that there is a prerequisite of an economic dependency—we have more invested in Poland, more in Poland now than we did at the time of these countries coming in.

Mr. TORRICELLI. If the Senator will yield, I would be glad to address each of those.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me make a second point.

Mr. WARNER. Could the time be allocated?

Mr. BIDEN. I make a point, I have the floor.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I appreciate that, but the Senator asked a question that deserves to be answered.

Mr. BIDEN. I also find this notion, and it is repeated in different ways but never in a more articulate fashion than just done by my friend from New Jersey, no force on Earth will be able to defend Poland or the Baltics, and he may have mentioned another country, Ukraine, if Russia is not a democracy.

One of the secondary reasons why people want to expand NATO is because we fundamentally reject that notion, but fundamentally reject the notion that if things ''go south,'' to use the colloquial expression, in Russia, that someone will be there to never let it happen to Poland again, just like we defended Germany, just like we defended Turkey, just like we defended Norway.

Now, I am going to, at a later point, speak at length about this iron ring notion my friend from Virginia and my friend from New York talk about and point out that there has been a border shared between Norway and Russia that is one of the most heavily fortified places in the world, and during the period when the Soviet Union was at its zenith, we made a judgment as a people that we would defend Norway.

Now, I know my friend is not suggesting this, but is anyone implying that peace and stability in Europe is any less at issue if Poland, after having received their independence, were now or again to be invaded as compared to Norway? What are we saying here? And the notion, will we use nuclear weapons to defend Warsaw, do you think anybody in our respective constituency is going to say, yes, let's use them to defend Turkey, Ankara?

I respectfully suggest that we can use rhetorical devices to make a point, but that they are able to be used in more than one instance. Maybe you are not going to get a consensus to use the requirement, the nuclear protection in NATO, the consultation provision where we are required to go to the mutual defense, I believe article V—and

we always used to hear, when the Soviet Union existed, how many Americans are prepared to trade Bonn for Washington, Bonn for New York City. Well, now to say how many people will be prepared to defend Warsaw, I suggest you might get more people to say they are prepared to defend Warsaw than they are prepared to defend Ankara or Oslo. That is my guess, because there are a heck of a lot more Polish Americans than there are Turkish Americans. I don't think it is a useful, in terms of what our national policy should be, particularly useful point to make because it could be made about every capital in Europe, I suspect, if it were put to the American people today.

But the real question to be put to the American people is—I think they answer affirmatively on it—is peace and stability in Europe in our national interest, and it is one of those things that we either pay now or pay later, because Americans have good memories. They understand that every time chaos has reigned in Europe, we have been dragged in this century. And so I suggest further that to denigrate the forces of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who were equally, or better situated than Spain and Portugal were when they came in, in terms of forces, or to suggest the only way to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is nuclear weapons is simply militarily not accurate. And so I think what we are really debating here—and I will say it again—and I don't think people really want to speak to it directly—and what this is really about is whether we should have NATO, period—not whether we should expand it, but whether we should have it now. Because if a test as to whether or not we are going to admit Poland is whether or not we are going to use nuclear weapons—and it is not an option because there is no serious problem about conventional forces overrunning Poland today—none—you could scramble enough jets, bombers, fighters out of Germany to get to the Polish border without having to have them in Poland at all, to withstand any reasonable conventional capability that is available to the Russians or anyone else right now. But the question is: Would we defend Warsaw? If we don't believe that resoundingly the American people would say that, then we should not let Poland in.

I think really what you are saying is that you have to ask the honest question to the folks in Salem, New Jersey, across the river from Delaware, and up in Trenton, and further up in Newark: Are you willing to go to war to save Oslo? I would be willing to make my friend a bet, and let my vote depend on it, that if he got more people to say, yes, we are willing to go to war to defend Oslo, then I will vote against admitting Poland. But my guess is, if you ask any capital in any city in any European country—say possibly London—are you willing to go to war to defend Oslo, I am not sure you would get much of a different answer, no matter where you asked. So if that is the question—and the Presiding Officer knows this issue well—aren't we really asking: Do we want NATO, period? If that is the case, why doesn't someone introduce an amendment, straight up, and stop all this foolishness—I take that back. I withdraw that statement. I don't mean that. Stop all the tangential attacks on expansion and get right to what this is about—introduce an amendment saying that we no longer need NATO. We can save a lot of money. We spend well over $120 billion a year on the deal—nothing to do with expansion.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the course of working out with the distinguished majority and minority leaders, and others, a time agreement for the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, it had been my hope to have an up-or-down vote. Last night, in the course of deliberations on time agreement, that was stated, but there may be some feeling—if I could get the attention of the Senator from Delaware, I hope that we can have an up-or-down vote on my amendment. That would be my hope.

Mr. BIDEN. That was my assumption all along, to have an up-or-down vote.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. I say to my distinguished colleague from Delaware, believe me, there has been no stronger supporter of NATO, I say with humility, than the Senator from Virginia throughout my 19th year in the Senate. I am sure that colleagues' comments were serious, but with a note of jest.

NATO is so vital to the United States of America. It gives us the legitimate presence with our military in Europe. It gives us the legitimacy of a strong voice in Europe. Indeed, this country has responded, with others, in two major wars to preserve the integrity of Europe.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WARNER. Just one sentence and I will yield. There has been a historical—over a 100 years—inability of the major nations of Europe to live in peace with one another. Indeed that is the principal purpose of NATO—the U.S. presence, both with military there, with a strong voice so as to ensure the tranquility this treaty has preserved for 49 years. It has exceeded every expectation of the drafters of the treaty and those who promoted and supported it in these 49 years. It is a magnificent document. I have fought hard with others to preserve the integrity of that document. Does the Senator wish to say a word?

Mr. BIDEN. If I can ask a question on my time. Does the Senator think—and he is a strong supporter of NATO, and if he thought I was implying that he wasn't, I was not. There are others who believe very strongly that it is no longer as relevant. You and I think it is.

Let me ask you, do you think this is a relevant question, a threshold question? Would the American people defend Warsaw? Do you think if that question were not answered in the affirmative, that that should be the test as to whether a nation should come in or not, or whether one should stay in, or we should stay in NATO or not?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on my time, the very short answer to that is that the American people will defend, under article V, the integrity of all the existing members. Should it be the wisdom of this body that if three additional members are admitted, article V becomes the very heart of the action that will be taken by this distinguished body before the close of this day.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his answer. The Senator from New Jersey raised a point with me. I raised three questions and several rhetorical questions about his comments. He pointed out that because I didn't want to use my time, I did not yield to him, and he did not think he had an opportunity to respond, and he wishes to respond. I am delighted to yield him a couple of minutes on my time at the appropriate time. I don't want to interfere with my friend's comments to respond to the issues I raised.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, like the Senator from Virginia, my remarks are not based on a belief that the cause and reasons for NATO have expired. Quite the contrary. My concern is that whatever we do in the expansion of NATO has real credibility. I raise the military question of whether or not the Polish frontier is defendable with this pledge, simply because of this: It never has been.

There is not a historical basis by which the ambitions of an imperial Russia has ever been checked, nor will we. I, too, believe that Poland should be defended.

I will vote for NATO expansion, but under the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from New York, they are suggesting a strategy whereby the political and economic bounds be given meaning, or there be time. It is not an honest assessment of the situation of the people of Poland to tell them that three American divisions with no indigenous forces are going to be positioned to defend them against a revitalized, or ambitious future Russia. It is not an accurate situation.

If this is worth doing, it is worth doing with real resources based on a real assessment of costs, based on bonds that have meaning, not over a period of time. It is based on that realistic military situation that I join with the Senator from Virginia. I, too, like the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Virginia, believe the United States will stand by its credibility and its pledges in each of these instances. But it is one thing to do it; it

is another thing to do it contrary to historic experience, or military reality.

I thank the Senator from Delaware for yielding me the time so I could clarify my views.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will make a geographic point. The Polish border, I am guessing, is about 200 miles from the Russian border, if you do not count Kaliningrad where there are not Russian divisions, et cetera. If you were to take a look—my friend says that if in fact this threat, any threat, to Poland from Russia, a NATO commitment to defend would not be credible because of three American divisions. The fact of the matter is Poland is on the Russian border. From the Russian border to the far border of Poland to Belarus is essentially the same distance from the main body of Russia to Poland. The number of American NATO and other divisions that sit in Germany are by a factor of 25 more credible than any force Russia now or in the near term could use to threaten Poland. So the idea we do not have the physical capability, which I understand is the point being made, the physical capability of defending Poland once the pledge is made is in fact, I think, inaccurate.

I yield the floor.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes from the time controlled by the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

If I may, I would like to take the liberty of speaking both on the previous amendment, which would have required these three nations to obtain membership in the European Union before ultimately becoming members of NATO, and this amendment as well. I think they both spring from a common core, certainly have a common effect, and the effect would be to move the goalposts, to change the rules of the NATO accession game as defined in article X of the NATO treaty, to frustrate the hopes of the people of these three nations and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe who lived for four decades under the tyranny of Soviet communism, to say to them now that they want to voluntarily assume their place in the NATO community and more broadly in the community of free nations that we are not ready. OK, there was plenty of time in the late forties after the Second World War for Stalin and others to carve up Europe and take you in involuntarily, but now that the cold war is over, no, we didn't learn the lesson. We are going to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. We are going to snatch the defeat of principle and security, freedom and democracy from the jaws of our victory in the cold war.

The first amendment says to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, you have come this far, we have a whole procedure that we have developed. You have democratized your country. Go back a little bit. You had the courage to rise up against a powerful central government which subjugated you, which did not give you political freedom or religious freedom or economic opportunity, and you have achieved your independence and your freedom. You are developing a market economy and democracy and have met all the standards that have traditionally been associated with access to NATO under article X—oh, no, now you have to go to the European Union and be accepted there.

As I said the other day, on the first day of this debate, to ask these nations to now obtain membership in the European Union before they do in NATO is not only unfair—in the sense that it moves the goalposts, it changes the rules of the game, it applies to them a standard not applied to other NATO members, four of whom are not now members of the European Union—but it puts them in a very, very difficult position. It says to them that all the effort they made is not going to be justified, and it has an effect that is extremely unfair and inequitable. It puts the cart before the horse. It says that commerce should precede the principles of freedom and security, when those principles are what the cold war was all about. It puts the cart of commerce before the sturdy horses of democracy and security. It puts the cart of the European Union before the horses of NATO. And that is not the order that is appropriate. That is why I oppose that first amendment and hope my colleagues will as well.

Of course, both of these amendments, including this one now that asks for a 3-year moratorium, I think spring—as some of the proponents of the amendment have said—from a concern about the effect on Russia. Our Secretary of State printed an op-ed piece in the New York Times Wednesday, April 29, yesterday—Madeleine Albright. It is a brilliant piece, eloquent, right to the point. Headline: ''Stop Worrying About Russia.''

The most fundamental argument the critics have put forward is that the admission of even a single new ally from Central Europe will harm our relations with Russia.

Secretary Albright says:

My first response is to wonder why some people cannot discuss the future of Central Europe without immediately changing the subject to Russia. Central Europe has more than 20 countries, and 200 million people, with its own history, its own problems and its own contributions to make to our alliance. Most of these countries do not even border Russia. But their security is and always has been vital to the future of Europe as a whole.

Mr. President, I heard my friend and colleague from New Jersey say something I find very unsettling, arguing for the pause, arguing for the earlier amendment about European Union membership first; wondering whether we were true to our pledge, as part of NATO accession under article V, to defend member states. We wouldn't make the pledge if we were not sincere about it. Of course we are prepared to defend these nations if necessary.

I found the references to Chamberlain in the 1930s particularly—I say this respectfully—inappropriate. If there was any sincerity behind the pledge that Chamberlain made in 1939 to defend Poland from the Nazis, as was stated, the history of the 1940s might well have been different. The lessons are clear. The best way to secure peace is to remain strong. And that is what this is all about, access to NATO, a military alliance in defense of a principle.

The Senator from New Jersey said imperial Russia has never been defeated. Who is talking about imperial Russia? We, who are supporting the extension of NATO, believe there is a new Russia. We don't see an imperial Russia. We believe that these new countries, adding 200,000 troops to NATO forces, will help us meet common threats from ethnic division, international conflict, in some of the emerging democracies. We have seen it in Bosnia. We see it in Kosovo today. And it will help us meet the common threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, coming particularly from the south of the NATO region but perhaps from elsewhere.

Let me go to this amendment requiring a pause, a 3-year pause. The Senator from Virginia says we ought to let some future President decide this. There is a process under article X. There is nothing inevitable about it. We are not on automatic pilot. No other nation is automatically going to be admitted to NATO. There is a process. NATO members will consider it, presidents—administrations will decide, and then always the Senate will have the option of ratifying or not ratifying accession of anyone else to this great treaty in defense of a principle. So why the pause? Presumably to reassure Russia again. But what are the effects of that? The effects of that are destructive in three regards.

First, on the other nations of Central Europe who may dream of membership in NATO, and, on the basis of which dreams, they are acting in exactly the way we would have them act to develop their democracies and market economies. Again, I refer to the New York Times, this time Sunday, April 26.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD after my remarks an article by Jane Perlez.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That article makes very clear that the goal of access to NATO, in this case of the article in particular regard to the three countries we are considering today—

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—has moved those countries. The promise of inclusion in NATO has helped the cause of moderate government, the reporter says, during a tough period of economic and political transition. I quote Marek Matraszek, Warsaw director of the CEC Government Relations, a political consulting firm, who says:

The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from the left and right.* * * If NATO had not been offered, Poland could have been in a disastrous situation, externally and internally.

If we now slam the door closed on the dreams of every other nation in Central and Eastern Europe to join this family of freedom, this military alliance, I fear that we will set back the onward march of freedom and a market economy for which we fought the cold war.

Second, it will reduce the ability of NATO and the dream and goal of NATO membership to resolve conflicts that now exist among various nations in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarians and the Romanians, because of their desire to join NATO, settled age-old problems. Poland and Lithuania began talks about concerns they had for the same reason, to put themselves in the same position. The nations in that region have not lost sight of the reaction of NATO to the movement within Slovakia toward a less open, less free government—which is to say that Slovakia has dropped down in the chain of those who are being considered for NATO membership.

Finally, a third consequence of imposing this pause.

Mr. President, I note you moving toward the gavel, and I ask simply for an additional minute, if I may, from the time of the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

The final loss from imposing an arbitrary 3-year pause where none is necessary because no action is required will be on us, on the United States, on our credibility, on what we stand for, on the principles that the rest of the world now, most of it, want to emulate and aspire to.

If we say to these other nations of Central and Eastern Europe, ''Forget about it, we are more worried about Russia, we are more worried about a renaissance of imperialist Russia, we are more worried about affecting the feelings of people who may be aggressive than we are about honoring your dream and effort to achieve freedom and democracy and security,'' then we will have abandoned our principles, our first principles as a country. When we do that, we lose our strength, because ultimately those principles underlie the power of America in the world community.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to defeat these two amendments and to put ourselves on the right side of history.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, April 26, 1998]

WITH PROMISES, PROMISES, NATO MOVES THE EAST

(By Jane Perlez)

In the United States, the question of whether to expand NATO eastward has been debated only in fits and starts, and then most passionately on the issues of how the Russians feel about it and whether it might cost too much.

But another question figures in the debate too: What effect has the lure of NATO membership had on the way the proposed new members—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—govern themselves and behave toward their neighbors after nearly half a century under Communism?

No one of these questions alone will decide the debate, which the Senate is scheduled to resume on Monday. Opponents of the Clinton Administration's proposal to expand NATO will doubtless emphasize the questions of money, Russia, and how many other new members this precedent will open the door to.

Still, it is on the question of how the prospective members are behaving that some of the hardest evidence is in, and it adds up to this:

AGREEMENT ON A GOAL

While all three have a way to go on meeting Western standards of democratic rule and stable market economies, no issue has dominated the internal political behavior of the three Central European countries as much as the aspiration to belong to the Western security alliance.

In all three prospective new members, former Communists and anti-Communists alike have agreed on NATO membership as a national goal, and as a result all have tried with varying degrees of sincerity to meet the alliance's broad requirements of democratic rule and free enterprise.

In other words, the promise of inclusion in NATO has helped the cause of moderate government during a tough period of economic and political transition. And there is little doubt, analysts say, that trying to lay the political groundwork to satisfy NATO has left Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic better positioned for sustained economic growth.

Such growth, in turn, could also help these countries join the European Union—another goal they share, and one they are pursuing in negotiations that opened in Brussels last month and that promise to be tough.

One lesson clearly taken to heart by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was the elimination of Slovakia from the list of potential NATO members after its Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, became increasingly authoritarian. Similarly, the European Union has cited Slovakia's lack of democratic progress as a reason for its inclusion from the first round of the economic union's eastward expansion.

The new American Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, who helped formulate the arguments for expanding NATO when he worked at the National Security Council before coming to Warsaw last fall, likes to point to the way the three countries have behaved toward each other. ''When Poland and Hungary became more confident of their NATO membership,'' he said, ''they increased their outreach to their neighbors—Hungary to Romania, and Poland to Lithuania.''

A decade ago, when the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe was evaporating, one worry for NATO was that old national resentments would resurface in the form of border disputes and mistreatment of minorities, creating instability in the region. So when NATO decided it might enlarge, it made it clear that aspirants to membership had to avoid that kind of thing.

Now Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty guaranteeing each other's borders and respecting the right of the large Hungarian minority in Romania. And tense relations between Poland and Lithuania have improved to the point that they have created a joint peacekeeping battalion.

Another benchmark set down by NATO, and in particular by the Pentagon, was that the military in new members had to be subordinate to civilian control. This was a prickly subject in Poland, where former President Lech Walesa wanted to keep broad authority in the hands of his generals. Only since the defeat of Mr. Walesa in elections in 1995 and the adoption of a new Constitution calling for subordination of the general staff to the Minister of Defense has the strong political influence of the Polish military brass diminished.

CHANGES IN THE BRASS

Last year, to the relief of the Pentagon, President Kwasniewski fired Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, a Walesa appointee, who had shown open contempt for the civilians at the defense ministry.

Now Henry Szumski, a younger general who has United Nations field experience, is at the top, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, an ardent proponent of civilian control of the military, is defense minister. NATO specialists say they are satisfied that the Polish military is on the right track, but another challenge remains: to clear out many of the Communist-era holdovers in the military intelligence service.

In another example of changing attitudes, the Hungarian Government passed over Soviet-trained generals for the post of chief of the general staff and reached down to the third level of the military hierarchy for Lieut. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, and English-speaking graduate of the United States Army War College. Now 7 of the top 10 generals in Hungary are Western trained.

Last month, the Czechs appointed a new chief of the general staff, Jiri Sedivy, 45, who stands out for his experience as a battalion commander in Bosnia and for his choice of military heroes: Eisenhower, Patton and Schwarzkopf.

Along with elevating military officers who think like those in the West, the three countries have been encouraged by NATO to get serious about parliamentary oversight committees. On this point, they still have a long way to go; the defense committee in the lower house of Poland's Parliament has no staff, and the enthusiastic members of Hungary's parliamentary defense committee have little background in military affairs.

No one would argue that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are mature democracies with classic capitalist economies. Progress toward the rule of law and the protection of minority rights is far from perfect. In all three countries, the judicial systems are fragile and financial corruption widespread. There are still huge disparities in terms of wealth between the European Union and its prospective new eastern members.

But Marek Matraszek, the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations, a political consulting firm that has worked on NATO related issues, believes that without the prospect of membership in NATO, Poland might easily have fallen under the sway of nationalist and populist politicians. Now it seems reasonable to believe that Poland, a land with 40 million people and a bounding economy growing at six percent a year, may reach its goal of being a middle-size Western European power within the next decade.

''The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from the left and right.'' Mr. Matraszek said. ''If NATO had not been offered, Poland could have been in a disastrous situation, externally and internally.''

Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The Senator from Maryland.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I seek recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?

Ms. MIKULSKI. Seven minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 26 minutes remaining in opposition.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sure all 7 minutes will be worth yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Warner amendment to freeze NATO membership and, if time permits, to also comment on the Moynihan amendment regarding the necessity for EU membership for these countries before being included in NATO.

It is very difficult—like you when you spoke earlier and said you had great admiration for both the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia as I do, we have such constructive relationships, and I admire their grasp on policy and their desire to move ahead on constructive foreign policy.

As well-intentioned as the Warner proposal is, its acceptance would be inconsistent with the NATO treaty itself. It would unnecessarily limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement should the United States of America determine that such enlargement would be in its national interest. It would also undercut the tremendous gains for peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe, including the historic reconciliation now underway between Russia and the West.

Article X of the Washington treaty, which was the alliance's founding charter nearly 50 years ago, states that membership is open to ''any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.''

NATO has been an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends, NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain relevant and successful in the future, NATO must keep its doors open to those European democracies ready to bear the responsibilities, as well as the burdens, of membership.

NATO enlargement is a policy deeply rooted in this principle, often driven by moral imperatives, but equally important strategic self-interest and objective criteria concerning military readiness and political and economic reform.

It is not easy to become a NATO member. This is not like signing up for an American Express card. New NATO members must meet stringent military base criteria. They must also demonstrate a commitment to resolve ethnic disputes and territorial disputes by peaceful means. In fact, the prospect of NATO membership has led newly free countries in Europe to settle border disputes.

Potential NATO members must also show a commitment to promote stability and well-being by promoting economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. They must establish democratic and civilian control of their military, a transparent military budget and be fit for duty, as well as using diplomacy as its first tool of dispute resolution.

You have to do that in order to even be considered. So, therefore, I oppose the Warner amendment because it would freeze or reduce U.S. flexibility within the alliance and, at the same time, close the door that article X gave as a message of optimism and hope.

The Warner amendment would repudiate article X and its message of optimism and hope, which is what a freeze on enlargement would do. It would be seen by reformist countries of Central Europe as a door being shut. Do we really want to send such a disillusioning message to those other countries that are working for democracy, economic reform and civilian control of their military?

Article X of the Washington treaty was a source of hope to Central Europe during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It has already motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, and Italy and Slovenia, among others. The civil and military agreements between these countries have helped to consolidate peace and stability in Central Europe, and these things must be protected and not undercut.

Third, a mandated pause would create a new dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only been stalled but stopped, a key incentive behind their current participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, a military partnership, would be eliminated. A key achievement of this program is the coordination that it now fosters between their defense planning and force structure development. Thus, a freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, this remarkable development of European security around an alliance-determined agenda. This is what NATO is all about.

Fourth, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over NATO enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory for the hard-liners by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors, those who wish to see that Russia could deny the entry into NATO of these three democracies.

Worse, it could lead others to draw the conclusion that they will never ever have a chance to join NATO and never ever get out of the Russian sphere of influence. A freeze would undercut the basic principles that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own security arrangements—a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO membership.

Mr. President, the resolution of ratification passed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 16 to 2, and on that day that it voted, March 3, 1998, it explicitly addressed the concerns of those accusing the alliance of moving too fast on enlargement. It states:

> The United States will not support the admission of, or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless . . . (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States . . . and (II) the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States.

That is what the committee voted on, that we just would not have an open door but it would be an open door according to article X of the treaty we already adopted.

Mr. President, I encourage my colleagues, no matter how well-intentioned—no matter how well-intentioned the Warner amendment is, I think it would absolutely undercut peace and stability.

Mr. President, also in terms of the Moynihan amendment, I want to associate myself with your remarks in which you said we could not be part of NATO under that, Canada could not, Turkey could not. And if we then would adopt the Moynihan amendment, should we then consider an amendment that would remove from NATO any members that are now part of EU?

What would that mean? It would take us out. It would take Canada out. It would take Turkey out. I do not think it is logical.

I know there are many concerns about Russia. I know my time is limited and others wish to speak on this amendment. Later on this afternoon I will give my thoughts on Russia. I wish to maintain a constructive relationship with Russia, but I do not think this is the time nor the place to then give in to the Russian hard-liners but to focus on the new Russia, which I believe is not an imperial Russia.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Virginia, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to accommodate the Senate on the schedule that Mr. SMITH and I are working on, from the standpoint of the proponents of my amendment, following Mr. DORGAN, it would be desirable to have the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. WELLSTONE, follow for a period of 5 minutes, and then Mr. SMITH would care for about 3 or 4 minutes. Now, there is time within which the opposition, of course, will want to intervene, and we certainly will go back and forth on this.

We also wish to accommodate the senior Senator from Alaska. He has two amendments, is that correct, I say to the Senator?

Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. The time that the Senator from Alaska desires under his control would be how much?

Mr. STEVENS. Well, 30 minutes. I am willing to have a time agreement on the amendments. It was my understanding, Mr. President, one of them would be accepted. That may have changed in the last few minutes. But in any event, I do not need more than 20 minutes myself to explain my two amendments.

Mr. WARNER. Fine.

Mr. President, I would suggest that the votes, then, on the two Warner amendments and the one on Senator CRAIG's from last night be deferred until the Senator from Alaska has had an opportunity to address his two amendments, and such time as whatever opposition there may be required, and then we vote on the five amendments in sequence thereafter, with the normal time allocated to the first vote and for 10 minutes allocated to each of the other four votes, with a total of five. I would suggest that request, on my behalf, be considered by the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and others before it is finalized, but that is a suggestion.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. The suggestion I made, I say to my colleague, is that the senior Senator from Alaska wishes perhaps 20 minutes on his two amendments, and such time as you have, the votes scheduled for 3 p.m. be deferred until his amendments are discussed by the senior Senator and yourself, and then we take five consecutive votes, with the normal time allocated to the first vote, and 10 minutes to each vote thereafter.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me say that, first of all, I do not know what the Stevens amendment is, so I do not want to agree to a time agreement. He is a very formidable adversary on these issues, and I am not about to agree to a time agreement on what I do not know, No. 1.

Mr. STEVENS. Could I respond to that?

Mr. BIDEN. Surely.

Mr. STEVENS. The amendments have been submitted. It is my understanding that one of them was cleared on both sides. That may have changed within the last 30 minutes. The second one will be modified, as requested by the Secretary of Defense and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have modified that at their request to make the portion dealing with reduction in the U.S. contribution to NATO to be a sense of the Senate rather than mandatory. But there is a mandatory cap in that amendment. And it will be controversial, I do admit.

Why do I need unanimous consent? I will wait my turn.

Mr. BIDEN. No. I am not trying to be an obstructionist at all. No. 1, I am told by my staff—A, I don't know about the amendment, notwithstanding it has been filed. I have been concentrating on other things. No. 2, I am told by my staff—and they may be incorrect; staff as well as Senators often are—the fact is that I am told that Senator HELMS has not signed off on any amendment yet.

Mr. STEVENS. I am not asking for people to sign off on the amendment. I am only asking for time to debate it and have a vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to have time to debate it. That is why I think we should just go ahead, have the two amendments, vote. And then the Senator and I and others who wish to debate it from 3 o'clock on, to debate as long as you want. That is fine by me.

Mr. STEVENS. All I am trying to do, Mr. President, is accommodate the Senate. I thought instead of having three votes, have five votes after we are finished. It is all right by me. I will wait. I want to be assured some time—I am leading a delegation, pursuant to the Byrd amendment to the supplemental bill, to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia tonight. I would prefer that we were going to finish this or postpone it until we get back, one or the other.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, every effort is being made to accommodate the important mission undertaken by the Senator from Alaska and to have the final votes on this treaty tonight. This Senator has given his commitment to the leadership of the Senate. I suggest that we continue with this debate now and that the colleagues confer on the Stevens amendments and then revisit the possibility of five consecutive votes.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the order of business after the—if I may, with the Senator's permission?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. What is the order of business after the Warner vote, after the three votes scheduled at 3 o'clock? Is there an agreement after that time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have two pending amendments that we would go back to after the vote. They would have to be disposed of and then other amendments offered.

Mr. WARNER. Of course, Mr. President, they could be laid aside to accommodate the Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to lay them aside after the scheduled votes at 3 o'clock and take up my two amendments at that time before I leave.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I do not intend to object, but I wonder, before the Senator from Delaware leaves the floor, prior to his arriving, the Senator from Virginia outlined a series of speakers who will speak in support of the amendment, but we did not establish a lineup for speakers who would speak in opposition to Senator WARNER's amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to my friend from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I believe we established Senator DORGAN would speak next. And if we could establish as part of that unanimous consent that——

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, those wishing to speak in opposition to the amendment, that I have been told of, who have not yet spoken, two of them, who are here, are the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia, Senator ROBB, with the possibility of the Senator from Indiana, Senator LUGAR, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator MCCAIN, all of whom are against the amendment, I believe all of whom wish to speak against the amendment, two of whom are here. And since I have very limited time left, the two who are here I am very happy to give 5 minutes to, and those who show up next I will give 5 minutes, and then I am out of time. It is my full intention to yield to the Senator from Michigan to speak in opposition.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Fine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request made by the Senator from Alaska?

Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. One additional request, if I may. I ask that my second amendment be modified. I have that right without unanimous consent. And I send it to the desk so that it can be reproduced so all Senators have a copy of it when I call it up after the 3 o'clock votes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator can modify a previously submitted amendment.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Although I have no objection—I realize we have gotten unanimous consent already with the Senator from Alaska going next—as soon as I did not object, I was informed by my Cloakroom that Senator CONRAD, whose amendment is one of those listed as next, objected to it being put aside. I wanted Senator CONRAD to know I did not realize he would object to that. I

just want the RECORD to show that I was unaware of that.

Mr. STEVENS. I do not wish to inconvenience Senator CONRAD. I would be perfectly willing to wait if he is the next one in line. So I can get in line and I know what the time is, so I can plan the day. And I can tell the Senator, I will not take longer than 30 minutes on my amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this point I ask the Chair to advise the Senate with regard to the remaining time under the pending amendment, the Warner-Moynihan 3-year moratorium.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 16 minutes 18 seconds and 17 minutes 2 seconds to the opposition.

Mr. WARNER. So the time has been consumed by this important colloquy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that 10 minutes equally divided be restored, given that this colloquy was essential.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

The order is that Senator DORGAN will now proceed. If the Senator would limit remarks to 8 minutes in favor of the amendment, the Senator from Minnesota would take 5 minutes, and the Senator from New Hampshire takes 3 minutes, that would enable the Senator from Virginia 2 or 3 minutes in conclusion.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to come to the floor of the Senate to support the amendment offered by Senator WARNER. I have not yet been part of this debate. I have followed it closely and read a great deal and want to speak about the larger issue and then explain why I support the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia.

The proposal brought to this Senate to expand NATO raises a range of questions that will still be unanswered as we vote on this treaty later this evening. Let me just describe a couple of them.

First of all, the cost. The cost estimates for the enlargement of NATO range from a few billion dollars to $125 billion. Our major European allies have made it clear that they have little intention of spending another lira, another franc, another pound, to pay for the expansion of NATO. The question, then, is: What will be the cost to the American taxpayer? We don't yet know.

Further, will there be a second round to expand NATO? The NATO Secretary-General said that there will be a second round, possibly including Romania, Slovenia, and three Baltic States. If there is a second round, what will that cost be? And if there is a third round, would it include some of the 19 other members of the Partnership for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe? Where does NATO expansion stop? We don't yet know.

The other question is: What is the threat that requires the enlargement of NATO? What is the threat to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that justifies NATO expansion? I am convinced these countries need economic integration into Europe rather than military integration into NATO.

The Warner amendment says, let us take the time to answer these basic questions. Let's wait for three years before we admit any more nations into NATO. Let's pause and try to understand what all of this will cost, what exactly is the threat, and what our response should be.

But more importantly, a three-year pause also will enable us to work with Russia to ensure our relations with Russia do not suffer as a result of the policy we seem about to endorse this evening.

NATO expansion, make no mistake about it, will play a large role in determining whether we will have a cooperative or a confrontational relationship with Russia in the years to come. I don't say this because I am sensitive to the feelings of Russia. I say it because I am sensitive to our own security interests.

I take a moment of the brief time that I have to describe why our relationship with Russia should play a role in this decision.

I wonder how many of my colleagues are aware of an incident that occurred on December 3, 1997, in the dark hours of the early morning, north of Norway in the Barents Sea. Several Russian ballistic missile submarines surfaced on December 3, last year, and prepared to fire SSN–20 missiles. Each of these missiles can carry 10 nuclear warheads and travel 5,000 miles—far enough to have reached the United States from the Barents Sea. Those submarines surfaced and launched 20 ballistic missiles. Roaring skyward, they rose to 30,000 feet. U.S. satellites tracked their path.

Last December 3, the radar and satellites in our Space Command NORAD complex and elsewhere saw that at 30,000 feet those Russian missiles exploded, they were destroyed. Why? Because this was not a Russian missile attack. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were watching from a ship a few miles away as the missiles were launched. These self-destruct launches were a quick and cheap way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched missiles, which it is required to do under the START I arms control treaty.

Mr. President, let me present one more piece of evidence about what is really important. This is a hinge, and with the permission of the Presiding Officer, I show it to my colleagues on the Senate floor. This is a hinge that comes from a missile silo in the former Soviet Union. This belonged to a silo that housed an SS–19 with warheads poised at the United States. This piece of a missile silo, with a missile and warhead aimed at the United States, comes from a silo that doesn't any longer exist. This comes from a silo which this picture shows is now gone. Silo removed, gone. The missile is gone. The warhead is gone. And where a silo once stood, sunflowers are planted.

How did that happen, that a Soviet missile was destroyed by taking it out of its silo? This country, with a program called Nunn-Lugar, helped pay for the cost of that. With that program, and under our arms control treaties, we help destroy the weapons of potential adversaries so they can never be used against us.

Now, the question for all of us is, What does enlarging NATO do to our relationship with Russia? There is no one on this floor who can stand and tell you with certainty what it does, but there is plenty of evidence that this is a step backward, not forward, with respect to our relationship with Russia.

One of the great lessons of this century's history is that the United States gains when we respect a former enemy. We have been through the cold war with the Soviet Union. They lost. The Soviet Union no longer exists.

Russia has enough fissile material to make 40,000 nuclear weapons if it wanted to. That's why our relationship with Russia is critically important. That relationship will determine whether we will see more nuclear missile silos planted with sunflowers, whether we will see bombers having their wing cut off —as this picture shows—whether we will see more progress in arms reduction.

The principal threat, in my judgment, to peace in this world is not a threat of a land invasion of Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. The principal threat is the threat of nuclear weapons—loose nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue nations, or a resumption of the nuclear arms race. We are on a path in this country, because of our arms control agreements and cooperative relationship with Russia, where both sides are now destroying nuclear weapons. This is very, very important progress for humankind.

We now are confronted here in the U.S. Senate with a question of enlarging NATO, a security alliance in Western Europe, at the expense of, in my judgment, our relationship with Russia. I don t want to see our relationship with Russia deteriorate into a new cold war confrontation and a resumption of nuclear weapons production. In my judgment, we expand NATO at the potential risk of reigniting a cold war and impeding and retarding progress on arms reduction.

The Senator from Virginia brings an amendment to the floor that says if we go to a first round of NATO enlargement, and if the vote is successful tonight, before we expand further let us at least pause for 3 years to answer the

questions I posed at the start of my presentation. What will this cost? What will this cost, and who will pay the bill? What is the threat, and where does the threat come from? And what does this do to arms control agreements that now, as I speak, are resulting in the destruction of missiles, the retirement of delivery vehicles, the sawing off of wings of Russian bombers?

What does it do to that progress, progress that comes from arms control treaties and a bipartisan initiative here in Congress called Nunn-Lugar to help implement those treaties? In the Nunn-Lugar program we provide money to accommodate arms control agreements, to help the other side destroy their nuclear weapons. These are the weapons that were once housed in a silo that contained this piece of metal, near Pervomaisk, a former Soviet missile base. What does NATO expansion do to the progress that this piece of metal represents?

This piece of metal was in a silo that housed a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at our country, but it is now just metal, and the ground is now sunflowers. That is substantial progress, in my view, for this world.

The question we need to ask, all of us, is, What does this issue, NATO enlargement, have to do with this progress? Will it impede this progress? Will it retard the progress of arms control? No one here knows the answer for certain. Our Nation's foremost experts on foreign policy are sharply divided. Yet, and I say this regretfully, the Senate seems prepared to vote on NATO expansion without understanding its potential consequences.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DORGAN. I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Virginia for his time.

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I will speak briefly in opposition to the Warner amendment. I will begin by saying that I think there are clear lessons that can be learned, but I disagree with my distinguished colleague from North Dakota as to what they are.

I think the last half of the 20th century demonstrated that when America did not assert itself adequately and act in its best interests after World War II by embracing the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, we in fact contributed to the development of a cold war; that when we in fact invested in our national security and asserted ourselves effectively—particularly during the 1980s—we brought the cold war to an end successfully. That is why I believe it is in our interests to move forward with expansion of NATO at this time.

In light of these reasons, I think it is ill advised for us to set arbitrary limits or deadlines or pauses in considering NATO expansion. If it is in our best interests to expand NATO quickly, then I want to maintain that possibility. If it is not in our best interests to expand NATO beyond the three countries under consideration today, then the process already established in the North Atlantic Council and our own constitutional advice and consent ratification requirements provide us more than enough protection against rash action.

Let me speak briefly and more specifically as to other reasons I oppose the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia mandating a ''strategic pause.''

First, I believe such a pause would send exactly the wrong signal at this critical point in history, as it would represent a drastic change in U.S. policy. The United States led the charge at last year's Madrid summit to keep the door open for future NATO expansion. Throughout the general discussion on expanding NATO, we also declared that any possible offer of NATO membership would be dependent upon successful implementation of democratization and market reform programs. Taking away the possibility of NATO membership, even for just 3 years, may also take away the incentive for completion of reform.

Second, I believe the Senate's position during any future membership negotiations will be protected. During Foreign Relations Committee hearings on this issue, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright expressed the administration's understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate prior to any future round of expansion. I believe that commitment is secure, given their scrupulous consultation process with the Senate that has gone on throughout the current expansion phase.

Finally, I think we must look at this round of expansion in its historical context. Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically provides for the expansion of NATO to any European state in a position to further the principles of the treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security. This article has been utilized over the past 50 years for the accession of West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Spain. This is not a brand new process but one we have always kept open to review.

NATO's Secretary General stated at the Madrid summit:

> In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999.

This shows that NATO enlargement is an issue regularly reviewed by the North Atlantic Council, just as are the structure and requirements of the NATO armed forces.

In summary, I strongly oppose any measure which will place additional roadblocks in the way of future NATO expansion, roadblocks that are not needed and will only lead to further feelings of abandonment and exclusion by nations wanting to join the West. A decision to enlarge NATO should not be based on a rigid time line; rather, it should be the net result of thoughtful deliberation—a process already well protected by both the North Atlantic Treaty and our Constitution.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, let me associate myself with the amendment earlier introduced by Senator MOYNIHAN from New York. I have said before on the floor of the Senate—and I will say it again—the Senator from New York, I think, has said something very important with his amendment, which is that we should be using our prestige as a great country to really insist on membership to the EU for Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. That is what is most important to enable them to reach their goals.

Also, let me associate myself with the amendment of my colleague from Virginia, Senator WARNER. I think what he is saying in this amendment is: Colleagues, Democrats and Republicans alike, please go slowly.

Mr. President, many of us had the opportunity to serve with Senator Nunn. I think more of us should talk about him and his wisdom. Senator Nunn raised three questions about NATO expansion. The first question is: Will this help us in easing or dealing with the whole problem of proliferation of weapons that might go to Third World countries—the kind of cooperation we need with Russia? The answer that Senator Nunn gives to that question is no.

The second question Senator Nunn asked is: What about nuclear threats? Is this going to help us in terms of further arms agreement with Russia? Is this going to move the world away from reliance on nuclear weapons? The answer Senator Nunn gives is no.

The third question that Senator Nunn raised is: What about reform within Russia? What about the forces for democracy? What are the democrats—with a small ''d''—all trying to tell us? The answer, Senator Nunn says, is they are telling us with this NATO expansion, expanding the military alliance against a Soviet Union that no longer exists, against a military threat that no longer exists, is a huge step backward.

Mr. President, I will conclude this way. Other colleagues are on the floor and want to speak. From Senator Sam Nunn to Senator PATRICK MOYNIHAN, to Senator JOHN WARNER, to George Kennan, to scholars like Howard Mendelbaum, to prophetic thinkers like George Kennan, and, more importantly, the forces for democracy in Russia, there has been an eloquent and powerful plea to all of us to understand that this could be a tragic mistake.

Mr. President, I fear it will be a tragic mistake. I hope my colleagues will vote for Senator MOYNIHAN's amendment. I hope they will vote for Senator WARNER's amendments. I want to say one more time that I am in profound disagreement with NATO expansion. I think there will be fateful consequences. If we approve this, I hope and pray that I am wrong, but I have to speak for what I believe is right for my country and the world.

I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 16 minutes remaining in my control. For the benefit of the Senators, so I don't get myself in more trouble in the allocation of time, I am going to yield, in the following order: 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia, 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware, and 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona. That will leave me probably 10 seconds. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, it is not my intention today to belabor the points, so eloquently made by the principal proponents of this Resolution of Ratification—including the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the leadership of this body, and the Chairman and Ranking Members of the Foreign Relations Committee—about why enlarging NATO is in our national strategic interest.

The three national security committees on which I serve have dedicated an extraordinary amount of time to this issue, examining the full ramifications of enlarging NATO in over a dozen hearings, and following that intensive process I remain persuaded, that we ought to move ahead.

I certainly don't discount the concerns, that have been raised, by a number of highly respected opponents of ratification, most of whom I am normally in agreement with on national security matters, but I find the arguments advanced by the advocates more persuasive.

I would like to focus my remarks more narrowly on the implications for American leadership in Europe and beyond. The critical notion in my mind, is not simply that NATO is inviting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into its ranks, but that through our leadership, we've played a fundamental role in casting the light of freedom across Europe, and are prepared in peacetime or war, to guarantee the security of these new democracies.

Keeping the peace is something NATO has been doing well for 50 years. When an entity works as well as NATO has, in fact, the American people tend to either ignore it or take it for granted. Perhaps that explains the lack of widespread public interest in expanding NATO.

We have come to think of Europe mostly as a market for our goods, no longer as a territory under Soviet threat. Public apathy aside, we forget the lessons of history that made the 20th Century the single bloodiest of all, at our peril.

On two occasions American isolationism has led to world wars. What we thought was benign neglect of Europe turned out to be an abject failure of our leadership. Harry Truman was right when he said that if NATO had existed in 1914 or 1939, we never would have seen the toll in human lives that followed.

Mr. President, it is an undeniable fact that NATO has contributed dramatically to Europe's peace, stability, and democracy the past 50 years, and hence to our own security. The alliance was integral to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, to tearing down the Berlin Wall in 1989, and to hastening the overall demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Now, some wonder, if it is still relevant, and express serious doubts as to whether or not we should expand it.

Mr. President, it will be decades before we know with any certainty whether central Europe establishes itself in toto as a model of democratic rule, or something less. But it is not difficult to conjure up images of exclusive ethnic and latent ultra-nationalism underlying future conflict.

The historical legacy of the region generally is worrisome. World War I started with a mere gunshot in Sarejevo. And even recent history in the region shows that stability can't be treated as a foregone conclusion given the conflagration of the former Yugoslavia after Tito. And now Kosovo threatens to inflame the area all over again.

NATO has performed admirably in restoring a semblance of order in Bosnia. Yet the job is far from finished. We face years of civil and political reconstruction. But NATO and American leadership have made the difference in resuscitating that country.

Mr. President, Bosnia demonstrates that the stakes are far too great to view NATO as some kind of anachronism.

NATO is a vibrant, meaningful, omnipresent military institution that helps preserve a favorable security environment. And let me emphasize that it safeguards American vital interests. We don't lead NATO as a favor to Europe.

Mr. President, perhaps the greatest challenge, or opportunity, in all this lies in developing a partnership between Russia and an expanded NATO. The Permanent Joint Council we've established with the Russians secures an important role for them in the new security architecture of Europe.

We should welcome their input and value their advice in charting a new course for the Continent. Russia, after all, has been a player in Europe for better than 300 years. We can, and should, pursue those mutual security concerns with Russia that contribute toward peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

At the same time, an expanded NATO will retain the right to act independently, as has been the case for fifty years. Its core purpose will continue to be to ensure its own security through collective defense.

Where there might be disagreements, Russia should not interpret NATO actions as trampling on its national security prerogatives.

Rather, the aim of the alliance, in Vaclav Havel's words, ''is first and foremost an instrument of democracy, intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values * * * [and is] the guarantor of Euro-American civilization.''

NATO's expansion will erase the artificial lines drawn by Stalin, but is not and should not be perceived as a threat to Russia's security.

It is in our interest, and we should provide tangible support to further develop Russia as a peaceful democracy. Expanding NATO helps consolidate the hard fought gains of winning the Cold War, and sets a useful example for Russia among its neighbors to continue with democratic reforms internally.

Mr. President, the working predicate of a number of the amendments before the Senate seem designed to make the accession process more cumbersome and unwieldy. I believe we need to distinguish this particular matter, however, from common appropriations and authorization legislation we amend and consider in the Senate.

I believe, ambiguity regarding the protocol terms of entry, for example, will have a corrosive effect on our ability to lead the organization in the future. Existing and future members begin to focus more on American conditions instead of affirmative American leadership.

Mandating a multi-year pause in expansion, for example, would lead us into the same difficulty we encountered setting deadlines for troop withdrawals from Bosnia. Critical national decisions based on carefully reasoned and supported judgments are subjugated to an artificial time line that could actually end up proving harmful to our military interests.

We need to be flexible rather than arbitrary about future entrants into NATO: If the first round goes well, the Partnership for Peace program will keep the door open for new members. Present and future security considerations will then dictate the pace and scope of enlargement.

Along these same lines conditioning NATO membership on EU membership strikes a discomfiting parallel between two organizations whose core missions are fundamentally different, one being military and the other economic and social.

The amendment would, in effect, allow a group of EU nations veto power over a critical decision affecting U.S.

national security: our choice of military allies in any future contingency.

In all three previous rounds of NATO enlargement—Turkey and Greece in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982—it was clearly understood that expansion presaged European economic development and integration as a key benefit, not the other way around. Now, inclusion in NATO will help establish a climate of confidence for these three countries as they seek foreign direct investment and pursue economic integration.

Mr. President, strengthening NATO by expanding its ranks contributes to a peaceful, democratic, free and unified Europe. As the security landscape of central Europe rapidly changes, we ought to take advantage of this historic moment. A static, cautionary approach misses the opportunity to extend democratic principles across Europe.

Vaclav Havel, perhaps better than anyone, has stripped away the layers of argument on each side, observing that ''if the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.'' Europe looks to the United States for leadership, and it is time for us to act.

I urge my colleagues to support the Resolution of Ratification before us, and oppose burdensome amendments that would weaken an enlarged NATO.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. The distinguished Senator from New York desires to speak on behalf of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in brief, a moment of history about Russia.

On March 20, 1917, one of the most momentous Cabinet meetings in American history took place in which Woodrow Wilson and his Cabinet judged that German submarine warfare had reached a point which left the United States with no choice but to enter the war on behalf of the Allied Powers. In 13 days Wilson would convened Congress and speak to a joint session asking for recognition of the state of war with Germany. At the Cabinet meeting, Robert Lansing, as Secretary of State, spoke in favor of doing this. He captured the meeting in a memorandum in which he wrote: ''I said that the revolution in Russia which appeared to be successful had removed the one objection to affirming that the European war was a war between democracy and absolutism.''

Sir, in 1917, Russia had a democratic revolution. As a schoolchild in New York, I can recall the head of that provisional government, Mr. Kerensky, would come around to our assemblies to tell us about it. That democratic revolution was crushed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg. And the country lived a hideous 70 years under that regime. Then the Russians liberated themselves. They did it internally.

They had to face a second coup against Mr. Gorbachev with tanks around the government buildings. The tanks withdrew and the forces of an earlier protodemocratic government prevailed. There are Russians who genuinely believe that they liberated their country. They now once more have the possibilities they had at the beginning of the century before the Bolsheviks took power. Why some of us here hated the Bolsheviks, hated Lenin and Stalin, and their successes, was not just for what they stood for but for what they had crushed.

There is a belief that is growing in Russia—one learns this; one hears this—that they not only freed themselves of the infamous Stalin and Lenin but also the countries around them; and that they should be seen now as a partner, not as the enemy. They were under the rule of the their enemies.

I hope we will see this and not expand in their direction an alliance that was formed against Joseph Stalin and his politburo. Give us a chance to bring Russia into the democratic world in which it almost entered and which will now be put in jeopardy, or so some of us believe. What a historic failure that would be.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Arizona.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to begin by stating my opposition to the Ashcroft amendment which would too narrowly limit NATO's freedom of action by permitting NATO missions only for collective self-defense, or in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

I believe that is understandable—the concerns that have led to this amendment being proposed, and some valid points have been made. Clearly, the NATO military forces must not be used frivolously. I do not believe that NATO is an organization that should take on worldwide military missions that have nothing to do with European security.

I think these types of problems, however, should be avoided as NATO makes decisions—not limitations to be placed on NATO's ability to make decisions. When real-world challenges arise, we need the ability to have free and unfettered consultations with our allies on all possible courses of action before a decision is reached. Article IV of the NATO treaty already permits this kind of unrestricted consultation, as it has ever since Dean Acheson first presented it to the Senate 49 years ago.

The Ashcroft amendment would for the first time restrict the scope of such article IV consultation by preventing NATO from considering taking action in many cases—even if we and our allies believed that such action would serve our common security interests. This is an unwarranted restriction on our freedom to consult and take joint action with our allies through NATO.

The fear that NATO might take on missions that the United States opposes is unfounded. We already have all the safeguards we need at NATO because we have a veto. There can be no NATO mission, no military operation, no out-of-area deployment, unless the United States specifically supports that decision. Mr. President, not only do we have a veto but the United States is a leader of NATO. Rather than our getting dragged into missions we do not want, the reality at NATO is the opposite. The United States has always been the country to take a strong leadership position and to seek support from our European allies. We are the ones who seek to spread the burdens of maintaining security to our allies, not the other way around. The Ashcroft amendment would give a powerful tool to those allies who may seek to dodge burden sharing, who may want to prevent an active NATO role, or who would otherwise oppose a strong U.S. leadership role.

I suspect that part of the motivation behind this amendment is a lack of confidence that the current U.S. administration will say no to military operations when it has to. That is a concern I fully understand. But a lack of confidence in the current administration is one thing to be dealt with between the Congress and the White House. Putting a hard and fast limit on NATO, the most successful military alliance in history, and the best tool we have for spreading the burdens of common security, is quite another thing.

Mr. President, this is a serious amendment and one that I think would have serious consequences on our alliance and our relations with our allies, as well as our ability to act in the United States vital national security interests.

Finally, I oppose the Warner amendment because I believe it is an artificial barrier. I don't believe that we want to keep countries out of NATO. We can do that already because we have a veto of NATO. If the administration were to make a bad decision, we in the Senate could still withhold our consent at that time. But if we decide our own national security interests warrant bringing a qualified country into NATO in less than 3 years, this amendment would prevent us from doing so. I don't see why we would want to limit ourselves in this way.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. After consultation with the distinguished Senator from Virginia, in light of the fact several more Senators have asked to speak, I would ask unanimous consent, if the Senator is listening, for 10 additional minutes equally divided.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. My intention in terms of the now 10 minutes total time I control, I will yield 5 to my senior colleague from Delaware, and then I will yield the remaining 5—and I think that will leave me 1 minute to close—to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, just so people will know the order.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as well intentioned as the WARNER amendment may be, I urge my colleagues to oppose it. To accept it would be inconsistent with the NATO Treaty. It would unnecessarily limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement. It is constitutionally unnecessary. And, above all, it undercuts the tremendous gains for peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe and in our relationship with Russia.

What this amendment proposes is an arbitrary freeze—or a pause—in the enlargement process. This, despite the fact that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's founding charter, states clearly that membership is open to, and I quote, ''any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.''

Mr. President, we all agree that NATO is an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends, NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain vital, relevant, and successful in the future, NATO must remain consistent with Article 10 and keep its doors open to those European democracies ready to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership.

NATO enlargement is a policy rooted in this principle and driven by moral imperatives, strategic self-interest, and objective criteria concerning military readiness and political and economic reform. Any proposal to freeze enlargement—whether it be permanent or temporary—subordinates these factors to an arbitrary timeline. And it opens the door to other significantly adverse consequences for the United States and the Alliance:

First, a freeze would reduce U.S. flexibility and leverage within NATO. It would unnecessarily undercut our ability—and the Alliance's ability—to respond to the inherent uncertainty of the future.

Second, it would send an unfortunate, and even dangerous message to the reformist governments of Central Europe. They would suppose—and not incorrectly—that the United States is slamming the door shut concerning their possible accession into the Alliance.

Do we really wish to send such a disillusioning message?

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a source of hope to Central Europeans during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It has motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, as well as Italy and Slovenia, among others. Their unprecedented efforts to cooperate among themselves and to jointly consolidate peace and security in that region must be strengthened, not undercut.

Third, a mandated pause created by this amendment would prompt a new dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only stalled, but stopped, a key incentive behind the aforementioned regional cooperation, including their current participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, will be seriously undercut. Thus, a freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, the remarkable development of European security around an Alliance-determined agenda.

Fourth, Mr. President, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory—proof of their own legitimacy—by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors. Worse yet, it could lead others to draw the same conclusion. A freeze would undercut the basic principle that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own security arrangements—a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO.

While I am sure the intentions behind this amendment are admirable, we must recognize that its consequences would be potentially disastrous. It would undercut U.S. leadership and influence within the Alliance. It would contradict the founding document of the Alliance. It would threaten the historic progress we have witnessed in Central Europe—progress from which we all benefit. And It would reject a principle fundamental to establishment of a constructive relationship with a democratic Russia.

I suspect, Mr. President, that one false premise behind this amendment is that NATO enlargement has been a rushed process. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The velvet revolutions that restored democracy and independence to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary took place in 1989. Nearly a decade will have passed before these three countries become NATO members in 1999.

Moreover, the Senate has not rushed, and is not being rushed, into endorsing NATO enlargement. This chamber and its committees have been examining and promoting this initiative since 1993, if not earlier. Anyone concerned about the future enlargement process can be assured that the same careful study, debate, and oversight that has attended this past effort will attend those to come. Read the resolution of ratification carefully. It explicitly requires extensive consultation between the Senate and the President about any such initiative.

It states that the ''United States will not support the admission of, or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and (II) the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States.''

Before, I yield the floor, Mr. President, let me reiterate a key point to those who fear a rushed process of further NATO enlargement. The bottom line, is that further expansion of the Alliance will always be contingent on careful study, public debate, high-level consultations, political consensus, and the strategic interests of NATO and the United States. Any further expansion will also be contingent on Senate ratification—the difficult hurdle of securing 67 votes.

For these and other reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote against any proposal that undercuts the founding document and basic principles of the NATO Alliance. The ratification of the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO will erase destabilizing lines, which are relics of the Cold War. This amendment portends only be a step toward new, divisive lines in Europe—and, that is something we should never accept.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. For purposes of informing the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the following order take place and time for each vote. The order of votes will be that the Craig amendment which was finished last night would come first, the Moynihan vote second, the Warner vote third, that the normal time be given to the Craig amendment, that the second and third votes be 10 minutes each, and that they be up or down votes on each amendment.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. KERRY. I will not object, but I would just like to ask would it be appropriate to include in the unanimous-consent request time for me to speak after the vote?

Mr. WARNER. No objection.

Mr. KERRY. I would so ask.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Consent has been granted to recognize Senator STEVENS.

Mr. KERRY. I would ask unanimous consent to be recognized following Senator STEVENS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains under my control?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator who is ranking member of the committee who is managing this business in the Chamber.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I speak with reference to the amendment offered by Mr. CRAIG that would, if adopted, require that the United States adopt a specific authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces now in Bosnia prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification of the protocols for NATO expansion. I have long supported an active Congressional role regarding the ongoing U.S. mission in Bosnia. Congress *does* have a responsibility to carefully oversee that mission, to ensure that it stays on track and that limits are placed on the U.S. role there that will safeguard our troops from being consumed in an ever-expanding nation-building crusade. So, I support what I think is the Senator's intent, which is to apply pressure to the Administration and the Congress to fulfill their oversight responsibilities with respect to Bosnia.

However, that being said, I do not believe that this amendment is necessary. The Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense Authorization bill is likely to be considered by the Senate within the next several weeks, and the corresponding appropriations bill will also be taken up before we adjourn. These bills are the appropriate vehicles on which to debate and act to place limits on the U.S. mission in Bosnia. They provide a vehicle for establishing policy and then backing up the will of Congress with the power over the purse. We do not need this amendment today to force us into taking action on Bosnia. We do not need to hold these nations—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—hostage to any perceived inability or lack of will on our part to act independently on Bosnia.

So I say to my colleagues that this Senator from West Virginia does not lack the will to work to establish a policy and a specific, detailed authorization for the U.S. mission in Bosnia. I do not favor open-ended commitments to deploy forces to Bosnia, and I do not favor giving this administration or any other administration a free rein to involve our men and women in uniform in the kind of policing actions that got us into such trouble in Somalia. I am already working on such an amendment in concert with other Senators, with the intention of offering it to the Department of Defense Authorization bill or perhaps some other vehicle. I welcome the participation of Senator CRAIG and his cosponsors in this debate. But we do not need to act on this amendment at this time. We do not need to leave this protocol bound and gagged in some dark closet until we ransom it with a debate and legislative action that, I assure you, will take place without a hostage on another occasion on another day and on another measure.

Although I will vote against this amendment, I assure my colleague from Idaho, and the other supporters of his amendment, that it is not because I do not wish to have a concrete policy regarding Bosnia. I urge Senators to vote against the amendment offered by Senator CRAIG.

I thank the Chair, and, Mr. President, I yield back the balance of my time.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2322

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the senior Senator from New York may desire. Could I inquire of the remainder of time on both sides, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 10 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes 8 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Does the Senator from Delaware wish to let the Senator from Massachusetts proceed? Is that my understanding?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 1 minute to my friend from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Delaware.

I share the concerns of many Senators with respect to the possibilities of future rapid expansion, and there are serious questions from the Congress about the control of that. But I do think the constitutional issues of restraint of a President before the fact on foreign policy are significant, and equally significant, I believe, that we will have ample opportunity for consultation.

I will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from the President that I received on April 23. I call my colleagues' attention to one particular paragraph, which is, the President says:

> I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or making any membership commitments.

In other words, no private membership commitments will be made outside of the process of the U.S. Congress consultation.

I might also add that that consultation in the past has taken over several years, with a number of different resolutions of support having been passed previously. So I think in that light I will oppose the WARNER amendment.

I ask unanimous consent the full text of the letter from the President be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, April 23, 1998.

Hon. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR JOHN: In the coming days the Senate will complete consideration of the proposed accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. NATO's enlargement offers our country an historic opportunity to increase America's security, improve Europe's stability, and erase the vestiges of the Cold War dividing line. For these reasons, I appreciate the support that you and a bipartisan majority of your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee gave this initiative on March 3, when the Committee voted 16–2 in favor of a resolution of ratification on NATO enlargement.

I know, however, that you and other senators have certain concerns about the process of NATO enlargement. In particular, I am sensitive to the questions you raised during the Committee's March 3 meeting regarding future rounds in the enlargement process. These same questions underlie Senator Warner's proposal for a mandated pause in the enlargement process after admission of these first new members. Let me take this opportunity to comment on Senator Warner's proposal and the issues it attempts to address.

I have long maintained that, as part of our broader strategy to make Europe more united and stable, NATO should keep its door open for other qualified states that aspire to membership. I was pleased that NATO adopted this position at the Madrid summit last July. The Alliance also declared in Madrid that it would review the process of enlargement at our next summit in Washington. Neither my Administration nor NATO has made any decision about when the next invitations for membership should be extended, or to whom.

Both the United States and or NATO will need to address many complex questions before making decisions about the admission of other new members, but I am convinced that such a mandated pause is the wrong way to address these questions. A mandated pause would reduce our own country's flexibility and leverage in Europe, and it would fracture the open door consensus we helped build within NATO. It would also undermine support for reforms in the Central European countries still aspiring to NATO membership and thereby create a new and potentially destabilizing line across Europe. In contrast, the Open Door policy retains the positive incentives that have reinforced reforms and good neighborly relations throughout the region over the last five years.

For these reasons, I have urged the Senate in the strongest terms to reject any effort to impose an artificial pause in the process of NATO's enlargement, and I hope I will have your support for that position. It is not necessary for the Senate to mandate a moratorium on the enlargement process to ensure that future steps proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I consulted extensively with members of both chambers and both parties in Congress on the full range of decisions concerning NATO's enlargement, including decisions on how many and which states to support for membership. I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions

about invitations of membership to other states, or making any membership commitments. Of course, the admission of any additional new members also would require the advice and consent of the Senate.

The end of the Cold War has given us an unprecedented opportunity to help build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. There are many elements in our strategy designed to achieve that goal, including our efforts to make further reductions in nuclear arms levels and to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; our bilateral programs to support reform in Russia, Ukraine, and the other new democracies; and our work with other institutions, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A strong NATO remains the foundation of our transatlantic security agenda and I am convinced that continuation of our open door policy will advance our overall interests and enhance NATO's capabilities.

I am grateful for the support and sound advice you and other senators have provided as we pursue that agenda, and I look forward to continuing our work on this and other national security issues in the days to come.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Warner amendment that would mandate a pause of three years before the United States would encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

At the outset, I would note that I am unaware of any rationale for choosing three years for a pause—it appears to be an arbitrary number and I think it is inappropriate to legislate on such an important matter on an arbitrary basis.

Article 10 of the NATO Treaty states in pertinent part that ''The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.'' NATO's door has been open since the establishment of the Alliance and has resulted in the admission of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain over the years. To mandate a three-year pause would be inconsistent with the policy that has guided the Alliance since 1949.

Mr. President, the desire to join the Alliance has been a productive force for candidate nations who have been seeking to establish their credentials for admission by perfecting their laws relating to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the establishment of market economies and by reaching accommodations with their neighbors. We should not do anything to discourage these developments.

But also importantly, I am concerned that a three-year pause would imply too much—that after three years, the Senate would support more nations joining NATO. Mandating a pause is no more logical than raising expectations as to when the next round of NATO accessions will occur. Further enlargement of the Alliance should be judged by the circumstances that exist at the time. I am not committed to further enlargement of the NATO Alliance after three years and I doubt that most of our colleagues are so committed. I fear that, by passage of this amendment, we would send a false signal to those nations that continue to aspire to NATO membership.

Mr. President, as noted in Foreign Relations Committee Report on NATO enlargement, Secretary of State Albright has committed the Executive Branch to keep the Senate fully informed of significant developments with regard to possible future rounds of NATO enlargement and seek its advice on important decisions before any commitments are made. More recently, in a letter to Senator JOHN KERRY that was released by the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on NATO enlargement, President Clinton wrote in part that ''I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or making membership commitments.''

Mr. President, those commitments and the Constitutional requirement for Senate advice and consent to any future amendments to the NATO Treaty that enlarge the Alliance are all that is necessary. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Warner amendment as both arbitrary and misleading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to point out, with regard to the military credibility of NATO raised by my friend from New Jersey, in terms of protecting Poland, I remind him, West Berlin was militarily indefensible but the Warsaw Pact never attacked. Why? Because the Soviet Union knew what would happen.

The third point I would make is with regard to the 3-year pause.

The clearest reason this amendment is superfluous is in the Resolution of Ratification itself, Section Two, Paragraph Seven. There it clearly states that the U.S. has not consented to invite any state other than the three before us today, and that many subsequent decision to do so would rest on that state's ability to fulfill the obligations of membership, as well as serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the U.S.

Further, Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty declares, and as the July 1997 Madrid NATO Summit Declaration repeats, that the door to NATO membership is open to other European states able to further principles of the treaty and to contribute the security of the North Atlantic area. Each applicant country will be judged on its merits.

Moreover, in the Resolution of Ratification before us, Section 2, Paragraph 7(A)(iv) requires prior consultation of the Senate by the President before the United States can support the invitation of any new member, and recalls that ratification of any new NATO ally requires the advice and consent of this body.

To mandate a pause would tie NATO's hands should an obviously qualified applicant such as Austria applies for membership. For the moment, it appears that the Austrian government has decided against applying for membership, but that could change after elections next year.

In fact, Austrian public opinion is already changing. Earlier this month when the Austrian public was informed of NATO's Article 5 guarantees, for the first time in a national poll a majority of Austrians said that Austria should abandon its neutrality and join NATO.

So if the Austrian government decides to follow public opinion, would we then want to tell the Austrians, ''Sorry, no applications accepted until the year 2002''?

As you know, many, including myself, believe that Solvenia already meets the criteria for NATO membership. I supported its entry in this first wave. There is every indication that Slovenia will be ready to join the Alliance within the next three years.

To mandate a pause would take the urgency off the reform efforts that nations such as Bulgaria and Romania have stepped up, at great short-term cost to their standard of living, precisely because they want to make themselves NATO-qualified for the next wave.

Even Slovakia, a long-shot applicant because of its poor record on democratization and privatization, may have a dramatic turn-around as a result of national elections this fall.

Such a decision would make NATO look like it can't be trusted to judiciously apply its own criteria; namely, that it cannot tell when and whom to invite to become new allies. This is no policy for a great nation like the United States or a great alliance like NATO.

Secretary of State Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee on February 24 that just the possibility of joining NATO has inspired declared applicants to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past.

As one of many examples of this, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus signed in March a border agreement paving the way for a final demarcation of the 500-kilometer Baltic-Belarusian frontier.

Given these accomplishments, Secretary Albright warned:

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn to in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in the reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would diminish the incentive nations now have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on the open door. It would be dangerous and utterly unnecessary since the Senate would, in any case, have to approve the admission of any new allies.

There are many foreign policy experts who share these views. But let me quote one concerned American who urged me to oppose this amendment.

David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, wrote to me on March third, stating:

> Last June 26, we [the American Jewish Committee] observed that an enlarged NATO will mean greater security and stability and also hasten the political and economic integration of Europe. An expanded NATO means greater stability and security for Central Europe, a region that was the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror to the world—and to the Jewish people.
>
> For many of the same reasons we supported NATO expansion we now oppose any effort to mandate a pause in initiating procedures for a second round of its enlargement.
>
> States throughout Central Europe that hope for eventual membership would feel that the open door enunciated at Madrid had been slammed shut in their face.
>
> At a minimum these states would be discouraged, and a pause might lead to instability in the region. Hardliners in the Russian Federation would find vindication.

Supporters of this amendment appear to believe that they are stopping a runaway train of immediate NATO membership for every state from Croatia to Kazakhstan.

They seem to be unaware that not every European state has declared an intent to join NATO. In particular, Ukraine, at its March 26 meeting with NATO officials, restated its view that while it ''does not rule out'' joining the alliance, such a move is currently unrealistic.

Ukraine issued three conditions for joining NATO: (1) decisive public opinion in favor of accession; (2) interoperability of its armed forces with those of NATO members; and (3) a guarantee that its accession would not harm relations with neighboring states, particularly Russia.

Recognizing that we already have all the control we need over the speed and choice of future NATO members, I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO members, by unanimous agreement, may invite the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. The resolution of ratification notes that only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been invited by NATO members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or document, including the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit declaration of NATO, or the Baltic Charter signed on January 16, 1998, should be construed otherwise.

Much has been said about these documents, but I am not certain that all of my distinguished colleagues have read them carefully. In Madrid, NATO's Secretary General stated ''In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999.'' This is not a promise, a commitment, or any other guarantee that countries in Central and Eastern Europe will be invited to join NATO—it is merely a statement that enlargement is a process that should be reviewed by NATO regularly.

Further, the Baltic Chapter, signed this past January by the Presidents of the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declares that the U.S. ''welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance''. Mr. President, this last statement is important—the Baltic Charter clearly states that including any new members in NATO must serve the strategic interests of the Alliance. All candidate countries will be evaluated on these criteria.

The United States should not support the invitation to NATO membership to any further candidates unless the Senate is first consulted, unless any proposed candidate can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and unless their inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the United States. During Foreign Relations Committee hearings, both Secretary of Defense Cohen and Secretary of State Albright expressed the Administration's understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate prior to any future rounds of expansion.

I strongly oppose, however, mandating a period of time during which the United States is not permitted to pursue a policy of NATO enlargement that very well may be in our national interests. The decision to enlarge NATO should be based not on an arbitrary timeline, but should be the result of a thoughtful process—based on consultations with the Congress—that considers the security interests of NATO and the qualifications of candidate states.

I strongly oppose the Warner Amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 9½ minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, 19 years ago when I was privileged to come to the U.S. Senate, the leadership had just a year or so before passed from one of our most distinguished Members, the senior Senator from Montana, Mike Mansfield. A few weeks ago in the old Senate Chamber, at age 95, he held forth in a magnificent review of history of the Senate without a flaw, without a quiver in his voice, and with an expression on his face that conveyed the strength and the confidence that that man had.

I missed the opportunity to serve with him. But one of his major goals in the concluding years of his distinguished career was to come to this floor, time and time again, and call for reduction of our commitment in troop size and financial commitment to NATO, saying that the job had been done, it was time to come home and to apply those dollars to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.

That was the majority leader of the U.S. Senate. I see my distinguished colleague from New York. He recalls those speeches very well.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. Certainly.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I remind the Senate that Mike Mansfield was in the Navy at age 14 and the Marines at age 17.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, saying that he spoke from some experience—having proudly worn the uniform of all three branches, by the way.

That could recur again in the minds of the American people, that we have spent enough, we have contributed enough, and the time has come for us to reduce our presence in Europe—which I think would be an absolute tragedy. I would fight against it, as I did in my earlier days in the U.S. Senate when, time and time again, Senator Jackson, Senator Stennis, Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater, Senator THURMOND would marshal the forces of those of us who had just joined the Senate on the floor to stop and ask the Senate not to cut NATO's budget. We felt it should be an orderly transition down in size. And that took place.

I just bring up this history to say that once again the taxpayers of this country, when they begin to look at the cost attributed to the accession of these three nations, costs which will be diverted in dollars from our own needs of the Armed Forces today, costs for the refurbishment and building of new bases in these three countries at the very time when we are going to shrink and continue to shrink the base structure in the United States—all of this to say that the magnitude of the decision to access countries to this treaty is just an important one. We are acting without full knowledge as to the future mission of NATO. We are acting without full knowledge of the cost of having these three nations build their military up to where they are a positive—not a negative, a positive—contribution to NATO.

I say with deep humility and respect of my colleagues, why not give America 3 years within which to study? Why not, I say to the leadership of the Senate, allow another President to give his or her wisdom to this question of whether additional countries should come in, preceded by, I hope, an active debate in the next Presidential election on the entire issue of the security interests of the United States using as a focal point NATO and the experience gained, in all probability, by accessing these three nations.

We owe no less to that future President, for he or she will have to incorporate in their budgets the costs of new accessions, will have to incorporate in their budgets the diversion of such funds as may be allocated to additional nations.

Furthermore, the changing face of Europe today from one of cold war to one our military leaders now refer to as instability—instability is the enemy in Europe and elsewhere in the world, largely because of the uncertainty associated with weapons of mass destruction and, in the wake of the new democracies, the instability as it relates to ethnic problems, religious problems and all those associated with these new nations trying to seek strength as democracies politically and strength economically in a one-world free market. But it is the whole range of instabilities and associated conflict with which we have had very little experience, other than Bosnia, possibly Kosovo. Should we not have the opportunity to study what are the requirements associated with these new instabilities? Learn from experience. Add up the costs in Bosnia. There have been many billions of dollars now contributed to bring about peace in that region.

I listened to our distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia talk about the policy in Bosnia. In many ways, I associate myself with his remarks. But we need—we need—that learning curve to make such important decisions as would be involved in adding more nations as members of NATO. Indeed the other——

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield?

Mr. WARNER. I will yield in a moment. The other nations would like, I am sure, to have this period of time. This 3-year moratorium gives a perfectly logical, understandable tool to the current President of the United States, indeed a future President, to withstand the stampede that I predict will occur if this is not put in place. Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I just ask my friend, and I know he will be aware of this, on January 16 this year, the President and the Presidents of the three Baltic States signed the U.S. Baltic Charter of Partnership, which states that the United States welcomes and supports the efforts of the Baltic States to join NATO, states that could only be defended by nuclear weapons.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I addressed that on the floor of the Senate before. I think it was an unwise movement by the President. We all have great compassion for those three states, the courage of their people, their desire to affiliate more and more with the Western World. But to have held out that hope which, once it is translated from the United States across the ocean into the states and down to the people, almost is equivalent to an absolute commitment to see that it is going to happen.

That is precisely why I am concerned about leaving open the opportunity for new accessions to begin tomorrow unless the 3-year moratorium, which is a reasonable period for study, is put in place.

I close with, once again, do we not have that obligation to the American taxpayers who pay the costs associated, do we not have that obligation to the men and women of our Armed Forces who will proudly wear their uniforms as a part of the NATO force to have clarity with respect to future missions, which we will not have until 1 year hence, April of 1999?

I say to my colleagues, let's just pause and take stock and think about the seriousness of the decisions we are about to make and consider that it is not unreasonable to allow 3 years of experience to transpire to make future decisions regarding other nations. Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back my time.

VOTE ON EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2316 offered by Mr. CRAIG of Idaho.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on that amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2316, offered by the Senator from Idaho, Mr. CRAIG. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that for the duration of the vote Sandra Ortland, of my office, be permitted the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry. The first vote is on the Craig amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 20, nays 80, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 110 Ex.]

YEAS—20

Allard	Grassley	Nickles
Ashcroft	Hutchinson	Roberts
Burns	Hutchison	Sessions
Craig	Inhofe	Smith (NH)
Faircloth	Jeffords	Specter
Feingold	Kempthorne	Warner
Gramm	Murkowski	

NAYS—80

Abraham	Brownback	Collins
Akaka	Bryan	Conrad
Baucus	Bumpers	Coverdell
Bennett	Byrd	D'Amato
Biden	Campbell	Daschle
Bingaman	Chafee	DeWine
Bond	Cleland	Dodd
Boxer	Coats	Domenici
Breaux	Cochran	Dorgan
Durbin	Kerrey	Reed
Enzi	Kerry	Reid
Feinstein	Kohl	Robb
Ford	Kyl	Rockefeller
Frist	Landrieu	Roth
Glenn	Lautenberg	Santorum
Gorton	Leahy	Sarbanes
Graham	Levin	Shelby
Grams	Lieberman	Smith (OR)
Gregg	Lott	Snowe
Hagel	Lugar	Stevens
Harkin	Mack	Thomas
Hatch	McCain	Thompson
Helms	McConnell	Thurmond
Hollings	Mikulski	Torricelli
Inouye	Moseley-Braun	Wellstone
Johnson	Moynihan	Wyden
Kennedy	Murray	

The amendment (No. 2316) was rejected.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I think this has been a very good debate. There have been significant amendments offered and now voted upon. I see from the list we have before us as many as six or eight additional amendments still pending, several of which we have not been able to work out a time agreement on. I thank all Senators for being cooperative. We have had opponents and proponents who have been cooperative. I encourage that to continue.

I believe maybe a Senator or two indicated that they didn't know we were going to try to finish this bill this week. I think I have said all along that we should have a focused, unobstructed debate, but the intent was to complete it Wednesday or Thursday. Here we are on Thursday at almost 4 o'clock. I talked to Senator DASCHLE, and we are agreed that we are going to finish NATO enlargement either at a reasonable hour this afternoon, or a late hour tonight, or tomorrow, or Saturday, but we are not going to leave this week until we finish NATO enlargement and the supplemental appropriations bill.

Now, we can do both of those in a very responsible way with still some good debate remaining. We need cooperation and time agreements. We need cooperation on the supplemental appropriations. We agree that these two issues must be completed this week so that next week we can move to IRS reform, or the Workplace Development Partnership Act, and perhaps even crop insurance and agriculture insurance. So we don't have the luxury of rolling this over until next week.

Our first vote will not occur until Tuesday at 5 o'clock. Please work with us, and we can complete this bill and have a vote by 6:30 or 7 o'clock if everybody will agree to a reasonable time limit.

I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2321

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate, equally divided, on amendment No. 2321 offered by Mr. MOYNIHAN of New York.

The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in the foreseeable future the central strategic object of the United States and the world will be that of controlling the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Near East, in

South Asia, in East Asia, and the control of them in Russia itself.

If we can have the cooperation, however tacit, of the Russian Government in these affairs, we have great hopes and possibilities. If we were to have their hostility, their opposition, it could be ruinous to the world. We are talking about nuclear war and biological and chemical war. That, in my view, is what is at issue in this decision we are about to make and the amendment I have offered.

I thank the Chair for its courteous attention.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is absolutely no evidence today that expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would do anything to exacerbate the problem we all are concerned about—the proliferation of nuclear capability.

The truth is, notwithstanding the knowledge on the part of Russia that we are going to expand, they continue to destroy their nuclear weapons under the Nunn-Lugar agreement, they have endorsed and have ratified the CWC agreement, and they have committed to take up the START II agreement. Nothing we have done relative to expansion has any negative impact on the continued cooperation between the United States and Russia to deal with the threat of nuclear warfare.

I respectfully suggest that to vote for this amendment turns over the future of what we think the defense architecture of Europe should be to an organization of which we are not a part, and that is the EU. It says that no one can join NATO unless they are first a member of the EU. Why would we turn our fate over to an organization of which we are not a member? I urge my colleagues to vote no on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 17, nays 83, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 111 Ex.]

YEAS—17

Ashcroft	Jeffords	Specter
Bumpers	Kempthorne	Torricelli
Craig	Leahy	Warner
Harkin	Moynihan	Wellstone
Hutchinson	Murray	Wyden
Inhofe	Smith (NH)	

NAYS—83

Abraham	Byrd	Domenici
Akaka	Campbell	Dorgan
Allard	Chafee	Durbin
Baucus	Cleland	Enzi
Bennett	Coats	Faircloth
Biden	Cochran	Feingold
Bingaman	Collins	Feinstein
Bond	Conrad	Ford
Boxer	Coverdell	Frist
Breaux	D'Amato	Glenn
Brownback	Daschle	Gorton
Bryan	DeWine	Graham
Burns	Dodd	Gramm
Grams	Landrieu	Robb
Grassley	Lautenberg	Roberts
Gregg	Levin	Rockefeller
Hagel	Lieberman	Roth
Hatch	Lott	Santorum
Helms	Lugar	Sarbanes
Hollings	Mack	Sessions
Hutchison	McCain	Shelby
Inouye	McConnell	Smith (OR)
Johnson	Mikulski	Snowe
Kennedy	Moseley-Braun	Stevens
Kerrey	Murkowski	Thomas
Kerry	Nickles	Thompson
Kohl	Reed	Thurmond
Kyl	Reid	

The amendment (No. 2321) was rejected.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2322

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes for debate evenly divided before the vote on amendment No. 2322 offered by the Senator from Virginia, Mr. WARNER.

The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

I say to my colleagues, think of the American taxpayer. Think of the parents of the young men and women who will today, tomorrow and in the future wear the uniform of our country as a part of the NATO force. We do not have a firm estimate of the costs and therefore in all probability there will be an expense to the American taxpayer associated with including these three countries. Nothing in this amendment precludes the Senate acting on the three countries, the subject of this principal debate. It simply says let us wait a reasonable period, 3 years, to get an experience curve to make the subsequent decision if it is the judgment of the President at that time that we proceed with further Member negotiations, giving us firmer cost estimates, a clearer definition of the mission to be undertaken and the risk to be assumed by the men and women who wear the uniform of our country.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, several points. One, this is superfluous. In the actual resolution of ratification, we make it clear in paragraph 7 it requires prior consultation by the President before the United States can support even the invitation of any new member, No. 1. No. 2, we have the advise-and-consent requirement. They have to come here and get our votes to begin with. No. 3, this has nothing to do with cost, nothing to do with cost. It doesn't mention cost at all. No. 4, to say now there is an artificial pause is going to put on hold all those actions taking place in other countries to meet the criteria from border disputes to ethnic disputes that exist within those countries that would be necessary to be solved before they could be invited. It is absolutely superfluous, and I would argue it is dangerous in that it will send a signal that there is an artificial pause that really means no one else will be considered.

I urge my colleagues to vote against it. It is totally unnecessary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on adoption of the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 41, nays 59, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 112 Ex.]

YEAS—41

Ashcroft	Harkin	Reid
Bingaman	Helms	Roberts
Bond	Hollings	Sessions
Bumpers	Hutchinson	Shelby
Burns	Hutchison	Smith (NH)
Byrd	Inhofe	Snowe
Campbell	Jeffords	Specter
Chafee	Kempthorne	Stevens
Conrad	Kohl	Thurmond
Craig	Leahy	Torricelli
Dorgan	Moynihan	Warner
Enzi	Murray	Wellstone
Faircloth	Nickles	Wyden
Feinstein	Reed	

NAYS—59

Abraham	Durbin	Lautenberg
Akaka	Feingold	Levin
Allard	Ford	Lieberman
Baucus	Frist	Lott
Bennett	Glenn	Lugar
Biden	Gorton	Mack
Boxer	Graham	McCain
Breaux	Gramm	McConnell
Brownback	Grams	Mikulski
Bryan	Grassley	Moseley-Braun
Cleland	Gregg	Murkowski
Coats	Hagel	Robb
Cochran	Hatch	Rockefeller
Collins	Inouye	Roth
Coverdell	Johnson	Santorum
D'Amato	Kennedy	Sarbanes
Daschle	Kerrey	Smith (OR)
DeWine	Kerry	Thomas
Dodd	Kyl	Thompson
Domenici	Landrieu	

The amendment (No. 2322) was rejected.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska allow me to address the Senate for a minute?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes, I yield for that purpose, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to thank all Senators for very, very careful consideration of this amendment. It is a strong vote. It sends a very strong signal. I recognize the conflict that some had in casting their votes, but I think it is important that we take a stand, as we did, with this very significant vote against the strongest of opposition to make that statement on behalf of the American taxpayers and the parents of the young men and women who one day must assume additional missions and additional risks. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, with the amount included in the emergency supplemental, the United States will have expended over $7.5 billion for operations in and around Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia by the end of this fiscal year 1998. It is estimated that the United States is paying over 50 percent of the cost of maintaining the peace in Bosnia, nearly $200 million a month in 1997 alone, and no end is in sight to the United States presence there, with the current wish of the President to extend our mission there.

Defense overseas funding to NATO countries continues. The cost of maintaining our U.S. forces there averages $10 billion a year. Let me state that again. Defense overseas funding in NATO countries is such that the cost of maintaining our forces there averages nearly $10 billion a year. Security assistance alone to NATO allies since 1950, and that includes military assistance and military education and training, now totals over $19 billion.

No other member of NATO has the global defense role that the United States has, nor the forward-deployed presence in potential flash-point areas such as the Middle East and the Korean peninsula. It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I wish to discuss the two amendments that I proposed. I presented them last month.

The amendments both deal with the challenges of defining and controlling NATO expansion costs. My original intent in proposing these amendments was to bring some greatly needed accountability to the critical issue of recognizing and clarifying all the costs to the United States to enlarge the NATO alliance.

My first amendment is No. 2065, which requires all costs related to either the admission of new NATO members, or their participation in NATO be specifically authorized by law. It is my understanding that the managers of the bill have not accepted this amendment for inclusion in the resolution, and for that reason I will, in a moment, ask for the yeas and nays on that amendment. I will explain it further if anyone wishes me to do so, but I think it is very plain. It just says any further costs must be authorized by law.

The second amendment has evolved since I originally offered it for the Senate's consideration. My original amendment would have restricted the use of funds for payment of NATO costs after September 30 of this year unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certified to the Congress that the total percentage of NATO common costs paid by the United States would not exceed 20 percent during the NATO fiscal year.

After the administration expressed their concern that this would be too difficult to achieve in such a time period, I redrafted this amendment to reduce the total U.S. contribution by only 1 percent each year over a 5-year period. That would have been no more severe a reduction than the Department of Defense has experienced as a whole in real terms since 1995.

However, during the extensive consultation that I have had with the Secretary of Defense, our former colleague, Secretary Cohen, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joe Ralston, they have requested further changes to this amendment.

Subsequently, I have sent to the desk now a modification of the latest version which is what I will ask the Senate to vote on, and that is a sense of the Senate, that beginning in fiscal year 1999 and over the next 5 years, the President should require the U.S. representative to NATO to propose to NATO a 1-percent reduction in U.S. contributions to the common-funded budgets of NATO. Sixty days after the proposal has been made, the President is requested to submit to Congress a report outlining the action taken by NATO, if any, on this U.S. proposal.

Additionally, this amendment directs the limitation on the total expenditures by the United States for payment to the common-funded budgets of NATO to the fiscal year 1998 levels unless an increase over that is specifically authorized by law.

Mr. President, a soon-to-be-released report of the General Accounting Office that has been conducted confirms—and I have seen the draft—confirms that NATO does not systematically review or renegotiate member cost shares for the common budgets. And it is well past time for this practice to be instituted. As I have stated before, this reassessment is long overdue in light of the United States' global defense responsibilities.

No formal renegotiations have occurred in the military and civil budgets in NATO since 1955. Let me repeat that. There have been no formal renegotiations in the military and civil budgets of NATO since 1955.

When Spain joined NATO in 1982, there was a pro rata adjustment in the civil and military budget shares based upon Spain's contribution. The NSIP, or the NATO infrastructure budget, has been adjusted five times since 1960 because of changes in the way projects were approved or funded, but there was no attempt to reallocate the percentages.

Mr. President, I think that is long overdue. I understand there will be no objection to my amendment, No. 2066. If that is the case, I would urge that it be adopted as soon as the managers have made their statements.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2065

(Purpose: To require a prior specific authorization of funds before any United States funds may be used to pay NATO enlargement costs)

Mr. STEVENS. In any event, Mr. President, if it is in order for me to do so at this time, I would like to place before the Senate amendment No. 2065 so I may ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. STEVENS], for himself, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. WARNER and Mr. ROBERTS, proposes executive amendment numbered 2065.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.—No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose.

Mr. STEVENS. This is the amendment that I believe the Senator from Delaware will discuss.

I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. To me, this is a matter of simple justice. As the surviving superpower of the world, we must take action to limit our international commitments at least to the extent that we have limited our own budgets within the United States for the Department of Defense. Both of my amendments do that. They merely say there is a restriction on the future obligation of funds of the United States to these NATO processes unless they are previously authorized by law.

There is no barrier to going above the 1998 limit, and there is no compulsion to reduce down to 20 percent as far as the total overall commitment to the common budgets. But my amendment will bring about a process by which further expenditures will have to be authorized by law and will give Congress a specific control every year over the additional cost, if any, that may be incurred because of this NATO expansion.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Would the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. STEVENS. I would be happy to yield, Mr. President.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent that Daniel G. Groeschen of Senator INHOFE's office be extended floor privileges for the remainder of the NATO debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding to me.

And I say to my friend, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I doubt whether, with the exception of two or three other people in this body, there are as many people who know about the defense budget as my friend does. And I want to say at the outset, what I am about to say is—I say this with all sincerity—I am a little bit confused about the two amendments.

Let me be very specific. The first amendment—I should get the numbers correct of the amendments. Amendment No.—I think it is 2066—that is the amendment that speaks to two things, one, a sense of the Senate regarding the common-funded budget or put another way—and I agree with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee that it is—we are instructing the President to negotiate down the percent that we, the United States, contribute to the common budgets of NATO. I think that is appropriate. I think that is necessary.

In 1950, the percent of the common budget that the United States paid was roughly 50 percent. And in the only renegotiation that took place, that was cut in half and went down to approximately 25 percent. The Senator knows better than I do, there are three common budgets. They are slightly different in terms of percentages, but essentially it is 25 percent. And it should be lower, in my view. I thank him for making it a sense of the Senate rather than a condition to passage of the treaty.

The second part of that amendment states—and I have a little difficulty with it, but I am prepared to accept it on our side—it says—and I quote on page 2, line 19:

Annual Limitation On United States Expenditures For NATO. Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998.

Now, that means, as I understand it, because a lot of our colleagues who do not spend as much time on these issues because of their committee assignments as the Senator from Alaska, the Senator from North Carolina, the Senator from Delaware—we are on committees that have these responsibilities—are somewhat confused, as I am, when we start talking about HCFA and a whole range of issues relating to the Department of Health and Human Services.

The common budget of NATO are all those expenditures which all 16 NATO members have to pitch in to pay for. Now, above the common budget, we have in the past, and we will continue in the future, I expect, expend dollars on—military dollars, State Department dollars, Defense Department dollars—on NATO member countries that are not part of a common budget.

For example, as the Senator knows better than I do, we have come up with subsidized sales of weapons systems to Greece or to Turkey. We have done the same in terms of cascading down weapons we are no longer using to other NATO countries. They do not fall within the common budget; they are expenditures of American taxpayer dollars on European countries that are members of NATO.

The way this amendment I am referring to would work, as I understand it, if in the year 1998 the United States of America spent $10—I am going to make this easy for me—$10 contributing to the common budget of NATO, that is, it represents 25 percent of all the expenditures, and all of NATO spent $40 on the common budget, we spent $10, in the year 1999 or 2000, we would be limited to spending $10 toward the common budget even if the total common budget went up to $110 because we would only be able to spend $10, which would represent a lower percentage than our 25 percent unless the authorizing committees in question specifically authorized the additional expenditures.

Is that correct?

Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. I think it is unnecessary, but I have no objection to that amendment.

Now, the second amendment, the number of which I am not going to even try to guess, because I will mess it up, but the second amendment is more direct—not more direct—is shorter and straightforward. It says—do I have a copy of it here? It says:

Requirement of payment out of funds specifically authorized. No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized. * * *

Now, the phrase ''no cost incurred by NATO'' by definition, as I understand it, means only one thing, the common budget—the common budget.

Now, if the chairman is concerned that we are going to, out of U.S. taxpayers' dollars, spend money on a new NATO admittee, Poland, let us say, that is not part of the common budget by saying, ''You know, NATO has agreed we're going to extend a runway in Warsaw'' or wherever we are going to do it. That is a common budget requirement. NATO must pay for that. It is not the national defense budget of Poland that pays for that. Since all of NATO is going to use it, we all are going to pay for it.

On the other hand, if you want to buy F–15 aircraft, we, the United States, will sell them to you under a Foreign Military Sales Act which is subsidized. We will be taking taxpayers' dollars, subsidizing the Polish military, if we sell them under the Foreign Military Sales Act. That is not out of the common budget.

Now, if what the chairman is trying to capture is those kinds of expenditures that exceed the common budget, I understand that, and I will support that, requiring a specific authorization. But if he is talking about any common budget expenditures by NATO, I see no distinction, by requiring a specific common budget expenditure that falls under the $10 ceiling, because we will be limited by the first amendment to spending no more than $10 the next year.

If, in fact, we require no specific authorization to extend the runway in Germany, and if it is a common budget investment and a NATO investment to extend a runway on German land for a NATO facility, and we don't have to have a specific authorization to do that as long as it doesn't exceed the cap of $10 total spending, then I don't understand why we would have to have a specific authorization to do the same exact thing with an equal member of NATO—assuming Poland is admitted—in Poland. It is not doing anything other than meeting a NATO obligation we will have had to sign on to.

Secondly, if I am right—and I may not be, because I may not understand the second amendment—when I read the phrase, ''No cost incurred by NATO in connection with admission of new members''——

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am more than happy to put into the second amendment, which is 2065, the phrase, ''other than common funded budgets of NATO.''

Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to accept the amendment if the Senator does that.

Mr. STEVENS. I have no intention, if the Senator will yield further, to cover the issues—he is talking about the one that puts a cap on the 1998 expenditures—unless authorized by law. The other one is intended to cover those costs where I believe the United States is going to venture out and say we will do this.

We have had that experience with the expenditures before. I think we will have it again in these new areas, and these new areas are the ones that need the most in terms of expenditure. Very frankly, we cannot afford to go it alone anymore. We want to see a requirement that Congress review the expenditures of funds in these areas.

Mr. HELMS. I would like to send a modification to the desk so we can accept that.

Mr. BIDEN. If the chairman will withhold for just a minute, I have no objection to agreeing to what you have stated. I would like to, and we have plenty of time to do this, and you have my commitment we will do it if our staffs can make sure that I am not misunderstanding what is being said.

Mr. HELMS. That is fair.

Mr. BIDEN. But I am 99 percent certain we agree fully, I say to the Senator from Alaska, in what he is attempting to do, and if he just changed

the language ''any NATO expenditure'' and we say ''any U.S. expenditure beyond a common budget affecting any of these three nations requires''—I am not a draftsman—''requires the authorization committee to do it,'' I will accept that.

Mr. STEVENS. I state to my friend from Delaware that I am preparing to change the amendment so that it reads, ''requirement of payments of funds specifically authorized, no cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, other than the common funded budgets of NATO in connection with the admission of membership participation of any country not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds from any agency,'' et cetera.

We do not seek to be redundant with the second amendment, but 2065 addresses the voyeurism of our people in Europe to go and do it alone in interoperability, in communications, in the whole series of things that they wish to have these new members of NATO have, without regard to common funded budgets, and to go obligate the United States, and then we get the bills brought to us in Appropriations without any authorization, without any review of Foreign Relations Committee, of Armed Services Committee, and suddenly the Appropriations Committee is faced with making decisions which we shouldn't have to make.

I am told all the time these areas should be authorized by law, and here is the chairman of the Appropriations Committee saying why don't we have a requirement they be authorized by law. It is sort of like a role reversal here of the husband saying, ''I've got a headache tonight, dear.'' It is not quite the normal thing to be hearing from an authorizer that this is wrong for us to say. Make them get the authorization by law before they present the Appropriations Committee a bill to be paid.

Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield, we have a unanimous consent we would like to enter, and it would give the Senator a minute to see if they can get an agreement on this point.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT—CONFERENCE REPORT TO H.R. 3579

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, as if in legislative session, that the majority leader, after notification of the Democratic leader, may proceed, after disposition of the NATO treaty, to the conference report to accompany H.R. 3579, the supplemental appropriations bill, and, further, the reading of the conference report be waived.

I further ask there be 1 hour of debate equally divided in the usual form, and following the expiration or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to a vote on the adoption of the conference report, with no intervening action or debate.

Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object—I could not hear—the majority leader intends to proceed to this after what?

Mr. LOTT. After disposition of the NATO treaty, with debate not to exceed 1 hour, and then a final vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2065

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, I am quite sure I can accept this amendment 2065, but I would like to not do it at the moment. I want to make sure I run the ''traps'' with my counterpart on the Armed Services Committee and to make sure it is right.

Secondly, I must tell him, as a former chairman of an authorizing committee and now a ranking member of an authorizing committee, I am heartened and my soul is soaring to hear a chairman of the Appropriations Committee say, ''First get an authorization.'' That is, all by itself, reason to be excited about this.

Mr. STEVENS. I am glad you don't have a headache tonight, dear.

Let me ask that this amendment 2065 be set aside temporarily until the Senator from Delaware concurs in my revision.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2066, AS MODIFIED

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the United States share of NATO's common-funded budgets, and to require an annual limitation on the amount of United States expenditures for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO)

Mr. STEVENS. I ask now that amendment 2066 be placed before the Senate. It will be accepted, and I ask that 2066 be voted upon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the next amendment.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. STEVENS], for himself, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. WARNER, and Mr. ROBERTS, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2066, as modified.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) UNITED STATES FUTURE PAYMENTS TO THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.—

(i) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES SHARE OF NATO'S COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS.—It is the sense of the Senate that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President should—

(A) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent; and

(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under subparagraph (A), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to carry out the United States proposal.

(ii) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES FOR NATO.—Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998.

(iii) DEFINITIONS.—In this subparagraph:

(I) COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.—The term ''common-funded budgets of NATO'' means—

(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget of NATO; and

(bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO.

(II) UNITED STATES PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.—The term ''United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO'' means the percentage that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO represent to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets during that fiscal year.

Mr. STEVENS. We just discussed this, and both sides have agreed to it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 2066), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. Parliamentary inquiry. It is my understanding amendment 2065 is temporarily set aside until a later time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes, if I may, to speak to the issue of the expansion. I have watched closely and participated closely as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I have a number of different thoughts about the place we find ourselves in now with respect to this first Eastern European expansion of new democracies to NATO—first Eastern European, obviously, since 1949.

I think most Americans who follow this kind of topic very closely are somewhat surprised by the level of the debate, the nature of the debate over the past week, sort of interrupted as it was for a period of time, and also by the seeming lack of significant concern in the country about this. There is, obviously, in the past weeks a sense by many of the pundits watching this who have observed it and pointed it out that, given the momentous nature of the transfer that is taking place, there might have been considerably more concern. Obviously, some of that concern has been heightened in the last weeks.

Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say the American public is fundamentally relatively oblivious to the fact that we are extending NATO's geographic range and military commitments. The debate

we now find ourselves in certainly doesn't seem joined like past debates of momentous impact on our foreign policy that many of us took part in and remember when Russia was the Soviet Union and issues of arms control loomed larger on our horizon.

One might ask why that is. Why is there this lack of confrontation or drama? I think it is quite simply because we are fundamentally presented with a fait accompli. It is true that the basic decisions have fundamentally been taken by Europe, by the President, by NATO, and I might point out significantly by Russia. Russia, recognizing some time ago that this was essentially a done deal, took steps to join in the available opportunities for cooperation that were made available. But at the highest levels of government it was very apparent to our leaders in bilateral discussions and otherwise that we were moving down this road. I suppose we have to be careful here, because if they mistakenly believe that somehow if they had offered greater opposition it might have been otherwise, I don't think that is necessarily the case, but clearly the debate would have been different, at least somewhat different.

So here we are in the Senate constitutionally charged with the power of advising and consenting of treaties. But essentially the Senate itself has been packaged and delivered much as the treaty has. I know that some outside of the Senate argued, ''Well, it is never too late. We can always make a different decision.'' But I think everybody understands the reality of where we find ourselves.

I have talked to a great many of my colleagues, each of whom have expressed the notion that perhaps a partnership-of-a-peace approach, or some other approach, might have been more advisable, but finding themselves where they were, they came out of that dilemma and that equation where we are today also.

It must also be pointed out, though, at the same time for those who have been complaining about the process, that the U.S. Senate had ample opportunity to do what it seems to be expressing a desire to do at the next stage, and that is be more a part of the process, impose itself more, know the consultative process, and, frankly, be more vigilant with respect to what the consequences are of some of the resolutions that come to the floor in the meantime, it is clear, however, that one of the reasons of the sense of lack of engagement at this moment is the reality that the Senate has gone on record a number of times in the last few years as being totally supportive of moving forward with enlargement.

So I think that all of this really underscores the dilemma of this ratification process at this stage. It has been very hard for anybody to object also to the notion that reconnecting Europe's east and west, performing modern diplomatic plastic surgery on a historical dividing line, which reminds everyone of Soviet oppression, and that post-World War II allied lassitude is somehow wrong.

In addition, many have found it difficult to say no, even if they thought they had reservations, to the countries of people who have so constructively and plentifully contributed to the life in the United States in which we are so connected historically, culturally, and politically; and many have found it difficult to even say no knowing that those countries at some point in the future in the meantime—depending on what Russia evolves into, depending on what history decides to lay in front of us, what history ultimately will be in the region—might someday ask the question that was on their lips in the not so distant past, which is, Why didn't you help us when you could?

So we are engaged in a debate that is rooted significantly in the emotions and the memories of the cold war, and with only a minimal and late reference to the changes that have already taken place, both in Europe and the rest of the world and in Russia, and to the full ramifications of the process of enlargement once begun.

The truth is that NATO already is no longer the same entity that it was a decade ago, and it no longer faces the same threat. For 40 years, NATO has stood as a bulwhark, preserving European security, and, by extension, our own security for one very simple reason. It was poised against the threat that was posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO was the simple wall of deterrence against Soviet expansionism and nuclear Armageddon. It drew its power and its raison d'etre from the geopolitical circumstances of the times. It was there like Everest, and it deterred because of its unwavering presence. It was not because of what NATO did that it drew its power. It was because of what was on paper, and in possibility. But now, with the Soviet Union's empire and the threat that they pose is gone, the truth is that so too is NATO's original mission. Today, democratic elements with varying degrees of success are taking root where communism once held sway even in Russia. To my knowledge, not one military expert or intelligence analyst has suggested that a threat like the old threat could emerge again without at least 10 years of buildup and warning. To be sure, Russia continues to be a nuclear power, but obviously a very different kind of nuclear power than the Soviet Union of yesterday. It is a country trying to make the transition to democracy and to Western institutions and values, both at home and abroad.

So while NATO continues to be a ''collective defense alliance,'' its mission today is not at least, so we state, to defend against the Russian threat, but nevertheless if we are to be honest, it is certainly at least still a principal rationale of it that we maintain it for and enlarge it as a hedge against the potential of future threats against the unknown, including that of the potential of recidivism in Russia.

Now with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the change in the nature of the threat, NATO has already begun a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other tasks. For example, peacekeeping, as evidenced by the presence in Bosnia, and the new NATO, if you will, has an expanded vision of the range of potential threats that include not only challenges posed by ethnic and political rivalries within Europe to global threats, such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater willingness to undertake certain kinds of missions to cope with those threats.

I know some of my colleagues find that transformation particularly troubling. Some may believe that what we passed with respect to the language and the scope of the NATO mission doesn't, in fact, change any of that. But I suspect as we go down the road and think about enlargement later on in other countries, the questions about those roles will become even more significant.

Mr. President, in my judgment, notwithstanding some of those cautionary instincts that a lot of us have about this process, and notwithstanding the potential difficulties that we may face down the road, I believe it is clear that the three countries in question—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—meet the basic requirements for membership in NATO, and that we need to recognize that in less than a decade those nations have successfully transformed themselves from Communist states into vital democracies with emerging market economies.

They have taken steps to establish civilian control over the military, and as participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace programs since 1994, they have already begun the process of integration into the NATO force structure and command. Each of these three nations has made it clear they are prepared to foot the cost of membership, and they have taken the steps to improve relations with their neighbors in an effort to earn that membership.

I believe that the benefits of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO are real. It will heighten the sense of security within those three countries not only through the extension of NATO's military guarantee but also through the psychological benefits of being a European member and a member of the NATO club, and interactions within the alliance will clearly help to strengthen the new democracies and their abilities to assimilate themselves into Europe both economically and politically, and obviously militarily within NATO's integrated force structure.

Their membership will enhance stability in Central Europe and strengthen NATO itself through the acquisition of additional forces and personnel to cope with future threats and missions.

These benefits notwithstanding—I think they are real—I express the concern that, as a number of colleagues have expressed it, admission of these countries, unless we do our job properly in the Senate, unless the consultation process is thoroughly pursued in the course of the next year, and unless we measure carefully the aftermath of the process of integration, the questions raised by the Senator from Alaska about funding, the questions raised by Senator WARNER and Senator MOYNIHAN, I think, are legitimate questions, not sufficient in and of themselves to stop us from proceeding forward, but questions which will have to be answered and addressed in order to be able to proceed forward.

It is important for us in the Senate not to permit the first tranche of admission to somehow create an automatic dynamic for further expansion to countries whose membership in NATO could conceivably—not definitely, but conceivably—pose serious strategic implications for the security of Europe and of the United States.

Personally, I believe, as others have expressed the fact, that it might have been equally as sensible, perhaps more sensible but equally as feasible, to proceed along the same line of building our relationships, building the democracies, integrating forces while simultaneously achieving the goal of START II and force reduction in Russia and building the democracy of Russia by dealing with the Partnership for Peace.

That was not the choice that was made, so we cannot stand here and debate what might have been. But I am convinced that a longer period of integration of armed forces and economic development over the next months will be critical to making the judgment about the next tranche, and it is critical for all of us not to allow this first vote to somehow create expectations that are unmeetable or create a dynamic that takes control of the process in and of itself.

One of the reasons I think it makes so much sense, obviously, and so much easier to accomplish what we are accomplishing now, which is why I think the vote will be significant in affirming it, is that historically these particular countries were a part of Europe before falling prey to Soviet domination during the cold war and culturally they do regard themselves as European. At the moment, there is no immediate threat to the security of those countries, but perhaps most importantly, the most significant component of Russia's leadership, beginning with President Yeltsin, came to recognize the inevitability of our initial intentions as well as to work out a process with the United States to make that acceptance possible.

The real question that has been asked eloquently by a number of our colleagues and needs to be watched carefully as we go forward from here is, when other countries of greater geographical or strategic significance to Russia push to admission, we have to carefully measure what the ramifications of that acceptance or rejection may be at that time. And I am confident that because of this process in the last weeks, the Senate is more prepared to do that than it may have been previously.

I believe the administration deserves significant credit for the way it has, in fact, managed this process. They have been, I think, particularly adept at focusing on those issues which have been raised in the Chamber with respect to Russia, and in my judgment they have laid the groundwork for our capacity to proceed down a cooperative, not a confrontational, road with Russia as a result. But clearly transitional politics in Russia, future issues about succession, and the politics of that nation have to play into our consideration in subsequent rounds.

We have to distinctly remember, I think, several critical facts. Democracy in Russia is in its earliest stages; Russia is still a nuclear power and the principal potential threat to European and American security; and, third, a good working relationship with Russia is clearly necessary if we are to achieve a whole set of other critical objectives on our foreign policy agenda, particularly that of nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons reduction, and the containment of Iraq both now and in the future.

The rationale for NATO expansion is rooted in the presumption that the continued existence of NATO is in our interests. It is the world's only established, effective, integrated military force with readiness and training. It benefits both us and Europe by tying us together and anchoring our involvement with the continent. It acts as a stabilizing influence on members that might otherwise come to blows, such as Greece and Turkey. It helps to nourish and strengthen the shared values and interests of its members and, through its security guarantee, it promotes the development of a united and secure Europe.

All of these offer very legitimate reasons for this current step that we take, but, again, one should not assume that that process of expansion or all of those interests will be served in the same way or be risk free as we go down the road.

Russia, as Secretary Albright acknowledged during the Foreign Relations Committee hearings, has always had strong nationalist forces which interpret every move that the West makes as anti-Russian. And while these forces may not have prevailed during this first round of expansion, there is no certainty as to what will happen in the future or that the next time we confront this issue, they may not be dominant within the life of the politics of Russia. In fact, the immediate prospect of NATO extending such an invitation could well propel those forces to dominance, given the transitional and tenuous aspects of the domestic politics of Russia.

So I think the question has to be asked as we go down the road, Will we and Europe be more secure if that were to occur or if Russia decided to enhance its security by increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons, therefore reversing the course that began with the ratification of START I and the signing of START II? Clearly, a country not defined an enemy today is hopefully not going to be made an enemy in the future by our unwillingness to be sensitive to some of those kinds of considerations.

Administration officials have stated thus far that no commitments or promises have been made about other nations' membership, and I placed into the RECORD earlier a letter from the President to the effect that he intends to adhere to a very strict consultative process in the future and that no secret or private commitments regarding membership will be made in the interval.

It seems to me that is the most important fact for us to focus on as we consider the future and the potential of what the Senate may face down the road. Some people may view that the assurances of the President are inadequate, but I disagree. I think when you really examine the full nature of the consultative process that we have had previously—the NAC visits, our visits to Europe, our discussions with NATO, our discussions in Brussels, the various meetings that took place between defense ministers and the Parliament and Congress—there has really been, I think, a much more lengthy consultative process than many Members have been willing to acknowledge.

In my judgment, as I said, Congress in many ways ratified most of that by passing a number of different resolutions along the course of time which stated that we were supportive of that particular enlargement. In light of that examination, of that process of consultation, and the President's commitment to replicate it as well as to avoid any private commitments, I think Congress is going to have ample opportunity, as we go down the road, to make the judgments about which some of our colleagues have expressed some concern.

I agree with the administration and with the Senator from North Carolina and others that we must never give Russia or any country a veto over our foreign policy. We certainly should not give them a veto over the question fundamentally of NATO enlargement. I agree with that. But I also strongly believe we have a fundamental responsibility to consider any country's likely reactions to the steps we take and other kinds of cooperative efforts that may be available to us at any point in time to secure the same interests that we may or may not be seeking to occur from actions that would, in fact, create a counterreaction.

I look forward to that future deliberation, and I also look forward to a greater clarity that will come through

the act of this first expansion with respect to the budgets and the true costs and true interests as they will define themselves as we go down the road. The bottom line is, however, that this expansion of NATO at this point in time under these circumstances will make NATO stronger and will also protect, enhance, and serve the interests of the United States of America. Those are the fundamental reasons for which we should enter into any kind of treaty, and that is why I will vote for this treaty.

I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS. On behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent when the Senate resumes consideration of the Conrad amendment numbered 2320, there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form. I further ask that following the expiration of time, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation to the Conrad amendment.

Mr. KERRY. This would occur when?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Upon the resumption of the amendment.

Mr. HELMS. I could not hear.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Massachusetts restate his inquiry.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts was asking when this would occur. I understand it is when it is called up. And it is not being called up at this time; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has not been called up.

Mr. KERRY. And it would have to be called up before we proceed?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.

I do not object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Let me say that I remember the old adage is, ''I like a finished speaker. I really, truly do. I don't mean one who's polished, I just mean one who's through.''

I deliberately stayed away from the podium yesterday because I wanted everybody to have their say on this matter, and I think it is time for us to move along and become finished speakers. But before I do, I want to make a few comments that occurred to me when I listened in my office and on the floor—a combination of the two—to various statements that were being made.

The Conrad amendment—and I have the greatest respect for Senator CONRAD—I must unalterably oppose because the United States has never, never agreed to tactical nuclear weapons reductions with the Russians, or the Soviets, for good reason.

First, these weapons are essential to an equitable sharing of the risk and burden associated with NATO's nuclear mission. Further, they are a visible sign that NATO is prepared to use any and all force necessary to deter an attack. Finally, there is absolutely no way that the United States can verify Russian compliance with an agreement to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, I am increasingly fascinated by the wailing, tearing of hair, and gnashing of teeth engaged in by the more liberal of our brethren, the news media, and otherwise, regarding the impact that NATO expansion would have on the United States-Russian relationship. It seems that the only argument against NATO enlargement—aside from the ''cost bugaboo''—is that Senate approval of this treaty will derail Russian ratification of START II, imperil future arms control agreements, and I have heard over and over again that it will turn Russia into a hostile power. I am going to agree to discuss these things as time goes by, but not this afternoon.

Mr. President, there has been a surfeit of bellyaching about the START II treaty. It has been nearly 5½ years since the United States and Russia signed that treaty. Since that time, Russia has used START II ratification as a pretext to hold hostage an ever-changing, ever-growing number of issues. And, of course, the weak-kneed arms controllers and Russia apologists in the United States have, in the past 5 years, been feeding the beast, encouraging the Russians to take one hostage after another. I could walk you through the various Russian threats, such as the Russians have threatened that there would be no START II treaty if the United States deploys a national missile defense.

At a press conference before the March 1997 Helsinki summit, President Yeltsin criticized U.S. discussion of a national missile defense stating, ''Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II—because ABM was suspended.''

Why does Russia not want the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty? Because with it we are prevented from having a national missile defense and Russia can hold our citizens hostage to its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Then there is a second threat. The Russians have threatened that there would be no START II unless the United States makes more foreign aid concessions. In 1996, the chairman of the Duma's defense committee, Sergei Yushkov, tied START II ratification not just merely to the ABM Treaty but to ''the provision of adequate funds for the maintenance of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.''

Threat No. 3: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless the United States makes other, unspecified concessions. In September of 1997, last year, there was a powerful voice that controls a sizable block of Duma votes who declared that START II should not be ratified until ''a favorable moment'' and that Russia should hold out for more U.S. concessions. According to this man, this leader, ''We have created a powerful missile complex, and we must use it to get certain advantages.''

Threat No. 4: The Russians declared there would be no START II if the U.S. mounts air-strikes against Saddam Hussein. In connection with the U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma declared that START II would never be approved if the United States were to use force against Iraq.

In the wake of that particular threat, the Russian diplomats at the United Nations have been working overtime to phase out international inspections of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological warfare facilities. We already caught the Russians red-handed trying to sell the Iraqis a fermenter specially-designed for biological weapons, and without UNSCOM inspectors poking around, Saddam's cooperation with Russia in developing these horrible weapons will be free and unimpeded.

Threat No. 5: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless the U.S. agrees to allow continued Russian violation of the START Treaty. Most recently, U.S. arms control negotiators were told that their refusal to shelve U.S. concerns over repeated Russian violations of the START Treaty would jeopardize START II ratification.

I was amazed to hear some point to the recent, massive salvo of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which the Russians launched to their destruction as the kind of cooperation that will cease if NATO is enlarged. Senators should know, as should others in the executive branch, that these SLBM launches were not emblematic of arms control cooperation.

In fact, the Administration has noted that these SLBM launches were violations of the START Treaty because Russia refused to provide telemetry as required. They simply brushed aside our concerns and went on with their plans.

Mr. President, the bottom line is that the Russian threat over NATO Enlargement is just one in a long, tired litany of ever-changing excuses for not ratifying START II. I urge the American people, and my fellow Senators, not to be taken in by this ludicrous argument.

I urge those who are bemoaning the abuse that we are doing to our ''Russian friends'' to listen very carefully:

There is not one arms control treaty signed by Russia that it is not violating! As I have said, Russia stands today in violation of its START Treaty obligations.

Likewise, Russia consistently has engaged in the worst, most abhorrent perversions of bio-chemistry known to man. Russian scientists continue to work overtime at weaponizing biological pathogens in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. According to key Russian defectors, Russia has placed enough biological agent—for example, small pox and various fever viruses—on its intercontinental ballistic missiles to wipe the human race from the face of the earth.

Similarly, as I warned during the course of debate on the Chemical

Weapons Convention, Russia is violating that treaty by clandestinely producing a series of nerve agents more lethal than any other chemical substance known to man.

And we have all read in recent days about the robust and continuing Russian assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program, in violation of their obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Mr. President, the list of arms control violations goes on and on. I am amazed that we are wringing our hands about antagonizing a country that is engaging in such abhorrent, reprehensible behavior. I challenge anyone to defend that regime's record of flagrant disregard for its treaty obligations, and its calculated assistance to regimes hostile to the United States. In light of these facts, piling another item onto the arms control agenda seems particularly ill-advised.

Russia is becoming, despite our best efforts to the contrary, a rogue nation bent on challenging the United States at every turn. Neither tactical nuclear weapons nor NATO expansion have anything to do with it.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2320

Mr. HELMS. I call for the regular order, the Conrad amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 2320, previously proposed by the Senator from North Dakota, Mr. CONRAD, for himself and Mr. BINGAMAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 30 minutes equally divided.

Mr. HELMS. There is a 30-minute time limitation; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is correct.

If neither side yields time, time will run equally.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, is the pending order the Conrad-Bingaman amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator from North Dakota has 13 minutes.

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is designed to address the question of tactical nuclear weapons. Let me just review briefly the circumstance we face, and remind my colleagues that unlike strategic weapons, unlike conventional systems, we have no treaty with respect to tactical nuclear weapons.

This chart shows the record on arms control. The red line is Russian forces; the blue line, U.S. or NATO forces. We can see under the Conventional Forces Treaty we have had steep reductions. In terms of strategic systems under the START accords, the same pattern—deep reductions on both sides on strategic systems. But on tactical nuclear weapons we don't know what has happened on the Russian side, although we have an estimate from our strategic commander, General Habiger, that they have 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons; we have about 1,600.

Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal—we need to know more. In 1991, Russia had 15,000; the United States, 3,500 in Europe. Today, in Europe we have roughly 400; they have between 7,000 and 12,000.

Terrorist use of a tactical nuclear weapons would be devastating. It would make what went off in Oklahoma look like a firecracker. That was a two one-thousandths kiloton equivalent, the bomb that went off in Oklahoma. The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima was 13 kilotons. The smaller tactical weapons of the day run in the 10-kiloton range. The larger tactical nuclear weapons are 300 kilotons plus.

There is also a strategic breakout danger. Under the strategic limits of START III, both sides would be at about 2,250 systems. Tactical nuclear weapons today: The United States, roughly 1,500 or 1,600; the Russians, 7,000 to 12,000. That becomes a strategic concern, that great differential between the tactical systems of the two sides.

This chart shows the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The distinction between the two is disappearing. During the cold-war period, strategic systems ran 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. The tactical systems currently run 10 kilotons up to 400 kilotons. But today's strategic weapons have been dramatically reduced in yield, down to 300 kilotons to 1 megaton. So the difference between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons is disappearing.

Let's listen to America's nuclear commander, the head of strategic forces. General Habiger said, ''The Russians have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons and we need to bring them into the equation.''

That is what the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is about. It is not about reducing United States tactical nuclear weapons. It is not about taking United States tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. It is not about those things.

It is about saying that we ought to engage the Russians in a discussion on reduction of tactical nuclear weapons because of the enormous disparity that they enjoy in these forces. It is about asking for a certification from the administration that they are engaged in that course. It is about a report on what we know about these tactical nuclear weapons.

I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague and cosponsor, Senator BINGAMAN of New Mexico.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota and compliment him on his leadership in proposing this amendment.

Mr. President, I have expressed grave concern about this whole proposal to expand NATO. One concern that I have expressed is that it diverts our attention from our real national security threats as I see them today. This amendment by the Senator from North Dakota tries to bring us back to those real national security threats by talking about the threat that is posed by these tactical nuclear weapons. For that reason I think it is a very good amendment and one that I am very honored to cosponsor.

Let me point out that we have had various hearings on this issue in the Armed Services Committee. There is no question but what the lack of agreement, the lack of progress, on dealing with tactical nuclear weapons is a serious concern for our military and a serious concern for our planners generally.

This amendment is extremely modest in its language. Let me just call people's attention to specific provisions of it.

First of all, it is a sense of the Senate. It does not have binding language in it. It essentially puts the Senate on record as favoring a certain position.

It says:

> It is the sense of the Senate that . . . Prior to the deposit of instruments of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the Senate that with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons
>
> (i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement. . . .

It is hard for me to understand what kind of argument our colleagues can make against that general proposition.

It is further stated that it is our policy that discussions toward these ends need to be initiated with the Russian Federation.

Mr. President, one of the arguments I have heard people present in opposition to this is that, sure, it may be a decent amendment, but it is not appropriate to consider it in the context of NATO enlargement.

I think just the contrary is the case, because clearly NATO enlargement can only be justified if it adds to our security in the European theater. This amendment will do more to add to our security in the European theater than the expansion of NATO that is now contemplated. For that reason, I think it is appropriate that we move ahead, that we vote for this amendment.

Quite frankly, I have great difficulty understanding why it cannot be accepted by all parties. It clearly states a position I believe the American people strongly believe in, which is that we need to do more to press the Russians to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, and I hope very much we will do that in the very near future.

I appreciate the time that has been yielded, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. It calls on the administration to initiate arms control negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear

weapons in Europe. The amendment seeks to push the United States down what I think is an extremely ill-advised path.

First of all, tactical nuclear weapons are essential to NATO. A credible alliance nuclear policy requires widespread participation in nuclear roles by our European allies.

The dual-capable aircraft and the few hundred substrategic nuclear gravity bombs which are deployed in Europe provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North Atlantic members of the alliance. The devices deployed on European soil are essential to an equitable sharing of the risk and burden associated with NATO's nuclear mission.

Second, the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear systems in Europe is an important demonstration of the U.S. commitment to deterring all threats to the territory of the alliance. These weapons are a visible sign that NATO is prepared to use any and all force necessary to deter an attack. For this reason, the defense ministers of the alliance have on multiple occasions expressed their support for the continued stationing of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

I ask my colleagues to ponder for a moment the message that this amendment would send if the United States were to expand NATO while simultaneously abandoning our nuclear commitments. Such a step would mean the hollowing out of the United States article V commitments and would gut the world's most powerful, stable defensive military alliance. NATO is different and vastly superior to other multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, because the members of the alliance do not merely pay lip service to the principles of collective defense.

Third, the fact that we have tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has nothing to do with the existence of or the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. We maintain them in Europe for reasons that I just mentioned. Throwing our tactical nuclear weapons into an arms control agreement with Russian tactical weapons makes no sense.

Finally, in the past, the United States has refused to agree to negotiate these weapons, for good reason. Simply put, it would be impossible to verify that the Russians are, in fact, complying with any agreement. Instead, the United States prudently focused on limiting delivery systems, such as missiles and bombs, which are large and observable and, therefore, verifiable. Given the importance of these weapons to the United States and the NATO alliance, and given the fact we would not be able to match the Russians cheating, as they have done on every arms control treaty we have ever signed with them, this amendment is conceptually flawed.

Again, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose the amendment.

Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I don't know what amendment the Senator from Arizona is referring to, but it is not my amendment. It is not the amendment that is before us. There is nothing in the Conrad-Bingaman amendment that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe—nothing.

The point is, the Russians have an enormous edge on us with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. Let's review the facts. Today, the United States has roughly 400 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; the Russians have between 7,000 and 12,000. How is it not in our interest to push them to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons? It is absolutely in our interest, just as it has been in our interest to get them to reduce conventional forces, as we have done by treaty negotiations, just as it has been in our interest to reduce strategic systems. But it is, I believe, dangerous to allow the Russians to have this kind of edge on us in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Again, I emphasize to my colleagues, there is nothing in my amendment—nothing—that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. I will take 2 or 3 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think that the flaw in the argument just stated is obvious. It is true, as Senator CONRAD points out, that there are no words in his amendment that talk about taking American tactical weapons out of Europe. That is not the point I was making. It is also true he could have said that there are no words in here that specifically call for the United States to reduce the number of American missiles.

He then makes the point that it would be desirable, since the Russians have more tactical nuclear weapons than we do, to get them to reduce those numbers. Indeed, it would. But I ask you, Mr. President, how we are going to initiate discussions—which is what this amendment precisely calls for as a condition to moving forward here—without putting at risk some of the American tactical nuclear weapons. I discussed all of the reasons why we need those tactical nuclear weapons. The very point that Senator CONRAD makes, that the Russians have a lot more than we do, makes the point that we can't afford to reduce the number that we have.

So, as a practical matter, while the words about reducing our tactical weapons are not in the amendment, there is no way to get the Russians to reduce their numbers unless we reduce our numbers as well. That is why, as I said, Mr. President, this amendment, which would have the effect, if these negotiations are in any way successful from Senator CONRAD's point of view, of reducing American tactical nuclear weapons. That is why this amendment should be rejected.

Mr. CONRAD. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from Arizona, the argument that he advances makes no sense to this Senator.

On conventional forces we, by treaty, have gotten them to dramatically reduce their forces as have we. The same is true of strategic systems. The place where there is an enormous disparity is tactical nuclear weapons. They have the advantage. And we are not engaging them in discussions on reduction?

I will tell you, if we could have a situation in which we take a 50 percent reduction and they take a 50 percent reduction, I would take that deal right now, because we would lose 200 and they would lose between 3,500 and 6,000. For us not to engage in discussions on ''loose nukes,'' which are the very ones that are most subject to terrorists, to being used in ways that are totally against the U.S. interests, makes no sense.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been here 25 years. The chairman of the full committee knows that there may have been, and there are people who have been, more effective people in pursuing arms control than the Senator from Delaware but none more consistently and more fervently than the Senator from Delaware.

This is not the place for this amendment. This is a treaty. This is a treaty. It is a treaty about expanding NATO. One of our colleagues on the Republican side, I was told earlier, had an amendment on the Kyoto environmental treaty saying we could not—I am told; I did not see it; but I am told he had been talked out of it, I believe—that we could not expand NATO unless Kyoto was dealt with.

Another one has an amendment that may come up here tonight dealing with—I believe, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma, at least he was talking about an amendment relating to a position I know the chairman shares, which I do not share, relating to strategic defense initiatives. This is not the place for that.

Secondly, I find it absolutely fascinating that some of the very Senators who have come to the floor and said, look, what we want to do here is we want to slow down passage, stop passage, or slow down new members coming in, because we are fearful it is going to offend the Russians or the Russians are going to get upset—a legitimate concern. But then they come

along and say, and by the way, before—before—we can deposit these instruments, the Russians have to agree to cut their tactical nuclear weapons, or whatever.

Now, that is giving to Russia a veto power over expansion in NATO.

Mr. CONRAD. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.

Mr. CONRAD. Is there anything in the amendment that is before the Senate now that requires a reduction on anybody's part before there is ratification?

Mr. BIDEN. Maybe the Senator can help me out.

Mr. President, maybe the Senator can help me out. It says, ''Prior to the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the Senate that with regard to [the following],'' and it lists the following nonstrategic nuclear weapons, that ''it is the policy of the United States . . . that discussions toward these ends have been initiated with the Russian Federation.''

All the Russian Federation can say is, ''I'm not going to discuss this with you,'' done, period, over; they have vetoed it. Look, if I am sitting in the Russian Duma, I am going to—and we are all worried about these reactionary nationalists who are the browns and the reds undercutting Yeltsin—I have got a real easy one. I go to Yeltsin and say, I tell you what, you've indicated to us you don't want to expand NATO but there is nothing you can do to stop it. I've got the way to stop it right now. When the President picks up the phone and calls you and says, ''By the way, I want to initiate discussions relative to tactical nuclear weapons,'' tell him, ''No. No.''

Guess what? By definition, no expansion of NATO, because the President cannot deposit these instruments until—until—he can certify to the U.S. Senate that discussions with the Russian Federation have been initiated.

Now, call me paranoid, if you would like, but I know what I would do. I am a pretty good politician. The Senator from North Dakota is even a better politician. We are all politicians in here. They are not any different in the Duma. They are no different in the Russian Federation. So I have a real easy one. And by the way, if they had not figured it out, I just told them.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. On his time I would be delighted to yield, since I have very limited time.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator refer to the bottom of page 2. It says there, ''Sense of the Senate. It is the sense of the Senate. . . .'' There is no binding language in this amendment. This calls upon the administration to try to initiate discussion with the Russians.

Mr. CONRAD. It would not stop NATO enlargement from going forward. This is not some scheme to stop NATO enlargement. I am opposed to NATO enlargement, but this does not stop enlargement. This does do something about sending a signal we ought to do something about tactical nuclear weapons when they enjoy this incredible edge over us and we seem to not pay much attention.

Mr. BIDEN. I am confused then. I am confused. Why is certification—I have never heard of a certification on the part of the President in a sense of the Senate. Explain that to me. Explain how a sense of the Senate requires a formal certification from a President. Like I said, I have been here a while. That is a new one.

So you mean the President can say, when we pass this, ''You know, BINGAMAN and CONRAD are good guys, they're my buddies and allies, but I'm not going to pay attention to them; I'm not going to certify anything''? Can he just say, ''I'm not going to certify it''?

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, in response, I would point out that there are many occasions where that has happened, and I am saying, it could happen here. This is a statement by the Senate, if it were to pass, a statement by the Senate, as I see it, that the Senate believes that the President should initiate discussions and should certify to us that he has done so. If he does not do so, he still has legal authority to go ahead and file the articles of ratification.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a question. Is the Senator saying that the President of the United States will fully be within the law if, when this passes tonight, if this were attached, if he is in a press conference and says, ''I want to compliment the Senate on expanding NATO, and I want to tell Senator CONRAD I'm not certifying anything''—would that be OK legally?

Mr. CONRAD. Yes. This is a sense—I mean, I do not know——

Mr. BIDEN. Great. I think that is wonderful.

Mr. CONRAD. This is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. Nobody knows better than the Senator from Delaware a sense-of-the-Senate resolution and its legal standing. What we are trying to do is direct the attention of this administration and our colleagues to the very real threat that ''loose nukes'' present. And we are trying to take the words of General Habiger, who has said to us they have 7,000 to 12,000 of these tactical nuclear weapons and we ought to address that differential.

Mr. BIDEN. May I ask how much time I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute 57 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. First of all, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Delaware and certainly support the points he made.

I think it is critical to go directly to the heart of what is behind this amendment. It has been a longstanding objective of the Russians to break our tactical nuclear connection with our NATO allies; make no mistake about that. We should do nothing in the U.S. Senate that assists the Russians in achieving this long-term goal.

Secondly, we need tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called credibility ladder. I would be very concerned if the only weapons we had at our disposal to act as a deterrent were strategic nuclear weapons. Mr. President, sometimes you need a graduated response. And to suggest that we should reduce the number of our weapons and we can do that by cutting out half if the Russians cut out half, that would leave us very few weapons, not enough to pose a credible deterrence. To suggest that we do that and then rely upon strategic weapons I think is something that no one in this Chamber would want to support.

And finally, as our colleague from Delaware said, we should not be tying up NATO expansion with this particular amendment. So I urge my colleagues again to vote against the Conrad amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.

Mr. HELMS. No. Go ahead.

Mr. BIDEN. I just want to make a point. I may be mistaken, but I think if my colleagues will look at this amendment, it is section (B) that is a sense of the Senate. The sense of the Senate controls language; only section B, a completely separate section is section C. If my colleagues wish to make the title of this sense of the Senate, it would be a different deal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENNETT). The Senator from North Dakota has 25 seconds.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I want to answer, again, the Senator from Arizona. There is absolutely no intent to require the United States to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons at all. The thrust of this amendment is the concern that a number of us have that Russia has an enormous edge on tactical nuclear weapons, and we ought to engage in discussions with them to get a reduction in those tactical nuclear weapons. That is clearly in the U.S. interest.

I hope our colleagues would support this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired on this amendment.

Mr. HELMS. I was assigned this afternoon to make the train run and to save Senators a lot of time. In that connection, I ask unanimous consent the Conrad amendment 2320 be laid aside, and Senator BINGAMAN be recognized to offer his amendment regarding strategic concept, and there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form; I further ask following the expiration time, the amendment be laid aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President might I ask for the yeas and nays on the Conrad amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I believe there are 15 minutes reserved on my side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2324

(Purpose: To require a certification of United States policy not to support further enlargement of NATO (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic) until revision of the Strategic Concept of NATO is completed)

Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair advise me when 10 of those minutes have expired and that the remaining 5 minutes be reserved for me to use prior to the vote on my amendment.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, without yet objecting, I would like to know if there is any time for a response to that prior to the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator wishing to oppose the amendment will have 15 minutes of time. It has not been allocated as to when that will occur.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I have no concern as to how you allocate that time.

Mr. KYL. I will not object.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me explain this amendment and use the 10 minutes I have at this point. First, let me send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. BINGAMAN], proposes an executive amendment numbered 2324.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The executive amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) UNITED STATES POLICY LIMITING NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS REVISED.—Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United States not to support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this amendment relates to what is called the NATO strategic concept. We have had quite a bit of discussion over the last couple of days about the NATO strategic concept and the fact that NATO countries, NATO members, including ourselves, have been engaged in serious discussions over the last year or two in an effort to revise the NATO strategic concept.

I think we are all aware that the current strategic concept for NATO is one that was arrived at back in 1991. It predates the disillusion of the Soviet Union, and the resulting emergence of new independent states. It does not account for the Civil War in Bosnia or NATO's peacekeeping operations there. It does not allow or contemplate the current nuclear or strategic concept, does not contemplate the denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and it does not contemplate the special relationships that NATO has established with Russia and separately with the Ukraine. So there is clearly a need to revise and update this strategic concept.

What my amendment says very simply is that the United States will withhold consent to inviting any additional countries other than the three we are talking about here today—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. We will not go forward with inviting any additional countries to join NATO until after NATO has approved this revised strategic concept.

This is simply a matter of understanding what NATO is doing before we agree to take in more members in addition to these three. NATO members need to decide on the alliance's mission before any new candidates or states are asked to join in the future.

I have great difficulty seeing why anyone would object to this. The reality is that the revised concept is expected to be completed even as soon as this summer. At the very latest it would be complete, as I understand it based on the statements by the NATO officials, before their meeting in 1999. So there is no attempt here to delay the invitation to other members in the future.

It simply says let's figure out what NATO is intended to do in this new post-cold-war world before we start inviting more people to join. Now, this doesn't strike me as a radical proposal. It is not radical from our point of view. It is certainly not radical from the point of view of potential new members. If I were representing a country that was considering admission to NATO I would be interested in what NATO's mission is, its new revised strategic concept is, before I would want to sign up. I think that is a reasonable thing for new members to want to know, and it is certainly reasonable for current members to want to settle on before we begin deciding which nations are appropriate new members and which are not. I think the amendment is very straightforward.

Let me make it crystal clear once more. It does not in any way relate to the enlargement of NATO to add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. That is not part of my amendment. My amendment assumes we will go ahead with the enlargement of NATO that is presently proposed by the administration in this treaty. But it says we will not go beyond that. We will not invite others until we settle on what this revised strategic concept is.

I have difficulty understanding, as I said, why this is objectionable. It seems to me imminently reasonable that this would be our position.

Let me make it crystal clear what I am doing. Let me read the one paragraph of the amendment into the record so it is clear what we are saying.

Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised strategic concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United States not to support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with any European state, other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Basically, what we would be saying is the President needs to tell us that it is our policy, the U.S. Government policy, not to invite others to join until we get the strategic concept settled.

I hope very much my colleagues will support the amendment. To me, it is an imminently reasonable, common-sense approach and I hope we can add it to the treaty.

I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I have great respect for the Senator from New Mexico. Much of what he says makes sense, but basically what is happening here is we are having a rerun of the Warner amendment. We are basically saying here that before any new members can come in, what has to happen is there has to be a new strategic concept agreed to.

Now, if I can make an analogy, that would be like saying my friend from Utah, the Presiding Officer, or of my friend from New Mexico, I am not certain what year their States came into the Union. The only claim to fame Delaware has is we are the very first State in the Union. I shouldn't say the only claim, one of the most notable claims. It would have been a little bit like Delaware, in the Thirteen Original Colonies, and the other States east of the Mississippi saying to you all out West, as long as the constitutional amendment for suffrage is under consideration to amend our document that controls our national affairs, no new States can come into the Union. Nobody is allowed in. As long as we are reconsidering—again, I don't know the years, and I apologize, when your States came into the Union. But as long as we are considering the 17th amendment, whether or not Senators are popularly elected, we are going to put on hold any new State becoming a member of the Union.

The 1991—and I don't have it with me—strategic concept was drafted by and agreed to by the 16-member nations after the Berlin Wall came down

and after the Soviet Union had disintegrated. The reason I bother to point that out, Mr. President, as my friend from New Hampshire kept saying yesterday—and appropriately—we have to look at the realities of the new world. This new strategic document took into consideration a new reality that there was no Soviet Union, there was no Warsaw Pact, there was a different world.

Now, what we said with the leadership of Senator KYL of Arizona yesterday, by a vote of 90–9, was the following. We said any new strategic concept that is to be agreed to in the future should accommodate the basic fundamental principles that we have adhered to thus far in NATO; and the Senator, with great skill, laid them out in specific form for all of us to see, incorporating the strategic notions that have underpinned NATO and the new reality.

So even though there is a consideration at the moment in NATO for an updated strategic concept, that could happen in a week, a year, a month, 5 years, or it could never be agreed to. And by an overwhelming vote in the Senate, 90 percent of us said, Mr. President, before you can agree to any new strategic concept, you have to make sure that what we have laid out here as the fundamental principles to guide that are incorporated in that concept. So I fully appreciate and believe that the Senator from New Mexico is concerned about strategic doctrine and is not using this amendment as a killer amendment to accomplish what Senator WARNER was unable to accomplish—that is, a de facto slowdown of any new admissions, an arbitrary judgment made that, without a new doctrine being consummated and another little blue and white book being published, no one can come in.

I further point out that the strategic concept of NATO is always under review, formally as well as informally. I assume the Senator's amendment speaks only to the formal review, the formal reconsideration of what that concept should be. Since 1991, NATO has changed internally with the creation of bodies such as the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russian Founding Act, NATO Ukraine Commission, and a more distinct role for the European pillar of this operation has emerged. The European politico-military situation has also changed. There has been significant reduction in the conventional armed forces. Both Warsaw and the Soviet Union are dissolved. NATO subsequently decided, via the ministerial and summit statements, to invite new members. We are doing all these things that we are concerned about already. We sent out a glidepath and a guide book to the administration as to how they must proceed with the next one, and to say until that is all done, no new members, is another way of trying to do in a 15-minute debate what my friend from Virginia and the Senator from Oregon and myself debated against for days.

So I respectfully suggest that our friend from Arizona has accommodated any concern about strategic doctrine with the amendment we overwhelmingly adopted, thereby clearing the way, and any justification for suggesting that the doctrine might change so radically that it might affect who we would be willing to bring in.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains of the 10 minutes that I had?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me just make clear what I intend by this amendment and what I think the language of it says. As much as I like to think that the U.S. Senate is all powerful, we are, in NATO, only one of the members. NATO is an entire organization. The United States and the other members have set about to develop this revised strategic concept.

As I understand the history of this, in July of last year, in Madrid, there was agreed upon—NATO Ministers agreed at that time to develop a revised strategic concept, which would be presented to them in their planned summit of April of 1999.

What my amendment says is that until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised strategic concept, whatever it is, for NATO, then we will not go ahead. At least the U.S. position is that we should not go ahead and participate in inviting new members. So I am talking about a very formal procedure here which is well underway. It was agreed to in July of last year in Madrid.

As I understand it, it is a three-stage process for conducting the review of the strategic concept. That three-stage process is well underway. There is no indication that I have seen that these deadlines will not be met. In fact, I have heard from people in the administration that they expect the revised strategic concept to be ready this summer, not in April of next year. So all I am saying is, let's figure out what NATO's purposes are and what its mission is before we take on additional members after we do these three.

So this is not an effort to delay, this is not an effort to postpone for 3 years, or 5 years, or indefinitely. I say, quite frankly, if we don't have agreement among the Council members, the Ministers of NATO, as to what the mission of NATO is, if we can't get agreement in the next period of time, then we should have it come back to us, and we ought to start thinking about how much more enlargement we want to do. That is the purpose of the amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will ask my friend a question on my time. What is the relevance of whether or not there is a new strategic concept as it relates to whether or not Austria is a new member of NATO? Are you suggesting that if the 16 NATO members now agree—or 19 when we finish tonight—to a change in the strategic concept, that change might or might not influence whether we should let Austria in if they meet all other criteria?

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I assume that part of what is being considered in this review of the strategic concept is the role that nuclear weapons would play in the future of NATO, where those weapons might be stationed, what the policy of NATO would be in the use of weapons. All of these are factors that I think would be very important for new members to know before they apply for membership and would be important for us to know before we agree to expand and expand and expand. Every time a member comes into NATO, we are committing U.S. forces to defend that territory. I understand that. I think it is just appropriate that we have some caution in committing U.S. forces to defend more and more and more territory, and that is the purpose of the amendment—just to understand where we are before we keep moving ahead.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's answer. The relevance is lost on me as to how that would affect who we would bring in or not. I understand the value of the strategic concept and why it is important that we should know it. These folks have already applied.

Let me point out one last thing. The Bingaman amendment would give sort of a pocket veto to further enlargement of certain countries. The French did not want the Slovenians in this time. But they didn't want to publicly say that they didn't want the Slovenians this time. This is my interpretation. And they said no Slovenians unless Romanians, because it is not very politic in Europe to say you don't want someone in directly. If I were the French or Germans or anyone else, I just don't agree to the new strategic concept. The present one works pretty well—en bloc membership.

I just think, Mr. President, this causal relationship being asserted between the strategic concept and new membership is tenuous. In changing the strategic concept, which we know has to follow the guide path of our friend from Arizona, we already know what it must contain for us to sign on to it. I just think it is totally unnecessary.

If the Senator is willing, and with the permission of the chairman, I am willing to yield back our time if there is any left, and move on, if my friend from New Mexico is willing to yield back his time.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much of the 10 minutes is still available?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 13 seconds.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the 13 seconds. I still reserve the 5 minutes. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: My friend has kept 5 minutes prior to the vote. Is there any time in opposition prior to the vote?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 5 minutes prior to the vote in opposition, if we choose to use it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator want to ask for the yeas and nays?

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will respond. I did not yet. But I at this time ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask that it be in order to propound a unanimous consent request regarding time for the next vote and the vote thereafter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that the first vote to occur on the amendment No. 2320, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment, be a 15-minute vote; that the second vote on this pending amendment, the Bingaman No. 2324, be limited to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Very well.

I suggest the absence of a quorum with the time being charged equally.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, just to give others an indication as to where I am and where some of the others are with amendments, I do have an amendment. It will take some time to get through, and yet I have a very strong feeling I do not want to hold up the emergency supplemental. I just want to make sure to get that on record so everyone knows. I certainly would not object to taking up the emergency supplemental prior to completing the NATO expansion.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Will the Senator yield for a comment?

Mr. INHOFE. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me also agree with my colleague. I was somewhat surprised when the unanimous consent was offered, but I just want my colleagues to know I also have an amendment which is going to take a considerable amount of time, and I do not want to hold up Members, who may wish to leave, who need to vote or feel we should vote on the supplemental.

So let me echo the comments of the Senator from Oklahoma and indicate that I am more than happy to agree to another UC to move the supplemental ahead of NATO if, in fact, it comes here in the near future.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have examined the landscape, and it gets more complicated as the returns come in. Now we cannot vote until 7 o'clock, because several Senators are ''far afield.''

Then there is an agreement that was made without my knowledge—and nobody was required to get my knowledge, let alone consent—that the vote on the Bingaman amendment would not occur until the Ashcroft amendment was dealt with. So we are not going to be able to vote at 7 o'clock.

I ask unanimous consent that sharply at 7 o'clock the vote begin on amendment No. 2320, and then we will proceed from there.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded that I may speak on the ratification of NATO enlargement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, we shortly will be entering into the closing hours of this debate. I want to take this opportunity to offer some observations about the ratification and also why this is so important.

I would like to take a minute, though, to really congratulate the people of Israel on the 50th anniversary of the founding of that great state, and how special, unique, that we are debating NATO expansion and bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO on the 50th anniversary of the founding of Israel. Forever and a day, I will always remember that we will have taken this vote at the same date of the anniversary of that state.

It will be important because, as we commemorate, soon, the 50th anniversary of NATO and the 50th anniversary of the founding of Israel, just like the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, as this century comes to an end, we will look at what came out of the end of World War II that created the institutions that will take us, hopefully, to a new century and a new millennium, where we will not repeat the despicable and inhumane practices of the old century, or ever again have to fight another war in Europe.

The Senate is about to take a historic vote and we are voting to make Europe more stable and America more secure. We are voting for a safer world. This will be one of the most important votes I will cast. Voting for a treaty is, indeed, a very special obligation, reserved only for the U.S. Senate.

For those who have known me, they have known I have fought long and hard for Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe to become free and independent. I think about the dark days of martial law in Poland, when we worked to support the Solidarity movement in Poland. Since the end of the cold war, when the captive nations of Eastern Europe threw off the yoke of communism, I have yearned for this day. I have supported the aid that the American people so generously provided to help the people of Eastern Europe build free-market democracies. I have introduced legislation with former colleagues, Senator Brown of Colorado and Senator Simon of Illinois, to nudge our Government toward welcoming the newly freed countries into our Western institutions.

My passion for this issue, though, is based partly on my own personal history. Each ethnic group in America brings their own history to this country. My colleagues have heard me speak about Poland's history many times in the past, because I have never believed that America was a melting pot. I always believed that America was a mosaic. We each come with our history and our culture and become part of something bigger than ourselves. So I come with thousands of years of history behind me, in terms of my heritage.

The history of Poland has indeed been a melancholy one, because every king, kaiser, czar or comrade who ever wanted to have a war in Europe starts always, first, by invading Poland. It has been historically true for a thousand years, and it has certainly been true for the last 100 years. At the same time, Poland has always wanted to be part of the West in terms of its values and in terms of its orientation.

It felt so passionate about democracy that when we fought our own revolution it sent two of its finest heroes, Kosciusko and Pulaski, to fight in the war for America's freedom. Pulaski came and was a brilliant soldier and led in the Battle of Savannah. Kosciusko was a brilliant tactician and led in the founding and building of West Point and, at the same time, then, fought for the democracy and became a great friend of Jefferson. He returned to Poland to help the Polish people of that time establish the first constitutional monarchy in Europe.

Poland thought it would be free and have a constitutional monarchy, but that was not to happen. In the 19th century, Poland was divided into three parts, under Russia, Prussia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it remained that way. That is when my great-grandmother came to this country. She came, not because she just wanted to come and start a new life,

she came on a prearranged marriage, because she wanted to forever escape that kind of occupation.

This evening is not about history lessons, but Poland was occupied, partitioned, invaded in World War I, had a brief stint of democracy between World War I and World War II, only to be invaded by the Nazis in World War II and occupied.

For me, growing up as a Polish American in east Baltimore, I learned about the burning of Warsaw. I knew about the occupation of Poland by the Nazis. I have seen films of the occupation, in which the great cathedral had Nazi storm troopers in there, burning the statues of the Saints and our Dear Lord himself, with their weapons. I learned about the burning of Warsaw at the end of World War II, when the Germans burned it because of the Warsaw uprising. Soviet troops stood on the other side of the Vistula River and watched it burn.

Then we learned about the Katyn massacre, where Russians murdered more than 4,000 military officers and intellectuals in the Katyn Forest at the start of the Second World War, so there would not be an intellectual force in Poland, ever, to lead it to democracy. For 5 years our family hoped and prayed, hoping World War II would end, with my uncle serving in the military. And then, at end of the war only to see Potsdam and Yalta occur, where Poland was sold out. My great-grandmother had on her mantle, three pictures, one of Pius XII, one of my uncle who had become a member of the police force, and the other of Roosevelt, because she believed in the Democratic Party. After Potsdam and Yalta, she took the picture of Roosevelt and turned him face down, until the day she died.

Those were the kinds of stories that I grew up with, looking at Poland as part of the captive nation. Then suddenly, in August of 1980, an obscure electrician, working in the Gdansk Shipyard, jumped over a wall proclaiming the Solidarity movement. And when he jumped over that wall, he took the whole world with him, to continue the push in this part of the century to free Poland. And then the movement, also of dissidents, spread.

These are the kinds of stories. What I wear here today is a picture of the Blessed Mother of Czestochowa. She is the Patron Saint and Protectress of Poland. Members of the Solidarity movement wore exactly this emblem because they were forbidden under martial law to wear any symbol related to Solidarity. So they wore a religious symbol. I wear this symbol today because this, then, is the next step toward what we fought for in World War II, what dissidents in these countries have worked for—to create a democracy and a free-market economy, risking their lives, imprisoned, living under the boot of communism.

So now those are the kinds of things that we must grasp. This is a historic moment, when three countries whose heart, soul, and political orientation is with us. So, I hope for those who worked so long and so hard, within Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, that we, then, understand the ratification of NATO enlargement.

Despite the importance of history, my support for NATO is based on the future. My support is based on what is best for our country. NATO enlargement will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It means the future generations of Americans, I believe, will not have to fight or die in Europe. It will make NATO stronger. It will make America stronger. And it will make Western civilization stronger.

Mr. President, I am only sorry my great-grandmother is not alive to see this, because when we vote to ratify this treaty, we will undo the historic tragedy that has often engulfed these nations and forever and ever, in the next century, ensure not only their protection but also ensure that despicable practices like the Holocaust will never again happen. That is what the 21st century is all about. That is why I will enthusiastically vote aye, when my name is called.

I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for months and weeks and days, we have listened to the intellectual exchange, the foreign policy considerations, the financial impact and what effect what we are about to do will have on bilateral-multilateral relations of the United States with other nations. That gave a context for this debate.

My friend from Maryland showed us the soul of this debate. I am proud to have been on the floor to hear her at this moment make the statement she made. Not only is it historically accurate, but it reflects the wave of emotion that tens of millions of Americans of Polish descent are feeling at this moment.

I would like to say something that is going to make her very angry. I would like our colleagues to consider that when we get to 67—we are going to cast our votes from our seat; I don't know if it is possible; it has never been done before—I think she should have the honor of casting the 67th vote for this treaty. I don't know mechanically how to do that. But you have no idea how much this means to her. You have no idea how much this means to millions of people like my colleague from Maryland.

I don't know how to work this out, but I am going to try, with the Democratic and Republican staff, to figure out whether there is a way we can officially record that my friend from Maryland was the 67th vote cast to take care of a historic inequity that her grandmother brought as a burden to this country and she as a Senator will help end.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I say thank you. I will be happy to vote when my turn comes. Thank you.

Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the L's come before the M's. I will be very happy to withhold my vote when it comes time, if that helps to get the Senator from Maryland in that sequence.

Mr. President, the vote on the resolution to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO, as we have all said, is as important as any we have cast in many years.

The debate on this resolution has been gaining momentum for over the year. The issues have been discussed, not always in the depth or with the clarity that I would have liked, but I am not among those who feel that we have not had an opportunity to seriously consider this resolution. I only wish that we had had this week's debate a year ago, when the outcome of the vote was not a fait accompli.

I deeply respect many of the people on both sides of the issue. None more than Secretary of State Albright, an ardent proponent of NATO enlargement, with whom I spoke by telephone yesterday while she was in China. I yield to no member of this body in my admiration of her.

I also give great weight to the views of the former Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, and to my close friend Senator MOYNIHAN, whose thoughtful speeches on the subject I have read with keen interest. I have also appreciated the views of a number of Vermonters who have expertise in arms control and U.S.-Russian relations. There have been well-qualified and articulate Vermonters on both sides of the debate.

But despite that, I am no more convinced by the positions of either side than I was when the debate began. After everything that has been spoken and written, I remain profoundly troubled by this resolution, as I know many others are. It is not more debate that is needed, it is the ability to predict the future, which of course none of us can.

It is because the future is so unpredictable, and I am still not convinced on an issue of such historic importance, that I will vote against this resolution.

Mr. President, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the world's most powerful and successful military alliance. For half a century, NATO served as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Europe. It has helped to keep the peace in a region that has seen countless wars over the centuries, including two world wars in this century. When genocide erupted in Bosnia it was NATO, with, I might add, the help of Russian soldiers, that enforced the Dayton peace accords. The earlier failure of the United Nations in Bosnia is but one example of NATO's relevance today.

So I am not among those who believes that because the cold war is over NATO is no longer needed. Bosnia proved otherwise, and there are other threats to which NATO might be called upon to respond. One, although no one likes to contemplate it, is a Russia in which the democratic reformers are ousted by nationalists whose attitude is overtly hostile and aggressive toward the West. I do not see that happening, but it is possible.

Russia is in the midst of far-reaching changes. Much of what is happening there is encouraging, even remarkable. The old Soviet Union is gone forever, of that I have no doubt. But democracy remains extremely fragile, and some of what is happening in Russia is discouraging, even alarming.

Some things in Russia have not changed. It continues to possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and while we and the Russians are cooperating on a wide range of issues including arms control, no one knows what Russia will look like ten years or even ten months from now. More than anything else, to vote for this resolution one should feel confident that enlarging NATO will lead to a closer and more cooperative relationship between Russia and the West. There is no more important issue for the security of Europe and the United States.

Reaching the decision to oppose this resolution was extremely difficult. Over the past couple of months as the vote approached I have seen that, as in many debates, the issues are far from black and white. I finally settled on four questions. I decided that only if I could confidently answer each of them in the affirmative could I vote for what amounts to a fundamental reshaping of NATO. I discussed these questions with other Senators, with the Secretary of State, and with many others whose judgment and opinions I respect.

I asked myself whether admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO result in a more united and secure Europe?

Would it result in a stronger, more effective NATO?

Would it improve our relations with Russia, especially Russia's willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear weapons?

And would it result in benefits that justify substantial additional military costs to the United States and the new NATO members?

These are not novel questions. Any one of them could occupy hours or even days of debate. They have been discussed at length by members of this body, and by some of our most knowledgeable European and Russian scholars and analysts including former Secretaries of State and Defense. What has struck me as I have read and listened to their views is the certainty and conviction with which they express them. Perhaps that is the nature of advocacy, but I find it interesting nonetheless because their conclusions, on a subject of such immense importance to our future security, are based on so much that is uncertain, indeed unknowable.

Mr. President, I began from the perspective that the presumption is against expanding NATO at this time. A rebutable presumption, but NATO has served us well for over fifty years and we should be wary of any attempt to substantially alter its configuration.

That is not to say that NATO can or should remain static. Its mission does need to evolve with the changing times. But what is contemplated here, by voting to admit these three invitees and opening the door to further admissions in the future, amounts to a fundamental reshaping of NATO. Before we take that step I want to be convinced that the benefits of enlargement justify the risks and the cost.

Would enlargement result in a more united and secure Europe? More united, probably yes. But what if expansion does not extend to the republics of the former Soviet Union, or even to certain other Eastern European countries. Then we have simply created a new dividing line in Europe, and new rivalries between those inside NATO and those that are excluded.

Would enlargement result in a stronger, more effective NATO? Frankly, I have been disappointed with the direction and focus of NATO in recent years. At times I have felt it was adrift, and at no time more than when NATO sat on the sidelines as the United Nations floundered in Bosnia. NATO has redeemed itself there but not until many thousands of innocent people had died, including in so- called UN safe-havens. NATO should have acted sooner and with far more decisiveness.

The administration says that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic accept the responsibilities of NATO membership and will contribute an additional 300,000 troops. Others argue that by adding new members we dilute NATO's effectiveness with poorly equipped, Soviet-trained forces. As Ambassador Paul Nitze has said, NATO would become ''fat and feeble.''

My own guess, and it is only a guess, is that NATO would probably not suffer, it might benefit from admitting these three invitees, but if additional countries are admitted next year or thereafter as most proponents of expansion anticipate, it would become unwieldy, even less decisive, and weakened.

My third question, and perhaps the most important, is whether enlargement would improve our relations with Russia, especially Russia's willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, the administration asserts that NATO expansion will lead to improved relations between the West and Russia because it will result in a more stable and secure Europe, a more prosperous Europe, and a new relationship between Russia and the former Warsaw countries that is based on partnership.

I do not see the evidence to support such a rosy picture. But whether or not it is true, is a military alliance the best or only way to achieve that new relationship? I do not see why. The enlargement of NATO, no matter how benign, can only strengthen the hand of left and right-wing extremists in Russia, while undermining the position of the democrats we support.

On arms control, the administration offers a litany of examples of how Russia is continuing to engage and cooperate on a broad agenda of security issues. There is cooperation, most visibly in Bosnia where Russian and American soldiers are enforcing the Dayton accords side-by-side. There is talk of the Duma ratifying START II in the near future. There are other examples.

But it seems to me that the real question is how can we best take advantage—not of Russia's weakness—but of the opportunity for a fundamentally different relationship, an opportunity that comes rarely in history, and which is fortuitously presented by the transitional stage in which Russia finds itself today.

In World War I, Europe isolated and alienated a defeated Germany, and in so doing sowed the seeds for World War II. After that war, through the leadership of great Americans like General Marshall and President Truman, we embraced our former German enemies and in so doing fostered one of the world's strongest democracies. It would be unforgivable to repeat a mistake of such tragic proportions.

Do we build a closer relationship with Russia by enlarging a military alliance possibly to its very borders, an alliance that has served principally to deter Soviet aggression? The so-called ''iron belt,'' as Senator WARNER has aptly called it? If Russia posed a serious military threat today I would see things differently. But the only serious military threat Russia poses is its arsenal of nuclear missiles, and I would argue that that threat is not diminished by expanding NATO eastward.

There is reason to suspect that NATO enlargement has already delayed DUMA ratification of START II, and that it has set back the cause for arms control in Russia. It has abandoned its ''no-first-use'' policy and, as its security situation deteriorates, Russia is headed toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

My point, Mr. President, is that while relations between Russia and the West are obviously far better than they were during the cold war, they are a far cry from what I believe they can and should be.

The Russians can be difficult to deal with. I am aware of that. They are obsessed with being treated as equals even though they are no longer a superpower. Russia in many respects is a poor, backward country. As we have seen in the recent spat with Latvia over Russian immigrants, Moscow is prone to reverting to its threatening, Cold War manner of dealing with its former territories.

But Russia is a big country. Big countries expect to exert a certain amount of power in their sphere of influence, and it will take time for Russia to recognize that those ways of acting are no longer acceptable.

No one knows who will follow President Yeltsin. Russia's future is too unpredictable for us to disband NATO, and in any event there are other important missions for NATO than to defend against Russian aggression. On that point I fully agree with the administration. I have lived most of my life in a world with NATO. I want future generations to benefit from this unmatched military alliance led by democratic nations. It serves us well.

But the United States should be doing everything possible to build a non-threatening, cooperative and stable relationship with Russia. Rather than rush to extend an historically anti-Russia alliance and build up the military capabilities of its neighbors—an approach that has undeniably caused great resentment and uneasiness in Russia, we should be building alliances that do not create new divisions between us.

Mr. President, my fourth question is whether enlargement would result in benefits that justify substantial additional military costs to the United States and the new NATO members.

One of the most troubling issues in this debate has been the cost projections. Estimates range from several hundred million dollars, which I find impossible to take seriously if these countries are to pull their own weight in NATO, to tens of billions of dollars. The administration's estimates have changed so many times that are virtually devoid of credibility.

As best I can tell, we only know that we do not know how much the admission of these three countries would cost, but that it would cost a lot and possibly a lot more than the administration says. When was the last time the Pentagon overestimated the cost of anything? I cannot recall a time.

Nor can I recall a time when we were asked to vote for something when the cost estimates differed so dramatically—from as little as $400 million to as much as $125 billion. That is a difference of over 300 times.

Nor do we know what it would cost to admit additional members after we cross this threshold. The President has said that ''no qualified European democracy is ruled out as a future member.'' There are over twenty. That is a potentially huge investment and a bonanza for the arms manufacturers who are not surprisingly among NATO enlargement's greatest champions.

The last thing we want to encourage is for the newly admitted countries will go on a weapons buying spree when they should be spending their scarce resources on economic development and infrastructure.

What would NATO be with 22 new members? That may sound farfetched, but under the President's scenario it is at least a plausible outcome and one we must consider before we start down the path of enlargement. I am afraid it would be a much weakened alliance, and one that Russia, rightly or wrongly, could quite reasonably regard as a threat.

And what commitments would we be making to those future members? President Clinton has said that NATO ''enlargement requires that we extend to new members our alliance's most solemn security pledge, to treat an attack against one as an attack against all.'' That is what the NATO charter says, but it is far from obvious that the American people are ready to accept that commitment. Others speak vaguely of different types of missions. I have strongly supported international peacekeeping, but I am uneasy about the lack of specificity about what we are committing to here.

Mr. President, I do not doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have every reason to want to be part of NATO. I also recognize that they have made tremendous progress in meeting the criteria set for NATO admission. But we must judge, above all, if enlarging NATO at this time in history is in the best interests of the United States—not Poland, not Hungary, not the Czech Republic, but the United States and NATO itself.

I have considered this resolution carefully, but I have been unable to satisfy myself that it is either necessary, or in our best interest. George Kennan, a man I admire greatly, called NATO expansion ''the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.'' I do not know if George Kennan is right. But neither am I confident that he is wrong. I am not prepared to gamble on his being wrong.

I hope that I am wrong. It appears that two-thirds of the Senate will vote for this resolution. I sincerely hope that the admission of new countries to NATO produces the desirable outcome the administration forecasts. If that happens I will be the first to admit that I was wrong, and to welcome that outcome.

As I said at the outset of my remarks, this has been a difficult decision for me. I obviously share the administration's goal of a united, secure and prosperous Europe. We all do. But I believe continued progress can be made to achieve that through Partnership for Peace and other means, without the risks and cost involved in enlarging NATO. Nothing, I am convinced, bears more directly on the future security of Europe and the United States than a democratic Russia that does not fear the West.

That should be our priority, that is what is at stake, and so the Senator from Vermont will oppose this resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed to a vote, may I ask the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Mr. BIDEN, if he is satisfied now with TED STEVENS' amendment?

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2065, AS MODIFIED

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am satisfied, and I will send to the desk, if I may, with the permission of the chairman, a modification that has been agreed to by Senator STEVENS and myself.

On behalf of Senator STEVENS, I ask that a modification to amendment No. 2065 be sent to the desk. This adds one word to the amendment which I have cleared with Senator STEVENS and with Chairman HELMS. I want to state my understanding about this amendment before we adopt it, which I have also cleared with the Senator from Alaska.

First, this amendment does not affect the Partnership for Peace Program.

Second, I understand this to mean that NATO cannot incur NATO expansion costs for which the United States would be obligated to pay except through NATO's common-funded budgets unless specifically authorized by law. And with those understandings, the amendment, as modified, is perfectly acceptable to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.

The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.—No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose.

Mr. BIDEN. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. To keep the Record straight, that is No. 2066, as modified?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 2065, as modified.

Mr. BIDEN. Amendment 2065, as modified.

Mr. HELMS. Amendment 2065, as modified. Very well.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Do we need to vitiate the yeas and nays?

I move to vitiate the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. I urge its adoption by voice.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

The executive amendment (No. 2065), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS. I think you have a UC, Mr. President.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2320

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on amendment No. 2320. By previous order, the yeas and nays have been ordered to occur at 7 o'clock. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Are we proceeding on the basis of a unanimous consent request that was entered into earlier to vote at 7 o'clock?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HARKIN. Further parliamentary inquiry. Will there be a series of votes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are two votes currently stacked——

Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is mistaken. There is only one vote currently called for under the previous order which was a result of the unanimous consent agreement. It is to occur at 7 o'clock.

Mr. HARKIN. As soon as the vote is over, I assume the floor would be open for further amendments and debate. Is that affirmative?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There have been amendments set aside. They would recur, if called up.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. At the conclusion of this vote, the regular order would be to return to the Ashcroft amendment; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HARKIN. Return to the Ashcroft amendment?

Mr. BIDEN. Ashcroft.

Mr. HARKIN. Is there a limited amount of time on that amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit.

Mr. HARKIN. So the floor would be open at that time. I thank the Chair. Thank you.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if I am not mistaken, we have two votes; the first would be 15, and the second 10?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was equally confused. But this is the parliamentary situation. Under a standing unanimous consent agreement, the Senate should now vote on the Conrad amendment No. 2320. By unanimous consent, there is a 10-minute limit on the vote on the Bingaman amendment, but the agreement did not call for the Bingaman amendment to occur immediately after the Conrad amendment. If that is the desire of the Senator from North Carolina, he will have to ask unanimous consent that that happen.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Now, this whole situation is fraught with sideline agreements that nobody recorded. Now, the understanding was that at this point—all right. So we will vote first on the Conrad-Bingaman; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HELMS. Amendment No. 2320, and then followed by 2324?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order for 2324.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest we get something done.

I suggest we proceed with the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from North Carolina asking that we move to 2324 after 2320? That would require a unanimous consent.

Mr. HELMS. We will do that afterwards.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All right. The question is on agreeing to the executive amendment No. 2320. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 16, nays 84, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 113 Ex.]

YEAS—16

Bingaman	Jeffords	Leahy
Bryan	Johnson	Murray
Bumpers	Kennedy	Wellstone
Conrad	Kerry	Wyden
Dorgan	Kohl	
Harkin	Lautenberg	

NAYS—84

Abraham	Faircloth	Mack
Akaka	Feingold	McCain
Allard	Feinstein	McConnell
Ashcroft	Ford	Mikulski
Baucus	Frist	Moseley-Braun
Bennett	Glenn	Moynihan
Biden	Gorton	Murkowski
Bond	Graham	Nickles
Boxer	Gramm	Reed
Breaux	Grams	Reid
Brownback	Grassley	Robb
Burns	Gregg	Roberts
Byrd	Hagel	Rockefeller
Campbell	Hatch	Roth
Chafee	Helms	Santorum
Cleland	Hollings	Sarbanes
Coats	Hutchinson	Sessions
Cochran	Hutchison	Shelby
Collins	Inhofe	Smith (NH)
Coverdell	Inouye	Smith (OR)
Craig	Kempthorne	Snowe
D'Amato	Kerrey	Specter
Daschle	Kyl	Stevens
DeWine	Landrieu	Thomas
Dodd	Levin	Thompson
Domenici	Lieberman	Thurmond
Durbin	Lott	Torricelli
Enzi	Lugar	Warner

The executive amendment (No. 2320) was rejected.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 2318

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I call for the regular order with respect to amendment 2318, the Ashcroft amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.

That amendment is now in order.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to express my strong opposition to this amendment and to urge my colleagues to vote this amendment down.

Before I start Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published today on this amendment in the Washington Times by David Gompert, who served as senior director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff under President George Bush. This is a very insightful piece, and I intend to reiterate and elaborate on the sound points raised by David Gompert.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A VOTE AGAINST NATO

(By David Gompert)

As the Senate prepares to ratify the enlargement of NATO, the debate has taken a troubling turn. While not questioning the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Sen. John Ashcroft has offered an amendment to the ratification resolution aimed essentially at limiting NATO's purpose to the Cold War mission of defending the borders of the European allies. Should such a new restriction be imposed, the big loser would be the United States.

Needless to say Sen. Ashcroft has no intention of harming U.S. security interests. His motivation, it seems, is to keep the U.S. from being drawn into peacekeeping operations, like Bosnia, that the Europeans ought to handle on their own. Reasonable people can disagree about the merits of U.S. involvement in Bosnia and other peacekeeping missions. In some cases, the nation will opt to send forces, as in Bosnia; in other cases, it will not, as in last year's crisis in Albania. But let's be clear: The NATO treaty does not and will not require the U.S. to participate in peacekeeping. The Clinton administration has never claimed that the U.S. has a *treaty obligation* to join its allies in Bosnia.

Thus, the Ashcroft amendment is at best unnecessary. Far worse, it could foreclose a potentially crucial strategic option for the United States, namely, to seek NATO's help in confronting future threats to the common security interests of the Atlantic democracies. In this world of rogue states with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons poised to seize Western oil supplies, why would we want to restrict NATO's purpose to our coming to the defense of European soil? Why would we want to cut off U.S. options in this unpredictable era? Why would we discard our chance to get allied support for U.S. security interests?

Wisely, the drafters of the NATO Treaty 50 years ago provided not only for the defense of the territory of the European allies but also for the possibility of common action to protect other interests. The United States wanted this latter provision—not as an obligation but as an option. When the treaty was signed, Secretary of State Acheson proclaimed that it contained no limitations on alliance missions. As long as the Soviets threatened Europe, the defense of allied territory was NATO's overriding concern. But now, the U.S. has begun to ask the Europeans to contribute more to the protection of other common interests, such as oil and security from weapons of mass destruction. It is time for the U.S. not only to give but also to receive security benefits from NATO.

Accordingly, since the Gulf War, when the U.S. had to send nearly all the forces and run nearly all the risks, the Bush administration and the Clinton administration have urged

the Europeans to move beyond the Cold War mission of border defense and to join the United States in combating the new threats. This work has just begun to bear fruit: The British, French and Germans have, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to build forces that could help out if, for example, another war erupted in the Persian Gulf. The allies are becoming convinced by the United States that NATO is too valuable—and the world is too dangerous—to restrict its options.

The Ashcroft amendment could derail this effort. By stressing that NATO's only business is to defend European borders, it would remove any motivation for the allies to field better forces for post-Cold War missions and give them a perfect excuse to let their military readiness decline. By suggesting that the U.S. will not support any other NATO missions, it would guarantee that the allies will not. By disapproving of the use of NATO to combat today's threats it would signal that the U.S. sees the alliance as having little value in the new era. Those Europeans that prefer to see the U.S. face the new era's dangers alone would welcome the Ashcroft amendment.

Worst of all, those who would threaten U.S. and European common interests, such as Iraq, Libya, Iran and Serbia, might be relieved, if also astounded, to learn that the United States was not going to use NATO to face them with a common U.S.-European front, in peacetime and war. These renegades are already trying to split us from our allies. The only thing that would bother and deter them better than U.S. power is U.S. power backed by NATO. The Ashcroft amendment—unintentionally, of course—could rule that out. Upon admitting the three new democracies as members, thus consolidating security within Europe, NATO will turn its attention to how the U.S. and Europeans can work together to combat common threats wherever they might arise. We will be debating and refining such a concept for years to come, and the Senate will have an important voice. By design, the treaty itself neither requires nor forbids new missions. The Ashcroft amendment would pinch off options that the treaty was meant to provide and that the U.S., above all, can now use to its advantage.

Mr. ROTH. I fully recognize that the sponsors of this amendment are motivated by the desire to preserve the vitality of NATO and the central priority of its collective defense mission. These are goals that I fully endorse. However, the motivations behind this amendment and its real and potential impact upon the Alliance are leagues apart. Mr. President, this amendment would do great damage to the Alliance and to the interests of the United States.

First, it intends to unilaterally impose for the first time in the history of the Alliance new restrictions on NATO's roles and missions. And it would do so, in absence of serious consultations within the Alliance.

Second, such a unilateral move by the Senate runs counter to the spirit and traditions of the Alliance. It would invite other allies to unilaterally impose their own restrictions and definitions on the terms of the Washington Treaty. We must not set the Alliance upon such a slippery and divisive slope.

Third, by imposing such restrictions, this amendment would undercut the ability of the United States to prompt NATO to take actions necessary to protect and defend the interests of the North Atlantic community. Worse yet, the language of this amendment would undermine the ability of the United States to call NATO to action in defense of American security interests.

Fourth, this chamber has repeatedly called upon our Allies to stop the decline of their defense establishments and do more to bear burdens of the Alliance. This amendment directly undercuts those efforts to attain more equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance and the transatlantic community. It would do by granting our European allies yet another excuse to not improve their defense forces.

At its best this amendment in unnecessary to achieve the goals of its sponsors. At its worst, the amendment would undercut the Alliance's will and capability to defend the security interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies.

This amendment is unnecessary to attain the goal of preventing the United States from being drawn into dangerous peace-keeping operations that the countries of Europe should handle on their own. The United States already reserves the right to veto any such initiative within or by the Alliance. Moreover, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty makes U.S. Participation in a NATO mission strictly a national decision. It is not an obligation. That has always been the case and will always remain the case in NATO.

It is quite evident that not everyone in the Senate supports the decision of the United States to have NATO lead the effort to bring peace to the Balkans. Nonetheless, it was a national decision by the United States and the United States Congress to support the NATO mission in Bosnia. And, the fact is that this military operation is completely consistent with the Washington Treaty. We should not allow disagreements with the foreign policy of the executive branch, as serious as they may be, to prompt dangerous revisions or restrictions upon a treaty that has been an unprecedented success for the deterrence of aggression and the preservation of peace. Yet, that is exactly what this amendment would do.

I understand that one key intent of the amendment is to express the opinion that the Alliance must remain first and foremost an institution of collective defense. That goal is already accomplished through the resolution of ratification. Just read it.

Section 3.1.A of the resolution of ratification declares clearly that the ''core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members.'' The resolution makes crystal clear that the Senate firmly believes that NATO's first priority must be the mission of collective defense.

Unfortunately, this amendment is not only unnecessary, it is dangerous. By attempting to define and restrict the missions that NATO can and should undertake, it risks foreclosing the ability of the United States to seek NATO's assistance in confronting future threats to the transatlantic community of nations.

Ironically, this amendment's current construction would not keep the United States from becoming engaged in any future ''Bosnia-type contingencies''—a core intent of its authors—because such contingencies as Bosnia can be defined as meeting its requirements. Indeed, the U.S. Congress has done just that by supporting our troops in Bosnia. But, this amendment, could serve as an excuse for our allies to avoid sharing the risks and burdens of such contingencies with the United States.

In a world of rogue states with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons increasingly at their disposal, why would we, the United States Senate, want to undercut NATO's willingness and ability to defend the common interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies? Why would we, the United States Senate discard one of the best vehicles through which to prompt allied support for U.S. security interests?

Some fifty years ago, the drafters of the Washington Treaty included provisions not only to provide for the territorial defense of the North Atlantic region, but also for the possibility of common action to protect other interests of the North Atlantic Community. It was the United States that insisted upon this provision—Article 4 of the Charter—and a construction of the Charter that would permit actions beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke to this point clearly before the Treaty went into force in 1949, and I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt of a memorandum of his press conferences in which he spoke definitively on this point be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT OF MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1949

* * * * *

A correspondent asked the Secretary to consider a situation which might arise if there was a demonstration of a power, not a member of this group, in the direction of one of the Middle Eastern countries such as Iran or Turkey which was considered by one of the powers in the group to constitute a threat to peace and security. He asked if there was any provision in the Treaty beyond the provision for consultation and Secretary Acheson replied in the negative. Asked if Article 9 did not provide for a recommendation by the council on a situation of this type, the Secretary replied that this was correct. He said that it applied for recommendations for carrying out or implementing the Treaty but said that this did not change what he had said earlier. He declared that there was no provision which looked toward these Parties acting as a unit in regard to some matter not covered by the Treaty and said they might act as a unit or they might not, but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them to do so.

Asked if there was no provision for anything except consultation, except actual

armed attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied that there were Articles one, two, three and four. Asked if there were no limiting clause the Secretary stated that there was no limiting clause. A correspondent asked if the area of the Treaty was specified but was not necessarily limited as to what the Parties might do after they might consult, considering the fact that an attack to security might originate outside of the geographical limits of the Treaty. The Secretary said that, in the first place, there was the very first article of the Treaty which says that the Parties affirm their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to settle their disputes peacefully. He added that he didn't know whether this would be called limiting but that it was one of the great obligations of the Charter, and that if it were carried out by all members of the United Nations a great many problems in this world would disappear. In conclusion, he said that he would think that it was quite limiting. A correspondent said that geographical limitations in Europe and the North Atlantic had also been set up in Article 5 and the Secretary said that this was right.

Asked if the Treaty stipulated that if armed attack should originate outside of the area no action might be taken, the Secretary replied in the negative.

* * * * *

Mr. ROTH. The fact is that the policy of the United States and the policy of NATO have always permitted actions by the Alliance that go beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Yet, this amendment clearly attempts to constrict the interpretation of the Washington treaty rendered by its founding fathers.

And, let us not underestimate what kind of example passage of this amendment would set for our Allies. It would encourage our European Allies to impose their own unilateral reinterpretations or restrictions upon the Washington treaty. Imagine our reaction, if one of the parliaments or governments of our allies were to attach such conditions to NATO enlargement. How would we react, if for example, one ally were to prohibit the use of NATO-designated units against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq? Judging from recent events in the Persian Gulf, I imagine the reaction in this chamber would be one of complete outrage.

Mr. President, we must also be aware of the message this amendment would send to our European Allies should the Senate make the profound mistake of accepting it.

For years, the United States, and especially the United States Congress, has worked arduously to make our European Allies more outward looking in their security policies and to assume a greater share of the risks and burdens in addressing common challenges and threats. We have repeatedly called upon them to stop the decline of their defense establishments and to devote the resources that will enable them to better contribute to the transatlantic security.

Yet this amendment, perhaps inadvertently, would signal that the business of NATO is only territorial defense, and no more. It would thereby eliminate any motivation for the Allies to field the forces necessary for post-Cold War missions. It would serve as an excuse to let the military establishments continue an over decade long decline.

Worse, this amendment would infer that the United States views the Alliance as having limited value in the post-Cold War era. This is an important point made by David Gompert, and I fully agree. Passage of this amendment could be interpreted by our allies and the detractors of the Alliance that the United States no longer regards its vital interests as being best secured through the fabric of the transatlantic community and the NATO alliance. That would be a dangerously counterproductive message—a message that would ignore the lessons of two world wars and the Cold War. I just don't believe that our memory is so short.

Mr. President, the Senate must reject this amendment. As I stated earlier, at its best, this amendment is redundant and unnecessary. At its worst, it is a radical and dangerous departure from the Washington Treaty of 1949 and the way in which the United States has over the years used the Alliance to advance our own national interests.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I now move to table the Ashcroft amendment, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Delaware to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from Missouri. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 82, nays 18, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 114 Ex.]

YEAS—82

Abraham	Enzi	Lugar
Akaka	Feingold	Mack
Allard	Feinstein	McCain
Baucus	Ford	McConnell
Bennett	Frist	Mikulski
Biden	Glenn	Moseley-Braun
Bingaman	Gorton	Moynihan
Boxer	Graham	Murkowski
Breaux	Gramm	Murray
Bryan	Gregg	Reed
Bumpers	Hagel	Reid
Burns	Harkin	Robb
Byrd	Hatch	Rockefeller
Campbell	Hollings	Roth
Chafee	Inouye	Santorum
Cleland	Jeffords	Sarbanes
Coats	Johnson	Shelby
Cochran	Kennedy	Smith (OR)
Collins	Kerrey	Snowe
Conrad	Kerry	Specter
Coverdell	Kohl	Stevens
D'Amato	Kyl	Thomas
Daschle	Landrieu	Thompson
DeWine	Lautenberg	Torricelli
Dodd	Leahy	Wellstone
Domenici	Levin	Wyden
Dorgan	Lieberman	
Durbin	Lott	

NAYS—18

Ashcroft	Grassley	Nickles
Bond	Helms	Roberts
Brownback	Hutchinson	Sessions
Craig	Hutchison	Smith (NH)
Faircloth	Inhofe	Thurmond
Grams	Kempthorne	Warner

The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2318) was agreed to.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2324

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the Bingaman amendment, No. 2324. By previous agreement, this is a 10-minute vote. We have 10 minutes of debate equally divided. Then there is a 10-minute vote. Who yields time?

The Senator from New Mexico will be recognized when the Senate is in order. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the members of NATO are engaged today in revising and updating the so-called strategic concept of NATO. We are part of this ongoing review. It was agreed to in July of last year in Madrid, by the Council, that this revision of the strategic concept would take place, and they set out a three-stage process to do it. They are well into that process now. The idea behind it was that the new, revised strategic concept will be presented next April at the Ministers meeting.

My amendment says that after the admission of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, it will be the policy of the United States not to invite other members to come into NATO until that revised strategic concept has been agreed to by the Council, by the NATO Council. To my mind, this is not a radical proposal in any respect. It is exactly the process that is intended to take place. It is very important, I believe, for ourselves to know what the new mission is and to have agreement on what the new strategic concept is before we take on new members and commit to defend their territory. Of course, I think it is also very important that the new members who would like to become part of NATO understand precisely what this strategic concept is before they sign on to participate in it.

So that is the amendment. There is no great mystery about it. It is not intended to subvert anything, to delay anything. It has absolutely no effect on the question of whether Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary should be admitted into NATO at this time. But it does say before we go beyond that, we should get this strategic concept agreed to. It is intended that that happen next year. I have every reason to believe it will happen next year. It is important that it happen before we begin to invite others to join NATO after these three countries.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very, very brief. This is a rerun of the amendment by my distinguished friend from Virginia, Senator WARNER. This is

a means by which to artificially delay any new decision relative to new entrants. We already have the strategic concept that contemplated and reflected the changes that took place in 1991. You all voted 90 to 6 last night on the amendment of the Senator from Arizona, Senator KYL, laying out in detail what must be taken into consideration by the United States of America to sign on any new strategic concept. This is, in fact, not necessary. It is not needed, and it is an unnecessary delay. So I am prepared—if my colleague will yield the remainder of his time, I will yield the remainder of mine and I am ready to vote.

I urge you all to vote no.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I would like to use an additional 1 minute of my time. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 2 minutes 33 seconds.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Let me just sum up my position. I do not think the amendment by the Senator from Arizona is related to this. That is a statement by the U.S. Senate as to what we think ought to be in the revised strategic concept. It is not a statement by the Council, NATO Council, as to what ought to be in there. I think it is important that we get agreement among our NATO allies as to what is in this strategic concept before we go ahead to invite new members. That is what my amendment says.

Unless someone intends that we invite new members in the next 11 months, there is no delay involved in this. So I hope very much my colleagues will approve the amendment and add it to the treaty.

I yield the floor and I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I see no purpose for this amendment. I hope my colleagues will view it the same way.

I yield the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will now call the roll on the Bingaman amendment, No. 2324.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) is necessarily absent.

The result was announced, yeas 23, nays 76, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 115 Ex.]

YEAS—23

Ashcroft	Hollings	Reed
Bingaman	Hutchinson	Roberts
Bumpers	Hutchison	Smith (NH)
Conrad	Inhofe	Torricelli
Craig	Jeffords	Warner
Dorgan	Kempthorne	Wellstone
Graham	Kohl	Wyden
Harkin	Murray	

NAYS—76

Abraham	Biden	Bryan
Akaka	Bond	Burns
Allard	Boxer	Byrd
Baucus	Breaux	Campbell
Bennett	Brownback	Chafee
Cleland	Grassley	Moseley-Braun
Coats	Gregg	Moynihan
Cochran	Hagel	Murkowski
Collins	Hatch	Nickles
Coverdell	Helms	Reid
D'Amato	Inouye	Robb
Daschle	Johnson	Rockefeller
DeWine	Kennedy	Roth
Dodd	Kerrey	Santorum
Domenici	Kerry	Sarbanes
Durbin	Landrieu	Sessions
Enzi	Lautenberg	Shelby
Faircloth	Leahy	Smith (OR)
Feingold	Levin	Snowe
Feinstein	Lieberman	Specter
Ford	Lott	Stevens
Frist	Lugar	Thomas
Glenn	Mack	Thompson
Gorton	McCain	Thurmond
Gramm	McConnell	
Grams	Mikulski	

NOT VOTING—1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2324) was rejected.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2326

(Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2326.

At the end of section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) COMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN PROGRAMS WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Senate declares that the President, as part of NATO's ongoing Strategic Review, should examine the political and legal compatibility between—

(1) current United States programs involving nuclear weapons cooperation with other NATO members; and

(2) the obligations of the United States and the other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2326

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Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2326.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it is not a long amendment. That is why I wanted it read.

It is very straightforward. It will be my intention to just speak for a few minutes on the amendment, and then I will withdraw the amendment. After seeing how all of the amendments seem to be faring here, it seemed ridiculous to waste any more time of the Senate to be voting on these amendments.

I feel strongly about this aspect of going into NATO enlargement. More than anything else, I want to explain the purpose of my amendment and lay down a marker regarding an issue that I know concerns all of us here and which could have very severe repercussions in an expanded NATO. That is the issue of the nonproliferation treaty of which the United States is a signatory and, of course, an issue that we have pushed very hard.

Many of us have spoken many times about the importance of not slowing down international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This amendment is simply a sense of the Senate regarding NATO's relationship to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility—

Mr. President, could I have order? I have trouble hearing myself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order so the speaker can be heard? He is entitled to be heard.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the President.

This amendment just urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility of its nuclear-weapons-sharing programs with our obligations under the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

The NPT is one of our most important international agreements. Not only is the United States a member of the NPT regime, we were a strong leader in establishing the treaty.

Its purpose, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Through a series of provisions, it helps halt the spread of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons knowledge. That is the important part of this—the nuclear weapons knowledge.

The nonaligned members of the NPT have expressed great concern over NATO's nuclear-sharing programs. Let me make it clear. The United States has nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in NATO nations. In time of war the United States could release these nuclear weapons to these allied nations.

Of course, in peacetime our allies do not have control over them. We retain control. However, we do assist in training foreign militaries in nuclear-use capabilities.

For example, we train our NATO ally pilots how to drop nuclear weapons. We train their ground crews on how to store nuclear weapons and how to load them onto aircraft. And 110 nations have expressed concern over NATO's expansion impact on the NPT.

The first indication of this, Mr. President, was in an article that appeared in Defense News, on March 30, saying that:

''The 113 members of the so-called nonaligned movement, none of which have nuclear weapons, have asked conference leaders at the meeting to discuss assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be targeted by nuclear weapons.'' Stephen Young, of the British American Security Information Council was quoted in the article as adding, ''If NATO won't give nuclear weapons up, and in fact continues to publicly declare nuclear weapons as part of its strategy for the future of the alliance, the fear is that some states that do not currently have nuclear weapons may become frustrated and decide to acquire them for protection.''

Now, we have a news release from the same organization that came in just yesterday that stated that: ''At the meeting of the member states of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty''—in Geneva on April 28, just 2 days ago, 110 nations of the nonaligned movement—''demanded an end to NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.''

A working paper representing the position of more than 110 states demands that—and I quote—''the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with states not party to the treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.''

Well, NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear-sharing arrangements. Under these arrangements, somewhere between 150 to 200 U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European States: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

NATO countries, of course, have always maintained that NATO nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war.

However, the NPT regime also involves, as I stated earlier, the sharing of nuclear knowledge. So I think it is a well-grounded concern of the nonaligned nations to express their concerns about the expansion of NATO and the fact that we will begin sharing nuclear knowledge with the three new member nations. I think their fears are well founded and worth considering.

Will we now, of course, with the addition of these three new nations, begin to share this nuclear knowledge? Are these three new nations full and absolute partners of NATO—as many have said here on the floor during the course of the debate, that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be second-class NATO partners but should have all of the rights, obligations, and powers inherent in any NATO member nation? If that is the case, then certainly we will begin to share nuclear knowledge with those three countries. I believe, Mr. President, that this could fly in the face of our obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Therein lies the conundrum.

If we do proceed with NATO expansion—and it obviously looks like the votes will be here to do that—and if these three nations become full partners in NATO, as many have said they should, and obviously they will under the reading of the protocols, we then will proceed to share nuclear knowledge with those three nations. And what of nuclear capabilities? I am not saying that we will turn over control of nuclear weapons—we have not yet done that to any nation of NATO—but we could get to the point where we might turn over nuclear weapons to those three nations if, in fact, conditions warrant it.

There is one other aspect—and I was going to offer another amendment, but I will not—the use and stationing of dual-use aircraft in these countries. Again, as members of NATO, we will be stationing aircraft in the countries that have dual uses. They can be used for conventional weapons delivery, but if fitted with the proper hard points and racks, they can also be used for nuclear weapons delivery. And will we then proceed to train ground crews and pilots in those countries in the delivery of these nuclear weapons, in their storage, and in their handling and loading capabilities? Again, I believe that we may do something which probably a lot of Senators have not thought about. That is how NATO expansion affects our obligations and our stated interest in the nonproliferation treaty.

So I am hopeful that the President will give due consideration to this. Quite frankly, I don't know what the President can do. Either we are going to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the NPT and not share nuclear knowledge and capabilities and training with the three countries coming in, or we will share nuclear capabilities, knowledge, and training with these countries, and violate the letter and the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. You can't have it both ways.

Another reason why I believe this rush to approve these three nations' accession into NATO is a march to folly—to quote the Senator from Arkansas, who last night quoted Barbara Tuchman's book, ''The March to Folly''—is that it just seems that the expansion has not been fully thought through, especially in the nuclear regime. If in fact we go ahead down that course, what then will Russia say? I know a lot of people have said, ''Well, Russia, understands what we are doing; they haven't raised a lot of objections.'' They have raised some.

Again, as Senator BUMPERS said last night, it is not now, it is when the elections are going to be held in Russia. That is when the hard-line right-wingers and the Communists will come out and say, see, we told you so. They will say that an expanded NATO in violation of oral assurances given to Mr. Gorbachev. Not only that, they could say that we have violated the nonproliferation treaty by providing nuclear capabilities to those three countries.

Right now, the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START II treaty. Nationalist elements have begun to gain power by accusing members of the democratic party with appeasement of the West. This will just give them another bullet in their arsenal in arguing that, in fact, Russia should change its course of action.

I was interested that former Ambassador Matlock, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union under the Bush administration, opposes NATO expansion. He stated, NATO expansion ''may go down in history as the most profound strategic plunder made since the end of the cold war.'' Ambassador Matlock further stated NATO enlargement ''fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the cold war, and proceeds in accord with the logic that made sense during the cold war.''

I agree with those words of Ambassador Matlock. I don't know Ambassador Matlock, never met him, as far as I know, but I think he has given us wise counsel. He is joined by many others across the Nation. I have watched this debate unfold over the course of the last few months. As more and more knowledge has gotten out around the country as to what NATO expansion really entails, the possibility of derailing START II talks, the unknown factor of what the costs are eventually going to be, the fact that once we have opened this door and with, I am sorry to say, the defeat of the Warner amendment—it was close—with the defeat of his amendment, you can bet your bottom dollar next year elements within our country will start pushing for new nations to be brought into the NATO umbrella.

How will we respond to those? By saying that they are less worthy that Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic? Will we say that somehow they are not ready, that we are going to have this hard dividing line in Europe? So it is going to exacerbate and cause even more tensions in Europe in the future.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will allow me to comment with him. I talked to former Ambassador Matlock today. I have known him since 1972, when he was part of our delegation that went over to work on the agreement. I have the highest regard for him. He confirmed to me very much what he advised the Senator. I just want to acknowledge that I think he is an authority that should be listened to.

Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate the Senator saying that. I have not met Mr. Matlock or talked to him personally. It is nice to know that even yet today he feels the same way. With words from respected people like Matlock, and with concerns such as what I have pointed out this evening in this amendment, more opposition has come out in

editorials around the country opposed to NATO expansion. The Des Moines Register, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, the Salt Lake Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle—spanning the spectrum of the country geographically, spanning the spectrum of the country, philosophically and ideologically.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some of these editorials be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Register's Editorials]

WHY RUSH? WHY NATO?—WHY EXPAND A MILITARY ALLIANCE THAT HAS NO LOGICAL ENEMY?

The end of the Cold War should logically have meant the end of NATO, the military alliance intended to offset the military power of the Soviet bloc, in favor of formal and informal alliances promoting more economic and social links. But logic has run up squarely against the interests of the defense industry. And far from disbanding NATO, the Senate is scheduled to vote soon on expanding it—to include the former Communist states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron have already promised to build arms factories in that area. The World Policy Institute reports that $1.2 billion in U.S. tax money has thus far been spent arming the countries in anticipation of NATO membership, and billions more must follow.

Meanwhile, the proposed NATO expansion has been one of the soundest sleeper issues in American politics. While the defense industry has dumped millions on Congress to win a favorable vote, the matter has rated the most meager of media coverage. But both President Clinton and the Senate Republican leadership favor it, and the skids are greased.

''What's the rush?'' Republican Senator John Warner of Virginia asked in a recent floor speech. Warner said expanding NATO will isolate Russia, needlessly threatening an already-insecure nation that retains a huge nuclear arsenal. Our priority, Warner said, should be further reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Instead, we seem intent on beefing up a military alliance that has no logical opponent—unless we succeed in creating one.

The Senate can vote to approve expansion, reject it or delay action pending further discussion. Expanding NATO without allowing reasonable time for considering alternatives is reckless and foolhardy.

[From The New York Times, April 29, 1998]

NATO AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

The small but vociferous band of senators opposed to NATO expansion retreated yesterday to trying to sell a series of amendments they hoped would delay enlargement or limit the financial costs to Washington. Only one, offered by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and John Warner, would put off this round of growth by making NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic contingent on their gaining admission to the European Union.

While it was encouraging to see the Senate at last thoughtfully debating the merits of expansion, the significance of the moment seemed to escape many members. Pushing NATO eastward may, as its proponents argue, only reinforce democracy and unity in Europe. We will be pleased if that proves true. But with the Senate now moving toward approval, the consequences could be quite different. The military alliance that played such a crucial role in preserving peace in Europe through the hard decades of the cold war could become the source of instability on that Continent.

The reason enlargement could prove to be a mistake of historic proportions is best explained by comparing the decision before the Senate with the far different course America chose at the end of World War II. America acted then not to isolate Germany and Japan, or to treat them as future threats, but rather to help make them democratic states. It was a generous and visionary policy that recognized that America's interests could be best secured by the advancement of its principles abroad and the embrace of its former enemies.

Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, the United States is taking an entirely different approach to the loser of that conflict. Though it has offered financial assistance and friendship to Russia, the Clinton Administration has made NATO expansion the centerpiece of its European policy. It is as if America had sent Japan and Germany a few billion dollars when the the war ended while devoting most of its energy to strengthening a military alliance against those countries.

It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile. At the very moment when Russia is shedding its totalitarian history and moving toward democracy and free markets, the West is essentially saying it still intends to treat Moscow as a military threat. The best way to defend Eastern Europe is not to erect a new barrier against Russian aggression but to bring democracy and prosperity to Russia so it will not be aggressive. The genius of American policy toward Japan and Germany was that it looked to the future rather than the past. It is lamentable that Washington lacks the imagination and courage to do so again.

[From the Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1998]

A CASE OF LESS IS MORE WITH NATO?

Like a fighter aircraft flying just above treetop level to evade detection by radar, the issue of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is moving, all but unnoticed by the American public, toward ratification by the Senate.

With formal consideration of the expansion treaty expected to begin in March, most knowledgeable observers look upon NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as an all but foregone conclusion. And with no serious opposition among the 15 other current members of the alliance—Turkey is the only one that has even feinted at rejection—that conclusion seems well warranted, even if the actual expansion is not.

This means that, very shortly, the U.S. will be committed to treat an attack on Prague like one on Peoria, a blow to Budapest like one to Birmingham. Since it is their sons and daughters, husbands and wives who will put their lives on the line. It would behoove the American people to give this issue the most careful thought. Unfortunately, that has not happened.

Indeed, the Clinton administration and its supporters in the expansion effort also may not have thought as carefully about it as they might, because expanding NATO could have the ironic result of making Europe, in the end, less secure than it otherwise would be.

Americans who supposed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. could finally lay down the burden of defending Europe may be surprised to learn that that is not so—at least not in the view of many in the foreign policy priesthood. What it has meant, according to the new NATO theology, is that NATO's raison d'etre has become not European defense from a ferocious USSR but European security.

The difference may seem so subtle as to be insignificant, but it is not. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, summed it up as a matter of keeping the Europeans from falling into a ''war of all against all,'' of becoming ex-Yugoslavia on a continental scale.

That is not an ignoble thing to do. The question is why is it the job of the U.S. any more than it is America's job to keep Hutus and Tutsis from each other's throats in Rwanda or to separate antagonists in any of the several dozen other places in the world where they insist on killing each other?

Good question, and one that never gets satisfactorily answered in discussions with European supporters of NATO expansion—and virtually every European of any standing or influence seems to support bringing in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

We have argued in the past—along with such foreign policy eminences as Henry Kissinger—that expanding NATO is a bad idea mainly because it would feed Russia's centuries-old insecurity about having foreign powers along its western border.

Certainly the West should not kowtow to Russia out of such concern, but neither should it needlessly antagonize Moscow and strengthen the anti-democratic crazies who use NATO expansion to promote themselves.

In interviews last week with NATO and American officials in Brussels, it was clear they believe they have disarmed the Russia argument by the friendship and cooperation treaties and consultations that have been concluded with Russia over the last year.

That's all very nice, but it's not at all clear that this era of good feeling is all that good or that it will outlast the perpetually infirm Boris Yeltsin. Even if Russia is currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will not always be so weak.

Leaving Russia aside, the question remains: Is it wise for the U.S. to make a commitment so grave as that implicit in expanding NATO?

It is not, and for an ironic reason: The more such promises America makes, the less seriously, ultimately, they will be taken, by those to whom they are made and those who might be tempted to test them.

Even without a NATO commitment, the U.S. probably would treat an attack on Warsaw as it would an attack on London or Wausau. But even with a NATO commitment, would it do the same for Bucharest or for Prague (where there seems to be a resounding public indifference to NATO enlargement)?

The very fact that the question can be asked—and it is asked by serious thinkers on this issue in Europe—suggests that, instead of increasing security in Europe, NATO expansion could weaken it.

Philippe Moreau Defarges, an expert with the French Institute of International Relations, sums up this irony with a French proverb that, translated, means. ''He who seeks to kiss everyone, kisses badly.''

[From the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1998]

QUASH NATO EXPANSION

The expansion of NATO is a policy in search of a justification. The U.S. Senate should reject it.

The pivotal truth in the debate is this: NATO was created as a defensive alliance to contain the spread of Soviet communism in Europe. When the Soviet Union died, the reason for NATO died with it. Expanding an alliance which lacks a reason for being makes no sense.

If NATO had been redefined to meet a new threat or to serve a new purpose, the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to its membership might be logical. But that has not occurred, except on a basis that is ill-defined and ad hoc.

If the new NATO is to be the policeman of Europe—a force to keep ethnic bloodshed and civil war in check in the Balkans, for example—that job can be accomplished without an expanded membership. Exhibit A is Bosnia, where NATO has taken the lead but where peacekeepers also have been drawn from nations outside the alliance.

The Clinton administration argues that adding the three new members will integrate them back into the West after five decades of separation. But NATO expansion is not necessary to bring the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians back into Europe's embrace. They already are there by virtue of having established democratic governments and market economies. Indeed, their inclusion in the European Union would be a surer sign of their return to the democratic European family.

The largest challenge for genuine European integration is not the three nations invited to NATO membership but rather Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Enlarging NATO toward the Russian frontier complicates this task, not because NATO threatens Russia or vice versa, but because, psychologically, the expansion looks backward to Cold War hostilities and suspicions.

The NATO expansionists charge that it is old Cold Warriors who cannot grasp the vision of a new, larger alliance. In fact, the opposite is true. It is those who are still thinking in Cold War terms who would expand an alliance whose purpose no longer exists.

[From the Houston Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1998]

ARMS CASH—DON'T LET WEAPONS DEALERS UNDULY AFFECT NATO EXPANSION

Like any group or individual, arms makers have a right to petition the government. But America's six biggest military contractors have spent $51 million over the last two years mainly to promote North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and that raises concerns. As does the fact that 48 companies whose primary business is weaponry have given $32.3 million to candidates to advance their companies' causes, including NATO expansion.

American arms manufacturers stand to gain billions in weapons and other military equipment sales if the Senate approves the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. New alliance members will be required to upgrade their militaries, and there is absolutely nothing wrong with weapons makers getting this business.

However, it is vital that lawmakers not be blinded by lobbyist cash to the importance of approving NATO's eastward expansion only if NATO retains its focus on military matters and if enlargement costs are shared equitably among member nations. Also, the United States must continue to insist that the new NATO-Russian Council has no real or implied ''veto'' of alliance matters—a move that had been designed to make the expansion more cooperative with and palatable to Russia.

These are important conditions, and they will continue to be important as perhaps a dozen other countries come to be considered for NATO membership. So however arms dealers' enthusiasm might infect senators considering expansion, lawmakers must keep their focus on maintaining NATO's integrity.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would have more articles, but I believe these are representative, geographically and philosophically, as to why we should not be rushing to expand NATO.

I will close by saying that I will withdraw my amendment, but I wanted to lay it down as a marker. We are going to hear more about the NATO expansion treaty and what it will mean to the nonproliferation treaty with our sharing of nuclear knowledge with these three countries, all of whom, I might point out, are signatories to the NPT. I think therein lies a dilemma. To this Senator's way of thinking, I believe the NPT is more important to us and more important to the world community than the expansion of NATO to include these three countries. Again, as Barbara Tuchman said in ''The March of Folly,'' ''I believe we are rushing into this without considering all of its ramifications, especially with nonproliferation.''

So, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take the time of the Senate to respond to all the Senator said. We have rehashed a lot of those things. I will just note that a 59–41 vote—I have been here a long time and I never thought that was a close vote. But let me say with regard to only one point, because a lot is not rehashed and lacking consequence, but we have debated it a lot. One point was raised that is new, and I thought it would be raised by someone.

The Senator from Iowa has just repeated the oft-heard assertion that the United States promised Gorbachev during negotiations on German unification that we would not expand NATO.

This is an important assertion. It is also historically incorrect.

Since opponents of NATO enlargement have taken to repeating this assertion as if it were true—most recently in a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, which contained other striking factual errors—I think it is imperative to set the record straight.

Both *Robert Zoellick*, a senior State Department and later White House official in the Bush Administration who drafted the famous ''Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement with the Russians in 1990, *Eduard Shevardnadze*, the current President of Georgia who was then Soviet Foreign Minister, have both made clear the no such promise was ever made.

There is nothing in the ''Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement about NATO expansion.

There is no secret addendum to the ''Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did make a comment ''not one step further east,'' which has been intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreted as having precluded NATO enlargement.

In actuality, according to Mr. Zoellick, the drafter of the agreement, this remark was related to what would be the status of U.S. forces if a united Germany were part of NATO. That is, *there would be no permanent stationing of American troops east of Germany, a position which did become official NATO policy* as enunciated by the well-known statement of the North Atlantic Council on March 14, 1997:

> In the current and foreseeable security environment, the alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

In fact, with possible NATO enlargement in mind, Zoellick made sure that the ''Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement did not foreclose the possibility of forces transiting Germany to reinforce Poland.

The September 12, 1990 Treaty precluded stationing NATO-integrated German forces on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany) until after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. These agreements explicitly did not apply to the rest of Europe.

Any agreement on the future security arrangements of other European countries would have been inappropriate, since such countries were not part of the talks.

Mr. President, lest anyone believe that this is one-sided American historical analysis, I would like to quote from an article in The Reuter European Community Report of February 13, 1997 entitled ''West Made No Pledge to Moscow, NATO Told'':

> Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told NATO this week that the West did not offer Moscow any guarantees about the alliance's future during talks over German unification in 1990...
>
> ...Shevardnadze's comments, made to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana during a meeting in Tbilisi on Wednesday, contradict Russian claims that NATO's enlargement plans represent broken promises by the West.
>
> Shevardnadze, who was Soviet foreign minister when Moscow cut the deal in 1990 with Western powers opening the way for unification, told Solana that the talks only concerned Germany...
>
> President Shevardnadze told the secretary general that during those two-plus-four-talks, no guarantees had been given concerning NATO enlargement...

Mr. President, the striking fact that the chief negotiators of German unification on both the Soviet and the American side have made categorical denials that any assurances were given about NATO enlargement should lay this specious claim to rest.

Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator will yield, now we get two sides. It seems to me if there is a meeting with the Secretary of State—it was James Baker at the time—and Mr. Gorbachev and our Ambassador, there would have been—there has been at every meeting I have been to—a memorandum called MEMCOMS were sent back to the State Department. I wonder if we can produce the MEMCOMS so we can look at those and see what did transpire.

Mr. BIDEN. You could ask them.

Mr. HARKIN. Who?

Mr. BIDEN. The President, the State Department. My understanding is that they are never released. I would be happy to have them released.

Mr. HARKIN. Would the committee ask for that?

Mr. BIDEN. I will not ask for it because we have never asked for a release for those purposes, other than affecting the outcome of a significant debate or an issue of national consequence.

Mr. HARKIN. This is a pretty significant debate.

Mr. BIDEN. It is ex post facto now. I would be happy to talk with the Senator about it. The Senator doesn't need me to ask. You are standing next to a chairman of a powerful committee. I am a mere ranking member of a Foreign Relations Committee. So I am sure if you get him to do it, he may be able to get others to do it. I have learned, even when I was a chairman, there was not much consequence to what I did and how I was viewed. Now, as a ranking member—we all know that ranking members are people who have no power. So I would find a Republican to help you out. You have a very fine one standing next to you.

Mr. HARKIN. My experience in my years here is that the distinguished chairman of the committee has been very successful in getting documents and papers out of the State Department in the past. I would hope that the committee would at least try to get these MEMCOMS so we can see what the facts are.

Mr. BIDEN. I will say this much to the Senator. I will inquire formally whether or not MEMCOMS have ever been released to the committee. If they were, I would be happy to talk with the Senator about how to get this released. It would be worthwhile knowing.

Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want everybody to know I am not usurping the prerogative of the chairman. He has asked me to do this. So I understand the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment, which I believe, after some negotiation with the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, we are likely to be able to accept. Is that correct, I say to my friend?

Mr. LEVIN. My understanding is that there is one change in those two words near the end. I think it ought to be accepted with that change.

Mr. BIDEN. I know it hasn't been introduced yet. Colleagues are saying: What is the deal? What is the schedule? I think we can facilitate rapidly a very important amendment which could have had a long debate in just a moment here. And then, as I understand it, the Senator from New Hampshire has an amendment and the junior Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment. To the best of my knowledge, they are the only remaining matters relating to this treaty, other than final passage.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

AMENDMENT NO. 2327

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. NICKLES], for himself and Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, proposes an amendment numbered 2327.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

In subparagraph (C) of section 3(1) of the resolution, strke clauses (ii) and (iii) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

(ii) An analysis of all potential threats to the North Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO members) up to the year 2010, including the consideration of a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threat affecting the North Atlantic area;

(iii) the identification of alternative system architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and an estimate of costs;

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk on behalf of myself and also Senator SMITH of New Hampshire basically says that under the report that is required by the resolution of ratification right now, the report says that we should have a study considering the cost of deployment of a NATO missile defense system for the region of Europe. I think, frankly, it should apply to all NATO countries.

That is the essence of the amendment. This is a NATO treaty. This is a mutual defense treaty for all NATO countries. All NATO countries are saying that they will come to one another's aid for the following reasons. If we are going to have a missile defense study for Europe, it certainly should have a missile defense study for the United States and for Canada.

That is the essence of my amendment. It is to make sure that we are not just having a treaty just to defend Europe but it is also to defend the United States and, of course, Canada, which I believe, as both the United States and Canada are instrumental and very important members of NATO, should not be denigrated and should not be put in a separate category or separate class.

I want to compliment my colleague from North Carolina for his leadership on this issue. He has done a very good job, as has the ranking member.

I will tell my colleagues. It has been I think a proud week for the Senate. We have not had a partisan vote yet. We have had a very, very significant foreign policy debate. I compliment my colleague from Virginia and my colleague from New York, Senator MOYNIHAN, for raising some very important issues.

Some people said, ''Well, the Senate hasn't considered this treaty. I will tell my colleagues, I think a lot of it has addressed this treaty pretty closely and even the committee reports. This is the committee report section. A lot of times some of us don't read those things. I happened to read this, or my staff brought it to my attention. I said, ''Wait a minute. This doesn't make sense. We are going to correct this.''

I appreciate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for their willingness to accept this amendment. But I think we have had some good debates. I think it has been very positive for the Senate and also positive for the mutual defense of all NATO countries.

I thank my colleagues. I also want to thank my colleague from New Hampshire for his leadership on this amendment as well.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the treaty before us not only promotes stability of Europe but also adds a measure of security to the United States. It also promotes universal values for freedom and democracy.

The amendment before us simply broadens the language of a study that is already required in the resolution to include the other NATO countries besides those in Europe.

I am one of those who is opposed to the commitment of a deployment of a national missile defense system before we know costs, threats, impacts on arms reduction, and technological feasibility. But this amendment does not call for any commitment to the deployment of a national missile defense; it simply broadens the geographical area of a study which is already provided for in the resolution.

I believe with that understanding and those two words that have been stricken, I understand, on line 6 of page 2, this amendment should be acceptable to all of us.

I thank my good friend from Oklahoma.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I want to compliment my colleague on his amendment. As chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee on the Armed Forces Committee, this has long been an irritation and frustration for many of us, the fact that we don't have a national missile defense. As it is right now, you have a provision in the NATO resolution that would exclude a missile defense system for Canada and the United States, and, in turn, having specifically mentioned Europe would be just outrageous.

I think that the fact that the Senator has identified this and brought this forward is a huge plus to this debate.

I also would like to lend my remarks in support of the remarks the Senator made about the caliber of the debate here. We have had, as the Senator said, no partisan debate but rather a very academic debate for several days now and one which I think is very, very important and I think will have a profound impact on our future and perhaps the future of the world.

I know people, as we get down to the latter part of the time here, get a little upset with planes to catch and so forth. But this is a very, very important debate. Votes have been changing in the past several days. In one case somebody told me they were absolutely in favor and are now opposed.

I think we are moving in the right direction. Even though this may seem dilatory, I am very much pleased with the debate and where we are.

I again want to say on this amendment that it is extremely important to identify and not to have this separation. To say in the NATO resolution that we would have Europe protected and not the United States and Canada just wouldn't work.

Let me just make a couple more points.

The President's plan, as we know, does not cover all of the United States. A plan for a missile defense system would comply with the ABM Treaty and, as required by the treaty, would be based out as a single site. The evidence available shows the areas that the President's ABM Treaty compliance system would protect in the event of a ballistic missile attack. As one can clearly understand, Alaska and Hawaii are left vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack under the President's plan.

There are a whole number of other factors, which I will not go into at this point other than to simply say that I am very strongly in support of this relatively minor change in terms of semantics and words. But a couple of words, where you change the word ''Europe'' and add ''Europe and the rest of NATO,'' that is very, very important and sends a very, very strong signal.

Again, I strongly support the amendment, and urge its adoption.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma, the Nickles amendment No. 2327.

The amendment (No. 2327) was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, what is the regular order? Are we permitted to speak at this point, or are there only amendments in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may speak.

Mr. DOMENICI. I ask that I be permitted to speak for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, fellow Senators, it was many days ago, it seems to me, that I spoke on this treaty. We have been on it for 4 days. I accepted the invitation to speak early on, like the leadership suggested. All this time has passed. Tonight, as we choose to do something rather historic, which I have no doubts about it in my mind and I believe it will be proper and I believe America will be very proud that we enlarge NATO tonight, all of the ominous predictions I believe will not happen and we will just have laid out another great big giant American stake for freedom, prosperity, and democracy.

I believe that is the way it is going to work.

I was most impressed as I studied this and met with different people in my office. I met with the Ambassador of Hungary, Gyorgy Banlaki. He was in my office visiting. My reason for being overwhelmingly in favor of this is what he said to me in the office. Let me quote it. It is very simple. It is two sentences.

> The people of my country would like to be able to choose our own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that history has denied us.

A few days ago I was here to say this is the Senate's chance to make the hopes of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic come true. Let them choose their own allies, for they have been denied that in the past. They have been denied the right to choose their own allies. We all know that part of history. In fact, they have been forced to choose their allies and to be part of their international arrangement, which was not for peace, as it turned out, but for nothing but troubles for the world and for these countries. We all know that.

I believe what we are doing tonight is typically American. We are saying to the three countries that were denied freedom and denied the right to choose their allies that we are glad that you are choosing the allied group that we are part of, and we are glad to have you.

I yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I plan to speak for about 11 or 12 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the foundation of European security since its creation in 1949, containing the Soviet Union for more than forty years and providing security to Western Europe. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO now stands as possibly the most successful alliance in history. Since that time, however, the Alliance has been forced to consider the continued relevance and future of NATO, and the United States has reviewed its role in Europe.

Since 1995, when the Alliance announced its intentions to enlarge NATO, the Armed Services Committee in particular, and the Senate in general, have conducted numerous hearings on enlarging the Alliance.

On February 27, the Committee forwarded its views on NATO enlargement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Those views are incorporated in the Executive Report of the Committee, which is before members of the Senate, along with the resolution of ratification.

During the Armed Services Committee's review of NATO enlargement, the following concerns were raised: the cost of enlarging the alliance; adapting NATO to the post-Cold War strategic environment; and, NATO relations with Russia.

Defense spending has declined steadily since 1985, from $423 billion to $257 billion—the amount of the defense budget request for fiscal year 1999. Because of the increasing scarcity of defense funds, the Committee focused extensively on the issue of costs, as the majority of the funding for the NATO budget is requested through the defense budget.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of enlarging the NATO to be as high as $125 billion over a fifteen year period, while the NATO Military Committee estimated the cost of enlarging NATO to be $1.5 billion over ten years. I remind my colleagues that the differences in the cost contained in the four estimates are primarily due to differing views on the threat, current and future military requirements of NATO forces, the condition of infrastructure and facilities in the prospective new member countries, and the activities identified by NATO as eligible for NATO funding.

Concerns were also raised about the willingness and commitment of current NATO members to bear their share of enlargement costs, as well as to continue to develop and modernize their military forces to defend their national borders and fulfill their Article V collective defense obligations as well.

Cost estimates developed by the Department of Defense for U.S. participation in the NATO operation in Bosnia raise concerns about the validity of cost estimates. In December 1995, the Secretary of Defense testified to the Committee that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia for one year to implement the Dayton Agreement would be $1.5 billion, and additional $500 million to provide logistical support. Before the year was over, the Committee was advised that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia had increased to $3.0 billion. Mr. President,

you are aware that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia over the past three years is now approaching $10 billion. We may once again be discussing the need for funds for Bosnia, as there are no funds available now in the budget resolution for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia in fiscal year 1999.

The Senate has been assured by the foreign and defense ministers of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that they will live up to their financial commitments. Our current allies have likewise given us the same assurances. If they fail to do so, the Senate can revisit the issue of burden sharing. Likewise, if the new NATO members, or current allies, do not live up to their financial obligations, I would expect the Administration to take appropriate action in the NATO military committee to revise the amount of the U.S. contribution.

With regard to adapting NATO to a new strategic environment, the committee was very clear on its position that collective defense should remain the primary mission of NATO, and recommended in its letter to the Foreign Relations Committee, that the resolution of ratification include an understanding to that effect. Regardless of changes in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO's mission restructuring it to deal with potential new challenges of out of area operations and to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation, first and foremost, NATO is a military alliance. NATO must remain militarily strong in order to execute its Article V obligations.

I understand that the NATO Policy Coordinating Group has developed suggested revisions to the 1991 Strategic Concept, which were circulated to Allies in late January. I also understand that the process in NATO for changes to be made to its strategic concept will take over a year. I believe it is important that the Senate be advised of any recommended revisions to the Strategic Concept, before the United States agrees to them. In particular, I believe it is important that the Senate be advised of any recommendations to change or dilute the core mission of the Alliance, revisions that would affect the distribution of forces in peacetime and redeployment capabilities, any recommendations to further enlarge the Alliance, and revisions that would affect the strategic balance in Europe.

As I stated earlier, since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet Union, many Americans wonder why we need NATO at all, much less an enlarged NATO with expanded security obligations. Skepticism about NATO's continued value is at least as widespread as support for an enlarged NATO. Frankly, I do not believe that the Administration has made the case to the public, or the Congress on why NATO should be enlarged, and why the United States should remain engaged in Europe. As a consequence, I worry that the lack of public support will result in a weak domestic political foundation, where the United States will find it difficult to maintain an expanded commitment in a future crisis.

We need to think about NATO enlargement in relation to national interests of the United States and our global strategy, and not just narrow political, organizational or even vital security interests. I believe NATO is still vital to U.S. interests. However, all Americans must first understand the magnitude of the commitment we are undertaking, and why it should be made.

I support a renewed and enlarged NATO because it ensures a U.S. involvement in the European community, and a ''seat at the table'' to the world's most vital, productive region. Quite simply, the U.S. has clear, abiding and vital interests in Europe. Europe is the soil where our deepest roots run. We are bound to Europe by innumerable links of trade, finance, communications, and technology exchange; ties of history, culture and shared values, and nearly five decades of mutual security arrangements.

A free and stable Europe has always been essential to the United States. In this century we have intervened in two bloody world wars to prevent the domination of Europe by aggressive dictatorships. We paid a high price for forty-five years of Cold War to prevent the domination of Europe and the Eurasian landmass by Communist imperialism. This long U.S. involvement and stabilizing presence have made the United States in effect a European power.

I do not believe Europe can remain stable and prosperous, to the mutual benefit of the United States and our European allies, if its post-Cold War boundary is drawn along the borders of Germany and Austria. Such an artificial division would leave a power vacuum in each central Europe, and consign millions of people who share our democratic values and aspirations to an uncertain fate. I do not believe a new European security framework will hold up unless it reflects the realities of the political upheaval that marked the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The new strategic environment includes the reorienting of former East Bloc states toward the West.

Some have said that the end of the Cold War spelled the ''end of history.'' I believe we are seeing the opposite. The end of the confrontation between the Soviet Empire and the Free World has unleashed historical forces suppressed for forty-five years. Nations and peoples are reverting to their patterns of the past.

One of those patterns of the past is Russian imperialism. Czarist Russia was an expansionist, aggressive regional power long before the Bolshevik Revolution. Although there is no longer a Soviet Union, Russia is still a great power—if no longer a super power—and is exerting its will in the so-called ''Near Abroad''. The brutal suppression of the revolt in Chechnya and Russia's intervention in Georgia, Azerbaijian and Moldova are worrisome examples.

America's primary national security goal in Europe should be to ensure that Russia makes the transition to a stable, free-market and democratic nation, but especially one that remains within its borders. Democracies do not make war on their neighbors. We should do everything within reason to help Russia's transition to democracy, to maintain warm and friendly relations, and to avoid unnecessary provocations. Likewise, Russia should take the hard steps required to transition to a stable, free-market and democratic nation. However, we cannot afford to let Russia's opposition decide the course of NATO enlargement.

In taking steps to assist Russia to transition to a stable and democratic nation, both the United States and NATO have established programs to reach out to, and cooperate with, Russia. With regard to NATO, just prior to the Madrid Summit, President Yeltsin, President Clinton, and NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This Act established a forum in which Russia can consult with NATO on issues of mutual interest, called the Permanent Joint Council. The United States has established programs in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to assist Russia in controlling its strategic arsenal, and to meet its arms control commitments.

The committee did, however, point out in its letter to the Foreign Relations Committee its view that activities in the Permanent Joint Council should not distract NATO from its core function. Again, while I believe we should take steps to aid Russia in transitioning away from its communist and imperialist past, I do not believe the Permanent Joint Council should be allowed to be used by Russia to participate in NATO matters, not used as a platform to divide the Alliance, or denounce U.S. policy.

The Clinton administration's policy toward Russia places all its stakes on the fate of Boris Yeltsin, and it does not appear to be having the desired effect. Moreover, the Administration's Russia-centered policy has caused us to neglect building solid relations with Ukraine and other former Soviet states. This also does not serve our goal. In fact, the policy of giving such sustained preferential treatment to Russia, and depending too much on President Yeltsin is the most destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe.

We have to face the very real possibility that our policies may not succeed. Russia may not make the transition to a stable, democratic nation, nor one content to remain within its borders. In fact, an unstable Russia, torn by factions and internal strife, may not even be able to agree where its natural borders lie.

The greatest potential threat to peace, stability, and security in Europe

is the return to power of Russian hardliners. President Yeltsin's popularity has sunk so low—that since his illness and heart operation—there is almost no yardstick against which to measure.

The United States and its allies need to look seriously at bringing into NATO the states of the East and Central Europe which share our democratic values, and which are able to assume mutual security obligations inherent in the Alliance. Only a strong NATO that includes those states can keep a future, resurgent Russia contained and deterred.

There are other reasons to expand membership of NATO, for example, the lessening of international tensions between members, and facilitating the resolution of conflicts. But we must not lose sight of the fact that NATO has been successful because it was a defensive alliance. Turning it into something else could fatally weaken it. Unless we understand that NATO's underlying and abiding purpose remains to defend Europe, the burdens of the Alliance over time will cause NATO to crumble.

As a great maritime power and trading nation, America has intervened all over the globe to protect freedom of the seas and our vital interests, from the earliest days of our existence as a nation. Over time we formed strong alliance to protect mutual interests, demonstrating that free democratic nations acting collectively, can survive the threat of tyranny. These kinds of alliances, the kind represented by NATO, with allies who share our democratic values, should be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Mr. President, I believe Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic share our values, and have worked hard to transition toward democratic nations and stabilize their economies. They have shown their willingness to act collectively with the United States by contributing forces to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War, and more recently, by sending military forces to work with NATO in Bosnia. Equally important to me, they have demonstrated their support for the United States during the most recent crisis with Iraq. They represent the type of nations which are deserving of membership in NATO, and I believe will be allies which the United States can look to in the future for support in areas of mutual defense and foreign policy interest.

The Senate will have to vote on behalf of the American people by a two-thirds majority to ratify the admittance of any new country to NATO. I do not want to see the Senate become an obstacle to progress toward the Nation's national security interests. For the reasons that I have outlined, I will vote to support NATO enlargement.

THE ALLEGED ''NEW THREAT TO RUSSIA'S BORDERS'' BY NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has asserted several times that NATO's enlargement to include Poland would for the first time bring NATO up to Russia's borders. This is because Poland shares a small border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

As I mentioned in our floor debate last month, the Senator's assertion is factually incorrect. Ever since the founding of NATO in 1949, Russia—first as the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union, then since 1991 as the Russian Federation—has shared a border with Norway, a charter member of NATO.

Norway's relations with Russia have remained excellent throughout. In fact, Norway gives Russia foreign aid, as do many other NATO members, the United States included.

The Senator from New York responded by minimizing both the size and importance of the Russian-Norwegian border. Here again, he was incorrect.

First, in regard to length, the Russian-Norwegian border is nearly as long as Poland's border with the Kaliningrad exclave—104 miles versus 128 miles, to be exact.

Second, militarily speaking the Russian-Norwegian border is much more important than the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Norway abuts Russia's Kola Peninsula, one of the most heavily militarized regions on earth. Among the Kola Peninsula's armaments are nuclear weapons.

In spite of the strategically sensitive nature of the NATO-Russian border, for nearly half-a-century relations have remained very good.

One might ask why. Aside from the tact and diplomacy of the Norwegians, another reason may be that NATO has not permanently stationed in Norway troops from other Alliance countries.

Mr. President, this is precisely what NATO declared on March 14, 1997 as the Alliance's policy for the prospective new members. So let's dispose of this bogey-man: Russia will not have to worry about large numbers of permanently stationed non-Polish NATO troops facing Kaliningrad.

I would like to return to geography for a few minutes, since the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia have brought this topic up several times.

I think that they would agree that in the bad, old Soviet Union the non-Russian Republics were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Moscow. Ethnic Russians who took their orders directly from the Kremlin filled the key positions in the Republics' political, economic, and military structures.

In that context, it is important to note that since Turkey entered NATO in 1952, the Alliance had a common border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—at that time Russian-ruled parts of the old Soviet Union.

For the record, that border was considerably longer than either the Russian-Norwegian or the Polish-Kaliningrad borders—328 miles long, to be exact.

So for nearly forty years, NATO had a lengthy border with the strategically vital southwestern flank of the Russian-ruled Soviet Union.

In fact, Mr. President, even today there are Russian troops stationed in the independent states of Armenia and Georgia.

So, once again, let's finally put to rest the nonsensical argument that Poland's joining NATO would constitute a new geographic move by NATO up to Russia's borders. It just isn't true.

ALLEGED AGGRESSIVE POSTURE OF NATO TOWARD RUSSIA

Moreover, the opponents of enlargement, the Senator from New York included, have asserted that by enlarging to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO will be assuming a militarily aggressive posture toward Russia.

Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth. NATO simply does not threaten Russia. Never did—never will.

Critics often characterize NATO's enlargement as if it were a massive deployment toward Russia. In reality, NATO's entire evolution since the end of the Cold War has been in the other direction, a fact which is patently clear to Moscow.

Since 1991, NATO countries have greatly substantially reduced their military forces, as measured by total spending, spending as a proportion of GDP, and by overall force levels.

American troop levels in Europe have declined by over two-thirds, down from a peak of over 300,000 to about 100,000 today.

NATO's forces during this period have moved away from Moscow, not toward it, as the Alliance abandoned its Cold War doctrine of forward, stationary defenses and relied instead on rapid reaction.

These changes have made NATO's posture unambiguously less threatening to Russia. The Alliance's enlargement does not appreciably change this fact.

Those who characterize NATO's enlargement as a movement of NATO power into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are simply wrong, and they do the public a grave disservice by suggesting this is the case.

The record has been clear for well over a year that this is not what enlargement means. In December 1996, the Alliance declared that it had ''no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,'' and has clarified that this statement subsumes nuclear weapon storage sites.

I have already cited the March 1997 statement regarding no need to move combat troops into the territory of the new members.

Moreover, the willingness of all Allies to negotiate adaptations to the Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) is a clear signal to Moscow that NATO seeks a post-Cold War arms build-down, not a build up.

NATO'S REACHING OUT TO MOSCOW

NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,

in the real world—not the rhetorical world—will not trigger an adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold War.

As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of enlargement are guilty of what might be called the ''Weimar Fallacy.'' They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National Socialism in Germany.

But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors of World War I. by contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations on Moscow after the Cold War.

On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our allies have provided Moscow with over $100 billion since 1991 to aid its political and economic reform.

One of the most important forms of aid has been through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program—known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar Program—which has provided $2.3 billion to Russia and other former Soviet states since 1992, with $442 million requested for FY99.

Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20 Russian SS–18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility.

Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make both our countries safer—not punishing the Russians at their own expense.

The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the transatlantic community, not isolate it.

In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In 1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the Partnership for Peace program.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces.

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with Russia on security issues of mutual concern.

Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March 1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G–7 leaders in Denver to inaugurate the ''summit of the Eight.'' The ''Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission'' continued to meet during the very period that NATO was pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

The Senator from new York in a recent speech in Texas warned darkly that NATO enlargement might lead to nuclear war. With all due respect to my good friend, I think his assertion is incorrect and alarmist.

He and other opponents of NATO enlargement have underscored Russia's disproportionate reliance on its nuclear forces, sometimes even resorting to scare tactics.

It is well known that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and Russia's transition to a market economy required jolting changes within Russia. Since 1990 Russia's economy has contracted by perhaps 40 percent and has only recently established and shown the first signs of recovery.

Partly as a result, Russian military spending contracted substantially. Russia's number of combat-ready divisions has also declined.

Beyond these measures, non-payment of wages and other factors have dampened morale among officers and enlisted personnel. The war in Chechnya showed the cumulative toll on Russia's forces.

Given this decline in Russia's conventional forces, it is understandable that Russia has apparently placed a heavier reliance on nuclear weapons. But this change became evident as early as 1992, when Russia declared that it would no longer abide by its previous policy of ''no first use'' of nuclear weapons.

There are many signs that ''no first use'' had been more of a propaganda tool than an actual reflection of Soviet policy, but the declared abandonment of this policy was significant. The move away from ''no first use'' gained a higher profile when it began to be discussed in public in 1997.

The Senator from New York and other proponents of NATO enlargement have recently charged that this increased reliance on nuclear forces was a consequence of Russia's fear of NATO's enlargement. This analysis is simply not credible.

First, as noted earlier, NATO's enlargement results in no significant increase in NATO's military capability relative to Russia.

Second, it is hardly likely that NATO's enlargement, begun in 1994, could have triggered a change in Russian policy that began in 1992. The fact is that opponents of NATO enlargement have constructed this argument retroactively.

The same is true for those who have attributed delays in Duma ratification of START II to NATO enlargement. Well before NATO enlargement was proposed, Duma critics of START II based their opposition on other arguments, from the cost of compliance with START II to the loss of national pride.

NATO enlargement became another useful argument for confirmed opponents, but hardly the cause of their opposition.

In any case, the Russian government is now moving to push ratification of START II through the Duma, perhaps by the end of June—another sign that NATO enlargement is no impediment to constructive relations with Russia or progress on arms control.

So, I would sum up by reminding my friend, the Senator from New York, of four key facts:

First, Poland's accession to NATO will not be creating a geographically new move of the Alliance to Russia's borders. It has had a strategically important border with Russia in the north for nearly fifty years, plus one in the south with Russian-ruled territory.

Second, there is absolutely no comparison with the allies' trimuphalist behavior toward defeated Germany after World War One and the reaching out of the United States and its NATO partners to Russia after it lost the Cold War.

Third, NATO has conclusively demonstrated through its movements of troops and equipment away from Russia's borders, and by concluding and carrying out significant arms control agreements, that it in no way threatens Russia.

Finally, it is completely false—even irresponsible—to assert that NATO enlargement is driving the world toward nuclear war. Cooperation, not confrontation is occurring on many fronts.

Russia need have no fear from NATO enlargement.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe NATO expansion is in the best interest of the United States. Also, expanding NATO will be in the interest of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and for that matter—world peace.

The United States' security is intrinsically tied to the security of all of Europe. An enlarged NATO will only extend the influence of peace and prosperity to these three deserving countries. Also, as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to grow and flourish, their acceptance into the NATO Alliance will only further integrate Western values and will lock in the practices of democracy. Locking democracy into this region is in the

United States interest and we should never shirk from our responsibility and duty to see that democracy is spread throughout the world.

While many foreign policy issues don't make the headlines and gather press, I do want to add to the record three opinion editorials from a few Colorado newspapers. I ask unanimous consent that an April 21st, 1998 editorial from the Daily Sentinel, a paper from Grand Junction Colorado, an April 28th, 1998 editorial from the Denver Post, and an April 5th, 1998 editorial from the Rocky Mountain News be printed in the RECORD at the end of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLARD. Let me highlight a few comments from these editorials.

The Daily Sentinel writes,

Adding Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO rewards three countries for their efforts against communism during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, Communists or something else.

The Denver Post states,

The Post believes adding these three nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world peace. . . . Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles, and Czechs, often against great odds. . . . their current governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

Lastly, from the Rocky Mountain News,

NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new alliance to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

For me this sums up many of the reasons why I believe adding these three countries to NATO will strengthen, stabilize, and promote peace for the United States and Europe. I urge my colleagues to support this NATO expansion.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Daily Sentinel, Apr. 21, 1998]

CONGRESS SHOULD OK EXPANSION OF NATO

Sometime very soon, perhaps by the end of the week, the Senate will vote on whether to ratify a treaty that would allow Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. It should vote decisively to allow the expansion.

Much has been said about the fact that the expansion will offend Russia because it will appear that NATO is expanding to the Russian doorstep. Clinton administration officials attempting to defuse that argument have declared that NATO is a peaceful alliance ''not arrayed against Russia'' or anyone else.

Such statements are, of course, necessary to deal with global politics. And they are misleading. NATO's purpose is to protect its western European members and the United States against outside aggression, including the possibility of a reawakened Russian bear decades down the road.

It's true that the Cold War is over but it's equally true that NATO was founded primarily to stem the expansionist proclivities of Soviet Russia.

Moreover, the three nations in question all challenged Soviet domination during that period, and each paid a heavy price in some form of Soviet retaliation—Hungary during the 1950s, Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and Poland in the 1980s. In discussing the NATO expansion, few people note that rejecting the membership of these three countries would be an even greater offense to them than their inclusion in NATO would be to Russia.

Additionally, while Russia is no longer communist, there is still reason to be suspicious of its expansionist tendencies which have gone on almost continuously since the days of Peter the Great. Two of the leading candidates to succeed Boris Yeltsin as president are nationalists who have hinted at trying to reassert Russian control over some of the old Soviet states which are now independent nations.

Adding Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO rewards three countries for their efforts against communism during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, Communists or something else.

[From the Denver Post, Apr. 28, 1998.]

ADMIT 3 MORE TO NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may well be history's most successful military alliance. Since its formation in the early days of the Cold War, not one square inch of any member country has been lost to external aggression. That record has not been lost on nations that were once members of the rival Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

This week, the U.S. Senate will vote on whether to admit three of those former rivals—Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic—to NATO. The Post believes adding these three nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world peace. But we would urge the administration and Senate to be extremely cautious about any more applicants, some of whom seem likely to embroil NATO in their domestic difficulties.

Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs, often against great odds. The 1956 Hungarian revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring and the rise of Solidarity in Poland bore eloquent witness to the ideals of their peoples. Their current governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

The Clinton administration has wisely stated it has ''no reason, no intention and no plan'' to station nuclear weapons in the new member states. Added to NATO but left in a nuclear-free condition, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary should be able to resume their historic role as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia and should thus be a stabilizing influence in Eastern Europe.

Beyond those three candidates, however, NATO should be very wary about further expansion. Already Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are eyeing admission and Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovakia are waiting in ther wings.

Some of these nations (Slovenia, Macedonia) are relatively new with little experience at democracy. Others, like Romania and Albania, had long histories of dictatorship alternating with instability. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are democratic and stable, but their location between Russia and the Baltic Sea makes them all but indefensible by nonnuclear means. Admitting Ukraine, Belarus or other former Soviet republics would be provocative to Russia.

In short, we support admission of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO. But there needs to be a great deal of thought, discussion and diplomacy before any more invitations are issued to join this exclusive club.

[From the Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 5, 1998]

SHOULD NATO GROW?—ENLARGEMENT OF ALLIANCE WILL TRULY SIGNAL THE END OF THE COLD WAR

(By Senator Wayne Allard)

The Cold war is over and many have argued that we can now begin to dismantle our defenses and look inward. I believe Secretary of State Albright said it best when testifying before the Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, ''[I]f you don't see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for fire insurance.''

The United States nor the world face the imminent threat of the Soviet Union, but this is no time to relax. United States' interests are still threatened by local conflicts; internal political and economic instability; the reemergence of ethnic, religious, and other historic grievances; terrorism; and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Soon, the U.S. Senate will debate and vote on the invitation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just because we are in a time of relative peace, we can not stop from being engaged in a fight for peace and freedom. I believe expanding NATO is the best way to ensure peace and stability.

First, NATO is and has always been a force for peace and prosperity. Enlarging NATO will only enhance the U.S. and European security and stability. Throughout our history, the U.S. has been closely linked to the stability of Europe, and that has not changed. The U.S. has been through two World Wars and a Cold War in Europe. However, since NATO was formed, not one major war or aggression has occurred against or between member states (except for Argentina's invasion of the British Falkland Island).

An enlarged NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done in Western Europe by strengthening the emerging democracies, creating conditions for continued prosperity, preventing local rivalries, diminishing the race for arms buildups and destabilizing nationalistic policies, and fostering common security interests. Enlargement will truly signal the end of the Cold War by no longer validating the old Stalinistic lines but will secure the historic gains of democracy in Central Europe.

Second, enlargement of NATO will further the integration of Western values into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Their invitation and movement into NATO will lock in Central Europe's practices of democracy. Enlargement will promote American-led multinational defense structures and prevent the renationalization of these democracies. As enlarged NATO will fill the security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet Union, subduing fear that the area will begin to divide nationalistically and begin to look like the former Yugoslavia.

However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has given these countries the incentive to peacefully resolve their border disputes. Since 1991, we have seen 10

major accords settling these differences and much of this is credited to the opportunity to join NATO. Even if old disputes resurface, NATO membership will help keep the peace, just as NATO has done in relation to the problems between NATO members Greece and Turkey.

Third, there has been concern about the Russian response to NATO enlargement. Russian leaders have expressed their dislike of NATO enlargement, in part due to the misperception that the Alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. NATO is not, and never has been an offensive Alliance, but one of defensive purposes only. We must respect the Russian concerns, but as my predecessor Senator Hank Brown has written, ''[W]orking closely with Russia in an attempt to allay their concerns makes sense. slowing or altering NATO expansion * * * hands the Russian government a veto pen.'' This would be a tragic mistake.

An enlarged and strengthened NATO promotes security and stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian security. The invited states must clearly know that they are no longer considered Russian ''eastern bloc nations'' but an integral part of the circle of democratic nations. Plus, unlike the Warsaw Pack, the decision by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join NATO was made by each individual country, without any coercion or force from any current NATO member.

Fourth, with any expansion there are costs. A bulk of the cost is to modernize and reform militaries and make them operable with NATO. However, being that the U.S. already has the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the cost will be incurred by our European allies and the three invited nations. They are voluntarily joining and understand the commitments asked of being a NATO member.

The United States' percentage of burden sharing for the NATO budget will go down with the addition of the three countries. Also, the U.S. is not obliged to subsidize the national expenses of any of the the three invitees to meet its NATO commitments. Adequate defense systems always costs money but alliances make it less expensive because costs are shared and countries join together to meet the challenges.

NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is the fourth time that the Atlantic alliance, which rose from the ashes of World War II, has decided to expand. And each time, expansion has served the same purpose—to expand the area in Europe within which peace, stability, freedom and democracy could flourish. The NATO Alliance was remarkably successful throughout its initial decades. Today we are considering a step designed to ensure that the success continues into the next century. This is not a decision that NATO, the U.S. or the Senate takes lightly. It is a more serious issue which goes to the heart of the question of how the U.S. can best promote our interest in peace and stability in the post-Cold War era. After all, these new members will enjoy all the benefits and bear all the responsibilities which apply to the current members of this mutual defense alliance. The U.S. will be obliged to consider an attack on Warsaw, Budapest or Prague in the same manner we are not obliged to consider an attack on London, Paris or Bonn. Having fought in two wars, I am most cognizant of the solemnity of the obligation we will be undertaking through the ratification of this agreement.

The 1990s, which witnessed the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, brought about a fundamental transformation in Europe. Where once we saw Europe divided into hostile, ideologically-opposed camps, we now see a continent increasingly united by a commitment to the principles of democracy and free market economics.

Initially I had two principal concerns about the proposed enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—the cost to the U.S. and the impact on relations with Russia. In the nearly ten months since NATO made the official decision to offer membership to these three nations, I have continued to examine these two areas and will summarize, very briefly, my conclusions.

In December of last year NATO completed a review of the estimated increases in the costs to NATO's commonly-funded budget resulting from enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report describes how NATO conducted its review and calculated its cost estimate.

NATO first identified the military requirements of incorporating these three new members into the Alliance. Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements. The NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will total $1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according to NATO, the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded budgets will average approximately $40 million per year over ten years.

This amount does not seem to me to be excessive, given the U.S. stake in continued security and stability in Europe. Obviously, in addition to these commonly-funded costs, there will be considerable additional costs to the new members themselves, which each of them has pledged to meet. Yes, the United States may decide to help these new NATO members modernize their military forces; just as we have provided such assistance to many of our current NATO allies through, for example, the provisions of loans or loan guarantees, for the purchase of U.S.-made military equipment. However, Mr. President, that is a separate decision for the U.S. government, one that is neither required by nor prohibited by our decision to support enlargement. The responsibility for ensuring that their militaries are capable of meeting their obligations to the common defense rest with the new members themselves.

It hardly needs repeating that cooperative relations between Russia and the U.S., and Russia and NATO, serve the interests of the U.S. and the Alliance. I am convinced that NATO enlargement and the development of a NATO-Russia relationship are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, since NATO made clear its intention to expand, NATO and Russia have concluded the ''NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security'', signed last May. This agreement is designed as a means of regularizing and formalizing consultative procedures between NATO and Russia.

Further, NATO is a purely defensive alliance, and a threat to no nation. The peace and stability within Europe promoted by the Alliance benefits the entire continent, including Russia. It may be unreasonable to expect Russia to approve of NATO expansion. But neither is Russia's unhappiness over the expansion likely to become the determining factor in Russian behavior toward the U.S. and the Alliance.

In summary, Mr. President, I believe that these two major issues arising from NATO expansion have been satisfactorily addressed. I will support NATO expansion and hope that the Senate will ratify the expansion agreement by an overwhelming margin.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Managers' amendment to the Resolution of Ratification, and of the Resolution of Ratification itself.

Even though the Berlin Wall has crumbled and the Soviet Union has dissolved, NATO remains vital. It is the cornerstone of stability for a continent that is under massive transition. The nations of central and eastern Europe have established democratic forms of government and have deregulated their economies. The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is the best way to bolster their fledgling democracies and market economies thereby making their newly-won freedom irreversible.

Let there be no mistake: our engagement with Europe since NATO was formed in 1949 has not been without its costs and not without its risks. Our engagement with the new democracies of Central Europe will not be without costs and risks either. The expansion of NATO will most likely antagonize Russia.

More importantly, as a military alliance, we risk obligating the United States military to defend the citizens of distant and unfamiliar lands. In the end, though, we have found it difficult to stay out of these conflicts. Just about anywhere in the world where there is conflict, our military is there.

I believe that disengagement from Europe, as history has repeatedly

shown, would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, I believe that we have no choice but to go forward with our current commitment to an expanded NATO. The Senate should vote to approve the Resolution of Ratification.

But, like many senators, I remain concerned at the potential financial costs of expansion. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am concerned that the Administration has not yet come to terms with the price of supporting NATO expansion or more generally with the costs of America's position as the sole superpower.

As was the case with Bosnia, there is reason to believe that the Administration is underestimating the costs of expansion in order to make ratification more palatable in the Senate.

Without pouring additional funds into the defense budget, NATO expansion costs that are unaccounted for may hinder the Defense Department's ability to carry out missions in other vital areas of the world and at the same time to modernize the force.

We have heard a number of cost estimates in the course of this debate. We must keep in mind that the new member nations, as the primary beneficiaries of expansion, must devote the resources necessary to shoulder their fair share of the common burden.

And I know that nothing would undermine the support of this body for NATO, or that of the American people, faster than a perception that the new members, or existing members, for that matter, were not living up to their responsibilities in this regard.

I am also concerned about another aspect of NATO expansion—one that has received less attention than the broader strategic issues, but one that is critical to the long-term success of an expanded alliance—namely intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

Here too, after a careful review, I have concluded that the long-term national interests of the United States are best served by a vote in favor of the Resolution. But I would like to encourage Senators to take the time to review the report that I will describe shortly, which is available in classified form in S–407.

An unclassified summary can be found in the Foreign Relations Committee report, Executive Report 105–14, on the Resolution of Ratification.

This report was prepared by the Intelligence Committee staff at the direction of Senator Kerrey, the Committee Vice Chairman, and myself, and submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate at large.

It contains the staff's assessment of the intelligence implications of NATO expansion.

The report is the culmination of the committee's work over the past year monitoring the progress of the accession process set in motion by the Alliance's decision last July to formally invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO.

The staff has routinely reviewed the state of the accession negotiations, a process that concluded in December 1997 with the signing of the accession protocols. Committee members and staff have met numerous times with NATO negotiators as well as representatives from the acceding states, both in European capitals and in Washington, D.C.

In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent, committee staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence officials; reviewed documents prepared by the Intelligence Community; and posed numerous questions for the record.

The committee directed the Executive branch—the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of State—to submit a formal report on the intelligence implications of enlargement.

Committee staff also met with members of the Alliance's Interagency Working Group on NATO Enlargement (IWGNE) to discuss integration efforts in the intelligence field.

Finally, committee members and staff traveled to national capitals of the three aspiring members to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge of how the civilian and military services of these countries operate, and whether adequate procedures are in place for the sharing of sensitive information with current NATO members.

Once again, I would remind my colleagues that the classified committee staff report is available in S–407 for Senators who may wish to read it.

The Committee has also prepared an unclassified summary of the report's major findings, and I would like to share with my colleagues the highlights.

OVERVIEW

The United States, along with its NATO allies, believes that membership in NATO cannot be granted piecemeal.

NATO has thus determined that there will not be a two-tiered security structure within the Alliance. If and when the three accede to full NATO membership, they will share in all rights and obligations, and will be entitled to share in Alliance secrets.

The work undertaken bilaterally and through NATO is geared to ensuring that the three invitees take the necessary steps over the transition or pre-accession period to demonstrate that they can and will guard NATO secrets appropriately once they join in April 1999.

In assessing the reliability of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in guarding NATO secrets, the following factors are critical:

1. the strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities;

2. the degree to which the three countries have succeeded in reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western-oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support for these services;

3. Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries, including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or taint their integration with the West;

4. counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by the three countries, and the adequacy of resources devoted to these efforts; and

5. the work underway between the three invitees and NATO to ensure that security standards will be met by the time the three join the Alliance.

COMMITTEE FINDINGS

As a result of their investigations, the committee staff arrived at a series of key findings.

Their report includes general findings, findings derived from the experience of our respective intelligence agencies working together in both bilateral and multilateral fora; and findings relating to the counterintelligence threat, the pace of reform and the NATO work program for intelligence issues.

GENERAL FINDINGS

Perhaps most important, the report makes a point that is obvious but nonetheless bears repeating: any intelligence sharing relationship inevitably involves some risks.

Nevertheless, I believe that the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and NATO interests. As many of my colleagues are aware, cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root.

In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a decade.

Based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling operational information and capable of guarding classified information—some of it extremely sensitive.

THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT

In the multilateral context, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have participated in the Implementation Force and the Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia, and have cooperated actively with U.S. intelligence to provide critical force protection information.

The three countries have demonstrated a solid record in the area of information and operational security within the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.

In addition, all three countries value their bilateral links to the U.S. and wish to expand them. They view multilateral intelligence cooperation in NATO as a complement to, not a substitute for, these bilateral intelligence relations.

THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT

The single most critical intelligence issue we face in inviting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is the counterintelligence question.

It is an unavoidable fact that past associations with Soviet intelligence services, together with proximity to Russia, make these countries vulnerable to hostile intelligence activity.

Over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability. But for the time being, the threat is there.

The problem is not one of attitudes. The legacy these countries inherit from 44 years of Soviet domination makes them suspicious of Russian policies and motives.

Indeed, for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the problem is not complacency about the foreign intelligence threat, but ensuring a capability to counter it.

Lastly, and to put this issue into perspective, we should recall that Russian and other intelligence efforts to penetrate NATO will continue, irrespective of new Alliance members.

THE RECORD OF REFORM

With respect to the critical issue of reform, all three countries have made significant strides in restructuring, reforming, and redirecting their intelligence services.

More needs to be done to attain greater experience in parliamentary oversight of the services, to secure acceptance by politicians of the need for these services to maintain political neutrality, to retain and promote experienced officers with Western orientation, and to enhance computer security.

As professionalism increases, morale will improve, and the intelligence services will be looked upon as contributing to common security interests. Adequate funding and visible support from the political leadership will be essential to this process.

THE NATO WORK PROGRAM

The three invitees are continuing to work with NATO in preparation for their final accession.

In cooperation with NATO to date, in a variety of interactions with the U.S. and other current NATO allies, including the sharing of sensitive information through the Partnership for Peace program, IFOR/SFOR, and in bilateral intelligence cooperation, the three invitees have demonstrated solid records in the area of information and operational security.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have undertaken significant steps to conform to NATO security standards and have enhanced personnel and information security practices.

Looking toward accession in April 1999, from a NATO perspective, the intelligence aspects of NATO enlargement appear to be on track. Indeed, the intelligence planning in NATO is currently ahead of the other NATO programs which must be readied for the April 1999 accession date.

NATO and U.S. officials have been reviewing the capabilities and intentions of the three governments to handle sensitive information, and the extent to which the military and intelligence services of these former Warsaw Pact members have distanced themselves from their former mentors.

The NATO Intelligence Board has worked closely with NATO's Office of Security to ensure adequate security measures are developed with new members.

The specific criteria that the Alliance is using to ensure that NATO practices and regulations become standard operating procedures for the three new invitees are based on established security guidelines developed for the Alliance and approved by the member states. Each of the three NATO invitees has thus far achieved or exceeded each criterion set before it, according to the Executive Branch.

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CONDITION

Based on these findings, I together with Senator Kerrey have proposed a condition to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty, which is included in the Managers' amendment now before the Senate.

The purpose of the condition is to monitor the progress that the three aspiring members are making in adopting NATO practices and regulations as standard operating procedures in their own intelligence services, and in enhancing their overall procedures for protecting intelligence sources and methods.

To monitor the progress in meeting NATO standards during the transition period up to April 1999, as well as to provide a benchmark following formal accession, the condition requires the President and the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the appropriate committees of Congress with three ''snapshots''—two before and one after formal accession of these countries to the alliance.

The President is required to report by 1 January 1999, on behalf of all the interested agencies, the progress made by the three countries in meeting NATO membership security requirements.

The Director of Central Intelligence is also required to report on or before 1 January 1999, and again not later than 90 days after the date of formal accession of these countries to NATO, on the latest procedures and requirements established in these countries for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, including a comparison of the overall procedures and requirements for such protection in these three countries with those in other NATO member states.

I believe that this condition sets forth a balanced approach to monitoring the progress of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic toward meeting the intelligence and security-related requirements for full NATO membership.

In what I believe is the unlikely event that a serious problem arises with respect to one or more of the prospective members, the reports due on January 1, 1999 will provide both the Senate and the Executive Branch with an opportunity to address and resolve any such problem before final accession.

FINAL ASSESSMENT

I would like to close with the following.

In developing an overall assessment of the security risks associated with the inclusion of the three new invitees in NATO, the issue is not only how to ensure that these three countries protect NATO secrets, but also to ensure that the new members, and NATO at large, devote sufficient attention and resources to address the overall non-NATO intelligence threat to the Alliance.

To reiterate, based on the information provided to the Committee, the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have demonstrated both an intent and an ability to protect the classified military and intelligence information that would be routinely provided them as members of the Alliance.

While past associations make these countries vulnerable to Russian intelligence activity, over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability.

As I noted earlier, cooperation on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement took root. In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context builds upon a pattern of cooperation of nearly a decade.

As with other aspects of NATO integration, it will take some time and technical advice and assistance from other NATO members for the governments of these three countries to totally overcome the legacy of their communist past.

As a critical element of such a program, the three governments must devote adequate resources to support professionalized intelligence and counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political support for these services' role in safeguarding the democratic political order.

Lastly, by the time the three invitees join NATO, a decade will have passed since the collapse of their communist regimes.

Contacts with the U.S., other allies, and NATO, coupled with continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from current NATO members, should help to ensure that all three countries satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession to NATO in April 1999.

In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator HELMS, and the

Ranking Member, Senator BIDEN, for including the Shelby-Kerrey condition as part of the Managers' amendment, and for their leadership in ensuring the thorough and expeditious consideration of this historic resolution.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the Resolution of Ratification currently pending before the Senate. I do so with less enthusiasm than I wished, and more doubts than I prefer.

I will vote yes because Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will strengthen NATO's resolve and improve the chances that a post-Cold War NATO will be the same stabilizing force for peace it has been for the past half-century. I will vote yes because the requirements for NATO membership, such as civilian control of the military and democratic rule, especially domestic laws that protect minority rights, make it more likely that external conflicts are resolved peacefully. I will vote yes because the benefits of doing so appear, on balance, to outweigh the potential liabilities.

My vote of support is also based on my belief that denying the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland entry after their expectations have been raised so high would do more harm than good. Further, I believe these three countries - on account of their passionate understanding of what life is like under the iron fist of a dictator—will stiffen the resolve of NATO to be a force for peace. NATO has no will to fight unless consensus can be achieved amongst all members, and it is the will to fight which will do the most good in deterring future military conflicts.

Too often during this debate I have heard the argument of some advocates who presume enlargement as a necessary insurance policy against the risk of Russia becoming an expansionist military threat again. These proponents often speak as if the circumstances of 1998 closely resembled those in Europe when NATO was created.

This vision is flawed. It is flawed because it misrepresents the comparative conditions of 1949 and 1998. It results in the subordination of other more important foreign policy goals such as assisting the Russian transition to democracy, reducing nuclear weapons, and confronting the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the less important task of adding three new members to a Cold War military alliance.

Consider what President Truman and Congress faced in the wake of the Second World War. In 1949, when they led America into the North Atlantic Alliance, only thirty years separated them from the end of the Great War, the war which was supposed to end all wars. Only twenty years had separated the end of this terrible war and the beginning of the next. Twenty years. Imagine what our attitudes would be if a war as savage and futile as World War I had been concluded on November 11, 1968, and then in 1988, the enemy we had vanquished rose to the attack again.

Both those wars were within memory's reach of President Truman and the Congress on April 4, 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. Europe lay in ruins. Their economies had been destroyed. Food and medical supplies were in short supply. Political uncertainty and instability were the order of the day. The Red Army was threatening in the east and their belligerence well established by the Communist coup d'etat in Prague in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade which began in June 1948.

All of this combined to justify the creation of a powerful military alliance. It is worth noting that even with these factors, NATO at first had no military structure. Only after the Korean War began in June 1950, did the idea of a worldwide communist offensive gain credibility. This led to the establishment of a NATO military force, the major element of which is the Allied Command Europe. In December 1950, General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The command's headquarters—the Supreme Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) - was located in Brussels.

President Truman was 65 years old in April 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. But certainly he must have remembered the day in mid-January 1919 when he was bivouacked near Verdun, France awaiting the demobilization orders needed before he could go home. In Paris, U.S. President Wilson, English Prime Minister Lloyd George, and French President Clemenceau had begun their discussions of terms and conditions for peace.

In a letter to his fiance, Bess Wallace, Truman had written:

> It's my opinion we'll stay until uncle Woodie gets his pet peace plans refused or okayed. For my part, and I'm sure every A.E.F. (American Expeditionary Force) man feels the same way, I don't give a whoop (to put it mildly) whether there's a League of Nations or whether Russia has a Red government or a Purple one, and if the President of the Czecho-Slovaks wants to pry the throne out from under the King of Bohemia, let him pry, but send us home . . . For my part I've had enough vin rouge and frog-eater victuals to last me a lifetime.

Mr. President, in our modern age of see and invade-all journalism, this letter would probably have surfaced to embarrass Truman when he entered national politics a decade later. However, it is also likely that cameras manned by brave men and women would have broadcast 1919 street scenes of Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, and Prague. I believe these scenes would have made Americans less anxious to withdraw from the devastating instability of starvation, demobilized and poorly led Armies, and the sudden collapse of the old order of the Kaiser, the Romanovs, Hapsburgs, and Ottomans.

Yet only thirty years after he wrote this letter, Lieutenant Truman had become President Truman, and he faced a world that looked not all that different from 1919. As he considered what policy would guarantee the peace after 50 million lives had been lost in the Second World War, he saw a Europe as devastated as it had been in the First. He saw a threatening Soviet Union in the east. Withdrawal, pacifism, and demilitarization were the failed policies of the 1920's and 1930's. Political engagement and military strength were logical and correct alternatives. Forty years later, as communism collapsed and our former enemies embraced democracy, Truman's vision and path was vindicated.

Mr. President, too many proponents of expansion have tried to cast this vote as a vote about our future engagement in the world. I am not persuaded by the preposterous either/or arguments used by these proponents. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for repeating the mistake we have made twice in this century to withdraw from Europe. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for appeasing the Russians. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for allowing instability to reign supreme on the European continent.

What nonsense. If NATO were to disappear tomorrow—as it almost did by refusing to become engaged in Bosnia—America would not withdraw from Europe. We are becoming more and more connected through travel, trade, and telecommunications. Any comparison of the political, economic, and social conditions of 1998 and 1919, or 1998 and the 1930's should be greeted with raised eyebrows and laughter.

Mr. President, many times during this debate I have heard my colleagues say that NATO has been the most successful military alliance in history. I do not disagree with their assessment. But the statement leads me to ask a question: why has NATO been so successful and what does that mean for the future of the Alliance?

Ultimately, NATO was successful during the Cold War not for any military operation, but for its military power and the willingness to use it. For nearly 50 years, NATO has served as the vanguard of peace and security in Europe. For forty of those years, NATO forces stood ready to engage in the defense of Europe from the very real threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The reason NATO was able to maintain the peace and never had to fight a hot war in Europe came from the recognition by our adversaries that NATO, despite the horrors of a potential superpower conflict, was prepared for real military action.

Equally as important as the will to act, NATO commanders understood the importance of maintaining a formidable capability to fight. Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military forces were highly motivated, superbly trained,

and equipped with the latest weapons and technology that made the Alliance a force to be reckoned with.

Beyond the success of the Cold War, I believe that NATO has survived in the post-Cold War era, despite many predictions to the contrary, because it was prepared to change to reflect new realities. First, NATO has begun the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing its force and command structure. As we in the Congress are well aware, following three rounds of U.S. base closures, making the necessary decisions to downsize the military is politically difficult. NATO deserves credit for what it has accomplished in this area, but more work will be needed in the future.

NATO has also been successful because of its willingness to address the challenges of the post-Cold War world. NATO has made significant progress in tackling difficult new issues such as arms control, regional ethnic instability, and creating partners out of former enemies. In this final area, the Partnership for Peace program has made tremendous progress in encouraging civilian control of the military and promoting military transparency, each of these essential in creating greater confidence between nations.

Each of these steps have contributed to transforming NATO into the Alliance that we have today, an Alliance that serves the interests of each of its members and promotes cooperation and stability. However, as NATO officials admit, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to evolve. We must ask ourselves: what must NATO do now if it is to be relevant in the future?

First, NATO must continue with the difficult work of reforming its force and command structure to reflect changes in its mission and strategic concept. Second, as during the Cold War, NATO must maintain a credible force and the will to use that force when diplomacy fails. These are the core elements of the Alliance that must be carried into the future.

But I believe NATO must also be prepared to take on new missions. It will have to be ready to address future threats to regional stability like Bosnia in an efficient and timely manner. Mr. President, the true lesson of the Dayton Accords is that sometimes force, or the credible threat of force, precedes diplomacy. I do not believe the Dayton Accords would have been possible had NATO not reached consensus to respond militarily, albeit late, to Serbian aggression in Bosnia. I hope we have learned the lesson of Bosnia, and I hope these three new members will help strengthen our will to react to Bosnia-style aggression in the future. The recent memory of the Solidarity movement, the moral leadership of President Vaclav Havel, and the impact of the 1956 uprising in Hungary will be extremely beneficial contributions to the diplomatic decision-making that occurs in Brussels. We may find the newest members of the Alliance will soon play a critical role in leading NATO into the future.

Mr. President, having addressed the history and future of the Alliance, let me restate that I will vote in favor of this Resolution of Ratification because I believe that NATO enlargement is a positive step forward for the three invitees and for the future of the NATO alliance.

The enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is a statement of the success of their transition to free-market democracies. Each of these countries have experienced the peaceful transitions of democratic government, established the rule of law in the interaction of people and institutions, and implemented strong civilian control of their militaries. We should not forget the difficulty with which each of these countries has made these changes, nor should we underestimate the political leadership that was necessary to make the decisions involved in transforming from a command-style economy to free-market democracy.

Mr. President, NATO membership, along with eventual membership in the European Union, will re-establish their contacts to the West and help solidify the political reforms in place today. Furthermore, the benefits of collective defense will limit the need to reconstitute national defenses and allow for continued focus on strengthening their economies and rebuilding the infrastructure necessary to compete in the global economy.

I also believe that these countries will benefit from NATO enlargement through the promotion of regional stability. The prospect of NATO membership has already caused Central European nations to re-examine their relationships with one another and to address age-old political and ethnic disputes. The resulting treaties and bi-lateral agreements will lessen the chance of border and ethnic conflicts in the region after these three nations become full members of the Alliance.

Mr. President, I also believe NATO will benefit from the inclusion of new members. Each of these countries will bring a unique set of capabilities to the Alliance. To be sure, each still needs to make significant progress in bringing their militaries up to NATO standards, but they are not starting from zero. Initial estimates show that following their own military restructuring, these countries will bring an additional 280,000 troops to the Alliance; this will undoubtedly boost NATO's ability to perform future missions.

An example of this enhanced capability for NATO can be seen in the contribution each of these three countries have made to the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia. Poland is currently providing SFOR an airborne infantry battalion, the Czech Republic has provided an engineering company and is maintaining a mechanized infantry battalion, and Hungary has contributed an engineering battalion. Hungary has also leased the Taszar airbase to the United States which provides a critical point of entry for U.S. forces into Bosnia. I am confident that when these countries become full members of NATO, we can expect that they will continue to provide a strong commitment to NATO operations.

In my duties as Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I joined with my colleagues in reviewing the security consequences of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance.

In directing this review, Senator SHELBY and I did not for a moment suspect the sincerity or the commitment of these countries to be loyal members of the Alliance. But because some of their intelligence professionals and other military and civilian personnel had served in similar positions when their countries were dominated by the Soviet Union, we felt duty-bound to examine how well these countries would meet NATO security requirements, especially with regard to handling NATO classified information and protecting intelligence sources and methods. We determined that, even in these narrow security terms, the new members will be a major net gain for the Alliance. They have the expertise and the dedication to protect the information which NATO will share with them, and they bring intelligence capabilities to the Alliance which will make NATO stronger.

To help measure and assist the transition of the new members to NATO security standards, Senator SHELBY and I proposed a condition to the resolution of ratification which would require two reports: one to be rendered by the President next January on the progress of the new members in meeting NATO security requirements, and another to be rendered in phases by the Director of Central Intelligence identifying the latest security procedures and requirements of the new allies and assessing how they compare with those of other NATO members. In my view, these reporting requirements are prudent and should help the expanded Alliance more quickly reach a common security standard.

Mr. President, I am encouraged by the prospect of membership for these three countries. However, this is a major change in U.S. policy, and a very real commitment that should not be entered into without a full understanding of its meaning. The American people must understand that membership in NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic carries with it all of the commitments of the 1949 Washington Treaty. In particular, by ratifying this change to the Washington Treaty, the United States extends full Article V protection to each of these countries.

Article V states:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,

each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The quantitative result of this treaty is that the United States has pledged to defend an additional 15% of European territory in the event of an attack. The qualitative result is that we as Americans pledge to send our young soldiers to defend Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. However, let me state, Mr. President, my firm belief that enlargement of the Alliance will in fact reduce our chances of having to fight a war in this region of the world. By solidifying democratic reforms, encouraging regional cohesion through the Partnership for Peace program, and limiting the need for national defenses, we will promote cooperation and limit the threat of war.

Like many of my colleagues, I also have concerns about the costs associated with NATO enlargement. Wide discrepancies in the assumptions on which the various cost estimates have been based have left us with, at best, an incomplete view of what enlargement will cost current and future members. I am hopeful that after the vote, the Administration will continue to work closely with Congress to address our remaining concerns regarding costs. At a time in which our military is being called on to protect against threats to U.S. security interests throughout the world, we must carefully scrutinize additional spending commitments.

Mr. President, I am concerned with the slowness with which the European Union has moved to address the needs of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. I strongly encourage the EU to catch-up to NATO by quickly completing negotiations over their own expansion. In the long-run, the success of the former-Soviet bloc countries will hinge more on their ability to access the economic benefits of the EU than membership in NATO.

While I support NATO enlargement for these three countries at this time, we must also ask how do we define our future foreign policy priorities. For the past year, members of the Administration have worked tirelessly to ensure ratification of NATO enlargement. I believe it is time for the United States to shift our foreign policy focus: our number one priority must become the successful transition of Russia to a stable, free-market democracy. I for one am very optimistic about the prospects for Russia.

I think at times we suffer from the inertial effects of Cold War thinking that limit our ability to see the world for what it is today. Just as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not the Warsaw Pact, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia no longer poses the immediate threat to our survival as expressed in Cold War rhetoric of Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. It is a new era, and we should use this opportunity to our utmost ability to work with Russia to ensure the establishment of the rule of law, to assist with the ethical privatization of state owned enterprises, to promote the continued development of the democratic process, and to realize meaningful progress on arms control.

We already have positive examples of what cooperation with Russia can accomplish. Mr. President, few may realize the Bosnia mission is the first time in which NATO troops have participated in an actual military engagement. Few would have guessed during the dangerous days of the Cold War that NATO's first military mission would have occurred with Russian soldiers working alongside American soldiers not as the enemy, but as partners. The Bosnia mission demonstrates the potential we have when we work with a democratic Russia to solve disputes. Another positive sign is that in recent months the Russian government has stepped up its participation in the Partnership for Peace program and I am hopeful about the possibility for continued dialog through the Permanent Joint Council as established under the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Mr. President, I encourage both the Congress and the Administration to address the future of U.S.-Russian relations with the same vigor with which we have worked to achieve NATO enlargement.

At no point in the future do I want to look back to this unique point in history and have to ask if we could have done more to ensure a peaceful, democratic Russia. Mr. President, I encourage all of us to take a long-term view of history. We should consider how the world has changed from the chaos and danger that led President Truman to create NATO in 1949 to the sweep of democracy that liberated Central and Eastern Europe from communist control. We should consider how these same nations have transformed themselves into stable democracies ready to become full members of the Atlantic Alliance. And finally, we should consider how we want the world to look in fifty years, and then set our priorities to ensure our children will have the benefit of living in that world.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the protocols of accession to NATO, specifically for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO expansion is clearly in the security interests of the United States and the NATO alliance as a whole.

We have an opportunity in the Senate today to make a truly a historic vote that will shatter, once and for all, the artificial division of Europe that occurred at the end of the Second World War. By expanding this alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we will further erase the Cold War lines of division and broaden the scope of protection of this defensive military alliance which has played the central role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe since the end of World War II. Now, if history is any guide, it ensures and enhances the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony throughout Europe.

It is important to remember that NATO is a defensive, not offensive, strategic military alliance. Although the new member countries were once considered so-called ''allies'' of the former Soviet Union, their so-called alliance had more to do with the presence of Soviet troops within their countries than any commitment to Soviet values or ideals. Bringing them into the NATO alliance is not a charge against Russia and should not be so construed. To the contrary, we are recognizing that the people of these countries are now our allies. We pledge to come to their defense if they are attacked by a non-member country, and they in turn make the same pledge to support all other NATO countries who may be attacked by a non-member party.

Mr. President, in the nearly 50 years of its existence, NATO has provided the military security umbrella that has permitted old enemies to heal the wounds of war and to build strong democracies and integrated free economies. Expanding NATO to include the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe will, I hope, produce the same results. That is, stronger and freer economies whose people can live in the same harmony as do the people of France and Germany.

Communism has collapsed. The Soviet Union is no more. This is not to say, however, that Europe no longer faces any security threats. I think that would be shortsighted. Threats continue to exist in Europe, and many of these threats are more difficult to identify and combat. Ethnic strife in many parts of Eastern Europe; the instability which we face daily with Iraq; terrorism; the list is long. These are all verifiable threats to which the United States and other NATO member countries must be prepared to respond and defend. By adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the NATO alliance, we are broadening and strengthening our ability to combat and defend against these threats.

Mr. President, I would also note that the prospect of NATO enlargement has already begun as seen by the process of harmonization in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary has settled its border and minority questions with Slovakia and Romania. Poland has reached across an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania.

Without question, an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply because we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. As Secretary of State Albright testified last year before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I quote, ''This is the paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression.'' At

the same time, we gain new allies, new friends who are committed to our common agenda for security in fighting terrorism and weapons proliferation, and to ensuring stability in places such as the former Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt in my mind that had Soviet troops not in 1945 occupied Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and installed puppet governments, the debate over whether these three countries should be members of NATO would have long ago been resolved in their favor.

The people of these countries have yearned for freedom, democracy, and peace for more than 40 years, as evidenced by Poland particularly. The blood in the streets of Budapest in 1956, the demonstrations of the people in Prague in 1968 who confronted Soviet tanks, and the public confrontations of Solidarity throughout Poland beginning in the 1970s all laid the foundation for the collapse of communism, which we have seen in our lifetime.

Now as they begin to build institutions of democracy and free enterprise, as they move to further integrate their economies with the rest of Europe, they should participate in the collective security of the continent. I think this will bind these countries closer together far into the future and ensure stability and peace throughout the continent.

Mr. President, there have been expressions of concern by some people that expanding NATO is a mistake because it would somehow be perceived as a threat, a threat to Russia. I find that argument hard to accept. In my opinion, NATO has never been a threat to Russia. Even during the height of the Cold War, no one seriously considered that NATO threatened the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. NATO stood to defend—defend—against any potential military threat to its members. There is a difference between defense and offense. And NATO is designed for defense. It was never designed as an alliance of aggression—rather, it is an alliance against aggression.

I think the same holds true today, Mr. President. The people of Russia, who are slowly trying to emerge from the darkness and terror of 70 years of communism, have nothing—I repeat, nothing—to fear from NATO. Our goal is not to isolate Russia; but to engage and support her in her efforts to develop a lasting democracy and a free market.

The people in the evolving democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have earned the right to become full partners in Europe and full partners in NATO. I hope my colleagues will support the dreams, hopes, and aspirations of these people who have struggled for freedom for so long, after so many decades in which they have lived without hope. They have that opportunity today.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to commend these countries for the rapid progress which they have made nurturing democracy and building stable economic development based on free market principles. While some would argue that they have not evolved far enough, I would simply say that they are light years from where they were when the Berlin Wall fell and that democracy and the free market is an evolving process. They are well on their way; bringing them into the NATO alliance will only serve to help them along.

The people of these nations have dedicated themselves to these democratic ideals, and it is incumbent upon us to support them in their quest. Mr. President, I strongly support expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and hope that the Senate speaks loudly and strongly on this issue today.

Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an important vehicle for maintaining security in Europe. For half a century NATO has been critical to maintaining security in Europe. Largely because of NATO, Europe has enjoyed more than 50 years without war among its major powers, the longest period in modern history. Because of this success, European countries that at one time were in a competing alliance, are now clamoring to join NATO. Today we have a historic opportunity to extend the NATO umbrella to additional European countries, and to expand the benefits that the alliance has created.

Dr. Brzezinski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a compelling case for NATO expansion and its importance to the United States. He said:

> For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-term historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the American-European connection, to the scope of democratic and secure Europe, and to the ability of America and Europe to work together in promoting international security.
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> The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into NATO counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American nations. That will further deepen the American-European kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy. Such a more secure Europe will be a better and more vital partner for America in the continuing effort to make democracy more widespread and international cooperation more pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement—in itself a vivid testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal—is very much in America's long-term national interest.

Since its inception, NATO has provided a forum to resolve disagreements among members and for institutionalizing norms and relations fundamental to modern democracies. It is natural therefore, that newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which qualify, should be considered for membership in the alliance.

The accession to the alliance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is the culmination of years of work on these countries part to meet the requirements of NATO membership. As Dr. John Micgiel, Director of the East Central European Center at Columbia University has said, ''the mere prospect of membership . . . has acted as a catalyst for political reform. . ..'' Furthermore the ''three prospective member countries have each taken a proactive role in cooperating with their neighbors and sometime former adversaries.''

These three countries have demonstrated functioning democratic political systems, as well as economic reforms that will allow them to share the costs of NATO membership. Although there are no set requirements for membership, at a minimum, candidates for membership must meet the following five requirements: new members must uphold democracy, including tolerating diversity; new members must be making progress toward a market economy; their military forces must be under firm civilian control; they must be good neighbors and respect sovereignty outside their borders; and they must be working toward compatibility with NATO forces.

Poland's membership is the logical culmination of its long struggle for freedom and economic independence. In 1989, the world watched as Poland became one of the first former Soviet-controlled countries to hold free and democratic elections. ''Solidarity'' became a symbol of freedom recognized around the globe.

In 1993, Poland was the first country in the region to record economic growth, and it now has one of the strongest economies in Europe. In 1997, its GDP grew at a rate of about seven percent, while its inflation and unemployment rates declined.

Moreover, Poland has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to security beyond its borders, one of the requirements of NATO membership. Poland contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition and currently provides troops to the NATO-led Stabilization Force mission striving to keep peace in Bosnia.

Hungary has met the requirements for NATO membership by holding fully free and fair elections since 1989. Over the past nine years, the country has had two complete democratic changes of government. Economically, Hungary has engaged in successful, yet painful, stabilization programs to cut its current budget deficits. Since 1990, Hungary has attracted almost $16 billion in foreign direct investment; almost a third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe.

Since 1989, the Czech Republic has held three fully free and fair elections. Their constitution contains protections similar to ours, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of the press. Economically, the country has privatized state-owned enterprises, engaged in tight monetary policies, and liberalized trade policies. As a result inflation is

controlled, the GDP has been rising since 1994, and unemployment is low.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were chosen to join the alliance because they meet all the requirements of admission. Each will be a good ally and each country is prepared to accept the responsibilities of NATO membership, including contributing their share to NATO's costs. I would like to congratulate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, for their courage, for their perseverance and now for their imminent membership in the greatest military security alliance the world has ever known.

Other countries will soon also be prepared to join the alliance, that is why I believe the expansion of NATO should be regarded as a process rather than the enactment of a single policy. Nations such as Romania and Slovenia, who were not invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit should be extended NATO membership once they meet the alliance's admission requirements.

During the 104th Congress, I supported the NATO Enlargement and Facilitation Act of 1996. This legislation would have extended economic aid to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe showing genuine interest in furthering economic privatization and political pluralization as a prerequisite to NATO membership. This legislation sent an important signal of American support for these countries undergoing the painful transition from communism to democratic market reform.

Mr. President, constituents from my state have indicated strong support for NATO expansion. While my constituents include Americans of Hungarian and Czech descent, you may know that Chicago has been called the Warsaw of the Midwest because of the large number of city residents of Polish descent. Statewide, there are nearly 1 million Illinoisans of Polish-ancestry, many of whom who have contacted my office in support of Poland's imminent entry into NATO.

Mr. President, it is not, however, merely the many Polish-Americans, or Hungarian-Americans or Czech-Americans in Illinois and around the United States who wish these countries well as they assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership. Freedom-loving people in every part of the world can take heart from these countries' examples. History records the innumerable times that they have been invaded by hostile armies. But these people have strived to maintain their culture and their unique way of life, and that struggle has finally been rewarded. For as long as there is a North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, their security will be guaranteed by some of the most powerful nations on earth.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today as we reach the end of our debate on NATO enlargement to restate my firm support for the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement is the right thing to do. We must seize this opportunity now to help make Europe whole and free. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of enlargement.

While NATO was born out of the Cold War to protect ourselves and our allies from the Soviet threat, it is also part of the broader U.S. policy to foster European integration after the end of World War II. The first step in this policy was the Marshall Plan, not NATO. But after Stalin's Iron Curtain divided Europe, and Soviet-installed puppet governments rejected Marshall Plan aid, it was clear that economic recovery and political cooperation could not proceed without a security shield. NATO provided that shield.

The Soviet Union is gone. So are the Moscow-controlled puppet governments in central and eastern European states. Once again, we have a window of opportunity to complete the work we started at the end of World War II. We must not miss this historic chance to advance our policy of supporting European integration based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

We have a chance to bring into the circle of Western democracies those states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, that were denied this chance by Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. By voting for enlargement, we are again extending the hand that Stalin slapped away, affirming the promise of freedom and security for the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech peoples.

As Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, I have seen NATO candidate states take steps to resolve internal problems and external disputes that have been major features of national life within those states for generations. Human rights violations in those states have substantially decreased, and their membership in NATO and, in the future, the EU, will give us leverage to resolve remaining problems. But for the promise of the security guarantee that comes with NATO membership, I believe these problems and disputes would not only have remained unresolved, but would likely have given rise, over time, to confrontations between states that could have led to war.

Thus, by that measure, NATO enlargement is already having positive results.

Once NATO enlargement is realized, the political risk associated with economic reform in central and eastern European states will diminish. This will make international investors more willing to provide capital to businesses in these states, creating jobs and improving economic health. Improved performance during and after transition to free market economies will help cement in place stable democratic governments.

The combination of healthy economies and stable democratic governments will help the European Union expand to include these states. Thus, expansion of NATO's security shield is the first step, not the last step, toward further broad European integration.

There have been many statements of caution about the impact of NATO enlargement on Russia. I firmly believe that Russian democracy will be better served by having healthy, stable, and prosperous democracies on its western border, than by leaving a gray zone between a steadily more integrated Europe and Russia.

Since coming to the Senate in 1981, I have been a member of the Helsinki Commission. This work has brought me into contact with the Soviet dissident community, which over time has become the core of the Russian pro-reform and pro-democracy movement. From this long experience, I can tell you that a failure to expand NATO and the European Union to embrace every European state that can meet the established entrance requirements would be a victory for the anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Especially if NATO enlargement were to fail because the United States would not agree to it, extremist politicians of all stripes from Russia through eastern and central Europe would take heart and encouragement. Democrats and free market reformers would be seriously damaged, and political and economic stability would be called into question. The influence of the United States would be greatly decreased, and our commitments would be open to doubt. When we cast our votes today, we need to keep in mind the probable highly negative consequences of what would, in effect, be a veto by the United States Senate of NATO expansion.

NATO enlargement, European integration, and the advancement of political reform, democracy, individual freedom, and free market economics are all part of the same effort. What we do here today can make a major contribution to the security and prosperity of future generations of Americans.

The opportunity to expand the circle of free and democratic countries can not be missed. This amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty should be approved. I will vote for it, and I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, for quite some time I have been studying the issue of whether we should expand NATO. There are some who have argued that there has not been sufficient debate about NATO expansion. Yet, we have been considering NATO expansion for several years now, long before this resolution of ratification made it to the Senate floor. By wide margins, the Senate indicated its support for the concept of NATO expansion in 1994 and 1995, and since then, there has been much discussion in the Senate and in the media on the pros and cons of expanding NATO. As the Administration has worked with our allies on the details of NATO expansion, building on

the Partnership for Peace which lay the ground work for this move back in 1994, and culminating with the signing of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in December 1997, we have reached the point where there is little doubt that the Senate will ratify the resolution before us today. It is interesting to note, that as a bipartisan consensus for NATO expansion has emerged, opponents of NATO expansion have sharpened their arguments. I want to credit these opponents for giving us all much food for thought and for ultimately helping me focus my thinking on this important issue.

After careful consideration, I have concluded that expanding NATO is in our national interest and I intend to support the resolution of ratification before us today for a number of reasons.

NATO will help to fill a security vacuum in newly democratic Central Europe. It has only been a few short years since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have embraced democratic institutions and embarked on the path to political and economic reform. We need to send the strongest possible signal to the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe that they must not falter in this endeavor. It is in our national interest for these nations to succeed, and support from the West allows them to proceed with difficult political and economic reforms. Just as it made sense in the breathless months after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to invite these countries to join NATO, we cannot back away from them now. Following through on our invitation offers them a sense of security after years of domination by the Soviet Union. And, it is fitting that a military alliance originally conceived to counter the Soviet threat would offer them a safe haven from the threats of the future. Although it may seem that they have little to worry about now, we cannot predict what threats may emerge. After all, few among us could have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

We should support NATO expansion because it will help ensure that Russia does not pose a threat to those countries in the future. Russia may not pose a threat now, but the fears of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that Russia will change its stripes or that some other hegemonic power will threaten them are all too real. We must respond to these fears. It's easy for critics of NATO expansion on this side of the Atlantic to say that these fears are not justified but we must not forget that the reason the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are clamoring for NATO membership in the first place is because of their long history of invasion and subjugation. Who among us could look the Poles, and the Czechs, and the Hungarians in the eyes and say that even without NATO they need not fear an invasion in the future. True, no one can make the case that the Russian military in its current state is in any position to reconstitute the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Recent articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times lay out in stark terms the weakened state of the military, and the difficulties Russia is facing in developing strong economic and political alliances with its neighbors. Although some have argued that these are reasons to oppose NATO expansion, for me this underscores the challenges Russia faces today in realizing full political and economic reform, challenges that have little to do with NATO expansion. If Russia does not succeed—and we must do all we can to ensure that it does—I shudder to think of the consequences. NATO expansion will shield Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic from these consequences.

I do not intend to respond to all of the arguments made by opponents of NATO expansion, but I want to say a few more words about Russia. I do not believe that NATO expansion will undermine Russian efforts to achieve democratic reform: If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic want greater integration with Western Europe this should not pose a threat to Russia. However, just as we are responding to the fears of the Central Europeans by inviting them to join NATO, we must recognize Russian fears. We must continue to remind the Russians that NATO is not antagonistic to their interests. And, we must redouble our efforts to help the Russians so that they too can succeed in their economic and political reforms. As the resolution of ratification states:

> The Senate finds that is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

I hope that at some future date the Senate will consider specific measures to further this goal.

As tensions between the United States and Russia have subsided, the end of the Cold War has brought many long dormant ethnic rivalries to the surface. NATO expansion is a reasonable response to these developments: A broad based military alliance can help keep ethnic tensions from escalating into violence. As we have seen all too vividly with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions in Europe are still deep rooted. The world was taken by surprise at the atrocities that were unleashed in Bosnia and it took several years for the West to bring enough pressure on the parties to end the violence. We want to do what we can to prevent the dissolution of state militaries into murderous ethnic militias as took place in Bosnia. There are no guarantees, but by bringing the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into a broad based military alliance we are encouraging military cooperation and understanding and fostering relationships that will make it easier to resolve major conflicts. Although NATO's primary purpose is not as a dispute resolution body, it is my hope that NATO can help prevent many of these disputes from emerging in the first place.

NATO's strength is that it is not only a military alliance, but an alliance of nations sharing democratic values. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made great strides over the last seven years demonstrating that their commitment to democratic institutions and political reform runs deep. Some have argued that political stability rests on economic stability and that we should press the European Union to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before we engage them in a military alliance. However, free market economies are not the only key to stable democracies. The role of the military can make a difference in the long-term success of democracies. A military alliance that defers to civilian leaders can serve as an example of stable civil-military relations. I am confident that inclusion in NATO will strengthen democratic values in the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The NATO alliance has been a successful alliance. It is in our national interest to build on that success. For fifty years, NATO has united Europe and America in a common purpose, and with its strong emphasis on cooperation and a collective defense, NATO will serve as a building block for the security arrangements of the future. We have established some very important relationships in NATO. These relationships are a source of strength and they should not be abandoned. And, the strong ties we have with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can be formalized by admitting them to NATO.

Earlier in the debate we reaffirmed the strategic purpose of NATO. I believe that as the threats of the future come into sharper focus, the strategic rationale for NATO will evolve. This will not happen overnight. And that is why I supported the Warner amendment. Before we remake an alliance that has served American interests and proceed with further expansion we need to spend more time thinking about the role NATO will play in our changing security arrangements. The Warner amendment also would have allowed us to step back from the process without specifically rejecting any of the nations of Central or Eastern Europe. Regardless of how long we wait before the next group of nations is admitted to NATO, we must closely monitor the integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the cost of NATO expansion, an issue of particular concern to me. Although there have been numerous estimates, the most recent Administration estimate is that we will spend $400 million over the coming decade to

cover the US share of NATO expansion costs. This is not a small sum. Consider, however, that we have already spent more than $6 billion on US operations in Bosnia in the last two and a half years. If NATO can help prevent the Bosnias of the future, even if NATO expansion costs are double the Administration's current estimate, this will be money well spent.

I am disappointed that there is no consensus in the Senate to limit our spending in this area beyond the existing limit on the US contribution to the NATO common budget. I supported the Harkin amendment that would have placed a 25 percent cap on expenses that might be incurred to help NATO's newest members integrate their forces with NATO, and I will continue to watch spending in this area. As the Resolution of Ratification states: ''the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments.''

Our future is and always has been inextricably tied to Europe, a region that has been beset by war. After two devastating World Wars dominated the first half of this century, we have relied on the NATO alliance to help keep the peace during the second half. I believe that NATO expansion can also help us maintain peace and stability in Europe into the next century and for that reason the resolution of ratification to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic merits our support.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, almost 10 years ago, the wall that had divided Europe for more than a generation suddenly crumbled. Brave, freedom-loving people in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia took matters into their own hands, eventually toppling their communist governments. East Germans attacked their wall with gusto, and in a matter of months, Germany was reunited. Ever since that time, there has been talk in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary of joining the West in a more formal way, to solidify their break from the East, to recognize their conversion to democracy and free markets, and to insure against future aggression from the East. NATO membership was seen as one way to do this. Eastern Europe also recognized that economic development was critical to their success and sought economic integration with the West and access to its markets. Membership in the European Economic Union was a high priority for most states.

While the West spoke glowingly of the transformations taking place in the East, it soon became clear that there would be only meager amounts of foreign assistance and economic investment for the East, and access to new markets would remain limited. Western Europe and North America were wrestling with their own economic difficulties and fighting popular expectations that the end of the Cold War would bring reduced financial commitments abroad. Increasingly, it became clear to many Eastern European governments that joining NATO was their best chance of getting membership in a western ''club''. NATO membership would address the historical and emotional anxieties of many East Europeans left by decades of domination and oppression by the East, and would provide western aid to modernize their militaries. While it wasn't what they needed most, at least it was something.

As the prospects of membership in the Economic Union faded, many East European governments jumped at the 1995 NATO announcement that it would consider taking in new members. NATO, led by the United States, was faced with the difficult task of deciding which countries would qualify for membership immediately and which ones would be refused, pending further political, economic and military maturation. The stakes were high, and in some cases, the disappointment was great. The United States made it clear to all who were not accepted that there would be other chances to join in the near future, that the door to membership would remain open. No clear vision of the shape or boundaries of NATO emerged from this exercise.

The decision to enlarge NATO also altered the context for the newly formed Partnership for Peace (PFP). Rather than concentrating on the quality of PFP discussions and ways that it could enhance regional security, the focus shifted instead to the benefits of full NATO membership. Rather than easing the tensions caused by the Cold War dividing line through the heart of Europe, enlarging NATO revived those tensions, once again creating a sense of ''us'' versus ''them'', and reducing the ability of the PFP to address the void left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Americans feel the strong emotional pull of the countries who want to join NATO. We want to do what we can to reward them for their struggles and solidify their political, social and economic gains. We have little ability to pry open European markets, and few financial resources to commit to economic development programs. So NATO membership at first glance seems the obvious thing to do.

I have some very deep reservations about this course of action. For one, NATO membership will not provide what the new democracies of Eastern Europe need most—economic and political development. Secondly, NATO expansion may well jeopardize critical U.S. national security concerns that require close cooperation with Russia. Additionally, moving to expand NATO at this time cuts short the potential development of the PFP into a more innovative structure for handling the very diverse military concerns of its members who now span the globe from the Arctic Ocean to Central Asia to the Pacific Ocean. We also must recognize that estimates of the cost of NATO expansion vary widely, and it is likely that the American taxpayer will get stuck picking up a very sizable percentage of the costs. Finally, I do not believe that the American public has given sufficient attention to the question that is being asked of the Senate: Should we extend our very best security guarantee to more nations? Are we ready to commit US troops to the unconditional defense of even more territory? The Senate should not act until it is sure that the American people support this commitment.

Now is not the time to make this move. Let's think for a moment about the most immediate threat facing both Europe and the United States. It is not really a Russian attack upon Eastern Europe. The war in Chechnya showed that the Russian military is not even capable of putting down internal rebellion. Yet this is what NATO is designed to protect against.

A very real and pressing threat to U.S. and European security is the leakage of Russian weapons of mass destruction. An expanded NATO gives us no advantage in countering this threat, while at the same time cutting back on the degree of cooperation we will get out of Russia in addressing these threats. If we want to work with the Russian military, we must convince them that we are not escalating the threat against them. Much as we might say that NATO is not an aggressive alliance aimed at Russia, Cold War perceptions do not dissipate that quickly, and if Russia feels increasingly threatened, it will be even more reluctant to scale back its military capabilities, to ratify START II and to cooperate in other arms control initiatives. And these are things that matter very much to U.S. national security.

We have increasingly found that the resolution of most thorny international crises require some assistance from Russia. The standoff with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections was the most recent example. Bosnia will continue to demand active US-Russian cooperation, and other efforts such as reducing the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia will be enhanced if we have Russian assistance.

The decision to move NATO closer to the borders of Russia may well have one other unintended and dangerous consequence—driving Russia into a closer relationship with China. China will continue to emerge as a greater presence on the international scene. And I believe we will have even more serious disagreements with its leadership. Russia is a part of this strategic equation. Our job now is to convince Russia that it shares our concerns vis a vis China, and that it is not in Russia's best interest to turn a blind eye to dangerous Chinese behaviors. But it Russia feels that a closer relationship with the West will not bring it greater security, then this will be a very difficult argument to make.

Mr. President, Senate ratification of this enlargement of NATO is just the

first step. Other countries are now very anxious to get ''in'' and eventually more of them are going to meet the stated qualifications for membership. Yet every new addition beyond the three before us today brings more trouble, both in terms of Russian reaction and challenges to the cohesion of the NATO structure. If NATO is unable to act decisively on matters that we feel are central to our security, it will be of diminishing use to us in the future.

I am quite concerned that by accepting these three countries today, we are increasing the pressure on others to join. Putting top priority on developing a close military relationship with NATO is not what these new democracies need right now. They should be focusing primarily on their economic, social and political development. I fear that we do them a disservice by holding up NATO membership as the best way to be ''tied'' to the West. After all, having a stable democracy and strong economic ties with one's neighbors has proven to be the most successful way to ward off both military and political strife.

If we proceed to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO, I believe we must be very cautious about any additional rounds. I have proposed an addition to the document before us that would require the Administration to report regularly to Congress on the status of discussions with other countries about joining NATO. Hopefully this will allow us to be more involved in the process before any new invitations are extended. I appreciate the Managers acceptance of my amendment. And I trust that the vigorous debate we have had on this issue will encourage much greater caution by the Administration and NATO in extending future invitations.

I know some Senators objected earlier to efforts to postpone consideration of this treaty. Yet, no matter where my Colleagues come down on this issue, I trust they all now will agree with me that U.S. foreign policy and the American public have benefited from the fuller debate we have had as a result.

In closing, Mr. President, let me say that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic deserve to be recognized for the great strides they have made in recent years. But I am not convinced that immediate full membership in NATO is the right answer for them or for us. And I am very concerned that the process this treaty sets in motion is one that we may well ultimately come to regret.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in support of expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

As the Congress has considered this issue, I have evaluated the arguments for and against NATO expansion. There are compelling arguments on both sides. However, on balance, I have concluded that this round of NATO expansion should be supported.

The first question I asked myself in making this vitally important decision is whether expanding NATO serves America's national security interests. I concluded that it does.

America has fought two brutal world wars in Europe, and we have thousands of troops stationed in Bosnia. Our vital interests in promoting European stability and democracy are clear.

I believe that NATO expansion will promote stability in Europe. The mere possibility that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic might be invited to join NATO created a strong incentive for them to resolve peacefully longstanding ethnic and border disputes and to improve ties with their neighbors. Hungary, for example, concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania in 1996, and its relations with Romania are greatly improved. Clearly, Europe is more stable as a result, and that is good for America.

While I hope tensions will not arise in the future among any of these new members, they may. If these countries are not NATO members, our ability to prevent tensions from boiling over into full-blown conflicts will be more limited. Experience has shown that NATO can play a constructive role in resolving conflicts between members, helping reconcile former adversaries like France and Germany and moderating tensions between Turkey and Greece. It could play the same role in mediating conflicts between new member countries.

NATO strength has come from the fact that it is not only a security alliance but also a political organization. Just as it has been a force for stability in Europe, so it has been a force for democratic development. Now that the Cold War is over, that political role will be increasingly important. By including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, the U.S. and NATO will have a greater ability to influence the continued democratic development of these countries.

Furthermore, expanding NATO will advance America's long sought goal of defense burden sharing. We've spent a considerable amount of time in the Senate debating the costs of NATO. But few have talked about the benefits of including three countries that are willing and prepared to share the defense burden in the Alliance. Already prospective members are working with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and serving with American troops in Bosnia. All three would have supported American air strikes in Iraq. They're willing to pay their fair share and contribute to the collective defense. The West ought to welcome them.

The second question I asked in making this decision, Mr. President, was whether each of the prospective NATO countries meets the five criteria articulated in 1996 by then Secretary of Defense Perry: commitment to democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and military capability to operate effectively with our other NATO allies. I am satisfied that each of the countries the Senate is being asked to approve for NATO membership meets these criteria.

In Poland, where communism once reigned, democracy is flourishing. Seven free and fair elections have been held since 1989, and two democratic changes in the government have taken place. A new Polish constitution has been approved in a popular referendum. The judiciary is independent, and the press is free.

As a result of Poland's economic reform program, the country currently has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. The private sector is thriving and currently accounts for about two-thirds of GDP and about 60% of the country's work force.

Poland has good relations with all seven of the states it borders. Its new constitution codifies civilian control as well as parliamentary oversight of the military. And American officials have determined that Poland has the most capable armed forces in Eastern Europe.

Hungary receives high marks on each of these criteria as well.

A stable, parliamentary democracy, Hungary has had two democratic changes of government since 1989 in free and fair elections. Its governmental institutions are stable, and its judiciary is independent.

Since 1989, the country has implemented price and trade liberalization, extensive privatization and instituted important legal changes. That almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe has been attracted to Hungary speaks to the strength and attractiveness of its economy.

After many years of tension, Hungary has made tremendous strides in improving its relations with neighboring countries, such as Romania, where large concentrations of ethnic Hungarians reside. New Treaties with Slovakia and Romania include important provisions on ethnic minority rights and reconfirms Hungary's commitment to respect existing borders.

Importantly, Hungary's military is under civilian control, and its armed forces are reorganizing to meet NATO standards.

Finally, Mr. President, there is the Czech Republic, a parliamentary democracy which has held three free and fair elections since 1989. Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner and human rights advocate, serves as President and conscience of the country.

The economy of the Czech Republic has been so transformed that nearly 80% is currently in private hands, an astonishing amount for a formerly centrally planned economy, and 65 percent of the GDP is generated by the private sector. Since 1991, the Czech Republic

has operated on a balanced budget. Relations between the Czech Republic and its neighbors, including Germany and Slovakia, are sound. And the Czech military is under civilian control.

As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I am aware of the issues that continue to form a part of the U.S.-Czech bilateral dialogue, including property restitution problems and discrimination against the Romani minority. At the same time, I believe that Czech leaders are committed to resolving these problems and I am committed to working with the Czech Government until they are.

I am keenly aware, Mr. President, that there are some risks involved in expanding NATO and that many are deeply concerned about the impact that expanding NATO will have on our relations with Russia. I have thought long and hard about this risk. I have discussed it at length with Undersecretary Pickering, and I have concluded that while NATO expansion may create some complications in our relations with Russia, those difficulties can be managed.

Despite the fact that most of the Russian political elite say they oppose enlargement, Russia continues to pursue a cooperative relationship with the U.S. Public opinion polls in Russia reveal that the vast majority of the Russian public would rather cooperate with than confront the enlarging Western alliance.

Even on arms control issues, progress is being made with the Russians despite the debate over NATO expansion. For example, Russia has continued to implement START I reductions in strategic forces. In fact, I am told that Russia is dismantling its strategic nuclear forces more rapidly than the Treaty requires.

Despite the fact that NATO was well on its way to expansion, at the March 1997 summit in Helsinki, President Yeltsin agreed to the outlines of a START III accord, and he agreed to urge the Duma to ratify START II. Importantly, there are signs that the Duma will move forward and ratify the START II agreement this summer because, according to Duma speaker Seleznev, it ''meets Russia's interests.''

There are other positive signs regarding arms control. While NATO expansion was being debated, Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also continued to work with the U.S. on adaptation to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

While I do not have a crystal ball, and I cannot predict the future of arms control, I am encouraged by these signs. They indicate to me that this round of NATO expansion will not derail arms control.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Expanding NATO will erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia ended up, against their will, on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. Now that democracy is flourishing in each of these countries, it is to America's advantage to erase that dividing line and bring them into the NATO alliance. We expanded NATO in 1952 when we allowed Greece and Turkey to join. We expanded it in 1955 when we allowed Germany to join. And we expanded it in 1982 when we invited Spain to join.

We should expand it now by allowing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join as well.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, after much consideration of the pending resolution of ratification to expand NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United States and our allies. But, as the Senate continues this historic debate on the expansion of the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I would like to make some observations about the cost implications of expanding NATO and steps we have taken in the Senate to address them.

When the Senate committees began to consider NATO expansion last year, I was skeptical. The Senate, I feared, was approaching this issue with insufficient information or appreciation for the costs of such expansion for the American taxpayer.

That is why I joined with our colleague from Texas, Senator KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, on a letter of June 25, 1997, to the President requesting specific facts and analysis regarding the cost and military implications of NATO expansion.

I continued to pursue the cost issue last October, when the Senate Appropriations Committee held a series of hearings on this important issue. On the first day, the committee heard about the policy implications of NATO expansion from Defense Secretary Cohen and Secretary of State Albright. The next day, the committee heard about the military implications from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, General Clark.

What came out of both days of hearings was the fact that no definitive estimates existed for the true costs of NATO expansion.

The committee heard how the original Defense Department estimates may have been inflated because they took into account a fourth country, rather than only those three currently invited to join NATO. Those estimates also considered a greater Russian threat than actually existed because of that country's recent reductions in force. The generals testified that, first, specific military requirements will be developed; then, NATO will determine the costs for meeting those requirements.

The third day of those hearings was critical. On October 23, 1997, I asked a witness from the General Accounting Office to provide for the Committee a definitive analysis of the cost of this expansion. During that hearing, I expressed my concern that no official estimates yet existed about what the U.S. contribution will be to an expanded NATO. IN fact, the title of the GAO report summed it up—''Cost Implications for the United States Remain Unclear.''

The hearing also revealed that the GAO cost estimates lacked critical information, such as the $60 million in bilateral aid which the U.S. had already provided the three invited countries. In response to my question, the GAO conceded the $60 million was American taxpayers' money and should be counted.

Ultimately, I was informed that an accurate projection could not be provided for some months.

Then in February of this year, the administration provided much lower figures for the U.S. share of NATO expansion—approximately $40 million each year over the next 10 years. This estimate stood in stark contrast to the much larger figures that had been quoted just months before.

Because of my concerns about the unpredictability of future expansion costs, I joined the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator STEVENS, on his amendments as an original cosponsor. The Senate adopted these amendments earlier this evening. They establish limits on the U.S. share of the common NATO budget and ensure Congress has the necessary authority to keep close watch over these costs in the future years of expansion.

Another important aspect of the cost issue is the expected contributions from the new members of NATO. Although Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made tremendous economic strides since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there have been concerns about their ability to live up to their individual cost commitments to NATO. It is important for the Senate to fully consider the commitments from these countries so the American taxpayers will not be forced to shoulder an unfair burden in the future. Therefore, I obtained letters of commitment from each of these Governments and ask unanimous consent that the text of the letters be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. CAMPBELL. Before I close, I want to recognize the work of our former distinguished colleague in this body from the State of Colorado, Senator HANK BROWN, who is one of this country's most ardent supporters of NATO expansion. Few have played a more crucial or steadfast role in the effort to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the NATO alliance. His outstanding work will have a lasting impact.

After much consideration of the cost and military implications of the pending resolution of ratification to expand

NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United States and our allies.

EXHIBIT 1

WARSAW, FEBRUARY 28, 1998

Hon. Mr. TRENT LOTT,
Senate Republican Majority Leaders,
Hon. Mr. TOM DASCHLE,
Senate Democratic Minority Leader,
Washington, DC.

DISTINGUISHED SENATORS: The Senate of the United States of America will soon vote on NATO enlargement with respect to Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership. It will be an important political decision with particular implications for the security of many nations, especially of those from Central and Eastern Europe.

Decisions of the member state of the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States' decision particularly, will provide our region, which suffered so much in the XXth century, with stability, security and lasting democratic order.

As leaders of all parliamentary caucuses in the Polish Parliament—those ruling as well as in the opposition—we assure you, Honorable Senators, that this question of Polish membership in NATO is vital for security of the Euroatlantic region and enjoys overwhelming support in our society.

Poland as a future member of NATO would like to be not only a security consumer but also a security provider. At the same time, we are determined to fulfill all necessary Alliance obligations—including financial ones.

It is our hope that the United States Senate will meet the expectations of millions of Poles and will give consent and advice to the President of the United States to ratify the Protocolls of Accession.

We address ourselves to you, as American Statesmen, to use your authority to assure the successful outcome of the Senate vote on NATO enlargement.

We remain, respectfully yours,

LESZEK MILLER,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Democratic Left Alliance.

JANUSZ DOBROSZ,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Polish Peasant Party.

MARIAN KRZAKLEWSKI,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Solidarity Election Action.

TADEOSZ SYRYJCZYK,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Union for Freedom.

JAN OLSZEWSKI,
Chairman, Parliamentary Group, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland.

THE AMBASSADOR OF HUNGARY,
April 28, 1998.

Hon. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
U.S. Senate,
380 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR CAMPBELL: As the U.S. Senate continues its debate on the enlargement of NATO and the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance, I am writing to you as the representative of the Hungarian Government in the United States. I highly appreciate your interest in this matter important for both the security of the United States and that of the European continent. I understand that you need assurances of our countries commitment to share the financial burdens of the enlargement.

Earlier last year, the Hungarian Government decided to raise the ratio of defense expenditures within the GDP by 0.1 percent annually until Hungary reaches the average level of defense spending by current NATO members of the same size as Hungary. Given the 4%+ growth of our GDP, this commitment will result in a 8–10% yearly increase of defense spending in real terms. Since both domestic and international financial institutions project the same or more growth in the years to come, it will be an ''increasing slice of a growing pie'' and my country's commitment to meet all the financial obligations stemming from our accession is supported by a solid economic background.

Mr. Senator, I remember that during the Appropriations Committee hearing last fall, you raised a concern that the U.S. cost implications would be unclear until NATO adopts its Target Force Goals report. It is true that this study will be adopted in June by the NATO Ministerial, however I should clarify that the Target Force Goals include military requirements to be fulfilled by the 3 nations. These requirements are national expenses and to be exclusively financed by the applicants, thus, they would not have an impact on the U.S. costs. It is clearly stated in one of the conditions of the Resolution of Ratification that ''the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments''. As a matter of fact, during our recent accession talks Hungary underwent a thorough ''screening'' by NATO which resulted in a conclusion that all the military requirements of NATO accession can be paid from the existing defense budgets.

With the above, I would reiterate the commitment of the Hungarian Government to pay all the necessary expenses of our membership. It is our fundamental interest to successfully adapt into an alliance that continues to be successful. This approach is supported by all the parliamentary parties of Hungary. This was also communicated to the U.S. Senate: our Foreign Minister visited Washington twice during the last half a year and meeting your distinguished colleagues as well as the leaderships of both aisles, he assured them about our firm commitment.

Enclose please find the Hungarian Government's memorandum on the enlargement that includes the financial commitment, as well. The memorandum was disseminated in the Senate in February.

I hope you will find the above useful in your consideration. I look forward to a continuing cooperation with you.

Sincerely yours,

DR. GYÖRGY BÁNLAKI.

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Hungary considers the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a unique historic step that will expand the zone of stability and security to the benefit of all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. Hungary's accession to NATO is a decisive step in the process of firmly anchoring itself in the community of democratic nations, with whom it shares values, interests and goals. Hungary is determined to play its part in ensuring international peace and justice, democracy and fundamental human rights, the principles and practice of the rule of law and a free market economy. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the strengthening of the transatlantic link assured by NATO is an indispensable prerequisite of the security of both present and future members of the Alliance.

Hungary's accession to NATO is based not only on the consensus of all parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament but also possesses an overwhelming support of Hungarian citizens. This was manifested in the impressive result of the referendum held on 16 November 1997 on the country's accession to the Alliance.

It is the firm intention of Hungary to provide for its own security and contribute to the security of all its Allies within the framework of a cohesive, strong NATO, based on solidarity among its members on both sides of the Atlantic. Hungary fully accepts all responsibilities and obligations and wishes to enjoy all rights stemming from membership.

Hungary accepts the broad approach to security as outlined in NATO's Strategic Concept. Hungary is determined to participate fully in NATO's Integrated Military Structure and in Collective Defense Planning. Hungary will commit the bulk of its armed forces to collective defense and is ready to commit forces, as necessary, to other NATO missions as well.

Hungary will allocate adequate budgetary resources for the implementations of its commitments. The country's sustainable economic growth and the envisaged increase of defense expenditure will provide solid foundation for fulfilling them.

The Republic of Hungary fully supports the continued openness of the Alliance, as stated in the Madrid Declaration. Hungary has a vested interest in seeing all countries of Central and Eastern Europe become members of the Alliance that wish to do so, once they have fulfilled the criteria of membership. Hungary remains committed to supporting their efforts and to sharing its experiences gained during the accession process.

In the period to come Hungary will further intensify her efforts to successfully complete her preparation for membership.

The Hungarian Government expresses its gratitude to all those in the United States of America, civilians and military alike, who have helped the entire process of Hungary's accession to NATO with dedication and a high level of professionalism.

The Hungarian Government hopes that the upcoming discussions and debates on NATO enlargement in the Senate will reflect the constructive approach that has consistently characterized the United States' position in all earlier phases of the enlargement process. Legislators in both current and future member states are facing the historic challenge of making a decision that will shape the future of the Euro-Atlantic region for a long time to come.

EMBASSY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
3900 SPRING OF FREEDOM ST. N.W.
Washington, DC, March 18, 1998.

Hon. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR CAMPBELL: The Embassy of the Czech Republic appreciate your interest in the contribution the new NATO members will make to the common defense of the North Atlantic Alliance.

I can assure you that the Czech Republic is ready to bear its share of the costs of NATO enlargement. In September 1996, the Czech Government decided to increase the military spending by 0.1% of the GDP annually until the year 2000. The 1998 budget adopted by the Parliament last December provides for a 22 percent increase in defense spending as compared with the previous year.

Attached please find statements of Czech officials on the costs of NATO enlargement and basic data on Czech military expenses.

Sincerely,

ANOTNIN HRADILEK,
Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Senate approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For me this issue is very clear, admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the Organization, reinforce new democracies, renew the American commitment to European security, and reaffirm American leadership in international relations and diplomacy.

The United States plays a pivotal role in international relations because of our position as the world's only military and economic superpower, and as the world's strongest democracy. The existence of NATO is one of our best hopes for relieving much of the burden of that role. NATO initiatives can prevent international incidents from becoming serious military conflicts by encouraging member nations to work together to resolve conflicts. The success of NATO initiatives depends entirely on the support and participation of member nations. Ratification of this NATO expansion resolution is a test of whether the United States will stay engaged in a changing and evolving Europe.

If NATO was not regularly reinforced and reinvigorated, the world's only superpower, the United States, would necessarily be involved in every international conflict and crisis. There is overwhelming bipartisan support for the notion that the United States taxpayer should not be responsible for policing the world, and that this should increasingly be an international responsibility. While I share this belief, I also have a personal interest in NATO expansion. My oldest son Brooks is in Bosnia as part of a NATO support effort. As NATO becomes more inclusive, the chances of going to war for all countries decreases. Likewise, as more countries join NATO, spreading the burden of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, fewer American soldiers will be needed abroad. This is a positive blessing for all Americans.

Nevertheless, there are some who oppose the expansion of NATO and others who would like to place limitations on expansion, eroding the body's effectiveness. Because Russia and the rest of the world know that NATO is a defensive peacekeeping body, not an offensive regime, the current fears that an expanded NATO will directly threaten relations with non-NATO member neighbors are inflated. Instead, including eastern European countries in NATO will lead to increased stability in the region, something good for all countries throughout the world. Additionally, efforts to preclude other countries from joining NATO over a specified time period and attempts to limit the powers of the Organization are not well thought out. Limiting the mission of NATO would not be wise, particularly because we would be limiting our own abilities in the future. And a mandated pause would undermine the open door commitment that NATO has had since 1949. All countries have always been welcome to join the fold of NATO and all countries should forever remain welcome to join an Organization committed to peace and security. The United States cannot walk away from the role of leadership in Europe. By what we have witnessed in Bosnia, Europe is at a very fragile stage. We must embrace the European countries that wish to be a part of a world alliance for peace and security, and we have a moral obligation to strengthen Europe and reduce the possibility of war in the region. The door to NATO must remain fully open, not half closed, to those nations equipped to shoulder the responsibility and reforms necessary to meet NATO membership standards.

With regard to the cost of NATO expansion, I believe that equitable financial involvement of member nations should be enforced. The U.S. should do what it can to support NATO to an extent equal to efforts of other countries involved. It is imperative that NATO expansion costs be kept as low as possible, and I do not believe that substantial expenditures to upgrade the new entry militaries is necessary or wise. Instead, I applaud the efforts of NATO to prioritize communications infrastructure, language skills, and strategic training for new members over big ticket items as the immediate criteria for NATO membership. It should also be noted that the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic estimate that they would spend more on defense, not less, if they remain outside NATO. Although the United States will have a proportional increase in overall NATO expenditures, I believe the cost of forgoing NATO expansion is much greater.

For these reasons, I fully support Senate approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the Organization and reaffirm American leadership in international relations and diplomacy. President Clinton announced his support for NATO enlargement in 1994 and in 1997 the Senate held over ten hearings on this issue. Debate on this issue has been extensive and thorough. NATO expansion is good for America and for the world.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks about expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.

I believe in a United States that is an activist leader and respectful participant in world affairs. This leadership comes with responsibilities that are often difficult for the United States: troops stationed and foreign aid dollars expended abroad; cooperation with international organizations like the United Nations; and the decision on NATO expansion that is before the Senate today. U.S. leadership abroad remains a vital national interest to the American people. My record as a United States Senator is strongly in support of a United States fully engaged with the world, a country and a people that participate and lead the international efforts to address the many problems that transcend borders and cultures.

NATO, since its founding in 1949, has been a successful foundation of U.S. security and cooperation with our European allies. This was particularly true throughout the period of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism can be partially credited to NATO; both to the alliance's collective defense arrangements and to its complimentary role in bringing Europe together which has fostered democratic and economic ties among countries with historical and cultural grievances. NATO has played a significant role in creating a Europe free from serious conflict for nearly 50 years.

The Senate is now considering whether to enlarge the sixteen member alliance by admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Few will deny that these three countries are prepared and committed to assuming the responsibilities of NATO membership. Few will contest the statement that these three countries have long ties to the West; that these three countries are the most Western states of the former Soviet bloc. And few will assert that these three countries face any military threat from Russia or other foe, either today or in the foreseeable future. I am confident that the enormous changes that have taken place in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will not be jeopardized by the upcoming vote. These changes including the creation of democratic institutions, new respect for human rights, and a growing market economy all enjoy enormous public support and will be continued regardless of Senate's decision on NATO expansion.

I do have a number of very serious concerns about NATO expansion including several which have been addressed through the amendment process. My concerns have very little to do with the three candidates for NATO expansion. In fact, I believe the United States and our allies should take aggressive steps to support these burgeoning democracies which have demonstrated so much promise since the fall of the Soviet Union. Each of these countries has a remarkable story to tell and each is deserving of closer ties to the United States and the West.

I voted for the amendment offered by Senator HARKIN to call for an accurate accounting of all expenses to the United States related to NATO expansion. The Senate and the American people ought to better understand the obligations we are assuming if we agree to NATO expansion. I have no confidence in the various cost estimates

that have been presented during this entire process. In fact, I am fairly certain the costs to U.S. taxpayers will exceed even the Administration's highest estimates. The various cost estimates for NATO expansion have ranged from $1.5 billion to $125 billion.

Opponents of the Harkin amendment argue that the U.S. is not issuing a blank check on behalf of our taxpayers. Certainly, Congress will object to escalating costs for NATO in the future and particularly if a significantly larger NATO burden falls upon the United States. However, my concern is that without a full accounting of costs, the United States is assuming a new moral and financial obligation to NATO without adequate consideration by the Senate. U.S. prestige and our position in the world should not be risked at some future point because we did not know or were not prepared to consider today the full costs on NATO expansion.

The Moynihan amendment to link NATO expansion with admission to the European Union also addresses my concerns regarding the most appropriate forum for integration between the West and the many former Soviet satellite states seeking closer ties with Western Europe and the United States. Senator MOYNIHAN has been an articulate voice throughout this debate and I do agree with many of the eloquent points he has brought before the Senate. I voted for the Moynihan amendment as I believe European Union membership is the most appropriate of the available forums for integrating with the West the three nations invited to join NATO.

These three countries are in various stages of economic development and each is committed to improving the lives of its citizens through closer ties to the West. In my mind, the European Union is a far better vehicle for economic growth and integration with the West. Participation and inclusion in the EU and its marketplace will pay dividends for the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary that far outweigh the security assurances inherent with NATO membership.

The European Union has begun negotiations for EU admission with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and several other countries. Frankly, I am very skeptical that the EU will in a timely manner admit new members. The EU has a history of protected industries—particularly agriculture—and I doubt Europe's protected industries will be anxious to take on lower wage countries or significant agricultural producers. Export states here at home, like my state of Washington, have long sought to open Europe's protected market and system of state subsidies. We should be careful not to aid or validate Europe's trade practices which have hurt the United States.

Admission to the EU is a question for EU countries to consider, however, I do not think we should give the EU the opportunity to settle for NATO expansion. Europe has the strongest interest in the success of many former Soviet states. The EU, including the European states who do not belong to NATO, should also be expected to make sacrifices to ensure a peace for all time in Europe.

My vote for the Moynihan amendment should be viewed as a call for new thinking on the shared objective of bringing the newly independent nations of Europe into the existing political and economic system. We have to ask ourselves if the tools of the Cold War will work for the U.S. and Europe as we enter a new century.

The impact of NATO expansion on our relationship with Russia is my most significant concern on this issue. I am delighted so many of my colleagues have raised the issue, both those who favor expansion and those who oppose it.

Unfortunately, I believe that the impact of the vote we are to cast today will have very little effect on the U.S.-Russia relationship. For I believe, from the very beginning of the expansion process, we have pursued a process and a policy that has seriously damaged our relationship with Russia. I believe the Administration has erred greatly here and our foreign policy will be effected by it for years to come regardless of the outcome of the NATO expansion vote.

Already, numerous Senators have cited the historic work of George Kennan. I also take his counsel very seriously and I encourage my colleagues to ponder his words from a 1997 New York Times opinion piece. Mr. Kennan wrote, ''Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.''

Kennan's final words are particularly troubling as he states, ''. . . to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.'' One needs only look at recent weapons inspection crisis with Iraq to see the worsening ties between the U.S. and Russia as a result of NATO expansion. There are other examples of the growing divide between the U.S. and Russia: cooperation with Iran on ballistic missiles, agreements with China to counter a world with one superpower, and an assortment of other nuclear weapons related issues from declarations on the first use of nuclear weapons to ratification of START III and the eventual negotiation of START. All of these issues are vital to the United States and all have been negatively impacted by NATO expansion.

It goes without saying that Russia does not dictate to the United States our foreign policy interests and policies. However, U.S. policy makers should not underestimate the degree to which Russia matters to our own future. Russia is the largest nation in a new Europe. Any attempt to guarantee the future peace and security of Europe by excluding Russia creates more problems than promise for the future.

NATO Expansion fails to consider the political landscape of Russia. Approximately two-thirds of the Russian Duma is controlled by communist and nationalist parties. These political parties are very anti-American and the West. The Russian Constitution grants enormous powers to the Presidency that have allowed the West to underestimate Russia's opposition to NATO Expansion.

My fear is we have undermined those in Russia who are advocating and following the course of democracy, international cooperation and economic reform. I hope the Senate does not revisit the words of George Kennan with immense regret in future years. The Administration and the Senate now must take it upon themselves to rebuild those ties with Russia to go forward and address our many shared interests for the future. Vice President Gore has been instrumental in building ties between our two countries, and I certainly encourage him to continue his leadership role with Russia's new prime minister.

I have discussed in detail my concerns with NATO expansion. This has been a very difficult decision for me. In the end, I was swayed by one additional, very powerful concern.

This powerful concern is for U.S. credibility. I do believe U.S. credibility is on the line with this vote. Regardless of the wisdom of NATO expansion, I fear that rejection of NATO expansion at this point will send dangerous messages to the world about U.S. intentions for the future. The international community will view a rejection of this initiative which was started and driven by the United States as a sign of U.S. isolationism. Allowing that message to be sent around the world will, in my mind, be far more damaging to U.S. interests worldwide than admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Quite frankly, I think the Administration has marginalized the United States Senate on the question before us today. While I doubt that the Administration intended to do this and I know the Senate has been active and engaged throughout this process, the result is the same. The Senate, as I see it, has little choice in the matter before the body today. To reject NATO expansion at this point will also cause serious long-term problems for U.S. interests throughout the world.

Therefore, I will vote for NATO expansion.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Delaware, the Minority manager of the resolution of ratification regarding NATO enlargement.

I had planned to submit an amendment to the resolution of ratification as I discussed in my floor speed of October 27, 1997. This amendment, simply put, would express the Sense of the Senate that the United States should consult with all NATO member nations, subsequent to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic but prior to the consideration of any other nation for accession, concerning the desirability of establishing a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO member if it no longer conforms to the Alliance's fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Mr. President, I raised this issue with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he testified before the Armed Services Committee on January 29th. In response to my question as to whether NATO should have a mechanism to suspend a member, Secretary Kissinger stated:

> I think in situations in which a government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put forward. I have not thought this through, but I fully agree this is a very important issue which does not apply to any of the new countries that are now before us.

I also raised the issue of establishing a mechanism for suspending a NATO member with former Secretary of Defense William Perry when he testified before the Armed Services Committee on March 19th. I posed the question in the context of a NATO nation that no longer conforms to NATO's fundamental principles but still has a veto over NATO operations. Secretary Perry stated:

> That is a very good question, Senator LEVIN. What you are describing is a problem—in fact, I would call it a flaw—in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many years. And, therefore it is important, in addressing that problem to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO accession issue.
>
> We could have predicted several decades ago that that would cause a problem, there would be some major issue come up on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO values. Happily that has not happened. But it is a potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.

Mr. President, I do not intend to offer this amendment at this time because it has nothing to do with Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic and I do not want to suggest or imply any such connection. Nevertheless, I do believe it is an issue that needs to be raised within NATO councils. I believe it should be resolved before any additional accessions to NATO are considered. And so, I would ask the distinguished Senator from Delaware if he believes this is a matter that merits consideration?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States and our Allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than to be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency situation exists. I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for raising this matter. I also commend him for not seeking to amend the resolution of ratification, for, as he has correctly noted, this issue is not related to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I have voiced a number of concerns with regard to the Administration's open-door policy on NATO enlargement, and in particular the implementation of that policy with regard to the Baltic states.

Over the last few days, the Administration and Sen. BIDEN and his staff have worked closely with myself and my staff to address my concerns.

I wish to confirm with Sen. BIDEN and Sen. HELMS that my understanding of certain provisions in the NATO resolution, as modified by the Manager's Amendment, is correct.

First, there is the issue of consultations with the Senate. I understand that the Resolution, as clarified by the Manager's Amendment, states that the Senate will be consulted prior to the U.S. consenting to invite any European state to begin accession talks with NATO, as was done for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at Madrid last year. This would apply for the Baltic states, and for any other European state seeking admission to NATO. Is that correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Second is the issue of U.S. security commitments. The NATO resolution contains a provision stating that only ''a consensus decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member * * * will constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.'' This means that a political document, like the Baltic Charter, which has not been approved by the Senate pursuant to constitutional treaty-making process, does not constitute a U.S. security commitment to the Baltic states. Is my understanding of that provision correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BINGAMAN. The third concern that I wish to address is whether the United States, in signing the Baltic charter, has ''pre-committed'' to support Baltic membership in NATO in the future. The Resolution, as modified, contains a provision to the effect that, other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented or committed to invite any other country to join NATO in the future. My understanding of this provision is that it reflects the fact that the Baltic Charter of Partnership does not constitute a U.S. pre-commitment to NATO membership for the Baltics, and that presently the United States has not consented or committed to support NATO membership for any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) that may seek to accede to NATO. Is that understanding correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I want to begin my discussion of this very important issue by commending the people of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for their brave and determined transition to democracy and free market economies. The citizens of these three nations have suffered grave injustices and brutal atrocities during World War II and the Cold War and now, to see these nations emerge from these dark days and turn toward democracy, deserves the praise of every man and woman who cherishes freedom.

I also want to express my strong support for the security and independence of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I also believe the United States and its military forces will support the independence of these nations whether or not they join NATO.

While I want to encourage the move toward democracy, free markets and Western values in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, I also want to see these values take root in Russia. It is because of my concern that a vote now on NATO expansion will hinder our relations with Russia and risk the Duma's ratification of the START II Treaty that I will vote against NATO expansion at this time.

I have spent a good deal of time and effort discussing the issue of NATO expansion with a number of U.S. foreign policy makers and military leaders. I have given this question a considerable amount of thought because I believe before the United States commits itself to defending additional nations, with U.S. nuclear weapons if necessary, we must carefully consider all of the ramifications of this action.

As I look at the current security situation in Central Europe, I do not see a security threat that necessitates a vote to expand NATO today. What I do see however, is a weakened superpower in Russia with thousands of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.

I think if anyone looks at the lessons of the end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, it shows that the harsh terms of the peace imposed on Germany fed the antagonisms that allowed Adolf Hitler to come to power. That, I believe, is the real threat we face today.

At present, we have an historic opportunity to bring Russia into the West and cement Russia's commitment to freedom, democracy and free enterprise. On the other hand, we can expand NATO, right up to Russia's border, and we can thereby inadvertently recreate a Russia that is a threat to U.S. security and peace in Central Europe.

It is ironic that by adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO we may create the security danger these nation's fear. More importantly, by voting to expand NATO today I believe we run the risk of undercutting the supporters of democracy in Russia and fuel the fears of those who want to restore an aggressive, imperialist Russia that will then require billions of dollars in additional American taxpayer money to deter.

This is not idle speculation, this scenario is real and it is here now. At present, the Russian Duma has refused to ratify the START II Treaty and this action has led the United States to maintain nuclear armed ICBMs, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines that we would otherwise deactivate under the START II treaty. In fact, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal would drop from about 6,000 warheads under START I to 3,000 under START II. Department of Defense figures indicate by fiscal year 2000 it will cost hundreds of million of dollars to keep the U.S. nuclear arsenal at a START I level.

While we wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the Secretary of Defense, our friend Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, believe that we must keep our forces at a START I level to keep the pressure on the Russia Duma to ratify the treaty.

Therefore, when the supporters of NATO expansion discuss the costs associated with adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the alliance, I would ask that they add the cost of keeping U.S. nuclear forces at a START I level to their calculations. Let the record show, no Administration official has stepped forward to argue that a Senate vote to expand NATO will encourage the Russian Duma to ratify START II.

In fact, in a conversation I and several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee had with Alexie Arbatov, a member of the Russian Duma and a democratic reformist, Mr. Arbatov told us that NATO expansion undercuts democratic reformists ability to promote cooperation between NATO allies and Russia. He continued to tell us that expansion of NATO to include these three countries will delay Russian ratification of START II.

The Washington Post recently included two articles describing the degraded state of Russia's nuclear arsenal. These articles also confirm the extensive testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee which documents Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons.

As my colleagues, know, Russia's economic problems have resulted in a huge reduction in that nation's conventional capability. This reality has led Russian policy makers to enunciate a policy stressing a reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Russia's security interest.

We therefore find ourselves in a situation, under the proposed NATO expansion, where we are extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella closer to Russia's border, and literally to Russia's border in the Kaliningrad province which borders Russia, at a time when Russia is increasing its reliance on weapons of mass destruction to defend its interests.

Given Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons, I believe it is dangerous for the United States to push the border of NATO eastward to Russia's border at this time.

Administration officials tell us NATO expansion is not directed toward Russia, indeed some offer the hope that Russia will eventually join NATO, but I ask these officials do the Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs believe NATO is their defense against Russia? Of course they do!

I also question the logic of those who say Russia is free to join NATO. If Russia is allowed to join NATO, what is the real mission of NATO? If Russia and everyone else who wants to is allowed to join NATO, is NATO still a self-defense alliance or is it then a new version of the United Nations?

I believe NATO expansion at this time will decrease U.S. national security because I believe it will hinder joint U.S.-Russian efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to a February editorial in the New York Times by Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scrowcroft and Alton Frye, ''frictions over NATO distract Moscow and Washington from profound common dangers.'' At the top of the list of the ''profound common dangers'' is the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This enormous challenge begins with our effort to control the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists in Russia. All of these crucial non-proliferation programs require the active cooperation of Russia and a vote today to expand NATO does not contribute to this cooperation.

As it stands today, even my good friends on the other side of this issue will agree Russia's conventional forces are weak and getting weaker. Russia's plans for new conventional weapons systems are slowed and reduced. Russia cannot afford to regularly pay the members of her armed forces. Instead, Russia has turned efforts inward to refocus and rebuild their country; and, with our help, Russia may reemerge with a strong market economy rooted in freedom and democracy. Without a doubt, Russia's continued evolution toward the West will have the greatest impact on long term U.S. security.

Mr. President, I support efforts by the United States and the European Union to help Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become strong democracies with robust market economies. But I also want Russia to continue on the road to freedom and democracy so I therefore will oppose the resolution to expand NATO at this time.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The inclusion of these three countries will alter the Alliance, but the benefits clearly make this expansion both timely and worthwhile.

In 1949, if the founders of NATO had been asked to predict where the alliance would be five decades later, few if any could have foreseen a more extraordinary success. The NATO nations stood firmly together as the great bulwark against communism during the Cold War. NATO is, without doubt, the most successful security alliance in history.

The original purpose of NATO was to protect the West against the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Now, even though the Cold War is over, NATO continues to be essential. It makes sense to adopt this modest expansion of the Alliance beyond its Cold War borders to include three nations which were once part of the Warsaw Pact.

The greatest threats to European security are now the long-standing ethnic conflicts that have simmered inside many of these nations for centuries. Two world wars in this century began in Central Europe. Extension of NATO's security umbrella to these three additional nations will place them in a part of Europe where wars no longer happen.

Obviously, there are concerns about the expansion of NATO that Congress and the country must be sensitive to—especially the potential impact of this expansion on our relationship with Russia.

We have rightly spent much of the past decade and billions of U.S. taxpayers' dollars in working with Russia to achieve nuclear arms reductions and to help Russia safeguard its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear materials. Russian cooperation with the U.S. under the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program and our bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaties with Russia have substantially reduced the chance of nuclear war. In my view, anything that would disrupt or harm this vital progress would be a fateful error.

Many of Russia's leaders do not support NATO's invitation to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic. But the addition of these countries to NATO poses no threat to Russia. I commend President Clinton for his effective leadership in making this point clear. We must continue to work to assure President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders that the expansion of NATO is not a danger to their country or their security. We must do all we can to address Russia's concerns and increase our cooperation in all key areas with Russia to ensure that our goal of a more secure future is achieved.

We must also deal with the concerns over costs, especially the costs that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have to bear to upgrade their military forces to NATO standards.

These costs will inevitably have to compete with pressing domestic needs in those countries.

Together, these three nations will have to spend as much as $14 billion over the next 10 years to meet NATO standards. These costs are the responsibility of these prospective new members. They committed to pay these costs when they asked to become members of NATO. The U.S. already pays 25% of NATO's commonly-funded expenses. NATO expansion should not impose costly new burdens on U.S. taxpayers.

Nevertheless, these countries are on the right track, and so is NATO. This expansion of NATO is amply justified. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO. They are solid democracies, and they will make our alliance for peace even stronger. Their rightful place is in NATO, and I urge the Senate to support this Resolution of Ratification.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, later this evening the Senate will conclude debate on a resolution of ratification authorizing the United States to support the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The decision that the Senate takes with respect to this resolution will have an historic impact on the future of Europe and the nature of the Transatlantic partnership that will take us into the next millennium.

Without question, NATO has been the singularly most successful alliance for mutual defense in modern history since its establishment in 1949. For nearly fifty years it has served as a bulwark against communism, and as a deterrent against threats posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites.

Today the world has changed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and the Warsaw Pact is fast becoming a mere footnote in our history books. In that context, it seems to me to be a particularly appropriate moment to review whether and how NATO's role should evolve, to keep pace with the changing political landscape.

Some changes have already been undertaken by NATO. For example, not too long ago NATO members agreed that it was an appropriate mission for NATO forces to assist with efforts to implement the Dayton Peace accords in war torn Bosnia.

Certainly the debate this week is as much about such matters as it is whether Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will be good NATO partners.

The debate is also about the merits of admitting additional members beyond these three—and the order and timing for doing so. And, it is about the budgetary implications of an enlarged organization with an expanded land area requiring collective defense. Finally, it is about the impact on U.S. and NATO's relations with Russia and other NIS countries and the implications for internal Russian political stability.

These are all important and legitimate areas for discussion. The Senate's debate on these questions has been thoughtful and constructive. Senators WARNER, MOYNIHAN, HARKIN and others have asked some very important questions that deserve answers before moving forward to take NATO from 16 to nineteen members and beyond. It would be foolhardy not to carefully assess these matters before making changes to NATO.

I agree with those who have held up a yellow flag urging caution. Certainly it behooves us to act judiciously in reshaping NATO to ensure that whatever we do does not undermine the effectiveness or efficiency of the current organization. Nor should we foster expectations in Eastern and Central Europe that cannot be fulfilled—or create additional and unnecessary financial burdens on existing or new members.

I also believe that it is important that we take into account the implications for our current and future relations with Russia and other former Soviet states. And particularly with respect to Russia's continued willingness to move forward to ratify Start II and other future arms control agreements.

While I agree with those who suggest it would be wrong to give Moscow veto power over NATO decisions—on the other hand, I see nothing to be gained from causing unnecessary uncertainty or anxiety with respect to our intentions toward Russia.

After the many hours of debate we have had on the pending measure, I believe a strong case has been made in favor of admitting these three new members. Foreign policy experts and scholars who have spent a great deal of time studying NATO over the years make a persuasive case in support of expansion.

I also believe that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, together with other Clinton Administration officials, have during hours and hours of Congressional testimony made a very compelling case in favor of ratification of the pending protocols. Former Presidents Bush and Carter have endorsed the President's decision. As have a number of our distinguished former Secretaries of State and former members of the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also adequately addressed concerns that have been raised with respect to NATO expansion.

During the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO heads of state, including President Clinton reached common agreement at that time to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the organization, while leaving open the door to other interested governments. However, no commitment was made with respect to the sequence or timing of such additions.

That was appropriate in my view. It goes without saying that we must assess any impact of enlarging NATO by three on that organization's ability to continue to fulfill its primary mission—namely collective self-defense—before moving forward to consider additional new members.

Realistically, such an assessment is likely to take three or more years by my estimation—in line with the time frame fame Senators WARNER and MOYNIHAN have included in their so called pause reservation. Having said that, I really do not think it necessary to codify this time frame into a binding proposition. In fact, the time period could even turn out to be longer than three years. Were we to codify the time period, we might in fact be creating false expectations in the minds of countries waiting to join that invitations will automatically be forthcoming once three years have elapsed. It was for those reasons that I voted against this amendment earlier today.

It is important as we review the current structure, purpose, and membership of this important organization that we remain mindful of the central proposition—the organization's relevance to today's and tomorrow's realities. We should ask as well whether and what changes best further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Only after such questions have been fully explored should we move forward to alter NATO.

I believe that during the course of the current debate we have exhaustively reviewed the implications and U.S. interests at stake with respect to the pending protocols. I am satisfied that the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will enhance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by strengthening and fostering European unity and security.

There is little doubt in my mind, Mr. President, about the likely outcome of the final vote on this matter. In my judgement the United States Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification, and thereby authorize the United States to consent to the admission of these three members.

Mr. President, I will join my colleagues in voting aye on this matter. To do otherwise would severely undermine the cohesive support that has existed for NATO since its establishment in 1949 and leave us ill prepared to promote a strong, secure, and united Europe in the 21st century.

THE COST OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no more complex issue than the financial cost of NATO enlargement.

Over the past two years there have been several studies by private and by governmental organizations, which have yielded widely differing estimates.

The highest figure reached one hundred twenty-five billion dollars over ten years, with over thirty billion of that accruing to the United States. The most recent—and I believe the best—estimate is NATO's own cost study, which estimates only one-and-a-

half billion dollars in direct costs over ten years. According to the latest estimate, the expected U.S. contribution to the direct costs of enlargement are estimated to average forty million dollars per year for ten years.

There are good reasons for the vast disparities in the estimates—basically there was a lot of ''apples and oranges'' mixing going on.

Explaining all this requires a fair amount of effort, which, I regret, some of the critics of enlargement either were unwilling to give, or which they eschewed for the easier route of utilizing unexplained, raw data for partisan purposes.

Mr. President, at this time I would like to examine the cost issue.

The 16 NATO nations collectively spent about $455 billion on defense in 1997. Of that total approximately $1.6 billion goes to the NATO common budget.

What does the NATO common budget pay for? Let's take the airbase at Aviano, Italy, as an example.

The host country, Italy, maintains an airbase that has been designated for NATO use. Italy pays for all costs related to the base except new construction and improvements that benefit the United States Air Force units stationed there. These improvements, above and beyond the national needs of Italy, comprising some $260 million, are paid for by NATO's common budget.

One of NATO's founding principles was (and remains) equitable cost sharing—that is, nations make financial contributions to offset costs based on their ability to pay.

In the 1950's, the U.S. paid almost 50% of NATO's operating costs. In the 1960's, however, our European allies assumed about half of the original U.S. contribution in recognition of our worldwide security commitments.

Since then, our overall national contribution to NATO's three common budgets has been reduced to about one-quarter. Our allies account for the other three quarters of NATO operating costs.

We participate in NATO at a reduced rate, but we receive security benefits that far outweigh our financial contributions.

Let's take a closer look at where our annual contributions to NATO's budget go.

NATO has three budgets, each supporting a distinct aspect of NATO operations.

NATO's Civil Budget pays for the operating costs of NATO's modest, 1960's-vintage headquarters building plus associated staff in Brussels.

Additionally, there are numerous public information, political, and scientific activity programs supported by this budget, including civilian elements of NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace activities.

The annual U.S. contribution is provided by the State Department.

NATO's Military Budget provides support for NATO's military headquarter (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other elements of the integrated command structure.

This budget also supports operations of several key NATO military agencies, like the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO C3 Agency, for example, and the costs of running the NATO AWACS fleet.

Annual contributions are paid from Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance funds.

NATO's Security Investment Program pays for construction of the facilities and installations NATO uses to support alliance military activities, such as command structure C3 support, force mobility projects, and training facilities—in other words, infrastructure.

It is also used to support common-user procurements to meet priority military requirements set by SACEUR and SACLANT, like integrated air defense and interoperable communications systems.

U.S. contributions to this budget are obtained from Department of Defense Military Construction funds.

As I said, the U.S. pays approximately one-quarter of the overall NATO common budget.

If there were no enlargement in 1999, we would still expect to pay about $458 million.

Now let's turn to the costs of enlargement. NATO has estimated that over 10 years, the cost to the NATO common-funded budgets will be about $1.5 billion.

While the amount may not be distributed evenly over 10 years, let's accept for the sake of discussion that it will.

This means that the U.S. quarter-share will be about $400 million over 10 years, or about $40 million a year.

This represents only a 9% increase in our total contribution to the NATO common-funded budgets.

Bearing in mind that the U.S. share of NATO's common-funded budgets represents only one-tenth of one percent of the current defense budget, I believe that enlargement expenditures are a pretty good deal.

The key questions for us should be: Is the $1.5 billion figure accurate? What is the U.S. share? and Is the U.S. share a fair share?

Anyone who has looked at this issue would, I believe, agree that it is extremely confusing.

There are lots of numbers out there on enlargement costs in addition to the $1.5 billion.

You will recall that the Administration told us in February 1997 that the total cost of enlargement would be about $27 to 35 billion.

Let's look at those numbers.

First, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out, the Administration's estimate included two categories of costs that are not direct enlargement costs.

The first was costs to current NATO members—$8 to 10 billion. These are the national costs the current allies needed to spend to meet their commitments under the revised 1991 Strategic Concept to improve their mobility, reinforcement, and power projection capabilities.

They would incur these costs even if NATO did not enlarge.

That's why GAO said the Administration made a mistake in including them in the February 1997 estimate.

The U.S. has already met its power projection requirements, so we would not have additional costs in this area.

The second figure in the February 1997 estimate, which is not counted in the final NATO study, represented the costs to new members to restructure and modernize their militaries—$10 to 13 billion.

They would incur these costs even if they did not join NATO.

Once again, this is why GAO said the Administration goofed in including these costs in their February 1997 estimate.

This leaves us with $9 to 12 billion in direct enlargement costs.

Of this $9 to 12 billion, the Administration said in February 1997 that about 60% would be eligible for NATO common funding.

The rest of these direct enlargement costs would be picked up by the new members.

For example, there is the procurement of something called Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) gear—you need to have it if you're in the Alliance—but NATO common funding won't pay for it.

60% of $9 to 12 billion is about $5.5 to 7 billion.

This is the number we should start with when comparing the NATO estimate of common-funded costs of $1.5 billion.

What accounts for the difference? $5.5 to 7 billion versus $1.5 billion?

I just talked about the top half of this chart * * * above the dash line.

Let's focus on why the Administration's $5.5 to 7 billion estimate and NATO's $1.5 billion estimate are different.

First, there is the matter of four versus three new members. The Administration did its estimate several months before the decision in Madrid. The extra member counts for about $1.1 billion. That brings us down to $4.9 to 6.2 billion.

The February 1997 estimate did not have the benefit of detailed responses by the three to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) or the benefit of site visits to the three countries' facilities conducted by SHAPE military experts.

The infrastructure turned out to be much better than expected. This is a key point. In February 1997, we thought we had a lot of work to do to bring airfields up to NATO standards.

The reality is that a number of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian airfields are in very good shape. The earlier Administration assumptions about the capacity of the airfields to host NATO aircraft were incorrect.

For example, during Partnership for Peace exercises, a Hungarian airbase successfully hosted a Dutch F–16 squadron, that is, the Dutch F–16s landed, were serviced and refueled, and took off again.

With regard to funding eligibility: The Administration assumed NATO would pay for some works that NATO later determined were national responsibilities.

There were also some pricing differences. The U.S. used generalized cost factors and pricing, while NATO used by-item, historical cost data from their files.

While there were some military requirements differences between the U.S. and NATO studies, these were modest and not operationally significant. What are we getting for $1.5 billion? Is it the right set of requirements? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is. What are those categories?

C31 Requirements include: Cross border connections, transmission media, terminal and security equipment; Upgrades to military headquarters interface equipment; C2 info systems, including the NATO-specialized functional area sub-system; and a NATO satellite communications (SATCOM) terminal for Hungary.

Air Defense Requirements include: Air Sovereignty Operations Center communication links to airfields; NATO air defense ground environment C2 sites; Interface to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); Installation of Combined Air Operations Centers in Hungary and Poland; Upgraded air defense radars; and Air Command and Control System acquisition.

Necessary reinforcement improvements (land, air & maritime facility upgrades) include: Tactical fighter airfields; An AWACS and air-refueling forward operating base; Rail and storage facilities for land reinforcement; Petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; and Maritime facilities.

Training and exercise improvements include: Upgrades to air and ground communications, Tank and vehicle wash facilities, Movement costs for new allies' exercise participation, and Costs for minor construction and administrative travel.

Now I would pose the question: are these the right requirements.

I have confidence in the positive assessment of these requirements given by General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of Defense has assured us that the scenarios which these requirements have been planned against include robust assumptions.

These assumptions have changed from the Cold War assumptions of about 40 to 60 divisions coming across the border with less than 24 hours' warning, to scenarios of 10 to 20 divisions with 60 to 90 days' warning.

We can discuss the specifics in a classified setting.

But I am satisfied that the requirements are based on reasonable assumptions, and that they include sound, worst-case analyses, given the current security environment.

To sum up, the most recent NATO estimate of the direct costs of enlargement appears to be sound.

The annual costs of NATO enlargement to the United States are real, but they are affordable, constituting only a tiny fraction of our annual defense expenditures. For them, we gain three loyal allies with a quarter-million troops. The costs are, in short, a bargain.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate is considering whether Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary should be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the most important foreign policy issues to be considered by the Senate in recent years, and the outcome will shape the future direction of NATO and our military relationship with our European allies.

In addressing this question, we should begin with the fundamentals, by examining the past and future purpose of NATO. NATO is a collective security military alliance, with the original purpose of defending Western Europe from a possible attack by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact. When considered from that perspective, NATO stands as one of the most stunningly successful alliances ever conceived. Not just because it maintained the peace for over forty years—other alliances in human history have kept the peace for longer periods of time. The success of NATO cannot be judged merely by time, but also by the scope of its mission. For, unlike previous military alliances, NATO was not intended merely to prevent another conventional war, but also to deter nuclear war. At stake was—and still is—nothing less than the preservation of global civilization, and the world owes a debt of gratitude to the alliance and its leaders for maintaining the peace.

Some have argued that NATO also serves to maintain democratic traditions, since its original purpose was to protect Western democracy from an attack by an authoritarian Warsaw Pact. Today, NATO continues to defend those democratic values, which are part of the criteria in the decision to expand the membership of the alliance.

Nonetheless, NATO continues to be, first and foremost, a defensive alliance. Critics of NATO expansion question whether Russia perceives NATO to be defensive or offensive, and argue that the admission of the these three new members will ''alarm'' Russia. These critics believe that Russian nationalists will perceive the expansion of NATO to be the enlargement of an offensive alliance aimed squarely at the heart of Russia, rather than the enlargement of a defensive agreement among nations inclined to keep, not break, the peace.

The question of Russian nationalists, and their future role in their own country, speaks to the core of the issues surrounding the future of NATO. The question is not only how Russian nationalists react today, but also whether the most militaristic and virulent nationalists might gain power in the future, and whether that could pose a renewed threat to peace in Europe.

Russia is unstable in virtually every societal area—her economy is weak, her military in shambles, and civil order is increasingly dominated by violence and corruption. Although we all sincerely hope that this wounded bear will regain her health and settle into a peaceful way of life that protects the interests of all her citizens and which deals fairly and openly in the community of nations, it is not at all clear that democratic traditions will survive within that nation for the next ten years. Some have argued that the expansion of NATO could be a factor in bringing the nationalists to power. The available evidence suggests that this is not the case. The Yeltsin government has publicly accepted the expansion of NATO, and public opinion polls indicate that the Russian populace is barely aware of this question, and everyday Russians do not have strong opinions on the question of NATO expansion. They are far more concerned about bread and jobs than they are about NATO.

If authoritarian nationalists are to gain power in Russia in the future, that sad scenario will be caused by the fundamental instability of Russian democratic institutions, and the general collapse of the economy, not by NATO expansion. If nationalists seize power, and impose a new militaristic dictatorship upon Russia, it will pose a new threat to the peace of Europe, and the continuation of NATO will be essential to again preserve that peace. We might again face the question of a newly hostile Russia that possesses a still formidable arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles.

I would also note that critics of NATO expansion argue this question both ways. They argue that we dare not enlarge NATO because it might irritate or anger the most virulent of the Russian nationalists, yet those same critics do not address the question of the threat posed by a future rise to power of those very same nationalists.

In the event of the rise to power of authoritarian nationalists in Russia, NATO would be strengthened by the admission of these three nations. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic occupy key geopolitical positions in the heart of central Europe. For that reason alone, their addition to NATO is of strategic importance. These three nations have also met the criteria for membership, and their inclusion in NATO would more firmly cement their ties to the U.S. and Western Europe.

Another related question is whether we should enlarge NATO now, or wait until some undefined future date.

There is little to be gained through delay, since the Russian government has largely accepted the addition of these three countries to NATO. The diplomatic and political conditions are not likely to be any better in the future, and there is a serious risk that circumstances may only worsen. For example, if militaristic nationalists gained power in Russia in the future, they would likely vehemently object to any expansion of NATO. NATO would likely not act to expand the alliance in the face of such Russian opposition, fearing that it might lead to renewed cold war tensions. The bottom line is that we would not be able to expand NATO at the very time that such enlargement would be in our national interest. Under such circumstances, NATO might deeply regret not including Poland, with the geopolitically important Polish plain, as part of NATO.

It is probably true that some xenophobic Russian nationalists will tell their people that NATO enlargement poses a threat to their country. But we know, as do they, that this argument is entirely false. NATO is inherently a defensive alliance. Its military structure revolves around the defense of its own territory, and not around the launching of offensive operations aimed at subjugating Russia. We cannot base our foreign policy upon the paranoid concerns of the opponents of democracy in Russia. They will advance arguments to undermine democracy and U.S.-Russian relations regardless of what we do.

Another important question is whether there should be another round of NATO enlargement, and if so, which nations should be included. Critics of NATO expansion have argued that a decision to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic implies yet another round of expansion, and that if we start down this path, we will inevitably include even more nations into NATO.

In my opinion, there is nothing inevitable about this at all. I am voting on the admission of three nations, and only three nations. My vote to admit those three does not imply either approval or disapproval for any other nations. If this or any future administration decides to recommend another round of countries for admission to NATO, that recommendation must receive the consent of the Senate to become a reality.

I want to clearly separate our vote on enlargement today from any vote in the future on other nations. I recognize that there are deep-seated concerns about the possible future admission of the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These are important questions, which would be carefully evaluated by the Senate, and any decision involving the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic stands by itself.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has performed a vital role in maintaining the peace and deterring catastrophic nuclear war. I believe that the enlargement of NATO, by including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will further strengthen that role in the future. Therefore, I will cast my vote in favor of expansion.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It is the right thing to do, right now.

Fifty years ago, President Harry Truman perceived the very real threat to our national interest posed by the rise of Soviet Communism in liberated Western Europe. He understood that although turning a blind, isolationist's eye to trans-Atlantic affairs may have seemed attractive in the short term, it could prove far more dangerous and costly to American interests in the long term. Therefore, it was absolutely in our national interest to promote and defend abroad our values of democracy and opportunity against an aggressive and oppressive Soviet regime. To that end, we fashioned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—a collective security agreement with fifteen of our allies. With NATO, insuring that Western Europe's democracies flourish—and that its economies grow—became a top U.S. priority, and rightly so.

Fifty years later, the results are impressive and worth examining. By instituting collective security among its member nations, NATO achieved collective stability. This stability allowed Western Europe to enjoy one of its longest periods of sustained peace and economic development ever. It has recovered remarkably from the scourge of two World Wars, and free markets have thrived inside of democratic institutions. NATO not only deterred the Soviets from aggression, but so strong is our alliance that since its inception no NATO country has ever been attacked. Of course, this success has not been achieved without sacrifice or without cost. However, the price of peace is a mere fraction of the cost of war.

Clearly, the mission of NATO needs to be adapted to the post-Cold War world. The threat is no longer the clearly defined ominous shadow of Communism; but the threat of instability is just as real. The Cold War has ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been dismantled, but now is not the time for passive complacency. Just as the war-torn countries of Western Europe did fifty years ago, the emerging democracies and economies of today's Eastern Europe need NATO security to rebuild and to thrive. And now, like then, it is in the national interest of the United States that this occur.

Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will sustain current and future economic reforms. It will promote cooperation and peace among neighbors. NATO's presence also will fill a dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, and further cement European security by uniting East with West.

As well as increasing global security, NATO expansion will have tangible economic benefits. Free but untapped markets in this part of the world hold tremendous economic potential for U.S. exporters. And undoubtedly, the prestige, the security, and the validation that comes with NATO membership will have a profoundly positive psychological impact on the minds of foreign investors.

Throughout this process it was important that the invited nations demonstrate that they are willing to make the sincere commitment required of NATO members, and it seems to me that they have. Politically, economically, and diplomatically, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland show great promise that they will become strong partners in our alliance.

Poland, for example, has just witnessed its second democratic change of government since 1989 as a result of fully free and fair elections. Its new democratic constitution was approved last year by national referendum. Economically speaking, Poland is sound. Its economy has been one of the fastest-growing in Europe since 1993, and the private sector now accounts for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. Poland has also codified civilian control and parliamentary oversight of its military. On the diplomatic front, Poland has resolved outstanding differences with its neighbors, including Ukraine, with whom it recently signed a declaration of reconciliation. These diplomatic efforts would not have been possible but for the promise of NATO expansion.

After forty years of dictatorship, democracy now reigns in Hungary. All six of its parliamentary parties support entry into NATO. The Hungarian government upholds human rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, and an independent judiciary, and it too has twice held free elections since the fall of Communism. While attracting almost $16 billion of direct foreign investment, Hungary has engaged in a strict stabilization program and cut its budget deficits substantially. And on the diplomatic front, Hungary has recently signed treaties with Romania and Slovakia, thus ending territorial disputes that had existed for generations. And the government has agreements with its neighbors, including Ukraine, to cooperate against organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The story is much the same in the Czech Republic, which has a constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. Two national elections were held in 1996 for the legislature, and they were free and fair. Since 1989, the Czech Republic has engaged in tight fiscal policy, liberal trade practices, and privatization of state enterprises. As a result, unemployment is low and inflation is controlled. It maintains

strong relations with its neighbors, especially Germany—its leading foreign investor—and with Poland, as the two countries have harmonized their approaches to European Union and NATO membership.

I would now like to make some comments about some of the amendments we have voted on.

First, I want to say that I opposed the amendment which would have linked admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to admission to the European Union. While NATO and the EU have overlapping membership, they have different missions. NATO is a collective defense organization designed to protect and defend the territory of its member states. The EU is not a military but an economic alliance of European states which does not include the United States. It also does not include Canada, Iceland, Norway—which by the way rejected EU membership—nor does it include Turkey.

The question I have is why would we want to allow an organization of which the US is not a member, to dictate our security interests? Another concern I have about this amendment is that it would ultimately—and unnecessarily—delay NATO enlargement, since Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are not members and have only recently been invited to begin the process of joining.

Second, I opposed the amendment which would have mandated a three year pause on new members. Article 10 of the NATO charter provides a mechanism to enlarge the alliance. This article has successfully worked for 50 years in bringing new member states into NATO. I strongly feel that this amendment would not have helped NATO, but rather have added an additional and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to the process.

The amendment also would have dampened the spirits of other countries who eagerly want to join NATO. Many of these countries have made significant sacrifices—both political and economic—to prepare themselves for future NATO membership. Enacting this amendment would have reduced the incentives of these countries to continue these important reforms. I would like to point out, however, that there is no commitment at this time to invite other nations to join NATO.

Let me conclude. Through democratic and economic reforms, these three nations have invested in long-term stability. NATO membership promotes confidence in this regional stability, thus making it even stronger.

If this century has taught us anything, it is that European instability ultimately becomes our problem. By admitting these committed and deserving nations to NATO, we will strengthen our alliance and expand the dividends of peace and prosperity to a level unprecedented in modern history.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the topic before us: Senate ratification to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

I wish to commend Senator HELMS and Senator BIDEN for their sustained efforts to investigate thoroughly the issues inherent in this historic move.

As befits the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous public hearings and provided many briefings and reports giving consideration to all aspects—and all views—regarding this historic move.

The Budget, Appropriations, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees in both bodies of Congress have further contributed to this valuable debate. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era in which we now find ourselves, I don't believe any issue has been more thoroughly vetted, and I thank my colleagues and the leaders of the relevant committees for their efforts.

I have lent a great deal of thought to this issue. Amid the euphoria of 1989, when many focused on the stunning collapse of Soviet occupation throughout central and eastern Europe, we had to recognize that a yawning geopolitical vacuum had just opened. For the first few years we correctly focused on assisting the Germans in their successful reunification efforts, but as nascent democratic and free markets institutions arose in central Europe, the United States stepped in to assist and solidify these developments.

The costs to us of solidifying these institutions were significantly less than the costs of waging the Cold War, but the benefits we saw—in terms of the freedom spread where darkness reigned for nearly half a century—were so much greater.

Mr. President, I have regularly visited the countries that will soon be accepted as NATO's new members, sometimes on my own, sometimes with other members, and regularly with our delegations to the North Atlantic Assembly, recently under the leadership of my colleague Senator ROTH. I have met with their political leaders, their military representatives, and local analysts on many occasions, as I have sought to measure their level of democratic advancement.

In 1995, I was honored to address the first multinational graduating class from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary, where the FBI now works with law enforcement officials from throughout central Europe to assist in combating criminal challenges to us all.

Democracy is strong in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The rule of law is established, civilian control of militaries is well-established, and these nations rightly take their place alongside the nations of the West.

There are a few voices, Mr. President, who argue that what the nations of central Europe need more than NATO membership is economic development. This is the essence of the amendment proposed by my respected colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, which requires European Union membership prior to the deposit of our instrument of ratification.

With great respect for the senior Senator of New York, I must disagree: Yes, the countries of central Europe require economic development, but it is mistaken, in my view, to believe that economic development and geopolitical advantage are exclusive of each other.

The European Union has only planned for joint defense capabilities; NATO has preserved the territorial integrity for its members for nearly half a century. The European Union excludes the United States; but the United States leads NATO. Therefore, subjecting determinations for future NATO expansions to the European Union is not only unwise, it is, in my view, illogical.

Mr. President, you have heard this many times already in this debate, and I daresay you will hear it many more times. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most successful treaty defense organization in human history.

Twice, before the founding of NATO, the United States was drawn into wars on the European continent, where we suffered huge losses of blood and treasure. An unbridled Germany and an unstable central Europe were predominant reasons for the calamities that became these world wars. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955 firmly established free Germany into the community of western democracies. With the unification of Germany in 1990 following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the integration of Germany was complete. Throughout that period, NATO succeeded by the virtue of its defensive cohesiveness and its deterrent effect on the European continent.

Today, we are set to integrate three important nations of central Europe, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. With their integration, geopolitical space in central Europe will be firmly incorporated into the territory protected by the defensive military alliance of NATO.

As the report accompanying the resolution of ratification asserts correctly: "With the enlargement of NATO, the United States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and cooperation."

Some have asserted that no threat exists to legitimize such an enlargement to the alliance now.

Mr. President, the extension of geopolitical stability in Europe is an insurance policy against the future development of regional threats. The United States, and the United States Senate, should not need to wait for the development of an imminent threat in order to implement sound geopolitical strategy.

NATO's mission has always been subject to certain applications beyond the core mission to defend territory. These applications have reflected consensus among members regarding military challenges, and I am hesitant to amend this resolution in any way that would impose definitions or mechanisms that might politicize the carefully honed language of the original North Atlantic Treaty.

I believe the language of the resolution sufficiently asserts the central mission and strategic rationale for this enlargement.

It is entirely reasonable for the Senate to carefully review the costs that this enlargement will incur.

Through the years of considering this move, many numbers have been manufactured: the range has been startling and the spin has been confounding.

I suppose it is somewhat predictable that attempts were made to politicize these numbers, but the scrutiny of many committee hearings have provided great focus. I am confident that the most recent GAO and CBO estimates are accurate: a total of $1.5 billion in increased U.S. contributions over the next 10 years. For increasing the geopolitical stability well into central Europe, this is a sound and defensible expenditure.

A great deal of debate has focused on the consequences of NATO enlargement on Russian geopolitical behavior and U.S.-Russian relations.

I am not convinced of any direct causality between NATO's decision to enlarge and the content and direction of Russian foreign policy. I think historians and analysts of Russia concur with my view.

Despite an unprecedented U.S.-Russia relationship that has developed over the past decade, a relationship that has seen billions of U.S. assistance go to the development of Russian democratic institutions, a relationship that has seen Russian and American troops serving side-by-side in Bosnia, some believe that this expansion of NATO will poison our efforts, or will, in the words of some, ''scare the Russians.''

I have visited Russia many times in my career in the Senate, most recently three weeks ago. Senator GORDON SMITH, who is chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I had many meetings with the Russian foreign policy establishment, including Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, responsible for U.S.-Russia relations, and Andrey Kokoshin, Secretary of President Yeltsin's Security Council. We met with a number of Duma and Federation Council members. We discussed many aspects of our bilateral relations, and NATO was reviewed in every meeting.

Every Russian official I met in Moscow objected to NATO enlargement. Yet every official I met denied that they believed NATO posed a military threat to Russia's territorial integrity, and every official I met admitted that, despite being unhappy with this enlargement, they were all reconciled to this development. Mr. President, no Russian—not one—told me that NATO enlargement would be a legitimate cause for reversal of Russia's domestic evolution toward democracy.

Not one Russian official told me he was afraid of NATO enlargement. Not one Russian, Mr. President, objected to the new contiguous border between Poland and Kaliningrad.

I must admit that I find this objection raised by opponents to enlargement to be somewhat bizarre. Since Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952, NATO had a long border with what was then the Soviet Union—we used to have nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles in that border country. We also had a contiguous border between NATO and the Soviet Union along Norway's eastern border with the Kola peninsula, behind which the Soviet Union's strategic naval forces resided.

And now we have opponents objecting to a border with Kaliningrad, which is not contiguous with Russia itself? Or, even stranger, there are those who analogize the Kaliningrad situation with a Russian alliance with Mexico along our southern border.

Such an argument would have been denounced 15 years ago as ''moral equivalence.'' Today, the Kaliningrad argument is ahistorical and simply dilatory.

Every Russian I met three weeks ago told me they still objected to NATO enlargement, but told me also they wanted to work with the Founding Act instrumentalities and were eager to continue and expand our many levels of bilateral cooperation.

The enlargement of NATO that this body will pass in the next few days is not short-sighted, Mr. President, but the most significant foreign policy act before the end of this century.

It has been long-considered, and, frankly, desired even longer. I recall the days when we looked across the Iron Curtain to countries we knew had once had Western, democratic societies.

I hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed, painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past four years.

Over the course of this debate we will hear quoted many testimonials by Americans from all walks of life, both parties, and all regions in favor of the move we will ultimately take.

It is particularly significant to me that the American Legion, as well as the American Veterans of Foreign Wars, have endorsed NATO enlargement. These men and women know the territory; they know the history; and they know the price. I'm proud to be associated with them on this important issue.

Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of this historic move. The countries formerly imprisoned by the Soviets have come out of the cold, have elected democratic governments that have established the rule of law, civilian control over their militaries and individual liberty and free markets. They have all indicated strong support from their publics for NATO membership and its responsibilities.

A geostrategic vacuum, long a source of instability on the European continent, is being filled—by an organization that is strictly defensive, with absolutely no offensive intentions. The action this body takes in the next few days—by ratifying this protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty—will not only extend stability into central Europe, but will extend the promise of peace and stability into the next century.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the order of business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is open for general debate.

Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank the Chair. I am pleased to have this opportunity to make some comments about NATO expansion, particularly as it relates to the resolution of ratification for protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty.

As was evident earlier, I had an amendment which was designed to challenge a transformation of NATO that would take place as a result of the resolution of ratification which would essentially expand the scope of NATO.

I would refer Members of the Senate to the New York Times of last Friday, April 24.

The editorial is identified as ''The Senate's Duty on NATO.'' It reads as follows:

> The ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate.

Here you have the New York Times drawing attention to this expansion of NATO's scope and mission. It says that the mission of NATO is being—in the words of the New York Times—changed when the resolution ''promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world.'' To change the nature of a treaty promiscuously, as the New York Times suggests, without asking the Senate to ratify the change, is a dangerous and troubling precedent. It is inappropriate.

I have raised this issue of NATO's broadened mission throughout the debate on NATO expansion. I raised it before this New York Times editorial was published, but I am very pleased that they would draw attention to this ''startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations.'' I don't think you can expand a treaty's license to conduct military operations without consulting the Senate and obtaining this body's advice and consent.

The New York Times stated this issue demands extensive debate. I proposed that we debate it, and I proposed

that we curtail this expansive extension of the ability of the NATO alliance to be involved in military operations around the world, regardless of whether they are related to NATO's collective defense mission. Frankly, I am very disappointed that the Members of the Senate have not engaged in extensive debate in this area—an area in which the Senate has been largely ignored by an administration which seeks to transform NATO into an entirely new organization. Treaty creep is what is occurring and NATO is being altered from a defense of territory organization to a defense of interest organization. The interests of NATO nations can be pursued around the globe, with international deployments of NATO forces not necessarily for the defense of NATO territorial integrity or political independence.

The New York Times properly says this expansion of NATO's scope demands extensive debate. I am sorry to say that the Senate decided to walk away from its obligation to oversee the ratification of this fundamental change in the treaty. By tabling the amendment, the Senate has failed to address an issue of fundamental importance for the future strength of NATO and the security of the United States.

It is not every day that I agree with the New York Times, but I think the article is insightful and clear on this point. I would like to take just a few minutes—and I will use some of these charts—to indicate the missed opportunity of the Senate to look carefully at what is happening to the mission of NATO. I intend to vote against the ratification of this treaty, if for no other reason than the promiscuous expansion of NATO's mission endorsed in this resolution of ratification. This shift from a defense of territory to a defense of interests is a tremendous question that must be addressed with regard to the future of NATO.

Let me just refer the Senate to the statement of William Perry, the immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was one of the architects of the treaty expansion that is before us. Here is what he says:

> The original mission of NATO—deterring an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant.

Then he goes on.

> The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. . . . The new missions of NATO—

You know, this debate hasn't been about new missions. This debate has been about three new countries. But here the architect of the expansion said:

> The new missions of NATO should be preventive defense—creating the conditions for peace in Europe . . . the geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world . . . .

That means the ambit of deployment, the arena for the deployment of NATO troops, including young men and women from the United States, is anywhere in the world. I think before we make that kind of change, we ought to think very carefully. No wonder the New York Times says, ''That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate.'' I shudder to think that we consider tabling ''the most extensive debate.''

But here is what the Secretary of State had to say. Secretary Albright, according to the Washington Post:

> . . . also has urged that an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . must extend its geographic reach beyond the European Continent and evolve into a 'force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa.'

All of us want to see peace around the world. We all want peace in the Middle East. We all want peace in central Africa. But if we allow a treaty to evolve through treaty creep, letting it expand on its own rather than having a real discussion on the role and responsibility of the United States and NATO and its proposed new missions of serving as a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa, then we are not fulfilling our responsibility as members of this body.

It is sad that the Senate of the United States decided to turn its back from that kind of discussion and decided that it would table that debate. This is a serious matter, whether we are going to be sending young men and women of the United States of America to perhaps stain the soil of Africa under some NATO mission, perhaps an international policing operation not envisaged in the NATO treaty. Such operations were never before thought to be within NATO's scope, because the alliance was explicitly for the defense of territory.

Now, by expansion of NATO's mission through press release and speech, the Secretary of State says we are going to be involved in central Africa and the Middle East in ways we had not ever anticipated. This treaty is changing in fundamental ways. If we allow NATO's expanded mission to be achieved through the unilateral press release, statement, and policy of this administration, what is the value of the U.S. Senate in giving its advice and consent to treaties? If the Senate does not fulfill its role, perhaps it would just take a single treaty that any administration then could evolve into whatever it chose. I think we ought to think seriously about allowing an organization, the most successful military collective defense organization in the history of the world, to be simply evolved into something for which it was never intended.

Just to make it clear that it was never intended, let me refer you to the statement of Senator Tom Connally. Tom Connally is not one of our contemporaries but was a Senator, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the year 1949, when the NATO alliance first came into existence. Here is what Tom Connally said: ''Let us not forget''—awesome words, because I think we are in the process of forgetting—''that this treaty is limited in scope.''

It was to be limited to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states. Now we are talking about anywhere in the world. We are talking about beyond Europe to central Africa.

This treaty is limited in scope. [I quote again Senator Connally.] Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.

The elasticity of stretched treaties has reached new limits, or perhaps has found no limits in what we are willing to do here today. The suggestion of the New York Times that this kind of expansion, this promiscuous opening of the door to military deployments around the world, doesn't merit discussion at all, it merited tabling—this is a sad day. A global NATO? That is not what Tom Connally thought we had.

As a matter of fact, NATO's first strategic concepts really focused on two things, ''Defense planning limited to the defense of the treaty area,'' and, ''NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty.'' It was a defense of area treaty. It wasn't to be an alliance the troops of which could be deployed like a mini-United Nations, with a standing army, to the hot spots around the globe for so-called international policing or so-called peacekeeping. It was to be something that defended the NATO nations. And to change this essential mission for NATO, I contend, should come before the Senate for its advice and consent.

However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of territory as being primary, we find ''to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe''—all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations—''in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of NATO to the European Continent as a whole to ''stop intimidation'' and ''coercion''.

The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the primary focus of the NATO alliance.

No. 2, ''to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests.''

Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital interests. I suppose ''vital interests'' could include trade

interests or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in cultural exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the expansion of the scope of this treaty.

All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.

There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory, it is the defense of ''vital interests.'' No wonder they are talking about deploying troops in Africa in international policing operations. No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying troops around the globe. The NATO nations could have commercial interests and trade interests around the world.

Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-U.N. with a standing army is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should at least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate saying, ''We'll table it; we won't consider it.'' As we all know here, a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.

Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that was to be defended:

> Any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Sounds like the legal description of a deed to the house. It is specific; it is particular. It doesn't say you deploy resources all around the globe to protect interests. It says that resources are to be used to defend territory. We have seen this change, and it is reflected over and over again.

The point that I am making is that when you change the nature of a treaty, you have a responsibility, at least as members of the United States Senate, to do so carefully. We didn't even have debate on this amendment today. We simply had a motion to table the amendment in haste to move on to other things.

Here is what happens when you cut defense and you start thinking about global deployments. One of the things I fear is that the same problem that has attended the deployment of our own Armed Forces around the world in peacekeeping and policing operations could happen to NATO. And you know, our Armed Forces are threatened because we have a tremendous willingness in the administration to deploy, but not much willingness to fund. We cut the funding and cut the funding and cut the funding, and we keep sending more troops to different places. As this administration has slashed defense spending, one wonders whether the resource that is devoted to the military and defense of this country is being impaired. I am confident that there are instances where it is.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 new square miles of territory to be defended; 2,612 miles of new borders to be defended. And yet, our total national defense spending fell by 27 percent over the last 8 years. And we are going to take on a substantial new commitment. Our share of whatever happens in NATO has always been about 25 percent. We are going to have that kind of an increase in commitment while we are having this kind of plummeting devotion of resources to our own military spending.

Additionally, we have spent money in a lot of different ways in these out-of-area deployments for our own Armed Forces. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 operational events between 1960 and 1991. Ten times we deployed troops in that 31-year period, and that is when we had a significant devotion of resources to support the troops.

Since 1991, we have been cutting our resources to the troops substantially. And what have we done while we have been cutting their supplies? We have been sending them out at an alarmingly higher rate. We had 10 deployments in 31 years, and then in the next 7 years, we have had 26 deployments. That is a formula for difficulty, and if that is the way we are going to treat NATO, by having increasing deployments based on the interest of the parties, not to defend the strategic territories of the parties, but to just sort of defend their vital interests, be they in Africa, Asia or the Middle East or somewhere else, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is North Atlantic in name only.

If we begin to deploy NATO forces without reference to the alliance's mission, we could hollow out this most successful defense organization ever in the history of mankind. We could hollow it out so it loses its effectiveness.

Our Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This business of deploying people all around the world is serious, and if we are going to do that with NATO, we are going to see some of the same challenges that we have seen in our own operations, because we are having trouble with maintaining our armed forces. Our fleets are getting old, and we are having trouble with reenlistments because we don't have the resources.

The same kind of problems besetting our own military also could beset the NATO alliance. The point I am making is simply this: If you are going to change the mission of NATO, if you are going to change it from defending territory, which is identified and understandable, located and clearly marked, and you are going to start making NATO into an organization the troops of which can be sent anywhere, anywhere in the world in the defense of ''the interests,'' we may well threaten the viability of NATO itself.

Let me just conclude by making this statement: We talk about NATO troops as if they are individuals who are strangers. Well, NATO troops include folks from the United States of America. They include our sons and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our nephews and nieces. I don't think we should embark upon a program of substantial change in the responsibility and duty of those troops without considering it very, very carefully. To switch from defending the territory of the NATO nations to defending interests potentially around the globe is to make a major change that merits the close scrutiny and extensive debate that this Senate should and could provide but which it declined to provide when this amendment was tabled.

However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of territory as being primary, we find ''to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe''—all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations—''in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of NATO to the European Continent as a whole to stop intimidation and coercion.

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Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity, and I yield the floor.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator from Texas wishes to be recognized next, but just so the Senators will be on notice to what I think will happen now, the Senator from Texas wishes to speak a few minutes on the final disposition of this issue. Senator SMITH will be recognized to offer an amendment. His amendment will be set aside, and Senator INHOFE will have an amendment he will offer. At the conclusion of their debate, then we would anticipate that there would be two or three votes that would occur, hopefully in sequence, so this could begin in a relatively short period of time.

We do not have a time agreement, but we hope to reach conclusion before too late into the night.

Mr. FORD. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. LOTT. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Is there a chance we might get a time agreement on those other two amendments?

Mr. LOTT. I believe, I say to the Senator, they would prefer that we not have a time agreement, but they do not anticipate taking a long time.

Mr. FORD. I thank the Senator.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe I share with a substantial number of my colleagues a real sense of unease about the process that we are about to finish. When I made my opening comments about the resolution before us, I noticed that a legislative body is ill-suited to the task of establishing order, coherence, and discipline to a foreign policy initiative. The last few days have proven me right, as we have missed the opportunity to greatly improve the resolution before us.

The decision to expand NATO and extend invitations was made in the heat of a political campaign, with little attention given to the truly important questions that should have been addressed.

There has been no assessment of the threat against which the military alliance was supposed to defend. There were no clear criteria established for membership in NATO. We did not use

this opportunity to debate what the mission of NATO should be in the post-cold-war era. We have not used this opportunity to lay out clear expectations for the next group of would-be members of NATO. We have left no roadmap for the future.

Unfortunately, the administration did little to address these issues when it proposed to expand the alliance in the first place. The Senate was placed in the position of having to do so because of a failure of executive leadership. And I do not think the Senate has done very well, either.

Why was it left to us to wonder about the possibility for border and ethnic disputes to impact the expanded alliance in a way that might hurt U.S. interests?

While my amendment on that matter was defeated, 37 Members, more than one-third needed to stop future expansions, believe that a process to address such disputes is important and should be discussed. Other Members raised equally valid concerns, and they were nearly all defeated.

The Senator from Virginia had a prudent proposal to step back after the first round of expansion to let the experience be fully absorbed by the United States and her allies. Defeated.

Our colleague from Idaho wondered if we should not at least vote to authorize the ongoing and possibly open-ended NATO mission in Bosnia before we think about expanding the alliance to new members. Defeated.

The Senator from New Mexico said strategy should be adopted before we take in new members. Defeated.

Because the concerns of so many Members were so summarily dispensed with, many will find it difficult to support this resolution. How much stronger a signal might this body have sent on this important matter if there had been more willingness to find an acceptable compromise with concerned Members, many of whom are not on the relevant committees and had no opportunity to really fashion the underlying resolution.

Instead, we have a resolution that has very little to say about the future beyond the fact that we will likely add three new members to the alliance. But that has never really been the debate here as far as I am concerned.

Most of us have not opposed the three countries being considered for immediate membership. We were concerned about the process by which we got to this point. In many ways, after more than a week of debate, we are still not much further than when we started.

For example, there is no strategic rationale for the new NATO alliance. It is not due from the President until 180 days after this resolution is passed. There is still no credible estimate about the cost. We have seen estimates miraculously shrink from $125 billion to a couple of million as we have gotten closer to this vote. Obviously, no one knows what the real cost will be. At least we have the protections available because of the cost caps imposed by the amendment of the Senator from Alaska.

In the meantime, this body over the last couple of days has voted for a provision that allows NATO possibly to engage in military efforts on border and ethnic disputes but, rather strangely, voted against letting NATO attempt to resolve such disputes peaceably at the lower levels through dispute resolution.

In short, I think, Mr. President, that both the administration and the Senate have approached the issue of NATO enlargement in a rather haphazard and disjointed manner. Because this Senate defeated the pause proposed by the Senator from Virginia, we will probably be debating the admission of yet another tranche of countries before we have any idea about cost, border disputes, or strategic rationale.

So where are we now? Instead of debating the more challenging issues involving the future of the alliance, we are left with a narrow question: Should Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary be admitted to NATO?

These countries have made a sustained commitment to democratic capitalism since the end of the cold war. In numerous discussions with the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers from each of these three countries as a member of the U.S. Senate's NATO Observer Group, I am convinced that they intend to aggressively shoulder the burdens of membership in NATO. They seek no special treatment, and they wish only to be treated as full members of the alliance with the rights and the responsibilities entailed.

Further, these countries have demonstrated a commitment to the goals of the alliance. They have contributed, in some cases heavily, to the ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia. In the case of Hungary, the United States has staged its Bosnia operations there for some years. The U.S. presence there has approached that of our closest NATO allies and our non-NATO allies. And the Hungarians have been excellent hosts to U.S. forces.

While I remain steadfast in my belief that NATO needs and should at least discuss the adoption of a formal dispute resolution process, the fact is that these countries have worked hard to resolve disputes with neighbors. The Czech Republic peaceably separated itself from Slovakia. Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty to resolve issues surrounding the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.

Despite these strong indications that these countries are ready for the burdens and benefits of alliance membership, I would nevertheless have retained additional reservations had the managers not accepted the U.S. cost limitations proposed by the Senator from Alaska.

A major issue that must be addressed is how much should the United States continue to shoulder for peace in Europe? We pay 25 percent of the cost of NATO. The Stevens amendment will keep U.S. costs at no greater than what we now spend for NATO. Additional costs incidental to the adoption of three new members will have to be specifically authorized by Congress.

With great reservations about this process, I will not vote against three countries that I believe will strengthen the alliance. I do hope this administration will not come to us again with new countries invited before the strategic rationale, cost limitations, border dispute processes and other conditions many of us tried and failed to impose. I hope we will not put the cart before the horse.

To that end, I take some comfort in the vote totals for at least two of the amendments that failed. My amendment on conflict resolution received 37 votes. Senator WARNER's amendment, requiring a pause of 3 years, received 41 votes. It takes 34 votes to stop a future treaty.

I hope the administration and its successors would see these votes as cautionary should they consider going forward and raising expectations of good people in other countries before looking at the long-term security interests of America and considering what our responsibility is throughout the world. America has never walked away from its responsibilities. We want to pay our fair share. But we would not represent the taxpayers of this country if we allowed our country to take more than its fair share and thereby debilitate the strength of our own security.

I hope that we can move forward now and continue to have the Senate maintain its constitutional responsibility in treaties of advise and consent, not just consent. What we have done instead of truly rewriting the course of our future and creating an alliance for the next century is to add three new members to an alliance whose purpose and therefore whose future is no more certain than when we began this process.

While I cast a vote in favor, I take no great comfort in doing so and I hope the next debate is on the role of NATO in the post-cold-war era. Only then will we assure that the greatest defense alliance in the history of the world will remain exactly that.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2328

(Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on specific legislative action for the continued deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH], proposes an executive amendment numbered 2328.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) LEGISLATIVE ACTION REGARDING DEPLOYMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have taken a vote on legislation that, if enacted, would contain specific authorization for the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues I will be very brief and try to keep it within 10 minutes.

This amendment is really quite simple. It is very much like the Craig amendment that we voted on earlier with the exception that it doesn't call for the passage. It simply says that one way or the other we would require Congress to debate and then vote—whichever way the vote comes out—but just vote on our deployment in Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of ratification.

I want to briefly touch on why I am offering this amendment. When the Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia in 1995, the administration placed very clear limits on the duration of this commitment. On every single occasion I am aware of, the administration official stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia for 1 year. In fact, Secretary Perry, on December 1, 1995, said, ''We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we based our plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.''

I think these remarks were well intended, and I think it is clear that the Secretary of Defense meant what he said, but it is also clear that they didn't bear out.

We also heard from Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995: ''The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't any question * * * The deeper question * * * [is] whether the nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That's a real question. But it's not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's on the civilian side, working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough. Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, 'til everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No, that is not their mission.''

There were many of us who watched these comments—especially in the Armed Services Committee—very closely, studying the conflict in Bosnia. We felt that this was an unrealistic commitment. We didn't feel that those kinds of commitments should have been made, because we didn't feel they could have been kept. But the American people had no choice but to kind of accept these comments from our leaders.

I was disappointed but I wasn't surprised when right after the 1996 elections, the President announced the continuation of the military commitment for an additional 18 months, to June of 1998. That is where we are now. It is almost June of 1998. Last December, the President acknowledged that our commitment now in Bosnia is open ended but we are still talking about clear and achievable goals.

For 2 years the President has had this opportunity, and I believe that he has been wrong in making these statements. I believe it is wrong for the Government to conduct the foreign policy of the United States without any input from Congress and the public. The American people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the commitment or not. We have a commitment. The President made it, and now he has extended it open ended.

The question before the Congress today is, do you want to continue with an open-ended commitment, a blank check in Bosnia or don't you? The President has stated he wants to, and he stated why. Now the American people ought to hear from us, the Congress, as to whether or not this is a good idea or a bad idea.

This is no longer simply a Presidential use of force based on his judgment of an immediate threat. We now have nation-building in Bosnia as deliberate foreign policy, and it ought to be approved and funded by the Congress of the United States. Failure to place this before Congress, in my opinion, will destroy congressional support for his foreign policy and, frankly, it insults the intelligence of the American people.

There already has been a casualty in Bosnia, and that casualty is the trust of the American people that their Government will do what it says it will do when it puts American armed forces in harm's way.

I don't see how Congress can allow this extended commitment to continue simply because the President sees no way out. Now, I have been around the cloakroom and in meetings for a couple of years now while this policy has been going on and I have been hearing a lot of complaining from my colleagues, a lot of complaining about how this will continue, it is open ended, what are we going to do about it.

Here is a chance to vote—and I'm not asking you to vote to say that we ought to take the troops out or leave them in; I'm asking you to vote. All I'm asking for is a vote. It could go 5–90 against deployment or the other way around for deployment. I'm not asking for a vote to come out either direction. I'm just simply saying the Congress should vote, the Senate and the House of Representatives, before we deposit the instruments of ratification. That is all this amendment does. It does nothing less and it does nothing more.

I don't, frankly, think that is asking very much. With the new nations we may have more Bosnias. We may have more Bosnias before we are finished, especially as we continue the expansion that Senator HUTCHISON of Texas was talking about a few moments ago, where we defeated the WARNER amendment. So who is next down the line? We continue to draw lines. Where do we draw these lines? This is a very important debate, and I really cannot understand why anybody would oppose this amendment that simply says vote one way or the other. Keep them in 90–10, or take them out 90–10. Just vote. That is all this amendment asks for, before we submit the articles of ratification. In either case, I think the objective is clear that the American people need to be heard. They haven't been heard. We should let them be heard right here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Again, let me just say that if my colleagues on both sides of the issue don't support this amendment, which simply requires them to cast a vote—just cast a vote—on this matter before the June 30 deadline, they ought to forever keep their peace on Bosnia. No more complaining in the cloakroom, no more speeches on the floor about how the policy is so bad and so open-ended, no more second-guessing the President, no more criticizing the President, no more saying Congress doesn't have any responsibility. If we can't force ourselves to stand up here tonight and be counted on this subject, then we don't have a right to criticize the President on this issue. Every time I am on the floor and I hear somebody criticizing the President on this, I am going to check the vote list and see how the votes were, and I am going to rise up and challenge that Senator. This is not going to delay the passage, the instruments of ratification. We can vote on this any time. We can vote next week or the following week, or tonight, for that matter. It doesn't matter to me when we vote on it. Whenever the leader wants to schedule it.

Mr. President, my final remarks. The purpose of this amendment is to simply require Congress to vote, period, one way or another on deployment to Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of ratification for NATO. That's it.

WHAT WILL EXPANSION COST, AND WHO WILL PAY THE BILL?

It is obvious to me that nobody really knows what the true costs of NATO

expansion will be. Just look at the cost estimates that are available.

In March of 1996, CBO issued a report that provided five options or scenarios for NATO expansion. The cost of those five options ranged from $60 billion to $124 billion.

In the fall of 1996, Rand Corporation completed a study on the costs of NATO expansion and concluded that the costs could range from $10 billion to $110 billion.

In February of 1997, the administration provided its own cost estimates. In this report the cost of NATO expansion was pegged at $27 to $35 billion.

In December of 1997, NATO itself estimated the cost of NATO expansion as $1.5 to $2 billion.

The February 16 edition of Defense News reports that the Pentagon will issue yet another study that will peg the cost of NATO expansion at $1.5 billion over 10 years.

According to the CRS, the administration assumes that the new nations will pick up 50 percent of the bill, the current NATO members will pay 44 percent and the U.S. will pick up 6 percent of these costs.

CAN POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFFORD NATO EXPANSION?

Supporters of NATO expansion say we must expand in order to help the young fledgling democracies and market economies of these countries grow. This is not what NATO does.

NATO is first a military or security alliance, not an economic alliance. If the goal is economic and not security, then let the EU deal with these countries, not NATO.

With NATO expansion, we are placing a requirement that the new members ''buy'' their way in. If they could buy their way in, their young market economies wouldn't need the protection of NATO expansion. This circular logic is no logic at all.

In an article on NATO expansion that appeared in the January/February 1998 edition of Foreign Affairs, Amos Perlmutter writes:

> The belief that the new members should be able to absorb costs of close to $42 billion between 1996 and 2001 overlooks the International Monetary Fund's rules and the Maastricht Treaty's expectations. The IMF requires former Warsaw Pact states to invest in economic infrastructure, and the Maastricht Treaty will accept members only on the basis of their conformity to its rigorous fiscal standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic are already experiencing serious budget crunches and are seeking ways to cut spending to meet IMF demands. Where, then, will the money come from to expand their military budgets?

POLITICAL WILL

In addition, there is also the question of whether or not there is the political will in these countries to help pay for expansion. The United States Information Agency (USIA) conducted a poll in October of 1997 in the countries listed below and asked if the respondents supported increasing their government's defense spending:

	Support	Oppose	Don't know
Czech Republic	29	63	8
Hungary	36	60	4
Poland	56	31	13
Slovakia	21	71	8
Slovenia	22	72	6
Bulgaria	28	55	17
Romania	55	39	7

Result: Only Poles, not Czech or Hungarians willing to increase spending to pay for expansion.

FISCAL REALITIES

Even our current European allies have had sharply declining defense budgets as they prepare to meet the fiscal requirements of the European common currency.

Sir John Kerr, the British Ambassador to the U.S. stated the following on July 23, 1997:

> I think, realistically, it is very unlikely that the Europeans will stump up another $15 billion on their defense budgets. It would mean increasing defense budgets on average by about 1.5 percent a year, a very much larger number than the cost for the United States. And I don't think it will happen.

In July of 1997 French President Jacques Chirac made the following statement:

> We have adopted a very simple position: Enlargement must not cost anything in net terms. We are convinced that it is possible.

A Washington Post article from July 10, 1997 quotes German President Helmut Kohl as saying:

> It is completely absurd to link NATO enlargement with cost factors as if the aim was to rearm large areas of Europe to the teeth.

Another German, Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner for the German Government said in the March 12, 1997 edition of the Washington Post:

> So who will pick up the tab? I think it will have to be the United States.

So we've heard from our NATO allies and they are saying that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion. Some supporters of NATO expansion will downplay these comments as political comments made for consumption at home. They say our allies will come through.

I am a firm believer that past performance is an indicator of future performance. What hasn't been heard too much in public is the fact that our NATO allies have been falling well short on their current NATO commitments. That certainly doesn't bode well for any additional commitment from our current NATO allies to pick up their share of the costs to expand.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Admiral Jack Shanahan (USN retired) made the following comments:

> In 1970 I was assigned to the U.S. mission to NATO in Brussels. The prevailing attitude of most of the alliance was that they were safely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result our allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in terms of defense spending. Their prepositioned war reserve of food, ammunition, fuel etc. were well below NATO standards. Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready then, they are not ready now, and as we integrate East European militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen, placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the burden. Even as we speak, our allies are making significant reductions in military spending and in their force structures.

This testimony is very revealing and speaks for itself—especially in light of the additional commitments that our present NATO allies will be asked to bear through expansion.

We not only have statements from the major Western European countries indicating that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion, but also disturbing testimony before the Senate that our current NATO allies already have fallen well short of fulfilling their current NATO commitments.

Thus, it will probably fall to the United States to pay for NATO expansion. Indeed, the March 12, 1997 Washington Post quoted a senior U.S. official as saying: ''There was a strong political imperative to low-ball figures. Everybody realized the main priority was to keep costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians.''

What are the implications of all this for the article V commitment that an attack on one is an attack on all? Do we really believe we can effectively carry out this commitment if the cost of NATO expansion has been fudged in order to reassure the Congress and Russia? Don't the supporters of expansion take the alliance more seriously than this?

ARE THEY PREPARED?

The three nations who would become part of NATO have military infrastructures that are profoundly unprepared to join NATO. Defense news recently reported on NATO's most recent assessment of the invitees. The report concluded that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are years away from having militaries that are minimally functional, much less strategically interoperable with NATO's military systems. Examples include:

All of the Czech Army's equipment is ''old and approaching obsolescence.''

None of Poland's naval ships are ''capable for command and control of joint or combined operations.''

In Hungary, 70 percent of the pilots carry out only 50 hours of training per year, far below NATO standards.

The United States cannot even pay for its own modernization. Why would we want to pay for the modernization of three new NATO members?

CAN THE U.S. FOOT THE BILL?

Don't be naive—NATO expansion is not going to be free—no matter how much the figure is lowered to make it more ''palatable.''

The balanced budget agreement has locked us into a flat if not declining defense budget during the next few years. We've all heard reports that readiness in the military is starting to deteriorate.

The House National Security Committee issued a report recently that chronicled some of the readiness problems that are starting to appear in our military. What we are facing, in my

opinion, is the very real scenario where we will be increasing our national security commitments without a corresponding increase in our defense spending because of the balanced budget agreement.

The current defense budget we have now is inadequate to meet our current plans and requirements. Just like every other contingency operation the Clinton administration has signed U.S. forces up to, an underfunded Defense Department will have to foot the bill once again.

We keep hearing from this administration that another round of BRAC is necessary to reduce infrastructure and pay for modernization. Could it be that the real objective of another BRAC is to pay for NATO expansion? Does the Senate really want to approve adding one more IOU to an already empty Pentagon checkbook, when we do not even know how large the IOU will be? I don't think so.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay my amendment aside so that Senator INHOFE may discuss his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, can I ask a question of Senator SMITH?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield for a question.

Mr. DOMENICI. Senator, I was thinking. Do you mean if I vote no on this, 3 weeks from now if we want to vote again in the Senate on the Bosnia policy, I can't vote?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Did I say that?

Mr. DOMENICI. So the vote means we are going to vote for it or not, and we can have a vote on Bosnia if we want it, whenever we want, whatever we do with your amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. You certainly can. But I am saying this should be a requirement. If we don't have that vote, we ought not to complain about the resolution of ratification.

Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2325

(Purpose: To require the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for its consideration under the Treaty Power of the Constitution)

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2325.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) REQUIREMENT OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE OF KYOTO PROTOCOL ON GLOBAL WARMING.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at Kyoto on December 10, 1997, to the Senate for its consideration under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the making of treaties).

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me briefly explain what my amendment does. It simply requires the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for its consideration under the Treaty Powers of the Constitution.

Mr. President, the White House has made a full-scale effort for ratification of expansion of NATO. We are considering that now and we have had a lot of debate. Some of us are against it and some of us are for it. We have had a chance to get our positions out and we know where we stand. But according to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, we are the only body—and it has to be by a two-thirds vote—that can ratify treaties of the United States. The President can't do it, the Secretary of State can't do it, the Vice President can't do it, the Secretary of Defense can't do it, the Director of the EPA can't do it—just the U.S. Senate.

Some might argue that the NATO expansion debate is not an appropriate place to raise the question about the Kyoto Protocol. But the issue here is whether the President is going to have serious regard for the Senate's advise-and-consent authority under the Constitution, which the senior Senator from West Virginia has reminded us many times is our prerogative. The President cannot be expected to send treaties up for advice and consent when he thinks the Senate agrees with him and refuse to send them up unilaterally when he feels that we do not. Truly, that is the case.

We made our case very specific when we voted 95–0, prior to going to Japan, that if they came back with something that did not treat the developing countries the same as the developed nations, we would oppose it, and the President came back with exactly that, putting us under obligations that the developing nations were not under. So that China doesn't have to worry about it, or Pakistan, and other countries, like Mexico. But we do. This is the issue we are dealing with here.

I am going to deviate from that for a moment in this very short time to repeat something that I said earlier in this debate because I understand I am the last speaker now and this is the last amendment. I would like to just say there are four reasons why we should not, in the final analysis, expand NATO.

The first one is the cost. I don't know why nobody seems to be upset that the range goes all the way from $400 million to $120 billion, and those at the low end are the administration—the same administration that said that Bosnia was going to cost us $1.2 billion, and now our direct costs have skyrocketed way way above $9 billion, and there is no end to it. It is a permanent commitment. Yet, we were told that it was going to be $1.2 billion.

So here we have an amount of money—at a time when we have cut our defense down to the bone, at a time when we have to be able to do something to put ourselves in a position to defend America. Yet, we are talking about an open-ended commitment by extending NATO to these countries.

The second reason is it is the open door. I hope nobody thinks we are talking about three countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. We are talking about an open door now that is extended to everyone. I want to read what our Secretary of State said in a statement she made:

We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.

She talks about Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovakia, and the list goes on and on. So it is the clear intent that this is not the last. If you think this is going to be expensive, just think what it is going to be when we start extending it to other countries. Where would we draw the line?

The third concern I have is a genuine concern that we talked about on the floor, and that is, what does this do to our relationship with Russia? Everybody says, ''That's all right, I have been to Russia and they don't mind.'' I have gotten commitments from people saying that is all right, go ahead, this is not going to be a problem. But that's not what the Duma said, which is their parliamentary body. The Duma passed a resolution calling NATO expansion the ''biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II.''

There is one person I had a great deal of respect for in this body, and I regretted when he left this body; it was Sam Nunn, who I served with on the Armed Services Committee. There is not a person who would stand up on the floor and question his integrity or his knowledge of foreign affairs or question his concern for defending America. Sam Nunn said that Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and ''This NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less cooperative.'' He further said, ''The administration's answer to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''

So everyone is on record. Last, I will address the concern that the Senator from New Hampshire had. He has a very good resolution, and I think everybody understands it. If anybody wants to get on record as to where they stand insofar as Bosnia is concerned, his amendment is your opportunity to do so. Because right now we don't have

anything to show who is on record. We do have a resolution of disapproval that was barely defeated by only three votes in November of 1995. I suspect that some people now have changed their minds now that they realize this open-ended commitment is there.

So I would like to wind this up by saying that if this cost to support the Bosnian operation is any indication, I remind you that in November of 1995, we were on the brink of being able to defeat this and not send our troops to Bosnia, except they said that this is going to be a short commitment, it is not going to be something that would last a long period of time.

It was going to be over within less than a year, and it was going to cost $1.2 billion. The only reason that they were able to get those votes to pass this was, they said, ''We must protect our integrity with our partners in NATO.'' Now that same argument can be used—I wonder who is going to be the next Bosnia.

Mr. President, while I have this amendment, I know the votes are not there for this amendment, and there is one very good reason, because of a dear person in this body, that we want to not extend any longer than it should be extended. So nothing would be gained by considering my amendment.

For that reason, I withdraw my amendment and urge my fellow colleagues to vote against the extension of NATO.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is withdrawn.

The amendment (No. 2325) was withdrawn.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I was opposed to the amendment offered by Senator INHOFE. Quite frankly, I believe the consequences if this amendment passed would have been extremely deleterious to our foreign policy.

Mr. President, everyone should recognize that his amendment is nothing more than a thinly-veiled threat to delay NATO enlargement and to ensure that we won't have NATO enlargement for a significant period of time. It is very clear that President Clinton can't and won't submit the Kyoto Protocol for Senate ratification until the conditions he has set are met—meaningful participation by developing countries. The Administration is not in a position of saying now when that milestone will be achieve, but it probably won't be soon. So a vote for this amendment is a vote to stop NATO expansion.

But even if you oppose NATO expansion, you should oppose this amendment because the approach it takes is without precedent and would have a significant impact on how the country conducts foreign policy.

Let me say also that I was a member of the Senate observer group to the Kyoto conference last December. There has never been a more complicated, difficult international negotiation attempted. I believe that the conference was a historic success: more than 160 countries recognized that the common threat of climate change was more important than each nation's separate anxiety about the immediate impact of an agreement.

The Conference was also a historic success because American proposals won the day. We called for much more real and realistic targets and timetables. We proposed flexibility through a trading program to use the power of the market to achieve lower compliance costs for business. We offered a joint implementation system that would allow American firms to build clean power plants or preserve forests in developing countries in exchange for emission reduction credits that could be used or sold later. Our negotiators won on each of these battles—and they were very hard fought battles.

But the President has clearly said that the Kyoto protocol is not ready to be submitted to the Senate. The President has made clear that the protocol will not be ready for submission until we have succeeded in achieving the meaningful participation of developing counties. At Kyoto, a down payment was made in the form of a ''clean development mechanism'' which embraces the U.S. backed concept of joint implementation with credit. This will allow companies in the developed world to invest in projects in countries in the developing world for the benefit of both parties.

But developing countries will clearly need to do more in order to meaningfully participate in combating global warming, and in order of the President to submit the protocol for the consideration of the Senate. Secretary Albright recently announced a full court diplomatic effort to achieve this goal.

Mr. President, as far as I can determine, there is no precedent in our history for doing essentially what this amendment seeks to do, force the President to transmit a treaty to the Senate before the President deems it appropriate to do so. This amendment is a high-handed attempt by Congress to undermine the President's constitutional power.

Mr. President, I asked the American Law Division of the CRS to look at a related issue: whether there are any time limitations within which the President must submit a treaty after it has been negotiated and signed. Let me quote from that report: ''As a general proposition, there do not appear to be any time constraints on the transmittal of treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. The spare language of the Constitution provides simply that '(the President) shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . .' Under this structure, it is the President who negotiates and ultimately ratifies treaties, provided the Senate gives its advice and consent. But the constitutional language does not set time limits on any aspect of the process of treaty-making.''

The report goes on to note that ''nor does statutory law appear to impose any time constraints on the submission of treaties.''

Mr. President, the memo goes on to discuss numerous cases in which treaties have not been submitted to the Senate for ratification for a long time after they were negotiated and signed. For example, the United States signed the ''International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'' on September 28, 1966. Nearly 12 years passed after the United States signature before it was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on February 23, 1978.

Let me read here from the memorandum's review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which discloses a number of examples of significant delay is transmittal of treaties.

A review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discloses a number of additional instances of significant delays in transmittal. A bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Haiti ''Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment'' was signed on December 13, 1983, but not submitted to the Senate until March 25, 1986. A treaty on ''Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'' between the U.S. and Nigeria, signed on September 13, 1989, was not transmitted until April 1, 1992. A ''Revised Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,'' originally signed on September 28, 1980, and then amended in 1983 and 1984, was finally submitted to the Senate on April 24, 1995. An extradition treaty with Belgium was signed on April 27, 1987, but not submitted until June 12, 1995; and one with Switzerland was signed on November 14, 1990, but not transmitted until June 12, 1995. The ''International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants'' was originally negotiated in 1961, amended in 1972, 1978, and 1991, and finally signed by the U.S. in 1991, but was not submitted to the Senate until September 5, 1995. Finally, the ''Convention on the International Maritime Organization,'' originally signed on March 6, 1948, was transmitted to the Senate on October 1, 1996.

All of these examples illustrate the absence of any legally binding time constraints on the President's transmittal of treaties to the Senate.

I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request. If we may be of additional assistance, please call on us.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of the treaty before us to expand NATO. I also strongly support the agreement that emerged from Kyoto, as well as the President's position that the agreement is not ripe for submittal to the Senate at this time. There is no precedent for forcing the President to submit a treaty on a timeframe established by the United States Senate before the President believes it is appropriate. But that is what this amendment seeks to do. Adopting this amendment would have been a terrible precedent for conducting our foreign policy and I believe would have stopped the treaty now pending before us.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2328

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question remains on the Smith amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the Smith amendment—the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith amendment.

I hope when we get to the vote—which I hope is very shortly—that we will vote no on the Smith amendment.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) is necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 16, nays 83, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 116]

YEAS—16

Ashcroft	Hutchinson	Sessions
Brownback	Hutchison	Smith Bob (NH)
Craig	Inhofe	Specter
Faircloth	Kempthorne	Warner
Feingold	Nickles	
Grassley	Roberts	

NAYS—83

Abraham	Durbin	Lott
Akaka	Enzi	Lugar
Allard	Feinstein	Mack
Baucus	Ford	McCain
Bennett	Frist	McConnell
Biden	Glenn	Mikulski
Bingaman	Gorton	Moseley-Braun
Bond	Graham	Moynihan
Boxer	Gramm	Murkowski
Breaux	Grams	Murray
Bryan	Gregg	Reed
Bumpers	Hagel	Reid
Burns	Harkin	Robb
Byrd	Hatch	Rockefeller
Campbell	Helms	Roth
Chafee	Hollings	Santorum
Cleland	Inouye	Sarbanes
Coats	Jeffords	Shelby
Cochran	Johnson	Smith Gordon H (OR)
Collins	Kennedy	Snowe
Conrad	Kerrey	Stevens
Coverdell	Kerry	Thomas
D'Amato	Kohl	Thompson
Daschle	Landrieu	Thurmond
DeWine	Lautenberg	Torricelli
Dodd	Leahy	Wellstone
Domenici	Levin	Wyden
Dorgan	Lieberman	

NOT VOTING—1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2328) was rejected.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining votes, and there are two remaining votes in this series, then, be limited to 10 minutes in length.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the question of whether to expand the NATO alliance is one of the most important foreign policy decisions this Senate has been called upon to make since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We will make history with this vote. So it would seem appropriate to consult history before we cast it. That's what I did the other day. I re-read some of the debate that took place in this chamber 49 years ago, when our predecessors, in the tumultuous years following the Second World War, had the courage and foresight to commit our own nation to this alliance.

One of the chief supporters was Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan, predicted that NATO would become ''the greatest war deterrent in history.''

History has proven him right. Because of NATO, a region that produced two cataclysmic wars in this century has now known a half-century of peace and stability. Those of us who were born after the Second World War tend to take that for granted. But in fact, it is a remarkable accomplishment.

Just as the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of World War II, it has been redrawn again with the end of the Cold War. Nations that once marched in lockstep with totalitarian dictatorships have been transformed into struggling young democracies.

It is time for us to redefine NATO to match the new map, the new reality, of this post-Cold War world.

Enlarging NATO's circle of security to include the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not only in the best interests of those nations. It is in the best interests of the entire European continent. And, it is in the national security interest of the United States.

For these reasons, I intend to vote for ratification of the treaty expanding NATO. And I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

I do not underestimate the seriousness of this action, nor do I take lightly the thoughtful arguments some of my fellow Senators have made against ratification of this treaty.

As I see it, there are essentially four such arguments. In making my own decision, I have wrestled with each of them. And I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on them.

First, though, I want to read something from a man who has thought very deeply about these arguments, and about the future of Europe: the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. President Havel is among the most articulate supporters of the treaty we are now considering.

''As I follow the debate over whether NATO should be enlarged,'' he has written, ''I have the strong sense that the arguments are often purely mechanical, somehow missing the real meaning of the alliance. ''The process of expansion must be accompanied by something much deeper: a refined definition of the purpose, mission and identity of NATO.

''The alliance,'' he continues, ''should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. ''It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more of less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization, and thus a pillar of global security.''

Does NATO exist to defend a fixed list of nations, chosen 49 years ago, against an enemy that no longer exists? Or does it need to respond to the new threats we face by including, under NATO's collective security umbrella, the three countries that have demonstrated not only a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it? That is the fundamental question in this debate.

The answer, in my view, is yes. We should expand NATO to include the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

There are, as I said, four other questions as well. They also deserve serious reflection.

The first is: What effect would expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have on Russia's relations with the West—particularly its relations with the United States?

Russia clearly would prefer that we not expand NATO. Given their history, that is understandable. Russia lost 20 million people in the Second World War.

Despite assurances from NATO that no troops or nuclear weapons will be stationed in the three new member nations, there are those in Russia who remain fearful of an expanded NATO, and others who are trying to exploit those fears to weaken the hands of Russian democratic reformers. This is troubling, because it is clearly in our national interest to see Russia fully engaged with the West.

There is evidence, however, that Russian leaders wish to continue that engagement. Russia's willingness last year to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act is one example of Russia's commitment to improved relations with the West. Perhaps an even better example is Russia's continued active participation in the international peacekeeping effort in Bosnia.

Some of my colleagues cite fear of antagonizing Russia as a reason to reject this treaty. While I respect their opinion, I do not believe this concern warrants such action, and I cite as evidence Russia's own actions.

We must remember what Secretary of State Albright calls the ''productive

paradox'' at the core of NATO. That is, by demonstrating that we are willing to defend our allies, we dramatically reduce the chances that we will ever actually have to commit troops to do so.

This has been true in the past, and I believe it will remain true in the future.

A second question we must address is the price of enlargement.

It is important that we be clear from the very start: There are costs associated with expanding NATO. And, while most of these costs will be borne by the new member nations, some of the costs will fall to existing members of the alliance, including the United States.

The initial estimates of the costs to the US were quite high. Two things have happened in the last year, however, to reduce projections of those costs.

First, NATO invited three members to join the alliance instead of four, the number on which earlier estimates were based.

Second, and more significant, the military committee of NATO conducted a thorough analysis of the three potential new members and found that their military infrastructures were in better shape than had been assumed. As a result, the cost of bringing them in line with NATO standards is projected to be considerably less.

The new, more accurate estimates put the cost to US at an average of $40 million a year for 10 years.

I am not suggesting for a minute that this is a small amount. It's not. But compare it to the price of some pieces of military hardware. One Blackhawk helicopter costs $10 million. One Harrier jump jet costs $27 million. One F–15 Eagle fighter costs $43 million. One Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile costs $53 million. And one B–2 bomber costs $2 billion—five times more than the entire 10-year cost of expanding NATO.

No, $400 million over 10 years is not a small amount. But if it can help extend stability and security in central and eastern Europe, it is not a bad bargain.

It is also important to note, Mr. President, that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be compelled to modernize their defenses—whether or not they join NATO.

If that modernization takes place within NATO's framework, however, we avoid the risk of re-nationalizing militaries that have caused so much instability in Europe in the past.

The third question we must consider is if, in expanding NATO, we are simply drawing new lines in the sand, and thus creating the potential for new conflicts.

Again, I want to quote President Havel, who has also considered the consequences of refusing to erase the old lines. ''If this way of thinking prevails,'' he warns, ''it will turn the alliance into a hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans.''

We can't allow that to happen.

It is not this Senate, or the NATO alliance, that erased the old dividing lines of Yalta. History erased those lines. The power of freedom and democracy erased those lines. We must not maintain an obsolete line in Europe because we are afraid of drawing a new line. We must not let fear of an old enemy keep us from embracing a new ally.

Hitler and Stalin helped draw the line that placed Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic on the wrong side of freedom in 1944. By admitting these nations to NATO, we are erasing that line.

Finally, there is a fourth question that some have raised in this debate. That is, when will we next consider expanding NATO? And which nations should we consider?

I believe that question is premature. We should remain open-minded. But we haven't yet approved the first expansion. We need to see this process through and carefully and thoroughly evaluate it before we can make any sort of informed decision about admitting additional new members to the alliance. I see no reason why we should commit ourselves to a fixed timetable or list of additional entrants now.

The danger in Europe today does not come from a totalitarian superpower. The danger in Europe today comes from aggressive nationalism and terrorism and the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

By bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's circle of security and democracy, we will strengthen the bulkhead against these destructive forces. We will bolster NATO's fighting capacity by adding 200,000 troops. We will add geographically significant territory to the alliance. We will increase NATO's understanding of these new threats, and thus its ability to head them off.

And all of this, Mr. President, is in the United States' national security interest.

When the Berlin Wall fell, it answered the prayers of millions of people all over the world. It also created a new landscape in Europe. Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help ensure that democracy and freedom fill that landscape, rather than old hatreds and outdated ideologies.

In his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel described his dream for his country.

''I dream,'' he said, ''of a republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially just, in short, of a humane republic which serves the individual and which therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in turn.''

In the years since the Berlin Wall collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all have made great strides toward achieving that dream. They have demonstrated that they meet NATO's standards for membership, and that they can contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.

For all these reasons, I will vote to expand the NATO Treaty to include these three new democracies, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will be brief as we complete debate on the resolution of ratification providing our advice and consent to the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Ths has been an excellent debate in the finest traditions of the Senate. We have spent more than 40 hours on the resolution over the course of 9 days. Almost 50 Senators have made statement, many of them on several occasions. The Senate has considered 20 amendments. We have adopted 12 and rejected 8. This is in addition to the 4 conditions and 7 declarations in the committee's Resolution.

Many people deserve credit in this debate. The Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, Senator HELMS, has shown great leadership. Senator ROTH led the NATO Observer Group with energy and diligence. Senator BIDEN served as the lead Democrat to both and made valuable—and frequent—contributions to our debate. Senator GORDON SMITH, Chair of the Europe Subcommittee played a central role.

Many staff played key roles as well. Steve Biegun, Brian McKeon, Beth Wilson and Mike Haltzel of the Foreign Relations Committee can all now get on with their lives. Ian Brzezinski (BRA-zin-ski) with Senator ROTH was always there for the Observer Group. The Congressional Research Service, especially Stan Sloan, on the floor now, provided invaluable services for members on both sides of the issue. Legislative Counsel Art Rynerson drafted virtually all of the language we have been debating.

A number of issues have been raised in our consideration. We have addressed future enlargement, NATO's mission, costs, Bosnia and arms control. I believe all sides have had an opportunity to have their voices heard. Now it is time to cast our votes.

Much has been said about Russia over the past week—how Russia will react to NATO enlargement and the impact on a wide range of bilateral issues. Both sides agree that Russian hard-liners should not have a veto over our course of action. But supporters and opponents of enlargement differ greatly over the impact on our relations with Russia.

We have heard many estimates of how our vote will influence the tangled web of Russian politics and the disturbing course of Russian foreign policy. I do not think anyone can predict the impact with complete precision. But we can look at some basic facts.

First, NATO poses no threat to Russia. No serious person inside or outside Russia believes NATO—with 16 or 19 members—jeopardizes Russia. The

thought of Czech tanks rolling across the Russian steppes is ludicrous.

Second, the average Russian is not concerned about NATO enlargement. A recent poll even shows the majority of Russians in Moscow support adding these three countries to NATO.

Third, the Russians have delayed action on START II for years. NATO enlargement is only the latest in a long line of reasons given for their inaction.

Fourth, Russian diplomacy in Brussels has not been affected by our debate here. Just yesterday, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council discussed a wide range of issues. Alleged Russian concerns about enlargement were not an issue.

Finally, long before NATO enlargement became a real possibility, Russia has engaged in a large number of foreign policy actions that harm our interests—from proliferation to Iran and violations of START I to subversion of its neighbors. NATO enlargement may provide an excuse for Russian adventurism, but will not provide a cause.

Our principle concern with Russia must be Russian behavior—not the volatile mood swings of Russian domestic politics.

Mr. President, this will be a historic vote. It is fitting that we are voting on including the Czech Republic in NATO sixty years after the sellout at Munich, fifty years after the communist coup in Prague, and thirty years after Soviet tanks crushed the winds of freedom in Czechoslovakia.

That is the past and, as many Senators have pointed out, this vote is about the future. It is about what kind of a Europe we want to see. It is about what kind of allies we want in a continent where we have fought three great wars in this century.

Expanding NATO is about ensuring this generation and future generations are not called to fight a fourth time. It is about a 21st century trans-Atlantic partnership that provides more freedom, more security and more opportunity for all of us.

A few days ago, I received a letter from Polish Foreign Minister Geremek (GAR-a-mech). His words are an appropriate way to close debate:

> The consistent and visionary foreign policy of the United States has opened a historic window of opportunity. Just as in 1989, it was American leadership which was the decisive factor in ending the Cold War. . . . so today it is the U.S. Senate which will decide whether a new page is turned in history of the Transatlantic area and Eurasia. It will be a chapter testifying to the triumph of freedom and democracy and to the success of the biggest and most successful alliance in world history. It will strengthen the Alliance to the clear advantage of Europe and America.

I thank all Senators for their cooperation in reaching this moment. I yield the floor.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, the votes are final passage of the NATO enlargement treaty, and according to the rules of the Senate, Senators should be in their assigned desks and vote from their desks. That is in the rules. I have discussed it with Senator BYRD. We are all here. I think it would be an appropriate thing for us to do. The rules do require it.

I also think it would help us expedite the vote. So, if the Senators would take their assigned desks, we will have a vote on the historic treaty.

The second vote is final passage of the supplemental appropriations bill. Tomorrow, the Senate will debate the Workforce Development Act under a time agreement of no more than 4 hours. Several amendments will be offered. Consequently, those votes will be postponed to occur Tuesday, May 5, at 5:30.

Monday, the Senate will begin consideration of the IRS reform bill. I know we will have a number of Senators who will wish to make opening statements. We will check with the managers and with the leadership to see about the possibility of amendments being offered. But if they are offered, they, too, would occur at 5:30 on Tuesday.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for a productive week. I congratulate the managers of this legislation. I thank the Senators who made it possible for us to complete this action tonight. I know some of those who are opposed to it would have liked to have delayed it over until next week, but I believe the time is right for us to vote. I thank all Senators for their help, and I thank Senator DASCHLE for his cooperation and I yield to Senator BYRD.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for yielding. I also thank the distinguished majority leader for calling to the attention of Senators the following standing order, which I hope that Senators will contemplate. And I congratulate the majority leader for enforcing this regulation. Any Senator may ask the Chair to enforce this regulation at any time. I have often thought about it. I think we ought to follow this regulation, Mr. Leader, and I hope that we will establish this as a practice and continue to do it.

The Senate would make a much better impression, not only upon the visitors but also on Senators themselves, if they learn to sit in their seats to answer the rollcall. And they will take greater pride in this institution. I guarantee that, watching from the galleries, it would be a much more impressive sight during rollcall votes than what we have been accustomed to seeing down here in the well, which looks like the floor of a stock market. I have been to the stock market on a few occasions. It doesn't look any worse.

Let me read this standing order of the Senate. It is on page 157 of the Senate manual. All Senators who wish to read it, here it is. It is only three lines. The heading, ''VOTES SHALL BE CAST FROM ASSIGNED DESK.''

> Resolved, that it is a standing order of the Senate that during yea and nay votes in the Senate, each Senator shall vote from the assigned desk of the Senator.

This was by Senate Resolution 480 in the 98th Congress, the Second Session, October 11, 1984.

This is a great day for me. I am glad to see the leader asking that Senators abide by this regulation, which we voted on, those of us who were here in 1984.

I thank the leader.

Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Senator BYRD. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back the time? The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic endured nearly half a century of communist domination as a result of expedient and short-sighted policies of the West. Today, we have the opportunity to remedy that injustice while securing democracy in Central Europe for future generations.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have established democratic governments, each has built a market economy, and all three work with us in defense of liberty from Cuba to China.

In my judgment, Mr. President, these three countries belong to NATO. I have met with the Foreign Ministers of all three countries. They understand the commitment and responsibilities that they undertake by joining NATO. I am confident they will meet all of their obligations.

The Foreign Relations Committee held 8 hearings in the past six months, heard from 37 supporters and opponents of NATO expansion. Before the Committee hearings, I myself had concerns about NATO expansion, including what it would cost, how we could deal with Russia, and the future mission of NATO. The Committee's resolution addresses all of these points and passed by a vote of 16-2.

Mr. President, NATO enlargement has been endorsed by countless distinguished individuals including Margaret Thatcher, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Caspar Weinberger, and Richard Perle. In addition, the Foreign Relations Committee has received endorsements of this policy from every living former U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries of Defense and national security advisors, and more than sixty flag officers and general officers, including five distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote overwhelmingly in support of NATO enlargement. This is the right decision for the United States of America.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. A century ago, our predecessors in the U.S. Senate took a very bold step in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty.

It is easy for us today to forget what a break with the past that vote represented. For the first time, this country committed itself, in peacetime, to

the defense of democratic Europe. The Senate recognized by its far-sighted action that our future—indeed our own freedom—is inextricably bound to Europe.

The success of the fledgling NATO was by no means certain. Western Europe was made up of a jumble of nations, several of which had only recently been at each others' throats. Germany and France alone had fought each other three times in 74 years. The three western zones of Germany, which were not the Federal Republic and, in fact, were not invited to join NATO.

The countries of Western Europe were economically weak, not yet having recovered nearly fully from the devastation of World War II.

Several European NATO members had strong Communist parties whose loyalty and commitment to democracy were suspect.

Mr. President, our predecessors took a gamble. Fortunately for us and our children—and I hope for our grandchildren—NATO succeeded beyond the Senate s fondest expectations.

As we all know, for 40 years, it kept Soviet imperialism at bay, thereby providing the security umbrella under which democratic Western Europe could recover socially and economically, and thrive.

In the process, NATO expanded its membership three times to welcome Greece and Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. With each expansion the Alliance was strengthened.

Largely thanks to NATO's persistence, communism in most of Europe crumbled, including in the Soviet Union.

Now, nearly 50 years after our predecessors met the challenge of their time, we are called upon, once again, to take up the torch.

Three highly qualified democracies that chafed under the Communist yoke for four decades are now candidates for membership in NATO. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have already rejoined the West politically and socially. Tonight we can vote to readmit them to the West's security framework.

In a larger sense we will be righting a historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin.

Mr. President, NATO enlargement is squarely in America's national interest. It is in Europe's interest. And yes—by stabilizing a historic crucible of violence in East-Central Europe—it is in Russia s interest.

I am proud to be able to play a small part in this historic occasion. I will cast my vote with conviction to ratify the Resolution of Ratification, and I urge my colleagues to join me. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I shall cast my vote in opposition for the reasons that I have stated over the past several days in what I regard is an excellent debate. But if it is the will of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate that this ratification go forward, then I commit, and I hope others will commit, who have been in opposition, to do our very best to make it work.

I think it is going to pose a mighty challenge to make it work, but if that is the decision of this body, for which I have infinite respect, then I commit as a member of the Armed Services Committee, where I will have some special responsibilities, to make it work.

But I also say that I shall be among others who will maintain a vigil as to the future with an open and objective mind but still predicated in my own thoughts on what I have expressed on this floor about future additions of other nations in a manner that would be untimely to make this treaty last another 50 years. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back on both sides? If so, the question is on agreeing to the committee amendment, as amended.

The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution of ratification with certain conditions and declarations to the Protocols of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) is necessarily absent.

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 80, nays 19, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 117 Ex.]

YEAS—80

Abraham	Faircloth	Lott
Akaka	Feingold	Lugar
Allard	Feinstein	Mack
Baucus	Ford	McCain
Bennett	Frist	McConnell
Biden	Glenn	Mikulski
Bingaman	Gorton	Moseley-Braun
Bond	Graham	Murkowski
Boxer	Gramm	Murray
Breaux	Grams	Nickles
Brownback	Grassley	Reed
Burns	Gregg	Robb
Byrd	Hagel	Roberts
Campbell	Hatch	Rockefeller
Chafee	Helms	Roth
Cleland	Hollings	Santorum
Coats	Hutchison	Sarbanes
Cochran	Inouye	Sessions
Collins	Johnson	Shelby
Coverdell	Kennedy	Smith (OR)
D'Amato	Kerrey	Snowe
Daschle	Kerry	Stevens
DeWine	Kohl	Thomas
Dodd	Landrieu	Thompson
Domenici	Lautenberg	Thurmond
Durbin	Levin	Torricelli
Enzi	Lieberman	

NAYS—19

Ashcroft	Conrad	Harkin
Bryan	Craig	Hutchinson
Bumpers	Dorgan	Inhofe
Jeffords	Reid	Wellstone
Kempthorne	Smith (NH)	Wyden
Leahy	Specter	
Moynihan	Warner	

NOT VOTING—1

Kyl

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 80, the nays are 19. Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification, as amended, is agreed to.

The resolution of ratification, as amended, was agreed to.

(The Text of the Resolution of Ratification, as amended, will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

Mr. BIDEN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will now go into legislative session.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the bill, H.R. 3579, making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee on conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill H.R. 3579, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the RECORD of April 30, 1998.)

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the House passed earlier today the emergency supplemental appropriations conference report by substantial margin.

I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to my friend and colleague from West Virginia, Sen. BYRD, for his assistance and cooperation in presenting this bill to the Senate.

Our Committee worked in a bipartisan manner through every step of the process of moving this emergency supplemental bill through the Senate, and back from conference.

I strongly urge all my colleagues to vote in support of this bill, which addresses urgent funding requirements for the Department of Defense, and many agencies responsible for dealing with natural disasters.

The conference report provides $2.8 billion for emergency defense accounts.