

ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTENTION TO OFFER MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES ON H.R. 2660, DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 7(c) of House rule XXII, I hereby notify the House of my intention tomorrow to offer the following motion to instruct House conferees on H.R. 2660, the fiscal year 2004 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.

The form of the motion is as follows:

I move that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill, H.R. 2660, be instructed to insist on no less than \$14,247,432,000 for student financial assistance and the highest funding level possible for subpart 1 of part A of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (the Pell Grant Program).

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2417, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

MOTION TO INSTRUCT OFFERED BY MS. HARMAN

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.

The Clerk read as follows:

Ms. HARMAN moves that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 2417 be instructed to insist upon section 344 of the House passed bill (relating to the report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq) and to include in the conference report a requirement that the report be submitted as soon as possible within the scope of conference.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. HARMAN) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Ms. HARMAN).

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct this bill's conferees to insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an intelligence "lessons

learned" report and to include a requirement that this report be submitted as soon as possible.

Section 344 of the House bill requests within 1 year of enactment a report from the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence lessons learned as a result of military operations in Iraq. But as we know all too well, the lives of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and -women, Marines and civilians are on the line in Iraq and Afghanistan today. There is an urgent need to identify what policymakers, military forces, and the intelligence community can be doing better today rather than months or years from now.

As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the war in Iraq is not over, and daily reports from Baghdad continue to be grave and disheartening. In the last several weeks, we have seen suicide bombings of the International Red Cross headquarters and several Baghdad police stations, a rocket attack on the al-Rashid Hotel where Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz was staying at the time, mortar attacks inside the U.S.-controlled Green Zone in central Baghdad, the downing of five U.S. Army helicopters, a suicide bombing of Italian military police in An Nasiriyah, and a steady stream of improvised road-side explosive devices directed against U.S. and coalition soldiers.

Coalition forces are being attacked up to 35 times a day. As of today, Mr. Speaker, 181 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Iraq by hostile fire since the President announced the end of major combat operations on May 1. Clearly, our intelligence efforts on the ground are not where they should be. We are only now setting up information sharing fusion centers. We have just recently begun to increase the number of analysts and intelligence experts. The bottom line is that we still know very little about the nature of the insurgency.

Accurate and actionable intelligence is vital if we are to prevail in this continuing conflict, and I and other members of the Committee intend to do everything possible to provide our forces with the very best intelligence. Lessons learned with respect to both prewar intelligence and intelligence support to the war fighters during combat operations are a key ingredient in that effort. The intelligence community must understand what worked well and what did not work so well so that improvements in intelligence support to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq today can be made as quickly as possible. Lessons learned are also important if future intelligence assessments of Iran, North Korea, and the war on terrorism in general are to be credible.

The gentleman from Florida (Chairman GOSS) has said, and I agree, that intelligence community reform, or transformation, must be on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's agenda next year. That effort should be informed by an under-

standing of where U.S. intelligence in Iraq needs to be better.

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In the course of a 5-month investigation, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on a bipartisan basis has identified serious shortcomings in the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism. We found that sketchy and often circumstantial evidence produced estimates that likely were substantially wrong. At a minimum, the intelligence community overstated the strength of the underlying data supporting its conclusions.

Our Senate counterparts are engaged in a similar effort to identify intelligence shortcomings and recommend changes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared their own assessment of strategic lessons learned from the Iraq war, and I strongly supported the Defense Authorization bill's requirement of a "lessons learned" report from the Department of Defense by March of next year.

Unfortunately, the intelligence community has yet to acknowledge any flaws in prewar intelligence. With American lives on the line, the problems with prewar intelligence must be addressed and analyzed now. An intelligence "lessons learned" study cannot await the conclusion of David Kay's ongoing WMD search in 9 months or a year from now. Regardless of what he finds, we already know there were problems with collection, analysis, and the way policymakers used the information.

Mr. Speaker, I offer this motion to instruct because the best intelligence is key to stopping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, which will then permit reconstruction and implementation of true self-government.

I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman GOSS) will accept my motion and that we will continue to work on a bipartisan basis to expedite the report and to implement its findings.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments and, of course, all the extraordinary hard work that she has put in on her side with her staff and her members. It clearly has been a good exercise in bipartisanship which I think distinguishes this House very well on an extremely important subject.

The subject that the gentlewoman has brought up is one of great concern to us. A report on lessons learned from the military operations in Iraq has a place in the bill, much deserved because it is important, and the language that is in there that her proposed instruction goes to in terms of the scope of the conference, for Members' benefit, says a report not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this act shall be made on lessons learned,