

on the principle that India shall be built by Indians." Swadeshi is a turn of the century term of the independence movement meaning self-reliance, use indigenous materials, sweep imports out.

They are not going to be as intimidated by sanctions as we may suppose. This is the first Hindu government in India in perhaps 800 years. We tend to forget that. When we go to visit India, distinguished persons are taken to view the Taj Mahal, the Red Fort, the India Gate. All those are monuments by conquerors—Islamic, then English. It is something we don't notice. They do. And after 50 years of Indian independence, founded by a secular government which denied all those things, there is now a Hindu government and its sensibilities need to be attended to if only as a matter of common sense.

Do we want India in a system of nuclear arms control or don't we? I think we do. I think we ought to encourage them and explore the implications of the statement reported by the Associated Press. And while we are at it, it would do no great harm to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ourselves.

I see my friend from Nebraska is on the floor. I look forward to a comment he might make.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I want to ask the Senator a question. First of all, I don't think there is anybody in the Senate who has been more consistently critical of the Central Intelligence Agency and has been more diligent in trying to change the way we classify documents. I find both of them to be a bit connected to his comments.

One of the concerns I have in all this is that we look for a scapegoat. Now, one of the things that citizens need to understand is that increasingly we are getting our intelligence through open sources. That is good because when you get your information through open sources there is a debate. Is what somebody said true or not true—and you debate such things.

I quite agree with what the Senator said earlier that for us to be going at the CIA right now because they didn't report this is a little ridiculous. All we have to do is read articles of John Burns over a half dozen months.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Of the New York Times.

Mr. KERREY. If we head in the direction of finding a scapegoat here what we will miss is an opportunity to debate what our policy ought to be toward the largest democracy on Earth. In addition to the other things that the Senator said about India, this is also the largest democracy. A billion people live in India. Not an easy country to govern.

They have a Hindu nationalist party that campaigned on a platform, and that platform was that nuclear testing would resume. They were not secretive about that. They did not operate in the shadows on that. They were upfront and they followed through.

It seems to me we should blame ourselves for not paying attention to what is going on there and blame ourselves for not giving enough consideration or concern about the direction of the largest democracy on Earth.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator his 10 minutes has expired.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KERREY. I am at the end of my question, Mr. President.

I just wanted, in addition to making the point that the distinguished Senator has been very critical of the CIA—and I think he is quite right in this particular instance to say though we may need some questions answered, the biggest question is why didn't anybody in either the administration or in this Congress notice that the Hindu nationalist party had campaigned on a promise to make India a nuclear power. What does the distinguished Senator from New York think this Congress needs to do to make certain that we are paying attention in the aftermath of these sanctions to what India is doing, to make certain that, first, we don't miss an opportunity to get them to ratify this treaty, and in addition, to get them to do a number of other things that not only would be in their best interests, but to be in our best interests, as well, since a third of the Earth's population lives between India and China in this very, very volatile region to which we obviously have not paid a sufficient amount of attention.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, I would say to my gallant, able friend that the Intelligence Committee could do worse than inviting some of the administration officials who are so indignant that the CIA didn't tell them what was going to happen up to say: have you read any Indian newspaper recently? Do you happen to know what the largest democracy in the world is and who they elected in the last election? Have you looked into their party platforms.

Mr. KERREY. Personally, I think it would be a waste of money to direct the CIA to read the New York Times and report to us what is contained in there relevant to any part of the world, let alone in India.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I much agree. May I say to my friend that I was Ambassador to India on May 18, 1974, when the Indians exploded a "peaceful" nuclear explosion, as they said, in India on the same testing grounds used this time. It fell on me to call on then Prime Minister Gandhi to express our concerns. I have to say that Secretary Kissinger was mild; he toned down the indignation that came from the Department of State in his draft statement. I did say to Mr. Gandhi on that occasion, speaking for myself, without instructions, that India had made a great mistake, that it was the No. 1 country in south Asia, the hegemonic country in South Asia, Pakistan No. 3,

if you like, then you go down to the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; but in 25 years time there would be a Mongol general in Islamabad with a nuclear capacity, saying, I have got four bombs and I want the Punjab back and I want this region or that region, the Kashmir, or else I will drop them on what was then Bombay, New Delhi, Madras and Calcutta.

Well, something like that is happening and we better see that it doesn't go forward. So to explore the Indian offer here, suggesting the offer, seems to me, a matter of huge importance. We could see the end of the cold war, followed by a nuclear proliferation of a kind we never conceived. We can see China, North Korea, and Pakistan arming in nuclear modes against India and Russia and us looking at an Armageddonic future that we had felt was behind us.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I know the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has come here for other reasons. He used to be chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I know from listening to him that he has an active interest in this issue as well. I have heard him comment many times. In fact, he asked the administration officials why they don't attempt to resolve the conflicts between India and Pakistan and India and China, and why do we not pay more attention to it. I suspect the Senator from Pennsylvania would rather not spend too much time commenting on it, but by coincidence, we have another individual on the floor who has an active interest in this issue.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend. I ask unanimous consent that the time from 1:45 p.m. to 2 o'clock be reserved for the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. WELLSTONE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I commend my colleague from New York for his comments about the problems with nuclear proliferation. I thank my colleague from Nebraska for commenting about discussions that we have had over the years about the issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I intend to speak directly to a subject that I had talked to the Senator from Nebraska about, and that is the need to have activism by the President of the United States in trying to deal with nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. In fact, Senator Hank Brown and I had visited with Indian Prime Minister Rao in August of 1995 and also with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. I then wrote to the President on this precise subject. I

intend to discuss that at some length during the course of the remarks that I am about to make.

I believe that the nuclear detonation in India makes it more important than ever that the United States move ahead with leadership to try to defuse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and that the Senate should act promptly to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We have had, already, in the course of the last 24 hours, indications of a chain reaction. We have had a response from Pakistan that they may well, too, test nuclear weapons. We have had a report from North Korea, which appears in this morning's press, that "North Korean officials have announced that they are suspending their efforts to carry out the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement that was intended to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. United States officials said the program was intended to produce weapons in North Korea."

So we see what is happening on the international scene. There needs to be a very positive response by the United States to the likes of these very, very threatening developments.

As I started to comment earlier, Mr. President, Senator Hank Brown and I had occasion to meet with both the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani Prime Minister back on August 26 and 27 of 1995. It is summarized best in a letter that I wrote to the President from Damascus, dated August 28, 1995, which reads as follows:

I think it important to call to your personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator Hank Brown and I have had in the last two days with Indian Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested in negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any nuclear weapons on his subcontinent within ten or fifteen years including renouncing first use of such weapons. His interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover bilateral talks or a regional conference which would include the United States, China and Russia in addition to India and Pakistan.

When we mentioned this conversation to Prime Minister Bhutto this morning, she expressed great interest in such negotiations. When we told her of our conversation with Prime Minister Rao, she asked if we could get him to put that in writing.

When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last talked to Prime Minister Rao, she said that she had no conversations with him during her tenure as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India.

From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile systems.

I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

When the news broke about the action by the government of India in detonating the nuclear weapon, I wrote to the President yesterday as follows:

With this letter, I am enclosing a copy of a letter I sent to you on August 28, 1995, concerning the United States brokering arrangements between India and Pakistan to make their subcontinent nuclear free.

You may recall that I have discussed this issue with you on several occasions after I sent you that letter. In light of the news reports today that India has set off nuclear devices, I again urge you to act to try to head off or otherwise deal with the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race.

I continue to believe that an invitation from you to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to meet in the Oval Office, after appropriate preparations, could ameliorate this very serious problem.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Secretary Albright.

Sincerely,

When I discussed the meeting which Senator Brown and I had with both Prime Ministers in late 1995, the President said that was an item which he would put on his agenda following the 1996 elections. Since those elections, I have had occasion again to talk to the President about this subject, and he expressed concern as to what the response of the Senate would be and what would happen with respect to the concerns of China. I expressed the opinion to President Clinton that I thought our colleagues in the Senate would be very interested in moving ahead to try to diffuse the obvious tension between India and Pakistan on nuclear weapons.

That is all prolog. What we have now is a testing of a nuclear device by India as a matter of national pride. And I think that is what it is.

The new Government of India did give adequate notice, although, here again, I believe there might have been some sharp focus of attention by the CIA. Perhaps it is necessary to talk to the White House even about columns which appear in the New York Times, or some formal way to warn of this threat in a more precise and focused manner, although I quite agree with what the Senator from Nebraska, Senator KERREY, said—that it was obvious what the Government of India had intended to do.

But as I say, that is prolog. Now I think there is an urgent necessity for leadership from the President to try to diffuse this situation. At the same time, Mr. President, I think there is an urgent need that the Senate of the United States proceed to the consideration and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The essence of that treaty provides that it is an obligation not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. That treaty has been considered by a number of countries, has been ratified by many countries, but it is still awaiting action by the United States.

The Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Serv-

ices held a hearing on this subject on October 27, of last year and March 18, of this year, and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development held a similar hearing on October 29 of last year. But as yet, there has been no action by the Foreign Relations Committee. It seems to me imperative that the matter be brought to the Senate floor as early as possible and whatever hearings are deemed necessary be held so that the Senate may consider this matter.

There are some considerations as to objections to the treaty as to whether we can know in a comprehensive way the adequacy of our nuclear weapons. But it seems to me that whatever the arguments may be, they ought to be aired in a hearing process before the Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor of this Senate and then brought for a vote by the U.S. Senate.

This is a matter of life and death. When we talk about nuclear weapons, we are talking about the force and the power which can destroy civilization as we know it. During the tenure that I had as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I took a look at the governmental structure in the United States on weapons of mass destruction, saw that some 96 separate agencies had operations, and, in conjunction with the then-Director John Deutch, inserted the provision to establish the commission to consider the governmental structure of the United States in dealing with weapons of mass destruction. That commission is now in operation. John Deutch is the chairman and I serve as vice chairman.

But it is certainly necessary that matters of this magnitude receive early attention at all levels of the government, including the President and the U.S. Senate. Where there is concern in the Senate on the subject of testing to know the capabilities of our weapons, it should be noted that article X of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does provide for the right to withdraw if the Government decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of this treaty would jeopardize the supreme interests, referring to the supreme interests of any nation. President Clinton has stated that he would consider withdrawing if we came to that kind of a situation.

President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996. Now we are more than a year and a half later without any real significant action having been taken by the U.S. Senate.

The 149 states have signed the treaty, and 13 have ratified it as of April of 1998. There is obviously a problem with what is going to happen with Iraq, Iran, or other countries which seek to develop nuclear weapons. There is obviously a problem with other nations which have nuclear weapons. But the ban on nuclear testing would certainly be a significant step forward in diffusing the situation and in acting to try to have comprehensive arms control on this very, very important subject.

I urge the President to take action, to use his good offices with sufficient preparation, as noted in my letter to him of yesterday, for a meeting in the Oval Office. Very few foreign leaders decline meetings in the Oval Office. That should be of the highest priority on the President's agenda, and similarly on the Senate agenda. Consideration and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ought to be a very high priority on the Senate's agenda.

Mr. President, in the absence of any other Senator on the floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SECURITY OF ISRAEL

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have again sought recognition to comment on the issue relating to the conditions which have been set by the U.S. Government on a further meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and the difference of opinion of what is adequate to handle the security interests of the State of Israel. It is my view that it was inappropriate and counterproductive for the U.S. Government to deliver what I consider to be an ultimatum to Prime Minister Netanyahu that he accept the further redeployment of Israeli forces as a precondition to come to Washington to meet with the President on last Monday, May 11.

Secretary of State Albright briefed a number of Senators yesterday in a room, S. 407, where we have secret discussions, and at that time the Secretary of State said that she had not delivered an ultimatum but instead had stated conditions which would have to be met before the United States would continue to carry forward with the peace process on the current track.

I responded to the Secretary of State that I thought it wasn't even a difference of semantics to say that a condition on further discussions did not constitute an ultimatum, that in fact it was clearly an ultimatum in those discussions.

If the diplomacy is carried out in a quiet way, so be it. But when diplomacy is carried out publicly and where the Prime Minister of another country is put in the position where the Prime Minister has to back down, it seems to me totally counterproductive and unlikely to produce a result where there will be agreement or compliance even if Prime Minister Netanyahu had wanted to do that.

When it comes to the question of the security interests of Israel, I do not believe that anybody can second-guess the security interests of Israel except

the Israelis and their Government. The view from the Potomac is a lot different than the view from the Jordan River as it has been said on many, many occasions. And Israel has been fighting more than 100 million Arabs for more than 50 years. They have won quite a number of wars, but they only have to lose one war before it is all over.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen appeared today before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and I asked the Secretary of Defense whether he or anybody in his department had carried out an analysis as to the adequacy of security for Israel if Israel agreed to the proposal of the administration. I commented in the course of that question that I would not think, even if the United States had made that kind of a determination, it would be binding and might not even be relevant as to what Israel thought was necessary for its own security. Secretary of Defense Cohen said that no such analysis had been made on his part. But it would seem to me that as an indispensable prerequisite for the U.S. Government to take a position that Israel ought to have certain withdrawal at least there ought to be a professional determination that the withdrawal would be consistent with Israel's security interests. But as I say, the Secretary of Defense had not undertaken that kind of an analysis.

I submit that the issue of Israel's security is something that has to be judged by the Government of Israel. There is no doubt about the friendship and support of President Clinton's administration for Israel. I do not question that for a minute. But where you have the negotiations at a very, very critical point and public statements are made as a precondition which is realistically viewed an ultimatum, pure and simple, that is totally wholly inappropriate. It is my hope that these peace negotiations can be put back on track. I know that the Secretary of State is going to be meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu later today. The Appropriations Committee has a meeting scheduled with Prime Minister Netanyahu tomorrow. I hope we can find our way through these negotiations and put the peace negotiations back on track.

I think it is a very difficult matter because while the administration is pressing Israel for a certain level of withdrawal, there are many items which are not being taken care of by the Palestinian authority.

Last year, Prime Minister Netanyahu had said that Arafat had given a green light to certain terrorist activities by the Palestinian Authority. And when Secretary of State Albright was before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I asked the question as to whether there had been, in fact, a green light given by Chairman Arafat, as charged by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Secretary of State Albright made the statement that it wasn't a green light, but there wasn't a red light either.

I think it is mandatory that the Palestinian Authority give such a red light. They cannot be guarantors, but a red light and their maximum effort to stop terrorism is required. Under the provisions of an amendment introduced by Senator SHELBY and myself, that kind of a maximum effort against terrorism is a precondition for getting any aid from the United States.

So, these matters are obviously delicate. They require a lot of diplomatic tact. It is my hope that the current stalemate can be surmounted, but I think it can be surmounted only if there is a recognition, as former Secretary of State Warren Christopher had, that security is a matter for the discretion of Israel—it is Israel's security—and that no ultimatum be issued, or at least no precondition be issued, before the Prime Minister of Israel can proceed to have a meeting or negotiations with the United States.

In the absence of any other Senator on the floor seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COATS). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUES ENDORSES FAIR MINIMUM WAGE

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, President Clinton and Democrats in Congress strongly support a fair increase in the minimum wage. The economy is in a period of record growth. The stock markets are at an all time high. Unemployment continues to fall to its lowest level in a quarter century. Yet, too many workers on the bottom rungs of the economic ladder are not receiving their fair share of this prosperity.

Most Americans recognize that the minimum wage is not yet a living wage. According to an April NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll, 79 percent of those questioned support an increase.

Time and again, opponents state that increases in the minimum wage are harmful to the economy, and especially harmful to minority communities. But such statements have no basis in fact, as the current evidence makes clear.

In his recent "To Be Equal" column published in over 300 African-American newspapers across the country, Hugh Price, President of the National Urban League, strongly endorses the increase in the minimum wage that many of us have proposed, from its current level of \$5.15 an hour to \$5.65 an hour on January 1, 1999 and to \$6.15 an hour on January 1, 2000. The National Urban League has played a prominent role in the civil rights community for over 80 years. Its 114 affiliates in 34 states and the District of Columbia are at the forefront of the battle for economic and social justice for all Americans.