

Approximately 600,000 people each year—roughly 75 percent of them children—participate in the EFNEP program, gaining new skills in food preparation, shopping, storage, safety, and sanitation. They learn how to better manage their food budgets and related resources such as Food Stamps. Youth topics may also include fitness, avoidance of substance abuse and other health-related issues. EFNEP's hands-on, learn-by-doing approach allows the participants to acquire the practical skills necessary to make positive changes in behavior.

The results are clear and heartening. For example, EFNEP's evaluation and reporting system showed that among program graduates in 2002: 88 percent improved in nutrition practices such as making healthy food choices, reading nutrition labels and having children eat breakfast; 83 percent improved in food resource practices such as meal planning and budgeting; 67 percent improved in food safety practices such as storing and thawing foods correctly; 51 percent now offer five fruits and vegetables to their families each day; and 41 percent now routinely eat low-fat foods instead of fat-rich foods.

Studies in several states found that EFNEP is a solid investment of federal dollars. According to the studies, every dollar invested in EFNEP reduced health care costs by \$10.64 in Virginia, \$8.82 in a group of Midwestern states, \$8.03 in Iowa, and \$3.63 in Oregon.

In spite of these successes, the fiscal year 2004 Agriculture Appropriations bill reduced funding to 33 programs administered by CSREES by 10 percent each. EFNEP was one of those programs. Even in the short time since that appropriations bill was enacted in late January, we have already heard about the adverse impact the cuts are having on EFNEP. In community after community, extension offices are laying off EFNEP staff, thereby limiting the reach of the program. Just to offer a few examples, the 10 percent cuts to EFNEP mean that:

In Maryland 375 currently enrolled families will not be served, and another 3,000 eligible individuals will not receive nutrition education;

In Colorado bilingual nutrition education serving low-income Hispanic families will be cut by 400 people;

In Tennessee 14 staff positions must be cut, and EFNEP programs in seven counties will be lost, forcing a large reduction from the 3,600 persons served on average;

In Florida EFNEP youth contacts will be decreased by about 1,600 adult and 100 youth participants;

In Ohio EFNEP will suffer major staff cuts, which will force it to give up on many of the 7,000 parents and 21,000 youth it reaches every year;

In Michigan EFNEP will reach up to 600 fewer families;

And in my own state of Connecticut, 150 families and about 350 youth will not be served in both Hartford and Bridgeport, 2 of the 10 poorest cities in the country, as well as in Danbury, a city with many immigrant groups that are in need of nutrition education.

At a time when the need for EFNEP is greatest, financial support for the program from Congress has waned. This will only squander some of the significant gains EFNEP has already made in hundreds of communities around the country. And this penny-wise solution to short-term budget challenges will come back to haunt us in the long-run as the Fed-

eral Government's share of health costs—driven by the obesity epidemic—continue to rise.

With a relatively small investment, we can stem the tide of obesity in this country. That is why for 2005, I hope we can increase funding for this critical program. I respectfully urge my colleagues to seize this opportunity and do what is right.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. BRAD SHERMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I voted present on H.R. 3717 today, the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act. I support the aim of the bill, to limit the broadcasting of indecent material through increased penalties, but I have concerns about the application of such fines. My concern is that, since the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) lacks appropriate guidance for administering fines of this size, such enforcement action could have a chilling effect on free speech with regard to smaller broadcasters and individual performers. Mr. Speaker, this chilling effect can be reduced if the FCC is given clear statutory guidance as to how to determine the size of the fine; this bill fails to provide such clear guidance. Among the factors the FCC should be required to employ are the degree of indecency, pre-meditation, the number of viewers or listeners, and the size and wealth of the violator. In the absence of such clear standards, small broadcasters and nonwealthy performers may fear to speak even in manners which should be protected.

A TRIBUTE TO SUSAN BOWERS, 29TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT WOMAN OF THE YEAR—2004

HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Women's History Month. During the month of March, we pay special tribute to the accomplishments made by our nation's most distinguished women. It is my great privilege to recognize outstanding women who are making a difference in my district.

I stand today, to recognize an extraordinary woman of California's 29th Congressional District, Mrs. Susan Bowers. Mrs. Bowers's passion for community service, especially on behalf of children and education, has made the City of Burbank a better place in which to live.

A native Californian, Susan attended California State University Fullerton where she graduated as a member of the Phi Alpha Theta Honor Society. In 1997, she married Gordon Bowers, a Captain with the Burbank Police Department. After a successful corporate career in manufacturing, she joined the Burbank Chamber of Commerce in 2000 as Executive Director/CEO, where she remained until her retirement in 2003. Currently, Susan divides her time between volunteering, organizational management consulting, and spending time with her children, Melanie, Bryan,

Jeff, stepsons Matt and Michael, three grandchildren, and Lamont Duverne, for whom she and Gordon are the primary caregivers.

The consummate volunteer, Susan has three areas of community service that she passionately supports: leadership, literacy and education. She has served on numerous city and school committees, including the Civic Pride Committee, the Workforce Investment Board, the Burbank Unified School District Strategic Planning Committee, the Burbank Unified School District Partnership Program, and the Verdugo School-To-Career Committee. In addition, Mrs. Bowers was a founder and director of the Burbank Community Foundation, a Board Director of the Burbank Boys and Girls Club, and with her husband Gordon, was a mentor at Elmwood Achievement Center.

Mrs. Bowers currently serves on the Board of Leadership Burbank, the Woodbury University President's Advisory Board, Burbank's Library Board of Trustees, the Measure L Committee for Burbank libraries and the La Providencia Guild. In addition, Susan is a Sunday school teacher at First Presbyterian Church of Burbank.

Susan has received many awards, including the 2001 Community Support Award by Work Training Programs, Inc. and an honorary membership in the Woodbury University School of Business Honor Society. In 2003 she received a key to the City from Mayor Stacey Murphy for her contributions to the Burbank Chamber of Commerce.

I ask all Members of Congress to join me today in honoring a remarkable woman of California's 29th Congressional District, Susan Bowers. The entire community joins me in thanking Susan Bowers for her continued efforts to make the 29th Congressional District a better place in which to live.

PREVENT INDONESIA FROM RECEIVING IMET FUNDING IN FISCAL YEAR 2004

HON. JOEL HEFLEY

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I offered an amendment that was intended to cut \$600,000 out of the IMET account to prevent Indonesia from receiving IMET funding in fiscal year 2004.

As many members are aware, I offered an amendment to the Foreign Service Re-Authorization Act of 2004 and 2005 that would limit Indonesia's participation in the IMET program. My amendment would limit Indonesia from receiving International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds until the President certifies to Congress that the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are taking effective measures, including cooperating with the Director of the FBI, in conducting a full investigation of the attack and to criminally prosecute the individuals responsible for the attack.

For those members that are not aware, on August 31, 2002, the staff of the International School in West Papua, Indonesia decided to take a picnic. The teachers lived and worked in Tembagapura, a company town located high in the mountains near the Grasberg gold

and copper mine. The group of eleven people, including a 6-year-old child, drove in two vehicles to a picnic site about 10 miles away on the road to Timika. Because it began to rain, they decided to return to town for lunch.

The road they were traveling on is not an ordinary road. The road is surrounded by the gold and copper mine, and is heavily guarded by the Indonesian military. At both ends of this mountain road are military check points, which seals the road and control access to Tembagapura.

As they returned home, the group was brutally attacked by a band of terrorists. Two Americans, Ted Burgon (from Oregon) and Rick Spier (from Colorado), and an Indonesian man were killed in the ambush. The attack, which occurred less than a half-mile away from an Indonesian military check point, went on for approximately 45 minutes. Hundreds of rounds were fired at the teachers and their vehicles. Most of the survivors, including the 6-year-old child, were shot. Several of the teachers were shot multiple times and suffered horrible injuries.

Ted Burgon of Sunriver, Oregon was killed and his wife Nancy suffered facial cuts and abrasions. Rick Spier of Littleton, Colorado was killed, and his wife Patsy was shot in the back and foot. Francine Goodfriend of Rockford, Illinois was shot and has a spinal cord injury. Steven Emma of Broward County, Florida was shot in the legs, buttocks, and suffered injuries to his back. Lynn Poston of Olga, Washington was shot in the shoulder and legs. Suandra Hopkins of Sunriver, Oregon was shot in the side, legs, and pellets around the eye and his wife Taia was shot in the buttocks.

Following the attack, the Indonesian Police promptly began an investigation. They collected evidence, interviewed witnesses and reconstructed the ambush. The Indonesian Police issued a report (that I ask for unanimous consent to submit for the RECORD) concluding, "there is a strong possibility that the Tambagapura case was perpetrated by members of the Indonesian National Army Force, however, it still needs to be investigated further."

In early November 2002, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that "United States intelligence agencies have intercepted messages between Indonesian army commanders indicating that they were involved in staging an ambush at the remote mine in which three school teachers, two of them Americans, were killed. . . ." The Washington Post has reported these same intelligence intercepts.

Despite this intelligence, the investigation of the attack has faltered. The Indonesian Police have been effectively removed from the case due to their report that implicated the military. The two senior Indonesian police officers who uncovered evidence of the army's involvement have been transferred to new posts, and the investigation has now been handed over to a joint military police team. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian military has exonerated itself. American investigative teams, including the FBI, have not been able to complete their investigations due mainly to the Indonesian military's refusal to cooperate and its tampering of evidence.

The evasions and obstructions of the Indonesian military are wholly unacceptable, and it is incumbent upon this Congress to see that a thorough investigation is conducted. The vic-

tims of this brutal attack deserve no less. My amendment is, therefore, intended to ensure that the perpetrators of this heinous crime against Americans are brought to justice. To the extent that the Indonesian military was involved, the United States should insist on criminal prosecution of all involved parties.

Mr. Speaker, the amendment is important. It gives voice to our commitment that the United States will hold accountable the perpetrators and protectors of terrorism. We will exhaust every means to protect our citizens. We will pursue terrorists wherever they may be and hold to account. We will demand justice for attacks against our citizens and withhold aid from those countries that do not cooperate in bringing terrorists to justice. As President Bush has stated, "if you are not with us you are against us." It is time for Indonesia to choose who it will align itself with, the terrorists or the coalition of nations that bring them to justice.

REPORT SUMMARY

I. SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 2002

1. Location of the Incident: Mile 62-63. In between two Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security stations, height, steep gorge on the right hand side, hill on the left hand side, foggy, difficult to escape.

2. Victim: 3 (three) died, 11 (eleven) heavy/light injured, not specified.

3. Evidence:

2 (two) Toyota LWB land cruiser, 2 (two) dump trucks, 1 (one) trailer truck;

94 (ninety four) bullet shells—5.56 mm caliber;

6 (six) bullet shells—7.62 × 51 mm caliber;

1 (one) broken magazine;

134 (one hundred thirty four) shooting holes on 5 (five) evidence vehicles (not included those that hit the windshields, approximately more than 200 (two hundreds) rounds; and

Broken windshields.

4. Witnesses: 3 (three) witnesses saw that there were around 3 (three) shooters with the following identifications:

Wore striped dress without any attributes;
Wore green "sebo" (camouflage paint that is worn on the face); and

Carried black long barrel rifle.

5. The victims: They saw approximately 11 (eleven) shooters with the following identifications:

1 (one) person wore a black shirt and striped pants;

1 (one) person wore military boots;

6 (six) persons ran into the bushes in front of the location of the incident; and

3 (three) persons ran in the direction of Timika.

II. SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2002

1. 08:45 East Indonesian Time (EIT): Processing team, led by the Head of the County Police of Mimika and the Head of the Detective Unit, was repeatedly shot at around the location of the incident.

2. 11:00 EIT: Vacuum Condition (VC) of the member of Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security—

11:40 EIT:

Mr. X was shot to death; and

Mr. Suherman, Private of the Highest Rank, was shot in his right thigh.

13:30 EIT:

Head of the Provincial Police, Territorial Military Commander, Military Regiment Commander, Military District Commander, Head of the County Police, and Task Force Commander and Security #515 of Army Strategic Reserve Command + the journalists arrived at the location of the incident;

Mr. X's dead body was laid down on the side of the road;

No puddle of blood or flowing of blood occurred in the location where Mr. X was placed on the side of the road;

Stiff dead body (left hand cannot be folded); and

The dead body has not been identified, approximate age is 25 years old, without shoes, Papuan ethnic.

15:30 EIT: Mr. X's dead body was transferred to Tembagapura Hospital, based on Dr. Kunto Rahardjo's report, the person had been dead for more than 6 (six) hours, small maggots/larvas was found on the intestine in the open stomach.

3. 3 (three) witnesses have seen Mr. X around Station #515 in Banti village.

III. MR X'S CORPSE CONDITION (AUTOPSY RESULT BY DR. AGUNG, FORENSIC SPECIALIST FROM INDONESIA POLICE HEADQUARTERS)

1. 4 (four) wounds were caused by the shooting:

2 (two) shots on the left-hand side of the back;

1 (one) shot on the upper right hand; and

1 (one) shot on the right side.

2. The wound direction on the body: vertical.

3. The victim was suffering from Testicle Hydrocele for approximately 2 (two) years (the scrotum diameter is 16 cm.).

IV. RECONSTRUCTION ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

1. Nothing significant happened on August 31, 2002.

2. September 1, 2002:

The distance between First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan (Mr. X's shooter) and Mr. X is approximately 75 meters, there are many sight hindrances and shooting impediments in between).

The colleagues of the First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan standing within 1-4 meters from Mr. Wayan could not see Mr. X. and his friends.

The location where Mr. X was shot is very narrow (approximately 0.5 meter), on the side of a very deep gorge, there was no blood stain in that place.

In between the evening of August 31 (aftermath of the incident 13:40 EIT) and September 1, 2002, the location of the incident was guarded strongly by the Task Force and Security of Army Strategic Reserve Command #515, and has been searched carefully so there will be very small probability that the Rebellious Movement Group still exists there.

V. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2002

1. There was shooting to the vehicle of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 63 (1300 meters from the station of Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 64).

2. No victim and no evidence.

VI. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002

1. 09:30 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security crossed the bridge at Mile 62, saw that there were 3 (three) members of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.

2. 11:00 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security crossed the Mile 62 bridge, saw that there was 1 (one) member of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.

3. 11:30 EIT, the investigation team that was led by Police Commissioner Adjunct Mr. Helmy Kwarto was on the way to Tembagapura Sectional Police and was shot

at repeatedly at Mile 61 (Translator's note: the original Indonesian language does not say specifically, whether the vehicle was shot at or the person, whether anyone was injured or died).

4. 10:30 EIT, the logistic vehicle of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security was shot at repeatedly by an unidentified shooter. 8 (eight) bullet holes, 2 (two) from outside and 6 (six) from the inside of the vehicle were found on the vehicle body.

5. Approximately 1 (one) hour before, the Territorial Military Commander group went down from Tembagapura and passed the shooting area down to Timika.

6. While the investigation team continued their travel to Tembagapura Sectional Police, the Vice Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security on behalf of Infantry Major Mr. Aksan Widjaya stopped the team at the place close to the bridge at Mile 62 and told the team that there is/are bomb/s under the bridge. (Translator's note, in the Indonesian language it is not clear about the singular or plural, so it is not clear if there was only one bomb, or more than one).

7. 3 (three) Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) Detonators, 2 (two) ABC brand batteries and 3 (three) detonator cables approximately 20 meters long were found.

8. At the same time, the Vice Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security said, "This is to inform the Head of the Provincial Police and Territorial Military Commander, please do not always accuse the Indonesian Army Force."

9. The Power Gel (the same as the one that is used by PT FIC = Freeport Indonesia Corporation) has expired.

10. The investigation that has been done in the PT FIC explosive storage showed that there is no indication that this power gel came from this storage, probably this power gel came from the field, the remaining explosion operation in the field.

11. The XVII Trikora Territorial Military Commander had made a statement in Jakarta, he said that this Tembagapura case probably was caused by the PT FIC internal conflict and it was not caused by the people from the inside of the forest.

VII. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002

There were 2 (two) unidentified threatening telephone calls:

1. Number 0901-422907 received a call that came from #358 that was used by Task Force and Security (It is confirmed by the print out or a hard copy of the call issued by the MIS Department of PT FIC, and this can be used as evidence).

2. Number 0901-422907 received a call from a cellular phone number 08124887486. This cellular phone belongs to Sergeant First Class Mr. Jatmiko, the member of the Army Special Force Command Cendrawasih Task Force. (Lieutenant Colonel Mr. Siburian acknowledged in front of Papuan Vice Chairman of the Provincial Police that the cellular phone belonged to one of the member of his team, but it has been sold to a bar waitress on Bar Boulevard).

3. The following was found on Friday, September 20, 2002: 2 (two) bullet shells on the

hill, at the location where the Papuan Freedom Organization people had gathered to shoot the Mr. Suhrman, Private of the Highest Rank, 7 (seven) bullet holders, and 3 (three) bullet shells of 5.56 caliber.

VIII. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2002

Interrogation result from the victim PATRICIA LYNN SPEIR (from Colorado):

1. At the time right after the shooting on August 31, 2002 and before the ambulance came, the victim saw 3 (three) persons who wore dark blue T-shirts, the victim did not pay attention at the color of the pants. 2 (two) Papuans and 1 (one) newcomer were helping the victims.

2. The victim saw 1 (one) other person with the following identification: non Papuan, wore a black vest, without weapon, at the location of the incident.

3. While waiting for the ambulance to come, a soldier, non Papuan, in a complete uniform with a jungle hat, wearing a shirt without an insignia, with his long barrel gun still hot (the victim felt it without touching it, the victim felt the heat transfer from the gun barrel to the victim's leg at a 510 cm distance), was standing up for approximately 10 minutes and almost stepped on the victim's leg without doing anything, with an unfriendly radiant eye.

IX. COMMUNITY OPINION

1. Papuan Freedom Organization does not have the quantity of bullets as the number of bullets that were shot during the incident (approximately 200 bullets were found on August 31, 2002), and usually this Papuan Freedom Organization will not spend that much ammunition.

2. There was no indication of the initiation from the tribe around PT FIC that they were going to attack (such as a traditional ritual, statement, a demonstration, etc.).

3. Mr. Kelly Kwalik had made a statement that his group was not involved in that incident.

4. The separatist groups leaders (Tom Beanal, Thaha Alhamid, etc.) stated that they were not involved.

5. Papuan Freedom Organization never kills white people.

6. Papuan Freedom Organization always gets involved in a "Hit and Run" when they make an attack. The fact is that between September 1 until September 14, 2002 there still were shootings.

7. The Non Government Organization or NGO such as LSM ELSHAM PAPUA and Toga, Tomas, which are pro-separatists groups, were very active in helping the investigation process.

X. OTHERS

1. The morale of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security is relatively low because of the following:

a. They only receive the incentive of Rp.125,000. per month for the rank of Tamtama (Private Second Class up to the Head of Corporal) and Rp.150,000. per month for the rank of Bintara (from Lower Ranking Sergeant up to Sergeant Major) (a Javanese anecdote says "Satu Selawe Njaluk Slamet" or in a free translation it gives a sarcastic meaning "For One and Twenty Five you are looking for a Safe") (Translator's note: Rp.

Is the Indonesia currency and stands for Rupiah, in August 2002 the approximate exchange rate is US\$1.=Rp.9000., so Rp.125,000/month=US\$13.89/month and Rp. 150.000/month US\$16.67/month).

b. For a side income they are often selling food and raw material for food to Timika.

c. On June 23, 2002, 12 (twelve) members of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security were caught because they stole copper wire.

d. Their perks, such as vehicles, telephones, etc., were reduced.

e. They had a high expectation when they transferred to the location of PT FIC (copper and gold mining), but in fact it is very minimal.

2. The "Demonstration Effect" that took place was caused by the excessive living standard of the PT FIC employees (especially those white employees), including the glaring facilities.

XI. SEPTEMBER 29, 2002: REPETITION OF INCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION ON THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2002

1. It was very difficult to see from the place where the First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan was shooting, whether those 2 (two) friends of Mr. X were hiding, or whether they were going to take Mr. X's weapon away from him, or whether they were trying to run away.

2. It was seen that Mr. X's dead body was dragged by 4 (four) members of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force by taking turns, 78 meters through trees roots, wet land and sharp gravels.

3. Blood spots and hair and broken clothes of Mr. X's were not found along the trail that was used to drag Mr. X's dead body.

4. Mr. Margono, Private of the Highest Rank, stated that he examined the corpse after the corpse had been laid down on the side of the street, the result was; 5 (five) shooting wounds were found, many charms or amulets and fresh blood were found around the corpse and on Mr. X's clothes.

XII. FACT FINDING

1. The vehicle plate numbers DS 20 PD and DS 54 PD that were used by the Task Force of Cendrawasih Army Special Force Command were vague numbers, and they were not issued by Mimika Police Department.

2. The number on the sides of the vehicles had been erased.

3. The PT FIC Management Information System (MIS) Department felt regret because they had given the print out or hard copy of the telephone usage to the Indonesian Police, this is related to the unidentified telephone threats: "If I knew that this is for the police, I will not print it."

XIII. TEMPORARY CONCLUSION

1. Based on the above-mentioned indicators, there is a strong possibility that the Temabagapura case was perpetrated by the member of the Indonesian National Army Force, however, it still needs to be investigated further.

2. Maybe the Indonesian National Army Force investigators should be involved, in order to alleviate further misleading circumstances that could harm somebody's life.

SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER PROCESSING OF THE WITNESS'S INVESTIGATION OFFICIAL REPORT, MR. DECKY MURIP (OPERATIONAL TEAM ASSISTANCE OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND)

No.	Contents of investigation official report (witnesses has been sworn in)	Material to be evaluated and analyzed
1	At 7:30 EIT, August 31, 2002, Mr. Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) was invited by the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) and other 9 (nine) persons among others are 3 (three) persons—First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi, Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Putu Suradnya and Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas with white Freeport vehicle (side number 0609 that used to be used by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus to go from Serayu Hotel in Timika to Freeport Tembagapura.	Information should be taken from the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. —Almost all the community in Timika (Police/Indonesian Army/community) know First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command).

SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER PROCESSING OF THE WITNESS'S INVESTIGATION OFFICIAL REPORT, MR. DECKY MURIP (OPERATIONAL TEAM ASSISTANCE OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND)—Continued

No.	Contents of investigation official report (witnesses has been sworn in)	Material to be evaluated and analyzed
2	On August 31, 2002, before Decky Murip went with a vehicle with a side number 0609 (used to be used by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus), in Serayu Hotel Mr. Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) was given two bottles of beer with plastic covers tied with a string, the others drank from the bottle with the original cover. Because Decky Murip drank those two bottles with a plastic cover, he lost his Identity Card that was saved in his pocket.	Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. —Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) was given a special drink and then invited to go with the group.
3	Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command), after he drank the two bottles with plastic covers and strings jumped into the white Freoport vehicle with side number 0609 with the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus and the driver called "Mas" with the other 8 (eight) persons that wore black vests carrying short black barrel guns (approximately 50 cm. length) and one of them wore a black hat with the white command knife logo. They started from Serayu Hotel in Timika to go up to Freoport Tembaga, and Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) with the other 4 (four) persons, the staff members of First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) were dropped off after Mile 50 (after passing the tunnel), and their task was to wait for further command and to listen to the explosion of gun shots for 4X.	Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. —Why parts of the group was dropped off, Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) + 4 (four) persons had to wait and listen to the 4 (four) shots? Was it a code? Or an execution, was it possible that Mr. X was executed during the sound of explosion that was heard by Decky Murip and the other 4 (four) persons with black vests? Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. Question: Why after the vehicle went round and round without any direction and without stopping, Markus Cs then brought the group with black vests up to the location of the incident at Mile 63, and then asked Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) to go to the hill in order to chase the Rebellious Movement Group? Answer: If Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) followed the command to go to the hill with the bushes (where it was guessed there were people there around the location of the incident at Mile 63), probably that black vested group that was brought by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus, would execute Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) considered to be the attacker of the attack that had just happened on August 31, 2002, this would show as if that First Lieutenant Mr. Markus and the black vested group had rendered a good service in chasing and finding the attacker in that day of August 31, 2002. This scenario plan in the location of the incident will damage the image of the Army Special Force Command Cendrawasih Team, because Decky Murip is the Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command.
4	Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) with the other 4 (four) persons, the staff members of First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) after waiting in the place that they were dropped off (after Mile 50) for a while, they were picked up again by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) with a driver called "Mas" with the other 4 (four) persons, the staff members of First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) with the same vehicle (white vehicle with side number 0609) and the total of people were 11 (eleven) including First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) and the driver, they were brought from Mile 50 down toward Timika and went round and round without any direction and without stopping and then went back up to the location of the incident at Mile 63.	Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. Question: What will happen if Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command) would go to the bushy hills around the location of the incident at Mile 63? Answer: Probably he would be a target for shooting by the black vested group that was led by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus. Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
5	When the group (that was led by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) with a driver and 8 (eight) staff members and Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command) arrived at the location of the incident at Mile 63 toward Tembaga, they stopped and all of them got out of the vehicle and saw the evidence (the victim's vehicle), at that same time Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) was ordered by the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) to go to the hill in order to check if there were people in the bushes on the hill, but Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) rejected the order of the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) because he said he felt dizzy which was caused by that drink (two bottles with plastic covers and strings), and he did not want to go to the hill to check the area in the location of the incident at Mile 63.	Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia. Question: Why after the vehicle went round and round without any direction and without stopping, Markus Cs then brought the group with black vests up to the location of the incident at Mile 63, and then asked Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) to go to the hill in order to chase the Rebellious Movement Group? Answer: If Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) followed the command to go to the hill with the bushes (where it was guessed there were people there around the location of the incident at Mile 63), probably that black vested group that was brought by First Lieutenant Mr. Markus, would execute Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) considered to be the attacker of the attack that had just happened on August 31, 2002, this would show as if that First Lieutenant Mr. Markus and the black vested group had rendered a good service in chasing and finding the attacker in that day of August 31, 2002. This scenario plan in the location of the incident will damage the image of the Army Special Force Command Cendrawasih Team, because Decky Murip is the Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command.
6	The result of the investigation, Freoport vehicle with side number 0609 usually was driven by a driver named Nathan, on a daily basis Nathan served as a driver for the Commander of the Task Force of Cendrawasih Army Special Force Command, if the Commander was on duty in Timika and Tembaga.	Information should be taken from First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan Suradnyia (Army Special Force Command), Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force Command). Note: —Indonesian Police does not have the authority. —The information should be taken by a Solid Team that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
7	The August 31, 2002 chronological group plan was begun from Serayu Hotel at 7:30 EIT where Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command) drank the two bottles with plastic covers and strings, with the other 4 (four) persons (the staff of the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army Special Force Command), and then they were dropped at Mile 50 and the rest of the group went up (Tembaga), but then they came back and picked up Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) and the other 4 (four) people (the staff of the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army Special Force Command), and then they all went back down toward Timika, the vehicle went round and round and then went back up and stopped after the incident of shooting at the location of the incident at Mile 63, then the group went down from the vehicle (with side number 0609) in order to see the evidence, the vehicle that was shot by the ambush. Then Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) did not want to follow the order of the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army Special Force Command) to investigate the hill around the location of the incident at Mile 63, and then went back down to Timika. Need explanation from the Army Special Force Command in order to clarify the information from Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command). If the information was vague, it was a violation of Article 242 KUPH that said "to provide vague information" to the Police Investigator or to the Army Special Force command. And the person will also be charged by Article 310 KUPH that said about "damaging somebody's reputation" because he/she has defiled the reputation of the Special Armed Force Command (Indonesian Armed Force). It was getting worse since the Press Conference on the television on September 25, 2002 at 23:30 EIT or 21:30 West Indonesian Time (WIT).	Referring to the information that was given by Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) that was supported by ELSHAM (ELSHAM is one of the NGO group). The Head of the Tribe, and a Pastor, and they spontaneously willing to do the Press Conference on the television, therefore it is important for the government of Indonesia to develop a team in order to clarify the case so it will alleviate the conflict between the Indonesian Police that act as the investigator for managing the case in the location of the incident that is located in a vital project (PT Freoport) and the misunderstood group. According to January 14, 2002 Operational Regiment Tembaga (Ren Ops Tembaga) that is valid for 365 days (one year) until January 2003, the location of the incident that is located in PT Freoport is under the authority of The XVII Trikora Regional Military Command. Note: —The vehicles that were used by Army Special Force Command without side numbers (had been erased) with vague numbers "DS" were freely driven in the area of Timika and go up and down vice versa to Tembaga. —The Indonesian Police that conducted the investigation in the area that is under the authority of the Indonesian National Army Force, needs to be backed up by a solid team that is developed by the government of Indonesia, because it is very sensitive and easy to become a conflict between the Indonesian Police and the Indonesian National Army Force (PAM PROVITNAS PT FREOPORT/OPS TEMBAGA 14 2002 by Trikora Regional Military Command).

Additional Information:

1. All of the information about Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) has been submitted by Vice Chairman of the Provincial Police to The Commander of the Task Force of the Army Special Force Command (Cendrawasih Team) in his residence on September 24, 2002 between 09:00–23:00 EIT.

2. The Press Conference, led by Mr. Jhon Rumbiak—ELSHAM (one of the NGO group), was held at September 25, 2002 at 23:30 IT or 21:30 WIT.

3. Mr. Siburian, the Lieutenant Colonel Infantry and the Commander of Task Force of the Army Special Force Command (Cendrawasih team), said that the information provided by those people and the Operational Team Assistant did not mean to mention the Cendrawasih Team of Army Special Force Command, and the purpose of Jhon Rumbiak and Decky Murip was to manipulate the public opinion in order to make the Army Special Force Command—Indonesian National Army Force look bad.

THE TRIANGLE AUTHENTICATION

The Location of the Incident (TKP)

1. August 31, 2002—block on Mile 62.
2. September 1, 2002—block Mile 61 (Police).
3. September 13, 2002—some members of 515 Task Force regiment were shot at. That happened at Mile 63.
4. September 14, 2002—the investigation team was shot at. That happened at Mile 62.
5. September 14, 2002—some members of 515 Task Force regiment were shot at Mile 62, 2 (two) holes from the outside and 4 (four) holes from the inside.
6. September 14, 2002—found bomb at Mile 62.
7. September 20, 2002—found explosive at Mile 63.
8. September 20, 2002—found 7 (seven) bullet holders, 2 (two) SS-1 bullet shells, 1 (one) M-16 bullet shell.

The Rectangle on the Top Left Hand Corner (the explanation is connected to Mr. X)

1. Larva/maggot inside the intestine of the victim seen from the open stomach.
2. The stomach and the intestine was empty, found brown color liquid, the person had not eaten for more than 12 hours.
3. The victim had been dead for more than 6 hours when the Tembaga Hospital received the dead body.
4. All of the dead body was rigid (rigor mortis).
5. There were 4 (four) horizontal shooting holes that caused the death of the victim.
6. The diameter of the testicle is approximately 17 cm., the victim was suffering Testicle Hydrocele.
7. The last position was at the dent of the hill, with 80° steep grade (steep down to a deep gorge).

8. The dead body was thrown away down 8 meters and was dragged for approximately 78 meters through the tree roots and sharp gravel.

The Rectangle on the Bottom Left Hand Corner (the explanation is connected to the evidence)

1. The case of August 31, 2002:
 - a. 95 bullet shells 5.56 and 7.62 caliber;
 - b. The vehicles of the victim (3 trucks and 2 jeeps);
 - c. 3 victims were dead & 11 heavy/light injured; and
 - d. Approximately 134 bullet holes.
2. The case of September 1, 2002:
 - a. Mr. X;
 - b. The accessories of Mr. X (bag, flashlight, m. tawon, ABC battery, pepsodent, etc.);
 - c. Bullet shells 5.56 + 7.62 + 1 broken M-16 magazine;

d. Mr. X hat with Special Army Force Command logo; and

e. Black shirt, black jacket, brown short pant.

Note: m. tawon = minyak tawon = a special medicated oil that is normally used by the people from Indonesia especially people that come from the eastern part of Indonesia.

The Rectangle on the Right Hand Side (the explanation is connected to the Witnesses)

1. Dwi Lasmono (the 515 driver), Agus Rahmat (Freeport Security) & Darius (the owner of a local pub in Banti) know Mr. X who was often hanging around close to 515 Station in Banti.

2. Daud Tandirerung, Yonan Djikwa, and Kamame Mum (driver & passenger of TDS pick up) saw at the location of the incident 2 (two) soldiers without attributes shooting at them, these witnesses faced down instantaneously, switched the gear, accelerated the vehicle, and drove away.

3. Stephen Emma & Francene saw 5-6 young men near adulthood, arose on the side of a trailer, carried long barrel gun and ran into the bushes in front of the location of the incident.

4. Sandra Hopkins & Kenneth Balk saw (for a minute) a black male, with black shirt, striped pants, with pendant hair, who was looking out toward Tembagapura direction.

5. The second rank corporal Mr. Wayan shot Mr. X (tsk) from the top of the hill to the exact position of Mr. X (slanted 80° at down direction).

6. The second rank of corporal Mr. Melky was the first person who saw the dead body of Mr. X.

7. The second lieutenant infantry Mr. Yanto/Highest Rank of Private Mr. Sugi Private Second Class Mr. Slamet/Highest Rank of Private Mr. Margono/Private Second Class Mr. Suriyadi/Second Rank Corporal Mr. Putu Dharma & Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. Ketut, they were all the people who dragged the dead body approximately for 78 meters through rocks and sharp gravel to the side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura.

8. Dr. Kunto (the head of Tembagapura Hospital) was the first person that saw the larva or maggots in Mr. X intestines.

9. The Head of the Forensic Laboratory confirmed the findings of Dr. Kunto (Tembagapura Hospital).

10. Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman (his right thigh was shot).

11. Timika Military District Commander (the first person who called the Mimika Head of County Police at 12:45 EIT; Mr. X was shot + Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman was shot).

12. The trailer driver (Mastur) saw one shooter with pendant hair, black face, clean face without beard/moustache wearing striped shirt and pants without attributes, with a long barrel gun.

THE CASES OF AUGUST 31, 2002 UP TO SEPTEMBER 1, 2002 (TEMBAGAPURA)

A. Motive

1. To create a situation that makes people pay attention.

2. To create a feeling of insecurity for those who use the road between Timika and Tembagapura.

B. Modus Operandi

1. Brutal shooting with a fully automatic gun.

2. There is no specific target for the victim.

3. Shooting and placing expired explosives around Mile 62 and Mile 62.5 and Mile 63 with the position always on the right side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura direction.

C. Deception:

1. On August 31, 2002 after the event, Second Lieutenant Infantry Mr. Yanto was shot

with an empty bullet at Mile 62.5 (the evidence of the bullet shell was kept by Mimika County Police).

2. On September 1, 2002 the Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman was shot in his right thigh at Mile 62.5 (the exact location of the incident was not known yet).

3. The community around Freeport does not know Mr. X (they kept their mouths shut).

4. On September 13, 2002, the shooting at the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 63 (the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

5. On September 14, 2002 the vehicle of 515 Bama was shot, 2 from outside & 6 bullet holes from the inside of the vehicle itself at Mile 62 (the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

6. On September 14, 2002 the explosive was found, 3 (three) Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) detonators, 2 (two) ABC batteries and 3 (three) 20 meters detonator cables at Mile 62 (was crystallized & expired)(the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

7. On September 14, 2002 after the finding of the explosive, the 515 Vice Battalion Commander said, this event will acknowledge to The Territorial Military Commander and Head of the Provincial Police what is the true situation around here, so please do not always blame the Indonesian National Army Force.

8. In his statement, the Jakarta Territorial Military Commander said that this Tembagapura case may be caused by the PT Freeport Indonesia internal, and not by the people from the forest (the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

9. On September 14, 2002 the individuals at Mile 50 station were threatened by two phone calls stating that the station would be attacked. The person, making the threats, called from no. 358 (that was used by the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security station, The Head of the Section II 515 Task Force Security), where this number at that time was used by Cendrawasih Task Force, and from a cellular phone number 08124887486 that was owned by First Class Sergeant Mr. Jatmiko, the member of Army Special Force Command, Cendrawasih Task Force to 0901-422907 (the supporting document is the call list print out that can be used for evidence)(the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

10. On September 20, 2002, the Second Lieutenant Infantry Mr. Rahmat found the explosive at Mile 63, 2 Power Gel & 2 Cassuary bones (the attacker was still around the location of the incident).

11. The PT Freeport vehicles still existed and were based on the EPO consideration (EPO=Exploration Production Operation) they might be used without side numbers and with vague license plate numbers, those are:

a. DS 1154 PD, used by Intelligence Detachment First Lieutenant Mr. Hartono, this vehicle originally has the side number 01-2234.

b. DS 1149 MA, used by Special Army Force Command Captain Irwan, this vehicle originally has the side number 01-2229.

c. DS 20 PD, used by Special Army Force Command Mas Jen, this vehicle did not have side number and was not registered in the office of Timika.

d. DS 54 PD, used by Special Army Force Command and driven by the EPO employee Mr. Nathan and was not registered in the office of Timika.

e. DS 1330 FB, was under contract by EPO and in that time was used by the Special Army Force Command the First Lieutenant Mr. Lukito, and this vehicle originally has the side number 01-1432 with the newest (renewal) DS 1301 MA, but was not put on yet.

f. On September 29, 2002 The Head of Unit Traffic Mimika County Police had the pictures as proof of evidence for the above explanation from point (a) up to point (e).

D. The Alternative of the Existence Mr. X.

1. Mr. X came by himself with 2 (two) of his friends and they came to the position on the hill below the position of the Second Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan at the top of the hill. Wayan was planning to shoot the police on the road that will come at 8:00 in the morning together with the investigators team at the location of the incident. Then there was an approximate lapse of 3 hours and at 11:40 EIT Mr. X. was pronounced dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of Corporal Mr. Wayan. Those two friends of Mr. X. with black and red shirts ran away and carried Mr. X's weapon, they ran down through the steep gorge. After that, Mr. X dead body was brought down 8 m. and then dragged 78 m to the side of the road after Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic Reserve Command/Regiment Commander of Sorong/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police came to see and witnessed the dead body of Mr. X, then Mr. X dead body was brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the larva/maggots on the intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X).

2. Mr. X was shot to death in another location and then brought to the forest and placed on the hill below Wayan's position on the top of the hill, and then there was a lapse of approximately 3 hours, then at 11:40 Mr. X was pronounced dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of Corporal Mr. Wayan at the location of the incident on the back of the hill. Then the dead body of Mr. X was brought down 8 m. and then dragged 78 m to the side of the road after Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic Reserve Command/Head of the Directorate IPP came to see and witnessed the dead body of Mr. X, then

Mr. X's dead body was brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the larva/maggots on the intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X).

3. Mr. X was shot to death and then his dead body was delivered and placed on the side of the road in order to be seen and witnessed by Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic Reserve Command/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police, then Mr. X's dead body was brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by Dr. Kunto Rahardjo who saw the larva/maggots on the intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X.

E. Evaluation Analysis

1. First Alternative: Mr. X suffered from Testicle Hydrocele acute disease (the inflammation of both testicles for approximately more than 1 year and the diameter of the testicle approximately 17 cm.). With his health condition it is impossible for Mr. X to go up to the hill to the location of the incident. (Mr. X's physical/health and mental condition does not support the first alternative).

2. Second Alternative: It is impossible for the persons who create the scenario. Because it took too long of a time and it was too exhausting for them to go up to the hill and carry the dead body of Mr. X and then carry Mr. X back down to the side of the road in

order to be seen and witnessed by the Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police.

3. Third Alternative: It is the most possible scenario that has been proposed. Mr. X was shot to death before. Then Mr. X's dead body was brought and placed on the side of the road in order to "invite" the police investigator team to come and to investigate the location of the incident and at the same time to wait for the coming of the group that consisted of the Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police to witness that it is true that Mr. X was the attacker on August 31, 2002 and also the attacker on September 1, 2002.

4. Referring to the third alternative that it was the most possible scenario. In order to make the case more clear, 10 (ten) questions need to be asked:

- (1) Who is Mr. X?
- (2) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was picked up at?
- (3) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was shot before he was placed on the side of the road?
- (4) Who picked up Mr. X and who shot Mr. X?
- (5) Why did they create this kind of scenario for Mr. X?
- (6) Who are the parties that have worked together to develop this Mr. X scenario?
- (7) Is this Mr. X scenario known by the responsible security of PT. FI (OPS TEMBAGA-14)?
- (8) Who is the initiator (the first person) to create this plan or create this Mr. X scenario?
- (9) What kind of vehicle was used to pick up Mr. X and to drop Mr. X's dead body on the side of the road?
- (10) What is the background reason that had triggered the creation of this scenario for Mr. X?

F. Closing

This is all about the findings pertaining to Mr. X. It is supported by the data and the facts from:

1. The condition of Mr. X while he was still alive.
2. The condition of dead Mr. X at the location of the incident.
3. The condition of Mr. X when the autopsy was performed.
4. The condition of Mr. X after he was buried in the Timika public cemetery.

PAYING TRIBUTE TO JAMES HARLOW

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to James Harlow for his commitment to education and public service in his La Junta, Colorado, community. For nearly four decades, James has been teaching English at La Junta High School and, after a rewarding career, will be retiring next year. For his outstanding dedication and commitment to the youth of La Junta, I would like to thank James before this body of Congress and this nation today.

Those whose lives James have touched over the years know him to be a passionate, friendly, and fair teacher. His inspiration to become a teacher came from his own high school English teacher, and since graduating from Adams State College, he has taught and inspired countless youths in his own classroom. Since 1965, James has taught English classes at the high school, and since 1976, has coached the school's golf team.

Mr. Speaker, I am honored to bring the service of James Harlow to the attention of this body of Congress, and commend him for the manner in which he has served his La Junta, Colorado community. The dedication and enthusiasm he brings to teaching his students is admirable, and I would like to thank him for all he has done for La Junta, and wish him the best in his future endeavors.

PAYING TRIBUTE TO JOSIE LUJAN

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Josie Lujan for the remarkable work she has done over the years educating her students. Her career as an educator has been marked by high accolades, and her upcoming retirement from Monte Vista High School will most certainly bring more awards, as she has already received her school's Golden Apple Award this year. It is my privilege to pay tribute to Josie as she puts the finishing touches on an extraordinary career.

Lujan perhaps is best known for the 1978 Lujan Act, an act that bears her name in reference to the lawsuit in which she was named the lead plaintiff. The Lujan Act guaranteed equal educational funding from the State of Colorado for poor and rural schools, and her dedication in this cause earned her the Federico Pena Community Service Award in 1979.

Josie continued challenging long held inequities when she was appointed to a vacated seat on the previously all male Del Norte School Board, to which she was subsequently re-elected. Despite her many historical achievements, it is her work with her special education students at Monte Vista High School, beginning in 1979, which fills her with the most joy. Lujan has carried out the role of educating her students, not only in scholastic subjects, but also in life skills, with remarkable compassion and devotion. Although she is retiring, her work with special education students will continue through programs such as therapeutic riding.

Mr. Speaker, I am honored to pay tribute to the service of Josie Lujan before this body of Congress and this nation, and to congratulate her on an outstanding career. I would like to wish her the best in her retirement and sincerely thank her for her service.

HONORING JAM PRODUCTIONS, LTD.

HON. RAHM EMANUEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 16, 2004

Mr. EMANUEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to congratulate Jam Productions, Ltd. of Chicago after 33 years of excellence and dedication to their work in music promotions.

Jam Productions was co-founded in 1971 by Jerry Mickelson and Army Granat, and has since become one of the country's leading promoters of concerts and shows, including public concerts, theatrical performances and private and corporate events.

During this time, Jam Productions has made Chicago proud through its efforts working with organizations and businesses in the community. They have worked with top names in the music industry, like U2, Frank Sinatra and Paul McCartney.

They have produced meetings and events for Fortune 500 companies including Ameritech, Philip Morris Companies, Miller Brewing, Ford Motor Company and HBO Entertainment.

Jam has developed close relationships with their clients by working through the entire production process for each individual project. This determination has made them the preferred production house at both Soldier Field and the United Center in Chicago.

In addition, Jam Productions, Ltd. has been continuously involved with organizations and events such as the Illinois state Gubernatorial Inauguration, the Democratic National Convention, the Grand Opening of Chicago's Museum Campus, the Chicago's AIDS Foundation annual gala benefit, the 100th Anniversary of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Grand Opening of Chicago's Navy Pier.

The staff of Jam Productions is considered an expert at each process of design and logistics, pre-show planning and production. Their valuable experience working with audiences both large and small continues to be a model for both Chicago businesses and for the entertainment field.

Mr. Speaker, I join with the people of Chicago in congratulating Jam Productions, Inc. on their achievement, and wish them continued growth and accomplishment in the future.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3717, BROADCAST DECENTENCY ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2004

SPEECH OF

HON. RON PAUL

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 11, 2004

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3717) to increase the penalties for violations by television and radio broadcasters of the prohibitions against transmission of obscene, indecent, and profane language:

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, Americans are right to be outraged at much of the content of broadcast television and radio today. Too