

Kayla Rolland was killed by a classmate in their own first-grade classroom at Buell Elementary School near Flint, Michigan almost one year ago. This well publicized school shooting sparked outrage across our state and nation and helped lead hundreds of thousands of mothers to march in Washington for safer gun laws.

Over the course of the year, we have learned more details about the shooting of the young girl. Police reports released just a few months ago reveal that the six-year-old boy who shot and killed Kayla had concealed the handgun in his pants pocket. He pulled the gun out of his pocket and pointed it at Kayla, who told the boy, "Jesus doesn't like you to point guns at someone." The young boy responded, "So? I don't like you" and fired the gun that killed the young girl. Just before she collapsed, she turned to her classmate and said, "I'm going to die."

For Kayla's mother and family, the pain from those few moments will last forever. At the Million Mom March, Kayla's mother spoke just a few days after what would have been Kayla's seventh birthday. She said:

These are hard times for me and Kayla's brothers, sisters, and her father, and for the rest of my family. Kayla's death was devastating. There is not a day that goes by that I do not cry as I go on with my life without my daughter. A part of my heart went with her. It is so hard for me to think that I will never see her smile, laugh or play again. I can never hold her and kiss her again. Or see her grow up, get married, and have a happy life. The gun that killed my daughter in her first grade classroom was a gun that could be loaded by a 6-year-old child, concealed by a 6-year-old child, and held and fired by a 6-year-old child. Please, don't ever forget that. This is proof that there is need for gun safety devices and gun control. I come here today, two days after what would have been her seventh birthday. I am a Mom with a terrible tragedy, and I hope it never, ever happens again.

One year after the death of Kayla Rolland, after hundreds of thousands of families marched in Washington at the Million Mom March, and after countless other shooting tragedies, Congress cannot guarantee that it never happens again because one year later Congress has not worked seriously to reduce youth access to guns or to pass legislation that will make our nation's children safer.

CONFIRMATION OF JOE ALLBAUGH

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, Mr. Joe Allbaugh is fully qualified to serve as the next FEMA Director, and I will vote to confirm his nomination.

Most recently, Mr. Allbaugh served as the national campaign manager for President Bush. Prior to that Mr. Allbaugh was then-Governor Bush's chief of staff. In that capacity, he was responsible for management of crises and emergency response. On many occasions, he worked closely with FEMA and the related state agencies. Clearly, Mr. Allbaugh has the management experience needed to run this important federal agency.

The position of FEMA Director is very important to me and the people of New Mexico. Nine months ago the Los Alamos community was devastated by fires accidentally started by the U.S. Park Service. More than 400 homes were destroyed and many businesses were affected. Last summer, we worked hard to pass legislation to compensate the victims.

FEMA was charged with the task of processing the victims' claims, and in part they have tackled this undertaking admirably. However, the number of complaints has been mounting as the February 26 deadline for some final settlements fast approaches. Frankly, I am greatly concerned about the delays and mishandling of some of the claims—a concern shared by Mr. Allbaugh.

Mr. Allbaugh assured me that this issue would be addressed expeditiously. I am confident that he will make it a top priority to resolve these complaints and carry out FEMA's duties under the legislation. I look forward to working with him, and I believe he will be a superb FEMA Director.

THE CTBT AND A NATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and how it fits into an integrated national non-proliferation policy. We all agree that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a bad thing. Slowing or halting new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, or keeping current nuclear states from developing new, more powerful weapons is not a Democrat or Republican—it is a necessity. It also is not a new idea.

Since the end of World War II, every president has worked on ways to reduce other countries' access to nuclear weapons and their reasons for trying to acquire them. By mutual security alliances and numerous international agreements, we have succeeded in slowing the development of nuclear weapons. But, the game has changed. A number of smaller states may see nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, as the only way to counter the unparalleled superiority of American conventional military power. Therefore, the United States has more reason than ever to lead global efforts to stop proliferation.

A national non-proliferation program needs to include diplomatic, economic, scientific and military tools, all honed and accessible for particular proliferation problems. One such tool should be the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. It is time for a responsible, calm reconsideration of the CTBT. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Shalikashvili's recent report addresses many of the questions and concerns raised in objection to the CTBT. I urge any of my colleagues who have not had a chance to read his report to do so. General Shalikashvili states that the CTBT ". . . is a very important part of

global non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping a safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent . . . an objective and thorough net assessment shows convincingly that U.S. interests, as well as those of friends and allies, will be served by the Treaty's entry into force."

The CTBT does not mean an end to the threat of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism or nuclear proliferation. It is, however, a step in the right direction of containing these threats. Of course there are risks, but they exist with or without the CTBT. These risks can be better managed with the treaty than without it. An integrated and comprehensive non-proliferation strategy is required, of which the CTBT is a crucial part. In his report, General Shalikashvili outlines recommendations to make such a strategy.

Is the CTBT verifiable? With or without the CTBT, we will always need reliable information about nuclear testing activity. The CTBT gives us new sources of information and creates greater political clout for uncovering and addressing suspected violations. There is more to the verification regime than the International Monitoring System, which by itself will be an impressive network of 321 stations and 16 laboratories. There are also stations and satellites owned and operated by governments, research institutions, universities, and commercial companies.

A report by the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT concludes that when all the resources are put into place, they will be able to detect, locate and identify all relevant events. Monitoring and verification will involve a complex and constantly evolving network, which any potential violator will have to confront. A treaty evader would need to muffle the seismic signal, ensure that no signature particles or gas escape the cavity, as well as avoid the creation of surface evidence, such as a crater. And, all test preparations, such as making a cavity or buying materials, would have to be done without causing suspicion. Only the United States and the former Soviet Union have ever been able to carry off such a test. How likely could an emerging nuclear weapon state do so? Some have argued that advancing technology would make hiding such a test easier, but that assumes all monitoring and detection technology will stand still. New technologies and the expansion of a global monitoring regime will make it more difficult to conceal such tests.

What about the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapon stockpile? General Shalikashvili, former Secretary of Defense Cohen, former Secretary of Energy Richardson, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command, the directors of the three nuclear weapon laboratories, and numerous experts agree that the nation's nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable and that nuclear testing is not needed at this time.