

they receive going down dramatically. The result is this enormous gap between what they are able to buy for, what they have to pay to receive goods, and what they are able to get when they sell their goods. This dramatic gap, this chasm now, between the prices farmers pay for what they have to buy and what they get for what they sell has opened up into such a large difference that literally tens of thousands of farm families are threatened.

It would be one thing if the United States was alone in this world, if we did not have competitors to worry about, but we do have competitors. The Europeans are our chief competitors, and it is very interesting to see what they are doing.

At the very time when we have dramatically cut support for farmers, cut support at the very time they are in the greatest need, because the gap between what they pay for and what they get has opened up in such a very serious way, we have cut dramatically the level of support we provide our farmers. In the last farm bill, we cut in half the support we provide our farmers. If we look at what our competitors, the Europeans, are doing, we see quite a different pattern.

Our European competitors are spending far more than we are to support their farmers. If we go back to 1996, we can see the red bar is what Europe is spending in direct support; the yellow bar is what we are spending. We can see the pattern all through 1997, 1998, 1999, the year 2000—and these are projections for 2001 and 2002—that our competitors are providing much more support to their producers than we are providing ours.

I conclude by saying we have a crisis in rural America. It requires a Federal response. I hope very much before this year has concluded that we have said farming is important in this country, that we understand it is in crisis, and that we are prepared to respond.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The time between 12 noon and 12:30 p.m. shall be under the control of the distinguished Senator from Utah, Mr. BENNETT. The Senator is recognized.

SUSPEND BOMBING IN KOSOVO

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I rise to call for a suspension of the bombing in Kosovo, not because of anything Milosevic has done, such as the release of three American servicemen; not because of differing opinions within NATO, such as those currently being expressed by the Italians and the Germans; not because of the inadvertent damage done to accidental targets, such as the Chinese Embassy; and not because of any personal animus or distrust of any individuals in this administration. No; I oppose continuation of the bombing in Kosovo because it has not worked. It is not working and

shows no signs of working in the future.

The bombing has been of no help to the Kosovars, hundreds of thousands of whom have lost their homes, their neighbors, their children and perhaps even their lives while the bombing has gone on. It has been of no help to the Albanians or the Macedonians who have seen hundreds of thousands of refugees flood cross the borders into their ill-equipped countries. It has been of no help to NATO, an alliance that has seen its military stocks drawn down to dangerously low levels with no effect on the atrocities going on in the killing fields. And the bombing has been of no help to our relationships with nations outside of NATO, particularly Russia and China, who have vigorously opposed our decision to proceed.

Again, in short, the bombing has not worked, even though we have persisted for a longer time than we bombed in Desert Storm. My call for suspending the bombing comes from the modern wisdom that says: If at first you don't succeed, try something else.

There are those, including my colleagues on the Senate floor, commentators and columnists for whom I have the utmost respect, who say we cannot even consider suspension of the bombing. We are at war, they say; we must press on to victory. Anything else would be dishonorable, and on a practical geopolitical level, would send the wrong signal to others who might choose to confront us in the future.

Such language is often called Churchillian, echoing the electrifying rhetoric of the indomitable prime minister speaking in the darkest days of World War II.

No one has a higher regard for the magnificent rhetoric and the deeds of Winston Churchill than I, but, to me, the mantra, "Because we're in, we have to win," is more suitable for a bumper sticker than it is for Winston Churchill.

Let me take you to a Churchillian episode that I think applies here, and it comes not from the darkest days of World War II but World War I.

Those who remember their history will remember that Winston Churchill fell into great disregard during World War I as a result of his sponsorship of the Dardanelles operation. He was removed from any position of responsibility. But because he was still an officer in the British Army, he agreed, indeed sought for, the opportunity to go to the front in France. And so, as Major Churchill, he went to the front, and unlike most British officers of the time, he really went to the front. He went all the way to the front lines and saw for himself over a period of time the horrors and the futility of trench warfare. He saw it firsthand, and he came away convinced that it was not working.

When he returned to England, he became Minister of Munitions and put his full support and strength behind searching for an alternative. If you

will, he put aside the patriotic rhetoric of his time and sought for a policy that would work. William Manchester, in his biography of Churchill called the "Last Line," refers to Churchill as the father of the tank. It was Winston Churchill who caught the vision of the fact that you could do something different and created the modern tank, or created the prototype of what became the modern tank, and revolutionized warfare, eliminating the failures of trench warfare.

If at first you don't succeed, try something else. The legacy of Winston Churchill was that he was willing to try something else when he saw the reality of the failure on the ground. I think, frankly, that is the Churchillian example we should seek to follow now: Suspend the bombing and try something else.

There are many suggestions on the table. The one, of course, we hear the most these days is send in the ground troops. To those who urge this, I ask, as I asked when the bombing was proposed in the first place: Will it work? Will it accomplish our goals? And with that question, we get the next obvious question: What are our goals?

When Secretary Madeleine Albright made the case for the bombing to the Senators in the Capitol, she told us if we did not bomb, the following would happen: First, there would be brutal atrocities and ethnic cleansing throughout all of Kosovo with tens of thousands of people being slaughtered and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes.

Second, she said there will be a flood of refugees across the borders into neighboring countries, swamping their already fragile economies.

Third, she said there will be splits within NATO. This alliance will be torn apart by disagreements.

And finally, she said Milosevic will strengthen his hand on his local political situation.

That was 8 weeks ago. Now, 8 weeks later, the bombing has failed to prevent any of those results. All four of them have taken place—the ethnic cleansing and the brutality and the atrocities have gone on; the refugees have appeared across the borders; NATO is split with arguments going on among its top leaders; and Milosevic has been strengthened as the leader, martyr, hero, if you will, of the Yugoslavs. We have not achieved a single goal that the bombing set out to accomplish. I come back to the same question: What are our new goals?

As best I can understand them, from the various statements that have been made, one list of the new goals would be as follows: No. 1, removal of all Serbian influence in Kosovo; No. 2, a return of the Kosovars physically to their land; No. 3, a rebuilding of their homes and villages; and No. 4, an international police force in there for an indefinitely long period of time to guarantee that their homes will always be protected.

Let us accept those goals for just a moment. I ask the same fundamental question I asked in the beginning with respect to bombing. Will it work? Will continuation of the bombing achieve these four new goals when it did not achieve the four old ones? And what about ground troops? Will ground troops achieve these new goals?

On the first question, as to whether the continuation of the bombing will achieve these new goals, there is disagreement from the experts. In this morning's Washington Post, General Short says: "Yes, we will see the achievement of these goals within a matter of months." Last Friday, the Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon said, "No, there was no indication that bombing would achieve the goals."

I ask this fundamental humanitarian question: Do we have to continue to destroy the economy of Yugoslavia, depriving the civilian population of power and water, as we did over the weekend, raising the specter of the epidemic spread of typhoid while we decide who is right, while we decide which opinion is the correct one? Can we not suspend the bombing while that debate goes on?

With respect to ground troops, and those who say ground troops are the only answer, those who are calling for an invasion and an indefinitely long occupation of part of Serbia, that part known as Kosovo, to them I would refer the words of Daniel Ellsberg that appeared in the New York Times last Friday. I find them chilling. I would like to read them now at some length. I cannot paraphrase them and put them in any better form than Mr. Ellsberg himself. He says, referring to a ground invasion in Kosovo:

... I believe, it would be a death sentence for most Albanians remaining in Kosovo.

By all accounts, it would take weeks to months to deploy an invasion force to the region once the decision to do so was made, and Slobodan Milosevic already has troops there fortifying the borders. Wouldn't the prospect of an invasion lead him to order his forces in Kosovo to kill all the military-age male Albanians and hold the rest of the population as hostages rather than continuing to deport them?

A very, very important question.

Daniel Ellsberg goes on:

We don't know how many male Kosovars of military age—broadly, [those] from 15 to 60 years old—have been killed already.

He says:

But even if the number is in the tens of thousands . . . that would mean that most of the men were still alive. Facing invasion, would Mr. Milosevic allow any more men to leave Kosovo to be recruited by the K.L.A., or to live to support the invasion? The Serbs could quickly slaughter 100,000 to 200,000 male Kosovars. (In Rwanda five years ago, an average of 8,000 civilians a day were killed for 100 days, mostly with machetes.)

Obviously, Mr. Milosevic and his subordinates are brutal enough to do that. If they haven't done it already (and there is no testimony [to suggest] that they have on that scale) it may well be because they fear that such an annihilation would make an inva-

sion inevitable. A commitment now to ground invasion would remove that deterrent, just as the commitment in March to begin bombing in support of an ultimatum and the consequent withdrawal of international monitors removed an implicit deterrent against sweeping ethnic cleansing and expulsion.

As for to the remaining civilians in Kosovo—women, children and old people—tens of thousands of them could be used against the invasion as human shields, in a way never before seen in warfare. Fighting in built-up areas, NATO troops would probably be fired on from buildings that were packed on every floor with Kosovar women and children. Using the traditional means—explosives, artillery and rockets—to destroy those buildings would make NATO forces the mass executioners of the people we were fighting to protect.

The column goes on. I shall not continue with it except to summarize the grim conclusion. Mr. Ellsberg says:

... We bombed Vietnam for seven and a half years in pursuit of goals we refused to compromise and never secured.

I find that a chilling summary in terms of some of the language we are hearing now: We must never compromise until our goals are secured. The first goals laid out were not secured. We now have a new set of goals and we are determined once again not to give in.

When I first went into the briefing room to hear Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, National Security Adviser Berger, and General Shelton give us the justification for proceeding in this area, I went in with no preconceptions one way or the other. Contrary to assumptions that have been made in the press about those of us who voted against the bombing, I did not carry any impeachment baggage into that briefing.

I have a history of backing President Clinton when I think he is right. I supported him on the recognition of Vietnam, on most favored nation status for China, on the Mexican peso bailout, on NATO expansion, on NAFTA and GATT and fast track, all to the discomfort of some of my constituents. I did so because I thought the President was right. And I went into that briefing very much capable of being convinced.

But during the briefing, as I became more and more uneasy about what I was hearing, when it came my turn to speak, I said to Secretary Albright: Let me give you a little bit of history.

I did that because she had quoted history to us, talking about the Balkans being the beginning of World War I and the battleground of World War II.

And she said: If we don't act quickly enough, this will be the spark that sets off World War III.

I did not choose to argue with her history. World War I did not begin because of a fight over the Balkans. While there were battles in World War II which occurred there, to be sure, the pivotal points in World War II were in places like North Africa, Stalingrad, Normandy, and Bastogne, not to mention, of course, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Leyte Gulf.

No. I said to her: Madam Secretary, let me give you a little piece of history. This comes out of the Eisenhower administration, presided over by a military general who had achieved international fame for his strategic vision. This is when he was President.

I said, "A group of his advisers came to him to describe an international situation and to recommend a military solution. They laid out all of the military actions they wanted to take and then said, Mr. President, it will achieve these results."

President Eisenhower listened very carefully and then asked: "Are you willing to take the next step?" They replied, "What do you mean, Mr. President?"

He said, "If this doesn't work, this first step that you have outlined, are you willing to take the next step?"

"Oh, Mr. President," they said, "the next step won't be necessary. There won't need to be any next steps. This first step will work."

President Eisenhower asked again, "You have not answered my question. Are you willing to take the next step?"

"Well, let us explain to you, Mr. President, why the next—

He said, "I accept your analysis that this will probably work. I accept your analysis that people will probably react in the way you are suggesting they will react. But I am asking you this question: 'Are you willing to take the next step if the first one does not work?' And if the answer is 'No', then don't take the first step." I asked, "Madam Secretary, my question to you is, 'Are you willing to take the next step?' If this doesn't work, what do we do?"

I got conversation, but I did not get an answer to my question. I came out of that briefing saying, unless I can get an answer to that question, I will vote against the bombing. I was not satisfied and I did vote against the bombing.

I did not prevail in this Chamber. A majority of the Members voted in favor of the bombing, and so we have now had 8 weeks of it.

That date has an interesting meaning for me, because in this conversation, in the briefing, they were asked, "How long will it take for us to find out if this is going to work?" We were told repeatedly, "We can't tell you that. We don't know."

Finally, in some frustration, I spoke out of turn and said to the briefer, "How long would you be surprised if it were more than?"

I got kind of a dirty look and then grumpily the fellow said: "8 weeks."

Well, it has now been 8 weeks, and it hasn't worked, which is why I am here saying let's suspend the bombing while we talk about something that might. Let us stop destroying the economy of Yugoslavia while we talk about what might work in Kosovo, because our destruction of water works and television stations and power-generating plants in Belgrade has had no effect on the

killing in Kosovo. Can't we stop killing civilians who are not involved in this while we talk about what our options might be?

I think one of the most trenchant and insightful analyses of what happened to this country in Vietnam was written by Barbara Tuchman in a book called "The March of Folly." In that book she described how people persist in going after solutions that do not work, because they do not want to admit that it won't work, and they are sure that if we just keep bombing a little bit longer, somehow something will work out.

Shortly after I had my exchange with Secretary Albright, the President, President Clinton, was asked, "What will you do if the bombing does not work?" He was asked by the Prime Minister of Italy. According to the Washington Post, he looked startled at the question, then turned to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger for an answer. Mr. Berger gave him the answer, "We will continue bombing."

To me, that is folly. To me, that is not Churchillian. To me, that is not looking around to see what else might be there. I suggest, again, I call for a suspension of the bombing while we review our options, admit that the bombing hasn't worked and try to devise a new strategy that will. Perhaps there is none. After all of this analysis we may come to the conclusion there is nothing we can do now that the brutalities have taken place and the Kosovars have been driven from their homes. There may be nothing we can do effectively to restore them. For those who say how humiliating it would be for the United States to admit that, I ask this question, "How humiliating will it be if we go forward and fail to achieve our goals? Wouldn't we have been better off in Vietnam if we had admitted that we were not getting it done long before the time came when that humiliating scene we all saw on our television screens of the helicopters above the Embassy in Saigon was broadcast throughout all the world?"

I voted for the supplemental bill that provided the military funds with respect to the operation in Kosovo. I did so because I lost the first debate. The bombing went on. The funds were spent. The President has exhausted all of the funds of the Department of Defense through the balance of this year, and it would be irresponsible, in my view, not to replenish those funds so the Defense Department can function now. I voted to replenish the funds that have already been spent. But I call on us to stop spending those funds now, while we undertake a comprehensive review of our strategy and address, once again, the fundamental question that was not answered in the beginning, and has not been answered so far, which is still, "Will it work?"

I conclude by saying that the historic figure upon whom I called for the rationality of answering that question is

Winston Churchill, the man who went to the front lines and saw that trench warfare was insanity and came back to become the father of the tank, who looked for another alternative. There must be something better than what is happening in Kosovo right now. Let us suspend the bombing and search for it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I have an additional 5 minutes under my control, which I yield to the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. HAGEL.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Nebraska will yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. HAGEL. I am happy to yield to my colleague from North Dakota.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have cleared this request. I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended until the hour of 1:30, and that at 1 I be recognized for 20 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The distinguished Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. HAGEL. I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend and colleague from Utah for some additional time.

I rise today to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the creation of the modern American Foreign Service.

We have all traveled abroad. I have visited over 60 countries over the years. As many Americans, I have seen firsthand the dedication of professional Foreign Service officers in some of the most difficult and dangerous working environments in the world.

There is no longer any clear division between domestic and international issues. Transportation, trade, telecommunications, technology, and the Internet have changed all that.

As our Nation grew, it became more globally engaged. Over the last 200 years, year after year, America has become an international community. In 1860, we had only 33 diplomatic missions around the world. But we had 253 consular posts abroad, primarily involved in supporting our Nation's dramatic economic growth and trade expansion. As America's role in the world grew, we took on more responsibility. America's diplomacy needed to draw from the broad strength of our democratic society. And that, too, grew.

The solution was the Rogers Act of 1924. This act created America's first professional competitive Foreign Service. It merged the small, elite diplomatic corps with the more broadly based consular services. The Rogers Act established a merit-based exam system to recruit the best our growing

Nation had to offer without regard to family ties or political favors.

America's diplomats are unsung heroes. Americans understand and appreciate the sacrifices of duty, honor, and country we ask every day from our military around the world. However, not enough Americans know about the sacrifices we also ask every day from our American Foreign Service officers around the world. Just like our military, they serve our national interests abroad in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world.

Our military's purpose is to fight and win wars. The purpose of our diplomats is to prevent wars. This makes recognition for their work more difficult. This is a little like listening for the dog that doesn't bark. But our Foreign Service officers do much more than prevent wars and resolve crises. They negotiate agreements to expand trade and open up foreign markets. They protect Americans abroad who find themselves in trouble and many more important responsibilities. They explain American policies to often hostile nations. They help negotiate arms control agreements to stem the dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The work of the Foreign Service is relevant. It is very relevant to the daily lives of every American. Their many successes are often unheralded. We take them for granted. The Foreign Service has endured the same underfunding and poor working conditions as has our military services. In the last decade, the Foreign Service has experienced similar recruitment and retention problems, as has the military.

Since 1992, the Foreign Service has declined 11 percent, even while we have asked the Foreign Service to open up new missions in Central Asia and Eastern Europe and increase staffing in China. This has led to sharp staff reductions elsewhere in the world.

In my travels, as I am sure in your travels, Mr. President, and all of our colleagues' travels, we have also seen how run down and dangerous many of our embassies around the world have become. This has a real impact on our national interest. This is as dangerous as what we have been doing to our military. It is like asking the Air Force to permanently maintain an increased flight tempo with aging aircraft and a severe shortage of pilots. This all has serious consequences to our country. Few appreciate how dangerous it has become for our diplomats who defend America's interests the world.

Since World War II, more ambassadors have been killed in the line of duty than generals and admirals. The Secretary of State has commemorated 186 American diplomats who have died under "heroic or inspirational circumstances."

Finally, in today's global community, we have a greater need for an active, energetic, and visionary foreign policy and those who carry out that foreign policy than ever before.