

As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Information is the currency of democracy." Our democracy is stronger if all citizens have equal access to at least that type of currency, and that is something which Members on both sides of the aisle can celebrate and join in.

This bipartisan resolution is an important step in informing and empowering American citizens. I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this legislation to make available useful Congressional information to the American people.

#### NONPROLIFERATION REPORT CARD

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a recent report released by The Russia Task Force entitled "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia." This bipartisan Task Force was co-chaired by Lloyd Cutler and Howard Baker. The report concludes that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material is "the most urgent unmet national security threat for the United States today."

This conclusion restates similar conclusions of other reports and analyses done over the past several years. The book *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy* published in 1996 drew a similar conclusion. A January 2000 Center for Strategic and International Study report, "Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat" provided a concise analysis and numerous policy recommendations of this "most devastating security threat."

The U.S. response has not been and still is not commensurate to the threat.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have achieved much and contributed greatly to U.S. security. Still there is always room for innovative approaches to remaining issues and faster progress.

The Department of Energy programs—from Materials Protection, Control and Accounting to the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention—have also enhanced U.S. security. But their work is not even close to complete, and a "clear and present danger" looms.

I have repeatedly suggested that we have a very simple choice: we can either spend money to reduce the threat or spend more money in the future to defend ourselves. I am a strong believer that threat reduction is now underfunded and is the first-best approach in this case.

The report estimated the cost at \$30 billion to be provided not only from the U.S. budget, but also by Russia and other countries. The national security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing 80,000 nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons would constitute the highest return on investment of any current national security program.

How do we get there? One recommendation of the report is the dire

need for a White House-level nonproliferation czar. Not just the Department of Energy and the Defense Department are involved in Russia. We have a number of federal agencies chipping away at specific, isolated aspects of the problem.

But we do not have a coherent, integrated agenda. Overlaps and shortfalls exist. But no one person—with budgetary responsibility and requisite authority—can view the spectrum and identify the gaps, remedy inter-agency turf battles and bring the necessary coordination to get the job done efficiently and quickly.

A nonproliferation czar should be given access to the President and the necessary budgetary powers. This person should be charged with formulating a cohesive strategy. This would allow us to coordinate and streamline our efforts. This person would identify which programs are ripe for more resources and which ones are already adequate to address the immediate need.

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation enacted in 1996 required that such a nonproliferation czar be put in place. Also, Section 3174 of the FY2001 Defense Authorization bill expressed again Congressional will to have one person accountable for our nonproliferation efforts. The Clinton Administration refused to adhere to the statute and repeatedly ignored other Congressional attempts to address the coordination problem. Other Commissions have also recommended this remedy in the past to no avail. I am hopeful that the national security team within the new Administration will see the merits of this recommendation and act on it soon.

The Task Force also offered several other important insights and recommendations. These included:

The threat today arises from Russia's weakened ability to secure its nuclear arsenal. Contributing factors include, delays in paying those who guard nuclear facilities, breakdown in command structures and inadequate budgets for stockpile protection.

I would go even further than that. I believe that it's the economics that drives many of the threats and areas of potential conflict that the U.S. faces with Russia today. They sell nuclear technologies to Iran not because they like the Iranians and want to snub the Americans. The Russians are also aware that Iran could present a threat should it acquire the requisite nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. However, the Russian decision is driven by economics—not by ideology, not by historical ties, but by necessity. If we don't attempt to address the underlying economics of the situation, cooperation with Iran may continue and many other programs may eventually fail.

The President should develop a strategic plan, consulting Congress and cooperating with the Russian Federation, to secure all weapons-usable material located in Russia, and to prevent the outflow of weapons of mass destruction-related scientific expertise.

We can only move so fast as the Russians allow. We can only achieve suffi-

cient transparency and get access so long as Russia agrees. However, I believe several existing programs, such as the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, have demonstrated that a serious U.S. commitment, especially in financial terms, is exactly the appropriate incentive to get action.

Repeatedly, however, our nonproliferation programs with Russia are in a Catch-22 situation. Congress will not adequately fund them until they demonstrate success. A trickle at the tap is insufficient to persuade Russians of the seriousness of our intent. So, the U.S. programs stumble along unable to achieve the gains necessary because the Russians are reticent to play ball. And, in turn, Congress becomes even more leery of providing any funding at all in light of the meager gains. It's in our immediate national security interest to remedy this situation.

The plan should review existing programs, identifying specific goals and measurable objectives for each program, as well as providing criteria for success and an exit strategy.

It would be reasonable to propose that one plan be geared toward addressing the fundamental linkages between economic and social instability in Russia and specific proliferation threats. Without addressing the relationship of Russians' economic situation to a decaying nuclear command and control infrastructure, threats of diversion from within, rather than from outside, the weapons complex, and many other tight relationships, we will fail to prevent proliferation.

The report envisions an 8-10 year time-frame. At that point, Russia will hopefully be in a position to take over any remaining work.

In the next decade we could eliminate the greatest security challenge we currently face. Inaction will only drive up costs to defend ourselves against unknowables that we could have squelched had we had greater foresight.

I believe President Bush and his team have foresight. President Bush repeatedly mentioned the importance of these programs as an integral part of his national security strategy.

To quote our new National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice:

American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile.

I believe this recent report reiterates this clear fact and sets forth several very important policy recommendations for tackling this challenge. I look forward to working with the new Administration to ensure that a decade from now we have protected U.S. citizens from this proliferation threat and secured a more peaceful future.

#### RETIREMENT OF THE HONORABLE BUD SHUSTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition today to honor my