Mr. Speaker, we have seen the tragedy and the suffering of the Bass family. At that hearing, the Subcommittee members heard the stories of the American families and the suffering they endured. The Basses and all of the families put their sons and daughters, and the families of the personnel killed, were the son of my cousin and I know the great suffering his family has endured. The Basses and all of the families put their sons and daughters, and husbands and wives, in the care of our armed forces, but they were let down when the foreigners acknowledged that they had the authority to act but simply were unwilling to.

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Mr. Speaker, I would particularly like to commend the leadership of Mr. WATT, the Ranking Member and Mr. SMITH, the Chair- man of the Immigration and Claims Subcommittee, who have worked in a bipartisan fashion to make the Pentagon do the right thing. There were a number of bills introduced including Congressmen WATT’s bill, H.R. 3022, to give our own personnel the same treatment as the foreign nationals. The Pentagon first could not answer whether they had the authority to make the payments to the Americans. Later, the Pentagon acknowledged that they had the authority to act but simply were unwilling to.

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Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon was wrong not to give our own personnel the same treatment that they gave the survivors of the foreign nationals. The Pentagon first could not answer whether they had the authority to make the payments to the Americans. Later, the Pentagon acknowledged that they had the authority to act but simply were unwilling to.

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months and I expect successive reports to be better, addressing additional questions as they are asked.

This morning, I will outline our March 1998 report—discuss areas where the substantive conclusions of the Commission's report and our thinking agree and differ; and discuss what we are doing differently for our 1999 report.

OUR 1998 REPORT

Secretary Rumsfeld has expressed concern that people not judge the Commission's report before they read it. While I share that concern, I will provide an annual update to this audience, which gives a full appreciation for our views and concerns about this growing threat—it remains classified, and therefore cannot be released. But, I can give you a feel for what the report says.

In our report, we underscore the significant role foreign assistance has played and continues to play—indeed throughout the report are several major discussions of technology transfer. For example, the report begins with several pages discussing the extent of foreign assistance from numerous suppliers to even more recipients. It also notes how foreign assistance has helped specific missile programs, such as with Iran's salesable missiles.

Our report also underlines the immediate threat posed by medium-range missiles, our continuing concern about existing and emerging ICBMs, the increasing danger that comes from the proliferation activities of countries that possess or are developing such systems. We and the Commission have some different views on some of our timelines for ICBM development, using the available evidence, group debate, and outside expert review. Nevertheless, where evidence is limited and the stakes are high, we need to keep challenging our assumptions—a role we will perform on this issue at least annually.

Let me make three points on our methodology.

First, we do not expect countries to follow any specific pattern for missile development. In fact, the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China all took different approaches. We frequently caution ourselves against any mirror-imaging. Just because the United States will be dependant on a long-range missile this year and that it could be deployed in a few years, does not mean any country will.

Second, we recognize that foreign countries can hide many activities from us. These countries are generally increasing their security measures and are learning from each other and from open reporting of our capabilities.

Third, our methodologies really are not that different. Given the fact that in many cases we have limited data, we are both forced somewhat to use both input and output methodologies to evaluate the threat. The key difference is that in most other cases, the Intelligence Community must attach likelihood judgments to our projections; the Commission did not. Thus, we project several scenarios and then include other scenarios with likelihood judgments attached. The Commission illustrated several possible scenarios, which we agree are plausible, but not attach likelihood judgments. But let me repeat, we agree that their scenarios are possible, as are many other scenarios we have looked at, including our own.

Let me now summarize the body of our 1998 report, which focused on threat projections through 2010. The medium-range missiles already in hostile hands pose an immediate threat to U.S. interests, military forces, and allies. The threat is increasing. More countries are acquiring ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1,000 km, and more importantly, with ranges between 1,000 km and 3,000 km. As Iran's Shahab 3 continues, we can envision a future in which North Korea may be capable of reaching the United States with a missile that can deliver a nuclear or chemical warhead.

Where we agree

We can provide five years warning before deployment that a potential hostile country was trying to develop and deploy an ICBM capable of hitting the United States, unless that country purchased an ICBM or space launch vehicle (SLV), including having another country develop the system for them; had an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV); or purchased a turnkey produc- tion facility.

We could not count on providing much warning of either the sale of an ICBM or the conversion of an SLV (conversion could occur in as little as two years). Neverthe--less, if a hostile country acquired an SLV, we would warn that the country had an inherent ICBM capability. I note, however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union used systems we did not consider as ICBMs to place their first satellites into orbit. The satellite we orbited weighed only 10 kg.

These two warnings need to be understood in tandem. Unfortunately, the warning rela- tionship may dominate in the short term. As North Korea proceeds with its Taepo Dong developments, we need to assume that they will follow their current path and mar- ket them; at a minimum, aspiring recipients will try to buy them.

We probably would obtain indications of the construction of a turnkey facility before it was completed, providing several years' warning.

If a country had an SLV, it could probably convert it into an ICBM in a few years, sig- nificantly reducing warning time.

Adapting missiles for launch from a commer- cial ship could be accomplished covertly, and probably with little warning.

Finally, our report noted that non missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, nuclear and radiologi- cal weapons—pose a serious, immediate threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad.

WHERE WE AGREE

Now I'll go over some of the points of agreement between our 1998 report and the Commission's work. We agree

The threat is real and growing. The medium-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. interests in the world is now increasing. More than one country has a missile capability that could be used against the United States; and a missile launch that is an attack on the United States for which there would be little or no warning.

WHERE WE DISAGREE

I will now walk through some of the areas of disagreement between the Commission and our 1998 report. The Commission's report indicates that intelligence analysts are too dependent on evidence and seem unable to make judgments without it. In actuality, de- spite the lack of evidence in some areas, our analysts make judgments and projection. I highlight that to allay concerns that we are unable to make judgments without it. In actuality, de-
their evidence and must make analytical judgments to project plausible scenarios. We need to do better. Working with limited evidence and make judgments is central to our job, and going forward it is a real concern. We don’t want to have little or no evidence. They did so in the case of the critical threats some missiles pose. In fact, we note that successful missile tests would not be an emerging threat capability with any missiles in their inventory, even without evidence of deployment.

As I indicated earlier, we are in basic agreement with the Commission’s efforts and those mentioned concerning North Korea. While they did not indicate so, I assume they do not disagree with our judgments that North Korea was capable of testing both the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 this year. The Commission considers Iraq to be behind North Korea and Iran relative to ballistic missile technology. We view Iraq as further along in some ways. Iraq was ahead of Iran before the Gulf war. They have not lost the technological expertise and creativity. If sanctions were lifted and they tried to develop independently a 9,000 km range ICBM to be able to reach the United States, it would take them several years. If they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, it would be a quicker alternative if they already had the range and payload capability of the missile. The missile already had the range capability, further development might be a moot point.

The Commission considers Iran to be as far along in its technological development efforts as North Korea. In our view, that is not the case. The test-failed Iranian Shahab 3 is based on the No Dong and followed North Korea’s test, even with foreign assistance, by several years. Iran will likely continue to seek longer range missiles, and would want to develop a 10,000 km range ICBM to be able to reach the United States. If they follow a pattern similar to the Shahab 3 time frame, it would take many years. On the other hand, if they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, it would be quicker, and depending on the range and payload capability of the missile, further development might be a moot point.

The Commission indicates that our ability to warn is eroding and that we may not be able to provide warning at all. I’ve covered our views on warning earlier, and I fear further detail would only help proliferators more. They’re already learning how to hide some of the programs, I’d rather they not learn more. I will say this, however. We need to be much more explicit in our warnings about missile developments—not just indicating that a country has an ICBM program and that it could flight test an ICBM in a given year, both of which are important messages. We need to include clearer language and more details about how we might and might not be able to warn about specific milestones in an ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely vary by country.

We are already working on the 1999 annual report and are planning to include significant additional outside expertise and red teaming into next year’s report. Private sector contractors will be asked to postulate missile threats that apply varying degrees of increased foreign assistance. These will be in addition to the Commission’s own efforts.

We are also asking academia to postulate future politico-economic environments that foster missile sales and ever increasing foreign assistance.

In addition, the Intelligence Community recently published a classified paper that postulates ways a country could demonstrate an ability with missile launchers and examines various ways it could convert its SLVs into ICBMs. This work will also feed into the 1999 report, as a generic look at some alternative approaches.

Finally, drafting is underway on a paper that examines how countries could push technology beyond perceived limits. Scientists and non-scientists are involved. Sometimes, those already outside the box can think so much differently. We also intend in the 1999 report—after discussing our projected timelines for likely missile development and deployments, as well as our concerns about the range and payload capabilities of the missile. The Intelligence Community is continuing to assess the North Korean capabilities demonstrated by this launch and the threat implications of the missile.

In particular, the Community is assessing how small a payload would have to be in order to fly to something on the order of an ICBM range. We need to look at the implications of lighter payloads and possibly a third stage for the Taepo Dong 2. We also need to ensure that we continue aggressive collection and analysis efforts against proliferation and foreign transfers, to assess their effects on advancing missile programs.

And we need to be much more explicit in our warnings about missile developments—not just indicating that a country has an ICBM program and that it could flight test an ICBM in a given year, both of which are important messages. We need to include clearer language and more details about how we might and might not be able to warn about specific milestones in an ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely vary by country.

**KIDSPEACE**

**HON. PAUL McHALE**

**OF PENNSYLVANIA**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**Tuesday, October 20, 1998**

Mr. McHALE. Mr. Speaker, I insert into the Congressional Record the following poem written by the talented young actress, Kristin Dunst. Ms. Dunst recited this poem at a press conference in Washington sponsored by KidsPeace, the National Center for Kids Overcoming Crisis, on September 23. The event sought to highlight the results of a national survey by KidsPeace of early teens and to identify new ways to strengthen America’s youth and families.

It is in the idleness of our dreams that we will find the city of angels lies deep within our minds. There is no loneliness or fear but if you feel it, know they’re near. In this world of so much hate, there could be a twist of fate. Just think about the angels, they will find your lost soul mate.

In this tranquil world behind my eyes, your dreams won’t turn to wasted lies. No judging face or different race in this tiny place behind my eyes.

You can always tell who has wings, because their soul and mind will sing, their wings are closed. Their soul and mind will sing, their wings are closed.

Our very being has come in so far, we have been able to determine much of what happened. Indeed, they are close, and as we continue to receive information, it will give us a more detailed picture.