

bill that we need to finish as we approach November 11. That will be finalized shortly.

The point is, we are able to proceed in a bipartisan manner, and we are making progress. We must continue to do that to get the needed work done as we try to work out or work through the host of complicated issues which are inevitable when we deal with legislation.

We will continue to work across the aisle to do the necessary work of this body as we move through these final days.

Again, we will not close the Senate until we work through a few remaining items of business, but I say thanks to my colleagues. We are making progress. We have a lot of work to do over the coming days, but we are going to be able to adjourn in a reasonable period of time if we stay focused and stay disciplined as we go forward.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PLASTIC GUN OR TOY GUN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, yesterday the Cannon House Office Building was temporarily evacuated when a staff member apparently carried a toy plastic gun past a Capitol Police security check point. This incident reminds us of how important it is that we maintain adequate security in our public buildings. Even though I raised this issue last week, I want to take this opportunity to highlight the importance of the Terrorist Firearms Detection Act, a bill introduced last week by Senator KENNEDY. Originally passed in 1988, and sometimes called the "plastic gun" law, this Federal law makes it illegal for any person to manufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer or receive any firearm that is not detectable by walk-through metal detectors or the type of x-ray machines commonly used at airports.

Since September 11, 2001, Congress has worked hard to improve the security of our borders, airports, Government buildings, and communities. In just over a month, on December 10, the plastic gun law is set to expire. The Terrorist Firearms Detection Act would permanently reauthorize this law. I support this bill because plastic guns, whose production has been endorsed by the National Rifle Association, should only be used by our military and intelligence agencies.

This legislation has the support of major gun safety organizations, including the Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence United with the Million Mom March, Americans for Gun Safety, and the Violence Policy Center. The De-

partment of Justice, while failing to endorse Senator KENNEDY's permanent ban, has indicated its support for extending the current ban.

I urge my colleagues in Congress to act quickly to pass the Terrorist Firearms Detection Act, so that hopefully President Bush can sign it into law.

THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY IN 1942

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I would like to share with my colleagues a fascinating article by Dr. James Schlesinger, who served our Nation in a number of prestigious positions, such as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The article, "Underappreciated Victory," was published in the October 2003, issue of the Naval History magazine, a publication of the Naval Institute Proceedings. The article calls for the recognition of the world-historic significance of the Battle of Midway in 1942 because it was the turning point in our Nation's war in the Pacific, which, in turn, proved critical to our efforts in the European theater of war. Yet the Battle of Midway, which played such a crucial strategic role for both the European and Pacific war, scarcely gets mentioned in the history books. I wish to submit a copy of Dr. Schlesinger's article to be printed in the RECORD. This brilliant article sets the record straight.

I ask unanimous consent the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Naval History Magazine, Oct. 2003]

UNDERAPPRECIATED VICTORY

(By James Schlesinger)

As we honor those who turned the tide of World War II with a victory over ostensibly overwhelming force at the Battle of Midway in 1942—61 years ago—too few of us understand the battle's world-historic significance. It is essential, therefore, for us to go forth and proselytize.

I continue to be puzzled over the fact that it comes as something of a revelation to many people that this battle played such a crucial strategic role for the war in Europe. So the question before us is: Why is Midway not recognized as the crucial battle for the West in World War II, just as Stalingrad is recognized as a crucial battle for the Soviet Union? The comparative neglect of Midway is a great historical puzzle and, in a sense, a great injustice.

In relation to what British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and others called Grand Strategy, Midway was far more than a decisive naval victory. It was far more than the turning of the tide in the Pacific war. In a strategic sense, Midway represents one of the great turning points of world history. And in that role, the battle remains underappreciated.

Consider the Grand Strategy of the Allies, which Churchill naturally preferred and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was eager to endorse. It was, quite simply, to deal with Adolf Hitler and with the German threat in Europe first. It has been embraced shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, at the Arcadia Conference. President Roosevelt clearly recognized and acted on the

conviction that the Third Reich was the greater menace. Dramatic as the Japanese advance after Pearl Harbor had been, it was into slightly developed colonial regions—to be sure, those possessing rubber and tin. Yet, at its base, it was far less dangerous than Hitler's continuing advance, crushing and then organizing the industrial nations of Europe, while to that point almost entirely obliterating far more formidable resistance. But it was Japan that had attacked the United States, and it was Japan on which the anger of the American people had focused.

Though Churchill could almost automatically concentrate on Europe, it required considerable courage for President Roosevelt to carry through on the Grand Strategy. Germany's declaration of war on the United States on 8 December 1941 provided a small opening. Yet, had it not been for Midway, President Roosevelt could not have persevered with a Europe-first policy. Public opinion would not have allowed it. Indeed, even after Midway, he paid a substantial political price. In the mid-term election of 1942, the Democrats lost 44 seats in the House of Representatives, barely retaining control, with comparable losses elsewhere. In a subsequent poll of all the Democratic congressional candidates, the principal reason given for the debacle: "frustration" and fury at Roosevelt's Germany-first strategy, which translated into failure to punish the Japanese more aggressively for Pearl Harbor.

Nonetheless, despite the inclinations of the public, President Roosevelt recognized that the larger threat lay elsewhere, and he was prepared to pay the domestic political price for that larger national objective, defined by his Grand Strategy.

Consider the overall military situation in spring 1942. Japan was on a roll. The Philippines had fallen, including the final outposts of Bataan and Corregidor. The Japanese had swept through the Malay Peninsula from French Indochina, and on 15 February the supposedly "impregnable fortress" of Singapore had fallen to numerically inferior Japanese forces. The Dutch East Indies had been captured. Japanese forces were advancing into Burma and threatening India. Even Australia appeared to be a target. U.S. naval forces significantly weakened by the attack at Pearl Harbor, appeared vastly inferior to the armada that Japan was gathering to advance eastward in the Pacific toward Midway—then possibly to the Hawaiian Islands or even to the U.S. West Coast. Additional Japanese victories would have made it politically impossible for President Roosevelt to continue to pursue the Grand Strategy of Europe-first.

Then came Midway. Through an extraordinary combination of the skill and courage of our pilots, splendid intelligence, prudent risk-taking by our commanders that paid off, and sheer good luck, the apparently inferior U.S. forces were victorious. This victory occurred despite inferior aircraft, ineffective torpedoes, the substantial absence of backup surface ships, and our overall numerical inferiority. The rest is well known. Four Japanese carriers had been sunk, confirming the dictum of Otto von Bismarck: "the Lord God has special providence for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America." The Japanese offensive had been blunted. The Japanese fleet turned back toward the home islands, their opportunity for victory lost forever. President Roosevelt could then execute his Grand Strategy, with all that was to imply regarding the condition of postwar Europe.

After Midway, the United States could, to the chagrin of General Douglas MacArthur, turn its primary attention back to the European theater. After the stunning surrender of Tobruk, which appeared to jeopardize both