

In addition to our service men and women, there are also other Americans in harm's way in the war zone, performing above and beyond the call of duty. I am talking about employees of the State Department. I am talking about other groups of people over there, serving, doing their utmost, who are in equally dangerous situations. At some future point I believe they also deserve due recognition in the same way as our military. We support our Americans. We deeply support our fellow Americans serving in the Balkans. I am very pleased the House has acted, and the Senate will be acting very soon.

I might say, I am also pleased the House approached this matter in the proper way. That is, they brought it up in the House tax-writing committee, the Ways and Means Committee, where the bill was discussed. It was marked up in the committee and then went to the House floor. That is the preferable way of doing business.

In this case, there was an attempt for a bill to be filed at the desk and then brought up directly on the floor on this issue, not going through the Senate tax-writing committee, the Senate Finance Committee. I hope we go back to the usual course of business as a general rule where tax bills go through the Finance Committee before they are brought to the floor. I say that because the legislation will be much better. It will be thought through. There is a chance to correct mistakes. There is a chance to add on measures that should be added on or subtract out measures that should be subtracted out.

Having said that, obviously time is of the essence in this case, and the House Ways and Means Committee has acted; that is, the authorizing committee in the other body did act so we did have at least that assurance this has been looked at with some considerable examination.

I will be very pleased when the House bill comes over. We will be able to vote on it. That will probably be within the hour. As I said, I hope after we do that we can give also the same kind of thought to other Americans who are also serving in the zone who are also sacrificing to a great degree in serving our country.

I yield the remainder of our time.

(Pursuant to the order of April 14, 1999, the bill (S. 767) was returned to the Calendar.)

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FITZGERALD). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. ROTH. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. ROTH, Mr. BIDEN and Mr. KENNEDY, pertaining to the introduction of S.J. Res. 19 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

(The remarks of Mr. ROTH and Mr. GRAMS pertaining to the introduction of S. 815 are located in today's RECORD

under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

KOSOVO POLICY

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, it is my privilege to speak on the question of Kosovo and our military and political goals there. In working with my staff to put together some background and understand the history of that region, I came across an interesting fact, because I value history. What is it Winston Churchill once said? How do you know where you are going unless you know where you have been?

I find it fascinating, after 146 B.C., the Roman Republic was the world's only superpower—that sounds familiar—following the destruction of its long-time superpower rival, Carthage. This Roman triumph created a tremendous expansion of Roman territory, wealth, and influence and, not coincidentally, an expansion of Roman involvement in local conflicts far removed from Italy.

One such intervention involved the Northern African kingdom of Numidia, where Rome became entangled in a secession struggle in 112 B.C., with the Roman Senate declaring actual war against Jugurtha, the leading contender for the Numidian throne. What followed is fascinating. It is described in a book called the "Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists."

I think there are some lessons here for us, particularly as we view Kosovo today. Viewed from a modern perspective, North Africa in the age of Jugurtha was in many ways Rome's Vietnam. The Jugurthine War is the story of the failure of the Romans to find a strategy that would determine the appropriate level of force needed to maintain sound and stable foreign policy.

The Romans should have learned to operate according to the rules that Clausewitz later laid out in his book "On War": that war is always to be regarded as the pursuit of policy by other means and that strategy is the art of using exactly the appropriate amount of force to accomplish the ends of the policy. The Romans never had a clear policy in Numidia.

This is something we have to avoid in Kosovo. We need a clear policy.

Thus the Romans never had a rational strategy for winning the war.

Another mistake we have to avoid.

As a result, they poured a massive amount of military force into the region and accomplished worse than nothing.

Mr. President, we can't accomplish worse than nothing in Kosovo. We have to accomplish something of which we can be proud. The horrifying scenes unfolding in and around Kosovo today are indeed a sad recap of many of the worst images of our 20th century: Massive refugee flight to uncertain futures, civilian casualties, large numbers of destroyed homes and shops and commu-

nities, ethnic intolerance, and hostilities fanned by demagogic political leaders.

The hearts of Americans and people around the world have been truly touched by the incredible tragic plight of the Kosovar Albanians who have been the primary victims of the incredible, reprehensible, so-called ethnic cleansing policies of Milosevic.

This is also a difficult situation. There are no easy answers, and any choice the President makes and, indeed, any choice the Congress makes is fraught with danger. Part of this, I think, is the world in which we live, not a new world order but a new world disorder.

The post-cold-war order is one of disorder. The two administrations which have confronted the post-Soviet Union world, the Bush and Clinton administrations, have grappled mightily with the complexities of this new age in foreign places, much like the Roman Empire, foreign places like Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, and now Kosovo. Almost every step in these areas has been subjected to questioning and controversy before, during, and even after the operation in question.

The decision to authorize the use of airstrikes against Serbia was one of the most difficult decisions I have ever had to make. I have felt in the weeks since much like President Kennedy described himself. He said he was an optimist with no illusions. I am an optimist. I am an idealist. I want to take the high ground. I thought that NATO and America needed to act, and act then, and airstrikes was our best option. Maximum impact on Milosevic, minimum impact on us. But it was a tough decision to make, and I am under no illusion that this is going to automatically get us to where we want to go in terms of our policies in the Balkans.

May I say that we have a major humanitarian interest in providing effective relief for the refugees and preventing further atrocities against civilians by the Milosevic regime. We certainly have a strong interest in stopping the spread of this conflict to the surrounding countries in this historically unstable region.

I find it interesting that the century opened in 1914 with a Serb nationalist assassinating Archduke Ferdinand and that led to the guns of August in 1914. We have to make sure that the current Milosevic-misled nationalism does not lead to the guns of 1999.

Unfortunately, I think that no real military, or so far diplomatic, approach we have come up with can really fully guarantee our goals in the Balkans. Despite my concern about our long-term policy in Kosovo and the Balkans, the Senate was asked to vote at a point when NATO had already united in favor of airstrikes. American troops were poised to embark on their mission and the credibility of American commitments was on the line.