

from these sales are going to his own personal needs, to his aggrandizement with palaces and other monuments that he builds to himself, and to embellishing his Republican Guard. Especially if that is the case, then we ought to be talking about not buying Iraqi oil so that he has the proceeds with which to act in that manner, and we ought to be talking about convincing our allies in the international community to do the same.

This will not be easy, but the fact of the matter is we have a capable State Department and a capable Secretary of State who ought to go about the hard work of working diplomatically to convince our international community that that is one way to enforce inspections and enforce disarmament, one tool to use to get the attention of Saddam Hussein, knowing there is a hammer at the other end that can be effective, and we ought to do it.

In the long range, we ought to make sure that we have an energy policy in place that allows us not only to back off of any use of Iraqi oil, but to eventually overcome any need to rely on Middle Eastern oil. It is a relatively small portion of the fossil fuel that we use in this country; and over a period of a reasonable number of years, a concerted and wise energy policy will allow us to strategically pull out of that area and resolve many of the crises we may have in the future dealing with Middle Eastern problems and situations, politically and otherwise.

Mr. Speaker, I think that this is a policy that would be wise. I think we have international resolutions for inspections and disarmament that need international enforcement. We ought to call upon the United Nations to do everything in its power to work within the international community to make sure that they in fact enforce those resolutions and have inspections and make sure that we have disarmament in Iraq.

But that is hard work, as I said before; and it is not as easy sometimes as taking an overpowering military force and attacking. But there is no imminency to any attack on the interests of the United States at this time, and we have an international body and we have an international means to act; and we have the time to do that and try that. We should exhaust all avenues before going to the extreme avenue of an unprovoked, in the sense of any action against the United States directly, action. We should make sure that we use our resources, work within the international community, understand that we can embargo oil to Iraq as an opening step, and get our allies to do the same as a way of enforcing provisions for inspections and disarmament. We ought to move in that direction.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that we can get some agreement on this, and I hope that we can work within the international community to do just that.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Guam (Mr. UNDERWOOD) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. UNDERWOOD addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DEFAZIO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, the rush to war continues here in Washington, despite the possibility of the reinstatement of effective, unfettered inspections aimed at the destruction of weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein may have hidden from past inspections or may have developed since that time.

Now, Prime Minister Tony Blair, as a surrogate for this administration, did provide a more concrete and detailed report than anything provided by the Bush administration to the United States Congress thus far on what is going on in Iraq. But the interesting thing is, in reading through the 50-some odd pages of this report and perusing the photographs, the actual conclusion is that inspections did work, U.N. sanctions did work, and are still working. The containment and deterrence doctrine has worked with Saddam Hussein.

In fact, the previous program before the inspectors left was extraordinarily successful, more so than would be admitted by this administration, that is very dismissive about the possibility of going back in with intrusive, unfettered inspections with a mandate to destroy any weapons of mass destruction that this miscreant may have managed to develop.

I will read a few quotes from Prime Minister Blair's report. He talks about their attempts to obtain nuclear weapons: "In August 1990, Iraq instigated a crash program to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash program had made little progress."

They go on to say that "UNSCOM had totally dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium."

It is hard to reconcile that with the assertions that intrusive inspections under the auspices of the U.N. will have no impact on Saddam Hussein or his attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

In early 2002, the British intelligence judged that while sanctions remained effective, Iraq will not be able to produce nuclear weapons. That is on page 27 of the justification given by the Prime Minister of Britain for a preemptive war against Iraq. He cannot

build or obtain nuclear weapons, according to British intelligence, as long as the sanctions remain in effect, and that is without intrusive inspections backed by the full force of the United States and around the world.

There are many other passages. This is incredibly instructive reading. I would recommend it to my colleagues in Congress. It is certainly more detailed than anything provided to this Congress, either in classified briefings or outside of classified briefings, and certainly more detailed than anything provided to the American public, NATO or anybody else by the United States, and the British have done us a service.

But the case they make is the opposite of the conclusion of their Prime Minister. The case that is strongly made here is that a return to the regime of an intrusive, unfettered weapons inspection and destruction program would effectively preclude this dictator from ever obtaining weapons with which he could threaten other countries in that region, and most certainly the United States of America.

So this, to me, certainly demonstrates that the rush to war, the first preemptive war in the history of the United States, the first preemptive war since the horrible destruction of World War II and the U.N. and the agreements we have reached since then, breaking with all precedent, the United States, in some bizarre version of "Minority Report," the movie, will decide that we have people in the administration who can determine whether or not someone presents a real and present threat to the United States, even if they made no threats, even if there is no documentation of them having the capabilities on carrying out on the threats they have not made; and we, the United States of America, should be able, in violation of all international law and all precedents of our Nation, be able to preemptively attack and destroy that country for the purposes of regime change, because we do not like who is running that country.

Well, there are a lot of brutal dictators around the world running a lot of countries I do not like, including Saddam Hussein; and I would support democratic efforts and subversion efforts and any other way to get those people out of power. But a war that opens the door to worldwide conflicts, to Taiwan and China, India and Pakistan and any other host of countries, is an incredibly dangerous precedent, and this report from the Prime Minister to his Parliament documents that it is not necessary. We have an effective option before us.

ENERGY AND THE POTENTIAL FOR WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.