

(2) Any witness planning to use at a hearing any exhibit such as a chart, graph, diagram, photo, map, slide, or model must submit one identical copy of the exhibit (or representation of the exhibit in the case of a model) and 100 copies reduced to letter or legal paper size at least 48 hours before the hearing. Any exhibit described above that is not provided to the committee at least 48 hours prior to the hearing cannot be used for purpose of presenting testimony to the committee and will not be included in the hearing record.

(3) The presiding officer at a hearing may have a witness confine the oral presentation to a summary of the written testimony.

(4) Notwithstanding a request that a document be embargoed, any document that is to be discussed at a hearing, including, but not limited to, those produced by the General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, a Federal agency, an Inspector General, or a non-governmental entity, shall be provided to all members of the committee at least 72 hours before the hearing.

Rule 4. Business meetings: Notice and filing requirements

(a) Notice: The chair of the committee or the subcommittee shall provide notice, the agenda of business to be discussed, and the text of agenda items to members of the committee or subcommittee at least 72 hours before a business meeting. If the 72 hours falls over a weekend, all materials will be provided by close of business on Friday.

(b) Amendments: First-degree amendments must be filed with the chair of the committee or the subcommittee at least 24 hours before a business meeting. After the filing deadline, the chair shall promptly distribute all filed amendments to the members of the committee or subcommittee.

(c) Modifications: The chair of the committee or the subcommittee may modify the notice and filing requirements to meet special circumstances, with the concurrence of the ranking member of the committee or subcommittee.

Rule 5. Business meetings: Voting

(a) Proxy Voting:

(1) Proxy voting is allowed on all measures, amendments, resolutions, or other matters before the committee or a subcommittee.

(2) A member who is unable to attend a business meeting may submit a proxy vote on any matter, in writing, orally, or through personal instructions.

(3) A proxy given in writing is valid until revoked. A proxy given orally or by personal instructions is valid only on the day given.

(b) Subsequent Voting: Members who were not present at a business meeting and were unable to cast their votes by proxy may record their votes later, so long as they do so that same business day and their vote does not change the outcome.

(c) Public Announcement:

(1) Whenever the committee conducts a rollcall vote, the chair shall announce the results of the vote, including a tabulation of the votes cast in favor and the votes cast against the proposition by each member of the committee.

(2) Whenever the committee reports any measure or matter by rollcall vote, the report shall include a tabulation of the votes cast in favor of and the votes cast in opposition to the measure or matter by each member of the committee.

Rule 6. Subcommittees

(a) Regularly Established Subcommittees: The committee has four subcommittees: Transportation and Infrastructure; Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety;

Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water; and Superfund and Waste Management.

(b) Membership: The committee chair, after consulting with the ranking minority member, shall select members of the subcommittees.

Rule 7. Statutory responsibilities and other matters

(a) Environmental Impact Statements: No project or legislation proposed by any executive branch agency may be approved or otherwise acted upon unless the committee has received a final environmental impact statement relative to it, in accordance with section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, and the written comments of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in accordance with section 309 of the Clean Air Act. This rule is not intended to broaden, narrow, or otherwise modify the class of projects or legislative proposals for which environmental impact statements are required under section 102(2)(C).

(b) Project Approvals:

(1) Whenever the committee authorizes a project under Public Law 89-298, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1965; Public Law 83-566, the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act; or Public Law 86-249, the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended; the chairman shall submit for printing in the Congressional Record, and the committee shall publish periodically as a committee print, a report that describes the project and the reasons for its approval, together with any dissenting or individual views.

(2) Proponents of a committee resolution shall submit appropriate evidence in favor of the resolution.

(c) Building Prospectuses:

(1) When the General Services Administration submits a prospectus, pursuant to section 7(a) of the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, for construction (including construction of buildings for lease by the government), alteration and repair, or acquisition, the committee shall act with respect to the prospectus during the same session in which the prospectus is submitted.

A prospectus rejected by majority vote of the committee or not reported to the Senate during the session in which it was submitted shall be returned to the GSA and must then be resubmitted in order to be considered by the committee during the next session of the Congress.

(2) A report of a building project survey submitted by the General Services Administration to the committee under section 11(b) of the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, may not be considered by the committee as being a prospectus subject to approval by committee resolution in accordance with section 7(a) of that Act. A project described in the report may be considered for committee action only if it is submitted as a prospectus in accordance with section 7(a) and is subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this rule.

(d) Naming Public Facilities: The committee may not name a building, structure or facility for any living person, except former Presidents or former Vice Presidents of the United States, former Members of Congress over 70 years of age, or former Justices of the United States Supreme Court over 70 years of age.

Rule 8. Amending the Rules

The rules may be added to, modified, amended, or suspended by vote of a majority of committee members at a business meeting if a quorum is present.

SOUTH KOREA AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last December I traveled to South Korea in my capacity as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, as well as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I was able to visit and talk with U.S. troops and inspect facilities. I also toured the DMZ, a chilling legacy of a war many Americans have already forgotten.

My visit could not have been more timely. The combination of saber-rattling in the North and anti-American protests in the South has made Korea front page news once again, as it faces its most complicated, and potentially explosive, crisis since the Korean war, 1950-53.

The Korean peninsula is a land of stunning beauty and startling contrasts. Divided at the end of World War II, following a long occupation by Japan, Korea continues to be one of the few reminders of what the world was like during the cold war.

North Korea is a quasi-Stalinist state which, since its formal creation in 1948, has been run by two men, Kim Il Sung, who died in 1994, and his son, Kim Jong Il. Still almost entirely closed to the Western World, North Korea is a stark and isolated country marked by repression and poverty.

Then, on the other side of the demilitarized zone, DMZ, perhaps the most tense border on Earth, is South Korea, a prosperous, Westernized democratic state. South Korea has been a staunch U.S. ally, and 37,000 U.S. troops have been stationed there for the past 40 years.

Waged from 1950 to 1953, the Korean war ended in a virtual stalemate, with the peninsula still divided. Mr. President, 54,246 American men and women died during that war, and although there are no precise figures for Korean casualties, conservative estimates put the figure at approximately 4 million, the majority of these being civilians.

On my trip to South Korea on the eve of the Presidential elections, I was surprised at the widespread anti-Americanism. Indeed, it was this issue, a growing sense that the United States was an imperial power indifferent to the needs and desires of the Korean people, that led Roh Moo Hyun to victory.

It is difficult to appreciate the situation on the Korean peninsula without a visit to the demilitarized zone. I was taken there in a helicopter by Gen. Leon LaPorte, our four-star general in command, who pointed out North Korean troop concentrations. It is an alarming sight, and in many ways a step back in time.

I then paid a visit to Panmunjom, a small village frozen in time, unchanged for half a century, which straddles the line separating North and South Korea. It was here that the Armistice ending the war was signed.

Seventy percent of the 1.2 million man North Korean army is deployed

along the DMZ, with enough heavy artillery to substantially damage Seoul and inflict casualties by the millions. And there are reports that nerve agents may also be deployed along the DMZ.

Since my visit, the 800,000 forward-deployed North Korean troops have been placed on high alert and are prepared to move instantly.

I believe the blame for precipitating this crisis lies squarely with North Korea, which clearly violated the Agreed Framework by beginning the surreptitious development of nuclear capacity.

North Korea has also expelled all international inspectors and equipment; withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; restarted its plutonium processing plants; moved thousands of plutonium rods out of locked safe storage back into the nuclear production line; and is enriching uranium for nuclear weapon purposes.

The government of Kim Jong Il has clearly placed its focus, not on feeding its people, but in developing its military, its missiles and its nuclear capability, all in defiance of treaties it has signed.

Yet it also appears that our own handling of events on the Korean peninsula over the past 2 years, as well as our broader foreign policy rhetoric and statements have served, ironically, to fuel North Korea's paranoia and made the situation much more difficult to manage.

Part of the problem has been our reluctance to endorse outgoing President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy," a diplomatic and economic effort by the South Korean government to ease tensions with the North. President Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for precisely these initiatives.

This move was perceived as a major humiliation in South Korea, helped set the stage for the rising tide of anti-Americanism, and was seen as a sign by the North that the administration was intent on a policy of isolation and confrontation.

The North Korean situation offers no easy solution. We should keep the door open to the possibility of high level discussion.

This ongoing crisis has also led many to rethink America's military presence on the Korean peninsula. Such periodic reviews are a good idea, but at the same time, I strongly believe that we should not do anything hastily.

And although overshadowed by the crisis, much of my trip to South Korea focused on determining how to best finance the reconfiguration of U.S. military installations in South Korea.

In the past 2 years alone, Congress has appropriated more than \$500 million for military construction in South Korea. Much of this money has gone to improve barracks and to begin to implement a program known as the Korean Land Partnership Plan.

This joint U.S.-Republic of Korea plan is designed to reduce the U.S.

military "footprint" in Korea, while at the same time upgrade facilities for U.S. soldiers. This latter effort is particularly important, seeing that the living and working conditions are among the poorest in the entire U.S. military.

Currently, the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea are scattered among 41 troop installations and 54 small camps and support sites. Under the Land Partnership Plan, the number of troop installations would be reduced to 23, a move that I support.

When near the DMZ, I also visited Camp Casey, which is north of UijongBu and occupied by some 6300 military and 2500 civilians. More than any other site I saw, Camp Casey clearly demonstrated the need for improved living conditions at the soldier barracks. This is an issue that deserves immediate attention in the 108th Congress.

As I mentioned earlier, I believe that the present crisis can be resolved. The United States should be more sensitive to our longstanding ally, South Korea, just as we should ensure that North Korea not be allowed to bully or intimidate its neighbors.

Finally, I believe that my trip could not have been more timely. It has given me a fresh and immediate perspective on a land and a people for which I have great admiration. Since returning to Washington, I have met with both the South Korean National Security Adviser and their Ambassador to the United States.

These talks, as well as those with my Senate colleagues and members of the Bush administration, give me confidence that we will be able to work well with President Roh, and that our bilateral relationship is strong enough to weather any short-term setbacks.

Lastly, I would once again like to thank Ambassador Thomas Hubbard and Gen. Leon LaPorte for all their assistance while I was in South Korea.

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER'S "AMERICAN UNILATERALISM"

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, In a December 2002 speech delivered by the commentator, Charles Krauthammer, at the Hillsdale College Churchill dinner entitled "American Unilateralism," Mr. Krauthammer superbly articulates the necessity of American action to confront today's challenges in the international arena, most notably Iraq. He makes a compelling case against the two kinds of multilateralist thinking that are common today: that of the liberal internationalists and that of the pragmatic realists.

Liberal internationalists, Krauthammer shows, cling to multilateralism as a shield for their real preference—in this case, inaction. He aptly points out that those most strenuously opposed to U.S. military action in Iraq are also the strongest supporters of requiring U.N. backing. The reason, Krauthammer concludes, is that "they see the

U.N. as a way to stop America in its tracks." The liberal internationalist fails to take into account that there is no logical, or moral, basis for depending upon the member of the U.N. Security Council to confer legitimacy on U.S. actions.

Pragmatic realists, Krauthammer explains, understand the absurdity of the liberal internationalist's arguments, but believe that, nonetheless, the U.S. needs from a practical standpoint, international support to act. They believe that shared decisionmaking will result in good will, improved relations, and greater burdensharing. But, as Krauthammer demonstrates, our experiences in the gulf war prove otherwise.

It is important to note that Krauthammer does not see unilateralism as a first choice. Rather, he advocates taking actions that are in the best interest of the United States, bringing others along if possible. What he wisely cautions against is allowing ourselves "to be held hostage" by the objections of countries that don't have America's interests at heart. He describes unilateralism as "the high road to multilateralism." This may sound paradoxical, but it makes sense. It is American leadership, asserting a firm position and committing to take whatever actions are necessary to see if through, that enables a solid coalition to be built.

Charles Krauthammer's remarks are both timely and insightful as the United States discusses Iraqi non-compliance with members of the U.N. Security Council and contemplates military action in Iraq. I highly recommend them to my colleagues in the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Krauthammer's December 2002 speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN UNILATERALISM (By Charles Krauthammer)

American unilateralism has to do with the motives and the methods of American behavior in the world, but any discussion of it has to begin with a discussion of the structure of the international system. The reason that we talk about unilateralism today is that we live in a totally new world. We live in a bipolar world of a sort that has not existed in at least 1500 years.

At the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom was that with the demise of the Soviet Empire, the bipolarity of the second half of the 20th century would yield to a multi-polar world. You might recall the school of thought led by historian Paul Kennedy, who said that America was already in decline, suffering from imperial overstretch. There was also the Asian enthusiasm, popularized by James Fallows and others, whose thinking was best captured by the late-1980s witticism: "The United States and Russia decided to hold a Cold War: Who won? Japan."

Well they were wrong, and ironically no one has put it better than Paul Kennedy himself, in a classic recantation emphasizing America's power: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power, nothing. Charlemagne's empire was merely Western