

of morning business not to extend beyond the hour of 11:30 a.m., with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes.

Under the previous order, the Senator from New York, Mrs. CLINTON, is recognized to speak for up to 15 minutes.

Mrs. CLINTON. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mrs. CLINTON pertaining to the introduction of S. 476 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed in morning business for up to 15 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Delaware, Mr. BIDEN, is recognized to speak up to 15 minutes.

NORTH KOREA

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the situation in North Korea. Today President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea is meeting with President Bush as part of his official state visit. His visit occurs against a hopeful backdrop of the third round of family reunions on the divided Korean peninsula. Fathers are greeting their grownup sons; sisters are hugging their sisters they haven't seen for a generation. Grandmothers are meeting their grandchildren who they have never met.

Tomorrow the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and I will host the President of South Korea for coffee here on Capitol Hill. Kim's visit will give us a chance to renew the close bonds forged in blood in the common struggle against the forces of oppression which unite our people in the United States and South Korea.

I rise today to talk a little bit about the Korean peninsula and the important role the United States can play in concert with our South Korean allies and other friends to help build lasting peace on that peninsula.

Yesterday the New York Times published an article by veteran defense correspondent Michael Gordon which suggests that a missile deal with North Korea may have been within reach last year. As fascinating as this rendition of events was and as fascinating as the policies were, we now have a new President. The failure or the judgment to not proceed with negotiations into the month of January of this year on the part of the new President is in fact at this moment irrelevant. We have a new President and a new administration. The question squarely now is not whether President Clinton should have gone to North Korea; the question is whether this administration, the Bush administration, is going to build on the progress made over the past 5 years since we narrowly averted a nuclear showdown on the Korean peninsula.

I was pleased to see Secretary of State Powell quoted in a Washington

Post article today, suggesting this administration was going to pursue the possibilities of a better relationship with North Korea and was going to leave nothing on the table. I was slightly dismayed to read of an informed source in the administration who chose not to be identified, demonstrating a great deal more of what seemed to me in the article to be not only skepticism, which I share about the intentions of North Korea, but willingness to pursue vigorously the possibilities of further negotiations. Hopefully, I am misreading that unidentified highly placed administration official.

In my view, there is only one correct answer and that is the one Secretary Powell has indicated today. For it would be irresponsible not to explore to discover whether North Korea is prepared to abandon its pursuit of long-range missiles in response to a serious proposal from the United States, our friends, and our allies.

North Korea confronts the United States with a number of security challenges. North Korea maintains a huge army of more than 1 million men and women in uniform, about 5 percent of its entire population. Many of that army are poised on the South Korean border. The threat that North Korea opposes extends well beyond the Korean peninsula. Its Nodong missile can not only strike all of South Korea but can also threaten our ally, Japan. North Korea sells those same missiles to anyone who has the cash to buy them. North Korean missile exports to Iran and Pakistan have guaranteed, unfortunately, that any future war in the Middle East or South Asia will be even more dangerous and more destructive than past conflicts in that region.

North Korean missiles and the very real concern that North Korea might even build longer range missiles capable of striking the United States are a driving force behind our plans to build a national missile defense system.

If we can remove that threat, that is, the threat from North Korea long-range missile possibility, the impact will be huge, not only on the security of Northeast Asia but also on our own defense strategy as we debate how best to deal with our vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction.

For most of the past 50 years, U.S. soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division have looked north from their positions along the DMV at North Korean adversaries that appeared unchanging—a hermit kingdom, locked in a Stalinist time warp. Indeed, 2 or 3 years ago if I had spoken to the American people about landmines, the 38th parallel, and the armies of North and South Korea, it would have been to discuss the latest northern incursion along what remains the most heavily armed border in the world. The troops of the 2d Infantry Division are still standing shoulder to shoulder with our South Korean allies. The landmines are still there. And much of the tension along the DMZ remains unabated, at least for now.

But maybe, just maybe, things are beginning to change.

The United States should end our "prevent defense" and go on the offensive to advance our vital interests—particularly the dismantlement of North Korea's long-range missile program. Now is not the time for lengthy policy reviews or foot-dragging on existing commitments. Now is the time to forge ahead and test North Korea's commitment to peace.

A few weeks ago what had been unthinkable—the opening of direct rail transport across the DMZ—became a near term achievable objective. The militaries of North and South Korea will soon begin to reconstruct the rail links connecting Seoul not only to Pyongyang, but also to China, Russia, and Western Europe.

I remember vividly the moment when the people of East and West Berlin decided to tear down the Berlin Wall.

The Berlin Wall had become a true anachronism: a graffiti-strewn relic of a morally, politically, and economically bankrupt Soviet regime. Once the East German people had torn down the ideological walls in their own minds, tearing down the concrete was a piece of cake.

The people of North and South Korea are not there yet. But the walls are under siege. The establishment of direct rail links will represent a major breach in the walls of fear, insecurity, and isolation which have built up over the past 50 years.

Last October, I spoke to this body about testing North Korea's willingness to abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. At that time, I pointed to some of the hopeful signs that North Korea was interested in improving its relations with its neighbors—a missile launch moratorium now more than 2 years old, summit meetings with South Korea, Russia, and China, and the first tentative steps toward economic reform.

I attributed these North Korean actions to the "Sunshine Policy" crafted by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, and to the hard-headed engagement strategy implemented by former Secretary of Defense William Perry on behalf of the Clinton administration.

Since last fall, evidence has mounted steadily that North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il has indeed decided that nothing short of a major overhaul of his economic system and diplomatic relations is likely to pull his country back from the brink of starvation and economic collapse.

In addition to the progress on rail links, here are some of the other recent developments:

North Korea has expanded cooperation to search for the remains of Americans missing in action from the Korean war. Uniformed U.S. military personnel are working along side their North Korean counterparts, searching the rice paddies, often in remote areas, in an effort to solve 50-year-old mysteries.

The North has continued modest steps to allow family reunions across the DMZ, exposing people from the North to the quality of life enjoyed by their brothers and sisters in the South. More than 300 families have enjoyed reunion visits, and more are scheduled.

The North has toned down its customary harsh rhetoric about the U.S. and South Korea, substituting a steady diet of editorials outlining the North's plans to make economic revitalization its top priority.

North Korea for the first time last November opened its food distribution system to South Korean inspection and also provided a detailed accounting of food aid distribution.

North and South Korea have held defense talks at both the ministerial level and subsequently at the working level, and have agreed, at the urging of South Korea, to improve military to military communications. This is the first step toward confidence building measures that can reduce the likelihood that a relatively minor incident along the DMZ might escalate into war.

North and South have established an economic cooperation panel and launched a joint study of North Korea's energy needs.

North and South Korean flood control experts met last month in Pyongyang for talks on cooperation in efforts along the Imjin River, which crosses the border between the two countries.

The North Koreans have dispatched a team of financial experts to Washington to examine what it would take for North Korea to earn support from international financial institutions once it has taken the steps necessary to satisfy U.S. anti-terrorism laws.

And, as I mentioned above, the North has not test-fired a missile for more than 2½ years, and has pledged not to do so while negotiations with the United States on the North's missile program continue.

Five years ago when people spoke of "North Korean offensives," they were referring to the threat of a North Korean assault across the DMZ.

Today, Kim Jong-il is mounting an offensive, but it is a diplomatic and economic offensive, not a military one. Over the past 12 months, North Korea has established diplomatic relations with almost all of the nations of Western Europe. Planning is underway for an unprecedented trip by Kim Jong-il to Seoul to meet with President Kim Dae-jung later this year.

Finally, Kim Jong-il's has publicly embraced China's model of economic reform. His celebrated January visit to Shanghai and his open praise of Chinese economic reforms indicates that Kim is driving North Korea toward a future in which it would be more closely integrated economically and politically to the rest of East Asia and the world.

What are we to make of all of this? How should we respond?

I want to be clear about why I find these developments so promising. I am not a fan of Kim Jong-il. No one should think that his motives are noble or humanitarian.

Over the years, Kim Jong-il has shown himself willing to go to any length—including state-sponsored terrorism—to preserve his regime.

I have no reason to believe he has abandoned his love of dictatorship in favor of constitutional democracy. Far from it.

Kim Jong-il is betting that he can emerge from a process of change at the head of a North Korean society that is more prosperous, stable, and militarily capable than it is today, but still a dictator.

But frankly, the reasons why Kim Jong-il is pursuing economic reform and diplomatic opening are not as important as the steps he will have to take along the way.

If North Korea's opening is to succeed, the North will have to address many of the fundamentals which make it so threatening—especially the gross distortion of its domestic spending priorities in favor of the military. The North cannot revitalize its economy while spending 25 percent of its gross domestic product on weaponry.

The North cannot obtain meaningful, sustained foreign investment without addressing the lack of transparency in its economy as well as the absence of laws and institutions to protect investors and facilitate international trade.

North Korea's pursuit of economic reform and diplomatic opening presents the United States with a golden opportunity, if we are wise enough to seize it.

We should welcome the emergence of North Korea from its shell not because North Korea's motives are benign, but because we have a chance, in concert with our allies, to shape its transformation into a less threatening country.

If we play our cards right, North Korea's opening can lead to a less authoritarian regime that is more respectful of international norms—all without any shots being fired in anger.

I point out, a number of old Communist dictators had thought they could move in an easy transition from the Communist regime that has clearly failed to a market economy, or integration with the rest of the world, and still maintain their power.

None, none—none has succeeded thus far. I believe it is an oxymoron to suggest that North Korea can emerge and become an engaged partner in world trade without having to fundamentally change itself and in the process, I believe, end up a country very different from what we have now.

I am delighted that Secretary Powell has expressed his support for this hard-headed brand of engagement with North Korea. As he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month:

We are open to a continued process of engagement with the North so long as it ad-

resses political, economic, and security concerns, is reciprocal, and does not come at the expense of our alliance relationships.

This is precisely the kind of engagement I have in mind. I think we should get on with it.

North Korea knows that under our nonproliferation laws it cannot gain unfettered access to trade, investment, and technology without first halting its development and export of long-range ballistic missile technology and submitting its nuclear program to full-scope safeguards under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Korea knows it won't get World Bank loans as long as it remains on our list of nations that condone international terrorism or provide sanctuary for terrorists. In order to get off that list, North Korea must end all support for terrorist organizations and must cooperate fully with the Japanese government to resolve the question of Japanese citizens abducted from Japan—some more than 20 years ago.

In other words, Mr. President, if North Korea is to turn around its moribund economy and fully normalize relations with its neighbors, it will have to take steps which are demonstrably in our national interest and in the national interests of our allies.

We should do everything in our power to ensure that North Korea does not diverge from the path it is now on.

Specifically, we should continue to provide generous humanitarian relief to starving North Korean children. Nothing about the situation on the peninsula will be improved by the suffering of North Korean children racked by hunger and disease.

We should continue to abide by the terms of the Agreed Framework, so long as North Korea does the same. We should not unilaterally start moving the goal posts. The Agreed Framework has effectively capped the North's ability to produce fissile material with which to construct nuclear weapons. Under the terms of Agreed Framework, North Korea placed its nuclear program under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and halted work on two unfinished heavy water nuclear reactors in exchange for the promise of proliferation-resistant light water nuclear reactors and heavy fuel oil deliveries for electric power generation. Without the Agreed Framework, North Korea might already have sufficient fissile material with which to construct dozens of nuclear bombs.

MISSILE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE—PATIENCE
REQUIRED

Finally, Mr. President, we should engage North Korea in a serious diplomatic effort aimed at an iron-clad agreement to end forever the North's pursuit of long range missiles.

In discussions with U.S., Russian, and Chinese officials, North Korea has signaled its willingness to give up the export, and possibly the development, of long-range missiles, in response to the right package of incentives. Such

an agreement would remove a direct North Korean threat to the region and improve prospects for North-South reconciliation. It would also remove a major source of missiles and missile technology for countries such as Iran.

Getting an agreement will not be easy, but it helps a lot that we are not the only country which would benefit from the dismantlement of North Korea's missile program. Our allies South Korea and Japan, our European allies who already provide financial support for the Agreed Framework, the Chinese, the Russians, all share a desire to see North Korea devote its meager resources to food, not rockets. The only countries which want to see North Korea building missiles are its disreputable customers.

A tough, verifiable agreement to eliminate the North's long-range missile threat might be possible in exchange for reasonable U.S. assistance that would help North Korea feed itself and help convert missile plants to peaceful manufacturing.

Some people are impatient for change in North Korea. They want to adopt a more confrontational approach, including rushing ahead to deploy an unproven, hugely expensive, and potentially destabilizing national missile defense system.

I understand their frustration and share their desire for action against the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles.

But foreclosing diplomatic options by rushing to deploy NMD is not the right antidote. Sure, a limited ground-based national missile defense might someday be capable of shooting down a handful of North Korean missiles aimed at Los Angeles, but it will do nothing to defend our Asian allies from a North Korean missile attack.

Nor will it defend us from a nuclear bomb smuggled into the country aboard a fishing trawler or a biological toxin released into our water supply. NMD will not defend U.S. forces on Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific theater. It will do nothing to prevent North Korea from wielding weapons of mass destruction against Seoul, much of which is actually within artillery range of North Korea.

Moreover, a rush to deploy an unproven national missile defense, particularly absent a meaningful strategic dialog with China, could jeopardize the cooperative role China has played in recent years on the Korean Peninsula. Given our common interest in preventing North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapons power, the United States and China should work in concert, not at cross purposes.

OPENING NORTH KOREAN EYES

North Korea's opening has given the North Korean people a fresh look at the outside world—like a gopher coming out of its hole—with consequences which could be profound over the long haul. Hundreds of foreigners are in North Korea today, compared with a handful just a few years ago.

Foreigners increasingly are free to travel widely in the country and talk to average North Koreans without government interference. North Korea has even begun to issue tourist visas. The presence of foreigners in North Korea is gradually changing North Korean attitudes about South Korea and the West.

One American with a long history of working in North Korea illustrated the change underway by describing an impromptu encounter he had recently.

While he was out on an unescorted morning walk, a North Korean woman approached him and said, "You're not a Russian, are you? You're a Miguk Nom aren't you?"

Her expression translates roughly into "You're an American imperialist bastard, eh?"

The American replied good-naturedly, "Yes, I am an American imperialist bastard."

To which the woman replied quite sincerely, "Thanks very much for the food aid!"

Another American, a State Department official accompanying a World Food Program inspection team, noted that hundreds of people along the road waved and smiled, and in the case of soldiers, saluted, as the convoy passed.

He also reports that many of 80 million woven nylon bags used to distribute grain and emblazoned with the letters "U.S.A." are being recycled by North Koreans for use as everything from back-packs to rain coats. These North Koreans become walking billboards of American aid and generosity of spirit.

North Korea is just one critical challenge in a region of enormous importance to us. We cannot separate our policy there from our overall approach in East Asia.

We cannot hope that decisions we make about national missile defense, Taiwan policy, or support for democracy and rule of law in China will be of no consequence to developments on the Korean Peninsula. To the contrary, we need to think holistically and comprehensively about East Asia policy.

Our interests are vast. Roughly one-third of the world's population resides in East Asia. In my lifetime, East Asia has gone from less than 3 percent of the world GDP in 1950 to roughly 25 percent today.

Four of our 10 largest trading partners—Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea, are in East Asia.

Each of those trading partners is also one of the world's top ten economies as measured by gross domestic product. China, Japan, and South Korea together hold more than \$700 billion in hard currency reserves—half of the world's total.

East Asia is a region of economic dynamism. Last year Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea grew by more than 10 percent, shaking off the East Asian financial crisis and resuming their characteristic vitality. U.S. exports to the region have grown dra-

matically in recent years. U.S. exports to Southeast Asia, for instance, surpass our exports to Germany and are double our exports to France. U.S. direct investment in East Asia now tops \$150 billion, and has tripled over the past decade.

And of course these are just a few of the raw economic realities which underscore East Asia's importance. The United States has important humanitarian, environmental, energy, and security interests throughout the region.

We have an obligation, it seems to me, not to drop the ball. We have a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. We have good friends and allies—like President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea—who stand ready to work with us toward that goal. It is vital that we not drop the ball; miss an opportunity to end North Korea's deadly and destabilizing pursuit of long range missiles. I don't know that an agreement can be reached. In the end North Korea may prove too intransigent, too truculent, for us to reach an accord.

But I hope the Bush administration will listen closely to President Kim today, and work with him to test North Korea's commitment to peace. We should stay the course on an engagement policy that has brought the peninsula to the brink, not of war, but of the dawning of a brave new day for all the Korean people.

I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California is recognized.

THE ISRAELI ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today a new government has been formed in Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, with Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister and the broad-based participation of many across Israel's political spectrum.

I would like to take a few minutes today to share my assessment of the present situation, where things stand, and what this may mean for U.S. policy in the region. I rise today as one who has supported the peace process, believed that a peace agreement was possible, and who has worked in the Senate, along with many of my colleagues, to see that the United States played an active role in helping Israel and the Palestinians seek peace.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak was elected two years ago to make peace and to bring about an "end of the conflict" with both Syria and the Palestinians. He was elected with a mandate to complete the Oslo process, a goal at the time supported by the majority of the people of Israel.

Over the past two years Prime Minister Barak tried, heroically and energetically, to achieve a comprehensive peace with both parties.