

discussions or advice of the board should involve matters that have a direct and predictable effect on an adviser's financial interests, he is recused from taking part." The problem is that currently, only your ethics officer receives the disclosure forms, so only he or she is in a position to assess whether the rules and safeguards being laid down by Mr. Perle are being followed. Increased scrutiny and review of these filings would no doubt lead to greater public trust and confidence in your Defense Policy Board.

The alternative is to face a continuing and damaging disclosure of the potential business conflicts of the Board Members. Just yesterday, my own investigation revealed that Perle is on the board of directors for Onset Technology. Onset is the world's leading provider of message conversion technology. The company's customers include Bechtel—a government contractor widely considered the leading candidate for rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure and Raytheon Company which is a provider of defense electronics including the patriot and tomahawk missiles. I also found out that Perle holds a directorship in DigitalNet, a Virginia-based communications company with Army and Defense Department contracts.

To the extent you are concerned about public disclosure of this material, I would be willing to develop a procedure whereby it is reviewed in confidence. As a matter of fact, several members of my staff have obtained a security clearance.

I would appreciate your office responding to this letter at your earliest convenience. Please respond through the House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff, B-351-C Rayburn House Office Building, Attn: Perry Apelbaum/Ted Kalo, tel. 202-225-6504, fax 202-225-7680.

Sincerely,

JOHN CONYERS, JR.,
Ranking Member.

Madam Speaker, this may serve to end the ongoing e-mails and other information that I am getting asking me to ask about this, that, and the other thing. In other words, Madam Speaker, if they were to make voluntary disclosure, this would put an end to all of this, the public could be restored in their confidence, and we could move ahead with our business.

The one matter that is a little puzzling is why Mr. Perle would resign as chairman but remain as a member of the board, as if the same ethics requirements do not apply to every member of the board as well as the chairman. If he feels inclined to explain what motivated him to step down as chairman but remain on the board, I would love to be edified by what led to that kind of action.

What we are doing is trying to move this along. The Secretary of Defense, who nominated Mr. Perle, can expedite this by making these kinds of disclosures, as well as Mr. Perle himself. So it is in the spirit of cooperation and responsibility as the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary that I urge my friends in the Defense Department to accommodate this humble request.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DAVIS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. DAVIS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks)

PRESSING ISSUES IN AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. TURNER. Madam Speaker, I am joined on the floor tonight by a group of Democrats who feel very strongly about the need to be sure that our Nation is prepared to defend against terrorist attacks and to respond in the event we have a terrorist attack on our soil.

As we speak tonight, we know that our young men and women in uniform are risking their lives fighting for our freedoms and liberty in and around Iraq. They make us very proud by the sacrifices they are making on behalf of our Nation, and we are proud of each of them and the commitment that they are making on our behalf.

None of us on this floor would dare suggest that we not provide them with the very best in equipment, the very best in training as they enter into that battle. We know that our men and women in uniform shall do the duties that we have asked them to do.

We know that we fight a war tonight in Iraq, but we also know that we are engaged in another battle here at home, the war against terrorism. We became acutely aware of that battle on September 11 of 2001, and in the 18 months since al Qaeda struck in the shadows, or from the shadows, and declared war on America, we know that we have a changed world.

Just as we prepare for battle in Iraq and arm our young men and women with the very best in equipment and training, we know that it is important for us as Americans to arm those who will fight the battle here at home against terrorism with the very best in equipment and the very best of training. Tonight we will address some of the issues that we think are pressing on our Nation in order to prevail in the battle against terror.

On this floor tomorrow we will debate a \$78 billion appropriation supplemental bill to fund the war and to prepare America to fight the war against terror at home. Tonight we will hear several Members from the Democratic side of the aisle share what we believe to be deficiencies in the proposal that will be debated tomorrow, because we firmly believe that our Nation must be prepared not only to defend against terror, but to prevail against terror. The Democratic Members of the House have a plan, a plan to win the war on terror.

It is my pleasure, Madam Speaker, to yield to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. LOWEY), who serves on the Committee on Homeland Security, to

speak to one of the issues that is so critically important, the issue of nuclear power plant security.

Mrs. LOWEY. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished ranking member from Texas, who has the same laryngitis I do, for yielding to me. I appreciate his leadership on this very important issue.

Madam Speaker, I rise to discuss my continued concerns about security at the Nation's commercial nuclear reactors. Since September 11, 2001, intelligence officials have amassed a critical body of evidence suggesting terrorists intend to strike our nuclear infrastructure. Plans of U.S. nuclear facilities discovered in al Qaeda caves during U.S. military operations in Afghanistan provided perhaps the earliest indication that terrorists had not just casually contemplated, but rather assiduously, studied the option of sabotaging a nuclear reactor.

In early March, fresh intelligence confirmed our worst fears: Terrorists continued to plot attacks against nuclear and other critical infrastructure. Recent reports of a terrorist plan to sabotage the Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Arizona were sufficiently serious that the National Guard was immediately deployed to secure the plant.

As disturbing as these revelations is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure to coherently address them. Indeed, the NRC, the agency responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the country's 103 commercial reactors, has shown a remarkable unwillingness to recognize post-September 11 terrorist threats.

The commission flatly denied petitions by citizen groups for reinforcement of the spent fuel pools at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, stating "the possibility of a terrorist attack is speculative . . . and simply too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action."

Over 18 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the same old assumptions about the size, tactics, and weapons used by an attacking force, referred to as the Design Basis Threat, guides serious security policies.

The NRC continues to presume a terrorist force of no more than three individuals, with one passive insider who would relay information to the outside force, but not manipulate any controls or even attempt to incapacitate plant operators. The NRC further assumes that the attacking force would not utilize a vehicle larger than a Jeep to transport and detonate explosives. The Design Basis Threat is also built on the premise that sophisticated weaponry, including grenade launchers and shaped charges, is well beyond the reach of terrorists.

These flawed assumptions define the conditions for NRC-supervised force-on-force exams, in which security personnel must defend the reactors against mock terrorists. They also govern NRC standards with respect to the size, training, and capability of the guard force.

Our national response to nuclear terrorism must no longer be predicated on such hollow hopes.

More than the Design Basis Threat is in urgent need of revision. The NRC has not required reinforcement of the walls of nuclear reactors and spent fuel pools. Although these pools often contain several times the radioactive material of the reactor vessels themselves, they remain among the most lightly defended parts of the nuclear facilities.

Collision of a large aircraft into these pools, which are not designed to withstand such an impact, could result in release of radioactive material in as little as 1 hour. A recent report on the hazards of spent fuel pools written by a team of distinguished scientists concluded that the long-term land contamination consequences of a spent pool fuel fire could be significantly worse than those of Chernobyl.

Force-on-force drills in which plant personnel respond to a mock terrorist attack have not been administered at some facilities in over 8 years. The NRC has only recently resumed these drills, discontinued after September 11, 2001. Nuclear power plants' abysmal performances on these force-on-force drills, licensees have failed about half of all of the exams administered, causes me considerable consternation.

The NRC has never decommissioned or fined facilities failing the exam. At an August security drill at the Indian Point Energy Center in Buchanan, New York, which abuts my district, mock attackers were able to place simulated explosives at the spent fuel pools twice in 60 seconds or less. The NRC nevertheless ultimately passed Indian Point with high marks.

The absence of any sanctions for poor performance provides licensees with little incentive to improve security. The commission's decision to administer force-on-force drills triennially, while certainly an improvement, will be of limited effectiveness as long as violations go unpunished. Chronic turnover in security personnel at nuclear facilities, which can approach 70 to 100 percent for a 3½ year period, also makes more frequent exams essential.

The size and tactics employed by the mock enemy force is still based on the current flawed Design Basis Threat of three lightly armed terrorists and one passive insider. More frequent realistic exams, coupled with stiff penalties for poor performance, would dramatically improve the usefulness of these drills.

The absence of strong Federal training standards have left many guards wholly unprepared to fend off a terrorist attack. Tactics are commonly taught using painted clothespins and a flat surface rather than serious simulation models.

The testimony of guards in a report released by the Project on Government Oversight challenges industry assertions that personnel received 270 hours of pre-posting training, 90 hours of recurrent firearms training, and 30 hours

per year of tactical instructions. Most guards interviewed engaged in firearms training only a few hours every year, and had no moving-target practice.

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Such training is all the more necessary as many personnel have no prior military or law enforcement experience. Physical agility exams are notoriously lax and wholly inadequate to verify plant personnel could respond effectively to a coordinated attack by multiple professional terrorists. An internal report completed by Entergy, the plant's owners, in 2001 revealed that 4 out of 5 guards interviewed by Entergy lacked confidence in their ability to thwart a terrorist attack. The majority of guards also stated they feared retribution if they spoke up about security concerns and substandard hiring and training procedures. Struggling to fill vacancies, Entergy has hired personnel with little or no law enforcement or military background. Security-sensitive information, including guard performance on firearm drills, has not been protected in accordance with Federal regulations.

Astoundingly, the NRC never fined or even warned Entergy for these practices which violated Commission-approved security policies. Foster Zeh, a certified instructor at Indian Point and vocal critic of its security operations, has affirmed, with few exceptions the problems identified in the December 2002 report still exist today.

I worry that a similar system prevails at other nuclear reactors around the country. The NRC's policy of benign negligence should no longer stand.

Training and qualification standards for guards must be strengthened and an enforcement system with real teeth must be put in place. A comprehensive evaluation of present terrorist threats and of the new security policies needed to address them is long overdue.

Certainly the stakes are high. Studies on the impact of a successful attack on a nuclear facility detail public health and economic consequences almost too chilling to contemplate. A 1982 investigation commissioned by the NRC found that a meltdown at Indian Point, which lies within 50 miles of 21 million people, could lead to 123,000 short- and long-term deaths, over 300,000 injuries, and property damages conservatively estimated at over \$1 trillion. Factoring the fourfold increase in property values in the New York metropolitan area since the study, the economic damages for our region could reach \$2.3 trillion.

This administration's recent decision to restrict public access to millions of classified documents, including those potentially dealing with the safety of nuclear power plants, represents a step in the wrong direction. Covering NRC activities in a veil of secrecy would limit the public's ability to effectively critique the plan, thereby removing a critical check on the agency.

The Department of Energy, pursuing a similar strategy, has repeatedly refused to provide the Government Affairs Office with details on the Design Basis Threat, information the office requires to complete a report on physical security at DOE sites.

As terrorist threats increase across the globe, we must acknowledge the vulnerability of nuclear infrastructure and craft thoughtful, coherent responses. In this area we truly delay at our own peril.

And I want to thank the gentleman again, my friend the Congressman and the ranking member of our select committee, for arranging this time to share our views on this very important issue of homeland security. I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER).

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman. I appreciate her leadership on the Select Committee on Homeland Security as well as her work on the Committee on Appropriations.

The amendment that Democrats hope to be able to offer, hope will be made in order tomorrow, would provide over \$240 million for nuclear security to cover the items mentioned by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. LOWEY).

I am pleased now to recognize another member of Select Committee on Homeland Security, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. LANGEVIN).

Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) and distinguished ranking member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for this timely special order.

There is no more important issue facing us in Congress than protecting the freedom and security of the American people. I was deeply honored when the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI) asked me to serve on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. It is a responsibility that I take very seriously and I am eager to embrace the challenges confronting us.

We have an incredibly important obligation to our first responders across the country, and we must make their needs a top priority. Firefighters, law enforcement officers, health care workers, and others on the front lines need our support to keep America safe. With dozens of States experiencing their worst fiscal crises since World War II, combined with the activation of thousands of Guard and Reserve members, first responders are more desperate than ever for Federal assistance. In addition, we are faced with significant unmet needs in the area of port security, nuclear and chemical plant security, border security and more. Mayors and Governors nationwide are faced with soaring costs as they seek to meet

their obligations under a heightened threat alert and a newly implemented Operation Liberty Shield.

I was deeply disappointed to learn yesterday during the supplemental appropriations markup, Republicans voted down the Obey amendment to add \$2.5 billion in homeland security funding. This funding is absolutely critical if we are to live up to our promises to the American people. The amendment would have meant an additional \$3 million of first responder funding for my home State of Rhode Island, money that is sorely needed to equip our State and local governments to fight the domestic fronts of our war on terror.

Another area that is of special interest to me is intelligence, and I am honored to be serving as interim ranking member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. In this capacity I hope to turn the committee's attention to some critical issues facing Congress as the new Department of Homeland Security gets up and running.

One of the most important things we must address is the issue of integration and cooperation among the different intelligence agencies. We need to know how DHS is receiving and analyzing information, what kind of intelligence the agency is getting, whether the process is efficient and streamlined, and whether DHS and the rest of the Intelligence Community understand their roles and obligations to each other clearly enough to make sure that there is neither too much overlap nor too much falling through the cracks.

Along these lines it is absolutely critical that we look at the relationship between the President's proposed Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the DHS Information Analysis Directorate. Their roles sound strikingly similar to me and it has not been made at all clear how they will interrelate and work together.

In addition, we must ensure that our State and local law enforcement agencies are properly equipped to share information and coordinated activities so that threats that cross jurisdictional lines can be adequately addressed.

Finally, as we endeavor to identify threats before they become real dangers, we must be ever vigilant of the civil liberties of our citizens. Protecting the homeland does not need to run counter to protecting privacy and freedom. We should make sure that intelligence tools are used judiciously, and we must always work towards a balance that ensures both security and liberty.

Again, I want to thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) for hosting this special order and urge my colleagues to make homeland security a priority both in words and in deeds.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. LANGEVIN) and I thank him for his leadership as the ranking member of the Subcommittee

on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.

Next I would like to recognize another outstanding member of our Select Committee on Homeland Security, the distinguished delegate from the Virgin Islands (Mrs. CHRISTENSEN).

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Madam Speaker, I want to begin by first thanking the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) for his leadership on the select committee and for this opportunity to draw attention to the critical issues of homeland security. And I also want to take the opportunity to thank as well the minority leader, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), for the honor of having me serve on this important committee.

I was placed here, I think, especially because I am a physician. The issue of bioterrorism is central to the work we are charged with and it is a charge we take very seriously. It is especially so for those of us who have long been concerned about the poor state of the public health infrastructure in many of our communities across the Nation, both urban and rural, as well as in our offshore areas.

The ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) has begun working to ensure we will have the hearings, briefings, and roundtable discussions to learn as much as we can about the public health and other needs of our communities so we will be better positioned to respond to them.

We had our first hearing which was on Project Bioshield last week. And while I am a strong supporter of NIH and applaud the work that they do, and while I was impressed with the Department's employment of advanced technology to be able to monitor and be alerted in real time of any potentially dangerous exposure, all of that will be useless if we do not take care of the public health facilities, personnel, and systems at home in our towns, cities, and islands who must be ready to respond immediately.

We cannot in some cases afford to lose 1 minute; in others, to wait the time it takes for DMAT teams or deployable medical units. They are great things. We have used them in the Virgin Islands after hurricanes, and they are very important, but we may not have the time it takes to get them to the site.

The health care disparities in minorities and in our rural areas that I have come to this floor to bring to the attention of our colleagues on many occasions did not just come about by chance. They exist because of the poor public health systems in these communities. The last 2 years of cuts to health budgets have been devastating. The lack of emphasis on minority and rural health and the even bigger cuts that the President is insisting on this year, so that those who already have the best of health care can get a tax cut and other perks, have sent States into a free fall of budget deficits, and

local public health safety nets, like those in Los Angeles and Detroit, to near collapse.

So, Madam Speaker, we cannot just throw money at the problem of terrorism, as this administration has a tendency to do, without adequate planning. In this case, we must first and foremost insist that our public health system is intact and that it can ensure that people are healthy and our bodies are in a better condition to fight off infections and the other biological assaults that may come from a bioterrorism attack.

The anthrax scare taught us that lesson. The breakdowns were fundamental ones. Project Bioshield, the administration's centerpiece for public health preparedness and biological countermeasures, would not have saved the two postal workers just a little way away from here who died because the public health system failed to respond. It happened here, but it could happen anywhere.

SARS, although that has not been determined to be deliberate, is testing the world health community once again. I am very pleased to be here with my colleagues and to be working with the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) and our other colleagues on the committee to bring real homeland-hometown security to the people of this country and restore the hope that was shaken so violently on 9/11/2001. It can be done. We can be secure again, but the requisite funding must be there in the supplemental tomorrow, and we have to do it by fixing and fortifying the public health systems that we depend on to keep us healthy every day.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Mrs. CHRISTENSEN). I particularly appreciate her leadership in the health care field. Her training as a medical doctor means much to us when we are dealing with the threats of bioterrorism and preparedness in the health care arena. We thank you for your leadership.

Next I would like to recognize another member of our Select Committee on Homeland Security, a gentleman who spent a great deal of time working on behalf of emergency preparedness to be sure our first responders get the tools and the training that they need to do the job, the distinguished member from New Jersey (Mr. PASCRELL).

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Mr. PASCRELL. Madam Speaker, I want to thank my good friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER), for his exemplary leadership as ranking member on the Permanent Select Committee on Homeland Security. He has a weighty and difficult course to chart in helping Congress stay focused on the most important issues of our day; but I cannot, if I can just move to an addendum, a footnote, I must respond to what I heard early this evening.

I voted on October 10 to support the President. That does not make me any

better of an American than those who voted not to support the resolution; and until we understand that, we do not really understand the impact of the Constitution. I carry this document with me at all times, and I would suggest that to come to this floor and to challenge those people who may disagree, who may protest, this is what changes us from the other guys, the bad guys. I had to put that in there. I hope my colleague does not mind.

Sometimes I fear that we do lose focus, Madam Speaker. Even as our national alert system is ablaze in Code Orange, our Armed Forces are fighting thousands of miles away. I just returned this last month. I was there in central Asia and in Kuwait. Far too much of our time has been spent on the rigid, uncompromising domestic proposals that have been sent to us time and time again.

At least it is somewhat heartening to see that tomorrow on the third day of the fourth month of 2003, we will begin debate on needed funding for the war and needed funding for homeland security. It is a little bit too late to be sure, but I also fear that it is too little.

I would like to read my colleagues a brief passage from a December 2002 report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, not a partisan group by any stretch. They wrote, "America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil." Just a few months ago they said that. Let that statement frame our conversation here tonight, and let those words linger in all of our thoughts as we decide on what the priorities of this Congress should be from here on out.

We must take every possible measure, bear any needed costs to safeguard our country and our people, and that is exactly what we are doing for our sons and daughters on the battlefield in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

A one-track-minded commitment to massive new tax breaks does not help us in this regard. As has been reported everywhere, local communities are now charged with an enormous responsibility. When Washington calls Code Orange alert, the States and local communities absorb the costs of heightened security measures.

In New Jersey, it has spent close to \$66 million, Madam Speaker, on homeland security needs this fiscal year alone. Shockingly, these increased security measures statewide cost about \$125,000 a day. Nationwide, a new survey released last week, by the United States Conference of Mayors, as a former mayor, I can particularly appreciate, they estimate that cities are spending \$70 million a week as a result of the war and the increased threat alert. At a time when our economy is barely moving, when States throughout our country are suffering from debilitating budget deficits, this is money they can ill afford.

We appreciate that tomorrow's supplemental spending measure includes

almost \$4.2 billion to homeland security; specifically, I am glad to see \$2 billion allotted to our first responders in terms of State grants. However, let us be real. The \$2 billion included for first responders, combined with the \$3.5 billion set-aside in fiscal 2003, the omnibus bill, is just about a third of what local governments really need. If we really care about our firefighters and police officers and other emergency workers, and I think both sides of the aisle are committed to this, Madam Speaker, but we have got to put our money where our mouth is. If everything's a priority, nothing's a priority; and we need to prioritize this to those first responders where they are day in and day out.

Three weeks ago, I had another meeting with first responders in my district. They reiterated what everyone who studies homeland security agrees upon: firefighters and police officers need better training. They need protective gear. They need interoperable communications equipment, when they rush to the scene of a terrorist attack. These people on the front lines know what they need. We do not need any consultants. We do not have to hire consultants to find this out. Ask them; they will tell us.

The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY) introduced that amendment yesterday. When it went down the tubes, I could not believe this. Our priority must be to improve local emergency preparedness, to provide for a strong homeland defense. If we agree that this is our priority, then we must do more.

I am disheartened, I will conclude, Madam Speaker, by the 2004 budget, which is not what we will be voting on tomorrow. That budget cuts \$4.1 billion from the Justice Department programs. Think about this. Here we are dealing with a supplemental tomorrow to help our first responders, and yet we are cutting money for the cops. We are cutting money for the Edward Burn grants. We are cutting money for fire assistance. So we are giving on one hand; and we are saying to the FBI, the INS, the DEA and Customs, wait, hold on.

I assure my colleagues, I realize that every person sitting at home, anything over \$1 million sounds like a tremendous amount of money and it is. So the fact that I am here arguing in a realm of billions of dollars may seem excessive, but we cannot do this on the cheap. If we think we can, we are wrong. Ask those people, ask those mayors, ask those councilmen, ask those Governors. They need help. They have been footing the bill since 9-11. Do we not get it? If we get it, we need to respond; and I thank the gentleman from Texas for giving me this opportunity to speak.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his leadership on behalf of homeland security.

The amendment that the Democrats hope to be able to offer on the floor to-

morrow on the supplemental appropriations bill would provide slightly over \$1 billion in additional funding for first responders, first responder equipment, firefighter grants, chemical/biological response to support State and local governments and to provide civil defense team funding. These we believe are important issues to ensure the security of our Nation and also to be sure that we arm and train those soldiers on the front lines of homeland security just as we are always committed to funding those who fight for us abroad.

It is my pleasure now to yield to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR), the distinguished ranking member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, a gentleman who knows perhaps more about the functions of a very important element of homeland security, the United States Coast Guard, than any person in this House.

(Mr. OBERSTAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for those kind words and his leadership in initiating this Special Order tonight to focus on transportation security, homeland security.

We have made a great deal of progress on aviation security, thanks to the tough law with strong deadlines that this Congress passed, largely initiated by the Democratic Caucus on the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; but we have made little progress in other modes by comparison. The administration has been unconscionably slow in proposing security measures and requesting the necessary funding to initiate and implement those measures.

Case in point is maritime transportation. EPA has identified 123 chemical manufacturing facilities in the U.S. where toxic gases released by a terrorist attack could kill or injure more than 1 million people and 700 other chemical facilities where an attack could kill or injure 100,000 people. Most of those 823 facilities are along the navigable waterways of the United States.

The Maritime Transportation Security Act, otherwise known as the port security bill, requires the Coast Guard to undertake a vulnerability assessment of each of those facilities and requires the owner to have the security plan approved by the Coast Guard and implemented by July 1 of next year. Good idea, good plan. Implementation in serious doubt. We have yet to see any plan from the administration for conducting vulnerability assessments of these chemical facilities, let alone a process to review and approve the security plans for these chemical time bombs.

The Port Security Act also requires the Federal Government to undertake vulnerability assessments of every vessel, port and facility to assess security weaknesses. By July 1 of next year, the Coast Guard is required to review and

approve a security plan for each port, facility and vessel. If it does not have a security plan, it cannot operate.

Again, slow implementation. Only in the past week has Secretary Ridge agreed to accelerate the rate of port vulnerability assessments to ensure that assessment will be done at the Nation's 55 largest ports by the end of next year. There are 361 ports in the United States. When are they going to get serious about this?

Then we have the Vessel Security Provisions Maritime Transportation Security Act. In the December 30, 2002, Federal Register, the Coast Guard stated it was going to accept the security certification, pay attention to this, issued by the foreign government where the vessel is documented. That means the U.S. Coast Guard will accept security certification by countries such as Liberia, Panama, Malta, Cyprus.

We did not intend the security of the Nation to be placed in the hands of the country that runs those flags of convenience registers. We expect the Coast Guard to review the plans firsthand. They will have very great difficulty reviewing foreign security flag plans since the International Maritime Organization Standards allow those plans to be written in French and Spanish.

The administration is supposed to support funding to secure our ports and facilities as required by the law. The Coast Guard estimates are it will cost \$4.4 billion to provide port security over the next 10 years, and the administration to date has requested only \$11 million. Congress has appropriated \$350 million, but the administration has made available only \$92.3 million of available port security funds.

When the maritime administration asked for proposals for the ports, they received requests totaling seven times the amount of money available, and even though we have appropriated more funds, no further grants have been awarded.

Last week, we passed a budget resolution that attempted to deal with this issue, but our side did not prevail. The other side did. It passed by one vote, but again, their budget proposal does not have enough in it to deal with the needs of port security.

I do not want America's port security to be in the hands of a country like Liberia that cannot even protect itself, let alone our maritime interests. This administration is not taking the threat to port security or its responsibility seriously enough. Securing the Nation's ports and the cargo that moves through them is a Federal responsibility. All Americans, whether they live in a port city or in Boise, Idaho, will benefit from that security.

The impact on our economy, on all Americans, if the Nation's ports are shut down, as the Nation's airports were in the aftermath of September 11 because of a terrorist attack, that aftermath, those consequences will be far greater than the consequences of September 11. Refineries will run out of

oil. Factory lines will shut down. Stores will run out of goods. The economy will come to a screeching halt. We cannot let this happen.

Madam Speaker, I insert for the RECORD the rest of my remarks:

AVIATION SECURITY

In aviation, the Transportation Security Administration has made major progress in enhancing security by securing cockpit doors, hiring and training a workforce of federal employees to screen baggage, and procuring and installing explosives detection and trace detection equipment to screen most checked baggage. However, at a few airports, not all baggage is being screened by detection equipment. TSA has been directed to have all baggage inspected with explosive detection equipment by December 31, 2003. We need to ensure that this deadline is met.

We also need to work on other areas of aviation security such as cargo. Current Explosion Detection Equipment systems are too small and too slow to screen all cargo carried on aircraft. TSA relies on the "known shipper" program to screen most cargo but questions have been raised about how well shippers are known by the carriers accepting cargo from them.

We also need to do much more work in securing the perimeters of our airports.

AMTRAK'S SECURITY NEEDS

We have to devote considerably more attention to security problems for passenger rail. Although there are unmet security needs of at least \$140 million dollars, the Administration has not requested funding.

Intercity rail passengers on Amtrak trains and the hundreds of thousands of others who use Amtrak stations and other facilities each day are also potential targets of terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks on crowded stations and on key elements of the infrastructure are a particular cause for concern. A preliminary estimate of the cost to secure Amtrak's facilities is \$100 million.

Amtrak has immediate security needs for its six New York area tunnels that connect New Jersey and Long Island to Penn Station. Amtrak, New Jersey Transit and the Long Island Railroad operate more than 1,180 trains through these tunnels each day. Although strapped for funding, Amtrak has begun engineering watertight doors to separate these tunnels from Penn Station. It is imperative that this work be completed as soon as possible to prevent catastrophic flooding of parts on NYC that are beneath the water table (including Penn Station, the Subway system and much of Lower Manhattan). Amtrak is trying to complete the work before the scheduled date of May 2004 and requires a \$4 million reimbursement for this emergency construction.

Amtrak also needs \$40 million to develop redundant capacity for its train dispatching centers. Currently, Amtrak has three dispatching centers for the electrified Northeast Corridor (Boston, New York, and Philadelphia). Amtrak also has a consolidated National Operations Center in Wilmington, Delaware that monitors and manages all other train movements around the Nation. A successful attack on any one of the three locations controlling the NEC trains could prevent Amtrak from monitoring and dispatching train movements. Amtrak would have to shut down all train movements in the Corridor including all commuter operations.

In addition, Amtrak is incurring additional security costs to respond to the Code Orange Threat Level. Each Code Orange day costs Amtrak an additional \$18,000 in overtime cost for security personnel—roughly \$500,000 for April alone.

BUS SECURITY

I am particularly concerned with the Administration's poor performance in dealing with security in the intercity bus industry. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, over the road bus drivers and passengers in the United States have been the targets of many serious assaults, including one assault killing seven passengers and another assault injuring 33 passengers. In addition, there have been at least three other serious over-the-road security breaches. Over the same period, no other mode of transportation has experienced as many incidents of passenger attacks. These incidents occurred in states throughout the country, including Tennessee, Arizona, Utah, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Vermont.

These violent incidents point to the immediate need to improve security measures for intercity buses and bus terminals. On August 2, 2002, the President signed into, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act which provided \$15 million for grants and contracts to enhance the security of intercity bus operations. The FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act provided an additional \$10 million for these purposes.

Despite the timely enactment of funds, the Transportation Security Administration has yet to release a single penny. Furthermore, there are indications that these funds may not be released until June.

The Administration's failure to make these funds available in a timely manner is inexcusable. Any further delay in releasing the funds risks the lives of thousands of Americans whose only mode of transportation may be travel by bus. The Administration must take immediate action to make the funds available.

Furthermore, I am gravely disappointed that the Administration's recently released plan, Operation Liberty Shield, says nothing about buses, the most ubiquitous and, in many ways, the most vulnerable public transportation mode. What were the people who drafted Operation Liberty Shield thinking about, leaving out such an important mode of transportation? In light of the war and its associated security risk, the Administration must take action now to release the funds. Releasing the funds will allow the intercity bus industry to respond immediately to the elevated threat level precipitated by the war.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, only in aviation have we responded to the security vulnerabilities of our transportation system. We, in the Congress, must pursue vigorous oversight to ensure that we do not have another 9/11 tragedy in our ports, highways or railroads.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his leadership on the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and his leadership, particularly on homeland security.

Next I would like to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. LAMPSON), a distinguished member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, a Member who has worked long and hard on behalf of homeland security.

□ 1845

Mr. LAMPSON. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding to me and giving me this opportunity to come up and join the Democratic members of the Homeland Security Committee, the select committee, on this amendment that they are trying to put together and that certainly needs consideration.

I was somewhat astounded when I was given the summary of this amendment and found what was not included on the bill that was put forward by the majority party and became very pleased that we were asking for something from the Democratic side as an amendment to that bill. It certainly, certainly needs to be given consideration.

If our recent experience with anthrax, for example, has taught us anything, it is that we need to make the necessary investments to better identify solutions to these problems and to prepare appropriate responses. This comes only after we make science and research investments a priority and boost our homeland security funding.

I know that Dr. John Stobo at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston had a vision when they moved to establish a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory to do that kind of research. UTMB Galveston's vision was validated after the attacks of September 11 and the ensuing anthrax tragedy. When completed, that project is going to be one of five such laboratories in North America and the first full-size facility on a university campus in the United States. The research that they will perform in this laboratory will be absolutely invaluable as we continue to attempt to solve these problems, whether it be smallpox, anthrax, or the next bioterror act that we may not know.

When I looked at this amendment, I found that there is zero money requested for this in the proposal tomorrow and that the Democratic amendment is requesting at least \$150 million for these funds. Half of the funds would go to the CDC and the other half would go to the EPA. The funds would be used by agencies to help State health laboratories develop capacity to rapidly detect the presence of chemical terrorism agents. What a tremendous need we have within our communities, and it is astounding to me that we do not appear to be addressing this right now.

Another point that I found in here that took my breath away, 20 percent of the petrochemical processing capacity of our country is in the Ninth Congressional District, immediately south of the district of my colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER). We are surrounded by other petrochemical activity. The Houston Galveston ship channel has 150 petrochemical facilities up and down the channel, and all of the rest that is going on there. We understand from a GAO report that the Federal Government has not comprehensively assessed the chemical industry's vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.

This is one of the things I have talked about since 2 days after September 11 when I began to meet with the plant managers of the plants and our municipal leaders throughout. Certainly they have done a great deal of work. Certainly the communities have reached out and attempted to make improvements to our security. And I feel very good about the work that has been done. But in this bill for tomorrow we are not requesting any more money to give them help, and it does cost if we are going to address the problems that they are facing about that security.

Water and chemical plant security. We are asking for \$100 million. Again, I am astounded we do not have any request in the supplemental tomorrow that we will be considering. We know what happened in my district in 1947. The Monsanto chemical plant in Texas City had two freighters parked at a port when ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploded and blew up both ships and half of the city of Texas City, killing over 600 people. It was the largest loss of life to firefighters until the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. So we know what can happen to these communities, and for us to not give every opportunity to address the problems that we are facing, I think is shortsighted.

If I may ask my colleague, I just received a phone call a few minutes ago from my county judge and the U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Texas, asking for the first responder equipment particularly dealing with inoperability of equipment. Am I to understand that there is not a request to fund the needs that they have for communications capability, to be able to communicate between agencies and among agencies when there is a disaster?

Mr. TURNER. It is my understanding that there are no funds in the current proposed appropriation supplemental to assist the local governments in that purpose.

Mr. LAMPSON. The fact that the gentleman's committee, and under his leadership with the Homeland Security Committee, is asking for \$350 million to help address that problem is most appreciated. And I want to assure him that not only will I pass this information on back to the people in my congressional district about the needs that they face and the effort that the gentleman is making, and all the members of that committee are making to change this, but I will work as hard as I possibly can in support of this amendment tomorrow. I hope that it will be considered and it will be passed into law.

We need these funds. The lives of our citizens across this country depend on it, and I thank the gentleman for his work and commend him for it.

Mr. TURNER. Well, I thank the gentleman for his leadership in this area.

Madam Speaker, I will now yield to another member of the Texas delega-

tion, who also represents a significant port in the United States and the city of Houston, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BELL).

Mr. BELL. Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) for his leadership as the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee and for giving me this opportunity this evening.

Madam Speaker, we as a Nation will pay any price in order to support and protect our troops in the line of fire. There is no cost too high to protect American lives in the face of tyranny and terrorism. This is not a new principle in American government but a promise renewed in the hearts and minds of the American people after the horrific events of September 11, 2001.

I think no one in this Chamber would disagree that the world has heard our resounding call: Never again. Never again will we handle the specter of terror with kid gloves or the dismissive neglect of indifference because it is a problem that affects them and not us. This is a lesson that we have all learned together, and I would like to commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their clear commitment to support our troops with the resources they need to protect themselves.

One question still hangs heavy over this body. How do we keep our homeland secure? I do not have to tell my colleagues that our firefighters and police officers have become citizen soldiers in the war on terror, our first line of defense against another September 11. Americans have been empowered with a responsibility to protect their families and their communities by working with each other to stop acts of terror before they happen. The war on terror is a war in which we are all on the front lines.

I submit to this body that Americans on the front line need greater resources to get the job done. They need more funding in order to protect our homeland. I am particularly concerned about the security of American seaports. America's ports are our gateways of commerce to the world. Each year nearly 6 million seaborne containers enter our Nation's ports, yet only 3 percent, only 3 percent, of the cargo is ever physically inspected. The screenings that are performed are often carried out without the use of detection aids or with only hand-held devices that have limited range and capability.

This security gap gives groups like al Qaeda over 5 million opportunities every year to smuggle a nuclear device or weapon of mass destruction into the United States of America. In total, 95 percent of the cargo moving into and leaving this country each year passes through American ports. The region of Texas I call home has one of the largest of these ports. In fact, the Port of Houston receives more foreign tonnage than any other port in America. Each year, Houston alone receives 7.8 million tons of cargo from Iraq itself, 10

million tons of cargo from Saudi Arabia, and nearly 5 million tons from Algeria, a known state sponsor of terrorism.

Recently, I had the opportunity to tour the Houston ship channel, home to one of the world's largest concentrations of petrochemical plants and other critical energy infrastructure. Having had the opportunity to see the sheer size of the ship channel, the miles of exposed coastline and the sensitive nature of the industry located there, it became clear just how daunting a task protecting our waterways has become. If a petrochemical plant were to be struck by a bomb, we could face a tragedy greater in magnitude than the Chernobyl meltdown right in the heart of a major metropolitan area. This is a problem we cannot afford to ignore in Houston or anywhere else.

The Port of New York/New Jersey, the Port of Long Beach, California, the Port of Charleston, South Carolina, all three are major American ports. All three are located in close proximity to major metropolitan areas. And all three are at serious risk of attacks. These ports I have mentioned are but a few of the at-risk waterways across America. According to the GAO, Tampa Bay is home to Florida's busiest port and receives half of Florida's volume of hazardous materials, such as liquid petroleum gas, sulfur, and ammonia, all this in close proximity to downtown Tampa Bay where thousands of Americans live and work.

As my colleagues can see, it is critical that we support our port authorities and the thousands of shipping companies around the world with whom they work by enabling them to do the business of America without the constant threat of a terrorist attack.

The U.S. Coast Guard announced last year that necessary improvements to port security will cost \$963 million in fiscal year 2004 and as much as \$4.4 billion over the next 10 years. But since the attacks of September 11, Congress has appropriated less than \$400 million for port security across America. Welcome funding, yes, but far short of where we should be given the challenges we face in protecting America's borders.

We must make a commitment in this body to adequately fund port security before it is too late. By giving lip service to the problem and then not providing our local communities with the resources they need to protect our families, we risk undermining our own campaign to rid the world of terror and keep the homeland secure.

How do we explain after the next terrorist attack on American soil that our country was willing to spend \$80 billion to liberate the oppressed people of Iraq but were unable to commit the money necessary to protect our homeland against what the CIA has determined is one of the greatest vulnerabilities in America today, the threat of attack against our own ports?

We must give our heroes on the home front the same quality of support that

I know each of us is committed to giving our heroic fighting men and women abroad. The threat to our Nation's ports and our communities is a clear and present danger that cannot be ignored. The time is now to begin fully funding these critical port security needs and it can begin now. The homeland security amendment to the wartime supplemental appropriations bill, to be offered tomorrow hopefully, calls for \$440 million for port and chemical plant security and for the Coast Guard. Pass the amendment. The time is now.

Mr. TURNER. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for his comments and for his leadership on a most critical issue, homeland security.

I now would like to now yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. ETHERIDGE), who serves as a member of the Homeland Security Committee, whose leadership on the committee has been invaluable, and whose experience in education brings a unique perspective to the issue of our homeland security.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I thank him for his leadership on this committee and his leadership on the Homeland Security Committee. It has been invaluable and it is an area that we need to spend a lot of time on.

First responders are our hometown heroes. Their sacrifice and service inspire us all. When the Federal Government raises the threat level to code orange, like we have seen in the last couple of weeks, and once before that when it was raised, these are the men and women that are immediately called upon to assume the extra duties and responsibilities to help defend our hometowns from unknown threats. Congress has the responsibility to back up our local first responders with the funds that they need to make the extra security details work.

Last year I held a series of meetings with first responders across my district in North Carolina to assess what their needs were. More than 100 police officers, sheriffs, firefighters, emergency personnel, and others came to those briefings. During these meetings and in the months since then, I have heard troubling reports from our frontline forces. Despite improvements in security here in Washington at our Nation's historic sites and many urban areas, North Carolina's first responders still lack an interoperative communications infrastructure, appropriate training equipment, and the things they need to respond appropriately.

Do not get me wrong, we have made progress in coordinating responsive training and communications; but at what cost? Police chiefs and county sheriffs must decide whether to buy gas masks or bulletproof vests. Firefighters have to choose between arson training and learning about weapons of mass destruction.

□ 1900

Public health authorities divert resources from prenatal care to smallpox

vaccination programs. The Federal Government mandated that local and State authorities take the lead in planning and coordinating response efforts, and when Congress appropriated funds for first responders, the President vetoed the first appropriation and said it was too much money. Now we are trying once again to provide additional money in the supplemental tomorrow, a bit more money to pay for the unfunded mandates ordered by the Federal Government.

The majority says it is too much money, that States may not be spending the money they already have on first responders. Yesterday I received a report from the State of North Carolina. It showed that last September North Carolina received approximately \$7 million for the Office of Domestic Preparedness for first responder equipment, and the State immediately began to collect and process grant requests. This process does take some time. We want to make sure that it is not duplicated and we get the best equipment. Believe me, States all across the country can use every spare dime they can get. Our cities and States do need the money for training equipment, and they do need timely information about possible threats, and it is our responsibility to put the dollars in to help these first responders. We need to pass this amendment tomorrow to help first responders who will protect our homes, our communities, our schools and our families.

We cannot let them down and leave them unprepared.

I call on the Congress and this Administration to make the training and equipping of our nation's first responders a top priority.

Our first responders are ready and willing to do what it takes to ensure the security of their communities, our state and our country.

However, it is the responsibility of the Administration and Congress to make sure that they have the information, training and resources necessary to protect the men, women and children of America, as well as themselves.

The American people deserve to live without fear of a terrorist attack.

Parents deserve to send their children to school without fear for their safe return. Shoppers deserve to be able to walk into a crowded shopping mall without fear that a suicide bomber lurks in their midst, waiting for the right moment to strike.

Passengers deserve to be able to board an airplane without the fear that a shoulder-fired missile will bring it down.

Although no plan can guarantee every individual's safety at any given moment, all Americans deserve the right to a reasonable expectation that in their daily lives, the proper authorities have taken appropriate measures to maximize safety and security.

Unfortunately, that expectation is not being met today due to a lack of leadership.

Mr. Speaker, America was changed forever by the 9/11 attacks, and the American people accept the challenges and difficulties this new era presents.

But the American people deserve to live free from fear, and the national leadership

must provide the means to restore that hope for a secure future.

Our local first responders are absolutely key to that effort, and Democrats are working in Congress to provide the leadership necessary to get the job done.

Again, I want to thank my colleague Congressman TURNER for his leadership in this most important endeavor, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his leadership.

Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MEEK), a freshman Member who served very effectively in the Florida legislature and who serves on the Committee of Homeland Security.

Mr. MEEK of Florida. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman. I want to be very quick and within a minute I would like to share with the American public something that is very, very important. The information that you are receiving here this evening and the amendment that the Democrats will have tomorrow to not only put teeth but to make sure we have real homeland security is very, very important.

As we look at our ports and the Coast Guard, I think we need to go far beyond great speeches in front of Coast Guard cutters, and talking about how we support our men and women riding in those vessels and fighting in helicopters. I would say that with any major incident in our ports, not only will we experience a large loss of life, but we would also experience quite an interruption in commerce.

It is very, very important that the American people understand that the Coast Guard says they need a billion dollars alone this year to secure our ports. We have individuals working at our ports now that do not have proper credentials as it relates to some of the shipping companies. We know we are very vulnerable in our ports, and I think it is important that we make sure that this administration understands that it is more than just giving speeches, that it is important that we put our money where our mouth is and make sure that we are standing on behalf of homeland security.

This is an everyday issue that Americans care about, and it is an everyday issue that we have to respond to, and I am encouraging this Congress to support our efforts tomorrow to make sure that we have true homeland security.

Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) and our subcommittee members for sharing their thoughts and ideas that we have as it relates to meaningful homeland security versus just talking about what we need to do.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. GINNY BROWN-WAITE of Florida). The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) has expired.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 5 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from Hawaii

(Mr. ABERCROMBIE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

FUNDING HOMELAND SECURITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Madam Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues in urging the House to increase the amounts we will include in the supplemental appropriations bill later this week for homeland security. Last Friday I held a meeting in Honolulu of first responders to discuss preparedness, planning and coordination among agencies and funding needs. It became very apparent during the meeting that funding being received is clearly inadequate to undertake the job we are asking of our emergency law enforcement agencies and personnel.

For example, the Honolulu Police Department has apprised me of the need for some \$65.5 million for several projects that are necessary if the Island of Oahu is to be protected to the extent necessary. There are several important military installations for which Honolulu police have major responsibilities, such as Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Hickam Air Force Base, and Schofield Barracks. The Department has the responsibility for the safety of military personnel and their family who live off base, and to some extent on base. Specifically, communication and operability between civilian law enforcement and the military is essential. Additional personnel protective equipment has been identified as a need as well as emergency vehicles in a centralized equipment and maintenance facility.

The cost for effective homeland security management is a huge, unfunded mandate the Federal Government has imposed on State and local governments. The Honolulu Police Department is establishing an Emergency Management Command and an antiterrorism unit. It is undertaking extensive specialized training in areas such as chemical, biological, and explosive handling. Joint exercises with the military have been conducted so that in the event of an emergency, roles are recognized and responsibilities are familiar.

Our state of affairs and level of protection afforded to our citizens changed greatly after September 11, and has been heightened by our military engagement in Iraq. Our citizens expect and deserve such elevated security. But it also serves to remind us that protection is not cheap, and we in Congress should stand up to our responsibilities to properly fund the protections our citizens need.

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There are other imbedded homeland security costs with which state and local officials are struggling. When the Nation moves to a Code Red Alert posture, the Honolulu police incur costs of over \$1.5 million a day, about two-thirds of it for the protection of critical infrastructure for military installations.

The Oahu Civil Defense Agency has identified numerous critical projects which total \$18.1 million. Essential projects include warning siren upgrades, security cameras, computer software, as well as equipment and personnel training.

These statistics are for but two of numerous first responder agencies. This does not include the fire department, nor the burdens placed on hospitals and emergency rooms. And the Hawaii State Government has separate and additional mandates and responsibilities.

I'm not speaking today to point fingers of blame at anyone for the situation we face, but to articulate the need to provide adequate funding in the supplemental appropriations bill.

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Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).

Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Speaker, while our brave soldiers continue their work abroad, our citizens back home must live under a constant state of Orange Alert. The administration has implemented Operation Liberty Shield.