

up where the Clinton administration left off because the Clinton administration obtained the framework agreement that resulted in the canning of that very material which is so dangerous which contains plutonium. Within 24 hours, at the summit the next day, President Bush basically said: We are not going to have any discussions with North Korea. We are not picking up where the Clinton administration left off. We do not trust North Korea.

No kidding. That is a mild statement, that we do not trust North Korea. If we did not talk to people we did not trust, we would not be talking to half of the world, including some of the most dangerous people in the world.

Talking to people does not mean we are going to reward anything. It simply means they will hear directly, eyeball to eyeball, from us as to what our concerns are, and also why we do not threaten them, and why, if they will terminate their nuclear program, they can rest assured they will get an agreement from us that there is not going to be any active aggression against them.

The blowing hot and cold, the erratic policy, the undermining not just of our own Secretary of State 24 hours after he said we would continue a policy, but undermining our South Korean allies with so much at stake, it seems to me has contributed to a very uncertain policy on the Korean peninsula, has sowed the seeds of confusion, and fueled and contributed to the paranoia that already existed in spades in North Korea.

I have been to Yongbyon, the place in North Korea where they were canning those fuel rods, where they had sealed them. I don't know that any other Member of the Congress got there, but I got there a couple years ago. I watched the International Atomic Energy Agency as they were sealing those fuel rods. That was a very positive thing to watch, to actually see, under IAEA inspection and supervision, those incredibly dangerous nuclear materials being canned instead of threatening to the rest of the world as potential proliferated material, to actually see it put under the supervision of the IAEA.

That is now out the window. We are starting from scratch. I understate my feelings on the matter when I say the Senator, the Democratic leader here, has so accurately stated the fact that we have a problem. Step 1 is to recognize we indeed have a crisis. Step 2 is not just to consult with allies but to seriously consider what they recommend when they talk about having direct engagement with the North Koreans.

I thank the Democratic leader for his constant determination to keep this Korean peninsula crisis in front of us. We cannot lose sight of it. It is a greater threat than Iraq because in North Korea you have a known proliferator who has removed the inspectors and who has nuclear material which could

be so easily distributed, shipped, or sold to people who could do great harm with it.

I thank my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

We can learn a lot from history. History, for most of my lifetime, involved a cold war, a cold war with an arch-enemy—the Soviet Union—which had thousands of nuclear warheads pointed toward the United States. They posed an imminent threat that could at any moment destroy all of civilization.

We made the choice, for good reason, Republican and Democratic administrations made the choice, that rather than engage in conflict, we would contain, negotiate, disarm, and ultimately wear down those leaders of the Soviet Union. That is ultimately what happened. The Soviet Union collapsed, negotiations for disarmament continued, and I recognize the contribution of many Presidents, from Harry Truman on.

But it was Ronald Reagan who said: Trust but verify. He did not say: I don't trust the Soviet Union, so I'm not going to enter into dialog with them. He was criticized at times, but he said: I'm going to engage in dialog. I'm going to continue the effort of my predecessors. I'm going to trust. But then I'm going to verify.

What the Senator from Michigan noted is that a couple of years ago that verification process was underway. We trusted. And we verified. His site visit was an indication of that verification.

I can only hope that those responsible for the day-to-day decisions made with regard to U.S. foreign policy will recognize the importance of past precedent, that we engage our enemies, we engage those whom there is ample reason to distrust, but we recognize that without some communication, without some engagement, the only other option is conflict.

The only other option is to see what is happening today. Nuclear weapons are being constructed. Nuclear weapons are being stockpiled. Nuclear weapons could be shipped. Nuclear weapons could be used not only in the region but against this country, as well. Every day we delay, every day we lack the will to confront and communicate, every day we lack the desire to verify, every day we create a problem more complex for future leaders and for future American policy.

I hope this administration will very carefully reconsider their position. I hope they will listen to our allies. I hope they will engage the North Koreans. I hope they can give us greater appreciation with greater clarity of their intentions with regard to that part of the world.

I yield the floor.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now return to legislative session and go into a period of morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHAMBLISS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAQ

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, this morning's Washington Post has an especially long editorial. Indeed, it takes up the entire length of the editorial page. It is entitled "Drumbeat on Iraq, a Response to Readers."

I have a dear friend in Utah who wrote me. She was distraught—is distraught, I am sure—about the prospect of going to war and expressed a great many concerns. I have been in the process of constructing what I hope is a responsible and thoughtful response to her concerns. As I read the editorial in this morning's Washington Post, I found that it does a better job than I could do of summarizing many, if not most, of the issues about which she is concerned. I want to read from sections of the editorial and then ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BENNETT. In the editorial they say:

The right question, though, is not, "Is war risky?" but "Is inaction less so?" No one can provide more than a judgment in reply. But the world is already a dangerous place. Anthrax has been wielded in Florida, New York and Washington. Terrorists have struck repeatedly and with increased strength over the past decade. Are the United States and its allies ultimately safer if they back down again and leave Saddam Hussein secure? Or does safety lie in making clear that his kind of outlaw behavior will not be tolerated and in helping Iraq become a peaceable nation that offers no haven to terrorists? We would say the latter. . . .

As I say, I could not have put it better, which is why I have quoted it. I have raised the question on the floor before: What are the consequences if we do not follow through in Iraq? Some have said let's just leave the troops in place. And that means Iraq remains contained.

Leaving the troops in place is not an option. We must understand that the troops are where they are, poised to move into Iraq, because of the agreement of the governments in Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Those governments will not allow our troops to remain on their soil indefinitely. They will not allow those troops to remain there while we contain Saddam Hussein for 6 months or 12 months or 12 years, which has been the period of "containment" that we have seen up until now. We must either withdraw those troops and say we are