and enter a childhood of crime. If we are to combat all of this, if we are to stop youth crime, we must come up with a way to revitalize traditional support structures and to reconnect our nation's youth to our nation's communities.

The bill Senator COATS and I are introducing today will, we hope, offer one step in that direction. The National Youth Crime Prevention Act would authorize $5 million for the National Center for Youth Enterprise to establish demonstration projects in eight cities, including the city of Hartford in my home state of Connecticut. In these projects, the National Center will build on success it already has had in doing precisely what I just described: working on a grassroots basis within communities to help heal those communities, and with them, their children.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that with the funding provided by this bill, the National Center's demonstration projects can create model programs that can be replicated across the nation in our war against youth crime. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.●

RECOGNITION OF OZANAM IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

● Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Ozanam in Kansas City, Missouri for its service to the community. For fifty years, Ozanam has been helping children and families in turmoil. Ozanam facility and staff help children reach their full potential and become productive members of society.

Ozanam began in the home of Mr. Al Allen, a Catholic Welfare Staff member, who after noticing the lack of help for emotionally disturbed adolescents, took it upon himself to bring six boys into his own home to give them long-term care, education and guidance. However, in just a year's short time, the need for a larger facility became apparent. Presently, the agency occupies 95 acres including two dormitories, a campus group home, a special education center that contains vocational training classrooms, indoor and outdoor recreation facilities and a spiritual life center.

During its existence, Ozanam has had some outstanding staff and administration to help the more than 4,000 children who have stayed there. Paul Gemeinhardt, President, Judith Hart, Senior Vice President of Development and Doug Zimmerman, Senior Vice President of Agency Operations, deserve special recognition for their undying commitment and service to Ozanam.

I commend the staff of Ozanam for their untiring dedication to helping children and their families in their time of need. I join the many in Missouri who thank Ozanam for its good work and continuing efforts to better the community. Congratulations for fifty years of service.●

THE U.S.S. ''CONSTITUTION''

● Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to a pillar of American history, a symbol of the proud sacrifices that forced the birth of a nation, and which makes its home in Massachusetts. I speak of course of the vessel that carried into battle the hopes of the early republic for freedom and a lasting independence, the ship that generation upon generation of schoolchildren have come to know as ''Old Ironsides''—the U.S.S. *Constitution*.

Two hundred and four years ago, six frigates were constructed for the United States Navy. One ship remains to this day to symbolize the strength and endurance that lies at the heart of this country's experiment in democratic ideals. The U.S.S. *Constitution*—docked in historic Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston—is a living monument to our proud history and to the values which endure in this country.

Like the Constitution written in Philadelphia that unified so many voices bound by a common spirit, this frigate itself carries in its mighty structure materials from all the original states of the union. Built by Colonel George Claghorn at Edmond Hartt's shipyard in Boston's North End, its hull of live oak, red cedar, white oak and pitch pine come from as far north as the deep woods of Maine and as far south as the forests of South Carolina and Georgia. The masts come from Maine. South Carolina pine gave the *Constitution* its decks, and canvas from Rhode Island formed the sails that pushed it on its historic journey. New Jersey contributed its keel and cannon balls, and the gun carriages and anchors came from Massachusetts tradespeople. We must never forget that it was Boston's Paul Revere, among the strongest voices in the chorus of revolution, who provided the spikes and copper sheathing that fortified the ship in battle. The U.S.S. *Constitution* belongs to all of us, from every state—and it belongs to every one around the world who believes in freedom.

Although this mighty ship was officially retired from naval duty in 1881, it continues to remind us of the work ahead of us in making the world safe for those who dare to dream, who dare to give voice to new ideas. The U.S.S. *Constitution* is launched into a new battle each time it reminds us of the full measure of sacrifice that our love of freedom demand for its protection. For hundreds of thousands of visitors each year, the U.S.S. *Constitution* is an inspiration—reminding us not just of where America has been, but where America is going. With its sails filled with the winds of freedom, I know the *Constitution* will take us all on endless journeys towards a new horizon, with our only boundaries lying in the limits of mankind's hopes for a better world.

A NEW APPROACH FOR SOUTH ASIA

● Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President. With the recent nuclear tests in South Asia, we are closer to nuclear war than we have been at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is a challenge which will compel the highest attention and the most subtle diplomacy. It requires extensive discussion with India and Pakistan. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has begun such a dialogue. He is a gifted diplomat; however, I must emphasize that despite the considerable talents of the Deputy Secretary, this is an issue which requires the President's close involvement.

Congress must also be involved in addressing the issues which arise from the nuclear tests in South Asia. Legislation is required to lift the sanctions which these actions triggered. As such, I was pleased that my friend from Delaware, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has set out a very sensible approach to South Asia. In a recent speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senator BIDEN challenges us to think anew about South Asia and calls on Congress to provide the President with the flexibility to negotiate in South Asia. This must entail providing him with broad authority to waive the present sanctions.

Most importantly, Senator BIDEN calls on the President to make ''arrangements to go to India.'' This is paramount and I hope that the President will note this wise counsel. The actions which we take to address this volatile situation will have profound repercussion on the future of the subcontinent and the world. Such stakes require the President's active participation. We must talk with them as a matter not just of their survival, but of our own as well. And we must stop supposing that sanctions are the answer. They are not.

Mr. President, I commend the remarks of our colleague, Senator BIDEN, and ask that they be printed in the RECORD.

The remarks follow:

A NEW APPROACH FOR SOUTH ASIA

(By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)

Two months ago, in the Rajasthan desert, the Government of India claimed to have exploded five nuclear devices. Just 15 days later, the Government of Pakistan followed suit.

These events, in a few short weeks, expanded the acknowledged nuclear club by forty percent. They confront the United States, as well as the rest of the international community, with a monumental challenge, calling into question decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy.

Addressing this challenge—devising a new approach toward South Asia—is the subject of my remarks today. I thank you for the kind invitation.

We can expect the policy community to dramatically increase the time and attention it devotes to South Asia in the coming months, but you at the Carnegie Endowment can credibly claim that you were focusing on

nuclear tensions long before it was even remotely fashionable. If only more had listened.

Clearly the tests by India and Pakistan require us to reexamine many aspects of our foreign and national security policy. We need to jettison some long-held beliefs that have acted as self-imposed constraints on U.S. policy.

Traditional approaches have not worked in the past in South Asia and will not work in the present situation. We need to think ''outside the box.'' Most of all, our national interests throughout Asia dictate that we end our benign neglect of South Asia. Let me outline the shortcomings of our policy:

First, we have not acknowledged or addressed the fundamental sense of insecurity felt by both India and Pakistan since the end of the Cold War.

It is both facile and misleading to blame India's decision to test solely on the election of the BJP government. While the BJP certainly had a domestic political imperative to test, there was already a consensus across the political spectrum in India (except for the Communists) that India needed to conduct tests.

Why? Because of India's underlying perception in the aftermath of the Cold War that it was isolated, vulnerable, and not taken seriously.

For much of the Cold War, but especially after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, a measure of stability prevailed with China and the United States as key supporters of Pakistan, and the Soviet Union as the chief ally of India. This set of power relationships, combined with the threat of U.S. sanctions, restrained India and Pakistan from either testing or deploying nuclear weapons.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, India could no longer rely on Moscow to balance China. In addition, India perceives us—falsely, I believe—as cultivating China as the regional hegemon that will preserve Asian stability.

The perceived U.S. preoccupation with China generates deep concern in New Delhi. Remember: China defeated India in the 1962 war and occupied several thousand square kilometers of disputed territory, a humiliation from which India has yet to recover. And a decade ago Indian and China massed several hundred thousand troops along their disputed border.

India's sense of strategic encirclement was heightened by reports of Chinese missile and nuclear transfers to Pakistan and budding Chinese military and security ties to Burma throughout the 1990s. Pakistan's test of a missile with a 1,000 kilometer range last April appeared to fit this pattern even though U.S. officials pointed to North Korea as the real source of the missile.

To put this in context, how would China feel if the tables were turned? What if India transferred its missiles to Vietnam, fighter planes to Mongolia, or a nuclear bomb design to Taiwan?

In such an environment, India felt that it was on its own and needed to demonstrate its capabilities, change the strategic landscape, in order to be taken more seriously by China, the United States, and other powers.

Pakistan's motives for testing are far less complicated than India's, but no less serious. Its strategic aim has been to resist Indian hegemony and guarantee its survival. Just as India's drive for a nuclear device can be traced to the defeat it suffered at the hands of China in 1962 and China's subsequent nuclear test in 1964, Pakistan's nuclear program can be traced to the role India played in splitting Pakistan into two with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

Many in Pakistan believe that India has never accepted the partition of the Indian subcontinent back in 1947. In Pakistan, therefore, nuclear capability is seen as the ultimate guarantor of its statehood.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Pakistan felt it needed to test to reestablish the deterrence that was disrupted by India's tests.

The end of the Cold War also made Pakistan feel abandoned and isolated. The United States no longer needed Pakistan to contain Soviet power. The Pressler amendment, invoked in 1990, banned aid to Pakistan and led directly to the erosion of Pakistan's conventional arsenal. This was seen as a betrayal, and has limited our influence with Pakistan ever since.

Unfortunately, we failed to acknowledge or act upon these fundamental shifts affecting Pakistan, just as we ignored the changes in India's security perceptions.

The second shortcoming of our South Asia policy is that its two chief elements—commerce and sanctions—are contradictory. We use sanctions to punish proliferation at the same time we are promoting commercial ties to take advantage of long-overdue market openings in both countries.

This policy is half right. The expansion of trade and investment ties with India and Pakistan will help these countries realize their full potential as well as benefit our own economic interests.

But the application of a one-size-fits-all non-proliferation policy is not appropriate to the special circumstances in South Asia. It lumps India and Pakistan with the far more dangerous outlaw states such as Libya and Iraq. It ignores the great lengths both countries have been prepared to go in order to achieve a basic sense of security. It presumes our influence is much greater than it actually is. Finally, it has prevented us from developing creative approaches to stabilize nuclear and missile development in the region.

Legislation initiated by the Congress, and signed by successive Presidents, is the basis for this rigid approach. I voted for that legislation. But when viewed in the context of Pakistan's and India's decision to test, I have to conclude that while our approach worked for many years, it is no longer working. It didn't stop them from testing, and it provides no incentive for India and Pakistan to take positive steps now.

To be sure, sanctions, when carefully calibrated, are a valuable policy tool. But I think it is clear that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions. For example, the recent decision by the Group of Eight to delay indefinitely World Bank loans for India and Pakistan is more likely to produce results than unilateral U.S. action.

Given these defects in our policy, I believe we have no choice but to construct a new conceptual framework. Here are our options.

First, we could maintain the status quo. That is, we retain sanctions on India and Pakistan indefinitely, not recognize their nuclear status, and keep the fundamentals of our Asia policy unchanged. That would ''keep the faith'' on non-proliferation, but leave the underlying tensions in place and set the stage for the next, perhaps more dangerous, crisis.

A second approach that has been suggested is bolder: why not enlist India as a potential strategic ally against a ''China threat?'' But this runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. China does not show signs of becoming hostile, nor are china's interests necessarily in conflict with our own. China prizes peace, stability, and economic development above all else.

I suggest a third approach. First, we should abandon our one-size-fits-all non-proliferation policy that we have applied to South Asia. We need to make distinctions between India, Israel, and Pakistan on the one hand, and nations that flout international norms such as Iraq and Libya on the other. The former should not concern us as much as the latter.

We are better served by bringing India and Pakistan into non-proliferation arrangements than by simply expecting them to foreswear their nuclear programs. In practical terms, this means that Congress should provide the President with the flexibility to negotiate a package that would lift sanctions in exchange for restraint by India and Pakistan in the areas that matter most to us.

We should seek agreement on five items: Formal commitments, preferably through adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to refrain from further nuclear testing; pledges to enter negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; Assurances that both countries will continue to refrain from spreading nuclear and missile technology; verifiable commitments not to deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, submarines, or aircraft; and a resumption of comprehensive bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan aimed at reducing tensions.

Such a package would serve our twin objectives of repairing the damage to the global non-proliferation regime, while not indefinitely isolating one-fifth of humanity.

Second, we need to distinguish between the relative importance of India and Pakistan to our interests over the long-term. Pakistan has been a good friend in the past, and we should not forget that. Moreover, a policy that dismisses Pakistan's legitimate security needs is bound to fail.

In fact, I believe that when we eventually ease the recently-imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan, we should simultaneously waive the Pressler and Symington amendments, which restrict military and economic aid to Pakistan. The time has come to clear the decks in our relationship with Pakistan and end a policy which is perceived as discriminatory by Islamabad.

Nor should we overlook the important strategic role Pakistan could play as a secure transit route for the vast oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin, if, and this is a big if, peace can be secured in Afghanistan.

But American national interests in the new multipolar world dictate a different level of relations with India. Because of its growing economic and political weight, India will become a significant player in Asia and at the global level.

Already India has a middle class approaching 200 million people. If Indian governments make policy decisions that continue to unleash the latent potential of a talented population, then India will in time achieve the great power status to which it has long aspired.

Furthermore, if current trends hold, I believe that it is only natural for some form of rivalry to persist, if not intensify, between a growing India and China. Obviously, this would diminish security and threaten U.S. interests across Asia.

To prevent it, two things must be done. First, the Sino-Indian rivalry must be channeled into a healthy and constructive competition. Second, as both India and China achieve great power status, they will need to ease the anxieties of lesser powers.

To deal with this emerging regional picture we must move away from a focus on discrete bilateral relationships in Asia, and broaden our vision with a more integrated region-wide approach that regards South Asia as an integral part of Asia.

I propose a new framework that would give a ''seat at the table'' to all of the major players in Asia—India, China, Japan, Russia,

and the United States. The emphasis should not be so much on formal structures, but on substance. The goal of this new framework would be to promote greater consultation and transparency among the countries.

The two emerging powers in this group—India and China—should be encouraged to set an example of cooperation for the rest of Asia. Such a system would also help them to realize that along with great power status comes responsibility. They must convince smaller nations of their peaceful intentions; they must act to strengthen, not weaken, international norms; and they must be seen as supporting an international environment that promotes peace and prosperity for all.

The ''Gujral doctrine'' demonstrates that India has the potential to mature into a responsible great power. As espoused by the previous Indian Prime Minister, this doctrine called for India, as the dominant power in South Asia, to go more than halfway in easing the fears of its smaller neighbors. I hope that the new Indian government will not stray from this far-sighted policy adopted by its predecessor.

The United States will need to take the lead in setting this regional security mechanism into motion. It could begin today with the President picking up the phone and speaking to the leaders of India, Russia, and Japan about the insights he gained from his trip to China and making arrangements to go to India.

Regular consultation among the key Asian countries could go a long way toward dispelling anxieties and suspicions. It would give everyone a stake in maintaining stability. It would provide an incentive for regional powers to work toward the settlement of longstanding disputes such as those over the Sino-Indian border, the Kurile islands, the Korean peninsula, and the South China Sea.

Key countries could be encouraged to share information about their armaments and defense budgets. If the other side does not have information, it will assume the worst. This inevitably leads to decisions and potentially dangerous cycles of action and reaction that are predicated upon assumptions that may be false.

Let me conclude. Devising a new approach to South Asia will not be easy, especially considering that it is being done in response to actions we don't approve of—namely, the Pakistan and Indian nuclear tests. But we have no choice, because the status quo is not an option.

We must show India and Pakistan that while we condemn their tests, we understand their security concerns and are willing to deal with them. If we don't devise a new approach, tensions will grow and South Asia's endemic security problems will undermine our long-term interests. And one thing is clear: South Asian security is becoming inseparable from Asian security.

And, of course, Asia matters to the United States. Despite recent economic setbacks, Asia will continue to be the most dynamic region into the next century. Our economic links will continue to grow. The regional balance of power and security perceptions will also undergo dramatic changes. I believe that we will need to find new mechanisms to preserve our security interests.

An effort that begins today in enlisting the key Asian powers in advancing our common objectives of peace, stability, and prosperity is one that could pay dividends far into the next century. Now is the time to begin.●

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. 442

Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent that S. 442 be referred to the Committee on Finance and, further, if the bill has not been reported by July 30, it be automatically discharged from the Finance Committee and placed on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on its amendment to H.R. 4112, request a conference with the House, and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Presiding Officer appointed Mr. BENNETT, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DORGAN, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. BYRD conferees on the part of the Senate.

ORDERS FOR WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1998

Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, July 22. I further ask that when the Senate reconvenes on Wednesday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate then resume consideration of S. 2260, the Commerce-State-Justice appropriations bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. GREGG. For the information of all Senators, when the Senate reconvenes on Wednesday, there will be potentially two back-to-back votes beginning at 9:40 a.m. In addition, I ask unanimous consent that following the stacked votes, Senator SESSIONS be recognized to offer an amendment relative to juvenile justice.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MEASURE PLACED ON THE CALENDAR—H.R. 1432

Mr. GREGG. I understand there is a bill at the desk awaiting its second reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1432) to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa.

Mr. GREGG. I object to further consideration of the bill at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. GREGG. The Senate will be in session late tomorrow in an effort to conclude the pending bill by the close of business tomorrow. Therefore, votes will occur throughout the day and into the evening on Wednesday.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. GREGG. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 8:55 p.m., adjourned until Wednesday, July 22, 1998, at 9:30 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate July 21, 1998:

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

Thomasina V. Rogers, of Maryland, to be a Member of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for a term expiring April 27, 2003, vice Velma Montoya, term expired.

CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING

Ritajean Hartung Butterworth, of Washington, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for a term expiring January 31, 2004. (Reappointment)

IN THE ARMY

The following Army National Guard of the United States officer for appointment in the Reserve of the Army to the grade indicated under title 10, U.S.C., section 12203:

To be brigadier general

COL. BRUCE W. PIERATT, 4901.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Bernard Daniel Rostker, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Army, vice Robert M. Walker.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

John Melvin Yates, of Washington, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Robert C. Randolph, of Washington, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development, vice Margaret V. W. Carpenter, resigned.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Sylvia M. Mathews, of West Virginia, to be Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, vice Jacob Joseph Lew.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

James A. Tassone, of Florida, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Florida for the term of four years, vice Daniel J. Horgan.

Scott Richard Lassar, of Illinois, to be United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois for the term of four years vice James B. Burns, resigned.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Leigh A. Bradley, of Virginia, to be General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs, vice Mary Lou Keener, resigned.

WITHDRAWALS

Executive messages transmitted by the President to the Senate on July 21,