their evidence and must make analytical judgments to project plausible scenarios. We need to do better. Working with limited evidence and make judgments is central to our job, as long as we underscore where we have little or no evidence. They did so in the case of the critical threats some missiles pose. In fact, we note that successful missile tests would give countries an emergency, launch capability with any missiles in their inventory, even without evidence of deployment.

As I indicated earlier, we are in basic agreement with the Commission on North Korea. While they did not indicate so, I assume they do not disagree with our judgments that North Korea was capable of testing both the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 this year.

The Commission considers Iraq to be behind North Korea and Iran relative to ballistic missile technology. We view Iraq as further along in some ways. Iraq was ahead of Iran before the Gulf war. They have not lost the technological expertise and creativity. If sanctions were lifted and they tried to develop indigenously a 9,000 km range ICBM to be able to reach the United States, it would take them several years. If they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, it would be quicker, depending on the range and payload capability of the missile. If the missile already had the range capability, further development would be moot.

The Commission considers Iran to be as far along in its technological development efforts as North Korea. In our view, that is not the case. The recently tested Iranian Shahab 3 is based on the No Dong and followed North Korea's test, even with foreign assistance, by several years. Iran will likely continue to seek longer range missiles, and would need to develop a 10,000 km range ICBM to be able to reach the United States. If they follow a pattern similar to the Shahab 3 time frame, it would take them many years. On the other hand, if they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, it would be quicker, and depending on the range and payload capability of the missile, further development might be a moot point.

The Commission indicates that our ability to warn is eroding and that we may not be able to provide warning at all. I've covered our views on warning earlier, and I fear further detail would only help proliferators more. They're already learning how to hide some aspects of missile programs, I'd rather they not learn more. I will say this, however. We need to be much more explicit in our warnings about missile developments—not just indicating that a country has an ICBM program and that it could flight test an ICBM this year, both of which are important messages. We need to include clearer language and more details about how we might and might not be able to warn about specific milestones in an ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely vary by country.

1999 REPORT

We are already working on the 1999 annual report and are planning to include significant additional outside expertise and red teaming into next year's report:

Private-sector contractors will be asked to postulate missile threats that apply varying degrees of increased foreign assistance. These will be in addition to the Commission's postulations and some of our own.

We are also asking academia to postulate future politico-economic environments that foster missile sales and ever increasing foreign assistance.

In addition, the Intelligence Community recently published a classified paper that postulates ways a country could demonstrate an ICBM capability with an SLV, and examines various ways it could convert its SLVs into ICBMs. This work will also feed into the 1999 report, as a generic look at some alternative approaches.

Finally, drafting is underway on a paper that examines how countries could push Scud technology beyond perceived limits. Scientists and non-scientists are involved. Sometimes, those already outside the box can think so more readily.

We also intend in the 1999 report—after discussing our projected timelines for likely missile developments and deployments, as well as our concerns for ICBM sales—to postulate and evaluate many alternative scenarios, including those developed during the Commission's efforts and those mentioned above. Finally, we will be much more explicit in our discussions about warning. All these evaluations will be made through the lens of potential denial and deception efforts, to ensure that as our task gets more difficult, we provide our policymakers with a clear representation of what we know, what we don't know, what we can't know, and finally what we judge based on evidence, the lack thereof, and expertise from inside and outside the government.

COMMUNITY ENHANCEMENT

In recent months we have undertaken numerous steps that will enhance the Community's abilities to tackle the increasingly difficult tasks we face, including addressing the emerging missile threat. For example, we have increased ''red teaming'' efforts to ensure that we question our assumptions and examine out-of-the-box possibilities. Furthermore, last year the DCI strengthened the Nonproliferation Center to ensure that we have an aggressive, well-coordinated effort to address the nonproliferation target. At DCI direction we are taking actions to ensure that we have the analysts and skills needed to cover those issues of greatest importance. These include: increasing the size of the analytic cadre; creation of the Community executive boards to leverage the best experts on critical issues to drive collection and analysis against the most significant intelligence needs and gaps; introducing new training methodologies, technologies and analytic tools, and improving the mix of skills to address our most pressing problems; creating mechanisms to increase cooperation and better integrate the efforts of all analytic production centers.

CONCLUSION

This is a serious and complex issue, one of many others that we're working. The Intelligence Community uses many vehicles, including estimates and annual reports, to convey our analyses to policy makers and Congress. We will continue to do so.

TAEPO DONG 1 LAUNCH

Before I close, let me make a few comments about the Taepo Dong 1 satellite launch attempt. While the system's third stage failed, the launch confirmed our concerns regarding North Korea's efforts to pursue an ICBM capability and demonstrated some unanticipated developments.

We have been following North Korea's ICBM progress since the early 1990s, most notably, their efforts to develop what we call the Taepo Dong 1 medium-range missile and the Taepo Dong 2 ICBM, which we assessed were two-stage missiles.

This recent launch used the Taepo Dong 1 and a third stage. They tested some important aspects of ICBM development and flight roughly on the timetable we expected. And, for example, they were successful at multiple stage separation.

As we have analyzed the information that has come in so far, we have been able to determine much of what happened.

Indeed, this is a work in progress, and as we continue to receive information, it will give us a more detailed picture.

Although the launch of the Taepo Dong 1 as a missile was expected for some time, its use as a space launch vehicle with a third stage was not.

The existence of the third stage concerns us; we had not anticipated it.

We need to conduct more analysis on it, trying to identify more about it, including its capabilities and why it failed.

The first and second stages performed to North Korean expectations, providing what could amount to a successful flight test of the two-stage Taepo Dong 1 medium-range missile.

However, we believe North Korea would need to resolve some important technical issues—including the problems with the third stage—prior to being able to use the three-stage configuration as a ballistic missile to deliver small payloads to ICBM ranges; that is, ranges in excess of 5,500 km.

The Intelligence Community is continuing to assess the North Korean capabilities demonstrated by this launch and the treat implications of the missile.

In particular, the Community is assessing how small a payload would have to be for this system to fly to something on the order of an ICBM range.

We need to look at the implications of lighter payloads and possibly a third stage for the Taepo Dong 2.

We also need to ensure that we continue aggressive collection and analysis efforts against proliferation and foreign transfers, and their effects on advancing missile programs.

And we need to be much more explicit in our warnings about missile developments—not just indicating that a country has an ICBM program and that it could flight test an ICBM in a given year, both of which are important messages. We need to include clearer language and more details about how we might and might not be able to warn about specific milestones in an ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely vary by country.

KIDSPEACE

HON. PAUL McHALE

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 20, 1998

Mr. McHALE. Mr. Speaker, I insert into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the following poem written by the talented young actress, Kristin Dunst. Ms. Dunst recited this poem at a press conference in Washington sponsored by KidsPeace, the National Center for Kids Overcoming Crisis, on September 23. The event sought to highlight the results of a national survey by KidsPeace of early teens and to identify new ways to strengthen America's youth and families.

It is in the idleness of our dreams that we will find the city of angels lies deep within our minds.
There is no loneliness or fear but if you feel it, know they're near.
In this world of so much hate, there could be a twist of fate.
Just think about the angels, they will find your lost soul mate.
In this tranquil world behind my eyes, your dreams won't turn to wasted lies.
No judging face or different race in this tiny place behind my eyes.
You can always tell who has wings, because their soul and mind will sing,
And the ones who are opposed, you will know their wings are closed.