

In light of the event which occurred in India, we need some time and, obviously, we need to think through the application of resources to the information necessary to make sure the test ban treaty can be carried out. India's willingness to test reminds us that global nuclear capabilities will not remain static if the United States agrees to lock in its nuclear capabilities pursuant to a test ban.

In the coming decades, other countries, whether they are signatories to the treaty or not, may develop nuclear capabilities and, given time, may even develop significant threatening nuclear capabilities, which is not the case at this point.

The United States nuclear posture is not established in response to the threat posed by a single country, but also considers threats that may be posed by strategic alliances. We need to recognize that the nuclear buildup we now expect to occur on the Pakistan-India border and that may spread to China could one day not be directed against one another, but there could be alliances which put America's future in jeopardy.

More so, we need to recognize that the nuclear arsenal of the United States, one that we maintain today and will maintain into the indefinite future, has to be able to respond to all potential scenarios that might unfold in an uncertain and changing world.

That means at a minimum, our weapons must be safe and reliable, not just theoretically so. We must have confidence in them as our tools of foreign policy and military policy. That requires our potential adversaries, whether they are our current adversaries or our current allies, be aware of our formidable scientific skills and our willingness to direct them toward the maintenance of our stockpile.

While there is some uncertainty, and my skepticism can be expected to continue to demand improvements, I am reasonably confident that the United States has the scientific ability to maintain our stockpile if we make that a priority. That requires that we make it a priority today, even though current focus is more on conventional warfighting capabilities, and we make it a priority into the future.

Everyone should understand that the United States has made a commitment that we will not test nuclear weapons. So we are not going to have any underground tests or any other kinds of tests. That means our scientists have to be capable of telling us that our stockpile is secure, safe and trustworthy.

That requires that we pay attention to what is needed to do that. The reason for the explosions in India is to make sure they can say, "We now know how to build a bona fide weapon, and that it will work." If they did not do the testing, they would be acting theoretically, they would be basing it on science, on modeling, on previous data about other weapons and weapons

they might try to duplicate. But the only way to be sure and to have it right is to do tests.

We have done those. We are not doing them anymore. But everybody in this body and in the House and in the White House have to be concerned that if we have them, they have to be trustworthy. And to do that, we may have to spend a little bit of money on science and technology to make sure that without testing that they are valid.

We are not building any new nuclear weapons. We have committed to that. We have not for some time; and for the foreseeable future we will not.

Our nuclear posture cannot be based exclusively on our dedication to maintaining our own stockpile so it can respond to any potential threat; we must also work to understand and then reduce that threat. India's ability to conduct five tests without our previous knowledge, even though we should have been on alert for them, demonstrates how easy it is for a nation to develop such a capability.

So while I began my remarks by saying that the focus of our frustration should not be on our intelligence agencies alone, that they were unable to provide us advanced warning of India's plans, I also believe that in the future we must improve by an order of magnitude our ability to understand the nuclear threats we face.

We are considering entering into discussions on a new round of arms control agreements that would, for the first time, limit the number of nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia. We need to approach the notion of counting warheads and of entering into limits with a single country with great skepticism. Our inability to monitor India's nuclear activities should make it clear that we are far from having the ability to monitor a warhead limitation treaty now and for some time to come.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE INDONESIAN CRISIS

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I take the floor today to discuss the sorry state of affairs that we find in Indonesia. The latest reports are that nearly 400 people have died in the past week of rioting and looting.

Despite the crumbling of this nation, there is a stony silence from the Clinton administration. We have heard nothing. The administration apparently has no policy in place to deal with the instability in Indonesia. Yet, in my opinion, administrative policies were largely responsible for many of today's problems in Indonesia. We created the problem, and we are not doing anything about it.

First, during this administration, investments in Indonesia have soared. Lending to Indonesia during the last 4 years by U.S. banks was larger than to other major nations in Europe. It was too much money chasing too few

worthwhile investments. So the money began to chase investments that were not worthwhile. The administration encouraged it and promoted it and had close ties to Indonesian conglomerates, the Lippo Group being a leading candidate.

Of course, this gold rush could not sustain itself. Vast amounts of money and weak investments always come home to you. And the bottom dropped out in Indonesia.

Rather than take responsibility for these problems and take a leadership role in handling the financial crisis in Asia, the answer of this administration has been to delegate the problems to the International Monetary Fund.

The IMF has bungled, from day one, the handling of the Indonesian crisis. From the closing of the banks on, from the day it went in, it has created a greater crisis.

We never should have turned over international economic and foreign policy to a group of 2,000 silk-suited bureaucrats that have little if any success to show for the billions and billions of American taxpayers' dollars that they have wasted throughout the world.

The panic began when IMF imposed their austerity measures. They have driven the Indonesian currency down to record low levels. Is it any wonder that riots have begun to break out in the streets and that 400 people have been killed when the currency is worth 300 percent less than it was a year ago?

In fact, the riots began to take hold when the government raised the cost of fuel and electricity, as mandated by the IMF.

Now, I repeat, the riots began to take hold when the government raised the cost of fuel and electricity as mandated by the IMF, the people we sent to bring calm and common sense to Indonesia. Another brilliant recommendation from the IMF, for a country finding itself plunged into poverty, was to raise the price of fuel and electricity.

This is, again, another reason why the IMF is the last institution we need to provide funding to in order to solve the world's economic problems. Their record of solving world economic problems could not be worse. In fact, I would like for someone to point out a world economic problem that they solved. The numbers they have made worse are far greater than those they have helped.

The only upturn in the Indonesian currency came when a currency board was suggested to stabilize monetary policy and there was a slight uptick in the value of the currency. But this idea was immediately smothered with pressure from the United States, this administration, and the IMF, that they could not have a currency board. Now we have a full-blown crisis in Indonesia. And the President is in Europe this week, and his aides are saying very little to nothing.

I think it is incumbent on this country to take a leadership role and solve

this problem that we had a large hand in creating. It can only get worse. There can only be more bloodshed, and we have no idea what kind of leadership will arise from the streets of Jakarta. We have no idea. It is time for the administration to stop sitting on the sidelines and get engaged in either easing the economic problem or making plans for a transition from the Soeharto regime. The IMF has done enough damage. Now the United States has to take a leadership role in the financial and political affairs of this country.

It cannot—and I repeat, it cannot—be left up to the IMF anymore. It has proven its inability to function.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORITY FOR RECORD TO REMAIN OPEN UNTIL 1 P.M.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Record remain open until 1 p.m. today for the submission of statements and bills.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR MONDAY, MAY 18, 1998

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 11 a.m. on Monday, May 18. I further ask that on Monday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning business hour be granted and the Senate begin a period of morning business until 12 noon, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator DORGAN, 15 minutes; Senator CONRAD, 15 minutes; and Senator HUTCHINSON, 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I further ask that on Monday any votes ordered with respect to S. 1723, the Abraham immigration bill, be postponed to occur beginning at 5:45 p.m. I further ask that the cloture vote on the motion to proceed be vitiated and, following those stacked votes, the Senate proceed to S. 1415, the tobacco legislation. I further ask unanimous consent that no call for the regular order displace the tobacco legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, when the Senate reconvenes on Monday at 11:00 a.m., there will be a period of morning business until 12 noon. Following morning business, under a previous order, the Senate will begin consideration of S. 1723, the Abraham immigration legislation. Any votes ordered with respect to the Abraham bill will be postponed to occur beginning at 5:45 p.m. Also, following those votes, the Senate will begin consideration of the tobacco bill.

Senators should expect a busy session next week as the Senate considers the tobacco legislation. The cooperation of all Senators will be necessary so that the Senate can complete its work prior to the Memorial Day recess.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. MONDAY, MAY 18, 1998

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 11:55 a.m., adjourned until Monday, May 18, 1998, at 11 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 15, 1998:

THE JUDICIARY

ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, OF NEW YORK, TO BE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VICE LOUIS L. STANTON, RETIRED.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN THE GRADES INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 531:

To be colonel

WILLIAM E. DICKERSON, 0000
JAMES J. DOUGHERTY, 0000
MICHAEL L. FARRELL, 0000

To be lieutenant colonel

GEORGE W. ESTES, 0000
DAVID P. KISSINGER, 0000
WILLIAM E. NELSON, 0000

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 12203 AND 12211:

To be colonel

HERBERT P. FRITTS, 0000
EDDIE L. NEWMAN, 0000
WILLIE H. OGLESBY, JR., 0000

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR REAPPOINTMENT IN THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY FROM THE TEMPORARY DISABILITY RETIRED LIST UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C. SECTION 1211:

To be lieutenant

MASAKO HASEBE, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 5721:

To be lieutenant commander

RICHARD B. ALSOP, 0000
DOUGLAS B. BECKER, JR., 0000
ROY G. BEJSOVC, 0000
GUNTER I. BRAUN, 0000
CHAD D. BROWN, 0000
ERIK A. BURIAN, 0000
STEPHEN N. BURKE, 0000
THOMAS M. CALLENDER, 0000
JAMES B. CAWRSE, 0000
BLAKE L. CONVERSE, 0000
MICHAEL J. COX, 0000
JOHN R. CRAIG, 0000
FLOYD R. CRISP, II, 0000
MICHAEL S. FEYEDDELEM, 0000
KEVIN S. FORD, 0000
RICHARD A. FREY, 0000
JAMES P. GOMPPER, 0000
FRANCIS R. J. GUTIERREZ, 0000
PAUL HARVEY, 0000
LYLE E. HOAG, 0000
THOMAS P. HOLLINGSHEAD, 0000
KEVIN D. JONES, 0000
MICHAEL I. KATAHARA, 0000
KYLE D. KLIEWER, 0000
KENN M. KNITTEL, 0000
JOHN J. LAPOINT, 0000
BRIAN M. LEPINE, 0000
DONALD B. LESH, 0000
ALBERT J. MAGNAN, 0000
CHARLES H. MCGUIRE, IV, 0000
JAMES C. MINISTER, 0000
DENNIS W. MITCHELL, 0000
DANIEL W. MONTGOMERY, 0000
DONALD R. MORDUS, 0000
ELMER M. NARRAVO, 0000
DOUGLAS B. OGLESBY, 0000
DAVID D. PETRI, 0000
MARK A. PROKOPIUS, 0000
TIMOTHY A. REXRODE, 0000
FARLEY K. REYNOLDS, 0000
TIMOTHY A. SCHORR, 0000
MELVIN J. SIMON, JR., 0000
STEVEN F. SMITH, JR., 0000
MICHAEL J. STEVENS, 0000
NEIL A. SZANYI, 0000
MICHAEL W. TEMME, 0000
JOHN D. THOMAS, 0000
STEVEN D. VINCENT, 0000
THEODORE A. ZOBEL, 0000