The bills (H.R. 2752 and H.R. 4579) were read the third time and passed.

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GLOBAL ROLE V: ROLES OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE, AND THE MILITARY IN WAR-MAKING

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, today, with my dear friend and wonderful colleague from Kansas, Senator ROBERTS, we come to the fifth and final in our series of floor discussions on the global role of the United States. We will begin with consideration of the key instruments of national security policy, and we will conclude this series with a presentation of what we have learned over the course of these dialogs.

The inspiration for the first of today's topics comes from a source we have often cited in this series: The great 19th century military thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, who wrote in his seminal work on war these words:

> Its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people. The scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.
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> These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone, it would be totally useless.
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> Our task, therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

Attempts to find the proper balance between the roles of the people, the military and the government when America goes to war have been a major feature of the last 35 years, from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, to Operation Desert Storm, to Operation Allied Force. In my opinion, it is an effort which has not been overly successful. Certainly in the case of Vietnam, there was no real attempt to mobilize the American public in support of the war effort, nor for the Executive Branch to seek or the Congress to demand that the Constitutional role of the Congress to legitimize the conduct of hostilities be exercised. But I would also contend that much the same pattern is evident in more recent American interventions in the Balkans, and to an only somewhat lesser extent in the Gulf War.

The fact that we have emerged from all of these military interventions without major harm—though the negative impact from Vietnam was far from negligible—is a tribute to the efforts of our servicemen and women, the capabilities of our weaponry, but also, I would suggest, the fact that our vital national interests were never threatened in these cases. Only the Cold War, which by and large was prosecuted effectively, both militarily and politically and on a bipartisan basis, and in which we achieved a decisive victory, posed such a threat in the last half century.

We have spent much of the time in previous dialogues in discussing the proper ends of American national security policy in the post-Cold War era, but if we don't fix the problems in this ''holy trinity'' of means—the roles of the public, the military and the government—we are going to be continually frustrated in our achievement of whatever objectives we set.

Let's start with the first of Clausewitz' trinity: the people.

The post-Cold War world is not only producing changes abroad—changes which we have spoken of at some length in our previous global role discussions—but also a number of alterations here at home. Over the past decade or so, we have seen a democratization in terms of our foreign and defense policies in the sense that the American public is less and less disposed to leave these matters to the ''experts,'' and to trust the assurances of the ''Establishment'' with respect to the benefits of internationalism.

While there is certainly nothing wrong with such skepticism, and indeed a demand for accountability is a healthy and appropriate attitude for the public to take, whether on national security or any other public policy, this democratization of national security policy has been marked by widespread public disengagement from the details of that policy:

For example, a 1997 Wall Street Journal/NBC News survey found that foreign policy and defense ranked last, at 9 percent, among issues cited by the public as the most important matters facing the country.

A 1997 Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard poll discovered that 64 percent of the American public thought that foreign aid was the largest component of the federal budget, when in fact it is one of the smallest at approximately 1 percent.

A 1999 Penn and Schoen survey discovered that nearly half—48 percent—of the American public felt that the U.S. was ''too engaged'' in international problems, while just 16 percent expressed the view that we are ''not engaged enough.''

A 1999 poll for the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that only 28 percent of the American people wanted the U.S. government to promote further globalization while 34 percent wanted our government to try to slow or reverse it, and another 33 percent preferred that we simply allow it to continue at its own pace, as we are doing now.

Related to these results, I personally believe that the end of the draft and the dramatic reductions in defense personnel levels in recent years—since FY85 the size of our armed forces decreased by 30 percent—has produced a growing disconnect between the American public and the American military, with fewer and fewer people having relatives or friends in the military, or living in communities in which a military base is a dominant feature of the local economy. This growing separation between the military and civilian worlds has produced a profound impact on the perspectives and performance of the U.S. government when it comes to the use of force, and I will return to this point later.

We can bemoan the public's skepticism and disengagement, and wish that it didn't exist, but it is a fact which impacts on all major foreign and defense policy issues facing the Congress. We saw it in the NAFTA debate, and in the debates on Iraq, NATO and the Balkans.

Now, I believe that the critics of foreign trade and foreign engagement raise important and legitimate concerns which need to be addressed. I do not believe we can stand behind platitudes that ''foreign trade is always good,'' or ''U.S. leadership is always essential.'' In my view, the burden is now on those who would urge engagement overseas, whether military, political or economic. As the just discussed public opinion data indicate, they have their work cut out for them, with widespread indifference, lack of knowledge and doubt about the value of such engagement. However, it is a debate worth having, and indeed is essential if we are to achieve the kind of national consensus we need in this post-Cold War era.

The second of the war-making trinity of Clausewitz is the military itself. Lets talk about the military. The subject of military reform is a fascinating and important one in its own right, but is somewhat beyond the scope of our dialogues on the U.S. global role. However, I would like to touch on a few areas in which the specific needs of our Armed Forces, and the perspectives of and about the American military have a direct bearing on our role as policymakers.

As perhaps the leading military analyst of the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry Summers, wrote in his excellent book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context:

> Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military forces our military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals. The political objective cannot merely be a platitude but must be stated in concrete terms. While such objectives may very well change during the course of the war, it is essential that we begin with an understanding of where we intend to go. I couldn't have said it better. As Clausewitz said, we should not ''take the first step without considering the last . . .'' There is an inherent contradiction between the military and its civilian leaders on this issue. For both domestic and international political purposes the civilian leaders want maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to fix on firm objectives. The military on the other hand

need just such a firm objective as early as possible in order to plan and conduct military operations. That is according to Harry Summers.

Mr. President, I know all too well the kind of price that is paid by our men and women in uniform when our political leaders fail to lay out clear and specific objectives. More than thirty years ago, in Vietnam we lacked clear and specific objectives. We attempted to use our military to impose our will in a region far from our shores and, in my view, far from our vital national interests, and without ever fully engaging the Congress or the American people in the process. The result was a conflict where the politicians failed to provide clear political objectives and where our policy was never fully understood or fully supported by the American people. From what I have seen since I came to this distinguished body in 1997, we have made very little progress on any of these fronts in the years since that time when it comes to America going to war.

The trend discussed earlier of a growing disconnect between the military and civilians has been perhaps even more pronounced among national foreign and defense policy-makers. A groundbreaking recent study, organized by the North Carolina Triangle Institute for Security Studies and entitled ''Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society,'' made a number of major findings relevant to our discussion today. Let me quote from the Project's Digest of Findings and Studies:

> Americans in the national political elite are increasingly losing a personal connection to the military. For the first 75 years of the 20th Century, there was a significant ''veteran's advantage'' in American politics: always a higher percentage of veterans in Congress than in the comparable age cohort in the general population. This veteran's advantage has eroded over the past twenty-five years in both chambers of Congress and across both parties. Beginning in the mid-1990s, there has been a lower percentage of veterans in the Senate and the House of Representatives than in the comparable cohort in the population at large . . . Compared to historical trends, military veterans seem now to be under-represented in the national political elite.

This particular growing disconnection is having a major impact on the central topic of our global role dialogues. To quote again from the Triangle Institute report:

> The presence of veterans in the national political elite has a profound effect on the use of force in American foreign policy. At least since 1816, there has been a very durable pattern in U.S. behavior: the more veterans in the national political elite, the less likely the United States is to initiate the use of force in the international arena. The effect is statistically stronger than many other factors known to influence the use of force . . . The trend of a declining rate of veterans in the national political elite may suggest a continued high rate of military involvement in conflicts in the coming years.

I find that statistic astounding.

One part of the Triangle Institute study, titled ''The Civilian-Military Gap and the American Use of Force 1816–1992,'' found:

> two broad clusters of opinion that track with military experience, yielding what we call civilian hawks and military doves.

Specifically, this particular survey discovered that civilian leaders are more willing to use force but more likely to want to impose restrictions on the level of force to be used, and more supportive of human rights objectives, while military leaders are more reluctant to use force but prefer fewer restrictions on what level of force to employ, and tend to support more traditional ''Realpolitik'' objectives for U.S. foreign policy. Fascinating. Interestingly, civilian leaders with prior military experience were found to hold views closer to the military rather than civilian leadership.

In other words, those who have seen the face of battle are more reticent about resorting to force than those who have not. This does not mean they—I should say we—are necessarily right in any particular case, but it should certainly give ''civilian hawks'' some pause in considering recourse to an instrument whose chief practitioners are wary of utilizing. Above all, as was the case with the government needing to engage the public far more effectively on questions of foreign policy, so must the military and the government—including the Congress—more effectively engage each other if we are ever going to achieve the kind of balance which Clausewitz wrote of.

This leads me to the third and final piece of the Clausewitz trinity: the government. As I noted earlier, Colonel Summers emphasized that military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals. In this country, that duty rests squarely on the shoulders of the President and Congress when it comes to the business of war, as outlined by our Founding Fathers when they drafted our Constitution.

Under the Constitution, war powers are divided. Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces, while Article II, Section 2 declares the President to be Commander in Chief. With this division of authority there has also been constant disagreement, not only between the executive and legislative branches, but between individual members of Congress as well, as we have seen in our most recent debates on authorizing the intervention in Kosovo and on the Byrd-Warner amendment concerning current funding of that very operation, dare I say war. Judging by the text of the Constitution and the debate that went into its drafting, however, members of Congress have a right, and I would say an obligation, to play a key role in the making of war and in determination of the proper use of our armed forces, which has brought Senator PAT ROBERTS and me to this floor, shoulder to shoulder, to see if we can't further articulate and work out a consensus on how do we commit American forces abroad.

It is generally agreed that the Commander in Chief role gives the President power to repel attacks against the United States and makes him responsible for leading the armed forces. During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, however, this country found itself involved for many years in undeclared wars. Many members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or should use our armed forces in situations that might lead to war.

On November 7, 1973, the Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over the veto of President Nixon. As Dante Fascell, former Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted:

> The importance of this law cannot be discounted. Simply stated, the War Powers Resolution seeks to restore the balance created in the Constitution between the President and Congress on questions of peace and war. It stipulates the constitutional directions that the President and Congress should be partners in such vital questions—to act together, not in separate ways.

The War Powers Resolution has two key requirements. Section 4(a) requires the President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours whenever troops are introduced into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Section 5(b) then stipulates that if U.S. armed forces have been sent into situations of actual or imminent hostilities the President must remove the troops within sixty days—ninety days if he requests a delay—unless Congress declares war or otherwise authorizes the use of force. The resolution also provides that Congress can compel the President to withdraw the troops at any time by passing a joint resolution. It is important to note, however, that since the adoption of the War Powers Resolution, every President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief, and the courts have not directly addressed this vital question.

I would submit that although the Congress tried to reassert itself after the Vietnam War with the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, we have continued to be a timid, sometimes non-existent player in the government that Clausewitz emphasized must play a vital role in creating the balance necessary for an effective war-making effort. Since I came to the Senate, it has been my observation that the current system by which the Executive and Legislative Branches discharge their respective Constitutional duties in committing American servicemen and women into harm's way has become inadequate. Congress continually lacks sufficient and timely information as to policy objectives and means prior to the commitment of American forces. And then, in my opinion, Congress largely abdicates its responsibilities

for declaring war and controlling the purse with inadequate and ill-timed consideration of operations.

Perhaps this failure has been a long time in the making. My dear friend and colleague Senator BYRD so eloquently stated in an earlier address to this body on the history of the Senate,

> We remember December 7, 1941, as a day of infamy. We mourn the hundreds of American servicemen who died at Pearl Harbor, and the thousands who gave their lives in the war that followed. We might also mourn the abrupt ending of the debate over American foreign policy. While history proved President Roosevelt and his followers more correct than their isolationist opponents, it also buried for decades the warnings of the isolationists that the United States should not aspire to police the world, nor should it intervene at will in the affairs of other nations in this hemisphere or elsewhere.

A very wise statement by Senator BYRD.

Reasons for the failure of the War Powers Resolution and for our current difficulties abound. I believe that part of our problem stems from the disputed and uncertain role of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in governing the conduct of the President, as well as the Congress, with respect to the introduction of American forces into hostile situations. Once again, these disputes continue to resound between both the branches and individual members of the legislative branch.

In all honesty, however, the realities of our government highlight the fact that while the legislature can urge, request, and demand that the President consult with members of Congress on decisions to use force, it cannot compel him to follow any of the advice that it might care to offer. With that in mind, as an institution, Congress can do no more than give or withhold its permission to use force. And while this ''use it or lose it'' quality of congressional authorizations may make many members leery about acting on a crisis too soon, delays will virtually guarantee, as Senator Arthur Vandenberg once stated, that crises will ''never reach Congress until they have developed to a point where congressional discretion is pathetically restricted.''

What a great quote. I felt that certainly as I tried to vote properly in this Chamber months ago in regard to Milosevic and his intervention in Kosovo.

Mr. President, I believe that in view of our obligations to the national interest, to the Constitution and to the young American servicemen and women whose very lives are at stake whether it be a ''contingency operation'' or a full-scale war, neither the executive or legislative branches should be satisfied with the current situation which results in uncertain signals to the American people, to overseas friends and foes, and to our armed forces personnel. In making our decision to authorize military action, Congress should work to elicit all advice and information from the President on down to the battlefield commanders, make a sound decision based on this information, and then leave battlefield management in the hands of those competent and qualified to carry out such a task. Only then will the proper roles and balance of the triad Clausewitz spoke of be obtained. And only then will our decisions to commit troops be based on the principles we spoke of in our earlier dialogs: (1) a vital national interest, (2) with clear national policy and objectives, and (3) with a well-defined exit strategy. As Senator Mansfield once stressed,

> In moments of crisis, at least, the President and the Congress cannot be adversaries; they must be allies who together, must delineate the path to guide the nation's massive machinery of government in a fashion which serves the interests of the people and is acceptable to the people.

Beautifully said.

In light of the problems and issues just discussed, I would like to take a moment to discuss S. 2851, a bill I recently introduced with Senators ROBERTS and JEFFORDS, which seeks to find a more workable system for Presidential and congressional interaction on the commitment of American forces into combat situations. It is a bill derived from the current system for Presidential approval and reporting to Congress on covert operations, a system which was established by Public Law 102–88 in 1991. By most accounts, this system has been accepted by both branches and has worked very well with respect to covert operations, producing both better decisionmaking in the executive branch and improved congressional input and oversight with respect to these operations. Since overt troop deployments into hostilities almost certainly constitute a greater risk to American interests and to American lives, I believe such a system represents the very least we should do to improve the approval and oversight process with respect to overt military operations. It does not bind or limit the executive branch or military, but seeks to build upon the principles we have covered throughout our global roles dialog.

Precisely because the United States is a democracy, it is important that policy decisions be made democratically. As Michael Walzer observes in his article ''Deterrence and Democracy'': ''The test of a democracy is not that the right side wins the political battle, but that there is a political battle.'' Policies that pass through public debate and inspection emerge all the stronger for it, because they enjoy greater respect both at home and abroad. Instead of seeing executive-legislative conflict over foreign policy as a cause for dismay, we should recognize that healthy democracies argue over the wisdom of policies. Debate is what, ultimately, produces better policy. And this is precisely the role of the government, both the President and Congress, in fulfilling our constitutional duties and achieving the proper balance of the Clausewitz trilogy.

I believe the case has clearly been made that the public, the military, and the government—the three underpinnings of successful national security policy—are not now in proper ''balance,'' to use Clausewitz' term. Each part of this trinity is skeptical and increasingly disengaged from the other two, with a number of significant and negative effects on our national interest which we have discussed today and in previous dialogs: a widening divide between the aspirations of American foreign policy-makers and the Congress' and the public's willingness to finance the necessary means is one such point; a military and civilian leadership which sees America's role in the world and the means appropriate to secure those ends in vastly different terms; a national government which is deeply divided along partisan lines and between the executive and legislative branches.

I suggest the chief responsibility for fixing this dysfunctional system lies squarely with us in the government. As Clausewitz said, ''the political aims are the business of government alone,'' and it is the political aims which drive, or at least should drive, both military requirements and the public's engagement, or disengagement, from American policy. We must find more and better ways of communicating with our constituents on the realities of our national interests and the real costs of securing them. We must find more and better ways to increase the exchange of experiences and ideas between the government and the military. And we must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and legislative branches properly fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in the arena of national security policy.

Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University Eliot Cohen closed his paper on ''The Unequal Dialogue: The Civil-Military Gap and the Use of Force,'' which is a very interesting series of case studies on effective, and ineffective, civilian and military interaction during wartime, with these observations, which are extremely relevant to our discussion today:

> (The lessons of serious conflict) are, above all, that political leaders must immerse themselves in the conduct of war no less than they do in great projects of domestic legislation; that they must master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do their civilian ones; that they must demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not dictate, it must dominate; that that conversation will include not only ends and policies, but ways and means.

In other words, we in Government, the constitutionally established political leaders, must step up to the plate and do our jobs when it comes to national security policy—especially when it comes to making war—with great humility as to our own limitations, with great care and forethought, but with diligence and determination.

Mr. President, it is my honor and distinct personal privilege to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, for further remarks.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, before I begin, I would like to pay tribute and special thanks to Scott Kindsvater, who happens to come from my hometown of Dodge City, KS, who is a major in the U.S. Air Force and is a congressional fellow in my office. He is an F–15 pilot second to none. He is going to be assigned to the Pentagon. His tour of duty will end about the same time as the election. I thank him for all of his help, all of his homework, all of his study, and for gathering together the material that has been so helpful to me to take part in this foreign policy dialog.

I thank my good friend and colleague, Senator CLELAND. We again come to the floor of the Senate for what is our fifth dialog with regard to our Nation's role in global affairs and our vital national security interests. This effort has been prompted by our conviction, as the Senator has said, that such a dialog, such a process is absolutely necessary, if we are to arrive at a better bipartisan consensus on national security policy, a consensus our Nation deserves and needs but has been lacking since the end of the cold war.

Both Senator CLELAND and I have the privilege of serving together on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The distinguished Presiding Officer also serves on that committee and provides very valuable service. As a matter of fact, Senator CLELAND and I sit directly opposite one another. During hearing after hearing on the leading national security issues of the past 4 years, it became obvious that while we did not agree on each and every issue, we shared many similar views and concerns. I call it ''the foreign policy and national security eyebrow syndrome''; that is to say, when MAX and I hear testimony we think is off the mark, a little puzzling, or downright silly, our eyebrows go up, and that is usually followed by a great deal of head shaking and commiserating.

The result has been a series of foreign policy dialogs: No. 1, what is the U.S. global role? No. 2, how do we define and defend U.S. vital national security interests? No. 3, what is the role of multilateral organizations in the world today and our role within them? No. 4, when and how should U.S. military forces be deployed?

Today Senator CLELAND has chosen a theme taken from the 19th century military strategist, Gen. Karl von Clausewitz, called ''The Trinity of War Making,'' or the role of government, the military, and the public in conducting and implementing our national security policy.

Finally, in closing these dialogs for this session of Congress by Senator CLELAND, I have prepared a summary of agreed upon principles which we suggest to this body that both he and I believe represent a suggested roadmap for the next administration and the Congress.

With regard to two of the Clausewitz so-called trinities, the need for government to gain public support for national security policy, Senator CLELAND already summarized our purpose very well when he said:

> We must find more and better ways of communicating with our constituents on the realities of our national interests and the costs in securing them.

Senator CLELAND went on to say:

> We must find more and better ways to increase the exchange of experiences and ideas between our Government and our military.

Finally, MAX said:

> We must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and our legislative branches properly fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in the arena of national security policy.

In this regard, I will comment on the first of Senator CLELAND's points, the fact that our political leadership must make sure that the public understands and supports the use of military force.

Former Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell asserted our troops must go into battle with the support and understanding of the American people. General Powell contended back in 1993 that the key to using force is to first match the political expectations to military means in a wholly realistic way and, second, to attain very decisive results. He said a decision to use force must be made with clear purpose in mind and added that if the purpose is too murky—and, goodness knows, we have had a lot of that in recent years—our political leadership will eventually have to find clarity.

As Senator CLELAND has pointed out already, unfortunately, today it seems that national security and foreign policy issues represent little more than a blip on the public's radar screen. Obviously, the public this evening will be tuned to either the baseball playoffs or the debate. He quoted news surveys and polls showing foreign policy and defense ranking last among issues cited by the public as most important that face the country. That is amazing to me.

A case in point: While we are all hopeful that the situation in the former Yugoslavia will result in the end of the Slobodan Milosevic regime and the possible transition to a more democratic government, U.S. and NATO military intervention and continued presence in the Balkans lacks a clearly defined policy goal or any realistic timetable for any conclusion. As a result, while most Americans may have really forgotten about or are not focused on Kosovo today, nevertheless, 6,000 American troops still remain there and could remain there for another decade. That is a difficult sell with regard to public understanding.

In that regard, as Senator CLELAND has pointed out, Congress bears part of that responsibility. It is easy to criticize, but we bear part of that responsibility. Unclear political objectives do not allow our military leaders to create clear, concise, and effective military strategies to accomplish any specific goal. Unclear political goals lead to wars and involvement with no exit strategy.

A brief examination of the chain of events leading up to the use of force in Kosovo certainly proves the point:

On March 23 of 1999, the Senate conducted minimal debate regarding the use of force in Yugoslavia after troops had already been deployed. S. Con. Res. 21 passed, authorizing the President to conduct military air operations.

On March 24, one day later, combat air operations did begin.

On March 26, the President notified Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, that operations began on March 24.

On March 27, after the fact, the House considered the use of force and failed to pass S. Con. Res. 21 on March 28.

On April 30, 18 Members of the House, having serious objection to that policy, filed suit against the President for conducting military activities without any authorization.

Then on May 20, 1999, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 1999 finally passed, and it provided funding for the ongoing U.S. Kosovo operations.

On May 25, the 60-day deadline passed following Presidential notification of military operations, and the President didn't seek a 30-day extension, noting instead that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective.

Then on February 18, 2000, a Federal appeals court affirmed the district court decision that the House of Representatives Members lacked standing to sue the President relative to the April 30 suit of the previous year.

I might add at this juncture that Senators CLELAND and SNOWE, I, and others had all previously successfully amended various appropriations measures mandating the administration report to the Congress specific policy goals and military strategy objectives prior to the involvement of any U.S. troops.

Most, if not all, of those reports were late, were not specific or pertinent to the fast changing situation in the Balkans. We at least tried.

And, Mr. President, I remember well the briefing by members of the Administration with regard to why the ongoing military operation in Kosovo was in our vital national interest. I still have my notebook and the list:

The Balkans represent a strategic bridge to Europe and the Middle East.

The current conflict could spin into Albania and include Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. After all World War I started in the same region.

We should act to prevent a humanitarian disaster and massacre of thousands of refugees.

If we do not act, it will endanger our progress in Bosnia.

The leadership and credibility of NATO into the next century is at stake.

We must oppose Serb aggression.

With all due respect Mr. President, these arguments did not match the fast-changing conditions in the Balkans. 20–20 hindsight now tells us the incremental bombing campaign and publicly ruling out the use of ground troops exacerbated the refugee tragedy.

The present Presiding Officer serves with me on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and we had a hearing after part of these problems developed. Somehow intelligence reports predicting the law of unintended effects went unheeded or were ignored.

And, in the end, U.S. stated goals changed when the original goals fell short. We were assured we were fighting, not for our national interest but selflessly to save lives and promote democracy, fighting in behalf of humanity. Mr. President, in my view, neither the Senate, the House or the administration can square these goals with what has actually taken place and is taking place in the Balkans. I don't question the intent.

The most optimistic lien today is that Kosovo is liberated after the mighty efforts of the U.S. led NATO coalition. Well, as described by James Warren of the Chicago Tribune, it is a liberated total mess.

He quotes British academic and international relations analyst Timothy Garton Ash, a professor at St. Antony's College, Oxford, who reviewed six books on the conflict with unbiased perspective.

According to Warren, most Americans have forgotten about the war by now, so they don't care much about the fact the so called winners are totally unprepared for dealing with peace. Violence and chaos reign in Kosovo. The victims and the ''good guys,'' the Kosovars have conducted reverse ethnic cleansing under the noses of U.S. and NATO troops.

We have, in fact, created a new Kosovo apartheid. Having failed to stop the killing, we are proving unable to win the peace or prevent revenge inspired reverse ethnic cleansing.

Moreover, since the Balkan war, badly fought and with no clear end game, other nations have increasingly been united in criticizing U.S. clout as we wield unparalleled power on the world stage and have reacted with what some refer to as a new arms race.

Since we can be sure there will be other calls for intervention in the world, it is incumbent on us to ask whether a more effective approach exists.

President Clinton has, in fact, proclaimed to the world, that if a state sought to wipe out large numbers of innocent civilians based on their race or religion, the United States should intervene in their behalf. Stated such, a public support can be garnered for such a policy.

But, as Kosovo has demonstrated, things are not that simple. As Adam Wolfson pointed out in his article within Commentary magazine;

Certainly the vast majority of Kosovars were subjected to harassment and much worse and their crisis was as President Clinton described, a humanitarian one. But, the Kosovars also had their political objectives and ambitions; an independent Kosovo ruled by themselves; a goal they press for today by political intimidation and violence.

The United States has, on the other hand, continued to oppose independence and has supported a multicultural society for Kosovo. Vice President GORE has said that in Kosovo there must be a genuine recognition and respect for difference and the creation of a tolerant and open society where everyone's rights are respected, regardless of ethnic or religious background and where all groups can participate in government, business, the arts and education.

These are fine and noble goals but they are ''ours'' not those of the Kosovars. We have two choices. First, we can accept the political ambitions for a mono-cultural and independent state purged of non Albanians or second, we can attempt to stay in Kosovo until we can somehow transform entrenched and long standing political and ethnic culture and teach the values of diversity and religious toleration. This is on small task and in my view, It may not sustainable over the long term both in terms of cost, benefit and public opinion.

Will the American people respond? Do they even care? In their book, ''Misreading the Public, the Myth of a New Isolationism,'' Steven Kull and I.M. Destler of the Brookings Institution, make the case that the notion that public attitudes are typified today by new isolationism, greater parochialism and declining interest in the world is simply not true.

They argue most Americans do not believe we should disengage from the world and support international engagement and for the United States to remain involved but with greater emphasis on cooperative and multilateral involvement. They also argue that when presented with facts, reasonable goals and alternatives, that public support can be gained.

That is the point, Mr. President. We have to do a better job. Member of the Senate need to participate in the daily grind of overseeing Administration policies, passing judgment, and behaving as a co-equal branch. When a majority, if a majority can be found, feels a President oversteps constitutional barriers or threatens to do so, we should respond with statutory checks, not floor speeches and sense-of-the-Senate resolutions.

In this regard Senator CLELAND has done us a favor with his proposal derived from the current system for Presidential approval and reporting to Congress on covert operations. Senator CLELAND has candidly pointed out his bill does not represent a consensus view and his introduction of the legislation is to stimulate further discussion. Let the discussion begin.

Mr. President, having spoken to the role of government and the public with the specific example of Kosovo, let me turn to the third topic of the ''Clausewitz Trinity'', the military.

Mr. President, I am sure that no General throughout history, be he Clausewitz or Eisenhower would condone sending troops that are not ready into battle. In the not-mincing-any-words department, I am concerned and frustrated that our United States Military today is stressed, strained, and in too many cases hollow.

I often say in Kansas that our first obligation as Members of Congress is to make sure our national security capability is equal to our vital national security responsibilities. How do we do this?

One way is to do exactly what Senator CLELAND and I try to do and that is to personally visit our men and women in uniform stationed here at home and throughout the world. We, along with a majority of members of the Armed Services Committee, visit with and seek advice from the ranks; our enlisted, our non-commissioned officers, officers and commanders.

Mr. President, when doing that and when making remarks and observations before many military groups; active duty, reserve and guard units, I always acknowledge those in the military must operate and perform their duties within the chain of command. But, I also ask them for their candor and honesty.

And they have provide me and others that with spades.

Those in the Navy tell me the Navy cannot or soon will not be able to perform assigned duties with current force structure. The bottom line is there are not enough ships or submarines in the fleet and training and weapons inventories are inadequate.

Those in the Army tell me the training and doctrine command is almost broken and peacekeeping operations are taking their toll on combat readiness.

Those in the Air Force repeat what is common knowledge—pilot retention problems are legion. The Air Force is short about 1,200 pilots today. Strategic lift in both air and sea is inadequate.

The Marines tell this former marine they have significant problems in the operation and maintenance of their Harrier and helicopter fleet. They tell me they are meeting their recruiting and retention challenges but they are working harder and harder to achieve that goal.

Overall, those in command tell us—and the figures are plain to see—that operation and maintenance accounts have been robbed for eight years to pay for ever increasing peace keeping and now peace enforcement missions.

Spare parts are hard to come by, we are short of weapons both for practice and combat. Mission capable rates are consistently down. Recent press reports state 12 of 20 major Army training centers are rated C–4, the lowest

readiness rating. A Navy Inspector General Report says Navy fliers are leaving port at a lower stage of readiness. The Air Force reports that its readiness rates for warplane squadrons continues to decline.

Many units are on frequent temporary duty assignments or are deployed most of the year on missions that many believe are of questionable value. When the troops come home, their training is shortchanged based on the lack of time available for training and lack of resources. Maintenance required for old equipment takes significant time away from other missions, from family and it is very costly.

There is another related problem and challenge, that of morale. There is a growing uneasiness with military men and women that their leadership either does not care or is out of touch with their problems. By leadership, I am including the Congress of the United States. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines tell me they are stressed out and dissatisfied and leaving.

This has been an anecdotal outpouring from military commanders in the field simply fed up with current quality of life and readiness stress. Pick up any service, military or defense publication or read any story in the press and what we have is equal opportunity frustration.

A February study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warns us about ''stress on personnel and families, problems with recruiting and retention, and for some, declining trust and confidence in the military institution and its leaders.''

Half of the respondents in the survey said their unit did not have high morale and two thirds said stress was a problem. A recent Army study at Fort Leavenworth, the intellectual center of the Army, located in my homes state of Kansas, warned the number of lieutenants and captains leaving the Army is now over 60% compared to 48% a decade ago.

In a survey taken at Fort Benning, outgoing captains complained they were disillusioned with the Army mission and lifestyle, struggling to maintain a functional family life. The American soldier has gone from a homeland protector of vital national interests to nomadic peace keeper. His weapons, on the cutting edge, some complain are beginning to rust.

During this time there has been quite a transition period Mr. President. Stretching from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, military personnel levels declined by 40 percent, spending dropped 35 percent and meanwhile the number of U.S. forces stationed abroad increased and remains high.

Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Jacques Gansler recently stated:

> We are trapped in a death spiral. The requirement to maintain our aging equipment is costing us more each year in repair costs, down time and maintenance tempo. But, we must keep this equipment in repair to maintain readiness. It drains our resources—resources we should apply to modernization of the traditional systems and development of new systems.
>
> So we stretch out our replacement schedules to ridiculous lengths and reduce the quantities of new equipment we purchase, raising the cost and still durther delaying modernization.

I am very concerned if what I have described is even close to factual—and I am afraid it is based upon my own conversations with the men and women of our military, that we are headed in a very dangerous direction.

I realize the readiness of our military has become an issue in the current presidential campaign. And, it is not my intent to take sides in that debate during this policy forum. I might add I think in some ways this debate is long overdue.

Another way to determine our military readiness is to ask those in charge. And, Senator CLELAND and I, along with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee did just that last week. The joint chiefs of staff came before the committee. Not without some not so subtle advice from on high.

Prior to the joint chiefs testimony, Administration spokesman Kenneth Bacon said Defense Secretary Cohen told the Chiefs he expected them to play straight on the readiness issue, to give the facts, not to ''beat the drum with a tin cup'' but to talk honestly about the pressures they face from the operations their forces are undergoing.

Well, Mr. Bacon need not have worried. The Chiefs testified and shot pretty straight. On an annual basis the Marines said they needed approximately $1.5 billion to be the fully modernized 911 force in readiness we expect of them. The Air Force told us they needed $20 to $30 billion, the Navy some $17 billion and the Army $10 billion. That totaled up to somewhere between $48 to $60 billion more the Chiefs feel each service needs to perform its mission.

Those figures, by the way, compare with a recent estimate by the Congressional Budget Office regarding the cost the CBO deems necessary to enable the services to meet their mission obligations.

Lord knows what the Chiefs would have requested if they had beat the drum with a tin cup. And, I must admit I am disappointed by the suggestion in Mr. Bacon's warning that the chiefs would ever provide anything but their honest testimony before the Congress, after all each of the Chiefs swore to provide their honest, candid assessment during their nomination hearings.

I always assume they do just that.

With all of the pressures of the current political season, perhaps Mr. Bacon's concern was understandable, after all he is a spokesman.

I brought a tin cup to the hearings last week. The distinguished acting Presiding Officer looked with some shock and amazement as I had a tin cup and poured water into it. I described all the missions that the military had. Then I described what they had to work with. I said: Keep pouring the water and some water might come out. In other words, the services can't carry all the water they were intended to carry. Of course, what I didn't say was that I had drilled a hole in the cup. Of course, some of the water was coming out. But it made a good audiovisual tool.

I thank the distinguished Senator for his help. I didn't bring one here tonight. Don't worry. We are not going to get anybody wet.

To be fair, Mr. Bacon stated he believes our forces are well equipped, trained and led. I will acknowledge the ''led'' part. The point is too much attention has been placed on the tip of the spear of U.S. military might.

Mr. Bacon is correct, the Secretary of Defense is correct, and others are correct. I think we all agree that the tip of the spear is ready. It is tough and it is lethal.

But, just as important but not often discussed is the shaft of the spear. Range, sustainability, lethality, accuracy and the deterrence capacity of the spear as a weapon is greatly reduced if the shaft is weak or damaged.

What comprises the shaft of our military readiness spear?

Let us try the adequacy of critical air and sea lift to sustain the force or get the force to the fight in a timely manner.

Let us try the adequacy of the reserve of key repair parts and weapons inventory to sustain the battle.

Let us talk about the effectiveness and adequacy of training time and funding.

We should mention the impact of quality of life from pay to health care to housing on the warrior's willingness—and they are warriors—to commit to a career in the military.

We should mention the impact of the significant operational tempo of the military and the impact that has on the total military spear.

We should also mention the effect of mission quality and duration on readiness to fight and win the nation's wars; and

The services' preparation for the future, joint battlefield in an environment where asymmetric warfare will be the norm and the battlefield may be in an urban environment.

I do not mean to pick on Mr. Bacon, notwithstanding his comments, the primary purpose of our military as defined from Clausewitz to Colin Powell is the readiness of the force to carry out the National Strategy. I have grave concerns that if we look behind the tip of the spear of U.S. military readiness, our forces are not ready. And, if that is banging on our readiness capability with a tin cup, so be it.

The point is that we in the Congress have the obligation and responsibility to provide the resources our Armed Forces need to protect our vital national interests.

There is the real debate that should take place. Our former NATO allied commander, Wes Clark recently asked the real pertinent question. How should the armed services be used? If readiness is a priority, what is it we should be ready for? General Clark said it's high time we had this debate and settled the issue.

While I am not sure we will ever settle the issue, it is time for the debate and I have a suggestion, I even have a road map.

The Senator from Georgia has during our past dialogues referred to the Commission on America's National Interests and the Commission's valuable 1996 report. As a matter of fact, we have both referred to this report and we found it most helpful.

The good news is that the commission has updated its findings for the year 2000. I have it in my hand. It has set forth a clear and easy-to-understand list of recommendations that at least in part can answer the question posed by General Clark and many others: ''Ready for what?''

Senator CLELAND referred to this challenge during his testimony with the Joint Chiefs last week. He pointed out, as I have tried to do in some respects, America is adrift, spending a great deal of time in what may be important interests we all agree with but ignoring matters of vital national interest.

The authors have summarized the national interest by saying that we have vital national interests: We have extremely important, we have important, and less important or secondary interests.

My dear friend knows we are spending an awful lot of time on important issues and less important or secondary issues—as far as I am concerned, not enough time with extremely important and vital.

I commend this report to the attention of my colleagues and all interested parties. The commission has identified six cardinal challenges for our next President and the next Congress more along the lines of the principles that we have agreed to and we will recommended in just a moment.

I ask unanimous consent the executive summary from the report by the Commission on America's National Interests, which is much shorter than the book, be printed in the RECORD following the conclusion of our remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield to my distinguished friend.

Mr. CLELAND. I thank Senator ROBERTS for that wonderful presentation.

We have reached several conclusions in this year-long dialog regarding America's global role. Before I get to some of the conclusions, may I say a special thank-you to my key staff members. Mr. Bill Johnstone, who has been the absolute force behind my remarks and has helped my thought process for a number of years as we have discussed American foreign policy issues, a special thanks goes to him. A special thanks also to Tricia Heller of my staff, and Andy Vanlandingham; they have been invaluable in helping me form some of my conclusions about America's global role in the world.

I thank very much my dear friend from Kansas. It is an honor to be with him, continuing our dialog on America's role in the world in the 21st century, particularly in terms of military commitments, our footprint around the world, so to speak, and its rationale. It is a pleasure to stand shoulder to shoulder with him in a bipartisan way, to see if we can't find a consensus that might lead us well into the 21st century in terms of our foreign policy.

Mr. President, when Senator ROBERTS and I embarked on this series of Global Role Dialogues back in February, we set as our goal the initiation of a serious debate in this great institution of the United States Senate on the proper role of our country in the post-cold war world. We both believed—and continue to believe—that such a process is absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at the bipartisan consensus on national security policy which our Nation so badly needs, but has been lacking since the fall of the Soviet Union. While the vagaries of Senators' schedules have unfortunately limited somewhat our ability to involve more Senators in this process, I want to thank Senators HUTCHISON, HAGEL, LUGAR and LEVIN who all made important contributions to these discussions. Senator ROBERTS and I will be exploring ways in which we can broaden this dialogue in the next Congress.

When we began our discussions we also indicated that we had far more questions than definitive answers. And while we cannot claim to have found any magic solutions or panaceas for the challenges facing the United States on the global scene as we approach the end of the Twentieth Century, I believe I can speak for Senator ROBERTS when I say that we believe we have learned much from the writings and statements of many, many others, in this country and abroad, who have thoughtfully considered these questions we have been examining.

We have drawn heavily on the work of such entities as the Commission on America's National Interests—on which Senator ROBERTS serves with distinction—, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, and the ODC's America's National Interests in Multilateral Engagement: A Bipartisan Dialogue. We have consulted the work of a large number of academics, and governmental, military and opinion leaders from around the world. And, for myself, I have certainly learned a great deal from my friend and colleague, the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

While what we are about to say is far from complete and very much a work in progress, we believe it is only fair to provide the Senate—which has indulged us with many hours of floor time to pursue this project—and to those who have followed our efforts with interest and encouragement to lay out the lessons we have learned and some general principles which we believe should guide our national security policies in the years ahead.

At this point, I yield again to my partner in these dialogues, Senator PAT ROBERTS of Kansas, but first I want to thank him for all of his help in this undertaking. His experience, his good humor and his wisdom have made our dialogues both instructive and extremely enjoyable. I yield to Senator ROBERTS.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with all those accolades, the Senator missed one—I had one other line in there.

I commend my good friend for his commonsense approach to our country's future. I thank him. I applaud him for his leadership. He has begun what I think is a trail-blazing initiative. This has been, as he has indicated, a year-long bipartisan foreign policy dialog endeavor. We thank staff and various folks on the floor for their patience. I learned a great deal from the distinguished Senator from Georgia. He said he learned from me. I learned from him.

As the Senator mentioned, we would now like to present our lessons learned from our year-long dialogs, these dialogs that we began because we both felt our foreign policy agenda had run aground. We wanted to start a series of these dialogs, these debates or colloquys, in order to arrive at a consensus concerning the future of our Nation's foreign and defense policies.

We condensed our five dialogs into seven foreign policy principles. These principles are not only a compilation of our dialogs, but also a summary of the lessons learned from the various discussions with colleagues, as the Senator has indicated, foreign policy elites, from academia and the government, and from several consultations with many military leaders. These seven foreign policy principles are simple. They are realistic. They are sustainable. We believe they would support and secure our national interests. We strongly believe the following principles are a step in the right direction.

We urge the next administration of Congress and all of our colleagues in the Congress to begin the process of trying to articulate a coherent national security strategy.

I again yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, these are not the ''seven deadly sins,'' but I think in many ways it is a sin if we violate these basic fundamental lessons that we have learned.

First and foremost, we believe as a nation—including government, media, academia, personalities, and other leaders—we need to engage in a serious and sustained national dialog to do

several things: First, define our national interests and differentiate the level of interest involved, spell out what we should be prepared to do in defense of those interests; second, build a bipartisan consensus in support of the resulting set of interests and policies.

As a starting point, within the Senate, we would encourage the Foreign Relations Committee and our own Armed Services Committee upon which we both sit to hold hearings on the finished products of the Commission on America's National Interests, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century and other relevant considerations of these critical topics.

I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Here is principle No. 2 that the distinguished Senator and I have agreed upon.

The President and the Congress need to, first, find more and better ways to increase communications with the American public. We both have talked about this at length in our previous discussion with the American public on the realities of our international interests and the costs of securing them.

I could go into a long speech on how I tried to convince the Kansas wheat farmer that first he must have security, then he must have stability, then he must have an economic future, then he may get $4 wheat at the country elevator, but it all starts with security.

Second, it finds more and better ways to increase the exchange of ideas and experiences between government and the military to avoid the broadening lack of military experience in the political elite. We must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and legislative branches fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in national security policy concerning military operations other than declared war.

And, as a result of our second principle, Senator CLELAND sponsored the bill of which I was proud to cosponsor, S. 2851, requiring the President to report on certain information before deployments of armed forces. This bill basically requires the President to report information of overt operations very similar to the law requiring the President to report certain information prior to covert operations. It makes sense to me. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLELAND. Third, the President and the Congress need to urgently address the mismatch between our foreign policy ends and means, and between commitments and forces by:

Determining the most appropriate instrument—diplomatic, military, or other—for securing policy objectives;

Reviewing carefully current American commitments—especially those involving troop deployments—including the clarity of objectives, and the presence of an exit strategy; and

Increasing the relatively small amount of resources devoted to the key instruments for securing our national interests—all of which can be supported by the American public, as detailed in ''The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public'' from the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies.

These include:

Armed Forces—which need to be reformed to meet the requirements of the 21st Century;

Diplomatic Forces;

Foreign Assistance;

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations—which also need to be reformed to become much more effective;

Key Regional Organizations—including NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity and the Association of South East Asian Nations.

I again yield to Senator ROBERTS.

Mr. ROBERTS. Let's try principle No. 4. We are the only global superpower, and in order to avoid stimulating the creation of a hostile coalition of other nations, the United States should, and can afford to, forego unilateralist actions, except where our vital national interests are involved.

The U.S. should pay international debt.

The U.S. must continue to respect and honor international commitments and not abdicate our global role leadership.

Finally, the U.S. must avoid unilateral economic and trade sanctions. Unilateral sanctions simply don't work as a foreign policy tool. They put American businesses, workers, and farmers at a huge competitive disadvantage. The U.S. needs to take a harder look at alternatives, such as multilateral pressure and more effective U.S. diplomacy.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLELAND. Fifth, with respect to multilateral organizations, the United States should:

More carefully consider NATO's new Strategic Concept, and the future direction of this, our most important international commitment; Press for reform of the UN's and Security Council's peacekeeping operations and decisionmaking processes; Fully support efforts to strengthen the capabilities of regional organizations including the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—to deal with threats to regional security; and

Promote a thorough debate, at the UN and elsewhere, on proposed standards for interventions within sovereign states.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Principle No. 6: In the post-cold-war world, the U.S. should adopt a policy of realistic restraint with respect to the use of U.S. military force in situations other than those involving the defense of vital national interests. In all other situations, we must: Insist on well-defined political objectives; determine whether nonmilitary means will be effective, and if so, try them prior to any recourse to military force. We should remember the quote from General Shelton:

> The military is the hammer in our foreign policy toolbox but not every problem is a nail.

We should ascertain whether military means can achieve the political objectives.

We should determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs (political, financial, military), and that we are prepared to bear those costs.

We should determine the ''last step'' we are prepared to take if necessary to achieve the objectives.

I wonder what that last step would be. It is one thing to have a cause to fight for. It is another thing to have a cause that you are willing to die for. In too many cases today, it doesn't seem to me that we have the willingness to enter into a cause in which we are ready to die but it seems to me we are sure willing to risk the lives of others in regards to limited policy objectives. That's not part of the principle. That's just an observation in regard to the last step recommendation.

We should insist that we have a clear, concise exit strategy, including sufficient consideration of the subsequent role of the United States, regional parties, international organizations and other entities in securing the long-term success of the mission—Kosovo is a great example.

Finally, insist on Congressional approval of all deployments other than those involving responses to emergency situations.

The Senator referred to the amendment introduced by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator WARNER, and that of Senator BYRD. I voted for that. I do not think it was an abdication of our responsibilities.

Again, those of us in Congress, the majority, should approve all deployments other than those involving responses to emergency situations.

I yield to the Senator.

Mr. CLELAND. Beautifully said. I could not have said it better, nor concur more.

Finally, the United States can, and must, continue to exercise international leadership, while following a policy of realistic restraint in the use of military forces in particular, by:

Pursuing policies that promote a strong and growing economy, which is the essential underpinning of any nation's strength; maintaining superior, ready and mobile armed forces, capable of rapidly responding to threats to our national interests; strengthening the non-military tools discussed above for securing our national interests; and making a long-term commitment to promoting democracy abroad via a comprehensive, sustained program which makes a realistic assessment of the capabilities of such a program as described by Thomas Carothers in his

excellent primer on ''Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve''.

I hope it is very clear that Senator ROBERTS and I are not advocating a retreat from America's global leadership role, and are not advocating a new form of isolationism. We both believe our country has substantial and inescapable self-interests which necessitate our leadership. However, when it comes to the way we exercise that leadership, especially when it involves military force, we do believe that our national interests sometimes require that we use restraint. The alternatives—whether a unilateralism which imposes direct resource costs far beyond what the Congress or the American people have shown a willingness to finance or an isolationism which would fail to secure our national interests in this increasingly interconnected world—are, in our judgment, unacceptable.

Over the course of these dialogues, Senator ROBERTS and I have both turned to the following words from the editor of the publication National Interest, Owen Harries:

> I advocate restraint because every dominant power in the last four centuries that has not practiced it—that has been excessively intrusive and demanding—has ultimately been confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans may believe that their country, being exceptional, need have no worries in this respect. I do not agree. It is not what Americans think of the United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter.

On his desk at the Pentagon when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell kept a quote from the great Athenian historian Thucydides:

> Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most.

With great thanks to my distinguished colleague, Senator ROBERTS, and to the Senate, I conclude these dialogs on the global role of the United States. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report of the Commission on America's National Interests focuses on one core issue: what are U.S. national interests today? The U.S. enters a new century as the world's most powerful nation, but too often seems uncertain of its direction. We hope to encourage serious debate about what must become an essential foundation for a successful American foreign policy: America's interests. We have sought to identify the central questions about American interests. Presuming no monopoly of wisdom, we nevertheless state our own best answers to these questions as clearly and precisely as we can—not abstractly or diplomatically. Clear assertions that some interests are more important than others will unavoidably give offense. We persist—with apologies—since our aim is to catalyze debate about the most important U.S. national interests. Our six principal conclusions are these:

America advantaged.—Today the U.S. has greater power and fewer adversaries than ever before in American history. Relative to any potential competitor, the U.S. is more powerful, more wealthy, and more influential than any nation since the Roman empire. With these extraordinary advantages, America today is uniquely positioned to shape the international system to promote international peace and prosperity for decades or even generations to come.

America adrift.—Great power implies great responsibility. But in the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. has lost focus. After four decades of unprecedented single-mindedness in containing Soviet Communist expansion, the United States has seen a decade of ad hoc fits and starts. A defining feature of American engagement in recent years has been confusion. The reasons why are not difficult to identify. From 1945 to 1989, containment of expansionist Soviet communism provided the fixed point for the compass of American engagement in the world. It concentrated minds in a deadly competition with the Soviet Union in every region of the world; motivated and sustained the build-up of large, standing military forces and nuclear arsenals with tens of thousands of weapons; and precluded the development of truly global systems and the possibility of cooperation to address global challenges from trade to environmental degradation. In 1989 the Cold War ended in a stunning, almost unimaginable victory that erased this fixed point from the globe. Most of the coordinates by which Americans gained their bearings in the world have now been consigned to history's dustbin: the Berlin Wall, a divided Germany, the Iron Curtain, captive nations of the Warsaw Pact, communism on the march, and, finally, the Soviet Union. Absent a compelling cause and understandable coordinates, America remains a superpower adrift.

Opportunities missed and threats emerging.—Because of the absence of coherent, consistent, purposive U.S. leadership in the years since the Cold War, the U.S. is missing one-time-only opportunities to advance American interests and values. Fitful engagement actually invites the emergence of new threats, from nuclear weapons-usable material unaccounted for in Russia and assertive Chinese risk-taking, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the unexpectedly rapid emergence of ballistic missile threats.

The foundation for sustainable American foreign policy.—The only sound foundation for a sustainable American foreign policy is a clear sense of America's national interests. Only a foreign policy grounded in America's national interests can identify priorities for American engagement in the world. Only such a policy will allow America's leaders to explain persuasively how and why American citizens should support expenditures of American treasure or blood.

The hierarchy of American national interests.—Clarity about American national interests demands that the current generation of American leaders think harder about international affairs than they have ever been required to do. During the Cold War we had clearer, simpler answers to questions about American national interests. Today we must confront again the central questions: Which regions and issues should Americans care about—for example, Bosnia, Rwanda, Russia, Mexico, Africa, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf? Which issues matter most—for example, opening markets for trade, investment opportunities, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international crime and drugs, the environment, or human rights? Why should Americans care? How much should citizens be prepared to pay to address these threats or seize these opportunities?

The Commission has identified a hierarchy of U.S. national interests: ''vital interests,'' ''extremely important interests,'' ''important interests,'' and ''less important or secondary interests.'' This Report states our own best judgment about which specific American national interests are vital, which are extremely important, and which are just important. Readers will note a sharp contrast between the expansive, vague assertions about vital interests in most discussion today, and the Commission's sparse list. While others have claimed that America has vital interests from the Balkans and the Baltics to pandemics and Taiwan, the Commission identifies only five vital U.S. national interests today. These are (1) to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad; (2) to ensure U.S. allies' survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive; (3) to prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders; (4) to ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and (5) to establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.

Challenges for the decade ahead.—Developments around the world pose threats to U.S. interests and present opportunities for advancing Americans' well-being. Because the United States is so predominant in the economic, technical, and military realms, many politicians and pundits fall victim to a rhetoric of illusion. They imagine that as the sole superpower, the U.S. can simply instruct other nations to do this or stop that and expect them to do it. But consider how many American presidents have come and gone since President Kennedy consigned Fidel Castro to the dustbin of history. Students of history will recognize a story-line in which a powerful state emerges (even if accidentally), engenders resentment (even when it acts benevolently), succumbs to the arrogance of power, and thus provokes new threats, from individual acts of terrorism to hostile coalitions of states. Because America's resources are limited, U.S. foreign policy must be selective in choosing which issues to address seriously. The proper basis for making such judgments is a lean, hierarchical conception of what American national interests are and what they are not. Media attention to foreign affairs reflects access to vivid, compelling images on a screen, without much consideration of the importance of the U.S. interest threatened. Graphic international problems like Bosnia or Kosovo make consuming claims on American foreign policy to the neglect of issues of greater importance, like the rise of Chinese power, the unprecedented risks of nuclear proliferation, the opportunity to increase the openness of the international trading and financial systems, or the future of Mexico.

Based on its assessment of specific threats to and opportunities for U.S. national interests in the final years of the century, the Commission has identified six cardinal challenges for the next U.S. president:

Strengthen strategic partnerships with Japan and the European allies despite the absence of an overwhelming, immediate threat;

Facilitate China's entry onto the world stage without disruption;

Prevent loss of control of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials, and contain the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons;

Prevent Russia's reversion to authoritarianism or disintegration into chaos;

Maintain the United States' singular leadership, military, and intelligence capabilities, and its international credibility; and

Marshal unprecedented economic, technological, military, and political advantages to shape a twenty-first century global system that promotes freedom, peace, and prosperity for Americans, our allies, and the world.

For each of these challenges, and others, our stated hierarchy of U.S. national interests provides coordinates by which to navigate the uncertain, fast-changing international terrain in the decade ahead.

SUMMARY OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Vital

Vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans' survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.

Vital U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad;
2. Ensure U.S. allies' survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders;
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.

Instrumentally, these vital interests will be enhanced and protected by promoting singular U.S. leadership, military and intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and even-handedness in dealing with other states), and strengthening critical international institutions—particularly the U.S. alliance system around the world.

Extremely Important

Extremely important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Extremely important U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere;
2. Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery systems;
3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes peacefully;
4. Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, especially the Persian Gulf;
5. Promote the well-being of U.S. allies and friends and protect them from external aggression;
6. Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere;
7. Prevent, manage, and, if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographic regions;
8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems;
9. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders;
10. Suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking; and
11. Prevent genocide.

Important

Important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Important U.S. national interests are to:

1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries;
2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization;
3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions;
4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations;
5. Reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations;
6. Prevent the nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad;
7. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors;
8. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations;
9. Promote international environmental policies consistent with long-term ecological requirements; and
10. Maximize U.S.-GNP growth from international trade and investment.

Instrumentally, the important U.S. national interests are to maintain a strong UN and other regional and functional cooperative mechanisms.

Less Important or Secondary

Less important or secondary national interests are not unimportant. They are important and desirable conditions, but ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Less important or secondary U.S. national interests include:

1. Balancing bilateral trade deficits;
2. Enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake;
3. Preserving the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states everywhere; and
4. Enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have been fascinated and informed by the colloquy that has been ongoing between the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Georgia. I have been honored to serve on the Armed Services Committee with the two of them. I know they take these issues seriously, and it is, indeed, appropriate we begin to think through clearly what the role of the United States is and what the role of Congress is in establishing U.S. policy.

I thank them for those observations. They are very valuable. I agree with them that we need to involve the American people in this. The great American experiment that has guided us so far has allowed the people to rule. We do not need to do it under the table without full and open debate.

I strongly believe we must not as a nation abdicate our ability to act unilaterally when our national interest is at stake, or else why have we invested so greatly to establish this magnificent military? We cannot rely on a majority vote of the U.N. We cannot rely on the fact that we may override or avoid a veto in the Security Council. We have to be prepared to take care of our own interests. I thank my colleagues for the dialog.

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ENERGY

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, energy prices are going up; gasoline prices are up. I doubt there are many families who do not spend $60 a month on gasoline. Those who commute, those who have children with vehicles, a husband and wife working may have two or three vehicles per family and not be wealthy. They may be paying $100 a month or more for gasoline. If they were paying $60 a month for gasoline 18 months ago, they are now paying over $90 a month. If they were paying $100 a month last year, they are probably paying over $150 a month this year.

That is $50 a month or $30 a month, perhaps more in some families, withdrawn from the usable income of that family, money with which they no longer can buy shoes, a new set of tires for their car, to go on a vacation with their children, take the kids to a ball game, buy shoes for them to play soccer or basketball, baseball, or volley ball. That is $50 a month extra of aftertax money that American citizens had 15, 18 months ago and no longer have today. That is because the price of energy has gone up.

In addition, businesses are facing those same increases. I traveled a couple of months ago with a full-time truck driver and his wife. I traveled from north of Birmingham to Clanton to Montgomery and discussed with them the problems they are facing. They are paying up to $800 to $1,000 a month extra to operate their truck. They try to pass it on, which increases the costs down the road, but they are not able to pass it all on and it is reducing their standard of living. They have, in fact, less money with which to go to the store and buy products.

What does that ultimately mean? It means there are going to be fewer widgets bought, there are going to be fewer shoes bought, there are going to be fewer new cars bought, fewer new houses bought and many other things we would like to purchase. We will not be able to purchase those items because OPEC, through its price-gouging cartel, has fixed the oil and gas prices and driven them up to an extraordinary degree. As a result, it is hurting us. We know this. We know the economy appears to have some slowing. We know that profit margins across the board have been shrinking significantly, and we know that higher energy costs are a big reason for that.

I say that because we are talking about some very big issues. If you do not have money to purchase, let's say you purchase 8 things this month instead of what you would normally purchase, 10, there is somebody who would have made those other 2 items, somebody who would have sold those other 2 items; they may not be able to continue to do that. What does that do to