

withholding of IAEA voluntary funds, those funds we pay above and beyond our membership fees for the Safeguard Program for Iran, if the Secretary cannot make the requisite certification. It also requires the Secretary of State to undertake a comprehensive review of all IAEA programs and projects in other states which sponsor international terrorism to determine if the IAEA is sponsoring any other projects which conflict with the United States' nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Clearly, our monies should not be going to any country, especially voluntary monies, if they oppose our own nuclear nonproliferation goals.

As it is, since the IAEA's inception, more than \$52 million for the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund has gone to countries on the United States' list of states which sponsor terrorism. The United States is the largest supporter of the IAEA. We provide them with more than 25 percent of its annual budget. In the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, we contribute about 32 percent, or over \$18 million annually in voluntary funds.

It is from that fund that the IAEA is providing over \$1.5 million to date for the development of the new Bushehr nuclear power plant. Moreover, the IAEA has launched a new program this year to help Iran in the area of uranium exploration. Clearly, when we suspect that Iran has the requisite technology to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, it is not a wise idea to help them in their efforts to locate more of it.

The Clinton administration has publicly stated its opposition to Iran's development of nuclear reactors and its concern about the development of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. In testimony before the United States Senate, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Einhorn explained, and I quote, "In our views, this is a large reactor project. It will involve hundreds of Russians being in Iran, hundreds of Iranians or more being in Moscow being trained, and this large-scale kind of project can provide a kind of commercial cover for a number of activities that we would not like to see, perhaps much more sensitive activities than pursuing this power reactor project."

It also will inevitably provide additional training and expertise in the nuclear field for Iranian technicians. "In our view," this is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary speaking, "in our view, given Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons, we do not want to see them move up the nuclear learning curve at all, and we believe this project would contribute to them moving up that curve," and that is the end of the quote.

Last fall, during a press briefing at the State Department, its spokesman, James Rubin said of the Bushehr: "We are convinced that Iran is using the Bushehr reactor project as a cover for acquiring sensitive Russian nuclear technology."

Given Iran's historic support for terrorism, coupled with the fact that Iran boasts immense, immense oil and natural gas reserves and the seismic activity near Bushehr, we must question Tehran's motives for conducting expensive nuclear reactors. Moreover, the development of the nuclear reactors has been an economic nightmare for Iranians. Clearly, Iran does not need additional energy sources, considering it has some of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves, nor is nuclear energy an economic choice for Iran.

So, in essence, what is it for? Clearly, the concerns expressed by the administration, clearly, those concerns are about nuclear weaponry. And if we add to that the fact that Iran's missile capacity has been developed, we now will not only have a uranium exploration and uranium enrichment, we now have all of the facets not only to create nuclear weapons, but to deliver them.

Mr. Speaker, we need to ask one basic question. Does it make sense for the United States and U.S. taxpayers to provide any kind of support for the construction of a nuclear reactor which we clearly and justifiably oppose.

This bill seeks to protect the United States taxpayers from assisting countries like Iran, which sponsors international terrorism. It seeks to make sure that our dollars are not going to develop weapons of mass destruction that can be used against us and our allies.

It is ludicrous for the United States to support a plan, even indirectly, which could pose a threat to its national security and to stability in the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1477.

The question was taken.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2415, the American Embassy Security Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

#### AMERICAN EMBASSY SECURITY ACT OF 1999

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GILMAN). Pursuant to House Resolution 247 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2415.

The Chair designates the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. KOLBE) as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PEASE) to assume the Chair temporarily.

□ 1457

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2415) to enhance security of United States missions and personnel overseas, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal year 2000, and for other purposes, with Mr. PEASE (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Georgia (Ms. MCKINNEY) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, our Nation has never been more vulnerable to its enemies than today. Unfortunately, it took a catastrophic double bombing in East Africa to teach us that lesson. Twelve Americans, 10 Tanzanians, and over 200 Kenyans died when Osama bin Ladin's terrorists blew up our American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam nearly 1 year ago.

This tragedy revealed that our overseas diplomats and other officials, Americans who risk their lives for our Nation, are in grave danger. I am happy to report, however, that we are doing something about this danger. We are moving quickly to protect our people. Last year, the Congress passed and the President signed an emergency appropriation of \$1.4 billion for security enhancements worldwide.

Let me start my remarks with a run-down of just what has happened in the past 12 months: Kenya, August 7, 1998; Tanzania, August 7, 1998; Moscow, our Moscow embassy, March 1999; Skopje, Macedonia, March 1999; Beijing, China, May 8, 1999; Chengdu in China, May 8, 1999.

Let me reach back a little further to June 25, 1996, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia where a truck bomb exploded next to the fence of the Khobar Towers military housing, killing 19 American servicemen and injuring over 502 other people.