

identify all the high-risk radioactive sources that are being used and have been abandoned." The Secretary told the conference "We are ready to assist other interested countries to speed the needed improvements, and we want to begin immediately."

I am sure his heart was in the right place, but he had no ability to deliver on the statement he made to this conference.

He went on to say:

We are prepared to work with other countries to locate, consolidate, secure, and dispose of high risk radiological sources by developing a system of national regional repositories to consolidate and securely store these sources.

The administration has never requested a penny for this purpose. It seems now that this supplemental appropriations bill is where we should make the Secretary's offer of assistance to the international community credible.

This bill calls for \$20 million for non-proliferation assistance to nations other than the former Soviet Union. The Materials, Protection, Controls, and Accounting Agency nuclear non-proliferation programs to date have only targeted nations of the former Soviet Union. There is no money to do anything about it, to assist countries all over the world, especially in Southeast Asia—no money. Obviously, the point is made there.

We have \$20 million in this bill for funds that are needed to develop the analytical capability to determine the nature and origin of a stolen nuclear weapon or captured improvised nuclear device or what happened and who did it in the event of nuclear detonation on U.S. soil.

We need research and development. If a nuclear device is found, we need to be able to determine what kind of a device it is, how it will detonate, how to defuse it. We have \$20 million, a relatively small amount, the Department needs to improve material and radiochemical analysis methods, the sampling and modeling of nuclear explosion debris, and the implications of nuclear weapons design.

Our weapons labs around this country have the best scientists in the world. I have been to the weapons labs: Livermore, Sandia, Los Alamos. They have the best and the brightest. But they can't do anything to help us unless they have money to do the research. That is what this will do.

In this amendment, we have \$15 million for nuclear nonproliferation verification, \$12 million for non-proliferation assistance to Russian strategic rocket forces. What is this amount? Certain elements of the Russian military prefer to deal with our Department of Energy rather than the Department of Defense. For example, all work by the United States to secure Russian Navy warheads has been done by DOE. The fiscal year 2004 budget proposes for the first time for DOE to assist the Russian strategic rocket force ICBMs to secure its weapons. It contains funds to secure 2 of the first

10 most viable sites. Additional funds in the supplemental would start the program much earlier and increase the number of sites to be protected.

I have worked with Senator DOMENICI for many years, as the ranking member and chairman—going back and forth—of the Energy and Water Subcommittee on Appropriations. We have the responsibility to take care of our nuclear weapons. Large amounts of money are appropriated every year. We in the United States appropriate large sums of money to make sure our nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. A nuclear stockpile is not like storing a car. It is not like storing canned goods. These weapons have elements that go bad, and you need to constantly review, examine these weapons to find if they are safe and reliable. The Russians know this. But they have not had the resources to help. It is in our best interest to work with them, with Nunn-Lugar and other such methods, to try to help them make their stockpile safe and reliable. Here is \$12 million for additional funds that, as I have indicated, would help the ICBMs in Russia be safe and reliable.

When the war with Iraq ends and we find weapons of mass destruction in with nuclear material, we need to make sure we will have some way of disposing of them. We have provided in this bill for that. We want to make sure there is money for nuclear material detection regarding materials and devices.

Funds are also needed to help develop advanced materials that will enable the fielding of room-temperature, high-resolution, hand-held and portable radiation detection and identification equipment. Our labs can do that with the scientific community, many of which are in the private sector.

We have another problem. We need to be able to detect any nuclear explosion from proliferant countries that have very low yield. We don't have the equipment to do that. We need \$10 million to do that. What we have in this amendment is a number of efforts to simply make our country safer, to make homeland security apply also to things nuclear.

I am going to offer this amendment when we get the parliamentary problem worked out. The threat of loose nukes worldwide scares me as much as anything that I am afraid of. We have to do something about it. We have not talked about it. It is like the perennial ostrich sticking his head underground so he cannot see what is going on. I see what is going on, and the Senate must see what is going on. This bill, which is extremely important—as important as anything we do for homeland security—contains \$400 million, directed totally to things nuclear.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAGEL). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

MIGUEL A. ESTRADA, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 1:30 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will now go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive Calendar No. 21, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Miguel A. Estrada, of Virginia, to be United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand the distinguished chairman is on his way over. As we have evenly divided time and time is running, I will begin and will yield when he arrives.

We have another in a series of cloture votes on this divisive nomination today. Actually, nothing has changed significantly since the leadership forced the three previous cloture votes.

I did read in the New York Times over the weekend that Mr. Estrada spoke about the memos he wrote as being perhaps somewhat divisive. Maybe that is why the White House does not want us to see them. The only reason we are having these problems is the administration has refused to bring forward the writings on which one could form an idea whether he should have a lifetime appointment to the second highest court in the country.

The White House has had access to all these writings and they eagerly committed the political capital to go forward. But they don't want us to see them. The administration remains insistent that the Senate rubberstamp nominees without fulfilling the Senate's constitutional advise and consent role in this most important process.

Everyone has known for a long time how to solve the impasse in the Miguel Estrada nomination. The Democratic leader's letter pointed the way back in early February. Some say that the administration is proceeding this way because they do not care whether he goes through or not. They think somehow it is a political issue. That is the problem if this administration continues in its efforts to politicize the Federal courts.

There has been too much politicizing. The Federal courts are not a branch that belongs to either the Republican or Democratic party. They are not a branch of whoever is in the White House or in control of the Congress. They are the one independent branch of Government. They are supposed to be above politics, outside of politics, and