

went through Russia (or Iran), lest Russia end up wielding too much regional power.

That day may be over. Today we welcome Russia as a regional power, particularly in Islamic Central Asia. With the United States and Russia facing a similar enemy—the radical Islamic threat is more virulent towards America but more proximate to Russia—Russia finds us far more accommodating to its aspirations in the region. The United States would not mind if Moscow once again gained hegemony in Central Asia. Indeed, we would be delighted to give it back Afghanistan—except that Russia (and Afghanistan) would decline the honor. But American recognition of the legitimacy of Russian Great Power status in Central Asia is clearly part of the tacit bargain in the U.S.-Russian realignment. Russian accommodation to NATO expansion is the other part. The Afghan campaign marks the first stage of a new, and quite possibly historic, rapprochement between Russia and the West.

The third and most reluctant player in the realignment game is China. China is the least directly threatened by radical Islam. It has no Chechnya or Kashmir. But it does have simmering Islamic discontent in its western provinces. It is sympathetic to any attempt to tame radical Islam because of the long-term threat it poses to Chinese unity. At the just completed Shanghai Summit, China was noticeably more accommodating than usual to the United States. It is still no ally, and still sees us, correctly, as standing in the way of its aspirations to hegemony in the western Pacific. Nonetheless, the notion of China's becoming the nidus for a new anti-American coalition is dead. At least for now. There is no Russian junior partner to play. Pakistan, which has thrown in with the United States, will not play either. And there is no real point. For the foreseeable future, the energies of the West will be directed against a common enemy. China's posture of sympathetic neutrality is thus a passive plus: It means that not a single Great Power on the planet lies on the wrong side of the new divide. This is historically unprecedented. Call it hyper-unipolarity. And for the United States, it is potentially a great gain.

With Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa on the sidelines, the one region still in play—indeed the prize in the new Great Game—is the Islamic world. It is obviously divided on the question of jihad against the infidel. Bin Laden still speaks for a minority. The religious parties in Pakistan, for example, in the past decade never got more than 5 percent of the vote *combined*. But bin Ladenism clearly has support in the Islamic "street." True, the street has long been overrated. During the Gulf War, it was utterly silent and utterly passive. Nonetheless, after five years of ceaseless agitation through Al Jazeera, and after yet another decade of failed repressive governance, the street is more radicalized and more potentially mobilizable. For now, the corrupt ruling Arab elites have largely lined up with the United States, at least on paper. But their holding power against the radical Islamic challenge is not absolute. The war on terrorism, and in particular the Afghan war, will be decisive in determining in whose camp the Islamic world will end up: ours—that of the United States, the West, Russia, India—or Osama bin Laden's.

IV. The War

The asymmetry is almost comical. The whole world against one man. If in the end the United States, backed by every Great Power, cannot succeed in defeating some cave dwellers in the most backward country on earth, then the entire structure or world stability, which rests ultimately on the paci-

fying deterrent effect of American power, will be fatally threatened.

Which is why so much hinges on the success of the war on terrorism. Initially, success need not be defined globally. No one expects a quick victory over an entrenched and shadowy worldwide network. Success does, however, mean demonstrating that the United States has the will and power to enforce the Bush doctrine that governments will be held accountable for the terrorists they harbor. Success therefore requires making an example of the Taliban. Getting Osama is not the immediate goal. Everyone understands that it is hard, even for a superpower, to go on a cave-to-cave manhunt. Toppling regimes is another matter. For the Taliban to hold off the United States is an astounding triumph. Every day that they remain in place is a rebuke to American power. Indeed, as the war drags on, their renown, particularly in the Islamic world, will only grow.

After September 11, the world awaited the show of American might. If that show fails, then the list of countries lining up on the other side of the new divide will grow. This particularly true of the Arab world with its small, fragile states. Weaker states invariably seek to join coalitions of the strong. For obvious reasons of safety, they go with those who appear to be the winners. (Great Powers, on the other hand, tend to support coalitions of the weak as a way to create equilibrium. Thus Britain was forever balancing power on the Continent by supporting coalitions of the weak against a succession of would-be hegemony.) Jordan is the classic example. Whenever there is a conflict, it tries to decide who is going to win, and joins that side. In the Gulf War, it first decided wrong, then switched to rejoin the American side. That was not out of affection for Washington. It was cold realpolitik. The improbable pro-American Gulf War coalition managed to include such traditional American adversaries as Syria because of an accurate Syrian calculation of who could overawe the region.

The Arab states played both sides against the middle during the Cold War, often abruptly changing sides (e.g., Egypt during the '60s and '70s). They lined up with the United States against Iraq at the peak of American unipolarity at the beginning of the 1990s. But with subsequent American weakness and irresolution, in the face both of post-Gulf War Iraqi defiance and of repeated terrorist attacks that garnered the most feckless American military responses, respect for American power declined. Inevitably, the pro-American coalition fell apart.

The current pro-American coalition will fall apart even more quickly if the Taliban prove a match for the United States. Contrary to the current delusion that the Islamic states will respond to American demonstrations of solicitousness and sensitivity (such as a halt in the fighting during Ramadan), they are waiting to see the success of American power before irrevocably committing themselves. The future of Islamic and Arab allegiance will depend on whether the Taliban are brought to grief.

The assumption after September 11 was that an aroused America will win. If we demonstrate that we cannot win, no coalition with moderate Arabs will long survive. But much more depends on our success than just the allegiance of that last piece of the geopolitical puzzle, the Islamic world. The entire new world alignment is at stake.

States line up with more powerful states not out of love but out of fear. And respect. The fear of radical Islam has created a new, almost unprecedented coalition of interests among the Great Powers. But that coalition of fear is held together also by respect for

American power and its ability to provide safety under the American umbrella. Should we succeed in the war on terrorism, first in Afghanistan, we will be cementing the New World Order—the expansion of the American sphere of peace to include Russia and India (with a more neutral China)—just now beginning to take shape. Should we fail, it will be *saave qui peut*. Other countries—and not just our new allies but even our old allies in Europe—will seek their separate peace. If the guarantor of world peace for the last half century cannot succeed in a war of self-defense against Afghanistan(!), then the whole post-World War II structure—open borders, open trade, open seas, open societies—will begin to unravel.

The first President Bush sought to establish a New World Order. He failed, in part because he allowed himself to lose a war he had just won. The second President Bush never sought a New World Order. It was handed to him on Sept. 11. To maintain it, however, he has a war to win.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

GIVE IT UP FOR BUCK O'NEIL

• Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, today I rise to honor a true hero on the occasion of his 90th birthday.

John Jordan O'Neil, Jr. was born on November 13, 1911 in Carrabelle, FL. Over the years he has been given many nicknames including Jay, Foots, Country, Cap, even Nancy and Old Relic, but the one that endures is Buck.

As a teenager, he worked in the Sarasota celery fields. The job was miserable, toiling in the oven-hot dirt and muck. He knew there had to be something better, and fortunately for us, he was right. Buck O'Neil loves baseball. It's that simple. In his own words he describes what a wonderful thing baseball is. "There is nothing greater for a human being than to get his body to react to all the things one does on a ballfield . . . It's as good as music. It fills you up."

You see, by studying the history of baseball one discovers a great deal about the sport's hidden history. Biographer Ken Burns said, "By lifting the rug of our past, we find not only the sins we hoped we had concealed beneath it, but also new and powerful heroes who thrived in the darkness and can teach us much about how to live in the light."

Living through the bitter experiences that our country reserved to men of his color, Buck reflects only gold and light out of despair and suffering. He knows he can go farther with generosity and kindness than with anger and hate. He knows what human progress is all about.

When asked to tell of his journey from the Negro Leagues to the Majors, Buck's eyes light up. Though he has been telling the story for the past fifty years, he never tires of recounting the playing days and the men who lived it—men like Satchel Paige, Josh Gibson and Cool Papa Bell. Like many a good story and storyteller, it's interesting to see how much they've improved over the years.

When others would have preferred to live in a more enlightened time, Buck has no regrets. "Waste no tears on me," he says. "I didn't come along too early. I was right on time." What a lesson we can learn from this great hero. "Give it up"—that's Buck's way. Don't be so formal. Don't hide behind polite conversations. Don't be afraid to show someone some love. Show what's in your heart, always; don't keep it inside. On this special occasion I urge us all to "Give it up."•

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Ms. Evans, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting a withdrawal and sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

REPORT ON THE SEVENTH BIENNIAL REVISION (2002-2006) TO THE UNITED STATES ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 59

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, as amended (15 U.S.C. 4108(a)), I transmit herewith the seventh biennial revision (2002-2006) to the United States Arctic Research Plan.

GEORGE W. BUSH.
THE WHITE HOUSE, November 15, 2001.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

At 5:32 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Hays, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following joint resolution, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.J. Res. 74. A joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2002, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House has agreed to the following concurrent resolutions, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 211. Concurrent resolution commending Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on the 10th anniversary of her receiving the Nobel Peace Prize and expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the Government of Burma.

H. Con. Res. 257. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the

men and women of the United States Postal Service have done an outstanding job of collecting, processing, sorting, and delivering the mail during this time of national emergency.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 2330. An act making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes.

H.R. 2500. An act making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bills were signed subsequently by the President pro tempore (Mr. BYRD).

MEASURES REFERRED

The following concurrent resolutions were read, and referred as indicated:

H. Con. Res. 211. Concurrent resolution commending Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on the 10th anniversary of her receiving the Nobel Peace Prize and expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the Government of Burma; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

H. Con. Res. 257. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the men and women of the United States Postal Service have done an outstanding job of delivering the mail during this time of national emergency; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-4576. A communication from the Secretary of the Senate, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the receipts and expenditures of the Senate for the period April 1, 2001 through September 30, 2001; ordered to lie on the table.

EC-4577. A communication from the General Counsel, National Science Foundation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Amendments to Antarctic Conservation Act Regulations (45 CFR Part 670) to designate two additional Antarctic Specially Protected Areas and Correct Typographical Errors" received on November 8, 2001; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. LIEBERMAN, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, with amendments:

S. 1008: A bill to amend the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to develop the United States Climate Change Response Strategy with the goal of stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, while minimizing adverse short-term and long-term economic and social impacts, aligning

the Strategy with United States energy policy, and promoting a sound national environmental policy, to establish a research and development program that focuses on bold technological breakthroughs that make significant progress toward the goal of stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, to establish the National Office of Climate Change Response within the Executive Office of the President, and for other purposes. (Rept. No. 107-99).

EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following executive report of a committee was reported on November 15, 2001:

By Mr. BIDEN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

TREATY DOC. 106-41 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MADRID AGREEMENT (EXEC. REPT. 107-1)

TEXT OF THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF ADVICE AND CONSENT

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. ADVICE AND CONSENT TO ACCESSION TO THE MADRID PROTOCOL, SUBJECT TO AN UNDERSTANDING, DECLARATIONS, AND CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the accession by the United States to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, adopted at Madrid on June 27, 1989, entered into force on December 1, 1995 (Treaty Doc. 106-41; in this resolution referred to as the "Protocol"), subject to the understanding in section 2, the declarations in section 3, and the conditions in section 4.

SEC. 2. UNDERSTANDING.

The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the understanding, which shall be included in the United States instrument of accession to the Protocol, that no secretariat is established by the Protocol and that nothing in the Protocol obligates the United States to appropriate funds for the purpose of establishing a permanent secretariat at any time.

SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following declarations:

(1) NOT SELF-EXECUTING.—The United States declares that the Protocol is not self-executing.

(2) TIME LIMIT FOR REFUSAL NOTIFICATION.—Pursuant to Article 5(2)(b) of the Protocol, the United States declares that, for international registrations made under the Protocol, the time limit referred to in subparagraph (a) of Article 5(2) is replaced by 18 months. The declaration in this paragraph shall be included in the United States instrument of accession.

(3) NOTIFYING REFUSAL OF PROTECTION.—Pursuant to Article 5(2)(c) of the Protocol, the United States declares that, when a refusal of protection may result from an opposition to the granting of protection, such refusal may be notified to the International Bureau after the expiry of the 18-month time limit. The declaration in this paragraph shall be included in the United States instrument of accession.

(4) FEES.—Pursuant to Article 8(7)(a) of the Protocol, the United States declares that, in connection with each international registration in which it is mentioned under Article 3 of the Protocol, and in connection with each renewal of any such international registration, the United States chooses to receive, instead of a share in revenue produced by the supplementary and complementary fees, an